Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Associated Stone Industries (Kotah) Ltd vs Commissioner of Income-1997 PTD 1810 · Supreme Court of India · 1997-02-05Read full judgment →
• Associated Power Co. Ltd vs Commissioner of Income Tax1997 PTD 757 · Supreme Court of India · 1995-11-28Read full judgment →
• Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Collector, Badin vs Haji Abdul Shakoor And Other1997 SCMR 919 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-15
  deficit court-feelimitationcontumacyland acquisitionfirst appealdiscretionary powersupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed the petitioner's first appeal against a land acquisition award on the ground that it was filed with a deficient court-fee and was barred by limitation under Article 156 of the Limitation Act. The core legal question was whether an appellate court is bound to extend time for making up a deficient court-fee under Section 149 read with Order VII, Rule 11(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, regardless of the appellant's conduct or the expiry of the limitation period. The Supreme Court held that while an appellate court has the discretion to allow the making up of a deficit court-fee, such discretion will not be exercised in favor of an appellant whose conduct is found to be negligent, contumacious, or tainted with positive mala fides. The Court laid down the principle that the provisions allowing for the correction of deficient court-fees do not grant an absolute right to an extension of time where the appellant acts with obstinacy or stubbornness, and the appellate court is justified in refusing indulgence and dismissing the appeal as time-barred under such circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is bound to grant time to make up a deficient court-fee under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure regardless of the period of limitation?
  • Can an appeal filed with an insufficient court-fee stamp be deemed properly instituted if the deficiency is made up after the expiry of the limitation period?
  • Does the concept of contumacy disentitle an appellant from seeking the discretionary extension of time for payment of court-fees?
  • What is the effect of a litigant's negligent and contumacious conduct on the appellate court's power to condone delay regarding court-fee deficits?
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• Assessee. Department vs AssesseePTCL 1997 CL. 129 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1997-03-05Read full judgment →
• Assessee vs DepartmentPTCL 1997 CL. 109 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1996-09-23Read full judgment →
• Aslam And Another vs The State1997 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-17
  murder convictionocular evidenceinterested witnessmedical evidencefalsus in uno falsus in omnibuscorroborationcriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal appeals against a High Court judgment maintaining murder convictions under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concern whether ocular testimony requires corroboration when witnesses are related to the deceased, whether medical evidence suggesting a mere possibility of a single shot overrides direct eyewitness accounts, and whether the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus applies to criminal trials. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the convictions. It held that relationship to the deceased does not automatically render a witness interested or unreliable, and that courts must evaluate the inherent worth of evidence. The Court affirmed that medical opinion based on mere possibility cannot supersede credible ocular testimony. Furthermore, it rejected the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, establishing that courts must sift the grain from the chaff to separate truth from exaggeration, even when some co-accused are acquitted due to lack of corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relationship of a witness to the deceased automatically render their testimony unreliable or require corroboration?
  • Can medical evidence suggesting a mere possibility of a single shot override credible ocular testimony?
  • Does the maxim 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' apply to the evaluation of evidence in criminal cases in Pakistan?
  • Is an investigating officer's concession regarding the innocence of the accused binding on the court?
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• Asif Ali Khoja vs Government of Sindh1997 PLC (C.S.) 776 · Sindh High Court · 1997-04-04
  service matterjurisdiction of civil courtArticle 212show-cause noticemala fidesterms and conditions of serviceservice tribunalconstitutional ouster
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal challenged an order rejecting a civil suit filed by a civil servant against a show-cause notice regarding the recall of his promotion. The core legal question was whether a civil servant could invoke the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to challenge an interlocutory departmental action (a show-cause notice) by alleging mala fides, despite the constitutional bar on jurisdiction regarding service matters. The Court held that the suit was barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. It affirmed that matters concerning terms and conditions of service, including interlocutory steps like show-cause notices, must be agitated before the relevant Service Tribunal upon the passing of a final order. The Court emphasized that the constitutional ouster of jurisdiction under Article 212 is absolute and cannot be bypassed by alleging mala fides without specific, substantial pleadings. The principle laid down is that a civil servant cannot circumvent the statutory appellate process by invoking the Civil Court's jurisdiction at an intermediate stage, as such actions must eventually merge into a final, appealable order before the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant challenge an interlocutory show-cause notice in a Civil Court before a final departmental order is passed?
  • Does the constitutional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in service matters even when mala fides are alleged?
  • Is a show-cause notice regarding service terms and conditions considered a final order appealable before a Service Tribunal?
  • Can a civil servant bypass the Service Tribunal by claiming a violation of Fundamental Rights in a service-related dispute?
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• Asiatic Chemical Industries Ltd. vs Punjab Agricultural Research1997 CLC 1606 · Lahore High Court · 1997-06-06Read full judgment →
• Asian Techs Ltd vs Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and another1997 PTD 770 · Kerala High Court · 1995-01-13Read full judgment →
• Ashok vs The State1997 SCMR 436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-20
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaySection 497 CrPCconclusion of trialInvestigating Officer attendancedeemed bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the order of the High Court of Sind, which had dismissed the petitioner's bail application based on statutory delay under the 3rd proviso to Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court had directed the Trial Court to procure the attendance of the Investigating Officer and conclude the trial within three months. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on statutory grounds due to the non-conclusion of the trial within the Court-mandated timeframe where the delay was not attributable to him. The Supreme Court observed that despite the High Court's explicit direction, the trial remained incomplete, and the petitioner was in no way responsible for the delay. Converting the petition into an appeal, the Supreme Court granted a final one-month extension for concluding the trial, ordering that if the trial was not concluded within that period, the petitioner would be deemed granted bail upon executing the specified surety and personal bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay in concluding a criminal trial not attributable to the accused entitles the accused to statutory bail under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can grant conditional deemed bail if the trial court fails to conclude the trial within a specified extended timeframe?
