Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,817 judgments in total.

• Walidad vs (Mst.) Tasneem Kausar Etc.K.L.R. 1999 Revenue Cases 29 · Lahore High Court · 1998-06-19Read full judgment →
• Wali-Ur-Rehman vs The StateK.L.R. 999 Shariat Cases 18 · Lahore High Court · 1998-04-22Read full judgment →
• Wali Shah vs The State1999 P Cr. L J 558 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-10-06Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad vs The State1999 P Cr. L J 1874 · Lahore High Court · 1998-12-23Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad vs Khan Gul And 54 Other1999 CLC 876 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1997-07-17Read full judgment →
• Wajid Hussain vs The State and another1999 YLR 1602 · Peshawar High Court · 1999-08-20Read full judgment →
• Wajid and another vs Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence1999 CLC 1833 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Wajahat Ikram and anothers vs The State1999 SCMR 1255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  attempted murderfirearm injuriescommon intentionenhancement of sentencehurtArsh and Damancriminal assaultSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the conviction of two first cousins for a murderous assault involving firearms. The core legal questions involved the interpretation and application of Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding simultaneous liability for attempt to commit Qatl-i-Amd (attempted murder) and resulting hurt, as well as the legality of sentencing and enhancement. The Supreme Court held that where hurt is caused during a murderous assault, the offender is liable both for the attempt to murder under the first part of Section 324 and additionally for the specific hurt caused under the relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, clarifying legislative intent and rectifying anomalies. The court dismissed the convicts' appeal, accepted the complainant's appeals for enhancement, restored and adjusted the sentences of imprisonment, and laid down principles concerning the cumulative applicability of attempt to murder and hurt provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person can be punished under both the first part of Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for an attempt to commit Qatl-i-Amd and under the subsequent part for the specific hurt caused?
  • Does the unamended Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 preclude the imposition of a sentence for attempt to murder when hurt has been successfully inflicted?
  • Can concurrent sentences of imprisonment be ordered for multiple distinct firearm injuries inflicted during the same criminal transaction under common intention?
  • Whether the non-recovery of a motorcycle used in a crime vitiates the otherwise established presence of an accused sharing a common intention?
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• Wahid Khan and others vs Abdul Majid Khan1999 YLR 2451 · Sindh High Court · 1999-05-31Read full judgment →
• Waheed Corporation vs Chairman C.D.a, Etc.1999 P.C.T.L.R. 178 · Lahore High Court · 1998-09-14Read full judgment →
• Waheed Corporation (Regd.) vs Capital Development Authority, Islamabad, through Its Chairman, EtcK.L.R. 1999 Civil Cases 531 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Wafi Associates Limited vs Tasneem Ismail and 5 other1999 YLR 2711 · Lahore High Court · 1999-05-11Read full judgment →
• W.Z. Ahmad vs Notified Officer, Settlement Department/ Additional1999 SCMR 1861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-22
  evacuee propertydemarcationsettlement departmenttransfer of propertyphysical possessionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the partition and demarcation of evacuee property bearing No. S-41-R-8 (Queens Road, Lahore). The core legal question revolves around whether the Notified Officer acted lawfully in partitioning the property among the primary transferees and recognizing the claims of occupants of servant quarters regarding excess area, and whether the division of the main bungalow between the competing claimants should be based on actual physical possession. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly remanded the matter for a fresh decision on physical possession and upheld the transfer of excess area (measuring 4 Kanals 19 Marlas) to the occupants of the servant quarters since the total area exceeded the 14 Kanals originally allotted. The key principle laid down is that settlement authorities, upon remand, must properly demarcate and divide evacuee properties in strict conformity with the parties' respective physical possessions and previous final adjudications under the relevant settlement laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether settlement authorities can transfer excess area of an evacuee property to occupants of servant quarters when the total property area exceeds the initially allotted entitlement?
  • Does a Notified Officer have the authority to divide an evacuee house between contesting transferees without considering their actual physical possessions?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in remanding a settlement matter for fresh demarcation based on physical possession of the constructed portions and lawns?
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• Vneshneeconomicheskoje Objedinenie Technopromexport, MoscowK.L.R. 1999 Civil Cases 276 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Vneshnee Conomicheskoje Objedinenuetechnopromexport, Moscow1999 CLC 331 · Lahore High Court · 1998-10-09Read full judgment →
• Vinder Textile Mills Ltd. vs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan1999 YLR 1188 · Sindh High Court · 1998-08-13Read full judgment →
• Vijay Kumar Saraf vs Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal1999 PTD 2131 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1995-10-19Read full judgment →
• Victory Corporation and others vs Emirates Bank1999 PLD Karachi 391 · Sindh High Court · 1999-08-24
  execution applicationlimitation periodbanking courtoriginal civil jurisdictionrecovery of loandecree execution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Section 21(1) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act 1997 was filed against an order of the Banking Court dismissing the appellants' application under Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1908. The appellants contended that the execution application filed by the respondent bank was time-barred under Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908, which prescribes a three-year limitation period. The respondent argued that Article 183 of the Limitation Act 1908 applied, providing a six-year period to enforce a decree of a High Court exercising its ordinary original jurisdiction. The High Court of Sindh held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 constitutes its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Consequently, the limitation period for executing such decrees is governed by Article 183 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the execution application was filed within the six-year limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 181 or Article 183 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to the execution of a decree passed by the High Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under banking recovery laws constitute 'ordinary original civil jurisdiction' for the purposes of Article 183 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • How does Section 22 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act 1997 affect the application of the Limitation Act 1908 to transferred and newly instituted proceedings?
