Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• The Commissioner of Incometax, Karachi and 2 others vs Messrs N.V.1993 PLD Supreme Court 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-31
  income taxreopening of assessmentconstitutional petitionalternate remedystatutory appealjurisdictionbad debt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi, challenged a Sindh High Court judgment that declared a notice issued under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, as without lawful authority. The respondent company had claimed a bad debt adjustment, which was initially disallowed but subsequently allowed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Income Tax Officer later issued a notice to reopen the assessment under section 65. While the respondent's constitutional petition was pending, the assessment was finalized, and the respondent pursued statutory appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Appellate Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that once a party elects to pursue statutory remedies provided under a relevant statute, they cannot bypass or switch over to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court mid-proceedings without compelling and justifiable reasons. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and directed the respondent to exhaust its pending statutory remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a taxpayer who has opted to invoke statutory remedies of appeal can simultaneously maintain or switch to a constitutional petition in the High Court?
  • Does a notice issued under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, merge into subsequent assessment and appellate orders passed during the pendency of a constitutional petition?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances may a party bypass statutory remedies to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
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• The Commissioner of Income-Tax,East Zone, Karachi vs Zafar Ali1993 PTD 39 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-04Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West Zone, Karachi vs Habib DostPTCL 1993 CL. 289 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Zone, Karachi vs Habib Dost1993 PTD 105 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-09Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Karachi and 2 others vs Messrs N.V.1993 PTD 865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-01
  Income tax assessmentreopening of assessmentbad debtstatutory remedyconstitutional jurisdictiondoctrine of mergeralternate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax arises from an order of the High Court of Sindh, which declared a notice issued under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 as without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The respondent-company had claimed a bad debt deduction, which led to protracted proceedings before the Income Tax Officer, Commissioner, and Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Subsequently, the Income Tax Officer issued a notice to reopen the assessment under Section 65, and the respondent challenged this notice through a constitutional petition while simultaneously availing statutory remedies by filing appeals against the fresh assessment order. The core legal question was whether a party can invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court while concurrently pursuing statutory appellate remedies under the tax framework. The Supreme Court held that once a party opts for statutory remedies, they cannot abandon or bypass them to seek constitutional remedies simultaneously without compelling and justifiable reasons, especially when the initial notice has merged into subsequent assessment and appellate orders. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, ruling that the respondent must exhaust the pending statutory remedies before the Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when the aggrieved party has already opted to avail statutory remedies by filing appeals under the Income Tax Ordinance?
  • Does a notice issued under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance merge into the subsequent assessment order and appellate decisions passed thereon?
  • Can a party switch over to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court in the middle of statutory proceedings without compelling and justifiable reasons?
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• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone-C, Karachi ' vs M/s.1993 PTD 58 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-02Read full judgment →
• The State vs Sardar Muhammad and others1993 P Cr. L J 1780 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-24Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone 'B', Karachi vs Messrs1993 PTD 46 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-29Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, South Zone, Karachi vs M/s. Iran1993 PTD 110 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-07Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore (Now at Multan) vs Messrs1993P T D 386 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Faisalabad vs Mst. Ghulam Fatima1993 PTD 1104 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-26Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, East Zone, Karachi vs Messrs Gujrat1993 PTD 756 · Sindh High Court · 1993-02-11Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies II, Income Tax Building, Karachi vs Messrs General Tyre and Rubber Company of Pakistan Ltd1993 PTD 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-18
  income taxtechnical assistance feebusiness deductioncurrency devaluationbusiness expediencyIncome-tax Act 1922tax liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment regarding the tax deductibility of a technical assistance fee paid by the respondent company to its foreign parent. The core legal question was whether the increased amount paid as a technical assistance fee, resulting from the devaluation of Pakistani currency during a period of delayed remittance, qualified as an admissible business deduction under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Revenue argued that the assessee’s failure to remit the funds on time, which caused the increased liability, should disqualify the deduction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the additional expenditure incurred due to currency devaluation remained a legitimate business expense. The Court rejected the application of the maxim "no man shall take advantage of his own wrong" in this context, affirming that increased costs arising from currency fluctuations while discharging a business liability are permissible allowances. The judgment establishes that such commercial losses, even when exacerbated by delayed payment, do not lose their character as deductible business expenses.

  Questions settled

  • Is an increased payment of a technical assistance fee resulting from currency devaluation an admissible business deduction?
  • Does a delay in remitting a business liability, which subsequently increases due to currency devaluation, disqualify the payment from being a deductible business expense?
  • Can the maxim 'no man shall take advantage of his own wrong' be applied to disallow a business deduction for increased costs arising from currency devaluation?
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• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone Karachi vs M/s.1993 PTD 459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1093-01-11
  limitation periodprocedural lawretrospective applicationrepeal and savingsdeclaratory legislationincome tax referencevested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the applicable period of limitation for filing a reference application to the High Court under income tax laws following the repeal of the Income-tax Act, 1922 by the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the sixty-day limitation period under the repealed Act or the ninety-day period under the new Ordinance applied to proceedings pending or decided after the Ordinance's commencement. The Supreme Court held that the law of limitation is procedural and generally applies retrospectively to pending proceedings, provided it does not impair existing vested rights. The Court determined that the saving clauses in the Ordinance protecting 'proceedings' were intended to preserve substantive vested rights regarding assessments, not procedural adjudication steps. Furthermore, the Court noted that the subsequent legislative Explanation to section 136(1) of the Ordinance was declaratory in nature, confirming that the ninety-day period applied to all applications made after the Ordinance's commencement, regardless of the assessment year. Consequently, the Court ruled that the extended limitation period under the Ordinance was applicable.

  Questions settled

  • Is the law of limitation considered a procedural law that can have retrospective application?
  • Do the saving clauses in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, protect procedural rights or only substantive vested rights?
  • Does the ninety-day limitation period under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, apply to assessment years prior to the Ordinance's commencement?
  • Can a declaratory legislative amendment be applied retrospectively to clarify the limitation period for pending proceedings?