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• Ashok Leyland Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1997 PTD 1965 · Supreme Court of India · 1996-12-19Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Muhammad vs The State1997 MLD 1361 · Lahore High Court · 1995-06-05Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain and anothers vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 916 · Lahore High Court · 1996-02-28Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain And Another vs The State1997 MLD 77 · Lahore High Court · 1995-07-10Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Ali Shujra vs Muhammad Ali And Another1997 SCMR 1458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-07
  leave to appealoffence of qazfimputation of zinarevision petitioncriminal complaintremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had allowed a revision petition and remanded a criminal complaint to the Additional Sessions Judge for proceeding in accordance with law. The underlying complaint was filed under sections 6, 10, and 11 of the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979, and had been summarily dismissed by the trial court. The core legal question concerns whether the statements made by the petitioner constituted an imputation of Zina amounting to Qazf under the Ordinance, or whether they merely referred to other offences under the law without alleging Zina. The Supreme Court held that there was substance in the petitioner's contention that the complaint did not disclose an allegation of Zina and that subsequent improvements made by witnesses could not advance the complainant's case. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted, and further proceedings before the trial court were stayed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allegation that does not specifically impute Zina constitutes the offence of Qazf under the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can improvements made by witnesses in their preliminary statements advance a criminal complaint when the original complaint fails to disclose the essential ingredients of the offence?
  • When is leave to appeal appropriately granted against an order of the Federal Shariat Court remanding a criminal complaint for further proceedings?
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• Ashfaq Hussain vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 1172 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-21Read full judgment →
• Ashfaq Ahmad vs University of the Punjab Through Vicechancellor, Senate Hall, Lahore And Another1997 MLD 87 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-11Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 1306 · Lahore High Court · 1997-04-23
  post-arrest bailattempt to commit qatl-i-amdhurtprohibitory clausefurther inquiryintent to killbailable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, Asghar Ali, who was charged under Section 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with the subsequent addition of Section 337-F(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an alleged shooting incident involving a property dispute between brothers. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the injuries and the applicability of the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court observed that the injuries sustained by the victim were not on vital parts of the body, and the assailants did not repeat fire, suggesting a lack of clear intent to kill. Consequently, the Court held that the applicability of Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 required further inquiry, and since the offence under Section 337-F(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is bailable, the petitioner was entitled to bail. The principle laid down is that where the intent to commit murder is questionable due to the non-vital location of injuries and lack of repeated fire, the case warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of injuries on vital parts of the body and the failure to repeat fire raise a question of intent requiring further inquiry under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is an offence under Section 337-F(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 considered bailable for the purpose of bail adjudication?
  • When does a case involving Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 warrant the grant of bail on the basis of further inquiry?
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• Asad Riaz vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore And 4 Other1997 SCMR 1611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-23
  land consolidationconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionrevenue authoritiesleave to appealconsolidation of holdingsjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a Constitutional Petition against a decision by the Member, Board of Revenue, regarding land consolidation. The petitioner argued that the Board of Revenue's modification of the consolidation scheme was inequitable, lacked proper notice to affected landowners, and misidentified the land in dispute. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly declined to interfere in its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. The Court reaffirmed the principle that revenue authorities possess exclusive jurisdiction to determine factual matters concerning land consolidation, such as the allocation of specific Khasra or Killa numbers. Consequently, the High Court cannot sit in judgment over these decisions unless they are perverse or without jurisdiction. The Court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the modification caused any reduction in his entitlement or ownership rights. As no question of public importance arose, the Court refused leave to appeal, maintaining that the revenue authorities' findings on land distribution convenience are final and not subject to judicial review under Article 199.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with the factual findings of Revenue Authorities regarding land consolidation in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure of a Revenue Authority to hear all affected landowners in a consolidation scheme modification violate the proviso to subsection (4) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance 1960?
  • Is a decision by a Revenue Authority regarding the allocation of specific land parcels subject to judicial review if it is not shown to be perverse or without jurisdiction?
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• Asad And Others vs The State1997 MLD 1384 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Aryan Petro Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Ministry of Finance And 4 Other1997 SCMR 968 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-07
  leave to appealcustoms dutysales tax refundwithdrawal of concessiondiscriminationpromissory estoppelconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 14-6-1995, which dismissed writ petitions challenging the withdrawal of customs duty repayments and sales tax refunds. The Central Board of Revenue had initially authorised repayment and refund concessions for the import of plastic moulding compound and plastic goods via a 1991 notification, but subsequently withdrew the concession in respect of plastic shopping bags exported to Afghanistan through a 1994 notification. The core legal questions involve whether the withdrawal of the tax concession was discriminatory under constitutional safeguards and whether the principle of promissory estoppel applied. The High Court had held that exemptions could be withdrawn and that the notification applied generally to all exporters of plastic shopping bags to Afghanistan without discrimination. Upon consideration of the contentions regarding the rationale of the withdrawal and alleged discriminatory treatment, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, ordering that interim stay orders continue pending final disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the withdrawal of a tax exemption or concession by the Government violates the constitutional safeguard against discrimination?
  • Does the principle of promissory estoppel apply to prevent the Government from withdrawing a customs duty and sales tax concession once granted?
