Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Dr. Fazal-E-Raziq vs Principal, Ayub Medical College and others1996 PLC (C.S.) 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-25
  service lawpromotionseniorityteaching experiencemedical collegeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the petitioner against the promotion of respondent No. 4 as Associate Professor and Professor in Pathology at Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad. The petitioner claimed he was senior and better qualified, arguing that the teaching experience and qualifications of respondent No. 4 should have been assessed under the amended Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulations and relevant service rules. The High Court had held that respondent No. 4 was governed by the unamended rules applicable at the time of his initial appointment, relying on a clarification letter from the Council. The petitioner contended before the Supreme Court that this view conflicted with established precedent holding that applicable rules and conditions are those in force on the date of consideration for promotion, and that service terms are governed by statutory civil servant rules rather than independent Council regulations. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine important questions regarding which regulatory framework governs the employees of the medical college and whether amended or unamended regulations apply to promotions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Regulations framed by the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council or the Ayub Medical College (Terms and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1980 would govern the cases of the employees of Ayub Medical College?
  • Whether the finding of the High Court that old Regulations govern the case of respondent No. 4 notwithstanding subsequent amendments is in accord with the law declared by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Faizur Rehman and others vs N.-W.F.P. Public Service Commission, Peshawar1996 SCMR 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-23
  public service commissionwaiting listcompetitive examinationqualifying testfuture vacanciesfundamental rightsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan disposes of seven consolidated appeals concerning the refusal of the N.-W.F.P. Public Service Commission to recommend the appellants for appointment against future vacancies based on a waiting list. The core legal question was whether candidates who appeared for interviews prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Musa Wazir's case (1993 SCMR 1124) acquired a vested right to be placed on a waiting list and appointed against subsequent vacancies in accordance with previous administrative practice. The Court held that interviews for specific advertised posts constitute a competitive process rather than a qualifying test, and that maintaining a waiting list for competitive examinations is illegal and violative of Fundamental Rights under the Constitution. The Court decided that the appellants, whose appointments had not been finalized prior to the Musa Wazir judgment, could not claim the benefit of the discontinued waiting list practice. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interviews conducted by a Public Service Commission for specific advertised posts constitute a competitive test or a qualifying examination?
  • Can a candidate claim a vested right to be recommended for appointment from a waiting list maintained by a Public Service Commission after such a practice has been declared illegal?
  • Does the maintenance of a waiting list for competitive examinations by a Public Service Commission violate the fundamental rights of citizens?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Atta Muhammad Khanzada vs Muhammad Sherin1996 CLC 1440 · Peshawar High Court · 1996-04-25Read full judgment →
• Dr. Amanullah Khan and anothers vs Chairman, Medical Research1996 SCMR 1211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-23
  original jurisdictionfundamental rightspublic interest litigationright to lifecigarette advertisingconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, seeking a judicial direction to ban television commercials promoting cigarettes. The petitioner contended that such advertising campaigns were contributing to the alarming rise of smoking-related health issues, such as cancer and heart disease, in Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court possesses the jurisdiction under Article 184(3) to issue such a directive. The Court held that its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) is strictly limited to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights enshrined in Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Constitution. The Court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate how the advertisements violated any specific Fundamental Right. While acknowledging the potential argument that Article 9 (right to life and liberty) could encompass the quality of life, the Court noted that the government already mandates health warnings on such advertisements. Consequently, the Court ruled that it lacked the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief and dismissed the petition, emphasizing the restricted scope of its original jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to ban commercial advertisements on television?
  • Is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution limited to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights contained in Chapter 1 of Part 2?
  • Does the broadcasting of cigarette advertisements on television violate the Fundamental Right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Aleem Mahmud vs The Appellate Authority through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 28 others1996 PLC (C.S.) 670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-14
  service tribunalseniorityleave to appealimplementation of judgmentcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Dr. Aleem Mahmud aggrieved by the alleged failure of departmental authorities to fix his seniority in accordance with a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal. The core legal question is whether the respondents implemented the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 12-5-1991 in letter and spirit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to examine the implementation of the Tribunal's judgment regarding seniority refixation. The key principle laid down is that departmental authorities are bound to implement judgments of the Service Tribunal strictly in letter and spirit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the departmental authorities have implemented the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal in letter and spirit?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted to examine the correct implementation of a Service Tribunal judgment regarding seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Aftab Ahmed and anothers vs The State1996 PLD Karachi 149 · Sindh High Court · 1995-11-12Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad vs The State1996 SCMR 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04
  leave to appealmurderself-defenseappreciation of evidenceeyewitness testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 11-1-1993, whereby the petitioner's conviction under section 302 and section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Sessions Judge, Vehari, was maintained, though the death sentence was converted to life imprisonment. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence, the establishment of guilt through eyewitness testimony, and the validity of the plea of self-defense. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through prompt lodging of the F.I.R., corroborated by injured and eyewitness testimonies, and that the plea of self-defense was rightly discarded by the courts below without any misreading of evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony is consistent, corroborated by a prompt F.I.R., and the occurrence is admitted by the accused with an untenable plea of self-defense, concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts will not be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of self-defense can be sustained when the prosecution case is established through prompt F.I.R. and consistent eyewitness testimony?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter?
