Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- District Evacuee Trust Committee vs Muhammad Umar and others1990 SCMR 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a dispute over whether a property in Hyderabad, previously treated as evacuee property, was attached to a religious or charitable trust. The appellant, the District Evacuee Trust Committee, sought a declaration under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, relying on City Survey Record entries describing the property as a 'Dharamsala' managed by trustees. The High Court and the Chief Settlement Commissioner had previously rejected this claim, ruling that in the absence of a formal trust deed, such entries were insufficient to establish the property's status as a religious trust. The Supreme Court of Pakistan reversed these decisions. The Court held that official records, such as the Property Register Card prepared by public officials, carry a presumption of correctness. It further clarified that under Hindu Law, a trust deed does not require registration, and demanding its production in circumstances where trustees had migrated is unreasonable. Consequently, the Court ruled that the official record sufficiently established the property as an evacuee trust, setting aside the lower courts' judgments.
Questions settled- Can a property be declared as attached to a religious or charitable trust based on official records like the City Survey Record in the absence of a formal trust deed?
- Does the presumption of correctness attaching to official records shift the burden of proof to the party challenging the status of a property?
- Is the production of a formal trust deed a mandatory requirement to establish the existence of a religious or charitable trust under Hindu Law?
- Director, Thal Jute Mills Ltd., Muzaffarghar and others vs Barjees1990 PLC 693 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- Director Hyesons Sugar Mills Ltd. vs M/s. Hyesons Sugar Mills Ltd.PTCL 1990 CL. 1098 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 1990-08-07Read full judgment →
- Director Food, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and another vs Syed1990 SCMR 1412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Director Food, Government of the Punjab, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a judgment of the Service Tribunal which set aside an order of recovery passed against the respondent, a Foodgrain Supervisor, regarding a shortage of wheat. An inquiry had recommended writing off a portion of the loss due to weather calamities and genuineness of losses, but the competent authority ordered recovery of the remaining loss from the respondent under rule 18.4(a) of P.F.R. Vol. I Part I read with Delegation of Powers under the Financial Rules and Powers of Re-appropriation Rules, 1962. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in interfering with the recovery order. The Supreme Court held that the competent authority failed to first determine the extent of loss due to defective storage conditions and natural calamities and to establish neglect or lack of care on the part of the respondent, making the Tribunal's interference justified. Leave to appeal was refused.
Questions settled- Whether the Service Tribunal is justified in setting aside an order of recovery when the competent authority fails to determine the extent of loss due to natural calamities and establish neglect on the part of the employee?
- Can leave to appeal be granted under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a judgment of the Service Tribunal where no legal error is committed?
- Director Administration, Lahore Development Authority, Lahore vs Muhammad Razak and another1990 PLC 689 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals arose from a decision of the Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore, which accepted the grievance petitions of the respondents for reinstatement in service, allowing the appellant to take action under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The core legal questions were whether the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) constitutes an 'industrial establishment' or 'construction industry' under the Ordinance, whether LDA operates under the authority of the Government, and whether the respondents were wrongfully penalized without a proper inquiry. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that while the LDA was not proven to be a general industrial establishment due to lack of evidence, it fell squarely within the definition of a 'construction industry' under Section 2(bb) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, and that it was not an entity working under the direct authority of the Government despite statutory controls. The Tribunal affirmed that imposing major penalties without holding an inquiry was legally unsustainable. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the Lahore Development Authority falls within the definition of a construction industry under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
- Does the Lahore Development Authority operate under the direct authority of the Government?
- Can a major penalty be imposed on an employee without holding a proper departmental inquiry under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968?
- Director (Establishment), S&Ga Division, WAPDA, Lahore and another vs Ashiq Hussain Khan1990 SCMR 1459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by WAPDA against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondent, a stenographer, was removed from service following departmental proceedings for misconduct, including late attendance and using abusive language. While the Federal Service Tribunal upheld the finding of misconduct, it exercised its discretion to modify the penalty from removal from service to the stoppage of three increments. The core legal question presented to the Supreme Court is whether the Federal Service Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction to interfere with and reduce the quantum of penalty imposed by a departmental authority once the finding of guilt regarding misconduct has been affirmed. The Supreme Court, finding that this contention regarding the scope of the Tribunal's power to interfere with departmental penalties requires further examination, granted leave to appeal. The Court ordered that the interim order previously issued on 17-4-1989 shall remain in force during the pendency of the appeal proceedings.
Questions settled- Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the legal authority to interfere with the quantum of penalty imposed by a departmental authority after upholding a finding of misconduct?
- Can the Federal Service Tribunal substitute the penalty of removal from service with a lesser penalty such as the stoppage of increments?
- Din Muhammad vs Province of Sind through Home Secretary and 21990 P Cr. LJ 605 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Din Muhammad vs Abdul Haq1990 SCMR 201(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon an application filed by the appellant's counsel seeking permission to withdraw the pending appeal. The core legal question was whether the appellant could be granted leave to withdraw the appeal at this stage of the proceedings. The Court, exercising its discretion, granted the request for withdrawal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with no order issued regarding costs. The Court also noted that, given the dismissal of the appeal, the assistance of the advocates appointed as amicus curiae was no longer required, though the Court expressed appreciation for their preparation. The judgment establishes the principle that an appellant retains the right to seek withdrawal of an appeal, and upon such request being granted, the appeal is effectively dismissed without further adjudication on the merits.
Questions settled- Can an appellant seek permission to withdraw an appeal pending before the Supreme Court?