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• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone 'C', Karachi vs Habib1993 PTD 83 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-12Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone 'B', Karachi vs M/s.1993 SCMR 1276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-11
  limitation periodretrospective applicationprocedural lawincome tax referencedeclaratory legislationrepeal and savingsvested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals regarding the applicable period of limitation for filing a reference application to the High Court under income tax laws. The core legal question was whether the sixty-day limitation period prescribed under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, or the ninety-day period prescribed under Section 136(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, applied to cases where assessment orders were passed prior to the Ordinance's enforcement but the Tribunal's decision occurred after its enforcement. The Supreme Court held that the procedural law of limitation, which enlarged the period to ninety days, applied retrospectively to pending proceedings, provided the right to sue had not already expired under the repealed Act. The Court emphasized that saving clauses in the Ordinance protecting 'proceedings' referred to substantive vested rights rather than procedural adjudication matters. Furthermore, the Court noted that the subsequent Explanation to Section 136(1) of the Ordinance was declaratory in nature, confirming that the extended limitation period applied to assessment years prior to 1979. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, ruling that the ninety-day limitation period was applicable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a change in the period of limitation for filing a reference application constitute a procedural change that applies retrospectively to pending proceedings?
  • Do the saving clauses in Section 166 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, protect procedural rights or only substantive vested rights?
  • Is a subsequent legislative explanation that clarifies a limitation period considered declaratory and thus retrospective in effect?
  • Does the ninety-day limitation period under Section 136(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, apply to assessment years prior to the Ordinance's commencement?
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• The Commissioner Of Income Tax vs M/s. Smith, Kline & French Of PakistanPTCL 1993 CL. 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income taxcasual receiptpromotion allowancewindfallvoluntary paymentburden of proofexemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of four consolidated civil appeals arising from decisions of the High Court of Sindh concerning tax assessments under the Income Tax Act, 1922. The core legal question was whether voluntary remittances received by subsidiary companies in Pakistan from their foreign parent or participant companies—designated variously as loss-absorption amounts or promotion allowances—constituted taxable 'income' under Section 4(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, or alternatively, whether they qualified as casual and non-recurring receipts exempt under Section 4(3)(vii) of the same Act. The Supreme Court held that the voluntary remittances made by foreign shareholders to cover local losses or as promotional allowances did not constitute 'income' because they lacked the character of a periodical monetary return from a definite source and amounted to mere windfalls. Furthermore, the Court held that even if deemed income, the receipts in question were exempt under Section 4(3)(vii) as they were casual, non-recurring, and did not arise directly from business dealings between the parties. The key principle laid down is that voluntary, un-obligatory payments lacking nexus with a trade or business source do not qualify as income, and the revenue bears the burden of establishing a receipt as taxable income.

  Questions settled

  • Whether voluntary remittances made by foreign parent companies to cover local accumulated losses of a subsidiary constitute taxable income under the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Do promotional allowances received by a resident company from a non-resident foreign principal qualify for exemption as casual and non-recurring receipts under section 4(3)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • On whom lies the burden of proof to establish whether a particular receipt constitutes taxable income versus an exempt casual receipt?
  • Whether payments lacking a direct nexus with business operations or professional activities can be classified as business income for tax purposes?
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• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs M/s. SH. Muhammad Saeed &1993 PTD 1198 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-15Read full judgment →
• The Colony Woollen Mills vs The Province of Punjab1993 PLD Revenue 30 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1991-11-10Read full judgment →
• The Capital Development Authority, Islamabad vs Rana Muhammad1993 CLC 2135 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-28Read full judgment →
• The Capital Development Authority vs Rana Muhammad Sarwar, AdvocateK.L.R. 1993 Revenue Cases 131 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Islamabad vs M/s.1993 PLD Lahore 328 · Lahore High Court · 1993-02-21Read full judgment →
• The Additional Chief Secretary, Local Government, Public Health1993 MLD 635 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-13
  revision applicationmaintainabilityland acquisitionappealable ordercourt feesconversion of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Revision Application filed by the Provincial Government against an order of the District Judge, Badin, who rejected a reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer regarding land acquisition proceedings. The core legal questions were whether a Revision Application is maintainable against an order that is appealable under the Land Acquisition Act, and whether a Revision Application can be converted into an appeal when the applicant has failed to pay the requisite court fees. The Court held that the Revision Application was not maintainable because the impugned order was appealable under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, explicitly bars revision where an appeal lies. Furthermore, the Court refused to convert the Revision Application into an appeal, noting the applicant's failure to pay the necessary ad valorem court fees and the lack of any effort to rectify this deficiency despite the objection being raised well in advance. The principle established is that a revision petition is incompetent against an appealable order.

  Questions settled

  • Is a revision application maintainable against an order that is appealable under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Can a revision application be converted into an appeal if the applicant has failed to pay the required ad valorem court fees?
  • Does Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 permit a revision application where an appeal lies against the impugned order?
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• Thal Development Authority through Administrator, Bhakkar vs Ch.1993 SCMR 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-15
  civil appealcompromise decreeallotment of state landtubewell sinking schemeresumption of landpleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the modified decree of the District Judge regarding the resumption of State land allotted to the respondent under a Tubewell Sinking Scheme. The core legal question concerned whether the respondent had violated the terms of a previous compromise decree by allegedly failing to pay instalments on time and alienating the land, rendering his second suit not maintainable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appellant's new contention ran counter to its own pleadings in the written statement, wherein it was admitted that the respondent had paid the instalments in terms of the earlier decree, and that payment of Tawan was not a requirement of that decree. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings that no violation or alienation had occurred.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new contention in the Supreme Court that runs counter to its own pleadings in the written statement?
  • Whether the payment of Tawan constitutes a requirement of a compromise decree when it was not part of the decree's terms?
  • Is a second suit barred when the plaintiff has complied with the terms of a compromise decree passed in an earlier suit?