  • Whether ocular testimony of an injured witness provides sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad vs Pakistan Steel Mills and anothers1996 CLC 530 · Sindh High Court · 1995-10-31
  fatal accidentsdamagesnegligencecompensatory costsvicarious liabilitypublic functionariestraffic accident
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil suit for the recovery of damages filed under the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, by the father of a deceased individual who lost his life in a traffic accident involving a bus owned by defendant No. 1 and driven by defendant No. 2. The core legal questions pertained to whether the death was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the defendant driver, the joint and several liability of the defendants for compensation, and the entitlement of the plaintiffs to costs, interest, and compensatory costs due to frivolous defenses raised by public bodies. The court held that the evidence established actionable negligence on the part of the driver in the course of his employment, rendering both defendants jointly and severally liable. The court laid down that public functionaries must not raise false, frivolous, or vexatious pleas to prolong litigation in fatal accident claims, and awarded damages along with interest and the maximum permissible compensatory costs under section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the owner of a vehicle is vicariously liable for the fatal accident caused by the negligence of its driver acting in the course of employment?
  • Can a plaintiff be awarded a higher amount of compensation than what was specifically claimed in the plaint?
  • Whether plaintiffs are entitled to interest from the date of the suit in claims arising under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855?
  • Are public bodies and government functionaries liable for compensatory costs when raising false and vexatious defenses in fatal accident litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Dosa vs The State1996 MLD 768 · Lahore High Court · 1994-10-17Read full judgment →
• Dodo and anothers vs The State1996 P Cr. L J 1326 · Sindh High Court · 1995-12-03Read full judgment →
• Doda Khan vs Government of Balochistan through its Secretary, Department of Education, Civil Secretariat, Quetta and 4 others1996 CLC 156 · Balochistan High Court · 1995-07-06Read full judgment →
• Doast Muhammad vs The State1996 PLD Lahore 217 · Lahore High Court · 1996-02-07Read full judgment →
• Diwan Azmat Said Muhammad vs Haji Bakhtiar Saeed1996 CLC 1427 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-11
  transfer of appealapprehension of biasparty to proceedingssuo motu transferinherent powersimpartial justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil application under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 sought the transfer of an appeal pending before an Additional District Judge to another court of competent jurisdiction on the ground of apprehension of bias. The core legal question revolved around whether an applicant seeking to be impleaded as a party via an application under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 qualifies as a 'party' entitled to maintain a transfer application, and whether the High Court could exercise transfer powers. The Lahore High Court held that a person whose interest is likely to be prejudiced and who has moved an impleadment application is covered under the term 'party' for the purposes of section 24, and in any event, the High Court possesses suo motu and inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as well as Article 203 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 to transfer cases. The court laid down the principle that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, and transfer is warranted when reasonable apprehensions of bias exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an applicant who has filed an application for impleadment as a party can maintain a transfer application under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the High Court possess suo motu and inherent powers under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Constitution to transfer a pending appeal?
  • What constitutes a 'party' under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in relation to pending judicial proceedings?
  • When can an appeal be transferred from one district to another on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the presiding officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Lahore vs Muhammad1996 SCMR 1199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-05-14
  suspension periodsubsistence allowancereinstated employeerailway employeeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the entitlement of a reinstated railway employee to full salary for the period of suspension without the deduction of subsistence allowance received during that period. The core legal question involves determining whether a reinstated employee is entitled to full salary or salary minus the subsistence allowance. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative pronouncement, considering conflicting single bench views of the High Court, previous observations regarding unpaid salary balances, and the ruling of the Shariat Appellate Bench on the Islamic injunctions concerning suspended government servants. The key principle noted is that the matter requires authoritative determination by a larger bench regarding the effect of subsistence allowance payments and Islamic injunctions on a suspended employee's salary rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a railway employee, upon reinstatement, is entitled to full salary for the period of suspension or to the salary minus the subsistence allowance received during that period?
  • What is the effect of the payment of subsistence allowance to civil servants during their suspension period on their final salary entitlement?