- What is the effect of granting an application to withdraw an appeal?
- Din Muhammad and 4 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1339 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-19Read full judgment →
- Dildar vs Safdar and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 158 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal petition under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed by the complainant Dildar to challenge an order passed by a Magistrate releasing respondent Safdar under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground of a plea of alibi, after challan had already been submitted. The core legal question was whether an investigating officer and a magistrate can discharge an accused prior to trial based on a pre-trial evaluation of a plea of alibi when sufficient incriminating evidence exists on record. The Peshawar High Court held that the investigating officer and magistrate acted arbitrarily and without jurisdiction by conducting a mini-trial and accepting a plea of alibi contrary to the weight of ocular and medical evidence, ignoring prior rejections of the same plea up to the Supreme Court. The court laid down the principle that section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not permit an investigating officer to arrogate the functions of an adjudicator to give a pre-trial verdict of innocence on a special plea like alibi, and the High Court can invoke its wide inherent powers under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to strike down illegal or arbitrary orders to prevent abuse of court process and secure the ends of justice.
Questions settled- Can an investigating officer release an accused under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the basis of a plea of alibi after a challan has already been submitted to the court?
- Whether a Magistrate acts lawfully by mechanically adopting an investigating officer's report for the release of an accused without independently examining the case record and existing evidence?
- Does the availability of alternate remedies bar the High Court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to set aside an illegal and arbitrary order?
- Is a pre-trial evaluation of evidence and acceptance of a special plea like alibi permissible during the investigation stage when sufficient ocular and medical evidence implicates the accused?
- Dilawar Hussain Shah vs Maqbool Hussain Shah and 20 others1990 SCMR 994 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition in a consolidation matter. The core legal question concerns whether the revenue authorities and the High Court erred in making adjustments under the Consolidation Scheme regarding the petitioner's land and orchard. The Supreme Court held that the petition is devoid of merit, affirming the findings that the petitioner was given land according to his entitlement, his Hissadari possession was duly protected during the partition of the joint Khata, and the orchard was not reflected in the revenue record. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact by revenue authorities regarding land entitlements and consolidation schemes, when properly considered and found to be fair, will not be interfered with in constitutional or appellate jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Whether concurrent findings of revenue authorities regarding land consolidation can be interfered with when the landowner was given land according to entitlement?
- Does the absence of an orchard in the revenue record affect its consideration during land consolidation adjustments?
- Dil Muhammad vs Noor Muhammad and 4 others1990 PLD Azad J&K 15 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-12-20Read full judgment →
- Dil Bibi vs Amir Hussain And Other1990 CLC 1994 · Board of Revenue · 1989-12-24Read full judgment →
- Dhirendra Kumar Garg and others vs Smt. Sugandhibai Jain and others1990 MLD 940 · Supreme Court of India · 1988-09-23Read full judgment →
- Dhani Bux and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1293 · Sindh High Court · 1989-03-01Read full judgment →
- Dhanai and others vs Senior Member, Federal Land Commission, Rawalpindi and others1990 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order upholding the resumption of land by the Federal Land Commission. The petitioners claimed the disputed land was gifted to them by their father in 1974; however, their father subsequently included this land in his declaration under the Land Reforms Act, 1977. The petitioners' attempts to exclude the land from the declaration through administrative appeals and a civil suit were unsuccessful. The High Court dismissed their writ petition, noting that the gift was never incorporated into the revenue record, the father failed to exclude the gifted land from his declaration, and the petitioners obtained an ex parte civil decree without impleading the Land Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, rejecting arguments regarding the father's alleged incapacity to make the declaration. The Court held that a civil decree obtained without impleading the Land Commission, where the land was voluntarily included in a declaration under the Land Reforms Act, 1977, does not invalidate the resumption of that land by the Commission.
Questions settled- Does a civil decree obtained without impleading the Land Commission affect the validity of land resumption proceedings under the Land Reforms Act, 1977?
- Can land included in a declaration under the Land Reforms Act, 1977 be excluded based on an alleged prior gift that was not incorporated into the revenue record?
- Design Group of Pakistan vs Clifton Cantonment Board1990 MLD 2010 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from an application under section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 concerning consultancy services and an arbitration clause designating the President of the Clifton Cantonment Board as sole arbitrator. After disputes arose, an initial application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 was granted, but subsequent delays, ex-parte proceedings, and an award issued after expiry prompted the court to set aside the award. The core legal questions involved whether an arbitrator becomes functus officio after making an award, whether an application under section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 could be treated as one for removal under section 11 of the Arbitration Act 1940, and whether the court could substitute a new arbitrator despite a named/designated arbitrator clause. The Sindh High Court held that while an arbitrator generally becomes functus officio after making an award, the court retains the power to remove a named arbitrator for misconduct and appoint a substitute under section 11 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The principle laid down is that where a named arbitrator has misconducted themselves and cannot be expected to render impartial justice, technicalities in pleadings should not obstruct justice, permitting the court to treat a section 8 application as a section 11 application for the removal and replacement of the arbitrator.
Questions settled- Does an arbitrator become functus officio after making an award?
- Can an application filed under section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 be treated as an application for removal under section 11 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
- Can the court substitute a new arbitrator in place of a named or designated arbitrator when misconduct is established?
- Under what circumstances can a court refuse to refer a dispute back to a previously appointed named arbitrator?