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• Tauqeer Shahid vs Additional District Judge and others1993 CLC 2435 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-10
  constitutional petitionrent restrictiontentative rent orderstriking off defencedefault in rentejectment petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the legality of orders passed by the lower appellate court and the Rent Controller whereby the petitioner-tenant's defence was struck off and an ejectment order was issued for non-deposit of rent for the month of July 1990 under section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller was bound to resolve controversies regarding default or the period for which rent was due before passing a tentative rent deposit order, and whether non-compliance with a flawed tentative order warranted striking off the defence. The Lahore High Court held that the Rent Controller is legally required to resolve disputes concerning from which month rent is due and to issue a speaking order before directing rent deposits. The court ruled that an interim order passed without determining such existing controversies is not in accordance with law, and its non-compliance cannot lawfully be visited with the penalty of striking off the defence. The petition was accepted, setting aside the orders of the lower forums and directing the Rent Controller to pass a fresh order after hearing the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Rent Controller is bound to resolve any controversy regarding from which month rent is due before passing a tentative rent deposit order?
  • Can a tenant's defence be struck off for non-compliance with a rent deposit order that was passed without determining existing disputes regarding prior rent payments?
  • Is an interim rent deposit order under the Rent Restriction Ordinance appealable?
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• Tauqeer Batool P.T.C. vs Deputy District Education Oficer (W) MailsiK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 257 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-24Read full judgment →
• Tassadduq Hussain vs Abdullah1993 CLC 1909 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-28Read full judgment →
• Tasdiq Waris vs The SSP, Sindhh Reserve Police, Sukkur And AnotherK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 101 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1992-09-23Read full judgment →
• Tasawar Khalil and anothers vs Matinur Rahman Khan1993 PLD Karachi 780 · Sindh High Court · 1993-07-21Read full judgment →
• Tariq Saeed and others vs Settlement Department1993 MLD 1663 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-14Read full judgment →
• Tariq Hussain Shah vs The State1993 MLD 2481 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-13Read full judgment →
• Tariq Aziz vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2499 · Sindh High Court · 1993-02-04Read full judgment →
• Tariq Aziz Siddiqui and anothers vs Farooq Hassan and 4 others1993 CLC 1793 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-07Read full judgment →
• Tarajan Tea Co. (Fa Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1993 PTD 1289 · Gujarat High Court · 1992-02-03Read full judgment →
• Taqi Muhammad and 3 others vs Rana Muhammad Afzal Khan1993 MLD 1025 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-01
  civil revisionspecific performancemortgage by conditional saleguardian ad-litemadministrative transfer of suitprocedural irregularityPunjab Alienation of Land Actremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision challenged the appellate court's decree in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land, which originated from a mortgage dispute. The core legal questions concerned the procedural validity of the trial court’s proceedings—specifically regarding the appointment of a guardian ad-litem for minors who attained majority, the propriety of ex-parte orders, and the failure to notify parties upon the administrative transfer of the suit—and the substantive legality of a mortgage containing a conditional sale clause under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900. The High Court held that the trial court committed material irregularities by failing to issue notices upon administrative transfer and by improperly appointing an official guardian for defendants who had attained majority. Furthermore, the Court ruled that under Section 10 of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, any mortgage condition stipulating a conditional sale is null and void. Consequently, the impugned judgments were set aside, and the case was remanded for a de novo trial with an opportunity for the petitioners to present their defense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the administrative transfer of a civil suit require the court to issue notice to the parties to ensure their appearance?
  • Is a condition in a mortgage agreement stipulating a conditional sale valid under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900?
  • Can a court appoint a guardian ad-litem for a defendant who has already attained the age of majority?
  • Does an order for ex parte proceedings against a defendant preclude their right to receive notice upon the administrative transfer of the suit?
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• Tanveer Mehboob and 2 others vs Noor Muhammad and 9 others1993 PLD Karachi 207 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-24
  Evacuee propertyConstitutional jurisdictionCompromise decreeNotified OfficerRepeal ActTransfer of propertyJurisdiction of tribunals
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Secretary (E.P.)/Notified Officer under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, which directed the transfer of property tenements to private respondents. The core legal question was whether the Notified Officer possessed the jurisdiction to order such transfers following a compromise decree recorded by the Supreme Court. The High Court held that the compromise, by setting aside the previous High Court judgment, effectively revived the original transfer in favor of the petitioners, thereby perfecting their title. Consequently, the property ceased to be "available for disposal" under the Repeal Act, stripping the Notified Officer of any jurisdiction to interfere. The Court established that a Notified Officer’s authority is strictly limited to cases pending at the time of repeal or those specifically remanded by superior courts. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that tribunals acting in excess of their jurisdiction or committing errors of law are subject to correction through constitutional jurisdiction, as every individual has the right to be dealt with in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Notified Officer under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 have jurisdiction to adjudicate property rights after title has been perfected by a compromise decree?
  • What is the effect of a Supreme Court compromise order that sets aside a High Court judgment on the availability of property for disposal under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
  • Can a tribunal's decision be quashed under constitutional jurisdiction if it commits an error of law or acts in excess of its jurisdiction?
  • Does the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 grant a Notified Officer the power to review or nullify orders passed by a previous Notified Officer acting as an appellate authority?
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• Tanveer Hussain Shah and another vs Rehmat Ali Shah and 12 others1993 MLD 1455 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1993-04-08Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Ahmed and another vs Nasarullah Khan1993 MLD 657 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-12Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Ahmad vs Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan and others1993 CLC 2167 · Lahore High Court · 1993-05-25Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 642 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-21Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain vs Anar Gul Khan and 4 others1993 SCMR 2177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-28
  police brutalityfundamental rightsdignity of mansentence enhancementtorture by policedepartmental proceedingscriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two appeals by special leave filed by the complainant, Talib Hussain, challenging the adequacy of sentences upheld by the Lahore High Court against police officials and a magistrate convicted under sections 323 and 504 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The incident arose from political agitation in March 1977, during which the respondents raided a house, severely beat citizens, stripped some naked, pierced a nose-pin serving as a rope ('nukail') through the complainant's nose, and forced him to dance like a monkey in the streets. The core legal question concerned the adequacy of sentences and the liability of law enforcement officials engaging in inhumane and illegal torture. The Supreme Court held that the sentences of imprisonment till the rising of the court were grossly inadequate given the sheer sadism and brutality of the respondents' conduct. The Court laid down the principle that criminal proceedings and departmental action can proceed side by side, and that the proclamation of emergency does not absolve state functionaries from respecting the dignity of man as a fundamental right.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings and departmental action go on side by side?