  • What is the impact of the Shariat Appellate Bench's ruling regarding the Injunctions of Islam on the salary of a suspended government servant?
  Read full judgment →
• District Superintendent of Post Office, Jhang and another vs Shahid1996 PLC 690 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-01-22Read full judgment →
• District Manager, Karachi Transport Corporation, Mehran Depot vs Muhammad Raees Ahmed and 2 others1996 PLC 367 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1995-12-20Read full judgment →
• District Manager, Karachi Transport Corporation, Karachi vs Zahoor Ahmed and another1996 PLC 558 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-03-11Read full judgment →
• District Manager, Karachi Transport Corporation, Karachi vs Muhammad Raees Ahmed and another1996 PLC 522 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-03-06Read full judgment →
• District Manager, K.T.C., Korangi Depot vs Mirza Ghulam Abbas and 71996 PLC 236 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1995-11-13Read full judgment →
• District and Sessions Judge vs Kirshan1996 P Cr. L J 995 · Sindh High Court · 1996-02-04Read full judgment →
• Director, Social Welfare, N.W.F.P., Peshawar vs Sadullah Khan1996 SCMR 1350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-13
  termination of serviceirregular appointmentreinstatementprocedural lapsecivil servantsappointing authorityservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against an order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, Peshawar. The respondent was appointed as a Salesman on a temporary basis by the competent authority but his services were subsequently terminated on the ground that his appointment was irregular and in violation of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989 and a departmental circular. The Service Tribunal reinstated the respondent, holding that a civil servant cannot be made to suffer for procedural lapses committed by the appointing authority. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision and refused leave to appeal. The Court held that an appointing authority cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own procedural lapses or irregularities in making a temporary appointment to subsequently terminate an employee's services, provided the employee possesses the requisite qualifications.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appointing authority terminate a civil servant's services by citing procedural irregularities that the authority itself committed during the appointment process?
  • Is a qualified employee liable to be terminated for procedural lapses attributable solely to the competent appointing authority?
  • Can the department take advantage of its own non-compliance with appointment rules to invalidate an appointment made by a competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Director, Social Welfare, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar vs Sadullah Khan1996 PLC (C.S.) 927 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-13
  service tribunalirregular appointmenttermination of servicecompetent authorityprocedural lapsecivil servantreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had set aside the termination of the respondent's services as a salesman. The respondent was appointed by the competent authority, but his services were later terminated on the ground that the appointment was irregular and violated procedural rules. The core legal question was whether an employee can be penalized and have their services terminated for procedural lapses or irregularities committed by the appointing authority itself. The Supreme Court held that an employee cannot suffer or be punished for the conscious or unconscious procedural lapses or irregularities of the competent authority, particularly when the employee possesses the requisite qualifications and was not at fault. The key principle laid down is that state functionaries and competent authorities cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own wrong or procedural violations to the detriment of a bona fide appointee.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee's services be terminated due to procedural irregularities committed by the appointing authority during the appointment process?
  • Whether an appointing authority can take benefit of its own lapses to terminate the services of a qualified employee?
  • Should an employee suffer adverse consequences for a violation of appointment rules attributable solely to the competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Director, Public Instructions (Schools), Punjab and 2 others vs Mrs.1996 PLC (C.S.) 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-25
  nationalization of schoolsservice benefitslength of serviceprovincialized cadresenioritymonetary benefitsGeneral Cadre teachers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the Provincial Government against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The respondents, formerly teachers in Municipal Committee schools, were absorbed into the Provincial Government service following the nationalization of their schools under Martial Law Regulation No. 118. The core legal question was whether these teachers were entitled to count their pre-nationalization service (prior to 1-7-1975) for the purpose of computing length of service to claim monetary benefits and selection grades equivalent to the General Cadre teachers. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding no merit in the Government's contention that service should only be counted from the date of provincialization. The Court held that since the respondents possessed identical academic qualifications and performed duties of the same nature and responsibility as the General Cadre teachers, their prior service must be included in the computation. The principle laid down is that where nationalized employees perform duties equivalent to a general cadre, their previous service cannot be ignored when determining eligibility for benefits granted to that cadre.

  Questions settled

  • Are teachers absorbed into provincial service following nationalization entitled to count their pre-nationalization service for the purpose of computing length of service for monetary benefits?
  • Does the lack of a specific limitation in a government directive regarding service computation allow for the exclusion of pre-nationalization service for teachers?