- Deputy Postmaster General (PS), Metropolitan Circle, Karachi and 2 others vs Syed Shamshad Hussain1990 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a Service Tribunal order that set aside the respondent’s dismissal from service, which had been effected through a summary procedure. The core legal questions concerned whether the departmental authority was justified in adopting a summary procedure rather than a regular inquiry, and whether such a choice rendered the proceedings illegal or oppressive. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the competent authority possesses the discretion to select between a summary procedure and a regular inquiry based on the specific facts and circumstances. The Court determined that where evidence is primarily documentary and the employee has made admissions, a summary procedure is neither perverse nor oppressive. Consequently, the dismissal was restored. The judgment establishes that an employee has no vested right to a particular procedural path in disciplinary matters. Furthermore, the requirement of a 'reasonable opportunity' to show cause does not mandate a full trial-like inquiry in every instance, particularly when the material evidence is already available and the controversy is narrow, as the primary objective of disciplinary proceedings is to ensure justice without unnecessary procedural delays.
Questions settled- Does an employee have a vested right to demand a regular inquiry instead of a summary procedure in departmental disciplinary proceedings?
- Is the discretion of an administrative authority to choose between a summary procedure and a regular inquiry subject to judicial interference if the procedure adopted is not perverse?
- Does the requirement of providing a reasonable opportunity to show cause in disciplinary proceedings mandate a full trial-like inquiry in every case?
- Can a dismissal order be upheld if the departmental authority opts for a summary procedure based on documentary evidence and admissions by the accused?
- Department vs AssesseePTCL 1990 CL. 819 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1989-12-10Read full judgment →
- Department vs AssesseePTCL 1990 CL. 1129 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1990-06-17Read full judgment →
- Department (Sales Tax). vs AssesseePTCL 1990 CL. 202 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1987-10-21Read full judgment →
- Deen Muhammad vs District Judge, Kohat and 2 others1990 SCMR 871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court, which had affirmed the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the appellate court directing the petitioner's eviction on the ground of personal requirement of the landlord's son. The core legal questions involved whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed given that the respondent was a co-owner of the property, and whether the question of such relationship was concluded by a prior remand order. The Supreme Court held that the respondent fell within the definition of a landlord under the applicable rent restriction law regardless of any delayed overt assertion of status, and that the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant stood concluded by the previous remand proceedings. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently refused, affirming the concurrent findings of fact.
Questions settled- Whether a co-owner falls within the definition of a landlord under the rent restriction law without a prior overt assertion of status?
- Can the question of relationship of landlord and tenant be re-opened before the Rent Controller after a remand order?
- Do concurrent findings of fact by the courts below warrant interference when they do not suffer from any legal infirmity?
- David Ochina Ojwang and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1886 · Federal Shariat CourtRead full judgment →
- Dauran Khan And Another vs Mst. Shamim Akhtar1990 CLC 1208 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition arose from execution proceedings initiated by a decree-holder following a final judgment in a pre-emption suit. The judgment-debtors sought to obstruct the delivery of physical possession of the decreed land by filing objection petitions, asserting that they held the land as tenants and were co-sharers in a joint khata. The Executing Court and the appellate court both dismissed these objections, noting that the issues of tenancy and co-sharership had been conclusively adjudicated against the judgment-debtors in the original suit, which had attained finality after the Supreme Court dismissed their leave to appeal. The core legal question was whether a judgment-debtor could re-agitate pleas of tenancy and co-sharership during execution proceedings to defeat a warrant for physical possession when those pleas had already been rejected in the underlying suit. The High Court held that such pleas were barred by the principle of res judicata. The court affirmed that this bar applies not only to subsequent suits but also to execution proceedings, thereby preventing the re-litigation of settled issues.
Questions settled- Can a judgment-debtor re-agitate claims of tenancy and co-sharership during execution proceedings if those claims were rejected in the original suit?
- Does the principle of res judicata apply to execution proceedings regarding issues already decided in the main suit?
- Is a decree-holder entitled to physical possession of land despite the judgment-debtor's claim of being a tenant?
- Daulat Ali vs Shagufta Rani And Another1990 CLC 917 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-09Read full judgment →
- Daud Iqbal Pervaiz and another vs The State1990 PLD Supreme Court 705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the High Court refusing to transfer a criminal case involving a murder charge under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code from District Mianwali to another district. The core legal question revolves around whether public agitation and sensationalism surrounding an offense constitute sufficient grounds to create a reasonable apprehension in the minds of the accused that they will not receive a fair and impartial trial. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the transfer of a case is justified only if there is a reasonable apprehension that a fair trial cannot be had, and that transient public indignation or out-of-turn trial scheduling by itself does not satisfy the test of a reasonable apprehension of bias. The key principle laid down is that sensationalism and initial public outcry alone cannot warrant the transfer of a criminal trial unless a reasonable person would genuinely apprehend prejudice in the presiding judge or local forum.
Questions settled- Does initial public agitation and indignation over a sensational crime automatically justify the transfer of a criminal case to another district?
- What is the proper test for determining whether an accused has a reasonable apprehension of not receiving a fair trial?
- Can the out-of-turn fixation of a trial by the Sessions Judge on the recommendation of district authorities form a valid ground for transferring a case?
