Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Basharat Ahmad Shaikh, I Kh. Mehtab Din vs Azad Government through its Chief Secretary and 4 others1993 CLC 988 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1993-02-13Read full judgment →
• Barrister Rashid Akhtar Qureshi vs The Province of Sindh through Secretary, Excise and Taxation, Government of Sindh, Karachi and another1993 MLD 2466 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-23Read full judgment →
• Barkhurdar and others vs Lal and others1993 CLC 2539 · Lahore High Court · 1993-05-17Read full judgment →
• Barkat vs Fazal Elahi and others1993 CLC 2400 · Lahore High Court · 1993-05-18Read full judgment →
• Barkat Masih vs The State and others1993 P Cr. L J 999 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-14Read full judgment →
• Barkat Bibi vs Incharge, Highway Rest House, Dunyapur, District1993 MLD 1758 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-14Read full judgment →
• Barkat Ali vs Sh. Anwar and others1993 MLD 2329 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-06Read full judgment →
• Barkat Ali vs Election Tribunal/Civil Judge Class III, Kasur and 21993 MLD 1635 · Lahore High Court · 1993-05-29Read full judgment →
• Banqu E INDOSUEZs vs Rehmani Brothers1993 CLC 1257 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-01
  Section 12(2) CPCdoctrine of mergerappellate jurisdictionbanking recoverypreliminary decreeclerical errorexecution of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  The defendants filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking to recall a judgment and decree passed in a suit for recovery of a loan under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979, alleging lack of jurisdiction and fraud. Additionally, the plaintiff filed an application under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to amend the decree to include a preliminary decree. The core legal questions were whether an application under Section 12(2) is maintainable in the trial court after an appeal has been dismissed, and whether a decree can be amended under Section 152 to include relief not originally prayed for. The Court held that the application under Section 12(2) was not maintainable because the trial court's judgment merged into the appellate court's judgment upon dismissal of the appeal, necessitating the application be filed before the appellate court. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the application under Section 152, ruling that the provision only allows for correcting accidental omissions, not for granting relief that was never requested or intended in the original decree.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable before the trial court after the judgment has been challenged in an appeal?
  • Does the doctrine of merger apply to a trial court's judgment when an appeal against it has been dismissed?
  • Can a court amend a decree under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to include a preliminary decree if the original prayer did not seek one?
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• Bank of Oman Ltd. vs Crescent International and others1993 MLD 1716 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-23Read full judgment →
• Bakhtawar vs Sikandar Khan and others1993 CLC 1232 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-03Read full judgment →
• Bakht Ali and anothers vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1872 · Federal Shariat Court · 1993-02-10
  QazfZina-bil-Jabrfalse accusationgood faithwitness testimonywhipping Haddcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur, convicting the appellants under section 7(3) of the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979, for allegedly supporting a false charge of Zina-bil-Jabr as witnesses, resulting in sentences of eighty stripes of whipping each. The core legal question revolves around whether an accusation or statement by a witness in a Zina case, made before an authorized person, constitutes Qazf under the law when the original case is dismissed for lack of incriminating evidence, and whether failure to prove an allegation automatically renders a witness liable for Qazf punishment. The Federal Shariat Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants. The Court held that mere failure to substantiate allegations or dismissal of a Zina case due to lack of confidence-inspiring evidence does not amount to Qazf unless there is a specific judicial finding that the witness gave false evidence mala fide, and that the statutory exceptions protect accusations preferred in good faith unless explicitly found false by the court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere failure of a complainant to prove an allegation of Zina make the witnesses of the said offence liable to Qazf punishment?
  • Whether an accusation of Zina preferred by a witness before an authorized person amounts to Qazf in the absence of a distinct judicial finding that the witness gave false evidence mala fide?
  • Can a conviction under section 7 of the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979 be sustained when the trial court's judgment in the primary case merely found the evidence not confidence-inspiring without recording a finding of falsity?
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• Bakhsh vs Province of Punjab through Collector, Lyalipur/Faisalabad1993 MLD 1905 · Lahore High Court · 1993-06-13Read full judgment →
• Bahar Qureshi and 2 others vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 496 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-20Read full judgment →
• Bahar Gul vs The State1993 PLD Peshawar 125 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-04-27Read full judgment →
• Bahadur Kamal vs Muhammad Ashraf1993 CLC 1236 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-19
  restoration of appealdismissal for defaultex parte decreepre-emption suitcondonation of delayLimitation Actsufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals arising from pre-emption suits where the trial court decreed the suits ex parte without recording evidence, relying solely on the plaints. The lower appellate court set aside the ex parte decrees and remanded the matters for decision on merits. The appellants subsequently failed to appear when their appeals were fixed for hearing before the High Court, leading to the dismissal of the appeals for default. The core legal questions concern whether sufficient cause was shown for the restoration of appeals dismissed in default, whether section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to such restoration applications, and whether the trial court can decree an ex parte suit without requiring proof. The court held that mere omission to check the cause-list does not constitute sufficient cause for non-appearance, that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications for restoration of appeals dismissed for default under Order 41 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that courts should generally ensure cases are decided on merits after requiring proof. The petitions for restoration were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether omission by a counsel to notice a case in the printed cause-list constitutes sufficient cause for setting aside a dismissal for default?
  • Does section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to an application for the restoration of an appeal dismissed for default in appearance under Order 41 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a trial court decree a pre-parte suit without taking any evidence or requiring proof of the averments in the plaint?
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• Bahadur and others vs Umar Hayat and others1993 PLD Lahore 390 · Lahore High Court · 1993-01-26
  res judicatacivil revisiongeneral jurisdictionjudicial reviewmortgage redemptioncollateral attacknullity of decreeCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition addresses whether a decree of a Civil Court, which declared an administrative order void, can be challenged in a subsequent civil suit, and whether a Civil Court can declare a prior decree of a competent Civil Court to be without jurisdiction. The dispute arose from a previous decree that declared a Collector’s order regarding mortgage redemption to be unlawful. The respondents later filed a new suit seeking to declare that previous decree void. The High Court held that Civil Courts are courts of general jurisdiction; thus, they possess the authority to decide questions of law. A decision, even if legally erroneous, is not a nullity or "without jurisdiction" simply because the conclusion is incorrect. Such errors must be corrected through the appellate process, not by a collateral suit. Consequently, the previous decree remained valid and operated as res judicata. The Court affirmed that judicial review of a Civil Court's judgment is unavailable via a subsequent suit, emphasizing the finality of litigation and the prohibition against re-litigating settled matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Civil Court declare a decree passed by another Civil Court of competent jurisdiction to be void in a subsequent suit?