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• Vector Joseph vs Muhammad Amin1999 CLC 1676 · Peshawar High Court · 1999-05-07Read full judgment →
• Vardhman Spinning and General Mills Ltd. vs Inspecting Assistant1999 PTD 3044 · Punjab and Haryana High CourtRead full judgment →
• V.D. Swami & Co. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1999 PTD 501 · Madras High Court · 1996-03-19Read full judgment →
• Uzair Ahmed Siddiqui vs The State And OtherK.L.R. 1999 Criminal Cases 619 · Sindh High Court · 1998-10-26Read full judgment →
• Usman Sarosh Alvi vs Additional District Judge, Lahore and 3 others1999 YLR 2676 · Lahore High Court · 1999-06-29Read full judgment →
• Usman Farauqui vs The State1999 P Cr. L J 1186 · Sindh High Court · 1998-10-23Read full judgment →
• Upasana Hospital and Nursing Home vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1999 PTD 3027 · Kerala High Court · 1997-06-10Read full judgment →
• Unsia Bano and 3 others vs Habib Ali1999 MLD 3370 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-14Read full judgment →
• University of the Punjab vs Muhammad Mubashar Mukarram SheikhK.L.R. 1999 Civil Cases 503 · Lahore High Court · 1998-06-15Read full judgment →
• University of the Punjab and others vs Dr. Aamar Mahmud Ijaz1999 SCMR 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-10-13
  examination malpracticelost answer bookaverage marksuniversity regulationseducational lawconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the loss of pages from an examination answer book. The respondent, a candidate for the M.S. Thoracic Surgery Examination, failed the examination after six pages of his answer book for the first paper were found missing. The University rejected his request for the award of average marks based on his performance in other papers. The Lahore High Court allowed the respondent's writ petition, directing the University to award him average marks and declare him successful. The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to the benefit of average marks under the relevant University regulations despite the loss of pages. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the first proviso to Regulation No. 6, framed under the University of the Punjab Act, 1973, explicitly mandates that if an answer book is lost before or after evaluation, the candidate is entitled to the average of marks obtained in other papers. The Court affirmed that the respondent's case fell squarely within this provision.

  Questions settled

  • Is a candidate entitled to the award of average marks if their answer book is lost before or after evaluation by the examiner?
  • Does the loss of pages from an answer book trigger the application of the first proviso to Regulation No. 6 of the University of the Punjab Act 1973?
  • Can a university deny the benefit of average marks to a candidate whose answer book was lost, if the candidate passed all other subjects?
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• University of Peshawar vs Malik Naaz1999 PLC (C.S.) 1088 · Peshawar High Court · 1999-04-14Read full judgment →
• Universal Plast Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax (1999 PTD 3817 · Supreme Court of India · 1999-03-23Read full judgment →
• United Steel Corporation, Moman Pura, Darughawala, G.T. Road, Lahore and 4 others vs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited1999 YLR 2071 · Lahore High Court · 1999-06-14
  leave to defendbanking recoverytriable issuesapprobate and reprobatebankers' books evidencepartnership liabilityfinance facility
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Banking Court's decree against the appellants for the recovery of finance facilities. The appellants challenged the dismissal of their application for leave to defend, arguing that the Banking Court failed to apply its mind and that the documents were forged or unauthorized. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellants raised valid triable issues warranting leave to defend and whether the definition of 'customer' under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, encompassed the appellants' situation. The Court held that the appellants failed to establish a plausible defense, as they had previously admitted their liabilities in writing and the documents were duly executed. The Court affirmed that the definition of 'customer' includes sureties and indemnifiers, and that partners are jointly and severally liable for firm debts. The ratio established that leave to defend must be refused if the defense is sham or illusory, but granted if substantial triable issues exist. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the Banking Court's decision to decree the suit based on the admitted financial facilities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'customer' under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 include a surety or indemnifier?
  • Under what circumstances should a Banking Court refuse an application for leave to defend a recovery suit?
  • Is a statement of accounts certified under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 admissible in a banking recovery suit?
  • Are partners of a firm jointly and independently responsible for the repayment of debts owed by the firm?
