Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- Pakistan Seamen's Union, Karachi vs The Registrar, Trade Unions, Karachi and 22 others1992 PLC 1289 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Pakistan Seamen's Union, Karachi and 14 others vs Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. v, Karachi and 6 others1992 PLC 526 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1992-01-22Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Railways vs Muhammad Yousaf, Udc, Personnel Branch, RAWALPINDIAnd 4 Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals filed by Pakistan Railways against the Federal Service Tribunal's decision directing the grant of advance increments to Class III employees who improved their qualifications. The core legal question was the interpretation of the 'Incentive Scheme' (Railway Board's letter dated 22nd January 1966), specifically whether Class III staff in the Personnel Branch required an LL.B. degree or a B.A. degree to qualify for benefits, and whether a departmental clarification (Para 332) could restrict the scheme's application. The Supreme Court held that the term 'prescribed' in the scheme referred to general qualifications for entry into Class II service, not the specific additional qualifications listed for Class II officers. Consequently, the Court ruled that the employees were entitled to the increments based on their B.A. degrees. The Court further established that departmental clarifications cannot override the plain text of a scheme when such interpretations contradict the scheme’s original language. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the employees' entitlement to the incentive increments.
Questions settled- Does a departmental clarification that contradicts the plain text of an incentive scheme hold legal validity?
- Does the term 'prescribed' in an incentive scheme refer to general entry-level qualifications or specific additional qualifications?
- Are Class III employees in the Personnel Branch required to possess an LL.B. degree to qualify for advance increments under the 1966 Incentive Scheme?
- Pakistan Railways Through Divisional Superintendent vs Karachi1992 PLD Karachi 71 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment from the Sindh High Court addresses an application under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking the rejection of a plaint filed by Pakistan Railways against the Karachi Development Authority (K.D.A.) and a cooperative housing society. The core legal questions involved whether the suit was barred under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 for failing to seek consequential relief of possession, whether the suit was barred for want of statutory notice under Article 131 of the Karachi Development Authority Order 1957, and whether a pre-suit notice was mandatory under section 70 of the Sindh Cooperative Societies Act 1925. The Court held that the plaint was indeed liable to be rejected on multiple grounds: it lacked the mandatory statutory notices required under Article 131 of the Karachi Development Authority Order 1957 and section 70 of the Sindh Cooperative Societies Act 1925 regarding acts done in the exercise of statutory powers and touching the business of a registered cooperative society. The key principle laid down is that failure to serve mandatory pre-institution statutory notices to public authorities and cooperative societies, where applicable, renders the suit non-maintainable and warrants rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908.
Questions settled- Is a suit for declaration simpliciter barred under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 when the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit land and omits to pray for possession?
- Whether a suit against the Karachi Development Authority is barred under Article 131 of the Karachi Development Authority Order 1957 in the absence of a mandatory pre-institution statutory notice?
- Does a suit challenging an act touching the business of a registered cooperative society require a mandatory notice under section 70 of the Sindh Cooperative Societies Act 1925 to be maintainable?
- Pakistan Railway vs Shahid Farooq1992 CLC 128 · Balochistan High Court · 1991-08-13Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Printing Ink Industries (Pvt) Ltd vs Messrs Elite Publishers1992 MLD 223 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-30Read full judgment →
- Pakistan P.V.C. Limited vs Pakistan P.V.C. General Employees Union1992 PLC 770 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-10-31Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Oxygen Ltd. vs Pakistan through the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, the Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 4 others1992 PTD 1000 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Pakistan National Shipping Corporation vs Rent Controller, Lahore1992 PLD Lahore 305 · Lahore High Court · 1992-04-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Rent Controller, Lahore, which allowed the respondent-landlords to withdraw advance rent deposited by the petitioner-tenant despite the tenant having vacated the premises before the lease expiry. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller acted without lawful authority in failing to consider a modified lease agreement and an affidavit regarding the refund of unexpired rent, and whether the High Court should exercise writ jurisdiction despite the availability of an appellate remedy. The Court held that while constitutional jurisdiction is not a substitute for appeal, it may be invoked where an order is passed without lawful authority or where a tribunal fails to exercise its discretion judicially. The Rent Controller failed to consider the legal effect of the amended lease clause and the affidavit, which were crucial to the dispute. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded for a fresh decision after allowing parties to lead evidence on the alleged compromise and the refund entitlement.
Questions settled- Can the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction to quash an order of a Rent Controller if the order is passed without lawful authority, despite the availability of an appellate remedy?
- Does a Rent Controller have the discretion to allow ratable adjustment of advance rent based on judicial principles when a tenant vacates premises before the lease expires?
- Is a party who has accepted a benefit under a compromise or arrangement estopped from challenging the procedure or validity of that arrangement later?
- Does a Rent Controller have a duty to examine the nature of a penalty clause in a lease agreement before ordering the forfeiture of advance rent?