  • Does an incorrect decision on a point of law by a Civil Court render its decree a nullity or without jurisdiction?
  • Is a subsequent civil suit maintainable to challenge a final decree that has attained finality through the failure to file an appeal?
  • Does the doctrine of res judicata bar a party from challenging a previous decree in a separate suit on the grounds that the previous court erred in law?
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• Bahadar vs Haji Muhammad Rafiq1993 CLC 295 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-07Read full judgment →
• Bahadar Ali vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 267 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-29Read full judgment →
• Badshah Zada vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 699 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-12-23
  rash and negligent drivingpost-mortem examinationproximate causesimultaneous convictioncriminal revisiontraffic accidentcausa causans
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition before the Peshawar High Court arose from the conviction of a bus driver by a Magistrate under Sections 279, 338, 304-A, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was subsequently upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner drove rashly and negligently, hitting a jeep from behind and then colliding head-on with a Suzuki van, resulting in the instantaneous death of the van driver and injuries to the jeep's occupant. The High Court examined whether simultaneous convictions under Sections 279, 338, and 304-A were legally sustainable and whether a conviction under Section 304-A could stand without a post-mortem report. The Court held that where rash or negligent driving results in death or grievous hurt, the offender is liable under Sections 304-A or 338, but cannot be simultaneously convicted under Section 279. Furthermore, the absence of a post-mortem report meant the prosecution failed to prove that the victim's death was the direct and proximate result of the injuries. Consequently, the Court acquitted the petitioner under Sections 304-A and 338, but maintained and modified the convictions under Sections 279 and 427.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be simultaneously convicted and sentenced under Section 279 and Sections 304-A or 338 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the same transaction of rash driving?
  • Is a formal post-mortem examination necessary to sustain a conviction for causing death by negligence under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 338 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained if the medical evidence fails to prove that the injured person suffered grievous hurt?
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• Badaruddin vs Mehr Ahmad Raza, Additional Sessions Judge, Jhang1993 PLD Supreme Court 399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-05
  Section 249-A Cr.P.C.acquittal before evidencecivil disputebreach of contractwrit petition maintainabilityrevisional jurisdictionpower of attorneypro forma respondent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court order dismissing a writ petition filed against a Revisional Court judgment that allowed the accuseds' application for acquittal under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. The complainant had alleged criminal offences including cheating and forgery following a land dispute, whereas the accused argued the dispute was purely civil. The core legal questions addressed were whether an accused can be acquitted under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. prior to recording evidence when the matter essentially involves a civil breach of contract, and whether a constitutional writ petition is maintainable against a final revisional order. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal, holding that the phrase 'at any stage of the case' in Section 249-A Cr.P.C. empowers the court to acquit without recording evidence if the charge is groundless or conviction is improbable. Furthermore, matters primarily civil in nature ought to be resolved in civil courts, and writ jurisdiction cannot be used to re-agitate issues finalized by a competent revisional court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court order an acquittal under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. prior to the recording of evidence?
  • Should a criminal court proceed with criminal charges where the dispute in substance relates to a civil breach of contract?
  • Is a constitutional writ petition maintainable against a final order passed by a competent court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction?
  • How should judicial officers and pro forma respondents be properly impleaded in court petitions?
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• Badar Iqbal vs The Speaker, Sindh Provincial Assembly and 3 others1993 PLD Karachi 312 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-17
  resignation of memberwithdrawal of resignationprovincial assemblyduresslachesbye-electionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a Member of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh challenging a notification issued by the Speaker that declared his seat vacant following his alleged resignation. The petitioner contended that his undated resignation letter had been obtained under duress by his party leadership and that, prior to the resignation letter reaching the Speaker, he had formally withdrawn it via a letter received by the Speaker on February 26, 1991. The resignation letter itself was received by the Speaker on February 27, 1991, who immediately gave it effect. The respondent argued that the petition was barred by laches as it was filed thirteen months later, during which time a bye-election was held and a new member elected. The High Court held that a resignation can only take effect if it reaches the competent authority, and if it is withdrawn by the maker before it reaches the Speaker, it becomes ineffective. The Court further held that laches is an equitable bar and should not be applied to perpetuate injustice, especially where the petitioner was forced to remain abroad. The petition was allowed, and both the notification and the subsequent bye-election were declared void.

  Questions settled

  • Can a member of a Provincial Assembly withdraw their resignation before it reaches the Speaker?
  • Does a resignation letter obtained under duress become effective if the maker communicates its withdrawal to the Speaker before the resignation letter is received?
  • Should a constitutional petition be dismissed on the ground of laches if the delay in filing was caused by the petitioner being forced to remain outside the country?
  • Can the bar of laches be invoked in discretionary constitutional jurisdiction if its application would result in perpetuating an injustice?
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• Babu Muhammad Munir vs Appellate Tribunal of the Election Commission and others1993 SCMR 2348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-03
  nomination paperselection disputedisqualificationconstitutional petitionleave to appealcooperative societyAmeen
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from petitions directed against an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal of the Election Commission, which allowed election appeals and disqualified the petitioner from contesting elections on the ground that he failed to meet the qualifications of being righteous and Ameen under Article 62(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and Section 99(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, due to his role as a director of a cooperative society that defaulted on returning depositors' funds. The core legal question was whether the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should be exercised to grant leave to appeal against the Tribunal's finding disqualifying a candidate on factual grounds relating to cooperative society defaults. The Supreme Court held that the petitions were not fit cases for granting leave to appeal because determining whether the petitioner was a sleeping director or had validly arranged for refunds involves the investigation of disputed questions of facts, which are pre-eminently suitable for adjudication through an election petition rather than a constitutional petition. The key principle laid down is that disputes regarding the rejection or acceptance of nomination papers involving disputed questions of fact relating to a candidate's qualifications should be agitated through an election petition after the election rather than invoked through constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal under its discretionary jurisdiction against an appellate tribunal's order disqualifying a candidate based on factual findings?
