Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Wang Lilly vs Ministry of Interior, Islamabad Through Secretary And 21997 MLD 1594 · Lahore High Court · 1996-09-29Read full judgment →
• Wan Abdullah And Another vs Government of Sindh And 3 Other1997 MLD 2581 · Sindh High Court · 1996-03-04Read full judgment →
• Walidad Alias Dadoo Maachi vs The State1997 MLD 1697 · Sindh High Court · 1996-07-11Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad And Another vs The State1997 MLD 1084 · Lahore High Court · 1995-04-03Read full judgment →
• Wali Dad vs Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (Private)1997 PLC 241 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-03-17Read full judgment →
• Waldies Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1997 PTD 1394 · Supreme Court of India · 1996-11-20Read full judgment →
• Wajid Shamsul Hasan vs The State1997 PLD Lahore 591 · Lahore High Court · 1997-03-13Read full judgment →
• Wahid Bux And Others vs Syed Ghulam Akbar Shah And Other1997 MLD 458 · Lahore High Court · 1996-09-17Read full judgment →
• Wahid Bukhsh And Others vs The State1997 SCMR 1424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-25
  criminal appealmurderrelated witnessesindependent corroborationrecovery of weaponsballistic expert reportsentence enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan, Quetta, which dismissed the appellants' appeal and upheld their convictions and sentences under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing the murder of two deceased persons. The core legal questions involved the credibility of related eye-witnesses without independent corroboration, the reliability of weapon recoveries supported by police officials despite being denied by public witnesses, and the legality of sentences awarded. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of related witnesses cannot be discarded merely due to their relationship unless they are shown to be inimically disposed toward the appellants, and that recovery evidence proved by police officials remains credible even if public recovery witnesses turn hostile. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eye-witnesses related to the deceased requires independent corroboration in the absence of enmity?
  • Does the denial of weapon recoveries by public recovery witnesses render the police testimony regarding recoveries unreliable?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with an inadequate sentence when neither the State nor the complainant has moved for its enhancement?
  Read full judgment →
• Wahid Bakhsh vs Abdul Qayum And Another1997 MLD 2945 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-05-13
  pre-emption suitZar-e-Soamdeposit of pre-emption moneyextension of timespecial lawN.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Actmandatory provision
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenge the orders of the District Judge, which dismissed the petitioners' pre-emption suits due to their failure to deposit one-third of the pre-emption money (Zar-e-Soam) within the time fixed by the trial court. The core legal questions were whether the trial court possessed the discretion to extend the time for such deposits under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987, whether Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 could override the Act, and the mandatory nature of Section 24(2) of the Act. The Court held that the trial court lacks the authority to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money once fixed. It determined that the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987 is a special law that prevails over the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Consequently, the Court ruled that the word "shall" in Section 24(2) is obligatory, and failure to comply with the deposit deadline necessitates the dismissal of the suit. The petitions were dismissed, affirming that pre-emption is a feeble right requiring strict adherence to statutory procedural requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Does the trial court have the power to extend the time for depositing the one-third pre-emption money under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987?
  • Does Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 override the provisions of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987 regarding the deposit of pre-emption money?
  • Is the requirement to deposit one-third of the pre-emption money within the fixed time under Section 24(2) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987 mandatory?
  Read full judgment →
• Veecumsees vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1997 PTD 264 · Supreme Court of India · 1996-04-26Read full judgment →
• Usman Ali vs Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs And Another1997 PLC (C.S.) 62 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-07-23Read full judgment →
• University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir through Chairman and 3 others1997 PLC (C.S.) 572 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1997-01-07Read full judgment →
• University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Through Chairman And 3 Other1997 PLC (C.S.) 572 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1997-01-07Read full judgment →
• United Sugar Mills Limited vs National Development Finance1997 MLD 3122 · Sindh High Court · 1996-08-29Read full judgment →
• United Insurance Company Ltd.And Another vs Messrs Mehlody199 7S C M R 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-14
  leave to appealinsurance policyfire lossdamagesexecution of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment and decree of the Peshawar High Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding Rs.3,09,927 as insurance claim for loss by fire and Rs.1,00,000 as damages for mental torture and inconvenience. The core legal questions involve whether the risk of fire was covered on the date of the incident and whether the lower courts were justified in decreeing the suit based on the evidence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, staying the execution of the damages portion unconditionally and staying the execution of the decretal loss amount subject to deposit with the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the risk of fire was covered on the day when the fire had taken place?
  • Whether the trial Court was justified to decree the suit of the respondents on the basis of the evidence brought on record?
  Read full judgment →
• United Distributors (Pvt.) Limited vs Mirza Trading Agency1997 MLD 2797 · Sindh High Court · 1995-05-25Read full judgment →
• United Business Lines, S.I.E. Gujranwala and anothers vs Government of Punjab through Secretary, Local Government, Lahore and 5 others1997 PLD Lahore 456 · Lahore High Court · 1997-04-21
  goods exit taxzila councildry port transitconstitutional petitionalternate remedystatutory interpretationtax evasioncustoms dry port sambrial
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of four writ petitions involving a common question of law regarding the levy of Goods Exit Tax by the Zila Council, Sialkot, on imported raw materials in transit from the Dry Port, Sambrial, to the petitioners' factories. The core legal question was when the 24-hour transit period under Rule 5(5) of the Punjab Zila Council (Goods Exit) Rules, 1990, commences for goods cleared from a dry port. The Lahore High Court held that the constitutional petitions were maintainable despite alternate statutory remedies, as the case involved resolving a novel question of law requiring statutory interpretation. The Court ruled that the 24-hour permissible transit period commences only when the consignments physically leave the Dry Port premises after delivery by the Port Authorities, and not when duties are deposited or when goods enter the district revenue limits. The key principle laid down is that goods in transit from a dry port are not liable to Goods Exit Tax if they clear the Zila Council limits within 24 hours of leaving the dry port, and that contractors lack the authority to detain goods or use force for tax recovery.

  Questions settled

  • Does the availability of an alternate statutory remedy of appeal and revision bar the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 when a difficult question of law requiring statutory interpretation is involved?
