Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Nusrat vs The State1997 MLD 1358 · Federal Shariat Court · 1996-03-05Read full judgment →
• Nusrat Ali vs The State1997 SCMR 876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-26
  post-arrest bailleave to appealillegal detentionrecoveries without independent witnessespolice encounter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of bail applications by the High Court of Sind in criminal cases involving charges related to police encounters, terrorism, and illicit arms possession. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner, an advocate alleged to have been arrested in an armed encounter involving police and rangers, is entitled to post-arrest bail given contentions of prior illegal detention and lack of independent witnesses for recoveries. The Supreme Court held that leave to appeal should be granted and interim bail awarded to the petitioner, noting prima facie grounds that the petitioner may have been detained prior to the formal arrest time and that no independent witnesses were associated with the recoveries despite being in a populated area. The key principle laid down is that where serious questions arise regarding the timing of arrest and the absence of independent corroboration for recoveries in populated areas, a case for further inquiry is made out warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted when there are serious doubts regarding the timing of the petitioner's arrest and prior detention?
  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses with recoveries in a populated area justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Whether a case of ineffective firing and doubtful recoveries constitutes grounds for further inquiry under criminal jurisprudence?
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• Nuruddin vs Kaimuddin and others1997 PLD Karachi 386 · Sindh High Court · 1997-03-27Read full judgment →
• Not vs Not1997 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 1 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1997-03-19Read full judgment →
• Noshirwan and others vs Wealth Tax Officer and another1997 PTD 1233 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1995-12-21Read full judgment →
• Noreen Rehman vs Raja Javed Akhtar1997 CLC 142 · Federal Shariat Court · 1996-07-16
  dissolution of marriagepre-trial proceedingspersonal appearancefamily courtsreconciliation proceedingspower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the validity of the judgment and decree passed by the Family Court, Mirpur, which dismissed the appellant's suit for dissolution of marriage due to her failure to make a personal appearance at the pre-trial stage. The core legal question is whether the personal appearance of a plaintiff is mandatory at the pre-trial proceedings under Section 10 of the Family Courts Act. The court held that the provisions of Section 10 do not make the personal attendance of parties indispensable, and a party may appear and be represented through a counsel or an authorized agent, particularly when residing abroad. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the dismissal order and remanded the matter back to the trial court to conduct pre-trial proceedings in the presence of the appellant's attorney. The key principle established is that the personal attendance of parties during pre-trial reconciliation proceedings under the Family Courts Act is directory rather than mandatory, and representation through a duly authorized agent or counsel is permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether at the stage of pre-trial proceeding, the personal appearance of the plaintiff is mandatory under the Family Courts Act?
  • Can a party be represented by an authorized agent or counsel during pre-trial reconciliation proceedings under Section 10 of the Family Courts Act?
  • Does Section 18 of the Family Courts Act empower the court to permit an authorized agent to appear on behalf of a party?
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• Noorul Hassan vs Abdul Hameed And Other1997 MLD 432 · Lahore High Court · 1996-09-18
  civil revisionrejection of plaintfraud and collusionframing of issueschallenge to decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the order of the Civil Judge Ist Class, Lodhran, dismissing the petitioner's application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for rejection of a plaint. The underlying suit sought to challenge a previous decree on the grounds of fraud, forgery, and collusion, which the petitioner argued was barred except through proceedings under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Lahore High Court held that where mixed questions of law and fact regarding fraud, misrepresentation, and forgery are raised and have already been framed into specific issues during a fully contested trial nearing its conclusion, the plaint cannot be rejected summarily under Order VII, Rule 11. The Court affirmed that such matters must be adjudicated upon the appraisal of evidence already brought on record rather than non-suiting the plaintiff on technical grounds. Consequently, the revision petition was dismissed with a direction for the expeditious disposal of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the grounds raised are already covered by issues framed in a trial nearing its conclusion?
  • Can a suit challenging a decree on the basis of fraud and collusion be dismissed summarily without examining evidence brought on record?
  • Whether High Court will interfere in revisional jurisdiction against an interlocutory order where no failure of justice or patent defect is shown?
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• Nooruddin and 11 others vs Abdul Waheed1997 PLD Karachi 6 · Sindh High Court · 1996-05-23
  burden of proofdismissal in limineland trespasscivil appealstandard of proofbalance of probabilitiesLaw Reforms Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court Appeal challenged a Single Judge's dismissal of a suit for declaration, injunction, and damages concerning an alleged land trespass. The core legal questions were whether the appellants had discharged the burden of proof regarding the alleged encroachment and whether the appeal could be dismissed in limine. The Court held that the appellants failed to establish their case, as the burden of proof rests on the party alleging a fact, and they failed to meet the standard of proof on the balance of probabilities. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, is distinct from a first regular appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and may be dismissed in limine. Key principles laid down include the fundamental rule that he who alleges must prove, the requirement that parties cannot take stances at variance with their pleadings, and the clarification that Division Benches possess the authority to dismiss such appeals in limine without admitting them for regular hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof in a civil suit for trespass rest upon the plaintiff to prove the encroachment on a balance of probabilities?
  • Can a High Court Appeal filed under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, be dismissed in limine?
  • Is a party permitted to take a legal stance at trial that is at variance with their original pleadings?
  • Does the failure to specifically request the disposal of an interlocutory application before the final hearing of a suit imply that the application was abandoned?
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• Noor Nabi Javaid vs Pakistan International Airlines CORPORATIONAnd1997 SCMR 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-22
  back benefitsservice tribunaldismissal from servicefresh inquirypetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal seeking non-payment of salary for the period from his dismissal until his resumption of duty following an earlier judgment of this Court that had set aside his dismissal and ordered a fresh inquiry. The core legal question concerns the entitlement and determination of back-benefits and salary during the period of suspension or dismissal when a fresh inquiry is ordered. The Supreme Court held that the question of payment of salary for the said period must be determined by the competent authority under the relevant rules, and declined to grant leave to appeal while observing that the respondent organization should finalize the matter in accordance with the law. The key principle laid down is that the determination of back-wages and salary following the setting aside of a dismissal order and the holding of a fresh inquiry rests with the competent authority under the applicable service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Who is authorized to determine the payment of salary for the period between dismissal and resumption of duty when a fresh inquiry is ordered?
  • Is an employee automatically entitled to back salary for the period following the setting aside of a dismissal order and pending a fresh inquiry?