  • Does a challenge to the rejection or acceptance of nomination papers involving disputed questions of fact warrant interference through a constitutional petition?
  • Whether failure of a cooperative society of which a candidate is a director to repay depositors' funds renders the candidate disqualified under Article 62(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Babar Islam vs Government of the Punjab1993 CLC 1206 · Lahore High Court · 1991-08-20Read full judgment →
• B. Nagi Reddy vs Commissioner of Income-Tax (1993 PTD 1314 · Madras High Court · 1991-06-10Read full judgment →
• Azmat Ullah Khan vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 270 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-23Read full judgment →
• Azmat Ullah Khan vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1220 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-23
  compromiseqisas and diyatmurderframing of chargerevision petitiontazir
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition arises from an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mianwali, dismissing the petitioner's application for acquittal based on a compromise in a murder case registered under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner contended that since some legal heirs compounded the offence and received Diyat, the charge should be altered to section 311 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a trial court is bound to alter a charge from section 302 to section 311 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and force unwilling legal heirs to accept Diyat prior to the recording of evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the trial court rightly framed the charge under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and that it would be premature to alter the charge before the prosecution evidence is recorded, especially when material eye-witnesses refuse to compound the offence. The court laid down the principle that an accused charged with a graver offence can be convicted of a lesser offence if established during trial, whereas initially charging a lesser offence prejudices a proper determination, and provisions relating to Tazir under section 311 are attracted only at the stage of conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can force unwilling legal heirs of a deceased to accept Diyat and compound an offence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is it mandatory for a trial court to alter a charge from section 302 to section 311 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 prior to the recording of prosecution evidence when some heirs refuse to compromise?
  • At what stage of the trial are the provisions of section 311 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 attracted?
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• Azmat Javed vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1235 · Lahore High Court · 1993-02-21Read full judgment →
• Azmat Farooq vs The Regional Commissioner of Income-Tax Central1993 PTD 801 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Azizur Rehman and 10 others vs Ali Haider Shah and 4 others1993 CLC 454 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1992-11-14
  adverse possessiontenant-at-willtitle suitrevenue recordhostile possessionpossession based on title
  Summary & questions settled

  This second civil appeal arose from a dispute over land ownership in Muzaffarabad. The respondents claimed ownership of the suit land through adverse possession, asserting they had been in peaceful possession for over 12 years, while the appellants sought possession based on their title as true owners. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the appellants, but the District Judge reversed this, granting the decree to the respondents based on adverse possession. Upon review, the High Court held that the respondents failed to establish the essential ingredients of adverse possession—namely, that their possession was hostile, continuous, and notorious against the true owners. The Court emphasized that revenue records consistently identified the respondents as tenants-at-will, negating any claim of hostile title. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that mere length of possession does not constitute adverse possession, especially when the occupant acknowledges the owner's title by paying produce. Consequently, the High Court set aside the District Judge's decree, restored the trial court's decree for possession in favor of the appellants, and denied the respondents' claim for costs of improvements.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere length of possession over land constitute adverse possession?
  • Can a party claiming adverse possession succeed if they are recorded as tenants-at-will in revenue records?
  • Is a tenant-at-will entitled to claim costs for improvements made on land without the owner's consent?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to prove a claim of adverse possession?
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• Azizuddin through his L.Rs, vs Muhammad Anwar and 2 others1993 MLD 1424 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-10Read full judgment →
• Aziz-Ud-Din, Secretary (Propaganda), Pakistan Inquilabi Labour Party1993 SCMR 1563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-27
  constitutional interpretationgender equalityeligibility for public officedefinition of Muslimstatutory interpretationPrime Minister eligibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Sindh High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition seeking declarations that women are ineligible to serve as Prime Minister, Ministers, or members of legislative assemblies under the Constitution and the Qur'an and Sunnah. The petitioner contended that the term "Muslim" in the Constitution should be interpreted exclusively as "male Muslim," thereby barring women from such offices. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that Article 260(3)(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 defines a "Muslim" as a "person" who believes in the unity of Allah and the finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him), without gender restriction. Furthermore, the Court relied on Article 263 of the Constitution, which mandates that words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that there is no constitutional basis to exclude women from holding public office based on gender. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'Muslim' in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 imply only a male Muslim?
  • Are women constitutionally disqualified from serving as Prime Minister or members of legislative assemblies in Pakistan?
  • Do words importing the masculine gender in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 include females?
  Read full judgment →
• Aziz Ahmad And Other vs (Mst.) Sughran Bibi And OtherK.L.R. 1993 Revenue Cases 52 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1990-09-16Read full judgment →
• Azhar Hussain Alvi vs (Mst.) Khursheed AkhtarK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 26 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-12Read full judgment →
• Azhar Hussain (deceased) through L.Rs. and others vs Mst. Jannat Bibi1993 MLD 345 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Azeemuddin (deceased) through his Legal Heirs vs Mst. Hamida Begum1993 PLD Karachi 50 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-17
  default in rentpersonal bona fide needpartnership firm tenanttender of rentejectment appealrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of ejectment passed by a Rent Controller under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, on the grounds of default in rent and personal bona fide need. The core legal questions involve determining the actual tenant where a partnership firm is claimed to be the lessee, whether the deposit of rent in court without prior tender to the landlord constitutes a valid tender under section 10 of the Ordinance, and whether personal need is established when the sons for whom premises are claimed are already in salaried employment. The Sindh High Court held that the tenancy vested in the individual partner in whose name receipts were issued, not the subsequently formed partnership firm, and that voluntary deposit of rent in court without a prior lawful tender or refusal by the landlord does not absolve the tenant from default. However, personal need was negatived as the sons were already gainfully employed. The eviction order was maintained solely on the ground of default in rent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenancy vest in a partnership firm when rent receipts are historically issued in the name of an individual partner?