  • When does the 24-hour permissible period for goods in transit under Rule 5(5) of the Punjab Zila Council (Goods Exit) Rules, 1990, commence in respect of goods imported through a dry port?
  • Do the lessees, contractors, or their agents have the authority under the Punjab Local Government Act, 1996 and the rules framed thereunder to detain consignments or use force for the recovery of Goods Exit Tax?
  • Are goods imported from abroad and cleared through a Customs Dry Port subject to Goods Exit Tax while in transit across the limits of a Zila Council?
  Read full judgment →
• United Bank Ltd. vs S. Ferozuddin Bajwa And 4 Other1997 MLD 801 · Sindh High Court · 1996-08-19Read full judgment →
• United Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Essajee Ebrahimjee & Company And 3 Other1997 MLD 3127 · Sindh High Court · 1996-05-07Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others vs Ali Gul1997 PLC 577 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-08-27Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited, Karachi Through President And 3 Other vs Ali Gul1997 PLC 577 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-08-27Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs Messrs Azmat Textile Mills Limited And 8 Other1997 MLD 1033 · Sindh High Court · 1997-04-24Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs Hotel Metropole (Private) Limited And Another1997 MLD 3110 · Sindh High Court · 1996-06-20Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs Ghaffar Azim Khan1997 PLD Karachi 134 · Sindh High Court · 1995-09-13Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited Through Zonal Head And Another vs Sindh Labour1997 PLC 446 · Sindh High Court · 1997-03-12
  labour lawcasual workerwrongful terminationemployer definitionstanding ordersreinstatementagency authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the orders of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had ordered the reinstatement of several employees of the petitioner bank. The core legal question was whether the bank could disown the employment of workers as 'casual' on the grounds that the branch managers who hired them exceeded their authority, and whether the termination of these workers without written orders was lawful. The Court held that the bank's managers, being responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment, qualified as 'employers' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Consequently, the bank was bound by the managers' actions. The Court further held that the classification of workers is determined by the nature of the job, not the payment frequency, and that the term 'casual worker' is not recognized under the Ordinance. Because the bank failed to issue appointment letters or written termination notices as required by the Ordinance, the termination was illegal. The Court affirmed that general law principles regarding agency cannot displace the specific protections afforded to workers under special labour legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a branch manager of a bank qualify as an 'employer' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can an employer terminate a worker without a written order specifying reasons under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Is the classification of a worker as 'permanent' or 'casual' determined by the nature of the job or the frequency of wage payment?
  • Can a principal disown the employment of workers by an agent on the grounds that the agent exceeded their authority in the context of special labour laws?
  Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited Employees' Union Registered C.B.A. through its1997 PLC 181 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-07-18Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited Employees Union Registered C.B.A. Through Its1997 PLC 181 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-07-18Read full judgment →
• Union of India and another vs A. Sanyasi Rao and others1997 PTD 333 · Supreme Court of IndiaRead full judgment →
• Unilever PLC., a British Company of Port Sunlight Wirral Merseyside, England vs R.B.Oil Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi1997 MLD 1447 · Sindh High Court · 1997-08-11Read full judgment →
• Unclassified vs Malik Shamas Khan And Other1997 MLD 717 · Peshawar High Court · 1996-04-22Read full judgment →
• Umar Khan vs Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Collector And 3 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 746 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-04-04Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat vs The Manager, Rafhan Maizeproducts Company Ltd., Faisalabad1997 PLC 745 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-02-27Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat vs The Manager, Rafhan Maize Products Company Ltd., Faisalabad1997 PLC 743 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Umar Hayat And 3 Others vs The State1997 SCMR 1076 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-08
  murderocular evidenceinterested witnesspartisan witnesscorroborationmotiverecovery of weaponsacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and life imprisonment sentences of the appellants under Sections 302 and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.) for the murder of the deceased. The prosecution's case rested on the ocular accounts of two eye-witnesses who were closely related to each other and to the deceased. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the conviction could be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of interested and partisan witnesses. The Court observed that the eye-witnesses were closely related inter se and to the deceased, necessitating independent corroboration to ensure truthfulness. The Court found that the alleged motive was weak and contradicted by the first informant's own F.I.R., the torch used for identification at night was not produced before the police, and the recovered weapons (Sotas) were not blood-stained. Holding that the prosecution failed to provide sufficient corroborative evidence to connect the accused with the crime, the Court accepted the appeals, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of interested and partisan eye-witnesses who are closely related to the deceased can form the sole basis of conviction without independent corroboration?
  • What nature of corroborative evidence is required to satisfy the court when the majority of eye-witnesses are related inter se and to the deceased?
  • Can the recovery of weapons that are not stained with blood serve as sufficient corroboration to connect the accused with the commission of a murder?
  • Does a material contradiction between the first informant's statement in the F.I.R. and their subsequent deposition in court regarding the motive weaken the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Farooq Shah And Others vs Mst. Shagufta Nasreen And 4 Other1997 CLC 1846 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-06-09
  succession certificateappellate foruminferior courtlimitation actgood faithjurisdictiondistrict judge
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arose from an application for the issuance of a succession certificate filed by the widow and minor daughters of a deceased person before the Senior Civil Judge Abbottabad exercising powers of a Guardian Judge. The trial court partly granted relief, bringing legal heirs of a deceased respondent on record and addressing objections regarding omitted assets, while noting that disputes over other assets could be agitated through separate suits. The respondents initially appealed to the District Judge, who returned the memorandum of appeal holding that the appeal lay before the High Court. The appellants then approached the Peshawar High Court, seeking condonation of delay under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. The core legal question centered on the correct appellate forum for orders passed by a court inferior to the District Judge regarding succession certificates under the Succession Act, 1925. The Court held that section 388 of the Succession Act operates as an exception to section 384, meaning that appeals against orders of an inferior court specifically invested with jurisdiction lie to the District Judge and not the High Court. Consequently, the High Court directed that the appeal be presented before the District Judge for a decision on merits, while granting the benefit of good faith for the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct appellate forum against an order passed by a court inferior to the District Judge in proceedings for a succession certificate under the Succession Act, 1925?