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• Noor Muhammad vs The Superintending Engineer And Another1997 PLC (C.S.) 1219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-18
  compulsory retirementback benefitsreinstatementdepartmental appealservice tribunalWAPDAemoluments
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Lineman-I in WAPDA, was compulsorily retired from service on 22-5-1993. Following a departmental appeal, he was reinstated on 2-11-1995, but the appellate authority treated the intervening period as extraordinary leave without pay and denied back benefits. The petitioner challenged this denial before the Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal. Subsequently, the petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerns whether an employee, upon reinstatement following a successful departmental appeal, is entitled to back benefits for the period during which the appeal remained pending, particularly when the delay in disposal was attributable to the departmental authority's failure to act despite judicial intervention. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the contention regarding the entitlement to back benefits requires consideration. The Court directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record within three months, emphasizing the significance of the emoluments issue. The matter remains pending for final adjudication on the merits of the entitlement to back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to back benefits for the period of unemployment if the delay in deciding their departmental appeal was caused by the departmental authority?
  • Does the reinstatement of an employee after a successful departmental appeal automatically entitle them to back benefits for the intervening period?
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• Noor Muhammad vs Muhammad Gulzar And Other1997 CLC 723 · Lahore High Court · 1994-06-26Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Muhammad Gulzar And Another1997 S CM R 1194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-31
  leave to appealagricultural landlease schemeproprietary rightsBoard of Revenuereview jurisdictionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition concerning agricultural land in Tehsil and District Khanewal. The core legal questions involve the competency of a minor to obtain land on lease under a temporary scheme, the finality of an unchallenged order refusing proprietary rights, and whether the Member, Board of Revenue exceeded jurisdiction by reviewing a prior order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions, holding that arguable questions of law were raised regarding the legality of the lease extension, the finality of the earlier revenue hierarchy orders, and the review powers exercised by the Member, Board of Revenue. The key principle laid down is that debatable questions concerning jurisdiction and the finality of administrative revenue orders warrant a full examination through a grant of leave to appeal, pending which status quo is maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a minor is competent to obtain agricultural land on lease under the temporary allotment scheme?
  • What is the legal effect of an order refusing proprietary rights that attains finality due to lack of further challenge in the revenue hierarchy?
  • Did the Member, Board of Revenue act in excess of jurisdiction by reviewing his own prior order?
  • Whether the High Court correctly appreciated the contentions regarding the legality of the lease extension?
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• Noor Muhammad vs Ghulam Muhammad and others1997 P Cr. L J 1525 · Lahore High Court · 1997-03-12Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Ahmad through Legal Heirs and anothers1997 PLD Supreme Court 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-26
  pre-emption suitlimitation periodmutationphysical possessionrevenue officerattestation of mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the appellant-vendee challenged the dismissal of his plea regarding the limitation period. The core legal question was whether the limitation period for a pre-emption suit under Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 commences from the date of the entry of the mutation or the date of its final attestation or sanction, particularly when the vendee claims prior physical possession. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the trial, appellate, and High Court, which determined that the appellant failed to substantiate the claim of taking physical possession of the land before the mutation was sanctioned. The Court held that the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commences from the date of the attestation of the mutation by the Revenue Officer, not the date of its entry or the recording of statements. The judgment reinforces the principle that mere entry of a mutation or recording of statements does not constitute the attestation required to trigger the limitation period under the Act, and that factual claims of prior physical possession must be proven by cogent evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 commence from the date of entry of a mutation or its final attestation?
  • Is the recording of a vendor's statement on a mutation equivalent to the attestation of the mutation for the purpose of calculating the limitation period?
  • Can a vendee successfully plead a limitation bar in a pre-emption suit based on prior physical possession without proving such possession through evidence?
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• Noor Muhammad Qureshi vs Ms. Benazir Bhutto And Other1997 CLC 1913 · Lahore High Court · 1996-12-31Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad And Another vs Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Manorities Affairs Division, Islamabad And Another1997 MLD 416 · Lahore High Court · 1996-09-07Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad alias Noora vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 843 · Lahore High Court · 1993-11-14Read full judgment →
• Noor Jehan Shah vs Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority1997 MLD 2261 · Sindh High Court · 1996-07-16
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionmaintainabilityhousing authoritypublic powersstate functions
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner approached the Sindh High Court through a constitutional petition challenging the cancellation of an allotment of extra land measuring 58 square yards adjacent to her plot by the Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority. The core legal question determined by the court was whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable against the respondent housing authority. The court held that the petition is not maintainable because the respondent does not perform functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a province, or a local authority, nor does it exercise sovereign or public powers, receive substantial government funding, or remain under substantial government control, as per the tests laid down by the Supreme Court. The key principle laid down is that for an entity to be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199, it must satisfy the tests of performing State functions involving sovereign or public powers with substantial government control and funding.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is maintainable against the Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority?
  • Does the Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority perform functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a province, or a local authority?
  • What are the primary tests to determine if an organization or person is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Noor Hussain And Others vs Gul Abbas Through Legal Heirs1997 SCMR 1377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-05
  Waqf propertymosqueoccupancy tenantMutwallirevenue recordconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the concurrent findings of three lower courts which held that the disputed land was Waqf property dedicated to the village mosque and that the petitioners' ancestor held it merely as a Mutwalli rather than as an occupancy tenant. The core legal question was whether the land alienated for the maintenance of the mosque and services of the Imam constituted Waqf property or created occupancy rights under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the revenue records clearly established the mosque as the owner of the property and that the concurrent findings of fact were supported by the record and free from misreading or non-reading. The key principle laid down is that where revenue records consistently show a mosque as the owner of dedicated land rather than individual occupancy tenants, the property retains its character as Waqf, and concurrent findings of fact on such status will not be interfered with in the absence of legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land alienated for the maintenance of a mosque and the services of an Imam constitutes Waqf property or creates occupancy rights under section 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the ownership and status of land as Waqf property be interfered with when supported by the revenue record?
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• Noor Elahi vs Federation of Pakistan And Others1997 PLC (C. S.) 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-11
  annual confidential reportexpungement of acrdelay in communicationpaf civiliansservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Noor Elahi, a Head Clerk in the Pakistan Air Force at Sargodha, seeking the expungement of an adverse Annual Confidential Report (A.C.R.) for the year 1991. The core legal question concerns whether an adverse A.C.R. communicated with a significant delay of nearly four years and allegedly issued in violation of departmental instructions is liable to be expunged. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions raised regarding the delayed communication and the alleged malice or procedural impropriety of the reporting officer. The court held that the petition raised arguable questions regarding the violation of paragraphs 15, 16-C, and 19 of Confidential Reports, PAF Civilians, laying down the principle that unexplained and inordinate delays in communicating adverse reports along with procedural breaches warrant a detailed examination by the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an adverse A.C.R. communicated after an inordinate delay is liable to be expunged?
