Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Muhammad Iqbal Khan And Another vs Rehmat Din And Other1991 SCMR 1854 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-24
  pre-emptionpossession suitrevenue recordspattileave to appealconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a second appeal regarding a suit for possession through pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs had established their qualification as pre-emptors based on their status as owners in the specific patti where the disputed land was situated. The trial court had initially decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, but the District Judge set aside this decree, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of distinct pattis in the village or their ownership therein. The High Court affirmed this dismissal, noting a lack of evidence in the revenue records to support the claim. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had properly appreciated the facts and that the oral testimony of the Patwari was insufficient to establish the claim in the absence of corroborating revenue records. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that no question of law was involved requiring interference with the concurrent findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Is oral testimony of a Patwari sufficient to establish the existence of a patti in a pre-emption suit in the absence of supporting revenue records?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise facts where lower courts have concurrently found that a pre-emptor failed to establish their qualification?
  • Does the absence of evidence in revenue records regarding the division of a village into distinct pattis defeat a claim of pre-emption based on ownership in a patti?
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• Muhammad Iqbal Kausar vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1602 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Etc. vs The StateK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 96 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Butt vs WAPDA and others1991 PLC (C.S.) 512 · Lahore High Court · 1990-12-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal And Others vs Muhammad Sharif And Another1991 SCMR 1208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-26
  defamationdamagescivil revisionconcurrent findingssupreme court petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions are directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' revision petitions. The respondents had filed suits claiming damages against the petitioners for defamation and mental torture after the petitioners publicly announced in a village mosque that the respondents had become Ahmadis, causing them to be expelled from the mosque and subjected to hostile slogans. The trial court decreed the suits awarding damages, and the lower appellate court as well as the High Court upheld the decrees concurrently. The core legal question involved whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding defamation and disrepute could be interfered with by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that since concurrent findings of fact were recorded against the petitioners and they failed to establish any error warranting interference, the petitions were devoid of merit. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact on the sufficiency of evidence in civil revision matters unless a clear misreading or non-reading of evidence is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding defamation in civil matters?
  • Can damages be awarded for public imputation of changing religion causing mental torture and disrepute?
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• Muhammad Iqbal And Other, Jalal Din vs Abdul Hamid Sardar1991 SCMR 978 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-25
  pre-emption suitdeficit court-feerejection of plaintvaluation of suitcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two civil appeals involving pre-emption suits where plaints were subjected to questions regarding the deficiency of court-fee. In the first matter, the plaintiff tentatively valued the plaint and failed to make good the deficit court-fee despite orders, leading to the rejection of the plaint by the trial court, which order was subsequently set aside by the High Court. In the second matter, the trial court decreed the suit subject to payment of a deficit court-fee, which the plaintiff paid, but the first appellate court set it aside due to the plaintiff's conduct, which decision was reversed by a Single Judge of the High Court. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to make up a deficiency in court-fee when a nominal court-fee was initially fixed. Relying on the precedent of Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan, the Supreme Court held that at least one opportunity as of right must be granted to a plaintiff to make up a determined deficiency in court-fee by a specified date, and since the trial courts failed to provide such clear orders, the Lahore High Court judgments were correct. Both appeals were dismissed with liberty for the appellants to raise other legal objections before the lower court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff is entitled to at least one opportunity as of right to make up a deficiency in court-fee?
  • Can a plaint be rejected for non-payment of court-fee without the trial court determining the exact deficiency and granting a clear opportunity to make it good by a certain date?
  • Does a deliberately fixed nominal court-fee disentitle a plaintiff from making good the deficiency if ordered by the court?
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• Muhammad Ilyas vs Mst. Ijazan And Another1991 SCMR 1508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-30
  fiduciary relationshipsale-deedconsiderationconcurrent findingscivil revisioninheritanceburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil suit filed by the respondents, daughters of the deceased Abdul Aziz, challenging a sale-deed executed in favour of the petitioner, who was their brother-in-law. The respondents alleged that the petitioner manipulated the sale-deed for land measuring 21 Kanals 13 Marlas without paying any consideration, exploiting his fiduciary relationship with the deceased, who was old and sick. While the trial court initially dismissed the suit, the appellate court reversed this decision, finding the sale invalid. The High Court subsequently upheld the appellate court's findings, noting the lack of proof regarding the payment of consideration and the suspicious timing of the transaction shortly before the deceased's death. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the failure to prove the sale and the payment of consideration were sound. The Court emphasized the lack of a plausible reason for the deceased to disinherit his daughters in favour of the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sale-deed be set aside if the petitioner fails to prove the payment of consideration?
  • Does a fiduciary relationship between the parties affect the burden of proof regarding the validity of a sale-deed?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the validity of a property transaction?
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• Muhammad Ilyas vs Hafiz Abdul Malik and 2 others1991 CLC 1975 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-14
  rejection of plaintfraud and misrepresentationres judicataexecution of ejectment orderSindh Rented Premises Ordinancetenant and landlordsuppression of material facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arises from an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 filed by the defendant to reject a suit brought by a tenant challenging ejectment orders on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, and suppression of material facts regarding ownership. The core legal questions involved whether a separate civil suit is barred by section 12(2) and section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, section 22 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, and the principles of res judicata when orders have been finalized up to the Supreme Court. The court held that since the plaintiff withdrew prior petitions from the Supreme Court seeking to file a separate suit and because the validity of the judgment obtained by fraud constitutes an independent cause of action not directly heard and finally decided on merits in the previous appellate proceedings, the suit is neither barred by res judicata, section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, nor section 22 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979. The application for rejection of the plaint was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a separate civil suit is barred under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when an order is passed by the Supreme Court?
  • Does section 22 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 bar a civil suit challenging an ejectment order obtained through fraud and misrepresentation?
  • Whether withdrawal of a review petition in the Supreme Court with the intention to file a civil suit operates as res judicata under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an executing court go behind a decree or entertain objections regarding its validity on the ground of fraud?