  • Whether the withdrawal of a concession in respect of one particular item or industry provides valid grounds for invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
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• Aryan Petro Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd vs Ministry of Finance and 4 others1997 PTD 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-07
  customs dutysales tax refunddiscriminatory notificationpromissory estoppelconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appealtax concession withdrawal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment regarding the withdrawal of a tax concession. The petitioners, exporters of plastic shopping bags to Afghanistan, challenged a government notification that withdrew a previously granted repayment of customs duties and refund of sales tax specifically for their product. The petitioners argued that the withdrawal was discriminatory and lacked a valid basis, contending that the government's justification—alleged misuse and smuggling—was contradicted by official correspondence from the Collectorate of Customs and Central Excise. The High Court had previously dismissed the petitions, ruling that the government possessed the authority to withdraw exemptions and that the principle of promissory estoppel did not apply, finding no discrimination as the notification applied to all exporters of the specific item. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the contentions regarding the factual basis for the withdrawal and the potential for discriminatory treatment, granted leave to appeal. The Court held that the arguments raised by the petitioners regarding the validity of the withdrawal and constitutional safeguards against discrimination required further judicial consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government withdraw a tax concession or exemption previously granted through a notification?
  • Does the withdrawal of a tax concession for a specific item violate constitutional safeguards against discrimination if it applies to all exporters of that item?
  • Is the principle of promissory estoppel applicable to the withdrawal of tax concessions by the government?
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• Arman Khan vs The Presiding Officer, VTH Sindh Labour Court, Karachi1997 PLC 230 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-04-14Read full judgment →
• Arif Hussain, Sub-Engineer, Power Station Mangla, WAPDA, District1997 PLC (C.S.) 1137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-01
  seniority disputeWAPDAsurplus employeesservice lawabsorption in serviceFederal Service Tribunaladministrative policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment regarding a seniority dispute between two WAPDA employees. The petitioner, a Sub-Engineer, sought seniority from his initial date of appointment, despite having been declared surplus in a previous cadre and subsequently absorbed into a new one. The core legal question concerned whether such surplus staff are entitled to seniority from their original appointment date or from the date of absorption into the new cadre, and whether the department could unilaterally revise a finalized seniority list. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, ruling that WAPDA’s standing policy mandates that surplus employees absorbed into a new cadre must be placed at the bottom of the seniority list, with seniority reckoned from the date of absorption. The Court affirmed that once a representation regarding seniority is rejected and the position attains finality, the department cannot arbitrarily review and alter that position to the detriment of others. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, confirming the restoration of the seniority list issued on 23-10-1994.

  Questions settled

  • Does the seniority of a surplus employee absorbed into a new cadre date from the initial appointment or the date of absorption?
  • Can a department unilaterally revise a seniority list after a previous representation regarding that position has been rejected?
  • Is an employee declared surplus in one cadre entitled to carry over seniority to a different cadre within the same organization?
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• Arif Hussain, Sub Engineer, Power Station Mangla, WAPDA, District1997 SCMR 1721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-01
  seniority disputeWAPDAsurplus employeeservice lawabsorption in servicecadre seniorityFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding a seniority dispute between two WAPDA employees. The core legal question was whether a surplus employee, upon absorption into a new cadre, is entitled to seniority from their original date of appointment or from the date of absorption into the new cadre, and whether the department could unilaterally revise a settled seniority position. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Tribunal's decision that the petitioner, having been declared surplus and absorbed into a new cadre, must be placed at the bottom of the seniority list of the new cadre, with seniority reckoned from the date of absorption. The court affirmed that administrative policy regarding surplus staff is binding; once an employee is absorbed into a new cadre, they cannot claim seniority from their previous service, and a department cannot unilaterally review and alter a seniority position that has attained finality through previous unchallenged rejections of the employee's representations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a surplus employee absorbed into a new cadre retain seniority from their original date of appointment?
  • Can a department unilaterally review and revise a seniority position that has previously attained finality?
  • Is a surplus employee entitled to be placed at the bottom of the seniority list of the new cadre upon absorption?
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• Arbab Ali vs The State1997 MLD 2717 · Sindh High Court · 1995-11-15Read full judgment →
• Arabian Express Line Ltd. of United Kingdom and others vs Union of India1997 PTD 833 · Gujarat High Court · 1994-04-06Read full judgment →
• Aqil Badshah vs Mayor, Karachi Metropolitan Corporation And Another1997 MLD 3229 · Sindh High Court · 1997-05-02Read full judgment →
• Aqeel Assam vs Principal, Government Vocational Institute, Multan1997 PLC (C.S.) 118 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1996-01-30Read full judgment →
• Anwar Ul Rehman And Others vs Modaraba Almali1997 MLD 3132 · Sindh High Court · 1996-08-21Read full judgment →
• Anwar Khan vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 1999 · Sindh High Court · 1997-07-02Read full judgment →
• Anwar Bibi And Others vs Raja1997 SCMR 1081 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Anwar Beg, S.E.T. and 2 others vs Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary Education, N.-W.F.P. and 2 others1997 PLC (C.S.) 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-27
  service tribunalregularization of servicegraded payexercise of jurisdictionleave to appealcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves three petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Service Tribunal. The petitioners, appointed as S.E.T. (Science) in BPS-15 on fixed pay, sought regularization of their services and the grant of graded pay from their initial dates of appointment. While the Service Tribunal partially allowed the appeals by directing the department to award graded pay from the date the petitioners acquired the requisite B.Ed. qualification, it failed to address or adjudicate the prayer regarding the regularization of their appointments. The petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that this omission constituted a failure to exercise vested jurisdiction, particularly in light of Section 3 of the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act, 1988. The Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal's failure to decide the regularization prayer required further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Tribunal erred in failing to exercise its jurisdiction regarding the regularization claim, thereby establishing that a judicial or quasi-judicial body must adjudicate all prayers raised in an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a Service Tribunal to decide a specific prayer in an appeal amount to a failure to exercise vested jurisdiction?
  • Are employees appointed on fixed pay entitled to regularization under the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act 1988?