- Dan Khan For Residents Of Village vs Chiragh Bibi And Other1990 CLC 1971 · Board of Revenue · 1988-12-07Read full judgment →
- Crescent Pak. Industries (Pvt.) Limited vs Government of Pakistan and others1990 PTD 29 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, an industrial importer, challenged the withdrawal of a sales tax exemption and the retrospective imposition of sales tax at 12-1/2% on imported tallow via a notification dated 26-6-1988, issued under Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The petitioner had previously obtained an import licence and opened Letters of Credit on 18-6-1988 when the goods enjoyed exemption under an earlier notification. The primary question was whether the newly inserted Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, by virtue of Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, negated the petitioner's vested rights under the principle in Al-Samrez Enterprise. The High Court held that Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act merely adopts the recovery and machinery provisions of the Customs Act, not its charging nature. Section 31-A of the Customs Act applies exclusively to duties and not to sales tax. Consequently, the withdrawal of exemption could only operate prospectively and could not defeat the petitioner's accrued vested rights.
Questions settled- Does Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 incorporate Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969 so as to defeat vested rights regarding sales tax exemptions?
- Does the machinery provision for recovery under Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 alter the inherent nature of sales tax into a customs duty?
- Can an executive notification withdrawing a sales tax exemption under Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 operate retrospectively to affect rights acquired upon opening Letters of Credit?
- Crescent Pak Indus Tries (Pvt) Limited. vs Government Of Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1990 CL. 457 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Continental Textiles Mills Ltd vs Commissioner for Workmen's1990 PLC 254 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-20Read full judgment →
- Concrete Sleeper Factory, Pakistan Railways vs Khuda Bux1990 PLC 571 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1987-12-15Read full judgment →
- Daood Ahmad vs Mst. Sabira Moqaddas1990 PLD Lahore 158 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition was filed by the petitioner-husband challenging the judgment and decree of the Family Court, Bahawalpur, which decreed the respondent-wife's suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khula. The petitioner contended that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction as the respondent allegedly resided in Lodhran and not Bahawalpur, and further argued that the grounds for Khula were not established. The Lahore High Court observed that the respondent, an educated school teacher, resided in Bahawalpur with her family for her brothers' education, and that the trial court's finding on her ordinary residence was based on a proper appreciation of evidence. On the merits of Khula, the Court noted that despite the Nikah being performed in 1977, Rukhsati had not taken place, and there was a severe disparity in their educational and social status. Holding that forcing the respondent into an unhappy union would be unjust, the Court affirmed the decree of Khula and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether a Family Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a suit for dissolution of marriage if the plaintiff-wife ordinarily resides within its local limits despite having ancestral property elsewhere?
- Can the High Court in its writ jurisdiction reappraise the evidence led by parties before a Family Court on the question of territorial jurisdiction?
- Whether an acute disparity in the educational and social status of spouses, coupled with a long delay in Rukhsati, constitutes a valid ground for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula?
- Commossioner Of Income Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore. vs Sh. GulzarPTCL 1990 CL. 115 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan and another vs Nighat Sultan and others1990 SCMR 805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding the admission policy for FATA candidates to medical colleges. For the 1987-88 session, the Governor of N.W.F.P. laid down a policy reserving certain seats for female candidates. For the 1988-89 session, upon discovering that numerous female candidates could qualify on open merit, the Government revised the policy and did away with the specific reservation for female candidates. Respondent No. 1 challenged her rejection under the former policy through a writ petition, which the High Court allowed, holding that the previous standard remained applicable. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the contentions regarding whether the policy was limited to the 1987-88 session and whether the Government could revise its policy under altered circumstances required detailed examination, and consequently suspended the operation of the High Court's order.
Questions settled- Whether an admission policy formulated for a specific academic session continues to apply to subsequent sessions unless expressly saved?
- Does the Provincial Government have the authority to revise its administrative admission policy in light of altered circumstances?
- Can a candidate claim admission to a medical college as a matter of right based on a previous year's reserved seat policy?
- Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Ravi Cheloor1990 PTD 1131 · Kerala High Court · 1989-02-28Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Gayatri Devi1990 PTD 377 · Allahabad High Court · 1990-02-27Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Sales Tax vs Pakistan Welding Electrode1990 PTD 411 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This tax reference matter before the Sindh High Court arose from assessment proceedings for the years 1970-71 to 1975-76, wherein the respondent claimed sales tax exemption on manufactured welding electrodes under SRO 125(1)/70 dated 29-06-1970. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the claim, but the Appellate Commissioner and subsequently the Appellate Tribunal allowed the exemption. The Department sought a reference under section 17(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, challenging the interpretation of the notification regarding whether welding electrodes qualified as articles for use with machinery. The Court noted concessions by counsel regarding specific assessment years due to subsequent amendments by SRO 3(1)/75. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of the notification and whether welding electrodes qualified for exemption. The Court held that since the Tribunal had made a finding of fact—un-challenged in the proceedings—that welding electrodes are articles used with machinery, the respondent was entitled to the claimed exemption. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's view, establishing that articles listed in the notification qualify if they function as articles for use with machinery.
Questions settled- Whether welding electrodes qualify for sales tax exemption under SRO 125(1)/70 as articles for use with machinery?
- Can an appellate tribunal's unchallenged finding of fact regarding the use of an article be disturbed in a reference under section 17(1) of the Sales Tax Act 1951?
- Commissioner of Sales Tax vs Messrs Philips Electrical Industries Ltd.1990 PTD 688 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-14Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Incometax, Lahore vs Messrs General Boot House, Lahore and others1990 SCMR 1352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These three petitions for leave to appeal were filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Lahore, against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which decided a referred question under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 in favour of the respondent-assessee. The core legal question involved the proper construction of section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and whether the petitions were barred by time. The Supreme Court noted that the view taken in the impugned judgment was based on a previous High Court judgment in respect of which leave had already been granted by the Supreme Court, and that the limitation issue raised identical questions of law and fact. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in these cases to be heard along with the connected matters, establishing that where petitions involve identical questions of law and fact previously entertained, leave to appeal should similarly be granted.