  • Is it permissible to equate the service of nationalized school teachers with General Cadre teachers for the purpose of awarding selection grades and monetary benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• Director of Schools and others a vs Zaheeruddin and others1996 SCMR 1767 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-04
  Rent Controller jurisdictionExemption notificationSindh Rented Premises OrdinanceMartial Law RegulationEjectment proceedingsLandlord and tenantJurisdictional objection
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals against High Court orders that dismissed rent appeals, thereby upholding ejectment orders passed by Rent Controllers. The core legal question was whether, in light of a specific government notification dated 29th July 1980, the Rent Controller possessed the jurisdiction to entertain rent applications concerning premises occupied by schools and colleges taken over under Martial Law Regulation 118 of 1972. The Supreme Court held that the notification, issued under Section 3(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, explicitly exempted such premises from the operation of the Ordinance. Consequently, the Rent Controller lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the applications, and the appropriate remedy for the landlords was to pursue a civil suit. The Court established that a jurisdictional objection not requiring the recording of fresh evidence may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The orders of the lower courts were set aside, effectively ousting the Rent Controller's jurisdiction over the subject premises.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government notification exempting premises from the operation of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, oust the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller?
  • Can an objection regarding the jurisdiction of a Rent Controller be raised at any stage of the proceedings if it does not require the recording of evidence?
  • Does the takeover of school management under Martial Law Regulation 118 of 1972 automatically grant the government ownership of the school buildings?
  Read full judgment →
• Dilshad vs The StateK.L.R. 1996 Criminal Case 513 · Lahore High Court · 1994-09-28Read full judgment →
• Dilon Limited Labour Union, Landhi Area, Karachi vs Messrs Dilon1996 PLC 211 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1995-10-19Read full judgment →
• Dilon Limited Labour Union vs Messrs Dilon Limited1996 PLC 698 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1995-10-19Read full judgment →
• Dilbar Khan vs Said Akbar1996 CLC 1178 · Peshawar High Court · 1996-02-11Read full judgment →
• Dilbar Hussain vs Muhammad Saleem, EtcK.L.R. 1996 Civil Cases 179 · Lahore High Court · 1994-11-06Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Khan vs Messrs Sogea Company Pakistan Branch, Karachi1996 PLC 678 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-02-05Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Khan Azad vs Secretary, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and another1996 PLC (C.S.) 730 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-01-23Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Hussain vs The State1996 SCMR 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-30
  leave to appealsudden quarrelculpable homicidemurdercriminal appealsentencing
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his appeal by the High Court. The core legal question presented is whether the act of inflicting a single fatal knife injury on the victim's thigh, arising from a sudden quarrel over a monetary dispute of Rs. 150 without prior enmity, constitutes an offence under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner argued that the circumstances of the incident, specifically the lack of premeditation and the nature of the dispute, warrant a reclassification of the offence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the conviction should be altered based on the contention that the incident occurred during a sudden quarrel, thereby potentially mitigating the offence from murder to a lesser charge under the relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single fatal injury inflicted during a sudden quarrel over a monetary dispute constitute an offence under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 instead of Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the absence of prior enmity between the parties mitigate a conviction for murder to a lesser offence under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Dil Murad vs Muhammad Aslam and 6 others1996 P Cr. L J 745 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-22
  bail cancellationcriminal trialpost-arrest bailshajjah-i-hashimahpolice challan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition arises out of a criminal case registered under sections 337, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, wherein the petitioner sought the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent by the Magistrate Section 30, which was earlier upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question was whether bail already granted to an accused should be cancelled by the High Court when the challan has been submitted and the trial is about to commence. The court held that bail should not be cancelled at such a belated stage when the trial is imminent, following established principles laid down by the superior courts. The key principle laid down is that superior courts ordinarily decline to interfere with or cancel bail on merits when the trial has reached the stage of commencement and is about to proceed, in order to avoid prejudice to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail once granted should be cancelled when the challan has been submitted and the trial is about to commence?
  • Does the superior court interfere with a bail grant on merits when the trial is at the evidence stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Dhani Bux vs Managing Director, Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation Ltd., Lahore and 2 others1996 PLC 201 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1995-11-26Read full judgment →
• Deputy District Education Officer (W), Murree, District Rawalpindi1996 PLC (C.S.) 677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-06
  service appealtermination of serviceregular appointmenttemporary basisservice tribunalnecessary partycivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by education department officials against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had set aside the termination of the respondent's service as a P.T.C. Teacher. The core legal questions involved whether a regular appointment made through proper departmental recruitment could be terminated summarily based on a High Court order in proceedings to which the employee was not a party, and whether a service appointment could be made on a 'purely temporary basis' contrary to service rules. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal rightly concluded that the High Court order was not binding on the respondent as she was not a party, and that the concept of 'purely temporary basis' is alien to the service rules, rendering the regular appointment immune from summary termination. The key principle laid down is that a regular civil servant appointed in the prescribed manner cannot have their services terminated summarily under a 'purely temporary' stipulation, nor can they be adversely affected by judicial proceedings to which they were not a party.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment of the High Court is binding on a civil servant who was not a party to the proceedings?
