Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• The Monarch Company Inc. vs The Sevenup Company and another1989 SCMR 1199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-10
  trademark registrationleave to appealbona fide intention to useauthorized usertrademark disputeassignment of trademark
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the registration of the trademark "Bubble-Up." The petitioner, an assignee of Bubble-Up Inc. USA, sought registration of the trademark, which was initially allowed despite objections from the respondent, The Seven-Up Company. The High Court subsequently set aside this registration, concluding that the petitioner lacked bona fide intention to use the mark and that there was no prior user by the petitioner or its authorized user, The Pakistan Beverages Limited. The High Court based this conclusion on the assumption that the agreement between the petitioner and the Pakistani company dated to 1966, while the authorized use began in 1984. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining it necessary to examine whether the High Court erred in its factual assumptions regarding the date of the agreement and the subsequent implications for the user of the trademark. The Court also identified the need to review whether the petitioner had demonstrated a bona fide intention to use the mark in the future.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court erred in its factual assumption regarding the date of the agreement between the petitioner and the authorized user?
  • Does the lack of prior use of a trademark by an applicant or its authorized user preclude the registration of said trademark?
  • What constitutes sufficient evidence of a bona fide intention to use a trademark in the future for registration purposes?
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• The Land Acquisition Collector, Abbottabad and anothers vs Muhammad Zubair Khan and 3 others1989 PLD Peshawar 64 · Peshawar High Court · 1988-11-27Read full judgment →
• The Grindlays Bank Limited vs Rai Abdul Razzaque Khan and others1989 SCMR 661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-03
  industrial disputedemotionpermission to alter terms of employmentinfructuous appealLabour Courtconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal filed by The Grindlays Bank Limited against the dismissal of its constitutional petition and subsequent Intra-Court Appeal by the High Court, which had upheld the Labour Court's refusal to grant permission under section 47(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, to implement a demotion order against a union president. The core legal question concerned the scope and ambit of subsection (2) of section 47 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the interim orders passed by the Labour Court and upheld by the High Court enured only till the conclusion of the proceedings involving the industrial dispute. Since the industrial dispute had already been resolved, the impugned interim order lapsed, rendering the appeal infructuous. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as infructuous with no order as to costs, establishing that interim permissions or refusals under section 47(2) lose efficacy upon the resolution of the underlying industrial dispute.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope and ambit of subsection (2) of section 47 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does an interim order refusing permission under section 47(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, lapse upon the resolution of the main industrial dispute?
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• The Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore vs Mst. Farkhanda Akhtar and others1989 SCMR 1589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-24
  evacuee trust propertyremand proceedingsdeletion of partiespermanent transfer deedlimitation periodsettlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which accepted a constitutional petition filed by the respondents against an order of the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board. The core legal dispute involved whether transferees of certain properties whose names were expressly deleted from proceedings upon the petitioner's own request during earlier settlement appeals could subsequently be re-impleaded as parties in remand proceedings, and whether the Chairman could stay the issuance of Permanent Transfer Deeds by the Settlement Department. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner itself had invited the court to drop the respondents as parties from the proceedings, the remand proceedings were strictly governed by the final remand order, and the respondents could not be re-impleaded. The Court further noted that the petition was improperly constituted as dead respondents were not substituted by legal representatives. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party that requested the deletion of respondents from proceedings subsequently have them re-impleaded in remand proceedings?
  • Does a remand order that is not challenged before a higher forum attain finality binding the parties?