  • Does a proclamation of emergency absolve state functionaries from respecting the dignity of citizens?
  • Whether a subordinate's plea of acting under superior orders can be used to mitigate the quantum of sentence for a palpably illegal action?
  • Are sentences of imprisonment till the rising of the Court adequate for grave police torture and degrading treatment of citizens?
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• Talib Hussain and others vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2264 · Lahore High Court · 1992-07-01Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain and another vs The State1993 MLD 357 · Lahore High Court · 1992-04-28Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad vs Raza Haider and another1993 MLD 2450 · Lahore High Court · 1993-01-11Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad and 2 others vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1025 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-03
  murderself-defencealibiwater disputebenefit of doubtQisasTazircriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and the connected State appeal challenge the judgment of the Special Court for Speedy Trial, Multan, which convicted three appellants for multiple murders and attempted murders arising from a dispute over canal water. The core legal question concerned whether the appellants acted in self-defence or were the aggressors, and whether the prosecution established its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prosecution successfully proved its case, establishing that the appellants were the aggressors and rejected the self-defence plea, while upholding the acquittal of a co-accused on the basis of a discrepancy regarding the weapon carried. The Court laid down the principle that the ocular account, when corroborated by medical evidence and consistent with the physical circumstances of the spot and proximity of firing, outweighs a fabricated defence of self-defence and alibi. Furthermore, the Court held that capital sentences of Qisas must strictly adhere to the modes of proof prescribed under the law, converting the conviction from Qisas to Tazir under Section 302(b) where such strict proof is lacking.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of self-defence can be sustained when the physical evidence and proximity of firing contradict the accused's version of events?
  • Does a minor discrepancy between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the weapon carried warrant the acquittal of an accused on the ground of benefit of doubt?
  • Can a sentence of Qisas under Section 302(a) be sustained if the death is not proved in accordance with the strict mode of proof provided in Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the testimony of a defence witness establishing an injury report for family members of the accused suffices to prove a plea of private defence when those injured individuals fail to enter the witness box?
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• Taj Din and others vs Mst. Sardar Begum and others1993 MLD 724 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-21Read full judgment →
• Taj Din . vs Lal Din And OtherK.L.R. 1993 Revenue Cases 46 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1990-02-28Read full judgment →
• Tairi Khan and others vs The State1993 MLD 1766 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-17Read full judgment →
• Tahir Zaman and others vs Abdul Akbar Khan and others1993 MLD 1774 · Peshawar High Court · 1983-05-30Read full judgment →
• Tahir Rashid vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1826 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-14Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mehmood Shaikh vs Messrs Prism Communication Ltd.1993 MLD 637 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-25Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mahmood vs Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore And AnotherK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 142 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Tahir Mahmood vs Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore &K.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 158 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Tahir Jawaid vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 859 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-01Read full judgment →
• Tahir Hussain vs Saeed Ahmed Khan Lodhi1993 CLC 519 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-18
  rented premisesstriking off defencearrears of rentsummary inquiryejectmentvague orderrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two consolidated appeals challenging orders passed by a Rent Controller that struck off the appellant-tenant's defence and ordered eviction due to alleged non-compliance with a previous order regarding the payment of arrears for electricity, water, and conservancy charges. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller's order under Section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, was sufficiently specific to justify the penal consequences of striking off the defence under Section 16(2) of the same Ordinance. The High Court held that the Rent Controller's order was vague and uncertain because it failed to determine the specific amount of arrears due after considering the material and accounts submitted by both parties. The Court established the principle that an order under Section 16(1) of the Ordinance must be based on a summary inquiry that explicitly determines the precise amount of arrears owed. Consequently, because the foundational order was defective and vague, the subsequent penal order striking off the defence was set aside, and the cases were remanded for a fresh, specific determination of arrears.

  Questions settled

  • Must a Rent Controller determine the specific amount of arrears before ordering a tenant to deposit them under Section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a penal order striking off a tenant's defence under Section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 be sustained if the underlying order for deposit of arrears is vague?
  • Is an interim order passed by a Rent Controller under Section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 appealable?
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• Tahir Hussain and 2 others vs Khan1993 CLC 2161 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-02Read full judgment →
• Tahir Ali and another vs H. Akbar Ali & Co.1993 MLD 755 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-04Read full judgment →
• Syeda Abida Hussain vs Returning Officer and others1993 MLD 2489 · Election Tribunal · 1993-09-12
  election disqualificationservice of Pakistannomination paperscontractual employmentAmbassadorReturning Officerelection tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This election appeal challenged the rejection of the appellant's nomination papers for the National Assembly by the Returning Officer. The nomination was rejected on two grounds: the appellant's disqualification under Article 63(1)(k) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 for having served as an Ambassador within the preceding two years, and her husband's alleged status as a loan defaulter. The core legal question was whether a contract-based appointment as an Ambassador constitutes 'service of Pakistan' under the Constitution, thereby triggering disqualification, and whether the Returning Officer is empowered to examine disqualifications during nomination scrutiny. The Tribunal held that the post of Ambassador, being a whole-time position in connection with the affairs of the Federation, falls within the definition of 'service of Pakistan' under Article 260, regardless of the appellant's contractual status or exclusion from the Civil Servants Act 1973. Consequently, the appellant was disqualified as two years had not elapsed since her service ended. The Tribunal affirmed the rejection of the nomination papers on this ground, while rejecting the loan default allegation as invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contract-based appointment as an Ambassador constitute 'service of Pakistan' under Article 260 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a person employed on a contract basis disqualified from contesting elections under Article 63(1)(k) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the definition of 'civil servant' in the Civil Servants Act 1973 govern the interpretation of 'service of Pakistan' for election disqualification purposes?
  • Is a Returning Officer empowered to examine disqualifications of a candidate during the scrutiny of nomination papers?