- Pakistan National Shipping Corporation vs Messrs General Service1992 SCMR 871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns an ejectment application filed by the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation against a tenant for default in rent payment following the amalgamation of the original landlord corporation. The respondent-tenant contested the application, arguing that no formal notice of ownership transfer was served via registered post as required by Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, and thus no landlord-tenant relationship existed. The High Court initially ruled in favor of the tenant, holding that strict compliance with the registered post requirement was mandatory. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan reversed this decision. The Court held that Section 18 is remedial in nature, not requiring strict, literal compliance with the registered post method if the tenant has actual knowledge of the transfer. The Court established that the object of the provision is merely to inform the tenant of the new landlord to facilitate rent payment. Consequently, where a tenant has positive knowledge of the transfer, the failure to serve notice by registered post does not invalidate the ejectment application, particularly when the tenant has defaulted on rent payments for an extended period.
Questions settled- Is the requirement of serving a notice of ownership transfer by registered post under Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 mandatory or directory?
- Does the failure to serve a formal notice under Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 negate the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship?
- Can a tenant be ejected for default in rent if they had actual knowledge of the transfer of ownership despite the absence of a notice sent by registered post?
- Pakistan Medical and Dental Council vs Dr. Raza Muhammad Khan1992 SCMR 1621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arose from a Peshawar High Court judgment that allowed a Constitution petition filed by the respondent, an Assistant Professor of Dermatology. The respondent sought recognition of his fellowship from the American Medical Society in Austria as an additional medical qualification. The appellant, the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council, had repeatedly declined to recommend the qualification. The High Court declared the fellowship equivalent to an M.R.C.P. (England) or M.D. (Pakistan). The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that under Section 16 of the Medical Council Ordinance, 1962, the Federal Government is the competent authority to amend the Third Schedule to include additional qualifications, and the appellant is merely a recommending body. Consequently, the failure to implead the Federal Government was fatal. Furthermore, the Court ruled that in its constitutional jurisdiction, the High Court does not sit as a court of appeal over statutory bodies composed of medical experts, whose professional assessments of academic excellence should not be lightly overridden.
Questions settled- Can a High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction substitute its own opinion for that of a specialized statutory body on the academic equivalence of medical qualifications?
- Is the Federal Government a necessary party in a constitutional petition seeking the recognition of an additional medical qualification under the Medical Council Ordinance, 1962?
- What is the scope of the High Court's power to override the recommendations of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council regarding postgraduate medical qualifications?
- Pakistan International Public School, Abbottabad vs Excise and Taxation Officer, Government of N.-W.F.P., Abbottabad and another1992 PLC 559 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-11-17Read full judgment →
- Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Wajid Ali Khan1992 PLC 1009 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-20Read full judgment →
- Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Messrs Khaud Brother1992 PLD Karachi 78, · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision application from the Sindh High Court addresses the scope and interpretation of Order XLI, Rules 22 and 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 concerning the rights of a successful respondent in an appeal. The core legal question was whether a respondent in whose favour a decree has been passed is entitled to challenge or attack findings on issues decided against them in the lower court without filing a cross-appeal or cross-objections, and the extent of the appellate court's powers under Rule 33. The Court held that while a respondent seeking to vary or attack the decree itself must file cross-objections under Rule 22, a successful party defending a favorable decree may support it on any ground, including by attacking findings on issues that went against them, without filing cross-objections. Furthermore, Rule 33 grants the appellate court wide plenary powers to make any order or pass any decree to do complete justice, irrespective of the absence of an appeal or cross-objections by a party.
Questions settled- Can a successful respondent in an appeal support the decree by attacking findings on issues decided against them without filing cross-objections?
- What is the extent of the appellate court's power under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to grant relief in the absence of an appeal or cross-objections?
- When is it mandatory for a respondent to file cross-objections in an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation vs Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of FinanceK.L.R. 1992 Tax & Custom Cases 112 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, a statutory corporation, challenged amendments to the Income-tax Act, 1922, introduced by the Finance Acts of 1967 and 1968, which levied income tax on a company's free reserves exceeding its paid-up ordinary share capital. The core legal question was whether these reserves, which consisted of previously taxed profits, could constitutionally be classified as income under Entry 43(c) of the Third Schedule of the 1962 Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the amendments were ultra vires. The Court reasoned that while the legislature has broad powers, it cannot, by a legal fiction or deeming provision, convert what is not income into income. Once income is received and taxed, it loses its character as income and becomes capital or money. Consequently, the legislature lacks the constitutional authority to treat retained, previously taxed profits as income for the purpose of a second levy. The Court emphasized that while double taxation is not inherently unconstitutional, it requires clear and explicit legislative intent, which was absent here, and that taxing non-income under the guise of income exceeds legislative competence.
Questions settled- Can the legislature, by a deeming provision, classify funds that are not income as income for taxation purposes?
- Does income, once taxed and retained as free reserves, retain its character as income for the purpose of further taxation?
- Is the levy of tax on free reserves of a company ultra vires the constitutional power to tax income?
- Under what circumstances can double taxation be imposed by the legislature?
- Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation vs Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance1992 PTD 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by a statutory corporation challenged the constitutional validity of amendments made to the Income-tax Act, 1922 by the Finance Acts of 1967 and 1968, which treated a company's free reserves exceeding its paid-up ordinary share capital as income and subjected them to tax. The core legal question was whether free reserves could lawfully be treated as income under the legislative competence conferred by Entry No. 43(c) of the Third Schedule to the late Constitution of 1962, and whether such levy constituted impermissible double taxation. The Supreme Court held that once profits are taxed and retained as free reserves, they do not constitute fresh income, making the specific amendments defining free reserves as income ultra vires the Constitution. However, the Court upheld the levy under section 55 of the Income-tax Act as a valid imposition of 'super-tax' on total income, noting that the legislature possesses the competence to impose double taxation if enacted clearly. The key principle laid down is that while profits retained as reserves cannot be artificially redefined as fresh income, they remain a component of total income upon which super-tax can validly be charged in addition to income-tax.
Questions settled- Whether the free reserves of a company constitute income within the meaning of entry No. 43, Third Schedule of the Constitution of 1962?
- Whether the Finance Acts of 1967 and 1968 are ultra vires the Constitution in so far as they tax free reserves as income?
- Whether super-tax can be validly levied on total income even if the statutory provisions defining free reserves as income are held to be ultra vires?
- Whether double taxation is permissible under the law in the absence of an express constitutional or statutory prohibition?
- Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation vs Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance (Copy)1992 SCMR 891 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, a statutory corporation, challenged the constitutional validity of amendments made to the Income-tax Act, 1922 by the Finance Acts of 1967 and 1968, which classified a company's 'free reserves' exceeding its paid-up share capital as 'income' and subjected it to further taxation. The core legal questions were whether accumulated free reserves could constitutionally fall under the definition of 'income' within Entry 43(c) of the Third Schedule to the late Constitution of 1962, and whether double taxation could be imposed on amounts already taxed. The Supreme Court held that once profits have been assessed to income tax, retaining them as free reserves does not transform them into fresh income for subsequent tax assessments, rendering the legislative fictions treating reserves as income ultra vires Entry 43(c). However, the Court sustained the tax levy on the ground that it constituted 'super-tax' under Section 55 of the Act, which is an additional duty legally chargeable on total income. The Court established that while double taxation is generally disfavoured, it is permissible if expressly and unambiguously authorized by legislature.
Questions settled- Can accumulated free reserves of a company that have already been subjected to income tax be constitutionally classified as income under Entry 43(c) of the Third Schedule to the 1962 Constitution?
- Is double taxation legally permissible under Pakistani law in the absence of an express constitutional or statutory prohibition?
- Does super-tax levied under Section 55 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 constitute an independent and distinct tax from ordinary income tax?
- Can a deeming provision in a taxing statute convert an amount into taxable income if it does not inherently possess the character of income?
- Pakistan Guarantee Insurance Company Ltd. and others vs Messrs1992 CLC 793 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-18Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Food Manufacturers vs Sadiq Ishaque and others1992 CLC 482 · Sindh High Court · 1990-06-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a Rent Controller's order directing the ejectment of the appellants from the demised premises. The respondents sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment, subletting, and personal bona fide requirement for an educational institution. The High Court examined whether the appellants committed default, whether the premises were sublet, and if the requirement was bona fide. The Court held that the appellants committed default in rent payment by failing to tender rent within the prescribed period or deposit it in court promptly after the landlord's alleged refusal, rejecting the excuse of subsequent deposit. However, the Court reversed the findings on subletting, ruling that mere shared usage by a sister concern without transferring exclusive possession does not constitute subletting. Additionally, the Court rejected the claim of personal bona fide requirement, finding no evidence of the respondents' capability or intent to establish an educational institution. Despite reversing findings on subletting and bona fide need, the Court upheld the eviction order solely on the ground of proven rent default.
Questions settled- Does the usage of premises by a sister company constitute subletting if the original tenant retains exclusive possession?
- Is a tenant liable for eviction for default in rent payment if they fail to deposit rent in court after the landlord refuses to accept it?
- What constitutes sufficient evidence to prove a landlord's personal bona fide requirement for an educational institution?
- Pakistan Engineering Co. Limited, Lahore through Managing Director vs Fazal Baig and 2 others1992 SCMR 2166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arises from the dismissal of an employee, working as a Security Jamadar, who was found in a domestic enquiry to have facilitated the removal of a tool cutter. He filed a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which was eventually dismissed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal on the ground that although he was a workman under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, he did not fall within the definition of a workman under section 2(1) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The employee successfully challenged this decision through a Constitution petition in the Lahore High Court, which held that a Security Jamadar qualifies as a workman. The Supreme Court dismissed the employer's appeal, holding that beneficial legislation must be interpreted to advance its purpose rather than thwart it, and that physical exertion involved in the duties of a Security Jamadar brings him within the definition of a workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.
Questions settled- Whether a Security Jamadar falls within the definition of a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
- How should beneficial labor legislation be interpreted according to its underlying purpose?
- Does a Security Jamadar performing duties involving physical exertion qualify as doing manual work under labor laws?