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• United Mercantile Co.(P.) Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax , .1999 PTD 482 · Kerala High Court · 1997-02-12Read full judgment →
• United Distributors (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Madina Traders1999 CLC 1567 · Lahore High Court · 1998-02-04Read full judgment →
• United Catalysts India Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax LT.1999 PTD 3316 · Kerala High Court · 1996-12-09Read full judgment →
• United Bank Ltd. vs Mrs. Alafia Hussain1999 YLR 508 · Sindh High Court · 1999-04-05Read full judgment →
• United Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Sarhad Ghee Mills Ltd. and 13 others1999 YLR 323 · Sindh High Court · 1998-09-02
  Letter of CreditEquitable mortgagePersonal guaranteeBanking lawMark-upSurety dischargeRecovery suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for recovery filed by United Bank Ltd. against a corporate debtor and its guarantors regarding import Letter of Credit facilities. The core legal questions involved the bank's entitlement to charge both mark-up and commission simultaneously, the validity of charging mark-up without explicit contractual agreement, and the enforceability of equitable mortgages and personal guarantees after the expiry of the original sanction advice. The Court held that the bank could not levy mark-up and commission simultaneously, particularly when the sanction advice did not provide for mark-up. Consequently, the claim for mark-up and additional commission was disallowed. Regarding securities, the Court ruled that the parties' conduct demonstrated an intention to continue the equitable mortgages and guarantees despite the expiry of formal sanction periods. The judgment establishes that a lender cannot take undue advantage of its position, and that a surety may validly waive protections under Section 133 of the Contract Act through specific contractual clauses. The suit was decreed for the principal amount with reduced mark-up, and the sale of mortgaged properties was ordered.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bank simultaneously charge both mark-up and commission on an import Letter of Credit facility?
  • Does the expiry of a sanction advice automatically discharge a surety from liability under a continuing guarantee?
  • Can the conduct of parties establish the continuation of an equitable mortgage despite the expiry of the formal sanction period?
  • Can a surety waive the statutory protection against discharge provided by Section 133 of the Contract Act 1872?
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• Zahid Ahmed vs A. Rasheed and 3 others1999 P Cr. L J 793 · Sindh High Court · 1998-08-31Read full judgment →
• United Bank Ltd. vs Chairman, Banking Tribunal-I And Others1999 P.C.T.L.R. 81 · Lahore High Court · 1998-02-11Read full judgment →
• United Bank Ltd. vs CH. Ghulam Hussain1999 P.C.T.L.R. 162 · Lahore High Court · 1997-07-03Read full judgment →
• United Bank Ltd. through attorney and 4 others vs Syed Mansoor Ahmad1999 MLD 2490 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-12-18Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs The Chairman, Banking Tribunali, Lahore and others1999 MLD 3267 · Lahore High Court · 1998-02-11Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs Shamim Ahmed Khan and 41 others1999 SCMR 894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-10-06
  Golden Handshake Schemecompulsory retirementservice tribunalcivil servantmaster and servantdownsizingleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves 42 petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which set aside the compulsory Golden Handshake Scheme introduced by United Bank Limited to downsize its staff and dispense with the respondents' services. The core legal question concerns the legality of applying the Golden Handshake Scheme compulsorily to bank employees without providing them options or hearings, following their status being deemed civil servants under Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Tribunal's judgment aligns with previously enunciated laws regarding master-servant relationships and corporate downsizing. As an interim relief, the Court directed the petitioner bank to either re-induct the respondents or pay them future monthly salaries pending the final disposal of the appeal, subject to the return of previously received scheme amounts by the respondents. The key principle revolves around the legality and procedural fairness of compulsory retrenchment schemes applied to employees deemed civil servants under statutory amendments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a banking company can compulsorily apply a Golden Handshake Scheme to its employees without giving them options?
  • Does the incorporation of Section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 change the applicability of master-servant principles to corporate employees?
  • Can an employer terminate the services of employees through reorganization and downsizing without adhering to principles of natural justice?
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• United Bank Limited vs Shamim Ahmad Khan and 41 others1999 PLC (C.S.) 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-10-06
  Golden Handshake Schemecompulsory retirementservice of Pakistancivil servantmaster and servantretrenchmentnatural justiceinterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns 42 petitions for leave to appeal filed by United Bank Limited against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had set aside the Bank's compulsory 'Golden Handshake Scheme,' which had resulted in the termination of the respondents' services, and ordered their reinstatement. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Bank's compulsory application of the Scheme to its employees, who were deemed civil servants under Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, was legally permissible, particularly regarding the principles of natural justice and Article 25 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the Tribunal's judgment aligned with established law. Pending the final disposal of the appeals, the Court granted interim relief, directing the Bank to either reinstate the respondents or pay them future monthly salaries, conditional upon the respondents returning the compensation amounts previously received under the Scheme. The Court emphasized the need to examine the legality of the compulsory nature of the retrenchment policy in light of the master-servant relationship and constitutional protections.

  Questions settled

  • Does the compulsory application of a Golden Handshake Scheme to employees deemed civil servants under Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Can a bank, as an employer, compulsorily terminate the services of employees under a reorganization scheme without providing an option to opt for the scheme?