  • Whether section 388 of the Succession Act, 1925 acts as an exception to section 384 regarding the forum of appeal?
  • Can time spent bona fide in pursuing an appeal before a wrong forum be excluded under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Draz vs The State1997 MLD 1583 · Lahore High Court · 1996-05-23Read full judgment →
• Umar Draz And Another vs The State1997 SCMR 885 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-26
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayhardened criminaltentative assessmentpresumption of innocencebail provisocriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the appellants, who were charged with murder and attempted murder. The appellants sought bail primarily on the ground of statutory delay in the conclusion of their trial. The core legal question was whether the facts and circumstances of the prosecution case, for which an accused is being tried, can be considered by the Court when determining if the accused falls under the category of a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' for the purposes of the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court, relying on the precedent established in 'Mounder v. State' (PLD 1990 SC 934), held that such facts can indeed be considered. The Court affirmed that the opinion formed under the fourth proviso is tentative and does not violate the presumption of innocence. Ultimately, the Court disposed of the appeal based on an undertaking by the Advocate-General, Punjab, that the trial would conclude within two months, granting the appellants liberty to re-apply for bail if the trial remained unfinished.

  Questions settled

  • Can the facts and circumstances of the prosecution case be considered when determining if an accused is a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' under the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the opinion formed by a court under the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a final determination of guilt?
  • Does the consideration of prosecution evidence for bail purposes violate the principle of presumption of innocence?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Din vs Akhtar Bano1997 CLC 864 · Lahore High Court · 1996-10-02Read full judgment →
• Umar Din And Others vs Abdul Ghafoor And Other1997 SCMR 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-11
  Settlement Lawsdisplaced personstransfer of propertyquasi-judicial dutyadministrative guidanceallotment of landleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of land under Settlement Laws. The petitioners, displaced persons, claimed entitlement to specific plots in Chak No. 127-G.B., Faisalabad, asserting they had occupied and constructed residential houses on the land since before 1955. Their applications for transfer were pending when the property was allotted to others as agricultural land and later as an industrial site ('Chakki'). The Deputy Settlement Commissioner, following a remand, sought guidance from the Board of Revenue rather than conducting an independent inquiry, leading to the rejection of the petitioners' claims on the basis that the property was unavailable for transfer. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' challenge, prompting this appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether the Settlement Authority failed to properly evaluate the validity of the transfer of the building site as an industry, whether the High Court misread the legal issues, and whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner improperly abdicated his quasi-judicial duty by seeking and relying upon administrative guidance from the Board of Revenue instead of deciding the matter independently.

  Questions settled

  • Can a quasi-judicial officer abdicate their duty to decide a case independently by seeking administrative guidance from a superior authority?
  • Does the existence of pending application forms for the transfer of a building site preclude the subsequent allotment of that same land to another party?
  • Is a transfer of land valid under Settlement Laws if the property was already occupied and constructed upon by displaced persons prior to the allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Asif Janjua vs University of Engineering and Technology1997 PLD Lahore 594 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-30Read full judgment →
• Um E Kalsoom vs Zahid Bashir And 6 Other1997 CLC 1774 · Lahore High Court · 1997-06-30Read full judgment →
• Udhamdas vs Dr. Muhammad Sharif1997 MLD 686 · Sindh High Court · 1996-09-04Read full judgment →
• U.B.L. Employees' Union vs Registrar of Trade Unions And Others1997 PLC 14 · Sindh High Court · 1996-08-26Read full judgment →
• Tubewell Employees' Union Through President, WAPDA Colony, Mandi1997 PLC 519 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-04-08Read full judgment →
• Trustees of the Port of Karachi Established under K.P.T. Act, 1886 And Another vs Pirdad And Another1997 PLC 634 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-08-25Read full judgment →
• Tristar Shipping Lines Limited vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary,1997 CLC 1475 · Lahore High Court · 1997-02-12
  blacklistingnatural justicespeaking orderconstitutional petitionpublic functionariesdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional petition filed by a shipping company registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, challenging an order of blacklisting passed against it by the authorities after a dispute arose regarding tenders for the shipment of wheat and the non-submission of a Performance Bond. The core legal question centered on whether a public functionary can blacklist a contractor without observing due process, providing valid reasons, and adhering to the principles of natural justice. The Lahore High Court held that blacklisting entails serious civil and financial consequences and cannot be resorted to arbitrarily or without giving valid reasons in a speaking order, as protected by Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Court laid down the principle that public authorities must provide reasons, consider replies and representations made by affected parties, and observe the principles of natural justice before taking adverse action.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public functionary pass an order blacklisting a contractor without assigning valid reasons?
  • Whether the principles of natural justice require public authorities to consider written representations before taking adverse action against a citizen?
  • Does an arbitrary blacklisting order violate the guarantees of due process and equal treatment under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Triple Em (Private) Limited Through Managing Director vs Deputy1997 SCMR 1093 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-14
  sales taxfake exemption notificationpenaltyinput tax adjustmentleave to appealconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition that assailed orders passed by Central Excise and Sales Tax Authorities. The petitioner-company stopped depositing sales tax on potato chips after receiving a copy of a notification purportedly exempting the product, which was later discovered to be a fake document supplied by consultants. The Deputy Collector demanded unpaid sales tax, additional tax, and surcharge, and imposed heavy penalties under sections 33 and 35 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. These orders were upheld in appeal and partially modified in revision by the Central Board of Revenue, and subsequently challenged before the High Court in a writ petition dismissed in limine. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine contentions regarding non-consideration of input tax adjustments, arithmetical errors in tax calculations, bona fide disputes over liability for other items, and discriminatory treatment, while granting interim relief subject to furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether penalties under sections 33 and 35 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 can be legally imposed when a taxpayer relies on a fake exemption notification provided by third-party consultants?
  • Does the failure of adjudicating authorities to consider claims regarding input sales tax adjustments and prior payments vitiate the tax assessment?