- Pakistan Defence Housing Authority vs Meer Brothers1992 CLC 1252 · Sindh High Court · 1987-01-15Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Karachi vs Waqaruddin1992 PLC 873 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-04-10Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Automobile Corporation Employees' Union vs Messrs1992 PLC 1153 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-08-16Read full judgment →
- Pakistan and 3 others. vs Civil and Militaiy Press Ltd. and 3 others.PTCL 1992 CL.1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal addresses the legality of levying Central Excise Duty on the manufacture of 'corrugated board' under Item No. 37 of Section IX of Part I of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The respondents, manufacturers of box cartons using corrugated board, challenged the duty through a constitutional petition in the Sindh High Court, which declared the levy illegal and without lawful authority, holding that corrugated board is distinct from 'paper board'. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the statutory phrasing, technical definitions, and international nomenclature, concluding that the expression 'Paper and Paper Board all sorts' has a wide connotation encompassing all varieties and kinds of paper boards, including corrugated board as a species thereof. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by not giving full effect to the words 'all sorts' and that departmental practice did not create a vested right excluding the product from taxation. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the writ was recalled.
Questions settled- Whether corrugated board falls within the description of 'paper and paper board all sorts' under Item No. 37 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
- Does the inclusion of the words 'all sorts' in a taxing statute expand the scope of an entry to cover all varieties and kinds of the specified goods without exception?
- Can a consistent prior departmental practice regarding non-levy of a tax create a vested right preventing the lawful imposition of a statutory duty?
- Does the ejusdem generis rule apply to restrict the interpretation of wide expressions like 'all sorts' when the Legislature intends to cover all species of an item?
- Pak-Saudi Fertilizers Limited, Distt. Sukkur vs Muhammad Amin Soomro1992 PLC 852 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-03-14Read full judgment →
- Padam Prakash vs Commissioner of Income-Tax and another1992 PTD 857 · Allahabad High Court · 1990-08-20Read full judgment →
- P. N. Boga Represented By Legal Heirs And Another vs Abdur Rehman1992 PLD Lahore 396 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-01Read full judgment →
- Orient Straw Board & Paper Mills Limited, Karachi vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Hyderabad1992 PTD 1369 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-30Read full judgment →
- Obaid Ullah vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 726 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-04Read full judgment →
- Nuzhat Shoukat vs Superintendent, Central Jail, KarachiK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 245 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-10Read full judgment →
- Nusratullah vs Quresh Ahmad1992 CLC 2508 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-01Read full judgment →
- Nusrat And 2 Others vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1095 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-09Read full judgment →
- Nouroze Khan and others vs Mst. Ajaib Sultan and others1992 CLC 1606 · Board of Revenue · 1991-08-19Read full judgment →
- Not vs Not1992 PTD (Trib) 17 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1991-09-30Read full judgment →
- Not vs Not1992 PTD (Trib.) 1653 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1992-04-23Read full judgment →
- Not vs Gotts1992 SCMR 1524 · House of LordsRead full judgment →
- Noorul Haq vs The State1992 SCMR 1451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court confirming and enhancing the conviction of the appellant for transporting heroin. The core legal question was whether a passenger sitting in a vehicle from which narcotics are recovered can be convicted solely on the basis of being an occupant and failing to prove a false defence, without proof of conscious knowledge or dominion over the contraband. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that the prosecution must prove its case against an accused beyond reasonable doubt, and failure of the accused's defence does not relieve the prosecution of this primary burden. The key principle laid down is that the burden of proof remains on the prosecution, and provisions regarding facts especially within the knowledge of an accused do not shift the onus to prove innocence until the prosecution has first established a prima facie case of guilt.
Questions settled- Can a passenger of a vehicle be convicted for the recovery of narcotics from the vehicle without proof of conscious knowledge or dominion over the contraband?
- Does the failure of an accused to prove a defence plea relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt?
- When does the presumption under the law regarding facts especially within the knowledge of a person come into play in criminal trials?
- Is an accused person entitled to an acquittal if the prosecution fails to establish essential ingredients of the offence despite a false defence?
- Noorul Amin and another vs Muhammad Hashim and 27 others1992 SCMR 1744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressing whether a civil suit seeking to set aside a judgment and decree on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation can be treated as an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petitioners instituted a civil suit challenging a previous decree, which the trial court rejected on the ground that it was barred and must be brought via section 12(2) C.P.C. The District Judge allowed the appeal and directed that the plaint be treated as a section 12(2) application, but the High Court in revision set this aside, holding that procedural laws and inherent powers under section 151 C.P.C. cannot override statutory procedure. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that procedural laws exist to advance justice rather than stifle remedies on technicalities, and that courts lean in favour of adjudication on merits. The Court laid down the principle that a plaint containing the ingredients of a section 12(2) application may be treated as such, provided no legal bar exists, and that mentioning a wrong provision or form does not deprive a court of jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Can a civil suit challenging a decree on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation be treated as an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure?
- Does the description of a proceeding as a plaint deprive a court of jurisdiction to decide it as an application under section 12(2) C.P.C. if it contains all the necessary ingredients?
- Can the mention of a wrong provision of law in an application deprive a court of the power and jurisdiction otherwise available under the law?
- Whether procedural laws can be used to stifle legal proceedings and remedies on technicalities rather than advancing the cause of justice?