  • Is the relationship between a bank and its employees governed by the master and servant doctrine even when those employees are deemed civil servants for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
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• United Bank Limited vs Mrs. Alafia Hussain1999 SCMR 1796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1999-03-04
  ejectmentpersonal bona fide requirementlandlord and tenantlease agreementburden of proofrent controllerrenewal clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that reversed a Rent Controller's order and allowed the respondent-landlord's application for ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from commercial premises. The core legal questions involved whether the landlord's claim of personal bona fide requirement was substantiated and whether a prior lease agreement containing a non-ejectment clause precluded the landlord from seeking eviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the landlord's evidence regarding personal need remained unshaken and consistent, thereby satisfying the burden of proof. The Court affirmed that the initial burden on a landlord to prove bona fide personal requirement is light, and once met, shifts to the tenant to disprove it. Furthermore, the Court held that a lease agreement cannot create a perpetual bar against statutory ejectment rights unless explicitly and validly structured to do so. Finding the lease in question had expired and was not renewed, the Court concluded the relationship was governed by statute, rendering the non-ejectment clause unenforceable. Leave to appeal was refused, though the tenant was granted one year to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • What is the extent of the burden of proof on a landlord seeking eviction on the grounds of personal bona fide requirement?
  • Can a landlord be barred from seeking ejectment on the ground of personal requirement due to a clause in an expired lease agreement?
  • Is a landlord required to disclose the specific nature of the business they intend to start in the premises to prove personal bona fide requirement?
  • Does a renewal clause in a lease agreement creating a lease in perpetuity without a specified period override the statutory right of a landlord to seek ejectment?
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• United Bank Limited vs Central Cotton Mills Ltd. and others1999 CLC 1374 · Sindh High Court · 1998-03-18
  recovery suitfinancing agreementmark-upforeign billsliquidated damagesbuy-back pricecushion period
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was instituted by United Bank Limited against Central Cotton Mills Ltd. and others for the recovery of outstanding dues under various financing agreements. The plaintiff claimed amounts based on foreign bills, mark-up on post-acceptance drafts (PADs), and arrears of Non-Interest Bearing Finance (NIDF) instalments, along with liquidated damages and post-contract mark-up. The defendants disputed the correctness of the claims. The High Court of Sindh examined the merits of each claim. It allowed the claim for the outstanding principal on the foreign bills but disallowed the mark-up on PADs due to the absence of a specific agreement authorizing such charges. The claim for NIDF instalments was also disallowed as it was barred under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, having been subject to a prior decree, and to prevent recovery exceeding the agreed buy-back price. Furthermore, the Court rejected claims for cushion period mark-up and liquidated damages, holding that under the Islamic banking system, mark-up is restricted to the contract period, and statutory post-suit mark-up under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances and Finances) Act 1997 sufficiently compensates for litigation delays. The suit was decreed only to the extent of the principal on the foreign bills with statutory mark-up.

  Questions settled

  • Can a financial institution charge mark-up on post-acceptance drafts in the absence of a specific agreement between the parties?
  • Does the recovery of instalments under a financing agreement violate Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if a prior suit has already been decreed for the entire buy-back price under the same agreement?
  • Is a financial institution entitled to claim mark-up for the cushion period and liquidated damages under the Islamic banking system when post-suit mark-up is governed by statutory provisions?
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• United Bank Limited through President vs Shahmim Ahmed Khan and 411999 PLD Supreme Court 990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1999-05-25
  Section 2-A Service Tribunals Actmaster and servantcompulsory retrenchment schemedeemed civil servantdownsizingjurisdiction of Service Tribunalreinstatementnon-statutory service rulesaudi alteram partem
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a decision of the Federal Service Tribunal which set aside the compulsory retrenchment and termination of service of 42 employees of United Bank Limited (UBL) and ordered their reinstatement. The main legal controversy centered on whether the insertion of Section 2-A into the Service Tribunals Act, 1973—which declared service under Federal-controlled corporations to be service of Pakistan and employees to be deemed civil servants for the purposes of the Act—conferred full statutory civil servant status upon bank employees and rendered the master-and-servant doctrine inapplicable. The Supreme Court held that Section 2-A was enacted for the limited purpose of providing an exclusive forum of appeal before the Service Tribunal and did not alter the non-statutory terms and conditions of service or transform bank employees into civil servants for other purposes. The Court further ruled that commercial entities under non-statutory rules retain the managerial discretion to reorganize operations and retrench staff for bona fide business considerations without issuing show-cause notices where no stigma attaches. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 convert employees of government-controlled corporations into civil servants for all purposes or only for the limited purpose of providing an appellate forum?
  • Does the insertion of Section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 alter or invalidate non-statutory service rules governing corporation employees?
  • Does a commercial enterprise or nationalized bank possess managerial discretion to retrench surplus staff as part of a bona fide reorganization to reduce continuous economic losses?