  • Does the communication of an adverse report in violation of departmental instructions vitiate the report?
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• Noor Elahi vs Federation of Pakistan And Other1997 SCMR 1364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-11
  Annual Confidential ReportService LawAdverse ACRExpunction of ACRProcedural irregularityP.A.F. Civilians
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Head Clerk in the Pakistan Air Force with thirty-one years of service, challenged an adverse Annual Confidential Report (A.C.R.) recorded in 1991. The petitioner contended that the report was biased, having been authored by a Reporting Officer under whom he served for only one year and with whom he had a grievance. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the communication of this adverse report occurred with a significant delay of nearly four years, specifically on 15-8-1994, which constituted a procedural violation of paragraphs 15, 16-C, and 19 of the Confidential Reports for P.A.F. Civilians. The petitioner sought the expunction of the adverse A.C.R. on these grounds. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the adverse A.C.R. should be expunged due to the alleged procedural irregularities in its communication and the circumstances surrounding its issuance.

  Questions settled

  • Can an adverse Annual Confidential Report be expunged if it was communicated to the employee with a significant delay in violation of departmental regulations?
  • Does a Reporting Officer's alleged bias or short duration of supervision invalidate an Annual Confidential Report?
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• Noor Elahi vs Director of Civilian Personnel, Rear Air Headquarters, Peshawar And 2 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-13
  Annual Confidential Reportadverse remarksexpunctionservice lawreporting officeradministrative efficiencyprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the expunction of adverse remarks recorded in the Annual Confidential Report (A.C.R.) of a Head Clerk in the Pakistan Air Force. The appellant challenged the remarks, arguing they were biased, unsubstantiated, and communicated with significant delay, violating established departmental instructions. The core legal question was whether the adverse remarks, which were vague and communicated years late, could be sustained against an employee with a long, otherwise spotless service record. The Supreme Court held that the reporting officer failed to adhere to the mandatory procedure for timely communication of adverse remarks and that the remarks themselves were vague and lacked specific supporting material. The Court emphasized that a reporting officer must be impartial, forthright, and unambiguous, and that the primary purpose of such reports is to provide an opportunity for the employee to correct deficiencies. Finding that the delay and the vague nature of the remarks caused grave prejudice to the appellant, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and ordered the expunction of the adverse remarks.

  Questions settled

  • Is a reporting officer required to provide specific details when recording adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report?
  • Does the failure to communicate adverse remarks within the stipulated timeframe render them liable to be expunged?
  • Can adverse remarks that are vague and lack supporting evidence be maintained against a government employee?
  • What is the legal consequence of a reporting officer failing to inform a subordinate of alleged defects to allow for correction?
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• Noor Ali vs Secretary to Government of N.W.F.P. And Other1997 MLD 672 · Peshawar High Court · 1996-04-17Read full judgment →
• Nnjuman Data Ganj Bakhsh Ali Hajveri and Darbar Baba Qasim Sain1997 SCMR 1462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-09
  leave to appealremand orderevacuee propertyfactual findingsconstitutional petitionforged documentsscope of remand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the ownership of land, originally claimed by the respondents based on an alleged 1956 transfer order from the Deputy Rehabilitation/Settlement Commissioner. Following an initial High Court remand, a notified officer conducted inquiries and concluded that the respondents' documents were forged and the land was State land rather than evacuee property. A learned Single Judge of the High Court subsequently set aside this finding, declaring it illegal and directing the authorities to record the respondents as owners. The petitioners challenged this decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that the notified officer acted within his competence under the remand order to examine the genuineness of the documents and that the High Court improperly interfered with findings of fact. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the contentions raised regarding the scope of the remand order and the propriety of the High Court's interference with the notified officer's factual findings required detailed consideration. The operation of the High Court judgment was suspended pending the final outcome.

  Questions settled

  • Is a notified officer competent to examine the genuineness of an alleged transfer order when a High Court remand order permits the parties to raise questions of fact and law?
  • Can a High Court interfere with the factual findings of a notified officer in a constitutional petition absent a showing of misreading of evidence or failure to consider material evidence?
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• Nizar Ali vs Collector Of Customs, Lahore.PTCL 1997 CL. 242 · Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1997-06-24Read full judgment →
• Nizamuddin And 2 Others vs Chairman, Evacuee Trust Properties Board1997 SCMR 1152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-06
  leave to appealevacuee trust propertypermanent transfer deedlachesconstitutional petitioncivil suit pendencyland settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing their constitutional petition regarding the cancellation of the transfer of agricultural land. The land, originally belonging to the Karachi Pinjrapore Association, was auctioned to the petitioners under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, with a Permanent Transfer Deed issued in 1962. Subsequently, the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, acting under M.L.R. 57, declared the transfer void, alleging the land was evacuee trust property. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' challenge on grounds of laches and the pendency of a parallel civil suit. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the delay was justified, the civil suit involved different issues, and the transfer was protected under the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions regarding the maintainability of the constitutional petition, the scope of the civil suit, and the statutory protection of the transfer deed required detailed examination by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a transfer of land confirmed by a Permanent Transfer Deed be cancelled on the ground that the land was evacuee trust property?
  • Does the pendency of a civil suit regarding the legality of a transfer order render a subsequent constitutional petition challenging the same order non-maintainable?
  • Is a delay in filing a constitutional petition sufficient grounds for dismissal if the petitioner provides detailed reasons for the delay?
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• Nizam-Ud-Din vs Maulvi Nazirullah and anothers1997 P Cr. L J 1401 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 1997-05-13Read full judgment →
• Nishat Group of Industries And Another vs Chairman, N.I.R.C. And Another1997 PLC 622 · Lahore High Court · 1997-05-07
  unfair labour practiceNIRC jurisdictionworkman definitioninterim injunctionconstitutional petitionmaster and servantreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional petition was filed by a group of industries and its Director Administration challenging an interim order passed by the Chairman, National Industrial Relations Commission (N.I.R.C.) suspending the termination and transfer orders of the second respondent, who served as a Deputy Manager (Administration). The core legal question was whether an employee holding a managerial post and drawing a high salary, who was not a worker or workman and against whom no allegation of unfair labour practice qua the employer existed, could maintain a petition under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and whether interim reinstatement could be ordered prior to a finding of guilt. The Lahore High Court held that the proceedings before the N.I.R.C. were coram non judice and without jurisdiction, as unfair labour practice must be qua the worker and the employee's own pleadings showed he was an administrative officer dealing with labour unions rather than a workman, and further held that an interim order of reinstatement cannot be granted before a final determination of guilt. The petition was accepted with costs, setting aside the impugned interim order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee serving as a Deputy Manager (Administration) falls within the definition of a workman or worker under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can the National Industrial Relations Commission grant an interim order of reinstatement under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, prior to a final finding of guilt?