  • Does the concept of purely temporary basis exist under the Punjab Civil Services Act 1974 and applicable service rules?
  • Can the services of a regularly appointed civil servant made through a Departmental Recruitment Committee be terminated summarily?
  Read full judgment →
• Deputy Collector, Central Excise And Land Customs, Lahore And Other. The Chairman, Central Board Of Revenue, Islamabad And Other vs Tyrex Pakistan Ltd., Lahore. Lone Tyres And Rubber Company Limited, Rawalpindi(PTCL 1996 CL. 358) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales taxmanufacturerretreading of tyrestax liabilityrepair versus manufacturecharging provision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals directed against a High Court judgment concerning the imposition of sales tax on the business of retreading tyres. The core legal question is whether the retreading and repair of worn-out tyres amount to "manufacture" or "production" of goods so as to attract sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The Supreme Court held that retreading of tyres constitutes repair rather than manufacture, as it does not result in the creation of a new and distinct commercial product, nor does it involve a sale of goods since the original owner retains and receives back the same property. Consequently, sales tax is not leviable under the charging provisions of the Act. The key principle laid down is that "manufacture" requires the transformation of materials into a new and different article or substance having a distinct character, and mere repair or retreading of existing goods does not amount to manufacturing for the purposes of tax liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does the retreading and repair of worn-out tyres amount to manufacture under the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  • Can sales tax be levied on the return of repaired goods to the original owner without a transfer of property by way of sale?
  • Does the definition of manufacture under the Central Excises and Salt Act override or expand the scope of manufacture under the Sales Tax Act?
  • What constitutes the bringing into existence of a new substance or article for the purpose of taxation on manufacturing?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain Unna R vs The State1996 P Cr. L J 414 · Sindh High Court · 1995-11-08Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Shafi/ vs Maj. (Retd.) M. Iqbal Hussain and others1996 PLD Lahore 667 · Lahore High Court · 1996-04-10
  arbitration agreementstay of legal proceedingsreadiness and willingnessbreach of contractdiscretionary powerarbitration act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, whereby the trial Court stayed the proceedings in a civil suit filed by the appellant for recovery of damages for breach of contract. The core legal question is whether the respondent satisfied the statutory requirement of being ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of arbitration at the commencement of the suit, particularly when the respondent had previously refused the appellant's requests to refer the dispute to arbitration. The Lahore High Court held that the power to stay proceedings under section 34 is discretionary and requires the applicant to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness to arbitrate, which the respondent failed to do given his prior express refusal. The court established the principle that a party who fails to respond or refuses to cooperate when called upon by the opposite party to settle disputes through arbitration prior to the filing of a suit cannot subsequently invoke section 34 to stay legal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is the power to stay legal proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 discretionary?
  • Does a party's refusal to submit to arbitration prior to the filing of a suit negate subsequent readiness and willingness under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Must an applicant seeking a stay of proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 plead and prove readiness and willingness to go to arbitration at the time the suit was filed?
  Read full judgment →
• Department vs Assessee(PTCL 1996 CL. 107) · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1995-09-27Read full judgment →
• Delta Tyres and Rubber Company Ltd. through its General Manager, Hattar Industrial Estate, District Haripur vs Mian Khan1996 PLC 635 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1995-07-13Read full judgment →
• Deeny and others vs Gooda Walker Ltd. (in liq) and others (No,2) (Inland Revenue Commissioners, third party)1996 PTD 1207 · House of Lords · 1996-03-07Read full judgment →
• Deedar Ali vs The State1996 P Cr. L J 771 · Sindh High Court · 1995-02-27Read full judgment →
• Deedar Ali vs Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and another1996 CLC 1710 · Sindh High Court · 1996-03-13Read full judgment →
• Dawa Jan vs The State1996 P Cr. L J 704 · Peshawar High Court · 1995-12-17
  statutory delaypost-arrest bailnarcotics offencemandatory bailtrial delayCode of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1994
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal matter concerns an application for post-arrest bail on the grounds of statutory delay under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, charged under Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 for transporting narcotics, sought bail after being detained for over one year without the conclusion of his trial. The core legal question was whether the time spent by the accused pursuing successive bail applications should be excluded from the calculation of the statutory period required for mandatory bail due to trial delay. The Court held that the application was premature. It determined that the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1994, specifically the phrase 'in exercise of any right or privilege under any law for the time being in force' within the third proviso, mandates that time consumed by an accused in pursuing bail applications must be deducted from the statutory period. Consequently, the Court established that such delays, being attributable to the accused's exercise of legal rights, do not count toward the statutory detention period.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time spent by an accused in pursuing bail applications count towards the statutory period of detention for the purpose of seeking bail on the grounds of trial delay?