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• Syed Zahid Ali vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1489 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-17
  post-arrest bailretraction of statementaffidavit before Oath Commissioneremigration offencecredibility of witnessesfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal bail application before the Sindh High Court arising from charges under section 22(b) of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question concerns the evidentiary value and authenticity of affidavits sworn by prosecution witnesses before an Oath Commissioner rather than an officer of the trial court, retracting their earlier statements made to the police under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and whether such retraction warrants the grant of bail. The High Court held that while an accused is generally entitled to bail when main witnesses retract their statements and do not support the prosecution, affidavits sworn before an Oath Commissioner without proper verification of the witnesses' personal appearance before the court are questionable and require proof of authenticity. The court concluded that the applicant must approach the trial court afresh, ensuring the witnesses physically appear before it to verify the affidavits, and accordingly dismissed the bail application with liberty to reapply if necessary.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of affidavits sworn by prosecution witnesses before an Oath Commissioner instead of the trial court?
  • Does the retraction of police statements by prosecution witnesses via affidavit automatically entitle an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • How should a trial court handle bail applications supported by retracted statements of material witnesses?
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• Syed Ward Ali and 4 others vs Globe Automobiles Ltd. and another1993 SCMR 819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-19
  evacuee propertypublic auctionsettlement schemeconverted propertyindustrial concerncurative legislationacquiescence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the auction-purchasers challenges the judgment of the High Court regarding the transfer of an evacuee property initially auctioned as a shop but claimed by the contesting respondent as an industrial concern (workshop). The core legal questions involved whether the property was available for auction, whether Paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No.I created any enforceable right in favour of the respondent, and whether the auction violated settlement laws. The Supreme Court held that since the respondent failed to timely invoke Paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No.I or file a timely claim as an industrial concern, and further voluntarily attorned to the auction-purchasers by paying rent, they had acquiesced and waived their rights. Moreover, the Court emphasized that curative and retrospective legislation such as the Displaced Persons Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1964 must be given effect in pending proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the property transfer in favour of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who fails to timely claim an evacuee property as a converted industrial concern under Settlement Scheme No.I has the locus standi to challenge its public auction as a shop?
  • Does voluntary attornment and payment of rent to an auction-purchaser amount to acquiescence and waiver of a contesting occupant's pre-existing rights in an evacuee property?
  • How do curative and retrospective validation statutes like the Displaced Persons Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1964 affect pending proceedings concerning the disposal of evacuee properties?
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• Syed Waqar Hussain and anothers vs Messrs National Refinery Ltd.1993 CLC 2497 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-13
  interim injunctionspecific performancebreach of contractbalance of convenienceirreparable lossvoidable contracttemporary injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arose from an application for an interim injunction filed by the plaintiffs, Syed Waqar Hussain and another, seeking to restrain the defendant, Messrs National Refinery Ltd., from committing a breach of a Drums Supply Agreement dated 22-3-1990 or from assigning the contract to a third party pending the disposal of their suit for specific performance, perpetual injunction, and damages. The core legal questions involved whether a prima facie case and balance of convenience existed for granting a temporary injunction in a contract dispute, and whether the agreement was void ab initio due to alleged coercion and political pressure. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiffs had made out a strong arguable case, that the agreement had been acted upon for months without objection, and that claiming damages alongside specific performance did not bar interim relief under Order XXXIX Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court concluded that irreparable loss and balance of convenience favored the plaintiffs and consequently allowed the injunction application, laying down that interlocutory relief should maintain the status quo when serious triable issues regarding contract performance and validity require evidence at trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff claiming damages in a suit for specific performance is barred from seeking a temporary injunction against a breach of contract?
  • Can a party to a commercial contract unilaterally declare the agreement void ab initio after acting upon it for an extended period?
  • Whether an interim injunction can be granted to restrain the breach of a manufacturing and supply agreement pending a full trial on merits?
  • Does the existence of alternative claims for monetary compensation preclude the court from finding irreparable loss in interlocutory proceedings?
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• Syed Wajih-Ul-Hassan Naqvi vs Auqaf Department, Punjab1993 MLD 1794 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-21Read full judgment →
• Syed Wahid Ali Kazmi vs The Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication1993 CLC 1679 · Sindh High Court · 1993-05-02Read full judgment →
• Syed Sardar Hussain Jaffery and anothers vs Dr. Muhammad Ali Khan1993 CLC 1711 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-15Read full judgment →
• Syed Sajid Ali Asif through Legal Heirss vs Mumtaz Ahmed and 3 others1993 PLD Karachi 520 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-03
  declaration and cancellation of documentspower of attorney forgerybona fide purchaser for valuetransfer of propertyvoid sale-deedcompromise agreementpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil suit for declaration, cancellation of documents, and possession was instituted by the original plaintiff (and continued by his legal heirs upon his death) regarding a residential plot in Karachi originally allotted by the Karachi Development Authority. The core legal question revolved around whether the subsequent sale-deeds and power of attorney executed through intermediaries were forged and void, and whether the contesting defendant qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The Sindh High Court held that the power of attorney used to transfer the property was a forged document executed without authority, rendering the subsequent conveyance deeds void ab initio. The Court further held that the contesting defendant could not be treated as a bona fide purchaser due to gross negligence, failure to inspect original title documents, and suspicious haste in the transaction. The suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the cancellation of the fraudulent instruments and restoration of possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a power of attorney executed without the knowledge and consent of the principal is void ab initio?
  • Can a purchaser of immovable property claim the protection of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice when original title documents are missing?
  • Whether an unacted-upon compromise agreement executed during the pendency of a suit operates as an agreement for sale or loses its force upon dismissal of the compromise application?
  • Does a mutation entry in the record of rights create title to immovable property?