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• Muhammad Ilyas vs Civil Aviation Authority and 2 others1991 PLC (C.S.) 384 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ilyas vs Additional District Judge and others1991 CLC 1408 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ilyas Khan Alias Lais Khan vs The State-1991 P Cr. L J 90 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-03-25
  inherent jurisdictionpre-trial detentionsentence set-offmandatory statutory dutymiscarriage of justicecriminal sentencing
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which had been omitted by the trial court when sentencing him to two years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act 1908. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction to rectify a trial court's failure to consider the mandatory provisions of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C., regarding the set-off of pre-trial detention period against a sentence of imprisonment. The Court held that Section 382-B imposes a mandatory duty on trial courts to consider the period of detention served as an under-trial prisoner. The Court established that while trial courts are not strictly bound to grant the concession, they are legally obligated to expressly state in their judgments whether the benefit is extended or denied, providing brief reasons for any refusal. Failure to do so constitutes a non-compliance with statutory requirements, which the High Court may remedy under its inherent powers to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for a trial court to explicitly address the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, in its judgment when passing a sentence of imprisonment?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to rectify a trial court's failure to consider the period of pre-trial detention?
  • Does the failure of a trial court to mention Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, in a judgment imply that the court failed to consider the statutory requirement?
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• Muhammad Ilyas and Another vs The StateKLR. 1991 Criminal Cases 87 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iltaf vs Azhar Mahmood alias Muhammad Hanif and another1991 MLD 756 · Lahore High Court · 1991-01-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ilays vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1086 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ikhlaq vs Sheikh Muhammad Saeed1991 CLC 2064 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ihsanullah vs Civil Aviation Authority and others1991 PLD Peshawar 127 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-04-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ihsan vs The State1991 M L D443 · Lahore High Court · 1990-11-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iftikhar vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 2069 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim vs Mst. Mehmooda1991 CLC 1795 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-28
  Appellate CourtCode of Civil ProcedureJudgment writingMaterial irregularityRemandPartnership dissolutionSpeaking order
  Summary & questions settled

  This Revision Application challenges the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court in a suit concerning the dissolution of a partnership and rendering of accounts. The core legal question was whether the Appellate Court's judgment, which dismissed the appeal without addressing the points for determination or providing reasons for its decision, satisfied the mandatory requirements of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court held that while substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of Order 41, Rule 31 is permissible—particularly when affirming a trial court's decision—the Appellate Court must still identify the points for determination, provide a decision on those points, and state reasons. A judgment that merely summarizes the parties' contentions without addressing the issues or the central controversy constitutes a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. Consequently, the High Court set aside the appellate decree and remanded the case for a fresh decision on the merits in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate judgment that fails to identify points for determination or provide reasons for its decision satisfy the requirements of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is substantial compliance with Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 sufficient for an appellate judgment in affirmation of a trial court's decree?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal by merely recording the contentions of the parties without addressing the issues or the central controversy?
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• Muhammad Ibrahim vs Mst. Kaneez Fatima Haya and 3 others1991 CLC 1175 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim vs Mst. Fazal Bibi and others1991 CLC 1296 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim vs Ilam Din1991 CLC 880 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim vs Fazal Muhammad and 7 others1991 MLD 504 · Lahore High Court · 1990-09-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim Azad And Another vs The Secretary, Government of Punjab Agricultural Department, Lahore And 4 Other1991 SCMR 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-21
  seniority rightscivil servicevested rightpromotion eligibilityservice rulesadministrative tribunalfunctional unit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the seniority and promotion rights of civil servants within the West Pakistan Agriculture Service. The appellants challenged the Punjab Administrative Tribunal's decision, which upheld the Department's practice of restricting seniority and promotion eligibility to specific "groups" created following a 1968 Governor's order. The core legal question was whether this redesignation of posts, which explicitly stated it would not affect terms of service, could lawfully override the joint seniority list mandated by the West Pakistan Agriculture Service (Research Wing) Rules, 1963. The Supreme Court held that the Department's bifurcation of seniority into groups was unauthorized and contrary to the 1963 Rules. The Court ruled that seniority is a vested right that cannot be curtailed by administrative action lacking clear legal sanction. Consequently, the Court directed the Department to maintain a joint seniority list and reconsider promotions based on service seniority and experience "in the line," rather than restricted group-based criteria. This judgment reinforces the principle that administrative redesignations cannot alter fundamental service conditions or vested seniority rights without explicit statutory authority.

  Questions settled

  • Is seniority of a civil servant a vested right that cannot be deprived except in accordance with the law?
  • Can administrative redesignation of posts be used to restrict seniority and promotion eligibility if the redesignation order explicitly states it shall not affect terms of service?
  • Does the West Pakistan Agriculture Service (Research Wing) Rules, 1963 require a single joint seniority list for the service?
  • Can a department restrict promotion eligibility to specific groups without the notification of functional units under the relevant service rules?
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• Muhammad Ibrahim And Others vs Faisalabad Development Authority1991 SCMR 1876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-03
  allotment of shopsprice fixationdevelopment authoritywrit jurisdictioncontractual obligationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed an Intra-Court Appeal regarding the allotment of shops by the Faisalabad Development Authority. The petitioners, former shopkeepers in the Old Vegetable Market, had been relocated by the Authority under a development scheme. Upon the Authority's agreement to provide them with new shops, the petitioners accepted the allotment but subsequently contested the price fixed for these shops, alleging it was arbitrary and legally unjustified. The High Court dismissed their initial writ petition in limine, and the subsequent Intra-Court Appeal was also dismissed. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and submissions, noting that the petitioners had explicitly agreed to pay the price determined by the Authority. Finding no breach of law or violation of any vested right, the Supreme Court held that there was no justification for judicial interference in the price fixation process. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the price fixation of allotted shops after having previously agreed to pay the price determined by the development authority?
  • Does the fixation of price for shops by a development authority constitute a breach of law or vested right when the allottee has consented to the authority's determination?