  • Does a petition under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, lie in the absence of any allegation of unfair labour practice against an employee?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained directly against an interim order of the National Industrial Relations Commission when the proceedings are coram non judice and without jurisdiction?
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• Nisar Muhammad and anothers vs Sultan Zari1997 PLD Supreme Court 852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-30
  habeas corpusminor custodySection 491 Cr.P.C.hizanatinterim custodyGuardians and Wards Act 1890extraordinary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court granting custody of five minor children to their mother under a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C. The core legal question was whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. to grant interim custody of minor children to a mother when alternative remedies under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 are available. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's order. The Court held that the availability of an alternative remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 does not oust the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. to restore provisional custody of minors to a person legally entitled to hizanat where their detention by another is improper or illegal. However, the Court cautioned that this extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. should be exercised sparingly and primarily in cases of real urgency, leaving ultimate custody determinations to the Guardian Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. to grant provisional custody of minor children to a mother?
  • Does the availability of a remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 bar a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C. for minor custody?
  • Under what circumstances should the High Court exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. regarding the custody of minors?
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• Nisar Ahmad And Others vs The State1997 MLD 2575 · Lahore High Court · 1994-12-19Read full judgment →
• Nilgiri Finance and Hire Purchase (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income Tax1997 PTD 710 · Madras High Court · 1994-08-22Read full judgment →
• Nighat Sultana vs Nasir Aziz1997 MLD 2403 · Lahore High Court · 1997-03-28Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad vs The State1997 PLD Quetta 17 · Balochistan High Court · 1996-07-11
  QisasTazirMuslim Personal LawCompounding of offenceInheritanceResiduarySection 311 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged an order by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pishin, which required the brother and sisters of a deceased person to confirm a compromise regarding the murder of their relative, despite the father having already relinquished his right of Qisas. The core legal questions concerned whether a father, under Muslim Personal Law, is competent to compound an offence of murder to the exclusion of other heirs, and whether a trial court retains discretion to initiate proceedings under Section 311, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, despite a valid compromise. The Court held that, under Islamic law of inheritance, a father of a childless deceased acts as a residuary and is solely competent to compound the offence, excluding brothers and sisters. Consequently, the trial court's order requiring confirmation from other heirs was set aside. The Court further clarified that while a court has discretion to punish an accused under Section 311, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, even after a compromise, such discretion must be exercised judiciously, particularly in cases involving brutality or habitual offenders, and requires cogent reasoning.

  Questions settled

  • Is a father of a childless deceased person competent to compound a murder offence to the exclusion of the deceased's brothers and sisters?
  • Does the acceptance of a compromise by the legal heirs of a deceased automatically entitle the accused to an acquittal?
  • Does a trial court have the discretion to proceed against an accused under Section 311, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, despite the compounding of the offence by the legal heirs?
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• Niaz Muhammad vs Mst. Noori1997 MLD 406 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-07
  res judicatacivil revisionabuse of processdiscretionary reliefmala fidesecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arose from a judgment and decree dated 14-1-1980 passed by the District Judge, Kasur, which had set aside the dismissal of the respondent's suit for declaration regarding a disputed mutation. The core legal question centered on whether the revision petition was barred by the principle of res judicata and amounted to an abuse of the court's process, given that a prior Regular Second Appeal (R.S.A. No.341 of 1980) filed by the same petitioner had been dismissed and attained finality, and whether discretionary relief could be granted to a party acting with mala fides. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner's conduct was mala fide, fraudulent, and aimed at prolonging proceedings, and that the principles underlying res judicata and the prevention of abuse of process applied to bar the re-litigation. The Court laid down the principle that the remedy of revision is a discretionary relief which will be denied to a litigant who approaches the court with unclean hands and attempts multiple, overlapping proceedings to vex the opposite party.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a prior regular second appeal operate to bar a subsequent civil revision petition on the same matter between the same parties?
  • Is a civil revision petition maintainable when filed by a petitioner who has already pursued alternative remedies up to the Supreme Court with mala fide intent?
  • Can discretionary relief in revision be refused to a party who approaches the court with unclean hands?
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• Niaz Hussain vs Senior Superintendent of Police And Others1997 PLC (C. S.) 404 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1995-04-19Read full judgment →
• Niaz Ali vs Secretary Industries And Other1997 MLD 1806 · Lahore High Court · 1996-07-02Read full judgment →
• Niaz Ahmed vs Nisar Ahmed and 3 others1997 P Cr. L J 1588 · Sindh High Court · 1997-04-21Read full judgment →
• Niaz Ahmed alias Niaz Hussain vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 1034 · Sindh High Court · 1997-03-13Read full judgment →
• New Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd. vs The Collector of Customs And Other1997 MLD 2770 · Sindh High Court · 1995-03-28
  constitutional petitionalternative remedyterritorial jurisdictioncustoms dutybonded warehouseinsurance policyrecovery of arrears
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner Insurance Company filed a constitutional petition in the Sindh High Court challenging a demand notice issued by the customs authorities for the recovery of customs duty and taxes following a fire at a bonded warehouse in Lahore where insured goods were stored. The respondents raised preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the petition due to the availability of adequate alternative remedies of appeal and revision under the Customs Act, 1969, and the lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Sindh High Court since all relevant events and execution of the insurance policy occurred in Lahore. The court held that the petition was premature as the petitioner failed to exhaust the statutory remedies of appeal and revision, and further ruled that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction as the cause of action accrued entirely outside its territorial limits. Consequently, the constitutional petition was dismissed without entering into the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition can be maintained when adequate alternative statutory remedies of appeal and revision are available under the Customs Act?
  • Does the mere service of a demand notice at Karachi confer territorial jurisdiction on the Sindh High Court when the cause of action and execution of the insurance contract took place in Lahore?
  • Whether a dispute arising out of a private contract of insurance can bypass the rule of exhausting alternative departmental remedies in tax matters?