  • Does the deposit of rent in court without a prior tender to the landlord constitute a valid tender under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is personal bona fide need established for sons who are already gainfully employed in salaried services?
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• Azeem Baig vs Syed Abdul Anis1993 MLD 1823 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-03Read full judgment →
• Azad Government through its Chief Secretary and another vs Javed Iqbal1993 CLC 992 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1993-02-13Read full judgment →
• Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Advocate-General vs Raja Waleed Khan1993 MLD 125 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1992-11-04Read full judgment →
• Azad Government of the State of J&K through its Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad vs Brig. (Rtd.) Muhammad Aslam 'Khan1993 CLC 1006 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1993-02-03Read full judgment →
• Azad Friends & Company vs Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks1993 PLD Karachi 571 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-15Read full judgment →
• Ayub Khan vs Muhammad Fayaz Ahmad and others1993 MLD 573 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-15Read full judgment →
• Ayaz Textile Mills Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary1993 PLD Lahore 194 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-17
  import licence feerural industrial development incentivespromissory estoppeltax versus feevested rightsconstitutional petitionimport policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of a batch of constitutional petitions challenging the levy of a 6% ad valorem import licence fee on machinery imported for rural industrial development under the Rural Industrial Development Incentives scheme. The core legal questions involved whether the levy of the fee amounted to an unconstitutional tax, whether the government was bound by promissory estoppel to grant total exemption from licence fees as initially announced, and whether the fee charged was reasonable. The Lahore High Court held that the import licence fee is a composite charge for a privilege conferred and services rendered, and while the government has the discretion to levy such a fee, it must be reasonable and not excessive. The court ruled that the principle of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against a statute, and since no concluded contract had been finalized before the policy modification, no vested rights had accrued. However, the court found the 6% fee to be exorbitant and unreasonable under the circumstances, noting that the government itself had subsequently reduced the fee to 2% ad valorem. The petitions were accepted, declaring the 6% levy without lawful authority, and holding that the petitioners were entitled to import licences upon the payment of a fair and reasonable 2% ad valorem licence fee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the levy of an import licence fee at the rate of 6% ad valorem amounts to an unconstitutional tax?
  • Can the principle of promissory estoppel be invoked against the statutory powers of the Federal Government to alter import policies and levy fees?
  • Whether an applicant acquires a vested right to the grant of an import licence merely by submitting an application and entering into preliminary negotiations prior to a change in government policy?
  • Whether the import licence fee charged by the Government for the import of machinery is required to be reasonable and commensurate with the privileges conferred and services rendered?
  Read full judgment →
• Ayaz Texile Mills Ltd. vs Federation Of Pakistan Through SecretaryPTCL 1993 CL. 746 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Avadesh Kumar Upadhyay vs Commissioner of Income Tax1993 PTD 823(1) · Allahabad High Court · 1991-10-10Read full judgment →
• Austin Nichols & Co. vs The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi1993 PLD Karachi 129 · Sindh High Court
  trade mark registrationinvented worddistinctivenesstotality of impressionrefusal of registrationtrade mark appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks' refusal to register the trade mark "Orangina" featuring a bottle and whirl device. The Registrar had rejected the application, contending the word was not "invented" and the mark lacked essential particulars. The core legal question was whether the mark, when viewed in its entirety, qualified for registration under the Trade Marks Act. The court held that while "Orangina" is a trivial variation of "Orange" and thus not an "invented word," the Registrar erred by failing to assess the mark's "totality of the impression." The court determined that the combination of the word with the specific bottle and whirl device rendered the mark distinctive under the Act. Consequently, the court set aside the refusal and directed the Registrar to proceed with the registration process. The key principle established is that when evaluating a trade mark comprising a word and a device, the Registrar must consider the get-up as a whole to determine its distinctiveness, rather than analyzing components in isolation.

  Questions settled

  • Is the word 'Orangina' considered an invented word under the Trade Marks Act?
  • Does the assessment of a trade mark's distinctiveness require consideration of the mark's totality of impression rather than its individual components?
  • Can a trade mark be registered under the Trade Marks Act if it is not an invented word but possesses distinctiveness through its overall design?
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• Aurangzeb vs The State1993 SCMR 1931 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-22
  leave to appealfalse informationcriminal complaintjurisdictionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question concerns the competency of a complaint filed under section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code pursuant to the order of a District Magistrate, where the initial application containing the alleged false information was submitted to the Divisional Commissioner, specifically in light of the provisions of section 195(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court granted leave to examine whether such a complaint is legally competent under the cited statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a complaint under section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code made under the order of the District Magistrate is competent when the application containing the alleged false information was made to the Divisional Commissioner?
  • Does section 195(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure bar a complaint under section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code in the absence of a complaint by the public servant concerned or their superior?
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• Aurangzeb vs Massan and 13 others1993 CLC 1020 · Lahore High Court · 1993-02-14
  pre-emptionSection 12(2) CPCnullity of decreetarget daterestitutionjurisdictionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arose from a pre-emption suit wherein the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the petitioner on 20-10-1987, based on collateralship, after the target date of 31-7-1986 established in the landmark judgment of Malik Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360). Subsequently, the respondents filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside the decree as being without jurisdiction and a nullity. The trial court dismissed the application, but the Additional District Judge allowed the revision and set aside the pre-emption decree. The Lahore High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine, holding that any pre-emption decree passed on the ground of mere relationship after the constitutional deadline is a nullity without jurisdiction. The Court laid down that neither consent nor estoppel can confer jurisdiction where it does not exist, and a decree passed in disregard of binding judgments of superior courts can be recalled under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, with consequential restitution ordered under Section 144.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption decree passed on the ground of collateralship after the target date of 31-7-1986 be set aside under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the withdrawal of pre-emption money by vendees estop them from filing an application for the rescission of an invalid decree?
  • Whether consent or estoppel can confer jurisdiction upon a court where it does not exist in law?