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• Anwar Beg, S.E.T. And 2 Other vs Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary Education, N.-W.F.P.U And 2 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-27
  service tribunalregularization of servicesgraded payjurisdictionleave to appealcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions filed by S.E.T. (Science) teachers appointed on fixed pay in 1987 who subsequently improved their qualifications and sought regularization and graded pay. The petitioners appealed to the Service Tribunal, which partially allowed their appeals by directing the department to award graded pay from the date they acquired the requisite B.Ed. qualification. However, the Tribunal failed to adjudicate upon the petitioners' prayer for the regularization of their appointments. Upon seeking leave to appeal, the petitioners contended that the Tribunal's failure to address the regularization issue constituted a refusal to exercise vested jurisdiction, particularly in light of Section 3 of the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act, 1988. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the Tribunal's omission to decide the prayer for regularization required judicial examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Tribunal erred in failing to exercise its jurisdiction regarding the regularization claim, thereby ensuring that all prayers in the original appeal are properly addressed and adjudicated upon according to law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Service Tribunal's failure to decide a specific prayer in an appeal constitute a refusal to exercise vested jurisdiction?
  • Are civil servants appointed on fixed pay entitled to regularization under the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act 1988?
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• Anwaar Ali vs Mst. Riaz Anwar And Another1997 MLD 1788 · Lahore High Court · 1996-11-06Read full judgment →
• Anjuman Tajran Charam vs The Commissioner, Faisalabad Division, Faisalabad And 3 Other1997 CLC 1281 · Lahore High Court · 1997-04-02Read full judgment →
• Anjum Nisar Mir, Advocate vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 808 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1994-04-24Read full judgment →
• Anjum M, Saleem Lahore vs I.A.C. Range-11 Company Zone-II, Lahore1997 P.C.T.L.R. 21 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1996-09-15Read full judgment →
• Anisul Rehman and 12 others vs Government of Sindh through Secretary, Excise and Taxation, Karachi and 5 others1997 PLC (C.S.) 577 · Sindh High Court · 1996-10-02Read full judgment →
• Anisul Rehman And 12 Other vs Government of Sindh Through Secretary, Excise And Taxation, Karachi And 5 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 577 · Sindh High Court · 1996-10-02Read full judgment →
• Anis Ahmed Khan vs The State1997 MLD 2463 · Sindh High Court · 1995-12-24Read full judgment →
• Anis Ahmed And 7 Others vs Messrs Habib Bank Limited1997 MLD 1 · Sindh High Court · 1996-01-10Read full judgment →
• Anees Ahmed Khan vs Mst. Safia Anees And Other1997 MLD 2257 · Sindh High Court · 1996-05-08Read full judgment →
• Aneel Kumar and 2 others vs University of Karachi and others1997 PLD Supreme Court 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-13
  migration of medical studentsright to equalityequal protection of lawuniversity migration rulesmedical college transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of Constitution Petitions by the High Court of Sindh, concerning the refusal of the University of Karachi to accept the migration of medical students from colleges in the interior of Sindh to Sindh Medical College, Karachi. The core legal question was whether the University of Karachi was justified in refusing migration and whether such refusal violated the principle of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, given that migrations had been granted to similarly placed students. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and held that although students have no vested right to migration and that indiscriminate migration without justifiable cause is deprecated, the refusal to treat the petitioners alike with other similarly placed students constituted a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution. The Court directed the University of Karachi to allow the petitioners' migration to prevent ruining their academic careers, while laying down principles that future migration requests must be strictly scrutinized and supported by compelling reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Whether students have a vested right to claim migration from one medical college to another?
  • Does the refusal to allow migration to certain students while granting it to others similarly placed violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can migration requests be entertained after the expiry of the time limit prescribed by university regulations?
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• Anarkali Sarabhai vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1997 PTD 2249 · Supreme Court of India · 1997-01-24Read full judgment →
• Amiruz Zaman alias Amiro vs The State and anothers1997 P Cr. L J 1200 · Sindh High Court · 1997-03-31Read full judgment →
• Amir Khan vs Muhammad Iqbal And 2 Other1997 MLD 1226 · Peshawar High Court · 1994-04-02Read full judgment →
• Amir Jan and 3 others vs Haji Ghulam Muhammad1997 PLD Supreme Court 883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-07-02
  pre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatTalbsOrder VI Rule 2 CPCpleadingsmaterial factsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a pre-emption suit filed by respondent Haji Ghulam Muhammad regarding the sale of land under Mutation No. 201. The respondent alleged in his plaint that upon gaining knowledge of the sale, he immediately declared his intention to pre-empt the land, thereby making Talb-i-Muwathibat, followed by the requisite notice. The petitioners contested the suit, claiming that the requirements of Talbs under Section 13 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act (Act X of 1987) were not met and that specific details regarding time, place, and witnesses were omitted from the plaint. The trial court decreed the suit, and both the District Judge and High Court affirmed the judgment. On a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether the omission of specific details (time, place, and witnesses) of Talb-i-Muwathibat in the plaint vitiated the proceedings under Order VI, Rule 2 C.P.C. The Supreme Court held that Order VI, Rule 2 C.P.C. requires pleading material facts, not the evidence by which they are to be proved. Stating the material fact of making Talb-i-Muwathibat upon gaining knowledge of the sale is sufficient to allow the party to lead evidence. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order VI, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure require a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit to specify the exact time, place, and witnesses of Talb-i-Muwathibat in the plaint?