  • Is a prior show-cause notice or hearing required under natural justice principles before terminating an employee under a compulsory retrenchment scheme where the termination carries no stigma?
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• United Bank Limited and 5 others vs Raja Ghulam Hussain and 4 others1999 PLC 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-11-04
  malicious prosecutionwrongful dismissaldomestic inquiryreasonable and probable causeburden of proofcivil damages
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a former bank manager, sued the appellants for damages, alleging malicious prosecution and wrongful dismissal. The trial court and the High Court decreed the suit in his favor, awarding damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan set aside these judgments. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish the essential ingredients for malicious prosecution, specifically malice and the absence of reasonable and probable cause, as the bank had legitimate grounds to initiate proceedings regarding unexplained financial irregularities. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the domestic inquiry was conducted in accordance with the law, and the appellate courts erred by re-examining the merits of the inquiry rather than limiting their review to jurisdictional defects. The Court emphasized that a plaintiff must affirmatively prove malice and lack of probable cause to succeed in such claims. Consequently, the dismissal was upheld as lawful, and the claim for damages was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients a plaintiff must prove to succeed in a suit for malicious prosecution?
  • Can an appellate court re-examine the merits of a domestic inquiry in a civil suit for damages?
  • Does a discharge in a criminal case automatically establish that the prosecution was malicious or without probable cause?
  • Is a bank employer liable for damages if it dismisses an employee following an ex parte domestic inquiry where the employee failed to participate?
  Read full judgment →
• Union of India and others vs Ku. Vijaya Raje1999 PTD 2203 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1998-09-21Read full judgment →
• Unilever PLC., a British Company of Port Sunlight Wirral Merseyside, England vs R.B.Oil Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi1999 MLD 1447 · Sindh High Court · 1998-08-11
  trademark infringementpassing offinterim injunctiongoodwilldeception and confusionintellectual propertytrade dress
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff, Unilever PLC, filed a suit for permanent injunction, damages, and accounts against the defendant, R.B. Oil Industries, alleging trademark infringement and passing off regarding the defendant's use of the 'Lipton' brand for Banaspati oil. The core legal question was whether the defendant's use of the 'Lipton' trademark and packaging for a product not manufactured by the plaintiff constitutes actionable infringement or passing off, given the plaintiff's established global reputation in other food categories. The Court confirmed the interim injunction, restraining the defendant from using the 'Lipton' mark. The Court held that even if a plaintiff does not manufacture the specific product in question, the unauthorized use of a well-known trademark creates a significant likelihood of deception and confusion among consumers. The law protects intangible property rights and goodwill; thus, a trader cannot misappropriate a famous mark to benefit from another's reputation. The Court emphasized that protecting the public from deception is paramount, and the defendant's imitation of the plaintiff's distinctive get-up and mark constitutes an actionable wrong of passing off.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff maintain a passing-off action for a trademark if they do not manufacture the specific product the defendant is selling?
  • Does the unauthorized use of a well-known trademark constitute passing off even if the defendant's product is not in direct competition with the plaintiff's existing product line?
  • Is a prior user of a trademark entitled to protection against a subsequent user even if the specific goods are classified differently?
  • What are the essential requirements for granting a temporary injunction in a trademark infringement suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Umer Zaman vs The State and others1999 MLD 1921 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-04-13Read full judgment →
• Umer Hayat vs The State1999 MLD 349 · Lahore High Court · 1998-07-09Read full judgment →
• Umer Gul vs The State1999 P Cr. L J 285 · Lahore High Court · 1998-07-27Read full judgment →
• Umer Din vs The State1999 P Cr. L J 1339 · Lahore High Court · 1998-07-20Read full judgment →
• Umar Khatab alias Kaka and another vs The State1999 YLR 2517 · Lahore High Court · 1998-07-15Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat vs Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir1999 PLC (C.S.) 93 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1998-08-13
  regional quotarefugee quotaPublic Service Commissionmandatory provisionacquiescenceestoppel against lawcivil service recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing the appellant's writ petition, which challenged an advertisement by the Public Service Commission for two posts of Assistant Engineers (Mechanical) in the Public Works Department issued without specifying the mandatory regional quota, including the quota reserved for refugees settled in Pakistan. The High Court had held that the quota system was merely a rule of convenience rather than an enforceable right. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir reversed this view, holding that statutory provisions and executive notifications establishing regional quotas are mandatory. All government functionaries are strictly bound to obey them, rendering any recruitment process conducted in violation thereof illegal. The Court rejected objections of acquiescence and failure to challenge subsequent appointment orders, observing that when an initial foundational action is void, all subsequent superstructures fall automatically. Instead of ordering de novo recruitment, the Court directed the preparation of a fresh merit list based on regional quotas using the existing test and interview results.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the regional quota prescribed for civil service recruitment under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977 is mandatory or merely a directory rule of convenience?
  • Does a candidate's participation in an examination after diligently filing a writ petition and seeking stay against the selection process constitute acquiescence that bars constitutional relief?