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• Muhammad Ibrahim and others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Gujranwala and others1991 MLD 2160 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim And 3 Others vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 864 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim and 3 others vs Province of Sindh and another1991 MLD 90 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-16
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompulsory acquisitionlimitation periodreference to courtadditional compensationpotential value
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Sindh High Court regarding the determination of compensation for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for a housing project in Sukkur. The core legal questions involved the competency of a reference regarding limitation under section 18 of the Act, the proper assessment of market and potential value of the acquired land, and the applicability of additional compensation under a provincial amendment to pending actions. The court held that a civil court or designated court cannot go behind a reference made by the Collector to examine questions of limitation, which fall within the exclusive domain of the Collector. Furthermore, the court ruled that potential value and comparable transactions must be considered for fair compensation, and that beneficial statutory amendments like additional compensation apply to pending proceedings as an appeal is a continuation of the suit. The appeal was accordingly allowed, enhancing the compensation rate and awarding damages and additional compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a designated civil court go behind a reference made by the Collector under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to determine whether the initial application was barred by limitation?
  • Whether the market value of compulsorily acquired land should be assessed by taking into consideration its potential value and future uses?
  • Does an amendment providing for additional compensation apply to pending actions and appeals arising from land acquisition proceedings?
  • What is the legal effect of failing to cross-examine a witness on material statements made during a civil trial?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs The Collector of Customs (Preventive) and 21991 MLD 1459 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-19
  customs dutyshort-levied dutylimitation periodshow-cause noticesuo motu revisionpalpable errormisconstructioncustoms valuation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerned whether the Customs Authorities could invoke the revisionary powers under Section 195 of the Customs Act 1969 to recover short-levied duty beyond the six-month limitation period prescribed under Section 32(3) of the same Act. The petitioners imported palm fatty acid consignments, paid duty, and obtained release of the goods. Show-cause notices initially alleging false statements under Section 32(2) were effectively abandoned, and subsequent notices were issued under Section 195 alleging short-levy based on price determination guidelines. The petitioners challenged these notices as time-barred under Section 32(3).

  The High Court held that Section 32 is the specific substantive provision governing the recovery of duty not levied, short-levied, or erroneously refunded. Section 195, which provides a general two-year limitation for revisionary jurisdiction, cannot be used to circumvent the specific six-month limitation period under Section 32(3) where allegations of false statements are dropped. The court declared the show-cause notices issued beyond six months to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Customs Authorities issue a show-cause notice under Section 195 of the Customs Act 1969 to recover short-levied duty after the expiration of the limitation period provided under Section 32(3)?
  • Is Section 195 of the Customs Act 1969 subject to the specific limitation provisions contained in Section 32 of the Customs Act 1969?
  • What is the applicable limitation period under Section 32(3) of the Customs Act 1969 for issuing a show-cause notice for recovery of duty short-levied due to inadvertence, error, or misconstruction?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Rehmat Ali1991 SCMR 1888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-30
  concurrent findings of factadverse possessiontenancyleave to appealproperty ownershiptrespasser
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts in a property dispute. The plaintiff/respondent filed a suit claiming ownership of land, while the defendant/petitioner asserted title based on an exchange deed, adverse possession, and protection under the Transfer of Property Act. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, a decision upheld by the appellate court and subsequently the High Court in civil revision. The Supreme Court addressed whether the petitioner's claims regarding ownership could override the established findings that he was merely a tenant and a trespasser. The Court held that the petitioner's arguments were frivolous attempts to perpetuate possession and that the case was concluded by concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming that concurrent findings of fact regarding the status of possession and tenancy are not open to interference in the absence of legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the status of a party as a tenant or trespasser be challenged in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does a claim of adverse possession successfully negate a finding of tenancy in a property dispute?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Fateh Muhammad1991 SCMR 1887 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-29
  transfer of civil suitdiscretionary powerconvenience of partiesappellate interferencespecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 28th June 1989, which allowed a transfer application filed by the respondent under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner had instituted a suit for specific performance of a contract before the Senior Civil Judge at Leiah. The respondent sought transfer of the suit to Sahiwal on grounds of advanced age, ill-health, apprehension of danger to life, and lack of proper representation by counsel at Leiah. The High Court transferred the suit to Sahiwal as an equidistant venue for both parties. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in transferring the suit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion for cogent reasons and dismissed the petition, establishing that appellate interference in the discretionary transfer of a civil suit is unwarranted when supported by sufficient justification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit can be transferred under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground of the defendant's ill-health and advanced age?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary order of the High Court regarding the transfer of a suit without sufficient grounds?
  • Is the equidistant location from the abodes of both parties a valid consideration for transferring a suit?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Fateh Muhammad and OtherK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 465 · Lahore High Court · 1990-11-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Fateh Muhammad and anothers1991 CLC 704 · Lahore High Court · 1990-11-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Asghar AliK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 262 · Lahore High Court · 1991-01-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Asghar Ali and 2 others1991 MLD 732 · Lahore High Court · 1991-01-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Allah Dad and 13 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-27
  ex parte decreedate of hearingcivil procedureremandwritten statementtemporary injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a civil suit where the appellant challenged an ex parte decree passed against him. The core legal question was whether a court can pass an ex parte decree on a date fixed merely for the filing of a written statement or a reply to a miscellaneous application, rather than a date of hearing. The Supreme Court examined the order-sheet, which revealed that the date in question was fixed for filing a reply to a temporary injunction application, not for filing a written statement. The Court held that such a date does not constitute a date of hearing for the suit itself. Furthermore, the Court clarified that there was no specific order requiring the defendant to file a written statement under the relevant procedural rules on that date. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a decision on merits. The judgment reinforces the principle that an ex parte decree cannot be passed on a date not fixed for the hearing of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ex parte decree be passed on a date fixed only for the filing of a reply to a miscellaneous application?
  • Is a date fixed for the filing of a written statement considered a date of hearing for the suit?
  • Does the absence of a court order requiring the filing of a written statement preclude the passing of an ex parte decree on a procedural date?
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• Muhammad Hussain Shah vs Ghulam Hussain ShahK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 232 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Fatavi and another vs Fakhrunnisa Begum and 51991 CLC 1930 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain And Others vs Punjab University Academic Staff1991 SCMR 1155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-24
  writ jurisdictionsuo motuallotment of landHigh Court powersjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the High Court's writ jurisdiction in the context of suo motu actions. The petitioners challenged a High Court judgment that had set aside an allotment of land made to petitioner No. 6 in 1973, despite the fact that this specific allotment was not challenged in the underlying writ petition (Writ Petition No. 402-R of 1976). The core legal question was whether the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, possesses the authority to issue a writ suo motu regarding matters not raised by the parties. The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot issue a writ suo motu while deciding a writ petition. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order insofar as it declared the 1973 allotment to be without lawful authority. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the original allotment, establishing the principle that the High Court's writ jurisdiction is confined to the issues properly brought before it and does not extend to suo motu interventions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court issue a writ suo motu while deciding a writ petition?