  • Is a statement in the plaint that the pre-emptor declared his intention to pre-empt immediately upon learning of the sale sufficient pleading to admit evidence of Talb-i-Muwathibat?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding compliance with Section 13 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 be interfered with in the absence of material irregularity?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Hamza, Ex-S.S.P. vs Federation of Pakistan/President of Pakistan/1997 PLC (C.S.) 732 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-11-10Read full judgment →
• Amir Dad vs Ghazanfar Ali And Another1997 MLD 683 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1996-08-05Read full judgment →
• Amer Yar Khan vs Principal, Allama Iqbal Medical College And Other1997 MLD 2379 · Lahore High Court · 1997-03-14Read full judgment →
• Amanullah vs The State1947 P Cr. L J 1578 · Sindh High Court · 1997-04-28Read full judgment →
• Amanullah vs Province of Sindh And Other1997 MLD 2936 · Sindh High Court · 1997-04-30Read full judgment →
• Amanullah vs Mst. Husna1997 PLD Karachi 306 · Sindh High Court · 1995-01-22Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Khan And Others vs Kohat Cement Co. And Other1997 MLD 2419 · Lahore High Court · 1997-01-26Read full judgment →
• Amanullah and anothers vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 1927 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-07-02
  bail bond forfeituresurety liabilityquantum of penaltyabscondence of accusedcriminal revisionjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mardan, which directed the petitioners to forfeit their bail bonds of Rs. 1,00,000 each due to the abscondence of the accused, for whom they stood surety. The petitioners argued that the forfeiture amount was excessively harsh, noting that they acted out of humanitarian grounds and familial relationship rather than financial gain, and that the accused's absence was not due to their connivance. The core legal question was the appropriate quantum of forfeiture for bail bonds when the accused absconds. The Court held that while the sureties were liable for the forfeiture, the trial court had acted with undue severity. Relying on the principle established in Dildar v. The State, the Court emphasized that a balance must be struck between undue leniency and undue severity, considering factors such as the surety's financial status, lack of connivance, and the absence of financial interest. Consequently, the Court reduced the forfeiture amount to 1/10th of the original bond amount, setting it at Rs. 10,000 for each petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • What factors should a court consider when determining the quantum of forfeiture for a bail bond?
  • Is a surety liable for the full amount of a bail bond if the accused absconds without the surety's connivance?
  • Does a familial relationship between the surety and the accused mitigate the penalty for bond forfeiture?
  • Must a court balance the principles of leniency and severity when ordering the forfeiture of bail bonds?
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• Amanullah And Another vs The State1997 MLD 1402 · Lahore High Court · 1995-02-08Read full judgment →
• Amanul Mulk vs Mian Ghafoor Ur Rehman And Other1997 SCMR 1796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-27
  constructive res judicataSection 11 CPCExplanation IV Section 11 CPCredemption of mortgagecivil revisionleave to appealgift deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision and affirmed the concurrent dismissal of a suit for possession by redemption of mortgaged property. The core legal question was whether the subsequent suit filed by the petitioner was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata under Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in light of earlier litigation concerning the validity of a registered gift deed over the same property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, refusing to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court laid down that constructive res judicata compels parties to bring their entire case before the court by raising all available grounds of attack and defence. If a party fails to assert an available ground in a former suit, it is deemed by legal fiction to have been raised, heard, and decided, precluding its assertion in a subsequent suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of constructive res judicata bar a party from raising in a subsequent suit a ground that was available but omitted in a former suit?
  • Can a party reserve available grounds of attack or defence for the purpose of initiating a second suit?
  • Whether a suit for redemption of property is hit by res judicata where the underlying title to the property was already adjudicated in a prior suit between substantially the same parties?
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• Amanat Ali, PTC Teacher vs Deputy District Education Officer, Mian1997 PLC (C.S.) 109 · Lahore High Court · 1996-06-04Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain vs Government of Sindh through Home Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and anothers1997 PLD Karachi 600 · Sindh High Court · 1997-06-11
  constitutional petitionregistration of FIRcognizable offensealternate remedyprivate complaintdiscretionary reliefpolice station
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Sindh High Court seeking directions for the Station House Officer to register a First Information Report based on a written complaint lodged by the petitioner concerning a murder case, despite a previous F.I.R. having already been registered regarding the same transaction at another police station. The core legal questions involved whether a police officer's refusal to record an F.I.R. mandates constitutional intervention, and whether an alternate remedy by way of a private complaint constitutes an adequate and efficacious remedy. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the relief under constitutional jurisdiction is purely discretionary and should ordinarily be declined where an adequate alternate remedy, such as initiating a private complaint, is available. Furthermore, the Court laid down that while a police officer is generally bound to record an F.I.R. disclosing a cognizable offense, the exercise of discretion by the High Court to issue directions for registration depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case, and a private complaint provides an equally adequate mechanism for redress since a complainant can independently lead evidence before the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is bound to issue directions for the registration of an F.I.R. under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when a police officer declines to record it?
  • Does a private complaint provide an equally adequate and efficacious alternate remedy to a petitioner seeking the registration of a criminal case?
  • Whether mandatory requirements of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are fulfilled when a written complaint is sent by a person not present in Pakistan?
  • Does a police officer have the discretion to verify the prima facie correctness of allegations before registering an F.I.R. under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Altaf Husain and 2 others vs N.E.D. University of Engineering and Technology through ViceChancellor and another1997 PLD Karachi 289 · Sindh High Court · 1997-02-11
  University StatuteSyndicate jurisdictionService conditionsUltra viresConstitutional petitionStatus quoSenate authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arose from a service dispute between non-teaching staff and the N.E.D. University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi. The petitioners challenged a Syndicate Resolution that altered their terms and conditions of service, arguing it bypassed the statutory authority of the Senate. The core legal question was whether the Syndicate possessed the jurisdiction to unilaterally modify service conditions governed by existing University Statutes. The Court held that the Syndicate, as the executive body, is subject to the provisions of the N.E.D. University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi Act, 1977, and the Statutes passed by the Senate. It determined that the Syndicate Resolution was ultra vires and ineffective because the power to regulate such service conditions resides exclusively with the Senate, subject to the Chancellor's approval. The Court affirmed that existing Statutes remain binding until validly amended by the competent authority. Consequently, the Court directed the University to maintain the status quo in accordance with the existing Statutes until such time as the Senate lawfully amends them.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Syndicate of the N.E.D. University have the authority to unilaterally modify the terms and conditions of service of non-teaching staff?