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• Syed Saeed Muhammad Shah and anothers vs The State1993 SCMR 550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-16
  Speedy Trials ActOffence of ZinaZina-bil-jabrSecond FIRCancellation of FIRDelayed Police StatementsMaterial ImprovementsBenefit of DoubtRight to CounselRecall of Witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan were filed under section 13 of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1992, challenging the conviction and sentences of the appellants under section 10(3) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and section 109/34 PPC for alleged rape and abetment. The core legal questions pertained to the legality of cancelling a first FIR to register a second FIR, the admissibility and reliability of prosecution evidence fraught with material improvements and belatedly recorded statements, procedural defects in conducting a trial in excessive haste, and the effect of failing to provide state-funded counsel to an indigent accused charged with a capital offence. The Supreme Court held that the law does not permit registering a second FIR with a divergent version; rather, further statements should be recorded under the initial FIR. The Court ruled that withholding the initial FIR, tutoring witnesses, unexplained delays in recording police statements, and medical evidence lacking proof of recent trauma created serious doubt. Acquitting both appellants, the Court established that expeditious trial requirements do not justify procedural haste or denial of a fair defence, and the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt always rests strictly upon the prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the police have legal authority to cancel an initial FIR and register a second FIR regarding the same transaction instead of recording supplementary statements during investigation?
  • Whether the failure of the trial court to provide counsel at state expense to an accused charged with an offence punishable by death or life imprisonment vitiates the trial proceedings?
  • Can an adverse inference be drawn against an accused under section 340(2) Cr.P.C. solely because he exercised his option not to give evidence on oath?
  • Whether unexplained delay in recording witness statements under section 161 Cr.P.C., coupled with material improvements at trial, renders such ocular testimony unreliable?
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• Syed Saad Bin Zarif vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 223 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-15
  inherent jurisdictiondelay in challanquashment of proceedingsinvestigationcentral excise dutycorrupt practices
  Summary & questions settled

  This application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed seeking a declaration that delay in submitting a challan by the State is illegal, a direction to the Federal Investigation Agency to immediately submit the challan, or alternatively the quashment of proceedings against the applicant who was implicated in an F.I.R. concerning the illegal manufacturing of cigarettes and evasion of Central Excise duty. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, can issue a direction to the investigating agency to complete investigation and submit a challan against an accused person within a specified time. The court held that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court does not empower it to issue a direction commanding the police or investigating agency to submit a challan forthwith. The key principle laid down is that while the investigating agency is expected to complete investigations and submit reports without unnecessary delay under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, courts are not competent to issue a mandamus or directive to compel the completion of investigation and submission of the challan.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can direct the investigating agency to complete the investigation and submit a challan under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 include the power to compel the submission of a police report?
  • Is the submission of a final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a bar to further investigation by the police?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Qaim Ali Shah vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 551 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-07
  quashment of proceedingscriminal breach of trustinherent jurisdictionabuse of processpublic servanterror of judgmentstate land allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought the quashing of proceedings pending against the applicant, a former Chief Minister of Sindh, under Sections 406 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the applicant had dishonestly disposed of state land to private builders at a nominal price, causing a massive pecuniary loss to the state. The core legal question was whether the applicant's actions, performed in accordance with the Sindh Government Rules of Business 1986, constituted criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the trial. The High Court allowed the application and quashed the proceedings, holding that the applicant acted within the scope of his statutory authority upon recommendations of the relevant department, and that a mere error of judgment by a Chief Executive does not invite penal action. Furthermore, the subsequent ratification of the land leases by the successor government at the same price negated any allegation of dishonest intent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a bona fide error of judgment by a Chief Executive in the disposal of state land invite penal action under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can criminal proceedings for breach of trust be maintained against a public official when the underlying administrative action was subsequently ratified by a successor government?
  • Under what circumstances should the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash a trial at an initial stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Qaim Ali Shah vs Qubool Muhammad Shah and 2 others1993 CLC 2396 · Election Commission of Pakistan · 1993-08-25Read full judgment →
• Syed Qaim Ali Shah vs Atta Muhammad Murri and 6 others1993 MLD 1127 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-17Read full judgment →
• Syed Nasir Ali vs Muhammad Haleem1993 CLC 1807 · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-10Read full judgment →
• Syed Naim Haider vs The State and others1993 P Cr. L J 645 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-10Read full judgment →
• Syed Muzaffar Hussain Jafri vs Khawaja Fazal Ahmad1993 MLD 1707 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-10
  ejectmentbona fide personal userent controllerlandlord and tenantburden of proofrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of an ejectment application filed by a landlord against his tenant, seeking possession of a shop for bona fide personal use. The core legal question was whether the landlord had sufficiently established his good faith requirement for the premises to warrant eviction. The court held that the landlord failed to prove his bona fide need. The judgment emphasized that a landlord’s mere assertion of personal requirement, even on oath, is insufficient to justify ejectment. The court noted significant inconsistencies between the landlord’s initial application and his subsequent evidence, particularly regarding the specific nature of the proposed business and the family member intended to operate it. Furthermore, the landlord’s admission that he could accommodate his needs in an alternative shop within the same premises undermined his claim of necessity. The court affirmed that bona fide personal requirement must be established through strong, objective evidence rather than mere desire. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the Rent Controller’s decision that the landlord’s claim lacked the requisite good faith.

  Questions settled

  • Is a landlord's mere statement on oath sufficient to prove the bona fide personal requirement for ejectment of a tenant?
  • Does an inconsistency between the initial ejectment application and the evidence filed by a landlord undermine the claim of bona fide personal use?
  • Can a landlord succeed in an ejectment application if they admit to having alternative premises available that could accommodate their stated needs?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Musarrat Hussain Zaidi and another vs Syed Salim Jawaid Zaidi1993 PLD Karachi 548 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-03
  partition suitappeal by non-partyleave to appealsealing of propertycriminal procedure codeofficial assignee reportstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court Appeal challenged an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Sindh High Court regarding the sealing and partitioning of a disputed property. The core legal questions involved whether a non-party to a suit could file an appeal without obtaining prior leave of the court, the correct scope and construction of sealing orders passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the property in question was capable of being partitioned by metes and bounds. The court held that a stranger to a suit can only appeal with the leave of the appellate court upon establishing an affected interest, which the second appellant failed to do. Furthermore, the court found that the orders of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate pertained strictly to the restaurant rather than the entire building, and that the Single Judge had misconstrued the Official Assignee's report regarding the divisibility of the property. The appeal was partly allowed to correct the finding on the property's divisibility while upholding the preliminary objection against the non-party appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who is not a party to a suit file an appeal against an order passed therein without obtaining prior leave of the appellate court?