  • Is a High Court order setting aside an allotment of land valid if the allotment was not challenged in the writ petition?
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• Muhammad Hussain and others vs Muhammad Nawaz and others1991 PLD Lahore 262 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-12
  failed exchangemesne profitspossession of landtransfer of propertyrestitutionsecond appealspecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal concerns a suit for possession of land following a failed exchange agreement. The plaintiff transferred his land to the defendants, but the defendants failed to reciprocate, leading the plaintiff to sue for the return of his property. The core legal question was whether a party who has performed their part of an exchange contract is entitled to the return of their property if the other party fails to perform, and whether the court can award mesne profits. The Court held that the principles underlying Section 119 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply to cases of failed exchange, entitling the aggrieved party to recover their property. Furthermore, the Court affirmed its discretionary power to award mesne profits as part of general relief to remedy injustice caused by the court's own stay orders during the litigation. The appeal was dismissed, and the trial court was directed to ascertain the mesne profits due to the plaintiff.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party to an exchange agreement recover their property if the other party fails to perform their part of the contract?
  • Does the principle underlying Section 119 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply to cases where there is no transfer at all?
  • Can a court award mesne profits in a suit for possession as part of general relief?
  • Is the power of the court to award future mesne profits discretionary?
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• Muhammad Hussain And Others vs Mst. Razia Rana And Other1991 SCMR 1769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-30
  leave to appealland disputetitle to propertyburden of proofinfirmity of title
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Hussain and others against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 30-6-1987, concerning a dispute over a piece of land situated in Mianapura, Sialkot City. The core legal question is whether a party can claim land based on the infirmity of the opposing party's title without establishing an independent right or title in themselves. The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff or petitioner cannot succeed on the basis of any infirmity in the defendant's or respondent's title without first demonstrating their own valid right or title to the property in question. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that a party must rely on the strength of their own title rather than the weakness of their opponent's.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner succeed in claiming land based solely on the infirmity of the respondent's title?
  • Is it necessary for a party claiming a piece of land to establish their own right or title before challenging the opposing party's title?
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• Muhammad Hussain and others vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Chairman, Railway Board, Lahore and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-03
  revisional jurisdictionLabour Appellate TribunalLabour CourtPayment of Wages ActIndustrial Relations Ordinancestatutory interpretationappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a dispute regarding the revisional jurisdiction of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal over orders passed by a Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The appellants, railway employees, sought extra wages, which the Authority granted. The Railway Administration appealed to the Labour Court, which dismissed the claim. The Labour Appellate Tribunal subsequently set aside the Labour Court's order. The High Court, however, declared the Tribunal's order void, ruling that the Tribunal lacked revisional jurisdiction over matters arising under the Payment of Wages Act. The Supreme Court resolved the conflict between High Courts, holding that when a Labour Court exercises appellate jurisdiction under the Payment of Wages Act, it acts within its statutory functions under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Consequently, proceedings before the Labour Court under the Act are deemed proceedings under the Ordinance, making them subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for consideration of other pending grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Labour Appellate Tribunal possess revisional jurisdiction over orders passed by a Labour Court in its appellate capacity under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
  • Are proceedings conducted by a Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act considered proceedings under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does the conferment of appellate jurisdiction on a Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act make its decisions final and immune from the revisional powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal?
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• Muhammad Hussain and 9 others vs Mst. Fatima and 2 others1991 CLC 1826 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-05
  suing as a pauperforma pauperiscourt-fee deficiencyplaint institutionfunctus officioconstitutional petitioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, arises from an order of the trial court which rejected the respondent's application to sue as a pauper under Order XXXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, but granted time to affix the requisite court-fee. The core legal question was whether a trial court, upon dismissing an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis, becomes functus officio or retains jurisdiction to permit the applicant to make good the deficiency in court-fee and treat the original application as a plaint from the date of its presentation. The Lahore High Court held that the trial court retains seisin of the case and, if the pauper application was not mala fide, may permit the applicant to pay the court-fee under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, deeming the suit instituted on the date the initial application was filed. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court become functus officio upon rejecting an application for permission to sue as a pauper?
  • Can a court permit an applicant to pay a deficit court-fee after dismissing their application to sue in forma pauperis?
  • From which date is a suit deemed to be instituted when a pauper application is converted into a plaint upon payment of court-fee?
  • What is the effect of non-payment or deficit of court-fee on the validity of the institution of a suit?
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• Muhammad Hussain And 4 Others vs The State and another-1991 PCr.LJ 1081 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain and 4 others vs Mehr Din and another1991 CLC 306 · Lahore High Court · 1990-09-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain and 4 others vs Karachi Building Control1991 CLC 1117 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Alias Hassan Muhammad vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1489 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat vs Muhammad Shakar And Another1991 SCMR 1328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  land allotmentclaimant allotteeauction confirmationlocus standiintra-court appealwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's Intra-Court Appeal, which had challenged the dismissal of his writ petition concerning land allotment. The core legal question involves the validity of cancelling a claimant allottee's land allotment on the ground of non-possession and whether a person in whose favour an auction was never confirmed possesses locus standi to maintain a writ petition or intra-court appeal. The Supreme Court held that possession is not an essential condition for the confirmation of land allotted to a claimant allottee, and an unconfirmed auction confers no vested right to challenge subsequent administrative orders through constitutional remedies. The petition was accordingly dismissed, upholding the concurrent judgments of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether possession is an essential condition for the confirmation of land allotted to a claimant allottee?
  • Does an unconfirmed auction give the auction-purchaser a sufficient right to maintain a writ petition or intra-court appeal?