  • Whether the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board can direct the Settlement Department to stay the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
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• The Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Lahore and another1989 PLC 709 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• The Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways and another vs Maqbool Ahmed1989 PLC 713 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• The Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways and another vs Hakim1989 PLC 707 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• The Divisional Superintendent of Railways, Pakistan Railways, Divisional Office, Lahore vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and 2 others1989 PLC (C.S.) 604 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-15Read full judgment →
• The Directorgeneral (Field), Agricultural Department, Lahore and another vs Haji Abdul Rehman1989 SCMR 1224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-09
  service lawdouble jeopardytermination of servicedisciplinary proceedingswilful absenceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had set aside the termination of the respondent's services. The respondent, an Assistant in the Office of the Director, Soil Conservation, Punjab, had his services terminated twice for the same charge of wilful absence from duty. After the first termination was set aside by the Director and the period of absence treated as leave without pay, the respondent was terminated again on the same charges in 1982. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that the second termination order was unlawful and void ab initio, reasoning that an employee cannot be vexed twice for the same charge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, upon hearing the petitioners, found no merit in the petition and dismissed it. The Court affirmed the principle that an employee cannot be subjected to disciplinary proceedings or termination twice for the same alleged misconduct once that matter has been previously adjudicated and resolved by the competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee be terminated twice for the same charge of wilful absence from duty?
  • Is a second termination order based on the same charges for which a previous termination was set aside considered void ab initio?
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• The Director of Education (Schools), N.W.F.P.Peshawar and another vs Ghulam Murtaza1989 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-14
  service lawdismissal from servicedepartmental inquirydisciplinary actionSummary Military Courtgovernment servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which set aside the dismissal of the respondent from government service. The respondent had been convicted by a Summary Military Court, leading to his initial dismissal. Although Martial Law authorities subsequently reduced the sentence and withdrew the dismissal order, the employer department initiated independent departmental action, dismissing the respondent under Rule 8 of the N.-W.F.P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, without conducting a formal inquiry. The Service Tribunal held that a formal inquiry process was mandatory despite the prior conviction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether Rule 8 of the N.-W.F.P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, permits dismissal from service based on a conviction without following the procedure of a detailed inquiry. The Court directed that the appeal be prepared on the existing record and heard alongside related matters to determine the scope of departmental disciplinary procedures following criminal convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 8 of the N.-W.F.P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, permit the dismissal of a government servant based on a conviction without conducting a formal inquiry?
  • Is a formal departmental inquiry mandatory before dismissing a government servant who has been convicted by a Summary Military Court?
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• The Deputy Inspectorgeneral of Police and anothers vs Muhammad1989 SCMR 852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-24
  service lawpolice disciplinecorruptiondepartmental inquiryremandefficiency and discipline rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which had set aside the dismissal of a police constable. The respondent had been dismissed for corruption following proceedings under Rule 6(3) of the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, rather than the regular inquiry procedure under Rule 6(4). The core legal question was whether the Tribunal's observations rendered Rule 6(3) redundant in corruption cases. The Supreme Court held that Rule 6(3) is not rendered redundant by Rule 6(4), as the application of either rule depends on the specific circumstances of each case. While the Court agreed with the Tribunal that the specific facts of this case warranted proceedings under Rule 6(4) due to the respondent's attempt to return the bribe and the partiality of the local D.S.P., it held that the Tribunal erred by not remanding the case for fresh proceedings. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the matter for further proceedings in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 6(4) of the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975 render Rule 6(3) redundant in corruption cases?
  • Is the application of Rule 6(3) or Rule 6(4) of the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975 dependent on the circumstances of each case?
  • Should a Service Tribunal remand a case for fresh proceedings when it determines that the initial disciplinary procedure was inappropriate?
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• The Controller of Estate Duty vs Abdul Jalil1989 PTD 475 · Sindh High Court · 1989-01-11Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Of Sales Tax. vs Shafiq Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd (M_S.)PTCL1989 CL. 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales taxraw materialexempted goodsfinished goodstaxable eventelectric fansmanufacturing licence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the High Court concerning the taxability of raw material used in the manufacture of electric fans after the finished goods were exempted from sales tax. The core legal question was whether sales tax could be retrospectively or additionally imposed on raw material incorporated into finished goods when the finished goods themselves were exempted from sales tax by notification under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The Supreme Court held that once raw material has been assimilated into finished goods and the finished goods are granted wholesale exemption under section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, the raw material loses its separate identity and cannot be subjected to sales tax in the absence of a specific taxable event or statutory provision making such assimilation taxable at the relevant time. The key principle laid down is that there is a distinction between the general levy of tax and the actual payability controlled by specific taxable events, and exempting an end-product removes it from the purview of the Act, precluding taxation of its constituent raw materials unless expressly permitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sales tax can be imposed on raw material incorporated into finished goods when the finished goods are exempted from sales tax by notification?