  • Whether an arithmetical or clerical error in calculating sales tax warrants interference by the court?
  • Whether differential treatment in waiving penalties for similarly placed taxpayers amounts to inequitable discrimination?
  Read full judgment →
• Triple Em (Private) Limited through . Managing Director, Lahore vs Deputy1997 PTD 641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-14
  sales taxforged notificationpenalty impositioninput tax adjustmentconstitutional petitionleave to appealtax evasionclerical error
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition against orders passed by Central Excise and Sales Tax authorities. The petitioner, a company producing snack foods, ceased paying sales tax after relying on a notification regarding exemption, which was later discovered to be a forged document. Consequently, the tax authorities issued a show-cause notice, leading to an adjudication demanding tax arrears and imposing heavy penalties under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The petitioner contends that it was a victim of fraud, disputes the applicability of penalties, and argues that the authorities failed to account for input tax adjustments, clerical errors in calculation, and discriminatory treatment compared to other similarly situated entities. The Supreme Court, finding that the contentions raised regarding the imposition of penalties, the failure to adjust input tax, and the alleged discrimination require deeper examination, granted leave to appeal. Pending final adjudication, the Court directed the petitioner to furnish security for the disputed amount to ensure recovery in the event of the appeal's dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a taxpayer be held liable for penalties under the Sales Tax Act 1990 when acting in good faith based on a forged exemption notification?
  • Are tax authorities required to account for input tax adjustments and clerical errors when calculating tax liability and penalties?
  • Does the imposition of penalties on a taxpayer who was a victim of fraud constitute a valid exercise of discretion under the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Is a taxpayer entitled to relief if they can demonstrate discriminatory treatment by tax authorities compared to similarly situated entities?
  Read full judgment →
• Wajid Shamasu Lhassan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad1997 PLD Lahore 617 · Lahore High Court · 1997-01-30
  Exit Control ListRight to travel abroadFundamental rightsPersonal libertyNatural justiceAudi alteram partemSpeaking orderJudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was instituted before the Lahore High Court challenging an executive order placing the petitioner on the Exit Control List (ECL) and the subsequent rejection of his review representation without assigning any reasons or granting a hearing. The core legal questions involved whether the right to travel abroad is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, whether executive authorities exercising statutory discretion under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 are mandated to give reasons and adhere to the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem), and whether the mere registration of a criminal FIR justifies restricting a citizen's travel abroad. The High Court allowed the petition, declaring both impugned orders to be arbitrary, mala fide, and without lawful authority. The Court ruled that the right to travel abroad is an integral aspect of personal liberty under Articles 2A, 4, 9, 15, and 25 of the Constitution. Administrative authorities must record reasons via speaking orders and provide an opportunity of hearing, and post-order registration of an FIR or mere criminal allegations cannot serve as valid grounds to deprive a citizen of liberty.

  Questions settled

  • Is the right to travel abroad a fundamental right protected under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the Federal Government place a citizen on the Exit Control List without assigning reasons or issuing a speaking order?
  • Does an administrative authority's failure to provide an opportunity of hearing before or during the review of an exit prohibition violate the principles of natural justice and render the order void?
  • Can the mere registration of a criminal FIR serve as a lawful justification for placing a citizen's name on the Exit Control List?
  Read full judgment →
• Trinity Private School And Another vs Mumtaz H. Hidayatullah And Other1997 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-17
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantpersonal usesixty years of agesummary procedurevested rightsretrospective operationSind Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment allowing an ejectment application filed by the respondent landlords under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The dispute arose over a building rented to the appellants, with the landlords seeking eviction on the ground that they had attained the age of sixty years and bona fide required the premises for personal use. The core legal questions revolved around the retrospectivity of section 14, the scope of the amendments introduced by Ordinance XII of 1980, the existence of any vested rights in favour of the tenants upon the deletion of the original proviso, and whether monthly acceptance of rent creates a new tenancy. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 14 applies to landlords who attained the age of sixty years before the promulgation of the Ordinance, that the amendment by Ordinance XII of 1980 removed the time limit without creating vested rights for tenants to resist eviction, and that the monthly acceptance of rent does not constitute a new tenancy. The key principle laid down is that the special summary remedy under section 14 is a prospective procedural provision meant to facilitate specified classes of landlords without arbitrary time limitations unless expressly provided by statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deletion of the original proviso to section 14(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, by Ordinance XII of 1980 create a vested right in favour of a tenant?
  • Can a landlord who attained the age of sixty years prior to the promulgation of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, invoke the summary ejectment procedure under section 14?
  • Does the monthly acceptance of rent by a landlord create a new tenancy that would debar the invocation of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is there any period of limitation prescribed under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, for filing an ejectment application after attaining the age of sixty years?
  Read full judgment →
• TM Muhammad and anothers vs The Assistant Commissioner/ Sub-1997 P Cr. L J 874 · Lahore High Court · 1996-12-10Read full judgment →
• Tilla Muhammad vs Muhammad Jan And Other1997 MLD 2363 · Peshawar High Court · 1996-02-18Read full judgment →
• Third Income-Tax Officer and another vs Arunagiri Chettiar1997 PTD 544 · Supreme Court of India · 1996-05-07Read full judgment →
• The Technicians vs Messrs Rahat Builders1997 MLD 3049 · Sindh High Court · 1997-06-12Read full judgment →
• The State vs Wazir Khan and anothers1997 P Cr. L J 1673 · Balochistan High Court · 1997-05-13Read full judgment →
• The State vs Syed Abdullah Shah and anothers1997 PLD Karachi 519 · Sindh High Court · 1997-05-22Read full judgment →
• The State vs Shafi M. Sehwani and anothers1997 PLD Lahore 563 · Lahore High Court · 1997-04-22
  Ehtesab Ordinancecorruption and corrupt practicespublic office holderundue pecuniary advantageCDA plot allotmentregularization of illegal constructionmisleading noteloss to State exchequer
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from a trial entrusted to the High Court Bench under Section 14 of the Ehtesab Ordinance 1996, in which a former Member Planning/Chairman of the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and a private allottee were accused of committing corruption and corrupt practices under Section 3(1)(d), punishable under Section 4 of the Ehtesab Ordinance 1997. The case centered on allegations that the former CDA official recorded misleading notes and illegally recommended the restoration of a cancelled plot and regularization of unauthorized commercial constructions at a nominal rate of Rs. 100 per sq. yard instead of the prevalent market rate of Rs. 1,000 per sq. yard, causing a loss of over Rs. 1.87 million to the State exchequer. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that both accused acted in concert through corrupt, dishonest, and illegal means to confer undue pecuniary advantage. The Court convicted both accused under Section 4 of the Ehtesab Ordinance 1997, sentencing them to five years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000,000 each.