  • Whether an allotment of land can be cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing to the claimant allottee?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat vs Muhammad Nawaz And Another1991 P Cr. L J 1068 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat and Two Other vs The StateK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 181 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat and anothers vs Member (Cons.), Board of Revenue1991 MLD 2365 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat And 2 Others vs The State-1991 P Cr. L J 50 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hassan vs The State and 4 others1991 CLC 667 · Lahore High Court · 1990-11-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hassan vs The State and 4 OtherK.L.R. 1991 Revenue Cases 59 · Lahore High Court · 1990-11-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hassan vs Manzoor Ahmad And Another1991 P Cr. L J 2177 · Sindh High Court · 1991-07-21
  quashment of proceedingsinherent jurisdictioncivil nature of disputeabuse of processcriminal intimidationcheatingco-extensive powersspecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Miscellaneous Application sought the quashment of criminal proceedings pending before a 1st Class Magistrate, initiated via an FIR alleging cheating and criminal intimidation. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings should be quashed when the underlying dispute is essentially civil in nature and a civil suit regarding the same property transaction is already pending. The Court held that the proceedings must be quashed, finding the FIR was lodged to coerce the applicant into withdrawing his civil suit and surrendering his rights. The allegations lacked the necessary ingredients for the charged offences, and the dispute was clearly a civil matter arising from a property transaction and a revoked power of attorney. The Court established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is co-extensive with the trial court's power under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, criminal proceedings cannot be utilized as an instrument of harassment or coercion to settle civil disputes, and where an FIR on its face fails to disclose an offence, the High Court will intervene to prevent abuse of process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is co-extensive with the trial court's powers under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed if the underlying dispute is purely of a civil nature?
  • Does the mere pendency of a civil suit bar the initiation of criminal proceedings for the same transaction?
  • Is an FIR liable to be quashed if it is used as a tool for coercion and harassment rather than for the prosecution of a genuine criminal offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hashim and others vs Arshad Javed [Irshad Javaid] and another1991 MLD 986 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-06-18
  pre-emptionpre-emption money depositSection 4 Limitation Actclosed courttransfer of presiding officerrejection of plaintactus curiae neminem gravabitcivil revisionPardanashin lady
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arose from consolidated pre-emption suits concerning land sold under mutation No. 3169. The respondent pre-emptor was directed by the trial court to deposit the pre-emption money before 7-3-1984. However, the Presiding Officer was transferred and relinquished charge on 3-3-1984 without a successor taking over. On 21-3-1984, the respondent applied to the District Judge, who permitted the deposit the same day. The trial court dismissed her suit under Section 23 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1950 for failure to make the deposit on time, but the District Judge reversed the dismissal on appeal. The core legal question before the Peshawar High Court was whether the absence or transfer of a Presiding Officer renders a court 'closed' under Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908, thereby extending the time for deposit until the court reopens. Dismissing the revision petition, the High Court held that when a Presiding Officer is unavailable and business cannot be transacted, the court is deemed closed, entitling the litigant to perform the required act upon reopening under the principle actus curiae neminem gravabit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court is deemed to be 'closed' under Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908 when its Presiding Officer is transferred or unavailable and no successor has assumed charge?
  • Can a pre-emptor legally deposit pre-emption money after the prescribed date if the court was closed due to the transfer of the Presiding Officer?
  • Does the failure to deposit pre-emption money by a specified date warrant rejection of the plaint under Section 23 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1950 when the delay was caused by the non-availability of the Presiding Officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hashim And 3 Others vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands)1991 SCMR 1564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-22
  allotment cancellationdisplaced personsbogus claimvoid ab initioleave to appealsettlement of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an order by the Settlement Commissioner (Lands) cancelling the petitioners' land allotment. The dispute originated when land reserved for the petitioners, who were displaced persons, was subsequently allotted to the respondents. While the Additional Settlement Commissioner initially restored the allotment to the petitioners, the Settlement Commissioner (Lands) later reversed this, cancelling the petitioners' rights. The petitioners challenged this before the High Court, which dismissed their petition. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the respondents' claim was based on a bogus claim form that had been cancelled as void ab initio, meaning the respondents lacked a valid legal basis to claim the disputed land. The Supreme Court found that the petitioners' contention regarding the fraudulent nature of the respondents' claim raised a substantial legal issue requiring further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and directed that the status quo be maintained pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allotment based on a bogus claim form constitute a void ab initio transaction?
  • Can a party who acquires rights from a claimant whose claim was subsequently cancelled as bogus maintain a valid interest in the disputed land?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hasham Khan vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 2216 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-08-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haroon vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1202 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haroon Usman vs Rizwan Cooperative Housing Society1991 CLC 1917 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-04
  rejection of plaintcooperative societiesouster of jurisdictionmembership disputetouching the business of the societystatutory noticeregistrar nominee award
  Summary & questions settled

  This decision by the Sindh High Court arises from an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 filed by defendant No. 2 seeking rejection of the plaint. The plaintiff had filed a suit challenging the membership status of defendants Nos. 2 to 10 in a cooperative housing society and seeking a declaration that orders and awards passed by the Nominee and Registrar of Cooperative Societies were illegal and without jurisdiction. The primary legal issue was whether a dispute regarding whether a person is or is not a member of a cooperative society constitutes a dispute 'touching the business of the society' within the scope of Section 54 of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925, thereby barring the civil court's jurisdiction. The High Court held that a dispute regarding membership status directly touches the business of the society. Because the issue of membership was explicitly referred to and decided by the Registrar under statutory procedures, Section 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925 ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts to question such awards. Additionally, non-compliance with statutory notice under Section 70 further barred the suit. Consequently, the High Court rejected the plaint.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dispute concerning the membership status of a person in a cooperative society constitutes a dispute touching the business of the society under Section 54 of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925?
  • Can a civil court entertain a suit challenging an award or decision passed by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies on a dispute referred under Section 54 in light of Section 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925?