- Noorul Amin And 4 Others vs Said Nazir and another-1992 P Cr. L J 800 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-07-08Read full judgment →
- Noorani Cotton Corporation vs Government of Pakistan and others1992 CLC 512 · Lahore High Court · 1976-04-27Read full judgment →
- Noora and 11 others vs Ahmad Ali and 3 others1992 SCMR 1610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal concerns a suit for possession of immovable property where the appellants claimed the respondents were permissive occupants. The core legal question was whether the suit was governed by Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court held that Article 144, the residuary article, applies to cases where the defendant's initial possession was permissive, rather than Article 142, which applies to cases of dispossession or abandonment. The Court reasoned that granting gratuitous permission to reside on property does not constitute 'discontinuance' of possession under Article 142. Because the respondents failed to prove adverse possession and the appellants' claim of permissive occupation was established, the limitation period for the suit commenced only when the respondents refused to vacate the property upon demand, not from the date of initial entry. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the trial court's decree, affirming that permissive possession does not trigger the limitation period under Article 142.
Questions settled- Does Article 142 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to cases where possession was initially permissive?
- What constitutes 'discontinuance of possession' within the meaning of Article 142 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- When does the limitation period commence for a suit for possession against a person who was granted permissive use of the property?
- Is a suit for possession governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act 1908 when the defendant's initial entry was permissive?
- Noor Samand And Others vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2246 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Noor Samand and another vs Sharafuddin and 5 others1992 CLC 64 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-05Read full judgment →
- Noor Muhammad vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 225 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-06Read full judgment →
- Noor Muhammad vs Muhammad ShafiK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 557 · Lahore High Court · 1992-04-29Read full judgment →
- Noor Muhammad vs Mst. Zainab Bibi and others1992 CLC 1470 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition challenges the concurrent orders of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's objection petition against the attachment and sale of a house in execution of a decree. The core legal question concerns the effective date of an attachment of immovable property as against a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration under Order 21, Rule 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Lahore High Court held that under sub-rule (3) of Order 21, Rule 54 (as amended by the Lahore High Court), an order of attachment takes effect against a non-gratuitous transferee from the date they had knowledge of the attachment order or from the date of proclamation, whichever is earlier. The Court found that the lower courts misread the evidence regarding the petitioner's knowledge of the attachment and that the petitioner purchased the property prior to the proclamation date. Consequently, the revision petition was accepted, setting aside the lower courts' orders and the attachment and sale of the property.
Questions settled- From which date does an order of attachment of immovable property take effect against a person claiming under a gratuitous transfer versus other transferees?
- Does the knowledge of a third party regarding an attachment order constitute knowledge of the purchaser for the purpose of Order 21 Rule 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can property be attached and sold in execution of a decree when the third-party purchaser acquired title before the attachment order became legally effective against them?
- Noor Muhammad Anwar and others vs Deputy Commissioner anothers1992 CLC 1575 · Lahore High Court · 1991-01-27Read full judgment →
- Noor Muhammad and anothers vs Building Control Authority and 21992 CLC 729 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil suit was instituted by the plaintiffs, occupants of shops in a building, challenging a notice issued by the Building Control Authority threatening action under section 7-A of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the Building Control Authority could issue a notice under section 7-A regarding alleged violations in a building constructed and regularized prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance, and whether a pre-suit notice under section 20-A was mandatory for challenging an act done without jurisdiction. The Sindh High Court held that the provisions of the Ordinance are prospective, applying only to constructions in progress at its commencement, and not to buildings already completed prior to its promulgation. Consequently, an action taken without jurisdiction cannot be termed an act done 'under the Ordinance', rendering the requirement of a pre-suit notice under section 20-A inapplicable. The court laid down the principle that statutory barring provisions and notice requirements apply exclusively to orders and actions passed with jurisdiction, and actions that are ultra vires do not enjoy such statutory protection.
Questions settled- Whether the provisions of section 6(1) and section 7-A of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979 apply retrospectively to buildings completed prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance?
- Does an act done without jurisdiction by a statutory authority qualify as an 'act done under the Ordinance' for the purpose of mandatory pre-suit notice under section 20-A of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979?
- Are statutory barring provisions and notice requirements applicable to orders passed without jurisdiction?
- Noor Khan vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2459 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a post-arrest bail application filed on behalf of applicant Noor Khan, who was charged under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for committing murder during the course of a robbery. The core legal questions involved the evidentiary value of a judicial confession alleged to have been obtained through coercion, the determination of the accused's age for the purpose of statutory concessions, and whether bail under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be claimed as a matter of right. The Sindh High Court held that the confessional statement, prima facie appearing true and voluntary, implicated the accused and warranted no deeper appreciation of evidence at the bail stage. The Court further held that a medical board's age assessment supersedes a school leaving certificate, and that the grant of bail under the first proviso to Section 497(1) is discretionary rather than mandatory, especially in heinous offences. The bail application was consequently dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a judicial confession containing inculpatory admissions is sufficient to deny post-arrest bail?
- Which evidence regarding age, between a school leaving certificate and a medical board report, should be given preference?