Questions settled- Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the petitions raise identical questions of law and fact as a previously connected case in which leave has already been granted?
- How is section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 to be construed in relation to assessments?
- Are the petitions for leave to appeal barred by time when raising questions similar to pending appeals?
- Commissioner of Incometax, Lahore vs Messrs Electro Cable1990 SCMR 1351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a decision of the Lahore High Court regarding the interpretation of Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, specifically concerning the right of a firm to obtain a renewal of its registration. The petitioner challenged the High Court's decision, which relied on an earlier judgment in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Messrs Rippon Printing Press. The Supreme Court observed that the current petitions raise the same legal questions and issues of limitation as those present in the Rippon Printing Press case, for which leave to appeal had already been granted. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in the present cases on the same terms and conditions as established in the Rippon Printing Press matter. The Court ordered that these appeals be prepared on the existing record, with liberty for parties to file additional documents, and directed that they be heard alongside the connected appeals arising from the Rippon Printing Press case.
Questions settled- Does a firm have a right to obtain a renewal of its registration under Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
- Should petitions raising identical legal questions to those in a pending appeal be granted leave to appeal on the same terms?
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi vs Messrs1990 PTD 821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding tax assessments under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The respondent-assessee declared a certain closing stock of grams, but inquiry from its bank revealed a significantly higher pledged stock, indicating a large undisclosed excess stock. The Income-tax Officer treated the value of this unrecorded excess stock as income from an undisclosed source under Section 4(2-B) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal maintained the addition. In a reference, the High Court upheld the finding that the excess stock existed, but held that the addition of the gross value of the suppressed stock was illegal without deducting the corresponding purchase price. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that since the value of the unrecorded investment in excess stock is deemed income of the previous year under Section 4(2-B), the question of deducting a corresponding purchase price does not arise. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's ruling on this point, answered the relevant reference questions in the affirmative, and allowed the appeal.
Questions settled- Whether the value of unrecorded excess stock treated as an investment under Section 4(2-B) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 can be subjected to a deduction for a corresponding purchase price?
- Whether the Income-tax Officer is entitled to draw an inference of assessable income when an assessee fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for unrecorded investments?
- Whether a discrepancy between the declared closing stock and the higher stock pledged with a bank constitutes valid material for the tax authorities to reject the assessee's accounts?
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras-II vs MLM. Mahalingam Chettiar1990 PTD 587 · Madras High Court · 1976-03-23Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore vs Messrs General Boot House, Lahore and others1990 PTD 842 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns three petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Lahore, against a judgment of the Lahore High Court. The High Court had decided in favour of the respondent-assessee regarding a question referred under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The petitioner subsequently sought certificates of appeal, which were dismissed by the High Court, leading to the current petitions which were noted as time-barred by the office. The core legal questions involve the proper construction of Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and the issue of whether the petitions for leave to appeal are within the prescribed limitation period. The Supreme Court observed that the issues raised in these petitions are identical to those in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Lahore v. Messrs Rippon Printing Press, where leave had already been granted. Consequently, the Court granted leave in the present cases and directed that these appeals be prepared on the existing record, with liberty to file additional documents, to be heard alongside the connected appeals.
Questions settled- What is the proper construction of Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
- Are petitions for leave to appeal filed after the dismissal of applications for certificates of appeal time-barred?
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Electro Cable1990 PTD 840 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comprised petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax against orders of the Lahore High Court deciding references under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 against the petitioner. The primary legal controversy across all cases concerned the proper interpretation of Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, specifically relating to the right of a firm to secure the renewal of its registration and the applicable period of limitation. The Supreme Court observed that the impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court relied on an earlier precedent in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Messrs Rippon Printing Press, in which leave to appeal had already been granted on identical questions. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in all the petitions on the same terms and conditions, directing that the appeals be prepared on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents and heard alongside the connected appeal arising out of the Rippon Printing Press case.
Questions settled- What is the proper interpretation of Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act 1922 regarding the right of a firm to obtain renewal of its registration?
- What period of limitation applies to a firm seeking renewal of registration under Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act 1922?
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kerala vs Morning Star Bus Service1990 PTD 998 · Kerala High Court · 1963-02-18Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujranwala Zone, Gujranwala vs Messrs Arshad Impex, Sialkot1990 PTD 680 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-03Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone, ---B---, Karachi vs Esso1990 PTD 787 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-08Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone `C' vs Messrs Muhammad1990 PTD 151 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This reference arose from an income tax dispute concerning the allowability of bad debts claimed by an assessee company for advances made to two industrial concerns that failed to commence operations. The Revenue contended these advances constituted capital expenditure, not deductible business expenses. The core legal question was whether the Revenue could re-agitate the nature of these expenditures after a prior remand order by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had already determined they were made in the course of the assessee's business. The Sindh High Court held that the Tribunal's earlier remand order, which explicitly rejected the characterization of these advances as capital expenditure, had attained finality as the Revenue failed to challenge it. Consequently, the Revenue was precluded from re-litigating the nature of the expenditure. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, ruling that the assessee was entitled to claim the advances as bad debts under the relevant statutory provisions, as the factual findings regarding the business nature of the advances and their irrecoverability were established. The principle of finality of unappealed findings in remand orders was upheld.