  • How does the phrase 'in exercise of any right or privilege under any law for the time being in force' in the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 affect the calculation of statutory delay?
  • Is an accused entitled to statutory bail if the total period of detention exceeds one year, even if that period includes time spent litigating previous bail applications?
  Read full judgment →
• Daula vs Channa and another1996 P Cr. L J 1873 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-25Read full judgment →
• Darul Aman Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd., Karachi vs The Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Works & Rehabilitation Division, Islamabad And OtherK.L.R. 1996 Civil Cases 272 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Darshan Oils Pvt. Ltd. vs Union of India1996 P.C.T.L.R. 1031 · Supreme Court of India · -Read full judgment →
• Dadan alias Dadoo vs The State1996 PLD Karachi 391 · Sindh High Court · 1996-04-17
  plea of guiltmandatory procedurecriminal revisionprotracted trialremand for retrialconviction on admission
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges a conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court based on the applicant's plea of guilt. The core legal question is whether the trial court complied with the mandatory procedural requirements of Section 243, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, before convicting the accused on his admission. The High Court held that the trial court failed to follow the mandatory procedure prescribed by Section 243, Cr.P.C., which requires the court to record the admission in the accused's own words and provide an opportunity to show cause why he should not be convicted. The Court observed that the applicant's plea was not voluntary but rather a result of frustration due to a protracted trial and the absence of prosecution witnesses. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the case was remanded for a fresh trial. The principle laid down is that a conviction based on a plea of guilt is invalid if the trial court fails to strictly adhere to the statutory safeguards designed to ensure the plea is voluntary and informed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a conviction based on a plea of guilt sustainable if the trial court fails to record the admission in the accused's own words as required by Section 243, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the failure to provide an accused an opportunity to show cause against conviction invalidate a plea of guilt under Section 243, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a plea of guilt be considered involuntary if it is motivated by the desire to end a protracted trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Dad Rehman vs Government of Sindh and 3 others1996 CLC 1268 · Sindh High Court · 1996-01-16Read full judgment →
• Dad Muhammad vs Qazi Muhammad Hayat and 11 other1996 CLC 1705 · Peshawar High Court · 1996-04-03
  constitutional petitionejectment petitionrelationship of landlord and tenantdeposit of rentinterlocutory orderstriking off defenceappellate jurisdictionvoid ab initio
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed to challenge the order of the Additional District Judge, Peshawar, which had reversed the Rent Controller's order recalling an earlier direction for the petitioner to deposit rent arrears and monthly rent. The core issues were whether the Rent Controller had the power to modify or recall its own invalid interlocutory order when the relationship of landlord and tenant was disputed, and whether such an interlocutory order was appealable before the District Judge. The Peshawar High Court held that where the relationship of landlord and tenant is denied, the Rent Controller must first determine that relationship before ordering the deposit of rent under Section 13(6) of the N.-W.F.P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. Furthermore, the court held that interlocutory orders of the Rent Controller are not appealable under Section 15 of the Ordinance. Consequently, the appellate order was declared without jurisdiction and void ab initio, and the writ petition was accepted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller order the deposit of rent under Section 13(6) of the N.-W.F.P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 before determining the disputed relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to modify, alter, or recall its own invalid interlocutory order?