  Questions settled

  • Does obtaining an undue pecuniary benefit by misleading a senior authority constitute an offence of corruption under Section 3(1)(d) of the Ehtesab Ordinance 1997?
  • Is a private citizen who aids or secures an illegal pecuniary advantage from a public office holder equally liable for punishment under the Ehtesab Ordinance 1997?
  • Does the repeal and re-enactment of an Ordinance invalidate ongoing criminal proceedings where saved by Section 24 of the General Clauses Act 1897?
  • Can a superior officer plead as a defense to a corruption charge that he was merely misled by his subordinate?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Pirak1997 P Cr. L J 1900 · Balochistan High Court · 1997-05-29
  appellate jurisdictionFederal Shariat CourtHudood Ordinancesame transactionmurder referencecriminal appealjurisdictional competence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a conviction and death sentence passed by an Additional Sessions Judge under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 17, Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The core legal question was whether the High Court or the Federal Shariat Court possessed the requisite appellate jurisdiction, given that the trial involved offences under the Hudood Ordinance. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. It determined that when an offence under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 is charged and tried by a Court of Session, the appellate jurisdiction vests exclusively in the Federal Shariat Court, irrespective of whether the final conviction was recorded under the Ordinance or the Pakistan Penal Code, provided the offences were committed in the same transaction. The Court established that the appellate forum is determined by the nature of the trial order rather than the specific section of conviction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable, and the murder reference was directed to the Federal Shariat Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appellate jurisdiction for a trial involving offences under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 lie with the High Court or the Federal Shariat Court?
  • Does an acquittal under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 divest the Federal Shariat Court of its appellate jurisdiction if the trial was conducted under that Ordinance?
  • What criteria determine whether multiple offences form the same transaction for the purpose of joint trial and appellate jurisdiction?
  • Can a High Court hear an appeal against a conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code if the accused was also charged under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 in the same trial?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Mushk-E-Alam1997 P Cr. L J 1082 · Federal Shariat Court · 1997-03-03Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Shafi1997 P Cr. L J 1659 · Federal Shariat Court · 1997-04-30Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Hashim Sher1997 P Cr. L J 1181 · Sindh High Court · 1997-04-23Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Hasham Babar1997 PLD Lahore 605 · Lahore High Court · 1997-05-07
  Ehtesab Ordinancepost-arrest bailcash securitywhite-collar crimeinherent jurisdictionbail conditionsspecial law
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Miscellaneous application, filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, sought a variation of bail conditions imposed by the Lahore High Court in references under the Ehtesab Ordinance No. XX of 1997. The applicant challenged the Court's authority to require cash security as a condition for post-arrest bail, arguing that the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 generally mandates bonds with sureties rather than cash deposits. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses the jurisdiction to impose cash security requirements under the Ehtesab Ordinance. The Court held that it possesses such authority. It reasoned that the Ehtesab Ordinance is a special law designed to eradicate corruption, and the Court is not strictly bound by the procedural limitations of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding security forms. Consequently, the Court affirmed its inherent power to evolve appropriate security procedures, including cash deposits, to ensure the objectives of the accountability legislation are met. The application for variation was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the authority to require cash security as a condition for bail under the Ehtesab Ordinance No. XX of 1997?
  • Are the procedural limitations regarding security forms in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to proceedings under the Ehtesab Ordinance No. XX of 1997?
  • Does the Court have inherent power to evolve its own procedures for security when dealing with special legislative measures like the Ehtesab Ordinance No. XX of 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Hanif1997 MLD 1507 · Lahore High Court · 1996-05-29Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Abid and 4 others1997 PLD Lahore 144 · Lahore High Court · 1996-12-08Read full judgment →
• The State vs Mazhar Hussain And Another1997 MLD 1422 · Federal Shariat Court · 1996-11-07Read full judgment →
• The State vs Hadan And Another1997 MLD 1146 · Northern Areas Chief Court · 1996-05-22Read full judgment →
• The State vs Asif Adil And Other1997 SCMR 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-20
  short ordersabsence of detailed reasonsfunctus officioact of courtvalidity of judgmentdemise or retirement of judgeoperative effect of ordercriminal procedure code
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal petitions for leave to appeal were filed by the State against an order of the High Court of Sindh, which treated earlier short orders of acquittal and allowance of convicts' appeals as final orders without detailed reasons having been recorded. The core legal question was whether signed short orders passed and pronounced by a Division Bench remain legally operative and final when one Judge ceases to hold office prior to the recording of detailed reasons and the remaining Judge retires without providing them. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that signed short orders pronounced in open Court are fully operative in law and constitute final orders disposing of the matters. The Court emphasized the established legal maxim that no suitor or party shall be made to suffer on account of an act or omission of the Court or State functionaries. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether signed short orders pronounced in open Court are legally operative and final when detailed reasons are not subsequently recorded due to a judge ceasing to hold office?
  • Do the provisions of Sections 366 and 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 strictly apply to judgments delivered by the High Court?
  • Can a party to a case be penalized or made to suffer due to an omission or act of the Court or State functionaries?