Questions settled- Can the Revenue re-agitate a finding regarding the nature of expenditure after a remand order has attained finality?
- Are advances made by a company to promote new industrial concerns deductible as bad debts under the Income-tax Act, 1922?
- Does an unappealed finding in a remand order by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal bind the Assessing Officer in subsequent proceedings?
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone vs Messrs Hilal Steel1990 PTD 570 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-11Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Karachi vs Messrs United Liner1990 PTD 829 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-19Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Amritsar vs Strawboard1990 PTD 71 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-04-28Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs T.K.Manicka Gounder1990 PTD 82 · Madras High Court · 1989-01-24Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Super Steel (Sales) Co.1990 PTD 375 · Calcutta High Court · 1988-12-21Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Shri Sat Parkash1990 PTD 1121 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1989-01-23Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd.1990 PTD 666 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-17Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Ruby Rubber Works Ltd. and 2 others1990 PTD 107 · Kerala High Court · 1989-04-06Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs P.K. Jhaveri1990 PTD 562 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-11-06Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs National Industrial Corporation1990 PTD 238 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-08-22Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Muhammad Bana1990 PTD 579 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-26Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Modi Industries Ltd.1990 PTD 1113 · Allahabad High Court · 1988-03-29Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Messrs Lever Brothers Pakistan Ltd.1990 PTD 385 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-15Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Messrs Bank of Tokyo Ltd.1990 PTD 406 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-15Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Mahatta Construction Co.1990 PTD 658 · Gauhati High Court · 1988-09-26Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Kuldip Industrial Corporation1990 PTD 239 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-09-26Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Kanda Rice Mills1990 PTD 379 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1990-02-01Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs K. Kesava Reddiar1990 PTD 368 · Kerala High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs India Sea Foods1990 PTD 1114 · Kerala High Court · 1989-01-25Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Eminent Enterprises1990 PTD 668 · Kerala High Court · 1989-01-28Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Dr. Sajjan Singh Malik1990 PTD 1127 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-10-06Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Cherupushpam Hospital Trust'1990 PTD 629 · Kerala High Court · 1989-09-19Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Bhatinda Chemicals and Banaspati1990 PTD 240 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-08-25Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Assam Cold Storage Co.1990 PTD 1117 · Gauhati High Court · 1988-09-23Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Ajoy Paper Mills Ltd.1990 PTD 992 · Calcutta High Court · 1989-04-18Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone, `A', Karachi vs Messrs1990 PTD 414 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-31Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone, Karachi vs Mir Khalilur1990 PTD 404 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-07Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone, Karachi vs Messrs Karachi1990 PTD 413 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-23Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone `A' vs Messrs Chemdyes1990 PTD 248 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This reference application under section 136(1) of the Income-tax Ordinance arises from a dispute regarding the disallowance of a provision for bonus made by the respondent assessee for the assessment year 1974-75. The core legal question is whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified under section 10(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act 1922 in allowing a deduction for bonus entered as a provision in the books of account of an assessee employing the mercantile system of accounting, without actual cash disbursement during the relevant accounting period. The Sindh High Court held that under the mercantile system of accounting, the term 'paid' as defined in section 10(5) of the Income-tax Act 1922 includes liabilities incurred according to the accounting method, meaning a provision for bonus is permissible for allowance even if not physically disbursed in that year, distinguishing it from cash-based accounting cases. The court answered the reconstituted question in the affirmative, upholding the Tribunal's decision.
Questions settled- Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in terms of section 10(2)(x) to give allowance of a provision made by the assessee for payment of bonus in its books of account without having paid it?
- Does the term 'paid' under section 10(5) of the Income-tax Act 1922 include amounts incurred according to the mercantile method of accounting?
- Does a provision for bonus qualify for tax exemption under section 10(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act 1922 when an assessee employs the mercantile accounting system?
- Commissioner of Income-Tax Calcutta vs Prahladrai Agarwala1990 PTD 67 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-04-26Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Zone vs Messrs Hilal Steel IndustriesPTCL 1990 CL. 917 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Gullat Shah vs The State1990 SCMR 564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition through jail seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and confirmed his conviction and death sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of three persons, along with a reference under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner fired at the three deceased persons, supported by eyewitness testimony. The defense claimed false implication due to enmity and suggested the murders were committed by dacoits. The High Court rejected the defense and confirmed the sentence, though it discarded the weapon recovery. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court considered discrepancies between the FIR, which alleged single shots, and the medical evidence showing numerous firearm injuries on the deceased, alongside unresolved questions regarding the motive and proven enmity. The Court held that these aspects required deeper examination and granted leave to appeal to consider whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Questions settled- Whether discrepancies between eyewitness accounts in the FIR and medical evidence regarding the number of firearm injuries warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
- Does an unproven defense version relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
- Whether failure of the High Court to give a finding on the alleged motive affects the sustainability of a conviction in a capital case?
- Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Karachi. vs M/s. United LinerPTCL 1990 CL. 989 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Of Income Tax vs Messrs Lever Brother Pakistan Limited.PTCL 1990 CL. 848 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-15Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Of Income Tax Central Zone 'A'. vs Messrs ChemdyesPTCL 1990 CL. 789 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Chief of Staff Pakistan Army through General Manager, Army Stud Farm1990 PLD Revenue 5 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1989-09-23Read full judgment →
- Chief Engineer Irrigation, Sargodha and others vs Muhammad Akram1990 PLC 804 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-07Read full judgment →
- Chief Administrator of Auoaf, Punjab vs Allah Ditta And Another1990 CLC 821 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition before the Lahore High Court arose from a suit filed by the respondents against the Chief Administrator of Auqaf and others seeking a declaration of exclusive ownership and possession of land taken over by the Auqaf Department as waqf property under the Auqaf (Federal Control) Act, 1976. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, and the lower appellate court affirmed the decision, holding that the civil court possessed jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts is expressly barred to question the taking over of property under the Auqaf (Federal Control) Act, 1976, where a special statutory remedy is provided. The High Court held that the scheme of the special legislation provides an exclusive procedure and remedy before the District Court and expressly bars the jurisdiction of civil courts. Consequently, the High Court accepted the petition, set aside the lower courts' judgments, and ordered the return of the plaint for presentation to the court of competent jurisdiction, establishing that ordinary civil courts lack jurisdiction over matters governed by the exclusive mechanisms of the Auqaf legislation.
Questions settled- Does the Auqaf (Federal Control) Act, 1976 bar the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts to challenge the notification and taking over of waqf properties?
- Is the remedy provided under section 11 of the Auqaf (Federal Control) Act, 1976 before the District Court exclusive or concurrent with ordinary civil suits?
- Can jurisdiction be conferred upon a civil court by the consent or submission of parties when such jurisdiction is expressly barred by a statute?
- What is the appropriate course of action for a civil court when it finds that its jurisdiction is ousted by a special statute?
- Chaudhry Construction Co. Ltd. vs Pakistan And Other1990 CLC 394 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition challenged an appellate court order that vacated a temporary injunction previously granted to the petitioner, a construction company. The petitioner sought to restrain the respondents from interfering with a construction contract that had been cancelled prior to the stipulated completion date. The core legal question was whether a court should grant an injunction to prevent an employer from revoking a building contract and re-entering the site, or whether the contractor's remedy is limited to a suit for damages. The Court held that a building or engineering contract constitutes a mere license to enter the site, which the employer may revoke at any time. Consequently, the Court ruled that an injunction cannot be issued to force an employer to continue a contract with a contractor they object to, as the court cannot enforce specific performance of such works. The key principle laid down is that in cases of wrongful termination of building contracts, the contractor's proper and exclusive remedy is a suit for damages, not an injunction.
Questions settled- Can a court grant an injunction to restrain an employer from cancelling a building contract and re-entering the site?
- Is a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 maintainable in respect of a contract?
- Does a building contract grant the contractor an irrevocable right to remain on the site until the contract period expires?
- What is the appropriate legal remedy for a contractor when a building contract is cancelled by the employer?
- Chaudhry Abdul Jabbar vs The State1990 MLD 1048 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-02-24Read full judgment →
- Chapal Builders vs Income-Tax Officer and another1990 PTD 62 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged an Income-tax Officer's order removing the petitioner's case from the Self-Assessment Scheme for the assessment year 1987-88. The Department had alleged concealment based on the petitioner's inconsistent accounting practices regarding plot purchase expenditures and electricity payments. The core legal question was whether the Department could summarily exclude an assessee from the Self-Assessment Scheme without a definitive, recorded finding of 'concealment' as required by the Scheme's provisions. The Court held that while the Department is entitled to seek explanations for accounting inconsistencies, the mere existence of discrepancies does not automatically constitute 'concealment' sufficient to trigger exclusion from the Scheme. The Court emphasized that 'concealment' requires a positive act of intentional suppression for fraudulent gain. Consequently, the impugned order was quashed for lacking the necessary prerequisite finding of concealment. The Court established that the Department must provide a proper hearing and record a clear finding of concealment before depriving an assessee of the benefits of the Self-Assessment Scheme, while affirming the Department's authority to scrutinize accounting practices.
Questions settled- Does the mere existence of accounting inconsistencies in a tax return constitute 'concealment' under the Self-Assessment Scheme?
- Is a formal, recorded finding of concealment a mandatory prerequisite for removing a case from the purview of the Self-Assessment Scheme?
- Can an assessee be deprived of the benefits of the Self-Assessment Scheme without being afforded a proper hearing regarding alleged accounting discrepancies?
- Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 to review an order removing a case from the Self-Assessment Scheme where no alternative remedy exists?
- Chapal Builders vs Income Tax Officer and anotherPTCL 1990 CL. 778 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-27Read full judgment →
- Chairman, P.M.D.C. and another vs Khiyal Nawaz Khattak1990 MLD 2203 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-06-20Read full judgment →
- Ch.Muhammad Azam and another vs Lal Din1990 PLD Azad J&K 12 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-12-17Read full judgment →
- Ch. Zafaryab vs Mian Bashir Ahmad, S.H.O._ Inspector, Police Station, Shalimar and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 896 · Lahore High Court · 1989-08-20Read full judgment →
- Ch. Nazir Ahmed vs Abdul Karim and anothers1990 PLD Supreme Court 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a pre-emption suit where the trial court initially allowed the plaintiff to extend the time for paying a deficient court-fee. Although the suit was decreed on merits, the first appellate court and the High Court subsequently rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., citing the plaintiff's alleged contumacy and lack of bona fides in filing a plaint with a nominal court-fee near the limitation deadline. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the trial court’s discretionary power under Section 148, C.P.C. was properly exercised. The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s discretion to extend time for payment of court-fee is valid unless the plaintiff is guilty of contumacy or positive mala fides. Finding that the plaintiff had applied for an extension before the expiry of the initial period due to genuine difficulties in obtaining revenue records, the Court ruled that no contumacy existed. Consequently, the Court set aside the rejection of the plaint, restoring the trial court's decree, and affirmed that compliance with court-fee orders validates the plaint from the date of its original filing.