  • Whether past failure to enforce a mandatory quota rule creates an estoppel against applying the quota system in subsequent recruitments?
  • Is it necessary for a petitioner to separately amend a writ petition to challenge subsequent appointments that are directly founded upon a basic action that is illegal and void ab initio?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat and 3 others vs The State1999 MLD 1263 · Sindh High Court · 1998-04-06Read full judgment →
• Umar Farooq and anothers vs Mst. Shagufta Nasreen and anothers1999 MLD 703 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-06-10Read full judgment →
• Umar Din And Other vs Shah Muhammad And OtherK.L.R. 1999 Revenue Cases 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-25
  pre-emptionpartial pre-emptionkhasra numberclerical errormutationjamabandi
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a pre-emption suit where the defendants objected that the suit suffered from partial pre-emption due to the omission of Khasra No. 1990-91/387, which was erroneously mentioned in the sale-mutation instead of Khasra No. 1990-91/337. The trial court decreed the suit, finding the discrepancy to be a clerical error and noting that the correct Khasra number was supported by the Jamabandi and RL-II entries. The lower appellate court reversed the decision, holding that the pre-emptor was bound by the description in the sale document. However, the High Court allowed the plaintiff's revision petition after the revenue authorities corrected the relevant mutation entry, holding that the doctrine of partial pre-emption does not apply to inadvertent clerical errors or bona fide omissions. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's view, ruling that the correction by the Revenue Authorities and the absence of the disputed Khasra on the ground negated any plea of partial pre-emption, and accordingly dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of partial pre-emption apply to inadvertent omissions and clerical errors in a sale mutation?
  • Can a pre-emption suit be defeated by a misdescription of a Khasra number that is later corrected by the Revenue Authorities?
  • Whether entries in the Jamabandi carry a presumption of correctness regarding the property owned and sold?
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• Ukash Ali vs The Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh and anothers1999 MLD 3425 · Sindh High Court · 1997-05-20Read full judgment →
• Uco Bank vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1999 PTD 3752 · Supreme Court of India · 1999-05-13
  sticky loansinterest suspense accountCBDT circularsmercantile system of accountingtaxable incomenotional incomestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the taxability of interest on 'sticky' loans—loans where recovery is doubtful—credited to a suspense account by banking and financial institutions. The core legal question was whether such interest, which is not brought to the profit and loss account, constitutes taxable income under the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) circulars providing for the exclusion of such interest from taxable income are binding on the Revenue. The Supreme Court held that the CBDT circulars, issued under Section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are binding on the Revenue. These circulars, designed to mitigate the rigour of the law and ensure uniform administration, are valid even if they deviate from a strict interpretation of the statute, provided they do not impose a higher burden on the taxpayer than the Act itself. Consequently, the Court ruled that interest on sticky loans, treated as notional income under recognized accounting practices and covered by valid CBDT circulars, is not taxable until actually realized.

  Questions settled

  • Are circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes under Section 119 of the Income-tax Act 1961 binding on the Revenue?
  • Can the Central Board of Direct Taxes issue circulars that mitigate the rigour of the law for the benefit of the assessee?
  • Is interest on 'sticky' loans credited to a suspense account taxable as income before it is actually realized?
  • Does a circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes have the power to override the provisions of the Income-tax Act 1961?
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• U. P. Cooperative Cane Union Federation Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1999 PTD 3730 · Supreme Court of India · 1997-01-30Read full judgment →
• Tuffail And Other vs The StateK.L.R. 1999 Shariat Cases 20 · Lahore High Court · 1998-04-16Read full judgment →
• Trustees of the Port of Karachi through Secretary vs Adamjee1999 MLD 3352 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-07Read full judgment →
• Tristar Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Messrs Trisa Bursten Tabrik A.G. and others1999 YLR 638 · Sindh High Court · 1999-03-10
  trademark infringementpassing offprior userinterim injunctionregistered trademarkterritoriality of trademarktrans-border reputation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 wherein the plaintiffs sought to restrain the defendants from infringing or passing off the plaintiffs' registered trademark 'TRISA' in Class 21. The core legal questions involved whether the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of infringement, whether the defendants qualified as prior users under section 25 of the Trademarks Act 1969 to defeat the registered proprietor's exclusive rights, and whether trans-border reputation could protect the defendants' unexpressed local presence. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiffs proved a valid registered trademark and exclusive rights under section 21 of the Trademarks Act 1969, whereas the defendants failed to establish extensive prior user or valid trans-border reputation within Pakistan to displace the registered proprietor. The court laid down the principle that trademark law is essentially territorial, requiring clear, extensive local user and advertising by a prior user to override a registered trademark, and that mere foreign registration or half-hearted attempts at market entry do not suffice to defeat a prima facie case for an interim injunction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of a trademark confer upon the proprietor the exclusive right to use the mark in relation to specified goods under the Trademarks Act 1969?
  • Can a defendant's claim of prior user under section 25 of the Trademarks Act 1969 displace the rights of a registered trademark proprietor without evidence of extensive and continuous local use?