  Read full judgment →
• The State Through Khushi Muhammad vs Roshan Din1997 MLD 2566 · Board of Revenue · 1994-08-04Read full judgment →
• The State through Advocate-General, Government of Sindh vs Asif Ali1997 P Cr. L J 1953 · Sindh High Court · 1997-05-12Read full judgment →
• The State Through A.G., Sindh vs Shankar1997 SCMR 1000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-17
  leave to appealacquittalopiumnarcotics recoverySection 103 CrPCsearch of premisesindependent witnessesProhibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  The State filed a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Shariat Court acquitting the respondent of charges under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The prosecution alleged that 250 grams of opium were recovered from the respondent's pocket and 5 kilograms were seized from a brief-case hidden under animal dung inside a house during a raid. The Federal Shariat Court acquitted the respondent due to non-compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Article 22 of the Order, as independent local witnesses were not associated in the search. The Supreme Court considered whether Section 103 applies to house searches in narcotics cases and whether the failure to associate local witnesses without a plausible explanation invalidates the search. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that Section 103 applies to house searches conducted by police, and in the absence of a cogent explanation for non-compliance, the legality of the search and recovery remains suspicious. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to house searches conducted under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979?
  • What is the legal effect of failing to associate independent local witnesses in a house search without providing a plausible explanation?
  • Does a recovery made pursuant to a search of premises require compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the accused was not in custody?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Through Secretary, Health1997 SCMR 1552 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-05
  civil servicetermination of servicetemporary employeeprobationermisconductregular inquirydepartmental inquiryreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which set aside the termination of the respondent's services as a Stenographer and ordered his reinstatement with back benefits. The respondent, initially hired on a contract basis, had his services regularized retrospectively as a temporary civil servant. His services were subsequently terminated under Section 10 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, following show-cause notices alleging misconduct, including defiance of superiors, rudeness, and concealing dual employment, which the respondent denied. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the government's appeal, holding that there is a clear distinction between a simpliciter termination in accordance with service terms and a termination based on misconduct. The Court laid down the principle that if a temporary employee, probationer, or contract worker is to be terminated on grounds of misconduct involving factual disputes, they are entitled to a fair opportunity to clear their position through a regular departmental inquiry under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, and a summary termination without such an inquiry is unsustainable in law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the services of a temporary civil servant or probationer can be terminated on the ground of misconduct without holding a regular departmental inquiry?
  • What is the legal distinction between a simpliciter termination of a temporary employee and a termination on the ground of misconduct?
  • Can a summary inquiry dispense with a regular inquiry if the nature of the alleged misconduct requires the resolution of factual controversies?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary, Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Health1997 PLC (C.S.) 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-05
  civil servanttermination of servicemisconductregular inquiryprobationernatural justicedisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the termination of a civil servant's employment. The respondent, a Stenographer, had his services terminated by the Project Director of the Pediatric Hospital/Institute on grounds of unsatisfactory performance and alleged misconduct, including defiance of orders and rudeness, without a formal inquiry. The core legal question was whether the services of a temporary employee could be terminated summarily for alleged misconduct without conducting a regular departmental inquiry. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while a temporary employee's services can be terminated in accordance with the terms of their contract for unsatisfactory performance, a distinction exists when termination is based on allegations of misconduct. In cases involving specific charges of misconduct that require factual determination, the employer cannot bypass a regular departmental inquiry. The Court affirmed that such summary termination, which carries a stigma, violates the principles of natural justice and legal requirements for disciplinary proceedings. Consequently, the Court upheld the Service Tribunal's decision to set aside the termination order and reinstate the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Can the services of a temporary civil servant be terminated for misconduct without a regular departmental inquiry?
  • Is there a legal distinction between terminating a probationer for unsatisfactory performance versus terminating them for misconduct?
  • Does a termination order based on allegations of misconduct constitute a stigma requiring a formal inquiry?
  • When is a regular departmental inquiry mandatory for the dismissal of a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary, Government of the Punjab Through Secretary, Health1997 PLC (C. S.) 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-05
  termination of servicemisconductregular inquiryprobationertemporary employeecivil servantservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Government of the Punjab challenges the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which allowed the respondent employee's appeal against the termination of his services as a Stenographer and ordered his reinstatement with back benefits. The core legal question was whether the services of a temporary employee or probationer could be terminated summarily under section 10 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 without holding a regular inquiry when the termination was actually grounded on allegations of misconduct. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while simpliciter termination of a temporary employee or probationer in accordance with the terms of appointment is permissible, terminating services on grounds of misconduct requires a fair opportunity and a regular departmental inquiry. The Court laid down the principle that where charges involve factual controversies such as misconduct, a regular inquiry cannot be dispensed with, and summary termination carrying a stigma of misconduct is unsustainable in law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the services of a temporary employee or probationer can be terminated on grounds of misconduct without holding a regular departmental inquiry?
  • Is there a distinction between simpliciter termination of service in accordance with appointment terms and termination on the ground of misconduct?
  • Does a civil servant facing allegations of misconduct requiring factual determination have the right to a regular inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• The Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab And 2 Others vs Naseer1997 SCMR 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-05
  Cooperative SocietiesExecutive AuthorityCabinet DecisionConstitutional InterpretationMartial Law OrderLeave to AppealStatus Quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court directing the Government of the Punjab to revive the Model Town Cooperative Society pursuant to an alleged Government decision dated 22nd August 1985, and challenging a subsequent order rescinding the same. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether an undated Cabinet decision or discussion constitutes a formal executive decision or order of the Provincial Government under the Constitution, particularly in the absence of any notification issued in the name of the Governor. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the interpretation of constitutional provisions regarding the exercise and expression of executive authority, specifically whether the Cabinet's agreement in principle amounts to an operative Government decision for reviving the Society under Martial Law Order No. 856. The Court held that an unauthenticated Cabinet noting without formal executive orders issued in accordance with the constitutional requirements does not suffice as a final executive decision, and directed that status quo be maintained pending the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Cabinet decision can be treated as an executive decision of the Provincial Government without being expressed and authenticated in the name of the Governor under the Constitution?
  • Does an agreement in principle by the Cabinet to revive a superseded society constitute a binding legal order?
  • Whether the provisions of Articles 129 and 139 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 require executive actions to be formally expressed and authenticated through prescribed rules?