  • Is the Syndicate of the N.E.D. University bound by the Statutes passed by the Senate?
  • Can a Syndicate Resolution override existing University Statutes without Senate approval and Chancellor's assent?
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• Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1997 PTD 1761 · Supreme Court of India · 1997-03-10Read full judgment →
• Allahdino vs Deputy Inspector-General of Police And Others1997 PLC (C. S.) 342 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1995-03-30Read full judgment →
• Allah Wadhayo and 22 others vs Pak Saudi Fertilizers Ltd., Mirpur1997 PLC 466 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-10-27Read full judgment →
• Allah Wadhayo And 22 Other vs Pak Saudi Fertilizers Ltd., Mirpur1997 PLC 466 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-10-27Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha And Others vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue And Other1997 CLC 1639 · Lahore High Court · 1997-05-28Read full judgment →
• Allah Nawaz Sheikh vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore And Another1997 SCMR 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-13
  lachesconstitutional petitionpremature retirementlabour lawgrievance petitionmisreading of evidencemala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a Constitutional petition due to laches, as the petition was filed thirteen months after the impugned order without explanation. The appellant, a former Pakistan Railways employee, sought to contest his premature retirement date, claiming he had requested an extension which was ignored, alleging mala fide intent by his employer. The Labour Court initially ruled in his favor, but the Labour Appellate Tribunal reversed this, finding no evidence that the appellant's extension requests were received or that relevant court cases were pending. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal, noting that the appellant failed to provide a valid explanation for the delay in the lower court. Furthermore, upon reviewing the merits, the Supreme Court held that the Labour Appellate Tribunal's findings were justified, as the documents relied upon by the appellant lacked evidentiary value or failed to support his claims. Consequently, the Court upheld the retirement date and dismissed the appeal, establishing that constitutional relief is unavailable where laches are unexplained and the underlying grievance lacks substantive merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be dismissed on the ground of laches if the delay in filing is not explained before the High Court?
  • Does the misreading of evidence by a tribunal justify interference in constitutional jurisdiction if the underlying claim lacks merit?
  • Is a document lacking the signature of the issuing authority admissible as evidence of a request for retirement extension?
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• Allah Yar vs The State1997 PLD Supreme Court 273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-09
  death sentencecommutation of sentencegrave and sudden provocationfamily honorcriminal appealmitigating circumstancesmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the propriety of the death sentence awarded to the appellant, Allah Yar, for the murder of Riaz Ahmed. The appellant was originally convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the trial court, which sentenced him to death, while his co-accused Akbar Shah received life imprisonment. The High Court maintained the appellant's conviction and sentence but acquitted the co-accused. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal specifically to review the sentencing. The evidence established that the motive for the murder was the abduction of the appellant's sister by the deceased's brother. Considering the appellant's young age (approximately 20 years) and the strong possibility that the crime was committed under the impulse of rehabilitating family honor, the Court held that the death penalty was not warranted. Consequently, the Court converted the death sentence to imprisonment for life, maintained the fine, and imposed additional compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, while granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can the death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment when the murder is committed under the impulse of rehabilitating family honor?
  • Does the young age of an offender constitute a mitigating factor for the reduction of a death sentence?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a sentence of life imprisonment?
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• Allah Ditta vs Bashir Ahmad1997 SCMR 181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-03
  specific performanceconsent ordertemporary injunctioncompromiseratificationleave to appealsuit dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal arising from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land, wherein a conditional temporary injunction was granted requiring the deposit of a balance sale price. The core legal question was whether a consent order passed by the High Court in an appeal against an interim injunction could lawfully dispose of the main suit upon failure to meet the deposit condition, and whether such a consent order is binding. The Supreme Court held that parties can enter into a lawful compromise or consent order regarding matters arising directly out of judicial proceedings, and a party who accepts the benefits of such an order and ratifies it through subsequent conduct cannot later challenge its validity or jurisdiction. The ratio laid down is that a consent order agreed to by counsel and ratified by a litigant's subsequent conduct is fully binding, and failure to comply with its penal conditions results in the lawful dismissal of the underlying suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court hearing an appeal against an interim injunction order can record a consent agreement disposing of the main suit?
  • Is a consent order entered into by a party's counsel binding on the client?
  • Does the subsequent conduct of a party amounting to ratification cure any potential excess of authority by counsel in a consent order?
  • Can a suit be deemed dismissed upon failure to comply with a conditional deposit requirement incorporated in a valid consent order?
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• Allah Ditta and others vs Sardar Khan and others1997 PLD Lahore 716 · Lahore High Court · 1996-12-04
  redemption of mortgageevacuee propertylimitation periodconstitutional jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefdelegation of powerscustodianbona fide purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from a dispute regarding the redemption of mortgaged land originally belonging to a local mortgagor and mortgaged in favor of an evacuee who subsequently migrated to India. The core legal questions involved whether the application for redemption was barred by time, whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Lands) had jurisdiction to entertain the redemption application, and whether the High Court should decline to set aside an illegal order in constitutional jurisdiction if doing so would revive another illegal order or cause injustice. The Lahore High Court held that the period of limitation stopped running against the evacuee mortgagee upon his migration under section 13 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and that the Custodian's powers were validly delegated to rehabilitation authorities under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957. The Court further held that even though a second revision petition was legally incompetent, it would decline to exercise discretionary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to set aside the impugned order because doing so would revive a manifestly illegal order and perpetuate injustice. The petition was accordingly dismissed with observations regarding compensation through alternate land.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period of limitation for redemption of a mortgage stop running against an evacuee mortgagee upon migration under the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner as a delegatee of the Custodian has jurisdiction to entertain an application for redemption of mortgaged evacuee property?