  • Is restitution required when an invalid pre-emption decree is set aside under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Aurangzeb vs Hassan EtcK.L.R. 1993 Revenue Cases 109 · Lahore High Court · 1993-02-14Read full judgment →
• Aurang Zaib vs M/s. Alhaider Construction Company through1993 PLD Karachi 397 · Sindh High Court
  mutation proceedingsrecord of rightsrevenue officers jurisdictioncivil disputesummary proceedingsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged orders passed by revenue authorities regarding the mutation and cancellation of entries in the Record of Rights concerning agricultural land. The core legal question revolved around the scope and jurisdiction of revenue officers in summary mutation proceedings when a dispute involving intricate questions of title or an agreement to sell arises between competing claimants. The Sindh High Court held that mutation proceedings under the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967 are summary in nature, and revenue officers lack jurisdiction to resolve complex civil disputes or usurp the functions of a competent Civil Court. The Court laid down the principle that once revenue authorities determine that a dispute is of a civil nature, they must refrain from deciding complex title issues or recording contradictory findings, and must leave such matters to a court of civil jurisdiction. The impugned orders were declared passed without lawful authority and the matter was remanded for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Do revenue officers have the jurisdiction to resolve intricate questions of title and complex civil disputes during summary mutation proceedings under the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967?
  • What is the legal recourse for revenue officers once they determine that a mutation dispute before them is purely of a civil nature?
  • Are mutation proceedings under sections 42 to 45 of the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967 summary in nature?
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• Attiqur Rahman vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 619 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-13Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad vs Nasiruddin1993 PLD Peshawar 127 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-03-06
  declaratory suitconsequential reliefrevenue recordJamabandilimitation periodco-ownershipcause of action
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a dispute over land ownership and the correctness of revenue record entries. The plaintiff-petitioner sought a declaration that revenue entries in the Jamabandi of 1974-75, which recorded the defendant-respondent as the owner of a 1/48 share of land, were incorrect as the plaintiff had not sold that share. The trial and appellate courts dismissed the suit, holding it incompetent under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, for failing to seek consequential relief of possession, and time-barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The High Court, upon review, held that because the plaintiff remained a co-owner in possession of the land, a suit for declaration without consequential relief was maintainable. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a wrong entry in the Jamabandi provides a fresh cause of action, and a suit for declaration and correction of such entries may be filed within six years from the date of knowledge of the wrong entry. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' findings, declared the suit maintainable and within time, and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for declaration maintainable without a prayer for consequential relief of possession when the plaintiff is a co-owner in possession of the land?
  • Does a wrong entry in the Jamabandi provide a fresh cause of action for a declaratory suit?
  • What is the limitation period for filing a suit for the correction of wrong entries in the Jamabandi?
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• Atta Muhammad And Another vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 210 · Lahore High Court · 1993-01-11Read full judgment →
• Atlantic Steamer's Supply Company vs m.v. Titisee and others1993 PLD Supreme Court 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-09
  Admiralty jurisdictionMaritime lienAction in remSupply of necessariesForeign lawLex foriLex loci contractusChange of ownershipPleadingsProof of foreign law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an admiralty suit instituted by the appellants to recover the cost of necessaries and repairs supplied to a vessel at Port Houston, Texas, USA. The vessel had subsequently changed ownership multiple times before being brought to Gadani Beach in Pakistan for scrapping. The appellants sought to enforce an alleged maritime lien against the vessel in rem. The High Court had dismissed the suit and appeal. The Supreme Court examined whether foreign law creates a maritime lien enforceable in Pakistan, how foreign law must be pleaded and proven, and the applicability of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980. The Court held that foreign law is a question of fact that must be expressly pleaded and proved. Furthermore, the question of whether a claim creates an enforceable maritime lien in an action in rem is governed by the lex fori (the law of Pakistan), not the lex loci. Claims for necessaries do not constitute a maritime lien under Pakistani law, and an action in rem under Section 4(4) of the 1980 Ordinance is not maintainable once the vessel ceases to be beneficially owned by the party liable in personam. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of whether a foreign law applies is a question of fact that must be expressly pleaded in the plaint?
  • Whether foreign law can be proved under Article 52 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat by producing an official government-printed publication of the relevant law?
  • Whether the determination of whether a claim gives rise to an enforceable maritime lien in an action in rem is governed by the lex fori or the lex loci contractus?
  • Can an action in rem for the supply of necessaries under Section 4(4) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980 be maintained against a vessel after its beneficial ownership has changed?
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• Atiuddin vs Saleem Karim1993 MLD 410 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-04Read full judgment →
• Ata Ullah Khan vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1718 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-21Read full judgment →
• Ata Muhammad vs Abdul Aziz and 3 others1993 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-01
  ejectment proceedingslandlord and tenantmisreading of evidencerent restrictionleave to appealevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld an ejectment order against the petitioner. The respondents initiated ejectment proceedings under the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, alleging the petitioner was a tenant in default of rent payments for a shop in Gojra. The petitioner contested the landlord-tenant relationship, claiming ownership of the property through a transfer to his father by the Settlement Department. The Rent Controller and the District Judge concurrently found that the shop occupied by the petitioner was not the one transferred to his father, relying on evidence and the petitioner's own admissions regarding the transfer of his father's shop to a third party. The High Court affirmed these findings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, primarily to examine whether the lower courts misread the evidence concerning the ownership of the disputed shop. The Court stayed the operation of the impugned judgment, thereby requiring a re-evaluation of the evidentiary findings regarding the identity and ownership of the premises in question.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant in an ejectment proceeding successfully challenge the landlord-tenant relationship by claiming ownership of the premises?
  • Does the admission of a party regarding the disposal of property transferred to their predecessor-in-interest constitute sufficient evidence to establish the identity of the premises in a rent dispute?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to re-examine the findings of fact regarding the ownership of disputed property in rent cases?