  Read full judgment →
• The Pakistan WAPDA Foundation Through Secretary vs Muhammad Alam1997 PLC 185 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-10-27Read full judgment →
• The Operational Head Bulk Water Supply Department, Pakistan Steel, Karachi And Another vs Muhammad Qasim And Another1997 PLC 633 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-08-06Read full judgment →
• The Lahore Textile and General Mills Ltd., Lahore And Others vs The Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary Ministry Of Finance, Islamabad And Other1997 SCMR 894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• The I.T.O., Circule-05, Zone-B, Lahore vs (M/s.) Orient Carpet & Gift1997 P.C.T.L.R 208 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1996-04-24Read full judgment →
• The Executive Engineer, Ghotki Tubewell Division, Ghotki vs Asghar1997 PLC 637 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-09-10Read full judgment →
• The Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways at Sukkur, Sindh vs Wahid Bux1997 PLC 348 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-05-13Read full judgment →
• The Director Accounts, WAPDA, Lahore and 4 others vs Member-I, National Industrial Relations Commission, Lahore and another1997 PLC (C.S.) 189 · Lahore High Court · 1996-06-25
  WAPDA employeescivil servant statusNational Industrial Relations CommissionFederal Service Tribunaljurisdiction barterms and conditions of serviceouster of jurisdictionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  Constitutional petitions were filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and its officers under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging various final and interim orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) and its Member under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969. These impugned orders related to the dismissal, removal, suspension, reversion, termination, and emoluments of WAPDA employees. The central legal issue was whether the NIRC possessed jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate grievances relating to the terms and conditions of service of WAPDA employees, or whether such matters fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal. The High Court held that by virtue of Section 17(1-B) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958, WAPDA employees are deemed to be civil servants for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act 1973. Pursuant to Article 212 of the Constitution, Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973, and Section 17(1-C) of the Act of 1958, the jurisdiction of all other courts, tribunals, and commissions, including the NIRC, is completely barred in matters concerning the terms and conditions of service. Consequently, the High Court accepted the writ petitions and declared all impugned NIRC orders to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of WAPDA are deemed to be civil servants for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have jurisdiction to entertain petitions concerning the terms and conditions of service of WAPDA employees?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 bar the jurisdiction of other courts and tribunals where an appeal lies to the Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Whether departmental orders regarding removal, dismissal, suspension, reversion, and payment of emoluments of WAPDA employees fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• The Director Accounts, WAPDA, Lahore And 4 Other vs Member-I, National Industrial Relations Commission, Lahore And Another1997 PLC (C. S.) 189 · Lahore High Court · 1996-06-25Read full judgment →
• The Commandant, 502, Eme Central Workshop, Rawalpindi And Others1997 SCMR 1471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-27
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsFederal Service Tribunalquantum of punishmentappellate jurisdictiongovernment servantmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Commandant, 502, E.M.E. Central Workshop, Rawalpindi, challenging a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had partially allowed an appeal by a respondent employee, converting his penalty of removal from service to a reduction to three lower stages in his pay scale for three years. The respondent had been removed from service following an incident where he physically assaulted his Head Clerk. The core legal question was whether the Federal Service Tribunal was justified in modifying the penalty imposed by the departmental authorities. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal acted within its appellate jurisdiction. The Court found that the Tribunal provided sound reasoning for the leniency, noting the incident was a sudden quarrel, the parties had compromised, and the respondent had seven years of service, making the original removal harsh. The Court affirmed the principle that the Service Tribunal possesses the competence to modify or reduce penalties imposed by departmental authorities, provided the substituted penalty remains within the framework of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to modify or reduce a penalty imposed by departmental authorities in disciplinary proceedings?
  • Is the reduction of a penalty by the Federal Service Tribunal legally permissible if the substituted penalty is one of the major penalties provided under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commandant, 502, E.M.E. Central Workshop, Rawalpindi and others1997 PLC (C.S.) 449 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-27
  service tribunalreduction in penaltyremoval from servicedepartmental enquirygrave indisciplineappellate jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which partly allowed an employee's appeal by converting the penalty of removal from service into reduction to three lower stages in his time scale for three years without cumulative effect. The respondent employee had been removed from service after an enquiry found him guilty of quarreling with and physically assaulting his Head Clerk. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in reducing the major penalty of removal from service to a lesser major penalty in the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal's order was just, fair, and free from legal or jurisdictional error, noting that the Tribunal had validly considered mitigating factors such as the suddenness of the quarrel, a subsequent compromise between the parties, the employee's clean future assurance, and his seven years of service. The key principle laid down is that the Service Tribunal is fully competent in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to review and modify departmental penalties by substituting them with lesser major penalties provided under the relevant rules where mitigating circumstances exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is competent to modify and reduce a penalty awarded by departmental authorities in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction?
  • Does reduction to lower stages in time scale constitute a major penalty under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  • Can mitigating circumstances such as a sudden quarrel and subsequent compromise justify the reduction of a penalty for grave indiscipline?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commandant, 502, E.M.E. Central Workshop, Rawalpindi And Other vs No.M.E-19862 LDC Ayub Hussain1997 PLC (C.S.) 449 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-27
  service appealdepartmental inquirypenalty modificationFederal Service Tribunalmisconductdisciplinary proceedingsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Commandant, 502, E.M.E. Central Workshop, Rawalpindi, challenging a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondent, an L.D.C., had been removed from service following an enquiry into an incident where he physically assaulted his Head Clerk. The Federal Service Tribunal, while acknowledging the misconduct, had modified the penalty from removal from service to reduction to three lower stages in his pay scale for three years. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in modifying the departmental penalty. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the Tribunal had provided sound reasoning for the leniency, specifically noting that the incident was a sudden quarrel, the parties had compromised, and the respondent had seven years of prior service. The Court held that the Tribunal possesses the appellate jurisdiction to modify and reduce penalties imposed by departmental authorities, provided the substituted penalty remains within the scope of permissible punishments under the relevant disciplinary rules. The petition was dismissed as the order suffered from no legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to modify a penalty imposed by departmental authorities in service matters?