  • Does failure to issue statutory notice under Section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925 render a suit against a society liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haroon and anothers vs Federation of Pakistan and others1991 MLD 397 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-19
  Constitutional petitionCustoms ActRailways Policeentrustment of powersquashment of FIRunlawful seizurewithout jurisdictiondelegation of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 challenged the registration of an FIR under Section 156(8)(89) of the Customs Act 1969 and the seizure of refined silver under Section 550 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the Pakistan Railways Police. The central legal issue was whether officers of the Pakistan Railways Police had jurisdiction to exercise the powers of customs officers to seize alleged smuggled goods and register a case under the Customs Act 1969. The High Court examined Section 6 of the Customs Act 1969 and Notification No. S.R.O. 913(I)/86, which explicitly excluded officers of the Pakistan Railways Police from the entrustment of customs functions. Holding that the Customs Act 1969 is a complete code creating its own procedure and functionaries, the Court declared that officers not lawfully entrusted under Section 6 lacked authority to act. The Court quashed the FIR and ordered the immediate return of the seized silver.

  Questions settled

  • Whether officers of the Pakistan Railways Police are authorized to exercise the powers of customs officers under the Customs Act 1969 when explicitly excluded by notification under Section 6?
  • Can an FIR and investigation under the Customs Act 1969 be quashed under Article 199 of the Constitution if initiated by officers lacking statutory jurisdiction?
  • Whether goods seized by an unauthorized police agency under Section 550 Cr.P.C. for alleged customs offences must be returned to the owner.
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1795 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Muhammad.Anwar1991 CLC 1304 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Muhammad Farooq And Other1991 SCMR 1744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  transfer of propertytenancystatus quoleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the transfer of disputed premises and the status of tenancy. The core legal question involves whether the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents was a tenant of the petitioner and whether the plea of tenancy was properly raised and considered. The Court held that the petitioner's consistent case was that the property stood transferred in his favour and was given to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest after vesting in the petitioner, meaning the plea of tenancy was not newly raised before the High Court. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, ordered security of Rs. 5,000, and directed that status quo be maintained regarding the property, prohibiting alienation or change of character during the pendency of the appeal. The key principle laid down is that established factual positions regarding tenancy and property transfer raised consistently throughout the proceedings must be duly considered.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plea of tenancy raised consistently throughout the proceedings can be deemed to have been raised for the first time before the High Court?
  • Can status quo be ordered during the pendency of an appeal concerning disputed property transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Chief Executive, Pakistan Herald Limited and another1991 PLC 516 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-10-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Chairman, Labour Appellate Tribunal and others1991 PLC 316 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-11-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif and anothers vs Abdul Aziz and 6 others1991 MLD 216 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif And Another vs The State1991 P. Cr. L J 2062 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif And Another vs Secretary, Ministry of Education And Other1991 SCMR 1674 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-14
  service lawseniority listex-cadre postFederal Service Tribunalleave to appealcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals regarding their seniority status. The petitioners, recruited as Research Scholars (Grade 17) in the Islamic Research Cell of the Ministry of Education, challenged the exclusion of their names from the seniority list of Education Officers. While one member of the Tribunal supported the petitioners' claim, the majority held that the post of Research Scholar was an ex-cadre position, thus justifying their exclusion from the seniority list. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal was divided on the issue, creating a significant legal controversy regarding the classification of the petitioners' posts and their entitlement to seniority alongside other officers inducted under the same scheme. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the respondent department was legally justified in treating the petitioners differently from other officers inducted into service under the same initiative. The Court directed that the appeals proceed on the existing record with the liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the post of Research Scholar in the Ministry of Education constitutes an ex-cadre post for the purpose of seniority determination?
  • Is the respondent department justified in treating officers inducted under the same scheme differently regarding their placement on a seniority list?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif And Another vs Abdul Aziz Since Dead Now1991 SCMR 1903 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-17
  pre-emptioncustom of pre-emptionsub-divisionconcurrent findingspetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents against the sale of a house situated in Mohallah Shah Chan Chiragh, Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether Mohallah Shah Chan Chiragh constituted a recognized sub-division and whether the custom of pre-emption existed therein at the commencement of the Pre-emption Act. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, a finding which was subsequently affirmed by the District Judge on appeal and further upheld by the High Court in second appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that concurrent findings of fact by all three lower courts regarding the existence of the custom of pre-emption were fully supported by the evidence on record and warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent factual findings of lower courts concerning the existence of a local custom of pre-emption unless they are shown to be perverse or without evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the custom of pre-emption existed in Mohallah Shah Chan Chiragh at the commencement of the Pre-emption Act?
  • Whether Mohallah Shah Chan Chiragh is a recognized sub-division for the purposes of pre-emption?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of a local custom of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif And 9 Others vs The State1991PCr.LJ 1181 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haneef vs Abdul Hakeem and 2 others1991 CLC 758 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-02
  Cooperative Societies Actarbitration awardproperty disputeencroachmentappellate jurisdictionconstitutional petitionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a property dispute between two brothers regarding 12 square yards of land within a housing society. Following an arbitration award under Section 54 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, which favored the petitioner, the respondent appealed to the Deputy Registrar, who set aside the award. The petitioner challenged this order, contending that no appeal lies against an arbitration award under the Act. The High Court held that the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 does not provide for an appeal against an award rendered by a panel of arbitrators under Section 54. The Court clarified that the only available remedy is under Section 54-A, which allows the Registrar to modify, correct, or remit the award, or set it aside and refer the dispute back to arbitration. The Registrar lacks the authority to decide the dispute finally upon setting aside an award. Consequently, the Court declared the Deputy Registrar’s order without lawful authority and remanded the matter to be treated as an application under Section 54-A, directing a fresh decision in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal maintainable against an award given by a panel of arbitrators under Section 54 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925?
  • What is the scope of the Registrar's power under Section 54-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 when setting aside an arbitration award?
  • Can the Registrar decide a dispute finally after setting aside an arbitration award under Section 54-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hamayun Khan vs Ali Asghar Khan and 10 others1991 MLD 1957 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-03-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haleem And Another vs The Model Town Cooperative1991 SCMR 1231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  civil suitacquisition of propertycooperative societysettlement schemepermanent injunctionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The dispute arose from the acquisition of land by the Respondent Cooperative Society, with the petitioners claiming ownership based on the operation of Settlement Scheme No. 7. The core legal question was whether the civil suit was competent given the acquisition proceedings and whether the disputed land was immune from such acquisition. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal, holding that even assuming the petitioners' ownership, it was highly doubtful that the civil suit was maintainable or that the land was immune from acquisition. The Court observed that the petitioners' remedy, if any, lay in seeking compensation, potentially in the form of an alternative plot of land as per the Society's rules and applicable law. Consequently, the Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, emphasizing that the civil litigation route was not the appropriate forum for challenging the acquisition in these specific circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit competent to challenge the acquisition of land by a cooperative society?