  • Does the assimilation of raw material into a finished product constitute a taxable event under the Sales Tax Act, 1951 without an express statutory provision?
  • What is the effect of an unconditional exemption granted to an end-product under section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 on its constituent raw materials?
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• The Commissioner of Incometax, West Zone, Karachi and anothers vs Messrs Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. and others1989 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-25
  income taxrevenue expenditurecapital expenditureinterest on unpaid purchase pricebusiness deductionindustrial concern
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from conflicting judgments of the High Court of Sind regarding whether interest paid by the purchaser of an industrial concern to the vendor on the unpaid purchase price constitutes a capital expenditure or a revenue expenditure allowable under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act. The core legal question was whether such interest payments on deferred purchase money could be deemed expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. The Supreme Court held that where the acquisition has taken place and the interest payments are closely related to the carrying on and conduct of the business as an integral part of the profit-earning process—rather than being for the initial acquisition of a capital asset of a permanent character—such interest qualifies as a deductible revenue expenditure. The key principle laid down is that subsequent interest paid on an unpaid balance of purchase price, where the business is already being operated by the assessee, is an allowable business expense under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amount of interest paid by the purchaser of an industrial concern to the vendor on the unpaid price is capital expenditure or an amount allowable under section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act?
  • Whether interest paid on unpaid instalments of a purchase price can be regarded as an integral part of the profit-earning process and thus allowable as revenue expenditure?
  • Whether the failure to pay interest resulting in the enforcement of a vendor's lien bears upon the characterization of the interest as a business expense?
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• The Commissioner of Income-Tax,Central Zone 'A' vs Chemdyes1989 PTD 763 · Sindh High Court · 1988-10-13Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Zone, Karachi and anotherPAKIST_e43278631989 PTD 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-25
  revenue expenditurecapital expenditureunpaid purchase priceinterest on unpaid balanceindustrial concernbusiness deductionincome-tax
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated civil appeals address whether interest paid by the purchaser of an industrial concern on the unpaid balance of the purchase price constitutes capital expenditure or allowable revenue expenditure under section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act as an expense laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. The Supreme Court examined cases where industrial concerns were acquired with a portion of the purchase price left unpaid and carrying stipulated interest, secured by a vendor's lien or operational agreements. The Court held that where the acquisition has already taken place and the business is actively being carried on, the subsequent payment of interest on the unpaid purchase price is not an expenditure for the acquisition of an asset or a right of a permanent character, but is an integral part of the profit-earning process related to the conduct of the business. Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that such interest payments qualify as allowable revenue expenditure under section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act, dismissing the appeals of the revenue and allowing the appeals of the assessees.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amount of interest paid by the purchaser of an industrial concern to the vendor on the unpaid purchase price is capital expenditure or an amount allowable under section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act as an expenditure laid down or spent wholly or exclusively for the purpose of business?
  • Whether the outstanding balance of purchase price payable to a vendor can be regarded as capital borrowed within the meaning of section 10(2)(iii) of the Income-tax Act?
  • Whether interest paid on the unpaid portion of the purchase price of a running business is an integral part of the profit-earning process and thus deductible as revenue expenditure?