  • Is the reduction of a penalty by the Federal Service Tribunal legally permissible if the substituted penalty is provided for in the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab the Chief Administrator of _858ab9751997 SCMR 1203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-03
  Waqf propertyAuqafalienation of trust propertyburden of prooflimitationcondonation of delayWaqif powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the status of properties taken over by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf under the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance. The core legal questions involved the validity of the alienation of Waqf properties by the Waqif after the dedication and the burden of proof regarding whether such alienations were beneficial to the trust. The High Court had previously held that the Waqif possessed the power to sell the properties if beneficial, placing the burden on the Auqaf Department to prove otherwise, which it failed to do. The Supreme Court dismissed one petition filed by Mst. Nawab Bibi as time-barred, rejecting the plea that misinformation by counsel constitutes a valid ground for condonation of delay. Regarding the remaining petitions, the Court granted leave to appeal, noting the contention that once a Waqf is created and dedication is complete, the Waqif cannot alienate the property unless it advances the purposes of the trust, and the burden of proving such necessity lies on the alienee.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Waqif alienate Waqf property after the dedication is complete?
  • Does the burden of proving that the alienation of Waqf property was for the benefit of the trust lie on the alienee?
  • Is misinformation provided by a legal counsel a valid ground for condonation of delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• The C.I.T. Group/Capital Equipment Financing Inc. vs M.T. Eastern1997 PLD Karachi 530 · Sindh High Court · 1997-05-19Read full judgment →
• Tazweez Hussain vs Zafar Iqbal1997 P Cr. L J 1915 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1997-07-03Read full judgment →
• Taslimul Islam vs Additional Commissioner And 9 Other1997 MLD 40 · Sindh High Court · 1996-02-11Read full judgment →
• Tasawwar Ahmad vs Pakistan Television Corporation, Islamabad1997 PLC (C.S.) 556 · Lahore High Court · 1997-01-16Read full judgment →
• Tariq Siddique vs Mrs. Shereen Hassan1997 MLD 2272 · Sindh High Court · 1996-09-23Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mahmood vs Niamat Ali Khan And 12 Other1997 SCMR 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-05
  land allotmentfraudulent allotmentremand orderconsent decreebona fide purchasercounsel authoritywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that remanded a case regarding the cancellation of land allotment to the Deputy Commissioner for a fresh decision. The land in question was originally allotted to displaced persons and subsequently purchased by the petitioner. Following an inquiry revealing that the allotment was fraudulent—specifically that the officials involved were not posted at the relevant location at the time—the Deputy Commissioner cancelled the allotment. The High Court, with the consent of all parties' counsel, remanded the matter for a fresh decision. The petitioner challenged this remand, arguing it was improper following the repeal of the relevant legislation and asserting his status as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was represented by counsel in the High Court and had consented to the remand order. Finding no evidence that the counsel lacked authority and noting the petitioner failed to seek recall of the order from the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the impugned judgment contained no legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a consent order passed by the High Court on the basis that their counsel lacked authority without first seeking recall of the order from that same court?
  • Is a remand order passed by the High Court with the consent of the parties' counsel legally sustainable?
  • Does the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 preclude the remand of a case concerning land allotment disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Khan vs The State1997 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-30
  rule of consistencybenefit of doubtocular evidencecorroborationcriminal appealmurder convictionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court convicted the appellant and a co-accused, while acquitting two others. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the co-accused but upheld the appellant's conviction, relying on the medical evidence and the specific attribution of injuries to him. The core legal question was whether the appellant, whose case was identical to that of his acquitted co-accused, was entitled to the same benefit of doubt under the rule of consistency. The Supreme Court held that since the prosecution witnesses had implicated all accused identically and the High Court had already discounted the evidentiary value of the weapon recoveries, there was no rational basis to distinguish the appellant's case from that of the acquitted co-accused. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reaffirms the principle that where the prosecution case against multiple accused is identical and the evidence is found unreliable regarding some, the rule of consistency mandates extending the benefit of doubt to the remaining accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of consistency apply when the prosecution's evidence against multiple co-accused is identical?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the testimony of interested witnesses without independent corroboration when the ocular evidence is found to be partly unreliable?
  • Does the recovery of weapons without ballistic matching provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Javed vs Director-General, F.I.A., Islamabad And 3 Others1997 PLC (C. S.) 273 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-29Read full judgment →
• Tariq Hussain vs Messrs Pakistan Railways Through Divisional1997 PLC 736 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-11-05Read full judgment →
• Walayat Shah vs The State And Another1997 MLD 1482 · Lahore High Court · 1995-05-06Read full judgment →
• Tariq and anothers vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 1409 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1997-05-28Read full judgment →
• Tariq Altaf vs Government of Punjab And Another1997 CLC 653 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-17Read full judgment →
• Tariq Akhtar vs The Plant Protection Advisor and Director, Department of Plant Protection, Karachi and others1997 PLC (C.S.) 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-14
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingspower of reviewprocedural timelineservice tribunal jurisdictiondepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which granted an extension of time to the respondent department to complete disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal’s grant of an extension of time for completing an inquiry, originally mandated by its own earlier judgment, constituted an impermissible review of that judgment in the absence of express statutory power to review. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal’s action did not constitute a review of its previous judgment, as the operative portion of the order—the reinstatement of the petitioner—remained untouched. The Court reasoned that the Tribunal, having the authority to fix a timeline for departmental inquiries, inherently possesses the jurisdiction to extend that timeline for cogent reasons, especially when delays were compounded by the petitioner’s own litigation. The key principle laid down is that a court or tribunal’s administrative power to set procedural timelines for compliance includes the incidental power to extend those timelines, which does not equate to a substantive review of the underlying judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Service Tribunal have the inherent power to extend a time limit it previously set for the completion of departmental inquiry proceedings?
  • Does the extension of a procedural deadline fixed by a Tribunal in its judgment constitute an impermissible review of that judgment?
  • Can a court or tribunal exercise a power of review without express statutory authorization?
  Read full judgment →