  • Will the High Court decline to set aside an illegal order in constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 if doing so revives another illegal order or causes injustice?
  • Does an allotment of land not treated as evacuee property before the appointed date convey valid title to subsequent purchasers?
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• Allah Ditta and others vs Province of Punjab1997 PLD Lahore 499 · Lahore High Court · 1997-02-02
  Land acquisitionUltra viresSubordinate legislationEminent domainPublic purposeDeeming clauseDirectory vs mandatoryConstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, focusing on the validity of Rules 7 and 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983. The core legal question was whether these rules, which impose a mandatory one-year time limit for issuing a notification under Section 5 of the Act, are consistent with the parent statute and intra vires. The Court held that Rules 7 and 8 are ultra vires the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court reasoned that the parent Act allows for acquisition "at any time" and does not prescribe a rigid terminal date; subordinate legislation cannot override the parent statute by imposing such limitations. Furthermore, the Court determined these rules are directory rather than mandatory, and acquisition proceedings cannot be automatically terminated by a deeming clause in subordinate rules. The key principle established is that subordinate legislation must remain consistent with the parent statute and cannot impose restrictions or terminal dates not contemplated by the enabling Act, nor can it defeat the Act's purpose through deeming provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Are Rules 7 and 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, consistent with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Can subordinate legislation impose a terminal date for acquisition proceedings when the parent Act does not provide one?
  • Are the provisions of Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, directory or mandatory in nature?
  • Does a deeming clause in subordinate rules have the power to automatically terminate acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
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• Allah Ditta And Others vs Muhammad Siddiq And Other1997 CLC 2000 · Board of Revenue · 1996-04-23Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta And 3 Others vs The State1997 MLD 1193 · Lahore High Court · 1995-05-02Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta And 2 Others vs The State1997 SCMR 891 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-05
  suspension of sentencebail pending appealinordinate delaysuppression of terrorist activitiescriminal appealtriple murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' application for the suspension of execution of their sentences. The petitioners, convicted of triple murder and other offenses by a Special Court, argued for bail pending appeal based on an inordinate delay of over four and a half years in the disposal of their appeal by the High Court. They contended that under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, the High Court was statutorily required to decide the appeal within three months. The Supreme Court considered whether bail could be granted solely on the ground of delay in the appellate process. The Court held that while the delay was unfortunate, suspension of sentence on the ground of delay alone is not permissible under the Act, particularly in cases involving serious offenses like triple murder. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that delay alone does not warrant bail in such circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Can the execution of a sentence be suspended solely on the ground of delay in the disposal of an appeal?
  • Is the High Court statutorily required to decide appeals under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975 within three months?
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• Allah Dad And 9 Others vs Province of Punjab And Another1997 MLD 526 · Lahore High Court · 1996-02-08Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh vs The State1997 MLD 1242 · Lahore High Court · 1995-07-18Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh And Others vs The State And Other1997 SCMR 1395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-30
  murderocular evidencedeath sentencesentencing parityleave to appealcriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the convictions of the petitioners for murder. The petitioners were convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the killing of the deceased, Mahar Bakhsh. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular evidence, the presence of the witnesses at the scene, the consistency between medical and ocular evidence, and the proportionality of the death sentence awarded to one petitioner compared to the life imprisonment awarded to co-accused for similar roles. The Supreme Court found the ocular evidence of the complainant and the witness credible, noting the prompt registration of the F.I.R. and the corroborative medical evidence. The Court rejected arguments regarding the place of incident and the alleged manipulation of investigation records. However, finding substance in the argument regarding sentencing parity, the Court granted leave to appeal to the petitioner sentenced to death to scrutinize whether the sentence should be commuted to life imprisonment, while dismissing the petitions of the other co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prompt registration of an F.I.R. negate the possibility of police manipulation in the investigation?
  • Can a court grant leave to appeal solely to scrutinize the proportionality of a death sentence when co-accused received life imprisonment for similar roles?
  • Is the testimony of a witness who is a tenant on neighboring land sufficient to establish presence at the scene of a crime?
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• Allah Bakhsh And 15 Others vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore And 6 Other1997 MLD 1779 · Lahore High Court · 1996-10-21Read full judgment →
• ALl Khan Subanpoto vs Federation of Pakistan and others1997 PLC (C.S.) 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-02
  Service Tribunalreview petitionadverse remarksdelay in judgmentCivil Procedure Codepetition for leave to appealjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's review petition against the dismissal of his service appeal concerning adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Report. The core legal questions addressed by the Supreme Court include whether the Service Tribunal has the power to review its own judgments in the absence of enabling provisions in the governing statute, and whether a delay in pronouncing a judgment or the failure to give notice of its pronouncement under the Code of Civil Procedure vitiates the Tribunal's order. The Court held that the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 contains no provision empowering the Tribunal to review its judgments, rendering the review petition incompetent ab initio. Furthermore, the Court held that while the Code of Civil Procedure does not strictly apply in its entirety to proceedings before the Tribunal, judicial and quasi-judicial forums must pronounce judgments promptly and fairly, and a delay of one month and twenty days does not vitiate the judgment where no prejudice is shown. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal possess the inherent or statutory jurisdiction to review its own judgments under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Are the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 strictly applicable to proceedings and appeals before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does a delay of one month and twenty days in pronouncing a judgment by the Service Tribunal vitiate its decision?
  • Does the failure to issue prior notice of the pronouncement of a judgment under Order XLI Rule 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 render the order illegal when no prejudice is caused to the party?