- Can bail under the first proviso to subsection (1) of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be claimed as a matter of right?
- Noor Hashim vs The State1992 PLD Federal Shariat Court 497 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-05-18Read full judgment →
- Noor Hameed Shah vs National Particle Board (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi,1992 PLC 928 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-02-21Read full judgment →
- Noor alias Noor Muhammad and others vs Manager of His Highness, the Mir of Khairpur and others1992 SCMR 1931 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellants challenged the compulsory acquisition of 323 acres of land in Taluka Khairpur, originally acquired by the Khairpur Government in 1945. They alleged that the land, though acquired for a public purpose, was treated as the personal property of the Mir of Khairpur and subsequently surrendered under M.L.R. 64, yet retained by him as a game reserve. Following their dispossession under the Sindh Public Property (Removal of Encroachments) Act, 1975, the appellants filed a writ petition, which the High Court dismissed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower authorities and the High Court erred in ignoring evidence regarding the appellants' title. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the appellants' factual assertions regarding their claim to the land were vehemently denied and disputed. Consequently, the Court ruled that this was not a fit case for interference under Constitutional jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that where disputed questions of fact exist, the appropriate remedy is a civil suit rather than a constitutional petition, particularly where the appellants had already served a statutory notice under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.
Questions settled- Is a constitutional petition the appropriate forum for resolving disputed questions of fact regarding land title?
- Should a party claiming land ownership pursue relief through a civil suit after serving a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can the High Court interfere in matters involving disputed factual assertions under its Constitutional jurisdiction?
- Noor Ahmad vs The StateK.L.R 1992 Criminal Cases 335 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-10Read full judgment →
- Noor Ahmad vs The State--1992 P Cr. L J 1841 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-10Read full judgment →
- Noor Ahmad vs Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Gujranwala And1992 PLD Supreme Court 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a pre-emption dispute between two rival pre-emptors, one claiming tenancy rights and the other asserting rights under the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The core legal question was whether a pre-emption decree obtained by one party without impleading the rival pre-emptor is binding, and whether the procedural provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act apply to proceedings before the Collector. The High Court had set aside the consent decree obtained by the tenant and remanded the case to the Collector for a fresh decision after impleading the rival party. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, finding that the rival pre-emptor was entitled to a fair trial and could not be prejudiced by a decree passed in their absence. The Court affirmed that procedural provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act are applicable to pre-emption proceedings before the Collector. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the rival pre-emptor must be impleaded to ensure justice and that the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction in remanding the matter for a fair adjudication of competing claims.
Questions settled- Can a pre-emption decree be binding on a rival pre-emptor who was not impleaded as a party to the suit?
- Are the procedural provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act applicable to pre-emption proceedings conducted before the Collector?
- Is a rival pre-emptor entitled to a fair trial and the opportunity to contest the pre-emption claim in the same proceedings?
- Noor Ahmad Shahid vs Mst. Nasim BibiK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 408 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-13Read full judgment →
- Noor Ahmad And 3 Others vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 888 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-08Read full judgment →
- Nizamuddin vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1970 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-17Read full judgment →
- Nizam-Ud-Din vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 62 · Sindh High Court · 1991-07-30Read full judgment →
- Nizam-Ud-Din vs Ghulam MuhammadK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 222 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from pre-emption claims concerning urban immovable properties in Jhang City and Multan City under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The core legal question was the nature of evidence and proof required to establish a right of pre-emption in respect of urban immovable property under Section 7 of the Act, specifically regarding whether the localities in question constituted distinct 'sub-divisions' of a town. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that for the purposes of pre-emption law, a party asserting that a town is divided into sub-divisions must prove that such sub-divisions actually exist. The Court laid down the principle that the division of a town into Mohallahs, streets, or wards does not automatically qualify them as 'sub-divisions' under Section 7. A 'sub-division' implies a well-known, recognized quarter of a town with a distinct structure, situation, and character. Consequently, where the custom of pre-emption is proved generally in the town or relevant area, and no distinct sub-division is established, the pre-emption claim must succeed.
Questions settled- What is the nature of evidence and proof required to establish a right of pre-emption in respect of urban immovable property under Section 7 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
- Does the division of a town into Mohallahs, streets, or wards automatically qualify those areas as 'sub-divisions' for the purposes of pre-emption law?
- What is the legal test to determine whether a particular quarter of a town constitutes a 'sub-division' under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
- Does a custom of pre-emption automatically extend to an area added to a town by a subsequent notification, or must the custom be proved independently for such added area?