  • Does mere registration of a trademark in foreign jurisdictions establish trans-border reputation within Pakistan under trademark law?
  • Is limitation in trademark infringement and passing off actions considered a mixed question of fact and law?
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• Tribhuvandas G. Patel vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1999 PTD 3252 · Supreme Court of India · 1996-02-14Read full judgment →
• Travel Agents Association of Pakistan through Convenor of Bondages1999 CLC 1962 · Sindh High Court · 1998-01-28Read full judgment →
• Travancore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1999 PTD 1252 · Supreme Court of India · 1997-12-17Read full judgment →
• Travancore Electro Chemical Industries Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1999 PTD 3040 · Kerala High Court · 1996-06-21Read full judgment →
• Travancore Chemical and Manufacturing Company Limited vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1999 PTD 1589 · Kerala High Court · 1996-09-17Read full judgment →
• Transocean Asia Ltd. vs Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan1999 MLD 1600 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-17Read full judgment →
• Track Knitwear vs Union Leasing Ltd.1999 YLR 1211 · Lahore High Court · 1998-09-22Read full judgment →
• Tomen Corporation And Another vs (M/s.) Mohib Textile Mills Ltd. And1999 P.C.T.L.R. 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Letter of CreditBank GuaranteeArbitration ActStay of SuitInternational TradeInjunctionForeign Assets
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute concerning a Letter of Credit (L.C.) established by the respondent for the import of machinery from the appellants. Following a disagreement over machinery quality, the respondent filed a civil suit for damages and sought to restrain L.C. payments. The trial court stayed the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940, and the High Court subsequently upheld this stay but conditioned the release of L.C. payments on the appellants furnishing a bank guarantee. The Supreme Court addressed the appellants' challenge to this condition. The Court held that while L.C. payments are generally unconditional, courts retain discretion to impose protective measures when the foreign beneficiary lacks assets within the jurisdiction to satisfy a potential future decree. Finding no prima facie evidence of fraud to justify an absolute injunction, the Court modified the High Court's order. It directed that a portion of the due and future instalments be retained in a Pakistani account to secure the respondent's potential claim, balancing the sanctity of international financial instruments with the necessity of protecting domestic interests.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court impose conditions on the payment of a Letter of Credit where the beneficiary lacks assets within the jurisdiction?
  • Does the absence of fraud or misrepresentation preclude a court from imposing protective conditions on the enforcement of a Letter of Credit?
  • Is a court empowered to order the retention of a portion of Letter of Credit proceeds in a local account to secure a potential future decree?
  Read full judgment →
• TM Muhammad vs The State1999 MLD 1376 · Lahore High Court · 1997-12-05Read full judgment →
• TM Khan and others vs The State1999 SCMR 2286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-12-28
  summoning of accusedColumn No. 2police investigationtrial court discretioncriminal revisioninvestigating officer opinion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a criminal revision petition filed by the petitioners. The petitioners, who were initially placed in Column No. 2 of the police challan (indicating they were found innocent by the investigating officer), were summoned by the Sessions Judge to stand trial based on the contents of the F.I.R. The core legal question was whether a trial court possesses the authority to summon accused persons placed in Column No. 2 of the challan without first recording evidence. The Supreme Court held that the trial court has plenary authority to summon such accused persons based on the material available, such as the F.I.R., as the opinion of the investigating officer is merely tentative and not binding on the court. The Court affirmed that it is not a legal requirement to record evidence before summoning an accused placed in Column No. 2. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the principle that the trial court retains discretion to summon accused persons based on the judicial assessment of the case material.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court have the authority to summon accused persons placed in Column No. 2 of the challan without first recording evidence?
  • Is the opinion of an investigating officer regarding the innocence of an accused binding upon the trial court?
  • Can a trial court summon an accused person based solely on the contents of the F.I.R. despite the police report suggesting innocence?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Uhammad Ibrahim1999 YLR 2360 · Balochistan High Court · 1999-08-16Read full judgment →
• The State vs Syed Tasawar Hussain Naqvi1999 P Cr. L J 625 · Lahore High Court · 1998-09-30Read full judgment →
• The State vs Syed Abdullah Shah and others1999 YLR 737 · Sindh High Court · 1999-03-19Read full judgment →
• The State vs Syed Abdullah Shah and 2 others1999 YLR 1133 · Sindh High Court · 1999-03-26Read full judgment →
• The State vs Station House Officer, Police Alpa, Multan and others1999 P Cr. L J 2015 · Lahore High Court · 1999-03-02Read full judgment →
• The State vs Sharif Khan1999 MLD 1612 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-06-03Read full judgment →
• The State vs Shameer and 3 others1999 YLR 1150 · Lahore High Court · 1998-10-20Read full judgment →
• The State vs Rahim Gul1999 P Cr. L J 1087 · Peshawar High Court · 1999-02-04
  appeal against acquittaldying declarationocular testimonyabscondencemotivecriminal revisionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the State challenges the acquittal of the respondent, Rahim Gul, for murder. The core legal question concerns whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse or manifestly wrong based on the evidence presented, specifically the dying declaration, motive, and the accused's abscondence. The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the acquittal. The Court held that the dying declaration was unreliable as it failed the test of being intrinsically true; it was materially inconsistent with the acquittal of the co-accused, Zafar Khan, and the physical distance between the parties rendered the alleged command implausible. Furthermore, the ocular testimony was rejected as unreliable, and the motive was not directly linked to the deceased. The Court reiterated that a dying declaration is a weak piece of evidence, not subject to cross-examination, and requires strict scrutiny. It emphasized that in an appeal against acquittal, interference is only warranted if the impugned judgment is perverse, illogical, or manifestly wrong, which was not established in this case.