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• Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax and others1993 PTD 1551 · Supreme Court of India · 1993-03-23Read full judgment →
• Associated Agencies Ltd. and another vs Industrija Masina/Tractora1993 PLD Karachi 459 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-22
  arbitrationstay of suitstep in the proceedingsjoint venture agreementsummary suitleave to defendmodification of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court Appeal challenged an order passed by a learned Single Judge dismissing the appellants' application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 for stay of a recovery suit. The core legal questions involved whether a subsequent protocol modifying outstanding dues superseded the original joint venture agreements containing arbitration clauses, and whether the appellants had taken steps in the proceedings amounting to an abandonment of their right to seek arbitration. The Sindh High Court held that the protocol was merely a minor modification of the original agreements rather than a substitution, and therefore the arbitration clauses continued to apply. It further held that applying for leave to appear and defend under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 alongside seeking a stay under Section 34 does not constitute a step in the proceedings or waiver of arbitration rights. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the suit proceedings were stayed pending arbitration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration clause in an original agreement survives a subsequent protocol modifying outstanding payment terms?
  • Does applying for leave to appear and defend in a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitute a step in the proceedings barring relief under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • When can an appellate court interfere with the discretion exercised by a trial court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Does a dispute regarding outstanding dues under a protocol fall within the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the foundational joint venture agreements?
  Read full judgment →
• Assistant Director, Intelligence And Investigation, Karachi vs M/s. B.R.PTCL 1993 CL. 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs dutysales tax refundrebateroving inquirynotice for informationprinciples of natural justiceCustoms Act 1969
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals, filed with leave of the Court, challenged judgments of the High Court of Sindh which had allowed constitutional petitions and quashed notices issued by the Assistant Director, Intelligence and Investigation (Customs & Excise) to the respondents. The respondents had previously exported certain goods and claimed refunds of customs duty and sales tax under specific notifications, a matter that had been contested and ultimately resolved by the Central Board of Revenue in favor of the respondents. Subsequently, the appellant authority issued notices under Section 26 of the Customs Act, 1969, requiring the production of import bills of entry and purchase vouchers. The core legal question was whether the authorities could issue such notices for information without specific allegations, and whether prior decisions by the Central Board of Revenue barred such inquiries. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that while Section 26 empowers authorized officers to require information for determining the legality or illegality of imports and exports, it does not permit roving or fishing inquiries. The Court laid down the principle that a notice under Section 26 must disclose specific allegations, facts, and the purpose for which documents or information are required; otherwise, it violates the principles of natural justice and is illegal, though the authorities remain free to issue fresh, compliant notices.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 26 of the Customs Act, 1969 empower customs authorities to conduct a roving or fishing inquiry without specific allegations?
  • Whether a notice issued under Section 26 of the Customs Act, 1969 is illegal if it fails to disclose the specific purpose and particulars for which information or documents are required?
  • Does a decision by the Central Board of Revenue regarding the applicability of exemption notifications bar customs authorities from subsequently examining import regularity under Section 26 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Are quasi-judicial functions exercised by customs authorities bound by the instructions and directions of the Central Board of Revenue under Section 223 of the Customs Act, 1969?
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• Assessee vs DepartmentPTCL 1993 CL. 39 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1986-05-06Read full judgment →
• Assessee vs DepartmentPTCL 1993 CL. 791 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1993-07-22Read full judgment →
• Assam Cooperative Apex Marketing Society Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax (Addl.)1993 PTD 1557 · Supreme Court of India · 1993-02-25Read full judgment →
• Asmat Sultana Begum through her Legal Heirs vs Inspector of Schools, Southern Zone, Karachi, and 6 others1993 CLC 761 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-28Read full judgment →
• Aslam and 9 others vs The Station House Officer, Police Station1993 MLD 1409 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-30Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali Zardari vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 781 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-31
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayretrospective operation of statutesvested rightssuppression of terrorist activitiesarms ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants, Asif Ali Zardari and Ali Bux Abbasi, facing trial before Special Courts for Suppression of Terrorist Activities, sought post-arrest bail on the ground of continuous detention exceeding the statutory periods under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. During the pendency of their applications, Ordinance No. XV of 1992 was promulgated, omitting the third and fourth provisos of Section 497(1). The core legal question was whether the amending Ordinance operated retrospectively to take away the right to seek bail in pending proceedings, and whether such right constituted a substantive or vested right. The Sindh High Court held that procedural statutes or amendments are generally prospective unless a clear contrary intention is expressed, and that a valuable statutory right to apply for and obtain bail upon fulfilling conditions had already accrued to the applicants. The Court held that the amending Ordinance did not affect pending proceedings or accrued rights. Consequently, the High Court granted post-arrest bail to both applicants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amendment to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by Ordinance XV of 1992, omitting the third and fourth provisos, operates retrospectively to affect pending bail applications?
  • Does the right to seek bail under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a substantive or vested right that survives the repeal of the provision?
  • Whether inordinate and unjustified delay in the conclusion of a trial can be considered as a ground for granting bail under Section 497 or Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the provisions of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding bail on the ground of delay apply to trials before Special Courts under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali Zardari vs Special Judge (Offences in Banks) And OtherK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 28 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-04Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 493 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-29Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Sugar Mills vs Federation of Pakistan and others1993 CLC 910 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-07
  excise dutyretrospective exemptionbenefit-conferring notificationrefund of dutyvested rightstaxation law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two writ petitions challenging the legality of a notice issued by the Central Excise authorities demanding the recovery of excise duty refunds previously granted to the petitioner, a sugar mill. The petitioner had been granted a 50% exemption on excise duty for its first two years of production under a 1985 notification, which was later revoked by the authorities on the grounds that the notification was void ab initio for having retrospective effect. The core legal question was whether the government could retrospectively withdraw a benefit-conferring notification that had already been acted upon. Relying on a Supreme Court precedent involving identical circumstances, the Lahore High Court held that while a notification cannot retrospectively impair vested rights or impose new liabilities, there is a valid distinction when a notification confers a benefit retrospectively. Consequently, the Court declared the recovery notice illegal and without lawful authority, ruling that the government could not unilaterally revoke the granted exemption. The principle established is that notifications conferring benefits retrospectively are permissible and distinct from those that impose burdens or impair vested rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can a notification granting a tax exemption be applied retrospectively if it confers a benefit rather than imposing a liability?
  • Is a notification granting a retrospective benefit void ab initio?
  • Does the distinction between notifications impairing vested rights and those conferring benefits affect their retrospective validity?