- Nisar Ahmad Khan vs Hakim Ali1992 CLC 651 · Board of Revenue · 1990-12-05Read full judgment →
- Niaz Muhammad vs Board of Revenue Punjab Lahore and AnotherK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 24 · Lahore High Court · 1988-01-12Read full judgment →
- Niaz And Another vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1712 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-08Read full judgment →
- Niaz And Another vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 153 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-08Read full judgment →
- Niaz Ahmad vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1409 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-12Read full judgment →
- Nestle Italiana S.P.A. vs Bela Ghee Mills Ltd. And Another1992 PLD Karachi 3 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-05Read full judgment →
- Nestle It Aliana S.Pa. vs Bela Ghee Mills Limited And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 527 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-05Read full judgment →
- Neelum Flour Mills vs Azad Government of the State of J&K & 2OtherK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 21 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1991-04-10Read full judgment →
- Nazir Masih vs Mst. Hajera Shaheen and 2 Other1992 PLD Karachi 552 · Sindh High Court · 1982-01-13Read full judgment →
- Nazir Hussain vs Rehmat Bibi And 4 Other1992 PLD Lahore 295 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition arises out of a dispute regarding an agreement to sell land. The petitioner filed a suit for cancellation of the agreement deed on the ground of coercion and undue influence by the police while he was on interim bail, whereas the respondents filed a suit for specific performance. The trial court decreed the petitioner's suit and dismissed the respondents' suit. The respondents only appealed the decree in the petitioner's suit, which the appellate court accepted. In revision, two preliminary objections were raised by the respondents: first, regarding the insufficiency of the court-fee based on the valuation of the respondents' separate suit; and second, that the revision was incompetent because an earlier review application against the appellate decree had been dismissed and not separately challenged. The Lahore High Court held that court-fee was payable solely according to the valuation of the suit out of which the revision arose, and that section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not bar a revision against a decree merely because an application to review that decree was dismissed. On the merits, the High Court found that the appellate court committed material irregularity by ignoring crucial evidence, and restored the trial court's judgment holding the agreement void due to coercion.
Questions settled- Whether the court-fee on a civil revision is to be valued according to the suit out of which the revision arises or a connected suit?
- Does the dismissal of a review application bar a civil revision against the original judgment and decree if the order on the review is not separately challenged?
- Is a revisional court competent to interfere with an appellate court's finding of fact when the appellate court has ignored material evidence on record?
- Whether an agreement to sell executed under police pressure regarding interim bail is vitiated by coercion and undue influence?
- Nazir Hussain Shah and 5 others vs Sain Muhammad Khan and another1992 CLC 1859 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1992-05-31Read full judgment →
- Nazir Begum vs Muhammad Iqbal And Another1992 PCr. L J 7 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-02Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmed vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1176 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-25Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmed Channa vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1231 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-23Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmad vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2191 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmad vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 516 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-09Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmad vs Islamic Republic of PakistanK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 56 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-30Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmad vs Collector1992 CLC 1696 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-14Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmad vs Abdur Rahim1992 CLC 1288 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-16Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmad vs Abdul Rahim and others1992 CLC 1290 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-16Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmad Kamray vs General Manager (a & P) and another1992 PLC 585 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1992-01-23Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmad Chatta vs Director of Agricultural And AnotherK.L.R. 1992 Labour & Service Cases 257 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-27Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmad And Another vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2153 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-02-25Read full judgment →
- Nazir Ahmad And Another vs Muhammad Tahir And Another1992 PLD Lahore 89 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment encompasses two distinct matters decided by the Lahore High Court. The first is a civil revision arising from a pre-emption suit where the lower appellate court erroneously concluded that proper court-fee had not been paid on the memorandum of appeal due to valuation issues. The High Court held that valuation fixed for the trial court continues for the appellate court unless altered by the trial court, and that technicalities should not override merits, setting aside the lower appellate court's order. The second matter involves a criminal revision where the High Court exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction against an appellate court's order reducing a sentence for rash and negligent driving causing death to the period already undergone (13 days). The High Court deprecated the unmerited recourse to the 'sentence already undergone' theory as judicial perversity that undermines deterrence, enhancing the accused's sentence to three years' rigorous imprisonment. The key principles established include the continuity of suit valuation for appellate purposes and the strict condemnation of lenient sentence reductions for fatal traffic offenses.
Questions settled- Does the valuation fixed for a trial court continue to be the valuation for the purpose of the appellate court if not altered by the trial court?
- Can an appellate court's recourse to the theory of sentence already undergone in fatal rash and negligent driving cases be sustained?
- Is a civil revision liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches when initially filed within the period of limitation but delayed due to the refiling process after removing objections?
- Whether the High Court can enhance a sentence in exercise of its suo motu revisional jurisdiction when an appellate court improperly reduces it to the period already undergone?
- Nazir & Other vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 280 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-17Read full judgment →
- Nazeer Ahmad vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1773 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-10Read full judgment →
- Nazeer Ahmad vs Haji Muhammad Akram Naz1992 PLD Lahore 97 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-13Read full judgment →
- Nazeer Ahmad And 3 Other vs The State And Another Rcspondents1992 PLD Karachi 163 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-03Read full judgment →
- Nazar Muhammad vs Muhammad AslamK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 34 · Lahore High Court · 1991-08-19Read full judgment →
- Nazar Muhammad vs Haji Khan Muhammad And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 104 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-10Read full judgment →
- Nazar Hussain Shah vs Mst. Jindo Mai and 8 others1992 CLC 293 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-12Read full judgment →
- Nazar Ali And Another vs The State1992 PLD Karachi 140 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under section 392/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for robbery. The core legal questions involve the reliability of the identification of the accused, the legal effect of non-production of the alleged robbed property in court, and the consequences of failing to examine recovery mashirs. The Sindh High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the identity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, that the investigation was dishonest and manipulated, and that the failure to produce the recovered property in court or examine material witnesses vitiates the trial. The court laid down the principle that in robbery cases where recovery of robbed property is claimed, the prosecution must produce the property in court for identification, and failure to do so, along with the non-examination of recovery witnesses, renders the recovery doubtful and vitiates the proceedings.