  • Is an interlocutory order passed by a Rent Controller regarding the deposit of rent appealable under Section 15 of the N.-W.F.P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Dad Muhammad And Other vs The StateK.L.R. 1996 Criminal Cases 164 · Balochistan High Court · 1995-10-09Read full judgment →
• Dad Muhammad and anothers vs The State1996 MLD 487 · Balochistan High Court · 1995-11-02Read full judgment →
• Dad Muhammad And Another vs The State1996 MLD 487 · Balochistan High Court · 1995-11-02Read full judgment →
• D.V. Krishna Murthy vs P. Viswanath1996 P.C.T.L.R. 1128 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1993-03-15Read full judgment →
• Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd vs Messrs Aljamil1996 PLD Karachi 179 · Sindh High Court · 1995-08-15Read full judgment →
• Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt) Limited, Karachi vs M/s.1996 CLC 796 · Sindh High Court · 1994-12-22Read full judgment →
• Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Private) Limited vs Modern1996 CLC 801 · Sindh High Court · 1995-05-28Read full judgment →
• Controller of Examinations, University of Punjab and others vs Javed1996 SCMR 1726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-15
  university examinationlost answer bookconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionleave to appealadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a writ petition filed by the respondent seeking a direction for the University of the Punjab to declare his M.Sc. Mathematics result by awarding average marks for a disputed paper lost during examination disturbances. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court could interfere with a finding of fact rendered by the Controller of Examinations regarding the receipt of an answer book under the University Calendar, and whether mandatory statutory approval procedures were followed. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the matter to the Vice-Chancellor because the record lacked evidence of the requisite approval by the Vice-Chancellor under Paragraph 6 of the University Calendar. The key principle laid down is that where university regulations require specific supervisory approval for findings on lost answer books, the absence of such approval renders the decision incomplete, necessitating reconsideration by the competent authority in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can record a finding of fact regarding the receipt of an answer book in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is the finding of the Controller of Examinations regarding a lost answer book subject to approval under the University Calendar?
  • What is the remedy when an examination authority fails to secure the mandatory approval for a decision regarding a lost answer book?
  Read full judgment →
• Continental (Pvt.) Limited vs Government of Sindh through Secretary, Housing Town Planning Department, Karachi and another1996 CLC 417 · Sindh High Court · 1995-09-20
  constitutional petitionhigh-rise building banNo Objection Certificatepublic interestutility servicesbuilding plan approvaldiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a private company seeking a declaration that a provincial government notification banning high-rise constructions above ground plus four floors did not apply to its project, and directing the Karachi Building Control Authority to approve its structural plans without requiring a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the utility board. The core legal questions were whether the ban applied to the petitioner's downgraded seven-storey project and whether the authority could lawfully demand an NOC from the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to prove it was exempted from the ban by any scrutiny committee. The Court ruled that the government's demand for an NOC was lawful, reasonable, and necessary to protect public interest, as mushrooming high-rise constructions without adequate utilities severely impact urban populations. The key principle laid down is that the state has a prime duty to ensure basic utilities and a pollution-free environment, and public interest overrides commercial construction interests when utility resources are scarce.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a general ban on high-rise constructions due to utility scarcity applies to projects with previously approved or revised plans that exceed the prescribed height limit?
  • Can the building control authority lawfully demand a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from utility providers before approving structural plans in the public interest?
  • Can a petitioner seek discretionary constitutional relief based on a factual claim of exemption without producing documentary evidence to support it?
  • Does the state's duty to ensure basic utilities and a pollution-free environment justify restricting commercial high-rise developments?
  Read full judgment →
• Conservator of Forests Watershed Management Project, Abbottabad and 3 others vs Shah Zarin1996 SCMR 1904 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-31
  disciplinary proceedingsauthorized officerservice tribunalmajor penaltymedical leavedepartmental inquirywillful absence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had modified a disciplinary order against a Forest Guard. The respondent, initially removed from service for willful absence, was reinstated by the Conservator of Forests but faced a penalty of pay reduction to the minimum scale. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the disciplinary proceedings, specifically the appointment of an Assistant as the Authorized Officer, the propriety of the Authorized Officer conducting the inquiry himself, and the rejection of medical certificates without valid grounds. The Supreme Court upheld the Service Tribunal's decision, finding that the disciplinary process was flawed. The Court affirmed that the Authorized Officer could not conduct the inquiry himself and that the department failed to properly consider the respondent's medical evidence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal correctly treated the period of absence as medical leave and restored the respondent's pay, as the disciplinary action lacked procedural integrity and failed to address the respondent's explanations for his absence.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Authorized Officer conduct the inquiry proceedings himself in a departmental disciplinary case?
  • Is a departmental appeal competent against an order passed by a Conservator of Forests that imposes a fresh penalty of pay reduction?