  • Can a claimant of land acquired by a cooperative society seek compensation in the form of an alternative plot?
  • Does the operation of Settlement Scheme No. 7 automatically grant immunity from land acquisition?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hafeez vs Muhammad Hanif Khan1991 MLD 1560 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hafeez vs Muhammad Hanif Khan and another1991 MLD 1576 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-31
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantagreement to sellspecific performanceburden of proofadverse inferencewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition arose from an ejectment application filed by the respondent against the petitioner regarding a house in Lahore. The petitioner contested the application, denying the landlord-tenant relationship and asserting ownership based on an alleged agreement to sell. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the ejectment petition, citing the agreement to sell under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. However, the District Judge reversed this decision, finding the relationship of landlord and tenant persisted and ordering ejectment. The High Court examined whether the lower appellate court misread the evidence or misapplied the law. It noted that the petitioner's suit for specific performance of the alleged agreement had been dismissed and that the petitioner failed to testify personally to prove the agreement's execution. The Court affirmed that a party with personal knowledge of the facts is duty-bound to appear as a witness. Consequently, the High Court held that the landlord-tenant relationship remained intact, upheld the ejectment order due to admitted non-payment of rent, and dismissed the petition, finding no jurisdictional defect in the appellate judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell automatically terminate the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties?
  • What is the legal consequence of a party failing to appear as their own witness when they have personal knowledge of the facts?
  • Can an ejectment order be sustained where the tenant admits to non-payment of rent and fails to prove a superior title?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Habib Khan vs Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-02
  Group InsuranceWorkmen's CompensationStanding Orders OrdinanceIndustrial RelationsJurisdiction of CommissionerSuperannuationBeneficial Legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that quashed an order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, which had awarded Group Insurance benefits to the appellant, a former employee of the respondent company. The core legal questions were whether the Commissioner possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under Standing Order 10-B of the West Pakistan (Industrial and Commercial Employment) Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, and whether the appellant was entitled to such benefits after being retired upon reaching the age of 55. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is the competent forum for such claims, as the phrase "in the same manner" in Standing Order 10-B(5) incorporates both the procedural framework and the adjudicatory authority of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the industrial award created a binding right to continued employment contingent upon medical fitness, not mere employer discretion. The key principle established is that beneficial labor legislation must be construed to provide effective remedies, and the statutory reference to the "manner" of determination necessarily includes the designated forum.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for Group Insurance under Standing Order 10-B of the West Pakistan (Industrial and Commercial Employment) Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does the phrase 'in the same manner' in Standing Order 10-B(5) of the West Pakistan (Industrial and Commercial Employment) Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, include the forum for adjudication?
  • Can an employer exercise absolute discretion to deny continued employment to a worker after age 55 when an industrial award mandates retention subject to medical fitness?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ha Nif and others vs Nasir Ali and others1991 CLC 833 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Gofran Ali vs Muhammad Siddique1991 PLC 174 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-03-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fazil vs The State1991 PCr.LJ 1071 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fazil And Others vs Mst. Sughran Bibi And Other1991 SCMR 1371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-28
  special oathQanun-e-Shahadatsecond regular appeallegal representativesmutationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a second regular appeal concerning a disputed land sale mutation. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had filed a suit challenging the sale as fictitious and without consideration, which was dismissed by the trial court and the first appellate court. During the second appeal, an offer was made by one of the legal representatives under Section 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, to have the dispute decided based on a special oath on the Holy Quran by one of the respondents. The respondent took the special oath, and the High Court dismissed the appeal accordingly. The petitioners sought leave to appeal on the ground that the legal representative who made the offer lacked authority to bind the other co-heirs. The Supreme Court held that since the same counsel represented all legal representatives in the High Court without raising any objection to the authority or the special oath procedure, and given that the original plaintiff had made a similar proposal, the petitioners were bound by the proceedings. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether co-heirs are bound by a special oath offer made by one of the legal representatives in the presence of and without objection from their common counsel?
  • Can a party resile from an offer to be bound by a special oath under Section 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 after the opposing party has taken the oath?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farooq Asghar vs Federation of Pakistan and 4 others1991 PLD Lahore 321 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-05Read full judgment →
• Shaikh Muhammad Taqi vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 963 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-11
  quashment of proceedingscivil liabilitybreach of contractcheatingcriminal breach of trustabuse of processpremature applicationguarantor liability
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant filed an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated against him under Sections 420, 406, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant alleged that the applicant, acting as a guarantor, failed to return a loan and complete a construction contract. The trial court had rejected the applicant's acquittal application under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 as premature because charges had not been framed and a co-accused was absconding. The High Court held that a Magistrate possesses the power under Section 249-A to acquit an accused at any stage of the case, even before framing charges, if the allegations are groundless. The Court ruled that a mere breach of contract or failure to repay a loan does not constitute a criminal offense unless accompanied by mens rea. Distinguishing civil liability from criminal liability, the Court concluded that using criminal machinery to pressure recovery of civil dues is an abuse of process and quashed the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application for acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be rejected as premature solely because charges have not yet been framed?
  • Does a mere breach of contract or failure to repay a loan amount to criminal offenses under Sections 420 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the dispute is purely of a civil nature?