  • What criteria must an appellant establish to obtain leave from an appellate court when they were not a party to the original suit or proceeding?
  • Whether an order passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for sealing a premises extends beyond the specific portions designated in the order?
  • Does a report by an Official Assignee stating that a property is incapable of division in its present position support a finding of divisibility?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Munawar Ali vs Tariq Shoaib1993 CLC 349 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-30Read full judgment →
• Syed Mukhtar Gilani, Director/Member, Board of Directors Azad1993 CLC 463 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1992-11-30Read full judgment →
• Syed Mukhtar Ali Shah vs Federation of Pakistan and another1993 SCMR 845 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-25
  Summary Military Courtjurisdictioncoram non judiceSub-Registrarmartial law conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed the appellant's Constitution petition in limine against his conviction by a Summary Military Court under Martial Law Order 72 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The core legal question was whether the conviction was without jurisdiction or coram non judice because the charge on its face did not make out an offence. The Supreme Court held that there was enough material on record to show direct involvement in the crime, particularly considering the statutory duties of a Sub-Registrar under Rule 126 of the West Pakistan Registration Rules to inquire into the identity and authority of executants, and that the conviction did not suffer from any jurisdictional defect or mala fides. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction by a Summary Military Court can be challenged on the ground that no offence was made out on the face of the charge?
  • Does a Sub-Registrar act merely mechanically in accepting documents for registration without inquiring into the title or authority of the executant?
  • When can a conviction rendered by a military court be interfered with by superior courts on grounds of jurisdiction or mala fides?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Khalilur Rehman Chishti vs Shamshad Khan and others1993 MLD 1225 · Election Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Imran Sherazi vs Returning Officer Etc.1993 MLD 2472 · Election Tribunal · 1993-09-09Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Hussain vs Syed Karam Ali Shah through Legal Heirs1993 SCMR 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-09-08
  displaced personsearmarking listsettlement schemeallotment of housepossessiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of the appellant's writ petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee house under the settlement laws. The core legal questions involved whether the disputed house was validly deleted from the earmarking list prior to its transfer by drawing of lots, and whether the appellant's possession satisfied the statutory definition of possession under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, read with the Central Government's amending notification dated August 3, 1960. The Supreme Court held that the house was indeed duly deleted from the earmarking list by a competent authority, rendering its subsequent disposal by drawing of lots unlawful, and that the appellant, a claimant displaced person in undisputed official occupation, was entitled to the transfer of the property. The Court laid down the principle that an evacuee property deleted from the earmarking list is not available for disposal via lots, and that subsequent administrative notifications extending the terminal date for possession under departmental allotments protect eligible government servants occupying such properties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a house once deleted from the earmarking list by a competent authority can be lawfully disposed of through drawing of lots?
  • Does a government servant occupying an evacuee house under a departmental allotment qualify for transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can the Central Government's notification dated 3-8-1960 extend the terminal date for undisputed possession of an evacuee house under the settlement laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muddassar Altaf vs The Deputy Commissioner/Collector, Lahore1993 PLD Lahore 810 · Lahore High Court · 1993-08-23
  maintenancepast maintenanceex parte orderlimitation periodarbitration councilfamily law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arose from a maintenance dispute under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The petitioner challenged an ex parte maintenance order passed by the Arbitration Council, which had been upheld by the Collector. The petitioner contended that he was condemned unheard, that his wife had voluntarily left his house, and that the grant of past maintenance beyond three years was unlawful. The High Court found that the petitioner had active knowledge of the proceedings and had failed to appear on the adjourned date, thereby justifying the ex parte proceedings. On the core legal question of the limitation period for past maintenance, the Court examined conflicting precedents and held that an application for maintenance under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 is not governed by the three-year limitation period under Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908, as that article applies only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Instead, following Supreme Court precedent, the Court ruled that such claims are governed by the six-year residuary period under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte maintenance order is valid if the husband had actual notice of the adjourned hearing date but failed to appear?
  • Does Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to applications for maintenance filed under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • What is the limitation period for a wife to claim past maintenance under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mohsin Raza Bukhari and 4 others vs Syed Azra Zenab Bukhari1993 CLC 31 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-29
  civil revisionpartition suitreplicationamendment of plainttitle paramountgiftunity of title
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged an order of the Civil Judge striking off a replication and issues in a partition suit. The plaintiffs filed for partition of a property based on inheritance, while the defendant set up an exclusive title by way of gift from their deceased father. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the gift through their replication. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff in a partition suit can challenge the validity of an independent or paramount title set up by a defendant through a replication rather than by seeking an amendment to the plaint. The Lahore High Court held that where a defendant in a partition suit sets up a paramount title denying unity of title, the question cannot be decided without amending the plaint to seek a declaration or cancellation of the deed, and a new case cannot be introduced via a replication. The court dismissed the revision petition, affirming that a replication is merely a supplement to clarify ambiguities in the plaint and cannot be used to present a fundamentally new case or bypass the requirement of amending the pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff challenge the validity of a paramount title or gift set up by a defendant in a partition suit through a replication without amending the plaint?
  • What are the necessary preconditions for maintaining a suit for partition?
  • Does a replication allow the introduction of a new case or cause of action that was not pleaded in the original plaint?