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• Nek Muhammad vs Sardar Abdul Karim and 11 others1997 P Cr. L J 1231 · Balochistan High Court · 1997-03-27Read full judgment →
• Nek Muhammad vs Judicial Magistrate Section 30, P.S. Saddar, Lodhran And Another1997 MLD 1325 · Lahore High Court · 1996-10-17Read full judgment →
• Nek Amal Jan vs Province of N.-W.F.P.through Secretary Health, Peshawar1997 PLC (C.S.) 380 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Nek Amal Jan vs Province of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary Health, Peshawar And 1 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 380 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Nazir Masih vs The State1997 MLD 48 · Lahore High Court · 1995-03-28Read full judgment →
• Nazir Jan vs District Manager, Karachi Transport Corporation, Karachi And Another1997 PLC 707 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-01-27Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmed Rana vs Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary1997 PLC (C.S.) 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-28
  deputationpermanent absorptioncontrolling authorityappointment authorityanticipation of approvalcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute where a civil servant on deputation to the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad, sought permanent absorption. The Secretary Education, Government of Punjab, permitted the petitioner's permanent absorption, and the Chairman of the Board issued an office order allowing the same in anticipation of the Board's approval. However, the Board subsequently resolved not to absorb the petitioner. The petitioner's writ petition and subsequent Intra-Court Appeal were dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the Secretary's permission constituted an appointment under Section 12(8)(ii) of the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976, and whether the Chairman had the authority to permanently absorb the petitioner without the Board's approval. The Court held that the Secretary's order was merely a permission to seek absorption, not an appointment. Furthermore, under Section 10(2)(xviii) of the Act, the Board, not the Chairman, is the competent authority to make permanent appointments. Consequently, the petitioner had no vested legal right to permanent absorption, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a permission granted by the Secretary Education to a deputationist to get absorbed in a Board constitutes an order of appointment by the Controlling Authority under the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976?
  • Does the Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education have the power to permanently absorb an employee in the Board's service without the approval of the Board?
  • Can a deputationist claim a vested legal right to be permanently absorbed in the borrowing organization when the competent authority has declined to confirm the absorption?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Shahid And 3 Other1997 MLD 1240 · Lahore High Court · 1996-10-08Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Khalid Pervaiz And 4 Other1997 MLD 2077 · Lahore High Court · 1997-01-28Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Jatoi and others1997 PLD Karachi 130 · Sindh High Court · 1996-09-19Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Shaikh vs Muhammad Ismail1997 PLD Karachi 479 · Sindh High Court · 1993-12-14Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad And Others vs Abdullah And Other1997 SCMR 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-30
  res judicatainheritancelimited ownerlife estateMuslim Family Laws Ordinancecomplete justicesuccession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the inheritance of agricultural land following the death of a limited owner, Mst. Fazlan Bibi, in 1984. The core legal questions concerned whether a previous 1929 judgment regarding the legitimacy of an heir constituted res judicata, and whether the heirs of a pre-deceased daughter were entitled to inherit upon the termination of a life estate, despite the original owner dying before the enactment of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Supreme Court held that the 1929 judgment was binding under Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, as it involved the same parties and subject matter, thereby barring the claim of appellants claiming through the disputed heir. However, regarding the inheritance of the pre-deceased daughter, the Court held that upon the termination of a life estate, succession re-opens, and the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, apply. The Court emphasized its power under Article 187 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice, ruling that legal heirs should not be denied their shares on technical grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code distinguish between judgments in rem and judgments in personam for the purposes of res judicata?
  • Does the termination of a life estate trigger the re-opening of succession for the purpose of applying the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant relief to legal heirs on issues not specifically mentioned in the leave to appeal under its power to do complete justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Akhtar vs Director General of Soil Survey of Pakistan, Lahore And Another1997 PLC (C.S.) 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-02
  service appeallimitation periodtime-barred appealreversionT.S.T. Schemeleave to appealstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's service appeal on the grounds of being time-barred. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner's appointment was regular or contingent upon the T.S.T. Scheme, and consequently, whether the reversion of the petitioner upon the termination of said scheme was lawful. Furthermore, the case addresses the computation of the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal, specifically whether the period should be calculated from the date of the final approval of the competent authority regarding the reversion. The Supreme Court, noting that similar contentions were already under consideration in other pending civil petitions, granted leave to appeal. The Court held that the issues raised required detailed examination and directed that the present matter be heard alongside the connected petitions. Additionally, the Court ordered that the status quo be maintained in the interim, thereby preserving the petitioner's position pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal is time-barred if filed within thirty days of the notification of the final approval of a reversion order?
  • Can an employee appointed against advertised posts without reference to a specific scheme be reverted upon the termination of that scheme?
  • Does the pendency of similar legal contentions in other petitions warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Akhtar vs Director General of Soil Survey of Pakistan1997 SCMR 1375 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-02
  leave to appealservice appeallimitation periodtime-barredregular appointmentreversionstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his service appeal on the grounds of being time-barred. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's appeal was filed within the limitation period, given the circumstances surrounding his appointment and subsequent reversion. The petitioner contended that his appointment was regular and not tied to the T.S.T. Scheme, and that he had awaited the final approval of the competent authority before challenging his reversion. The Supreme Court observed that similar contentions regarding the nature of appointments and the calculation of limitation periods were already under consideration in other pending civil petitions. Consequently, the Court held that the issues raised required detailed examination and granted leave to appeal. The Court further ordered that the status quo be maintained in the interim and directed that the matter be heard alongside the related pending appeals to ensure consistency in adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of similar legal contentions in other petitions warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  • Can a service appeal be considered timely if it is filed after the final notification of a reversion order by the competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad vs The State1997 PLD Lahore 538 · Lahore High Court · 1997-01-26Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad vs Mujahid and 4 others1997 PLD Peshawar 88 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-03-03Read full judgment →
• Nayab Kazmi vs Cantonment Board And Other1997 MLD 2794 · Sindh High Court · 1994-10-16Read full judgment →
• Naya Daur Motor (Pvt.) Limited vs Pakistan Banking Council through Chairman, Habib Bank Plaza, Karachi and 7 others1997 PLD Karachi 208 · Sindh High Court · 1997-01-14
  rejection of plaintjurisdiction of civil courtouster of jurisdictionpledge of sharesspecial courtcivil nature disputecause of action
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter before the Sindh High Court arose from a suit filed by the plaintiff for a declaration, permanent injunction, and recovery of possession of shares of a foreign company pledged with the plaintiff as security for advances. Defendant No.1 sought the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, contending that no cause of action was disclosed and that the suit was barred under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984, due to exclusive jurisdiction vesting in the Special Court where criminal proceedings were pending regarding the shares. The core legal question was whether the jurisdiction of a civil court of plenary jurisdiction to determine civil rights and title to property is ousted by implication under the Special Courts Ordinance when a criminal court has passed interim orders concerning the custody of the same property. The High Court dismissed the application for rejection of the plaint, holding that the Special Court, exercising criminal jurisdiction, cannot effectively decide intricate questions of civil ownership, title, and pledge. The court laid down that the ouster of jurisdiction of superior civil courts cannot be accepted lightly and requires clear, definite, and positive statutory provisions, and that the mere pendency of proceedings or interim custody orders before a special criminal tribunal does not bar a civil suit to determine proprietary rights and title.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of a civil court to determine title and ownership of property is ousted by implication under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984?