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• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi vs Mian1989 PTD 525 · Lahore High Court
  tax referenceredemption value of preference sharesdividend incomemaintainability of referencecertified copy of orderincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Lahore High Court addresses four connected tax references filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, regarding the assessment year 1962-63. The core legal question before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal pertained to whether the redemption value of preference shares constitutes dividend income under Section 2(6-A)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, and whether it is taxable in the hands of the assessee. However, during the hearing, the respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the references, pointing out that mandatory certified copies of the Tribunal's orders had not been filed along with the reference applications, as required by Section 66(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, as amended by Finance Ordinance No. XIV of 1971, nor was any application made to dispense with such requirement. The Court upheld the preliminary objection, holding that the tax references were incompetently instituted and not maintainable. Consequently, all four tax references were dismissed with parties bearing their own costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the redemption value of preference shares is a dividend income within the meaning of Section 2(6-A)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Whether filing a certified copy of the order of the Tribunal is a mandatory requirement for the competence of a tax reference under Section 66(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • What is the effect of failing to file certified copies of the Tribunal's orders or an application for dispensing with the same along with a tax reference application?
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• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore vs Gulzar1989 PTD 1008 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-20Read full judgment →
• Wazir and 2 others vs The State1989 P Cr. L J 2419 · Sindh High Court · 1988-09-27Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Karachi vs Arshad Javed1989 PTD 226 · Sindh High Court · 1988-12-01Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central, Karachi vs Atlas1989 PTD 1248 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-16Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone, Lahore vs Umreen1989 PTD 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-08
  capital gainsbonus sharesincome taxleave to appealcost of acquisitiontax computation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves 29 petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Zone, Lahore, against the judgment of the Lahore High Court. The petitions were initially barred by time, but the Supreme Court condoned the delay due to the significant public importance of the legal question involved. The core legal question concerns the method for computing capital gains, specifically whether the cost of bonus shares should be calculated based on their face value. The High Court had previously answered this in the negative, relying on its earlier decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Umar Saigol. The petitioner contended that this view was erroneous, citing an Indian Supreme Court precedent suggesting that the cost of original shares should be spread over both the original and bonus shares to determine an average price. Finding that the question requires further examination and authoritative settlement, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, directing the parties to prepare the appeals for hearing and to provide information regarding the status of any appeals filed against the cited precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Is the face value of bonus shares the correct basis for computing capital gains?
  • Should the cost of original shares be spread over both original and bonus shares to determine the average price for capital gains computation?
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• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone, Karachi vs Mushtaq1989 PTD 1 · Sindh High Court · 1988-09-22Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone, Karachi vs Eruch1989 PTD 1020 · Sindh High Court · 1989-04-03Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone vs S. M. Idris1989 PTD 1245 · Sindh High Court · 1988-12-14Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone Ia, Karachi vs Allied1989 PTD 735 · Sindh High Court · 1988-12-06Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone 'C', Karachi vs M.1989 PTD 52 · Sindh High Court · 1988-09-19Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Osman Textile Mills Ltd.1989 PTD 1088 · Sindh High Court · 1988-08-15Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Kohinoor Trading Company, Sialkot1989 PTD 1047 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-10Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Of Income Tax vs Messrs Quality Steel Works Ltd.PTCL1989 CL. 57 · Sindh High Court · 1987-09-09Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal1989 PTD 1240 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-06Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs Habib Insurance Co. Ltd.1989 PTD 1247 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-18Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs vs Messrs Kuku Limited and others1989 SCMR 1853 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-04
  customs dutyexemption notificationretrospective amendmentclerical errormisnomerpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Collector of Customs against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the customs authorities' demand for duty from M/s Kuku Limited. The respondent imported machinery in 1975 and obtained a 50% customs duty exemption pursuant to a Federal Government notification issued under the Customs Act, 1969, as the factory was installed in Tehsil Ferozewala. Subsequently, the notification was amended retrospectively to substitute 'Tehsil of Shandara' with 'Tehsil of Ferozewala' in the list of excluded areas, prompting the revenue authorities to demand repayment of the rebate and initiate recovery proceedings. The core legal question is whether the subsequent amendment substituting the Tehsil name constituted a permissible correction of a clerical/misnomer error reflecting the true legislative intent or an impermissible retrospective substantive amendment affecting vested rights. The Supreme Court held that the contention raised by the Deputy Attorney-General regarding the interpretation and correction of the notification needs further consideration, and granted leave to appeal. The key principle established is that modification of language and substitution of words to meet the true intention of the law-maker may be permissible where a misnomer or clerical error occurs in administrative notifications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the retrospective substitution of the name of a Tehsil in an exemption notification constitutes a mere correction of a clerical error or misnomer?