Questions settled- Does the payment of deficient court-fee within an extended time period validate the plaint from the date of its original filing?
- Is the exercise of a trial court's discretion to extend time for payment of court-fee under Section 149, C.P.C. subject to interference by appellate courts in the absence of illegality or arbitrariness?
- Does the filing of a suit with a nominal court-fee near the expiry of the limitation period automatically constitute contumacy or mala fides justifying the rejection of the plaint?
- Ch. Nazir Ahmad And 11 Others vs Rana Abdul Hamid And 9 Other1990 CLC 385 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-02Read full judgment →
- Ch. Muhammad Rafeq Akhtar vs Superintendent, Central Jail, Faisalabad1990 P Cr. L J 2061 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-23Read full judgment →
- Ch. Muhammad Mushtaq Ahmad Cheema vs Government of the Punjab1990 SCMR 988 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a civil servant retired from service upon completing twenty-five years of service on June 5, 1980, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dated April 9, 1986, which dismissed his second constitutional challenge against his retirement order. In the first round of litigation, the petitioner's service appeal was dismissed by the Service Tribunal on December 13, 1982. After the lifting of Martial Law, the petitioner initiated a second round by filing a Constitution Petition in the High Court. The petitioner contended that the retirement order was a nullity as it was passed by an incompetent officer. The Supreme Court held that the ground of incompetence of the authority was available to the petitioner during the earlier proceedings and should have been raised before the Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution. Consequently, the final inter partes decision of the Service Tribunal precluded the revival of the controversy in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether an inter partes decision of the Service Tribunal precludes the revival of a retirement controversy in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Can a plea regarding the incompetence of the authority passing a retirement order be raised in a second round of litigation when it was available during the first round?
- Does a petition for leave to appeal lie against the dismissal of a second constitutional petition challenging a retirement order already adjudicated by the Service Tribunal?
- Ch. Muhammad Hussain and others vs Muhammad Jameel and others1990 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Settlement Authorities challenging an order of the High Court. The High Court had disposed of a writ petition filed by the respondents in a manner that granted them significant relief without formally accepting the petition or providing adequate justification. The Supreme Court examined the impugned order and observed that the method of disposal employed by the High Court appeared inconsistent with established judicial practice, particularly concerning matters of vital importance to the involved parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, converting the petition into an appeal. The Court directed that the appeal be prepared based on the existing record, with liberty granted to the parties to file any necessary additional documents. The matter was subsequently fixed for a full hearing to address the procedural irregularities and the substantive merits of the relief granted by the High Court, thereby ensuring that the disposal of the writ petition adhered to proper legal standards and judicial procedure.
Questions settled- Does the disposal of a writ petition without formally accepting it, while granting relief, constitute a valid judicial order?
- Is it procedurally correct for a High Court to grant major relief in a writ petition without providing justification?
- Ch. Muhammad Hussain and anothers vs Muhammad Ajmal and anothers1990 PLD Supreme Court 930 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court whereby a constitutional petition arising from a land settlement case relating to evacuee property was disposed of in limine with observations that granted substantive relief to the respondents. The core legal question was whether the High Court could summarily decide complicated questions of fact and law—such as the genuineness of a verification order and jurisdiction—without a proper judgment, formal decision, or adequate opportunity of hearing to the affected parties. The Supreme Court held that the impugned order of the High Court was not in accordance with normal judicial practice and could not be sustained. The Court laid down the principle that a High Court exercising writ jurisdiction should not determine complex and disputed questions of fact and law in a summary manner without proper adjudication and affording a due opportunity of hearing to all affected parties, thereby setting aside the impugned order and remanding the matter for a fresh decision.
Questions settled- Whether a High Court can decide complicated questions of fact and law in a summary manner when disposing of a constitutional petition?
- Is it proper for a court to give conclusive findings on the genuineness of a verification order without affording an opportunity of hearing to the affected parties?
- Can a writ petition be disposed of with observations granting substantive relief without a proper judgment and decision?
- Ch. Muhammad Aslam vs Assistant Commissioner, Saddar, Sialkot and 4 others1990 PLD Lahore 9 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, whereby the petitioner sought to declare the proceedings of a vote of no-confidence against him as Chairman of a Union Council illegal and without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether holding a no-confidence meeting after a slight delay due to the breakdown of the Presiding Officer's vehicle vitiates the proceedings, and whether provisions regarding time in such rules are mandatory or directory. The Lahore High Court held that statutory provisions specifying a time for the performance of a public duty or official act are generally directory rather than mandatory, provided no prejudice is caused. The Court ruled that time is not of the essence in convening such meetings, and if a meeting cannot start at the exact appointed hour due to unavoidable reasons, it may be convened within a reasonable time. The key principle laid down is that the non-compliance with procedural timeframes in public rules does not invalidate subsequent actions unless actual prejudice is shown, and a petitioner cannot take advantage of his own wrong by prematurely attempting to suspend a meeting.
Questions settled- Whether the failure to convene a no-confidence meeting at the exact appointed time vitiates the subsequent proceedings?
- Are the statutory provisions specifying a time for the performance of a public duty by an official to be construed as mandatory or directory?
- Does a chairman against whom a no-confidence motion is moved have the authority to suspend or postpone the meeting if the presiding officer is delayed?
- What constitutes a reasonable time for holding a meeting when the presiding officer is unavoidably delayed?