  Questions settled

  • What are the tests for determining the genuineness of a dying declaration?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused person automatically establish guilt in the absence of other corroborative evidence?
  • Can a dying declaration be relied upon if it is inconsistent with the acquittal of a co-accused mentioned in the same declaration?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Nazir Ahmad and others1999 SCMR 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-11-30
  kidnapping for ransomacquittal appealcondonation of delayre-appraisal of evidencemisreading of evidencetestimony of abducteerecovery of ransom moneyperpetual warrants
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal was brought by the State against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh which had set aside the conviction and life imprisonment sentence awarded to the respondents by the Special Court-II (Suppression of Terrorist Activities) under Section 365-A/34 PPC for kidnapping a minor for ransom. During the Supreme Court proceedings, proceedings against one respondent abated due to his death, while appeals against three untraceable respondents were consigned to the record to be revived upon arrest under perpetual warrants. Regarding respondent Muhammad Asim, the Supreme Court re-appraised the evidence, emphasizing that the High Court had committed glaring misreadings of fact and law. The apex Court noted that the testimony of the abductee was reliable, unshaken, and corroborated by the recovery of Rs. 300,000 in ransom money at the instance of the respondent. The Court reiterated that an acquittal judgment can be set aside if it suffers from blatant misreading causing a grave miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the High Court’s acquittal of Muhammad Asim was reversed, his conviction under Section 365-A PPC was restored, and his sentence was reduced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment with fine. Delay in filing the appeal was condoned given the gravity of the offence and public interest.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court set aside an order of acquittal passed by the High Court?
  • Whether the testimony of an abductee, if natural and unshaken in cross-examination, is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 365-A PPC when corroborated by the recovery of ransom money?
  • Can delay in filing an acquittal appeal by the State be condoned in cases involving grave offences against society?
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• The State vs Muhammad Younis and another1999 YLR 715 · Lahore High Court · 1998-10-01Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Riaz and anothers1999 P Cr. L J 232 · Lahore High Court · 1998-06-10Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ms Benazir Bhutto and others1999 P Cr. L J 1133 · Sindh High Court · 1998-10-13Read full judgment →
• The State vs Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto1999 P Cr. L J 166 · Lahore High Court · 1998-10-30Read full judgment →
• The State vs Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto and anothers1999 PLD Lahore 535 · Lahore High Court · 1999-04-15Read full judgment →
• The State vs Mir Munawar Ali Talpur and 2 others1999 P Cr. L J 1603 · Sindh High Court · 1998-11-11Read full judgment →
• The State vs Intizar HussainK.L.R. 1999 Criminal Cases 65 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ghulam Mujtaba and anothers1999 MLD 426 · Lahore High Court · 1997-07-29Read full judgment →
• The State through M.I.T. vs Muhammad Ashraf1999 YLR 2488 · Sindh High Court · 1999-05-10Read full judgment →
• The State through M .1. T . vs Danish Ali Dewan and others1999 YLR 1445 · Sindh High Court · 1998-12-14Read full judgment →
• The State through Assistant Director (Legal)_Public Prosecutor of F.I.A., Hyderabad vs Leslie Fredricks1999 P Cr. L J 620 · Sindh High Court · 1998-09-28Read full judgment →
• The State through AdvocateGeneral, Sindh, Public Prosecutor, Sindh, Karachi vs Raza Muhammad and another1999 YLR 178 · Sindh High Court · 1999-03-09Read full judgment →
• The State through AdvocateGeneral, Sindh vs Farooq Jameel1999 MLD 2381 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-27Read full judgment →
• The State through Advocate-General, Sindh vs Badlo Gosh alias Galu1999 P Cr. L J 416 · Sindh High Court · 1998-01-13Read full judgment →
• The State through Advocate-General, Sindh vs Amir Bux and anothers1999 P Cr. L J 587 · Sindh High Court · 1998-09-22Read full judgment →
• The State through Advocate General Government of Sindh vs Asif AliK.L.R. 1999 Criminal Cases 370 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• The State through Additional AdvocateGeneral vs Gul Khan1999 YLR 2377 · Balochistan High Court · 1999-07-01Read full judgment →