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• Ashraf Masih and anothers vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2568 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-31Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Khan and 2 others vs The State1993 PLD Peshawar 77 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-02-03Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Khan And 2 Other vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Shariat Cases 34 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-02-03Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Himayati vs The State1993 MLD 2337 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-08Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Ali vs Registrar, N.E.D. University of Engineering & Technology, Karachi and another1993 CLC 1278 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-05Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Iiussain vs Additional District Judge and 2 others1993 CLC 799 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-18
  landlord and tenantcompromise deedestoppelejectmentexecution proceedingscompetency of appealinterlocutory order
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions arise from a dispute over the ejectment of a tenant following a compromise deed. The tenant, having initially admitted the landlord-tenant relationship in a formal compromise deed filed before the Rent Controller, later sought to challenge the relationship, arguing the transaction was a mortgage rather than a tenancy. The core legal questions were whether a party is estopped from denying a tenancy after formally admitting it in a compromise, whether an appeal against an interlocutory order in execution proceedings is competent, and whether a compromise deed stipulating ejectment upon default is enforceable. The Court held that the tenant was estopped from denying the relationship after acting upon the compromise and partially paying the arrears. Furthermore, the Court determined that the appeal before the Additional District Judge against the interlocutory order was incompetent. The Court affirmed that the compromise deed was binding and that the tenant's default in payment triggered the ejectment clause. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by challenging a relationship formally admitted in a judicial compromise, and that interlocutory orders in execution proceedings are not appealable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a tenant estopped from denying the landlord-tenant relationship after admitting it in a compromise deed filed before a Rent Controller?
  • Is an appeal competent against an interlocutory order passed during execution proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a party raise an objection to the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal for the first time in a writ petition if the objection was not raised before the lower appellate court?
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• Ashiq Hussain vs Jamia Masjid, Mauza Charranwala and another1993 SCMR 1899 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-24
  alienation of mosque propertyMutawalliunauthorized saleconcurrent findingsdeclaratory suitburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a civil suit concerning the validity of a sale of agricultural land attached to a Jamia mosque. The appellant, a tenant, purchased the land from the mosque's purported representative, respondent No. 2, who acted as the President of an alleged Anjuman. The mosque's Mutawalli filed a suit for a declaration that the sale was void, fraudulent, and without legal effect, arguing the seller lacked authority. The trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the Lahore High Court in revision all concurrently found against the appellant, determining that the sale was unauthorized and the evidence regarding the Anjuman's authority and the application of sale proceeds was unconvincing. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the sale deed. Upon review, the Court held that the appellant failed to prove the Anjuman's legal existence or its authority to alienate mosque property. Lacking evidence of authorization or proper accounting for sale proceeds, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, dismissing the appeal and upholding the declaration that the sale was void.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sale of land attached to a mosque be upheld if the seller lacks proven authority to alienate such property?
  • Does an unregistered Anjuman possess the legal capacity to authorize the sale of mosque property without evidence of its management mandate?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the validity of a sale deed subject to interference in appeal when evidence of authorization is absent?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashgar Ali vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 337 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-05Read full judgment →
• Ashfaq and anothers vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 722 · Lahore High Court · 1993-01-12Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 578 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-02-10Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs Shahzullah Khan alias Shazullah Khan and 4 others1993 CLC 545 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-09-15Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali and others vs The State1993 SCMR 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-07
  criminal appealretrialSection 342 CrPCright to defenseincriminating evidenceremand orderfair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction and sentencing by the Special Court for Speedy Trial No. II, Lahore, following a remand order by the Supreme Appellate Court. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred by failing to re-examine the accused under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and provide an opportunity for defense evidence after recording fresh testimony from court witnesses during the retrial. The Supreme Court held that the failure to examine the accused regarding the new incriminating evidence, as mandated by the earlier remand order and fundamental principles of law, caused prejudice to the appellants. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and remitted the case back to the trial court with directions to properly examine the accused under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and allow them to present defense evidence as previously ordered. The judgment reaffirms the principle that an accused must be confronted with all incriminating evidence brought on record, particularly when new evidence is introduced after the initial examination of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to be examined under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after the recording of fresh evidence during a retrial?
  • Does the failure to examine an accused regarding new incriminating evidence brought on record after the initial Section 342 examination vitiate a conviction?
  • Must a trial court strictly adhere to specific directions regarding the procedure for retrial issued in a remand order by an appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Abbas vs Muhammad Ramzan and 4 others1993 CLC 1313 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-16
  civil revisionrestoration of suitdismissal in defaultmisconception of datedecision on meritsprocedural technicalities
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of concurrent orders passed by the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's application for the restoration of a civil suit for possession and removal of debris, which had been dismissed in default of appearance. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's absence on the date of hearing was intentional or due to a bona fide misconception regarding the date, and whether the dismissal of a suit in default should be set aside to advance the cause of justice. The Lahore High Court held that the absence of the plaintiff and his attorney was not intentional but resulted from confusion over the hearing date, particularly since the presiding officer was on election duty on the previous date and attendance records were loosely maintained. Emphasizing that superior courts favour decisions on merits over technicalities, the Court set aside the impugned orders, accepted the revision petition, and restored the suit for trial on merits, laying down the principle that procedural defaults caused by honest confusion or counsel oversight should be condoned to ensure substantive justice in valuable property disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the dismissal of a civil suit in default of appearance should be set aside when the absence is caused by a bona fide misconception of the hearing date?
  • Does the failure to record the presence of a party's attorney in routine adjournment orders conclusively prove the absence of the attorney?
  • Can the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court be exercised liberally to condone technical defects such as the failure to attach certified copies of documents with a revision petition?