Questions settled- Does the failure of prosecution witnesses to identify the accused in court render the identity of the accused doubtful?
- Is the non-production of allegedly recovered robbed property in court a material irregularity that vitiates the trial?
- What is the legal effect when the prosecution fails to examine the mashirs of recovery and arrest?
- Does a severely flawed and dishonest investigation entitle the accused to the benefit of reasonable doubt?
- Nazar Ali And Another vs The State,1992 PLD Peshawar 176 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-03-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal before the Peshawar High Court arose from the conviction and sentencing of the appellants under Section 311 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a trial for the murder of their brother where a compromise and waiver of qisas and diyat were effected by the legal heirs. The core legal question was whether a trial court can award tazir punishment under Section 311 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 after a compromise in a case of qatl-e-amd not liable to qisas, and whether failure to put incriminating circumstances to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the trial. The Court held that Section 311 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applies only to waiver or compounding of qisas in qatl-e-amd liable to qisas, and has no application to qatl-e-amd liable to tazir which is compoundable under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 with the effect of an acquittal. Furthermore, failing to examine the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding facts used for conviction results in a total failure of justice. The convictions were consequently set aside.
Questions settled- Does Section 311 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply to cases of qatl-e-amd liable to tazir?
- What is the legal effect of the composition of an offence under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does failure to question an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding incriminating circumstances vitiate the trial?
- What mode of proof is required for qatl-e-amd to be liable to qisas under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Nawaz Khan and others vs Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land)1992 CLC 1540 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-13Read full judgment →
- Nawaz Alias Ali Nawaz vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2456 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-21Read full judgment →
- Nawab Khan vs Ismail and another1992 SCMR 1437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a civil review petition arising out of pre-emption suits. The petitioner, a vendee, challenged concurrent findings of lower courts decreeing possession through pre-emption in favor of the respondents. The core legal questions involved whether the pre-emption suits were barred by limitation based on the date of alleged delivery of possession, and whether the courts below ignored admissions regarding the delivery of possession. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding limitation and possession, supported by the trial court's assessment that possession was not delivered under the sale before the attestation of the mutation, suffered from no legal infirmity or misreading of evidence. Consequently, the Court laid down that mere changes in Khasra Girdawari are insufficient to prove change of possession for limitation purposes in pre-emption suits without strict proof, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether mere change in Khasra Girdawari is sufficient to prove change of possession in suits for possession through pre-emption?
- From which date is the period of limitation to be computed in a pre-emption suit when possession under the sale is not proved to have been delivered before the attestation of the mutation?
- Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts on the questions of limitation and possession be interfered with in revision without showing misreading or non-reading of evidence?
- Nausher alias Nausha vs Sakhawat Ali1992 CLC 2026 · Board of Revenue · 1991-06-14Read full judgment →
- Nauroz Khan vs Mst. Zulakha1992 CLC 1930 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-28Read full judgment →
- National Organisation of Postal Employees vs Directorate of Postmaster-General, Karachi1992 PLC 699 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-04-30Read full judgment →
- National Industrial Cooperative Credit Corporation Ltd. AndAnother vs Province of Punjab_Government of Punjab, Through Secretary, CooperativeDepartment And Another1992 PLD Lahore 462 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court addresses multiple constitutional petitions challenging the vires of the Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Ordinance, 1992, which was promulgated following a financial scandal and the report of an inquiry commission. The core legal questions involved whether the Provincial Governor or Legislature could competently declare 102 specific cooperative societies as 'undesirable' through a legislative enactment without a judicial inquiry, whether such an enactment violated fundamental rights and the principles of natural justice under Article 2A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and whether a provincial law could validly confer jurisdiction or assign functions upon a Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and provide for appeals to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the impugned provisions of the Ordinance constituted an impermissible 'legislative judgment' and an usurpation of judicial power, violated fundamental rights and natural justice, and that the appointment of a Supreme Court Judge as a Cooperative Judge and the creation of appellate jurisdiction over the Supreme Court were beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Governor. The key principle laid down is that the legislature cannot exercise judicial powers or pass legislative judgments against named entities without judicial determination, and provincial legislation cannot encroach upon federal legislative domains or alter the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
Questions settled- Whether the Provincial Legislature or Governor can declare specific cooperative societies as undesirable through a legislative enactment without a judicial finding?
- Does the enactment of a law that penalizes or dissolves named entities without a prior judicial trial amount to an impermissible legislative judgment?
- Can a provincial legislature or governor enact a law conferring judicial functions upon a Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan or enlarging the Supreme Court's jurisdiction?
- Whether the provisions of the Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Ordinance, 1992, violate the principles of natural justice and fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?