  • Should medical certificates submitted by a government servant be rejected without valid grounds during disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth-Tax vs Hira Lal Mehra1996 PTD 161 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1993-07-14Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Wealth Tax vs V. PugalagiriPTCL 1996 FC. 115) · Madras High Court · 1992-08-18Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs V. Cleetus1996 PTD 1201 · Kerala High Court · 1995-02-14Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Suhasbhai Vadilal1996 PTD 478 · Gauhati High Court · 1993-06-09Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Smt. Shushila Devi Tamakuwala1996 PTD 643 · Patna High Court · 1994-04-05Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Smt. Binapani Chakravarty1996 PTD 835 · Supreme Court of India · 1995-03-28Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Sharvan Kumar Swarup & Sons1996 PTD 50 · Supreme Court of India · 1994-09-22Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Ramniwas Karwa and another1996 PTD 60 · Gauhati High Court · 1994-03-16Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Ka.G. Aratoon and another1996 PTD 132 · Calcutta High Court · 1994-02-25Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs E.M. Gopalakrishna Kone Trust1996 PTD 637 · Madras High Court · 1992-11-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Champa Properties Ltd. ,1996 PTD 431 · Rajasthan High Court · 1992-07-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs C.G. Radhakrishnan(1996 PTD 49 · Madras High Court · 1994-01-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Anna Yyappa and Sons1996 PTD 437 · karnataka High Court · 1993-10-22Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax And Another vs Pine Chemicals Ltd. And Others1996 P.C.T.L.R. 1136 · Supreme Court of IndiaRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income-Tax. vs Dandeli Ferro Alloys Pvt. Itd.PTCL 1996 F.C. 89 · Bombay High Court · 1994-11-30Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Zone-B, Lahore vs Muhammad Shahbaz1996 PTD 1138 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Zone-a, Lahore vs Malik Bashir Ahmad1996 PTD 1136 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-10Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Faisalabad vs Yousaf Sons, Sargodha1996 PTD 1125 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Virmani Industries Pvt. Ltd. and others1996 PTD 947 · Supreme Court of India · 1995-10-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Usha Telehoist Ltd.1996 PTD 686 · Calcutta High Court · 1993-08-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Union Carbide Corporation, .1996 PTD 149 · Calcutta High Court · 1992-07-06Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Thanthi Trust1996 PTD 922 · Supreme Court of India · 1995-04-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Sunil Kumar1996 PTD 831 · Rajasthan High Court · 1994-07-21Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Smt. Pelleti Sridevamma1996 PTD 1036 · Supreme Court of India · 1995-10-11Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Shankar D. Dhanwatey and others1996 PTD 654 · Bombay High Court · 1992-01-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Sandoz (India) Ltd.1996 PTD 44 · Bombay High Court · 1993-10-01Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Roop Kishore Goyald. B.1996 PTD 693 · Rajasthan High Court · 1994-07-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Patel Brothers & Co. Ltd. and others1996 PTD 928 · Supreme Court of India · 1995-05-09Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Kamla Town Trust1996 PTD 1157 · Supreme Court of India · 1995-11-16Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs K. Bhaskaran-S, .(1996 PTD 658 · Kerala High Court · 1994-10-05Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Chittoor Electric Supply1996 PTD 509 · Supreme Court of India · 1995-01-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Champa Properties Pvt. Ltd.1996 PTD 648 · Calcutta High Court · 1993-11-26Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Bijoy Kumar Almal1996 PTD 919 · Supreme Court of India · 1995-04-04Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs A. M. Zainalabdeen Musaliar1996 PTD 661 · Kerala High Court · 1994-10-06Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi vs Pak. Mineral Industries1996 PTD 1108 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-11Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore vs National Fertilizer1996 PTD 276 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-09
  income taxdividend incomeconcessional tax ratesuper-taxstatutory interpretationtaxing statutereference application
  Summary & questions settled

  This application was filed under Section 136(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, seeking to compel the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to refer a question of law to the High Court. The core legal question was whether dividend income received by the respondent, a public limited company, was entitled to a concessional rate of super-tax under the First Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, regardless of whether such income was classified as business income or income from other sources. The department argued that the income should be taxed at normal rates, citing the assessee's previous treatment of dividends as business income. The Court held that the concessional rate of super-tax prescribed in the First Schedule is applicable solely based on the fulfillment of the conditions specified therein, specifically that the dividend income must be from a Pakistani company. The Court affirmed that tax statutes must be interpreted based on their plain language without implying additional requirements. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application, finding no merit in the department's request to refer the question.

  Questions settled

  • Is the applicability of a concessional rate of super-tax on dividend income dependent on the head of income under which it is classified?
  • Does the previous treatment of dividend income by an assessee as business income preclude the application of a concessional tax rate under the First Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • What is the primary condition for the application of a concessional rate of super-tax on dividend income under the First Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income Tax vs Sunil Kumar(PTCL 1996 FC. 172) · Rajasthan High Court · 1994-07-21Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income Tax vs Shankar D. Dhanwatey And OtherPTCL 1996 FC. 109 · Bombay High Court · 1992-01-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax vs Sardar Gurudev Singh Gills.J.C.1996 PTD 559 · Orissa High Court · 1994-12-07Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income Tax vs Sardar Gurudev Singh Gill(PTCL 1996 FC. 95) · Orissa High Court · 1994-12-07Read full judgment →