  • Is the presence of an absconding co-accused a bar to deciding an acquittal application under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the appearing accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farooq And Another vs The State1991 PCr.LJ 1319 · Lahore High Court · 1991-01-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farid vs Muhammad Saleh alias Chaman and another1991 PLC 514 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-10-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ejaz vs Secretary to Government of Punjab, Home1991 PLC (C.S.) 244 · Lahore High Court · 1990-08-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Eisa And 6 Others vs Khair Ud Din1991 SCMR 1942 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-30
  leave to appealconcurrent findings of factcivil revisioncancellation of sale deedfraudwant of considerationmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a Civil Revision arising from a suit for the cancellation of a sale deed. The petitioners, successors-in-interest to the original plaintiff, challenged the sale deed on grounds of fraud and lack of consideration. The trial court and the appellate court had concurrently ruled against the plaintiff on these factual issues. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners attempted to raise new arguments regarding the minority of their predecessor and an alleged admission by his father. The Supreme Court observed that these specific pleas were not pressed before the High Court, which had correctly focused on the concurrent findings of fact regarding fraud and consideration. Finding no misreading or non-reading of evidence by the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact do not warrant interference unless a legal defect is demonstrated. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that issues not raised or pressed before the High Court cannot be agitated for the first time in the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea in the Supreme Court that was not pressed before the High Court?
  • Do concurrent findings of fact by lower courts warrant interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when the underlying controversy relates solely to concurrent findings of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Durez vs Muhammad Din1991 MLD 1808 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din vs Liaqat Ali1991 MLD 1070 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-27
  first appealrecovery of moneydisputed signaturehandwriting expertappraisal of evidenceburden of proofcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant filed a first appeal under Section 96 read with Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 against the dismissal of his civil suit seeking recovery of money from his former son-in-law (the respondent). The core legal question revolved around whether the appellant successfully established that he advanced money to the respondent for purchasing a plot and constructing a house thereon, specifically concerning the proof of a disputed receipt and signatures. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiff was legally bound to seek a handwriting expert's opinion to prove a disputed signature, and found that the court itself can evaluate and compare signatures using admitted documents on record. The High Court partly allowed the appeal, granting a decree for the substantiated portion of the claim based on the proved receipt and corroborative evidence, while dismissing the unproven construction costs. The key principle laid down is that a party is not legally obligated to refer a disputed signature to a handwriting expert, and the court is fully competent to form its own opinion by comparing disputed signatures with admitted signatures on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party legally required to move the court to refer a disputed signature to a handwriting expert?
  • Can a court of law form its own opinion on a disputed signature by comparing it with admitted signatures on the record?
  • Whether an adverse presumption can be drawn against a party for failing to apply for a handwriting expert's opinion?
  • Does the failure to examine authors of private receipts for material and labor invalidate a claim for recovery of construction expenses?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din Etc vs Malik Noor Muhammad EtcK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 496 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din and others vs Ghulam Muhammad Naseem Sindhu and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-16
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer deedexcess areaplinth areasettlement authoritiesdisplaced personsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the setting aside of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order regarding excess land attached to an evacuee property. The core legal question was whether Settlement Authorities could determine excess area exceeding three times the plinth area of a transferred house after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed and the repeal of settlement laws. The Supreme Court, by a majority view, held that land in excess of three times the plinth area does not form part of the transferred house and remains available for disposal, and that authorities are competent to determine excess area notwithstanding the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed, provided such excess land was not legally transferred. The key principle laid down is that a Permanent Transfer Deed does not protect land that exceeds three times the plinth area of a house if such excess land was never legally transferred to the transferee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land exceeding three times the plinth area of an evacuee house forms part of the transferred house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can Settlement Authorities determine excess area attached to a transferred property after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Did the office of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner cease to exist for all purposes upon the repeal of the evacuee laws?
  • Whether occupants in possession of excess land have the locus standi to challenge orders concerning the disposal of such excess land?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din and 11 others vs Malik Noor Muhammad and 16 others1991 MLD 1291 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din and 11 others vs Ahmed Ali and 3 others1991 MLD 1425 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Chuttal vs The State1991 MLD 392 · Sindh High Court · 1990-09-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Chottey Khan vs Muhammad Munir Khan and 2 others1991 PLD Karachi 331 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Chiragh and anothers vs Muhammad Fazil and 4 others1991 MLD 172 · Lahore High Court · 1990-10-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bux vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1361 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1990 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota vs Deputy Commissioner, Sialkot1991 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-26
  Service Tribunalleave to appeallimitation periodmisconductunauthorized realization of moneypublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a decision of the Service Tribunal. The petitioner challenged the findings of the Tribunal, which had upheld disciplinary action against him based on his own admission of receiving an unauthorized sum of Rs. 200 from a complainant. The Supreme Court first addressed a preliminary objection regarding the limitation period, noting that while the petition appeared barred by 142 days, the Tribunal's own narration of facts indicated the petition was within time. On the merits, the Court found that the petitioner had admitted to realizing money without legal authority or official duty. Consequently, the Court held that no question of law of public importance arose that would warrant further examination or the grant of leave to appeal. The petition was dismissed, affirming that an admission of misconduct by a public servant regarding unauthorized financial transactions precludes the necessity for further judicial review by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an admission of misconduct by a public servant regarding unauthorized financial transactions raise a question of law of public importance?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be considered within limitation if the Tribunal's own narration of facts contradicts the calculation of delay?
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• Muhammad Boota And Others vs Additional Deputy Commissioner (G), Additional Settlement Commissioner, Sahiwal And Another1991 SCMR 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-27
  land settlementinformermukhbarsitting allotteedisplaced personsallotment cancellationretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over land allotment between 'informers' (mukhbar) and 'sitting allottees'. The core legal question was whether an informer held a preferential right to land over sitting allottees, particularly following the withdrawal of the informer concession under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme and subsequent legislative amendments. The Supreme Court held that the informer's claim lapsed upon the withdrawal of the concession, as no allotment had been made prior to that date. Furthermore, the Court ruled that under Section 14(1-A) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, as amended, informers could not override the rights of sitting allottees. The Court established that the amendment has retrospective effect, thereby protecting the appellants' possession. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the order confirming the land in favor of the appellants, affirming that informers cannot displace sitting allottees.

  Questions settled

  • Does an informer's application for land allotment lapse if no allotment is made before the withdrawal of the relevant concession?
  • Can an informer override the rights of sitting allottees in the allotment of land?
  • Does Section 14(1-A) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, have retrospective effect regarding the rights of informers?
  • Is an order passed by an Additional Settlement Commissioner acting as a revision authority without jurisdiction void?
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