  • How should a trial court proceed when a defendant in a partition suit sets up an exclusive title or title paramount denying unity of title?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mohsin Raza Bukhari And 4 Other vs Syed Azra Zeneb BukhariK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 322 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-29Read full judgment →
• Syed Mir Khan vs The State1993 PLD Karachi 344 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-10Read full judgment →
• Syed Masroor Ahsan vs The State1993 MLD 835 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-22Read full judgment →
• Syed Manzoor Hussain Gilani vs Sain Mullah, Advocate and 2 others1993 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 12 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1993-01-13Read full judgment →
• Syed Mahmood Ali Gerdezi and another vs Syeda Rabia Beg Um and 101993 MLD 814 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-16
  temporary injunctionspecific performanceCode of Civil Procedureinterlocutory reliefalienation of propertystatus quocivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether a court can grant a temporary injunction in a suit where the plaintiff has not explicitly prayed for a permanent injunction. The appellants filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell and sought a temporary injunction to restrain the respondents from alienating the suit property. The trial court dismissed the application, holding that a temporary injunction is not maintainable without a prayer for a permanent injunction. Upon review, the High Court held that the trial court's view was erroneous. The Court reasoned that Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 uses the phrase 'in any suit,' which is all-embracing and not limited to suits for permanent injunctions. The Court affirmed that temporary injunctions are ancillary to the main relief and can be granted to preserve the status quo of property during the pendency of various types of litigation, including specific performance suits, to prevent irreparable injury. The appeal was allowed, and the case remanded for a fresh decision on the injunction application.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction in a suit where the plaintiff has not prayed for a permanent injunction?
  • Does the phrase 'in any suit' in Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 limit the court's power to grant temporary injunctions to suits for permanent injunctions?
  • Is a temporary injunction considered an ancillary relief in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed M. Yusuf Shah vs Azad Government through its Chief Secterary, Muzaffarabad and another1993 CLC 2234 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1993-06-22Read full judgment →
• Syed Khursheed Ali JAFFERYAppeliant vs Jamiluddin Siddiqui1993 CLC 2511 · Sindh High Court · 1993-05-16
  personal requirementmarried daughterpower of attorneyrented premisesejectment appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller directing the appellant-tenant to vacate the premises on the ground of personal requirement for the landlord and his married daughters. The appellant challenged the maintainability of the eviction application, contending that the power of attorney executed in favour of the landlord's daughter was forged, that the landlord failed to explain the availability of another property in his possession, and that the personal requirement of a landlord under the relevant rent law does not extend to married, independent daughters. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a power of attorney authenticated by a notary public carries a presumption of authenticity under the law, that a landlord is only required to plead material facts constituting a cause of action rather than exhaustive details of other properties, and that the statutory definition of personal use under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance includes a son or daughter without the qualification of dependency. The court thus affirmed the eviction order while granting the tenant four months to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a power of attorney authenticated by a notary public requires formal proof of execution unless its genuineness is disputed by the principal?
  • Does the personal requirement of a landlord under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance extend to his married and independent daughters?
  • Is a landlord obligated to provide exhaustive details or reasons regarding other properties in his possession when seeking eviction for personal use?
  • Does the expression 'personal use' in the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance require a son or daughter of the landlord to be financially dependent upon him?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Israr Ali and anothers vs Mst. Ahmadi Begum and another1993 CLC 770 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-20Read full judgment →
• Syed Irshad Ahmad vs Inspector General of Police, Police Head Office, I.I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi And 2 OtherK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 105 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Syed Imran Shah through Legal Heirs vs The Deputy Administrator1993 CLC 299 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-15Read full judgment →
• Syed Hussain Zaidi vs Dr. Zaheer Umer1993 CLC 543 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-20Read full judgment →
• Syed Hasan Abbas Rizvi vs The StateK.L.R 1993 Criminal Cases 464 · Sindh High Court · 1993-04-28Read full judgment →
• Syed Hasan Abbas Rizvi vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1630 · Sindh High Court · 1993-04-28Read full judgment →
• Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi vs Muhammad Javed Aslam1993 CLC 1812 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-31Read full judgment →
• Syed Gulzar Ali Shah vs The Secretary And AnotherK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 128 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1993-01-31Read full judgment →
• Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah and another vs Syed Muhammad Hussain1993 PLD Karachi 369 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-28
  civil revisionadverse possessionprivate partitionownership disputerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Revision Application challenged the appellate court's judgment which set aside the trial court's decree for declaration and injunction concerning disputed land. The applicants claimed ownership through private partition after their grandfather's death and alternatively by adverse possession. The respondents asserted ownership through their father's purchase from the Barrage Department and subsequent inheritance. The High Court, exercising its revisional powers under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, found that the appellate court correctly held that the applicants failed to establish the ingredients for adverse possession and that their evidence for private partition was insufficient against the documentary evidence presented by the respondents. The Court reiterated that revisional jurisdiction is primarily for correcting jurisdictional errors, not erroneous decisions of fact unless perverse, and affirmed that a party claiming title through purchase/inheritance cannot simultaneously succeed on a plea of adverse possession. The revision application was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code?
  • Can erroneous decisions of fact be revised under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code?
  • What are the essential ingredients a person must show to claim title to immovable property by adverse possession?
  • Can a party simultaneously plead valid title through purchase/inheritance and adverse possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Fazal Abbas vs Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and another1993 SCMR 2255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-26
  service tribunalremoval from servicenarcotics smugglingopportunity of being heardpublic interestcargo assistantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his removal from service as a Cargo Assistant by the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation under Section 10(2) of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956. The core legal question was whether the Corporation was justified in removing the petitioner from service without holding a full-dressed formal inquiry, upon the discovery of narcotics smuggled through a flight during his duty hours, and whether the action complied with the statutory provisions. The Supreme Court held that the Corporation was fully justified in invoking Section 10(2) of the Act after providing an opportunity of being heard, given that narcotics smuggling affects national interests and individual acts of staff involved in loading are difficult to prove formally. The Court laid down that under Section 10(2) of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956, a full-dressed inquiry is not a mandatory prerequisite for removal where an opportunity of being heard is provided, and actions taken in good faith for public good regarding narcotics control will not be struck down on technical grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a full-dressed inquiry is mandatory before removing an employee under Section 10(2) of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956?
  • Can an order of removal passed under Section 10(2) of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956, be called in question before a court or tribunal other than as provided by the statute?
  • Does an action taken by the Corporation in the interest of the public and country against narcotics smuggling warrant interference on technical grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Farasat Ali vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 201 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-14Read full judgment →