  • Can a special court exercising criminal jurisdiction effectively determine intricate questions of ownership, title, and pledge of shares?
  • Does the pendency of proceedings or an interim custody order regarding property before a Special Court bar a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction?
  • What are the fundamental principles and tests for deciding whether the jurisdiction of a civil court is excluded in favor of a statutory tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawaz And Another vs The State1997 MLD 1519 · Lahore High Court · 1996-08-04Read full judgment →
• Nawab Khan And Others vs Said Karim Khan And Other1997 SCMR 1840 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  settlement recordpresumption of truthrevenue recordburden of proofconcurrent findingscustomary lawland ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a suit for declaration and possession filed by the petitioners, representing the residents of Village Nawagai, claiming ownership of certain mountainous lands based on an alleged order dated 4-7-1961 by the ex-Ruler of Swat. The petitioners challenged the 1977-78 Settlement Record, which recorded the land in favor of the respondents. The trial Court, the District Judge, and the Peshawar High Court concurrently dismissed the suit, finding that the petitioners failed to prove the authenticity of the 1961 order, which lacked the ex-Ruler's signature and was reportedly rescinded. Furthermore, the courts found that the petitioners were not in possession and failed to rebut the presumption of truth attached to the Settlement Record. The Supreme Court upheld these concurrent findings, affirming that the Settlement Record carries a presumption of correctness, especially the first settlement record, and that very strong evidence is required to rebut such entries. The Court concluded that the petitioners failed to provide sufficient evidence to challenge the revenue entries or establish their claim, thereby dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the first settlement record of an area carry a presumption of correctness?
  • Is very strong evidence required to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the first settlement record?
  • Can a document be relied upon as evidence of title if it lacks the necessary authentication or signature of the issuing authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Naveed Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi and 3 others vs Central Cotton Mills1997 PLD Karachi 432 · Sindh High Court · 1996-10-31
  Annual General Meetinginvalid general meetingnotice of meetingclear notice periodelection of directorsOfficial AssigneeCompanies Ordinance 1984voting rights
  Summary & questions settled

  High Court Appeals were filed challenging an order of a learned Single Judge that declared the Annual General Meeting (AGM) held on 29-6-1993 and its adjourned meeting held on 30-8-1993 invalid, while directing a fresh AGM to be convened under the supervision of the Official Assignee. The dispute arose between two family factions over the management and shareholdings of a listed company. The primary legal questions concerned the mandatory nature and consequences of non-compliance with the statutory 21 days' clear notice requirement under Section 158(3) and the despatch of audited accounts under Section 233(4) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, the scope of Section 161(8), and the legal status of a Chairman presiding over an AGM after the expiry of the Board's tenure. The High Court upheld the invalidation of the meetings due to non-service of personal notices and failure to circulate audited accounts, ordering a fresh AGM presided over by the Official Assignee. The Court held that statutory 21 days' notice requires a clear period excluding the date of despatch and meeting date; non-compliance invalidates proceedings where substantial prejudice ensues; and retiring directors continuing under Section 177 retain their Chairman until a new Board is inducted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement of giving 21 days' notice before an Annual General Meeting under Section 158(3) and Section 233(4) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 mandates a clear period excluding both the date of despatch and the date of the meeting?
  • Does the failure to personally serve notices and audited accounts on shareholders render the proceedings of an Annual General Meeting invalid notwithstanding publication in newspapers?
  • Under Section 161(8) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, must the members prevented from effectively using their rights be restricted to the applicants holding ten per cent voting power, or can it include members generally?
  • Does a Chairman of the Board of Directors continue in office along with retiring directors who continue to perform their functions under Section 177 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 beyond their prescribed term?
  Read full judgment →
• National Insurance Corporation, Karachi vs Pakistan National1997 P.C.T.L.R. 309 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• National Engineering Services Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi vs S.M.1997 PLC 501 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-08-12Read full judgment →
• National Development Finance Corporation, Shahrahequaideazam, Lahore vs Shaikh Naseemuddin and 4 others1997 PLD Supreme Court 564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  rent restrictionbona fide personal requirementdefault in rentejectmentlandlord and tenantstatutory rent increaseburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that reversed concurrent findings of lower courts and ordered the eviction of the petitioner-tenant. The landlords sought eviction based on default in rent payment and bona fide personal requirement. The High Court had found the tenant in default due to non-payment of a statutory 20% rent increase and accepted the landlords' claim of personal need. The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's finding on default, noting that "default" requires more than mere non-payment following a statutory increase, especially absent notice. However, the Court upheld the eviction order based on the landlords' bona fide personal requirement. The Court affirmed the principle that a landlord's sworn assertion of personal need, if consistent with the application, unshaken in cross-examination, and unrebutted by evidence, must be accepted as bona fide. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, though the Court granted the tenant a grace period until December 31, 1997, to vacate, subject to payment of an enhanced monthly rent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere non-payment of a statutory increase in rent automatically constitute a default by the tenant?
  • What is the evidentiary standard for establishing a landlord's bona fide personal requirement for rented premises?
  • Can a landlord's uncontradicted, sworn testimony regarding personal need for premises be accepted as sufficient proof of bona fide requirement?
  Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi vs Rahimdad1997 PLC 345 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-05-23Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi vs Abdul Wahab Abro1997 PLC 370 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-05-30Read full judgment →
• National Bank Of Pakistan vs Allied Paper Industries Ltd. And OtherPTCL 1997 CL. 139 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-14Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan Officers Association vs Presiding Officer, S.L. Court No. v And Others1997 PLC 434 · Sindh High Court · 1997-03-25Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan Officers Association vs Presiding Officer, S.L. Court N0. v and others1997 PLC 434 · Sindh High Court · 1997-03-25Read full judgment →
• Rana Muhammad Afzal Khan vs The State1997 MLD 2145 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-01Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan Employees Front Sindh vs Registrar of Trade Unions, Sindh And Others1997 PLC 432 · Sindh High Court · 1997-03-28Read full judgment →
• Nasrullah vs The State1997 MLD 1430 · Peshawar High Court · 1996-10-20
  cognizanceCourt of Sessionsection 169 Cr.P.C.section 173 Cr.P.C.challanquashmentcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition under section 439 read with section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenged the orders of the Additional Sessions Judge directing that the petitioner, who had been released by the police under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and whose name was not sent up in the report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, be placed in column No. 2 of the challan for trial. The core legal question was whether a Court of Session can take cognizance against a person released under section 169 who is not mentioned in the challan report submitted under section 173. The Peshawar High Court held that a Court of Session cannot take cognizance or of its own array an accused whose name is not mentioned in the report under section 173 either in column 2 or column 3 because he was released under section 169. The Court laid down the principle that while a Court of Session may exercise judicial discretion to summon persons mentioned in columns 2 or 3 of a section 173 report, it lacks jurisdiction to summon or take cognizance of an accused released under section 169 whose case was never sent up for trial, leaving the aggrieved party to pursue remedies under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Court of Session take cognizance against an accused released under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 whose name is not included in the report under section 173?
  • Does a Trial Court have the jurisdiction to of its own accord array a person as an accused who was released by the police during investigation?
  • What is the remedy available to a complainant when an accused is released under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and not sent up for trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasrullah Khan vs Mst. Bas Khandana And Another1997 MLD 2071 · Peshawar High Court · 1996-08-11Read full judgment →
• Nasir vs Superintendent, District Jail, Kasur and others1997 P Cr. L J 2020 · Lahore High Court · 1997-07-03Read full judgment →
• Nasir Khan vs The State1997 MLD 1473 · Lahore High Court · 1996-09-24Read full judgment →
• Nasir Khan vs Mushtaq Khan1997 P Cr. L J 1253 · Lahore High Court · 1995-04-04Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ashfaq & Co. vs Government of the Punjab And 3 Other1997 CLC 69 · Lahore High Court · 1996-09-18Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ahmad Rana vs Dr. Bashir Ahmad Rana, Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad And Another1997 PLC (C.S.) 125 · Lahore High Court · 1996-09-24Read full judgment →
• Nasim And Another vs The State1997 MLD 2217 · Federal Shariat Court · 1996-09-18Read full judgment →
• Naseer-Ud-Din Humayun Butt vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others1997 PLC (C.S.) 617 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1997-01-14Read full judgment →
• Naseer-Ud-Din Humayun Butt vs Secretary, Establishment Division1997 PLC (C. S.) 617 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1997-01-14Read full judgment →
• Naseer Ahmed vs The State1997 PLD Supreme Court 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-16
  post-arrest baillalkaraballistic expert reporttentative assessmentmurderabsconsionstatutory delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, Naseer Ahmed, seeking post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder and attempt to murder. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner is entitled to bail merely on the ground that the sole allegation against him in the first information report was raising a Lalkara, alongside contentions regarding retracted statements of independent witnesses and statutory delay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that bail cannot be granted solely on the ground of a Lalkara when there is extensive corroborative material on record, including active participation, possession of a weapon, a positive ballistic expert report matching crime empties with the recovered pistol, a clear motive, and absconsion. The Court laid down the principle that at the bail stage, courts must make a tentative assessment of the material available on record, carefully distinguishing it from final evaluation, and evaluate whether subsequent turns or contradictions by witnesses shake the credibility of the entire prosecution case on its own merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail solely on the ground that the allegation against him in the F.I.R. is limited to raising a Lalkara?
  • What is the distinction between tentative assessment of evidence and actual evaluation of evidence at the bail stage?
  • Can an accused raise the plea of statutory delay for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not urged before the trial Court or the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseer Ahmad vs General Manager, Quality Textile Mills And Another1997 PLC 253 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-04-22Read full judgment →
• Naseem Begum vs Mrs. Raeesa Khatoon And 2 Other1997 MLD 1030 · Sindh High Court · 1995-01-17Read full judgment →
• Nardullah Khan vs Haji Zarif Khan And 3 Other1997 CLC 428 · Peshawar High Court · 1995-03-14Read full judgment →
• Narayangonj Dock Limited vs Commissioner of Taxes, Intelligence1997 PTD 2274 · Dhaka High Court · 1994-05-12Read full judgment →
• Najibullah Khan And Another vs Fazal Karim And 2 Other1997 SCMR 1085 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-20
  suit for declarationpermanent injunctionoath on Holy Qur'anspecial oathresiling from agreementpresumption of correctnessQanun-e-Shahadat 1984revisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the respondents against the petitioners concerning ownership and possession of suit land. Following a remand from the Peshawar High Court, the matter came before the District Judge, Malakand, where petitioner No. 1, in the presence of his counsel, offered to have the suit decreed if the respondents took an oath on the Holy Qur'an. The respondents took the oath in open court, and the District Judge decreed the suit accordingly, a decision subsequently upheld by the High Court in revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that they had not consented to deciding the case on oath and that the procedure violated Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. The Supreme Court held that judicial orders carry a presumption of correctness, which the petitioners failed to rebut by affidavit. Having agreed to the offer and permitted the oath to be taken without objection, the petitioners were precluded from resiling from their agreement. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party resile from an offer to decide a suit on an oath on the Holy Qur'an after the opposite party has accepted and taken such oath in open court?
  • Does a presumption of correctness attach to the record and order of a court stating that a party consented to deciding a case on special oath?
  • Can a party challenge a decree passed pursuant to an agreed oath on the ground of non-compliance with Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 without having objected at the time the oath was administered?
  Read full judgment →
• Naik Muhammad vs Fazal Muhammad1997 CLC 731 · Board of Revenue · 1994-07-31Read full judgment →
• Naeem Jaffar vs Senior Superintendent of Police And 2 Other1997 MLD 1198 · Lahore High Court · 1996-05-15
  quashment of FIRconstitutional petitionpolice investigationtrial court jurisdictionalternate remedyabuse of process of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 seeking the quashment of a first information report registered under sections 399, 401, and 402 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction or inherent powers under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash a criminal case where a challan has already been submitted and the matter is ripe for trial. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that once a police investigation is complete and a challan is submitted, it is the exclusive domain of the trial court to evaluate evidence and determine guilt or innocence, and the constitutional jurisdiction cannot be used to bypass regular trial procedures or alternate remedies such as acquittal under section 249-A or section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that the High Court will not prematurely interfere with criminal proceedings or usurp the functions of the trial court through constitutional petitions when adequate statutory remedies exist within the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can a first information report be quashed through a constitutional petition when the challan has been submitted and the case is ripe for trial?