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• Ali Nawaz vs Ali Muhammad and others1997 P Cr. L J 1897 · Sindh High Court · 1997-04-24Read full judgment →
• Ali Nawaz And Others vs The State1997 MLD 1741 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-17Read full judgment →
• Ali Nawaz And 8 Others vs The State1997 MLD 2221 · Sindh High Court · 1996-11-10Read full judgment →
• Ali Nawaz And 2 Others vs The State1997 MLD 1725 · Sindh High Court · 1996-09-17Read full judgment →
• Ali Murad vs Chairman, WAPDA and others1997 PLC (C.S.) 530 · Sindh High Court · 1996-11-12Read full judgment →
• Ali Murad vs Chairman, WAPDA And Other1997 PLC (C.S.) 530 · Sindh High Court · 1996-11-12Read full judgment →
• Ali Murad vs Ayub Khan And Another1997 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-30
  criminal appealmurderappeal against acquittaldying declarationocular evidencemedical evidenceforensic science laboratorybenefit of doubtre-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the conviction and sentence of the respondent-accused for murder and theft, acquitting him by giving him the benefit of the doubt. The core legal question concerns the proper appreciation of ocular, medical, and circumstantial evidence, particularly regarding dying declarations, identification in torchlight, and weapon recoveries in criminal trials. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court misread the evidence, relied on conjectural assumptions, and wrongly discarded natural ocular witnesses and corroborative forensic reports. The ratio decidendi is that an appellate court should not interfere with a trial court's well-reasoned judgment of conviction based on speculative inferences, and that minor clerical discrepancies or hypothetical medical possibilities cannot outweigh reliable, direct, and corroborated eyewitness testimony. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, the acquittal was set aside, the trial court's conviction was restored, and the death sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in setting aside a conviction based on hypothetical medical opinions regarding the unconsciousness of an injured person who made a dying declaration?
  • What are the principles for interfering with an order of acquittal passed by a High Court?
  • Can the testimony of related eyewitnesses be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship when they are natural witnesses and corroborated by circumstances?
  • Does a clerical error in the date of preparing an injury sheet and inquest report vitiate the prosecution case?
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• Ali Muhammad vs Province of Sindh And Other1997 MLD 1113 · Sindh High Court · 1996-06-10Read full judgment →
• Ali Khan vs The State And Another1997 CLC 1203 · Board of Revenue · 1995-04-12Read full judgment →
• Ali Khan Subanpoto vs Federation of Pakistan And Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-02
  Service TribunalReview jurisdictionAnnual Confidential ReportJudgment pronouncementCode of Civil ProcedureAdverse remarksProcedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Federal Service Tribunal order dismissing a review petition concerning adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report. The core legal questions addressed were whether the Service Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction to review its own judgments and whether the procedural requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding judgment pronouncement apply to the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal lacks the power to review its own judgments under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Furthermore, the Court ruled that while the Tribunal must act justly, the strict procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are not fully applicable to its appellate proceedings. The Court established the principle that the Tribunal’s status as a Civil Court is a limited deeming provision for specific powers. Consequently, while judgments should be rendered promptly, a delay of one month and 20 days is not unreasonable, and the absence of notice for judgment pronouncement does not vitiate an order unless prejudice is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal possess the inherent jurisdiction to review its own judgments under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Are the procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the pronouncement of judgments strictly applicable to appeals before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the failure to provide notice of the date of judgment pronouncement automatically vitiate a judicial order?
  • What constitutes an unreasonable delay in the pronouncement of a judgment by a quasi-judicial forum?
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• Ali Khan Subanpoto vs Federation of Pakistan And Other1997 SCMR 1590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-02
  Service TribunalReview petitionCode of Civil ProcedureJudgment pronouncementAdverse remarksService lawAppellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal order that dismissed a review petition filed by the petitioner against an earlier judgment concerning adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Report. The core legal questions were whether the Service Tribunal possesses the inherent power to review its own judgments, whether the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) strictly applies to Tribunal proceedings, and whether a delay in pronouncing a judgment or failure to provide notice of such pronouncement vitiates the order. The Supreme Court held that the review petition was incompetent as the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, does not grant review powers. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while the Tribunal is deemed a civil court for specific purposes, the CPC does not apply strictly to its appellate proceedings. The Court established that while judicial forums must pronounce judgments promptly, a delay of one month and twenty days is not inherently unreasonable, and the absence of notice for judgment pronouncement does not vitiate an order absent proof of prejudice to the aggrieved party.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal possess the jurisdiction to review its own earlier judgment under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Are the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, strictly applicable to proceedings before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does a delay in the pronouncement of a judgment by the Service Tribunal automatically vitiate the order?
  • Does the failure to provide notice of the pronouncement of a judgment to the parties invalidate the order if no prejudice is shown?
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• Ali Hussain and 2 others vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 1727 · Lahore High Court · 1997-04-04Read full judgment →
• Ali Hasan vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 767 · Sindh High Court · 1994-06-15Read full judgment →
• Ali Hasan And Another vs Manzoor Ahmad And 4 Other1997 CLC 268 · Lahore High Court · 1996-02-04Read full judgment →
• Ali Anjum Shah vs Sar Anjum1997 CLC 425 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-04-18Read full judgment →
• Ali Anjam Shah vs Sar Anjam1997 MLD 3000 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-04-18Read full judgment →
• Ali Akram vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan Through Secretary, Establishment Division,Cabinet Secretariat, Government Of Pakistan, Islamabad And 2 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 520 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-12-18Read full judgment →
• Ali Akram vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others1997 PLC (C.S.) 520 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-12-18Read full judgment →
• Ali Akhtar And 3 Others vs University of the Punjab And Another1997 CLC 80 · Lahore High Court · 1996-07-31Read full judgment →
• Ali Akbar vs The State1997 P Cr. L J 783 · Sindh High Court · 1994-10-31Read full judgment →
• Ali Akbar and 2 others vs WAPDA through Chairman and another1997 PLC (C.S.) 705 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-12-24Read full judgment →