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• Asghar Abbas and 3 others vs Muhammad Amin and 6 others1993 SCMR 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-22
  pre-emption suitrepealed lawSaid Kamal Shah principleremandcivil revisionpossession through pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for possession through pre-emption, which had undergone multiple rounds of litigation, including remands and dismissals. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a pre-emption suit, in which a decree had been passed in favor of the pre-emptor prior to the pronouncement of the judgment in Said Kamal Shah's case, should be adjudicated under the provisions of the repealed pre-emption law or the new Act. The High Court had previously dismissed the appellants' revision petition, relying on subsequent case law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the legal position established in Rozi Khan v. Karim Shah and Bahadur Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf mandated that pre-emption suits where a decree was granted prior to the target date set in Said Kamal Shah's case must be governed by the repealed law. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and remanded the revision petition for a decision on the merits in accordance with the repealed legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emption suit in which a decree was passed prior to the judgment in Said Kamal Shah's case fall under the repealed law or the new Act?
  • Is a pre-emption suit where a decree was granted before the target date in Said Kamal Shah's case governed by the provisions of the repealed law?
  • Can a High Court dismiss a revision petition in a pre-emption suit without considering whether the decree was passed prior to the target date in Said Kamal Shah's case?
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• Aseel Badshah alias Sail Badshah and 2 others vs The State1993 PLD Peshawar 1 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-04-14Read full judgment →
• Asad Ullah Khan vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2272 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-18Read full judgment →
• Arvind Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1993 PTD 188 · Supreme Court of India · 1992-07-21Read full judgment →
• Arshad Zubair vs The State1993 SCMR 2059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-08-25
  recoverysearch witnessespolice enmitymalicious prosecutionillegal searcharms ordinancecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, following the alleged recovery of a Kalashnikov and heroin during a police raid. The core legal questions involved the mandatory application and compliance of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding public witnesses during searches, and the credibility of raiding officials deeply embroiled in severe antecedent enmity and multiple litigations with the appellant's family. The Supreme Court held that the search was governed by Chapter VII of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, making section 103 applicable, and that the raiding magistrates and police officers failed to perform statutory duties to associate respectable inhabitants of the locality. Furthermore, the testimonies of the official witnesses were tainted by deep-seated personal bias and animosity stemming from numerous prior writ petitions and criminal complaints filed against them by the appellant's father. The Court laid down that official witnesses who are inimical to the accused cannot inspire judicial confidence without strict compliance with mandatory search safeguards and independent public witness corroboration. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to a search conducted under the direction of a magistrate present at the scene?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the testimony of official witnesses who harbor deep-seated personal animosity and enmity toward the accused and his family?
  • What is the legal effect of failing to associate respectable inhabitants of the locality as public witnesses during a police search under Chapter VII of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Arshad Zubair vs S.H.O.1993 P Cr. L J 858 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-14Read full judgment →
• Arshad vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 349 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-21Read full judgment →
• Arshad Nadim vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1817 · Sindh High Court · 1993-05-15Read full judgment →
• Arshad Mahmood vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2481 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-13Read full judgment →
• Arshad Mahmood vs Directorgeneral, Lahore Development Authority1993 CLC 376 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-21Read full judgment →
• Arshad Mahmood and others vs Pak Kashmir Maches Factory, Mirpur1993 CLC 378 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1992-12-12
  dismissal for defaultrestoration of suitsufficient causerevisional jurisdictionnon-appearance of partiesopportunity of hearingcode of civil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the order of the Additional Sub-Judge, Mirpur, which dismissed an application for the restoration of a suit previously dismissed for default of appearance. The core legal questions involved the proper applicability of procedural provisions under Order 9 and Order 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 regarding dismissal of suits for non-appearance, whether an order rejecting an application for restoration of a suit is appealable or revisable, and whether a trial court is required to provide an opportunity to adduce evidence to substantiate sufficient cause for non-appearance. The High Court held that the dismissal of the suit where neither party appeared fell under Order 9 Rule 3, making the remedy for restoration fall under Order 9 Rule 4, and an order dismissing such an application is open to revision rather than appeal. The Court further held that the trial court erred in dismissing the restoration application in limine without affording the petitioners an opportunity to produce evidence in support of their affidavit. The petition was consequently allowed, the impugned order set aside, and the case remanded for recording evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order dismissing an application for the restoration of a suit is subject to appeal or revision under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Do the provisions of Order 9 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply when neither party appears on the date of hearing?
  • Is a trial court justified in dismissing an application for restoration of a suit in limine without providing an opportunity to the applicant to lead evidence in support of their affidavit?
  • When are the provisions of Rule 2 versus Rule 3 of Order 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 attracted in the disposal of a suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Arshad Berm and 3 others vs Subjudge (Rent Controller) Mirpur, and 12 others1993 CLC 1042 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1993-02-15Read full judgment →
• Arshad Ameen vs Messrs Swiss Bakery and others1993 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-21
  ejectment applicationrent defaultremand orderappellate jurisdictionCantonments Rent Restriction Acttender of rentcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court order remanding an ejectment application to the Rent Controller. The core legal questions were whether an appellate court should remand a case when the existing record is sufficient for adjudication, and whether a tenant can avoid the consequences of default by depositing rent in court after the statutory period has expired. The Supreme Court held that the remand was improper, as the appellate court possessed the power and the record necessary to decide the case finally. Regarding the merits, the Court held that a tenant cannot default on rent payments for an extended period and subsequently deposit the amount in court to claim immunity from eviction. The statutory provision for depositing rent in court is intended to protect a tenant who has timely tendered rent that was refused by the landlord, not to excuse prior defaults. Consequently, the Court set aside the remand order, allowed the appeal, and granted the ejectment application, establishing that appellate courts should avoid unnecessary remands when evidence is sufficient to pronounce judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Should an appellate court remand a case to a lower court when the evidence on record is already sufficient to pronounce a final judgment?
  • Can a tenant avoid the consequences of rent default by depositing rent in court after the statutory time limit for payment has expired?
  • Does the deposit of rent in court under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act provide immunity for a tenant who has already committed a default?
  Read full judgment →
• Arshad Ali vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 758 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-15Read full judgment →
• Arm Brothers Plastic Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi1993 CLC 2363 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-25Read full judgment →
• Arif Khan vs The District Magistrate, Lahore1993 MLD 2245 · Lahore High Court · 1993-08-29Read full judgment →
• Arif Hussain alias Muhammad Arif vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1956 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-04-15Read full judgment →
• Arif and anothers vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1971 · Lahore High Court · 1993-05-24Read full judgment →