  • Whether the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 can be used as an alternate remedy to bypass regular trial proceedings?
  • What is the scope of section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in preventing the abuse of the process of the court?
  • At what stage can Magistrates and Sessions Courts acquit an accused person under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if no case is made out?
  Read full judgment →
• Naeem Hussain Chattha vs Tawakkal Ullah And Another1997 CLC 192 · Election Commission of Pakistan · 1996-07-08
  election petitioncontesting candidatenecessary partynon-joinder of partieslimitation periodrepresentation of the peopledismissal of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an election petition filed under section 52 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, wherein the petitioner challenged the election of respondent No.1 and sought a declaration in his own favor. During the proceedings, upon the petitioner's request, the Election Tribunal deleted respondent No.2 from the array of respondents. Subsequently, respondent No.1 raised a preliminary objection that respondent No.2 was a contesting candidate and a necessary party, and his omission rendered the petition liable to dismissal under section 63 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The petitioner then applied to reimplead respondent No.2. The core legal questions involved whether a contesting candidate is a necessary party, the effect of non-joinder, and whether such a party can be reimpleaded after the expiry of the period of limitation. The Tribunal held that a contesting candidate is a mandatory party under section 54, that non-joinder entails mandatory dismissal under section 63, and that a party cannot be reimpleaded after the period of limitation has expired. The election petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contesting candidate is a necessary party to an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • What is the legal effect of the non-joinder of a necessary contesting candidate in an election petition?
  • Can a party whose name was deleted upon the petitioner's request be reimpleaded as a respondent after the expiry of the period of limitation for filing an election petition?
  • Are the provisions requiring the joinder of all contesting candidates in an election petition mandatory or directory?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadir Hayat Khan and another vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 2034 · Lahore High Court · 1997-07-04Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Hamid vs The State1997 PLD Karachi 494 · Sindh High Court · 1996-07-11
  post-arrest bailillegal detentionconstitutional guaranteesright to libertyremandspecial court jurisdictionpolice report
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a direct application for bail filed before the Sindh High Court seeking the release of the applicant, who was arrested under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, for alleged possession of an unlicensed pistol. The core legal questions involved the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant bail in cases triable by a Special Court, the applicability of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 regarding arrest and remand in relation to constitutional guarantees, and the consequences of a delay in submitting the police report under section 173 of the Code. The High Court held that its jurisdiction to grant bail is not ousted by the 1975 Act, and that the statutory and constitutional safeguards concerning personal liberty and remand under Articles 9 and 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, and sections 61, 62, and 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 remain applicable until the Special Court takes formal cognizance of the matter. The court laid down the principle that violation of mandatory detention procedures renders continued detention illegal, warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant bail?
  • Are the provisions of sections 61, 62, and 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 applicable to arrests made under special legislation?
  • What is the effect on detention when statutory remand and production timelines under the law and the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 are violated?
  • When does a Special Court take cognizance of a case to the exclusion of ordinary provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Anwar vs Atlas Autos Ltd., Karachi And Another1997 PLC 710 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-12-19Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Ahsan, U.S., Railway Mail Service, Lahore And 5 Other vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Communication, Islamabad And 6 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Ahsan, D.S., Railway Mail Service, Lahore and 5 others vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Communication, Islamabad and 6 others1997 PLC (C.S.) 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  seniority disputecivil servicedepartmental promoteesdirect recruitsprobationersappointment conditionsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions for leave to appeal arising from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the determination of seniority in BPS-17 within the Postal Group. The petitioners, who were probationers from the 1985 competitive examination, were appointed in 1987 to replace candidates who failed to join. Their appointment letters contained a specific condition stating they would rank senior to the probationers of the 1986 competitive examination. A dispute arose when the department placed departmental promotees, who were promoted in 1987, senior to the petitioners. The petitioners argued that their appointment letter guaranteed seniority over 1986 probationers, which should preclude them from being junior to those promoted in 1987. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the specific seniority guarantee in the petitioners' appointment letters regarding 1986 probationers also entitled them to claim seniority over departmental promotees who joined in 1986 and 1987. The Court held that this issue is of general public importance affecting numerous government employees, necessitating a definitive legal interpretation of seniority rules in the context of direct recruits versus departmental promotees.

  Questions settled

  • Does a specific seniority guarantee in an appointment letter regarding a particular batch of probationers automatically grant seniority over departmental promotees?
  • Under civil service rules, do departmental promotees rank senior to direct recruits when both are inducted in the same year?
  • Can a condition in an appointment letter regarding seniority relative to one group be interpreted to establish seniority relative to a different category of employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Ahsan And 5 Others vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Communications, Islamabad And 6 Other1997 SCMR 1365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-18
  seniority disputecivil servicedepartmental promoteesdirect recruitsappointment conditionsleave to appealFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the determination of seniority in B.P.S. 17 within the Postal Group. The petitioners, direct recruits from the 1985 competitive examination, were appointed in 1987. Their appointment letters contained a condition stipulating they would rank senior to probationers of the 1986 competitive examination. A dispute arose when the department placed departmental promotees, who were regularized in 1987, senior to the petitioners. The petitioners contended that their appointment condition guaranteed seniority over all those inducted in 1986 and 1987. Conversely, the respondents argued the condition only addressed seniority relative to 1986 probationers and did not override seniority rules concerning departmental promotees. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the specific seniority assurance provided in the petitioners' appointment letters effectively granted them seniority over departmental promotees inducted in the same year. The Court held that this issue is of general public importance affecting numerous government employees and directed that any promotions made pending the final decision shall remain subject to the outcome of these appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does a specific seniority clause in an appointment letter granting seniority over a specific batch of probationers automatically grant seniority over departmental promotees inducted in the same year?
  • Do departmental promotees rank senior to direct recruits when both are inducted into the same grade in the same year under the Rules of Seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Ahmed vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 1755 · Sindh High Court · 1997-06-18Read full judgment →
• Nadar Ali vs Mst. Hussain Bibi And 5 Other1997 CLC 1549 · Lahore High Court · 1997-05-30Read full judgment →
• Nabi Shah vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 943 · Sindh High Court · 1996-10-10Read full judgment →
• Nabi Bakhsh vs The State1997 MLD 1221 · Lahore High Court · 1995-05-04Read full judgment →
• Nabeela Anjum vs Rana Muhammad Azam and 2 others1997 P Cr. L J 1437 · Lahore High Court · 1997-04-28Read full judgment →