  • Can a statutory exemption notification be interpreted by substituting words to meet the true intention of the law-maker?
  • Whether recovery proceedings initiated on the basis of a retrospective amendment to a customs notification are lawful?
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• The Chief Administrator, Auqaf vs Abdul Nabi through his Legal Heirs and- others1989 PLD Supreme Court 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-05
  waqf-alal-auladauqaf propertiesres judicatajurisdiction of civil courtland reforms regulationletters patent appealmutawallibeneficiaries
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by right arises from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, which had set aside the notification issued by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf under section 6 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959, taking over certain agricultural and urban properties. The core legal questions involved whether the respondents were beneficiaries under a 1916 waqf-alal-aulad deed, whether previous civil litigation operated as res judicata, whether determinations by Land Reforms Authorities under Martial Law Regulation 64 ousted civil court jurisdiction, and whether a Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable against a single bench decision under the Waqf Properties Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the respondents qualified as beneficiaries under the proper construction of the 1916 deed, that the prior suit did not bar the current proceedings since a new factual situation and cause of action arose upon the extinction of intermediate lines of succession, that the Land Commission lacked exclusive jurisdiction to conclusively determine civil title or personal status, and that a Letters Patent Appeal is competent as an internal review mechanism of the High Court. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior civil court judgment regarding a waqf deed operate as res judicata when a completely new factual situation and cause of action arise due to the subsequent extinction of an intermediate line of succession?
  • Are determinations made by Land Reforms Authorities under Martial Law Regulation 64 regarding personal status, inheritance, or the true construction of a waqf deed final and binding so as to oust the jurisdiction of civil courts?
  • Whether a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against the decision of a learned Single Judge given under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961?
  • How should the expression 'if ultimately, in the end, there be no issue from my loin' in a waqf-alal-aulad deed be construed regarding ultimate dedication to charity?
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• The Chief Administrator Auqaf vs Pir Aftab Hussain and another1989 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08
  limitationcondonation of delayWaqf propertynegligence of counselleave to appealfirst appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's first appeal by the High Court against an original order of the District Court determining the character of the suit property as to whether it was Waqf property. The appeal before the High Court was dismissed as being time-barred. The core legal question was whether the delay in filing the appeal ought to have been condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 on the ground that the papers were handed over to counsel in time and that the counsel was negligent or allegedly collusive with the opposite party. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent factual findings and the appreciation of facts by the High Court regarding the limitation issue were unexceptionable, and there was no ground to differ. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming that negligence or alleged collusion of counsel does not automatically warrant condonation of delay when properly evaluated and rejected on facts by the lower appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the negligence of a counsel in filing an appeal within time constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted against the dismissal of a first appeal on the ground of limitation when the lower court's appreciation of facts is found to be unexceptionable?
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• The Chairman, Federal Land Commission, Islamabad and anothers vs Akhtar Abbas1989 PLD Supreme Court 550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-30
  land reformsexisting ownerproduce index unitssurplus landresumption of landsuo motu revisionrepeal and saving
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had set aside an order of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission. The respondent's land holding was scrutinized under the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 (M.L.R. 115), where it was discovered that he had acquired land via an oral Tamleek in 1968, bringing his total holding beyond the ceiling of 500 irrigated acres prescribed under Paragraph 8 of the Land Reforms Regulation 1959 (M.L.R. 64). The core legal questions were whether the concession under Paragraph 9(a) of the 1959 Regulation (allowing retention up to 36,000 PIUs) was available to an owner whose holding exceeded the ceiling after the enforcement of the Regulation, and whether the Federal Land Commission had jurisdiction under Paragraph 29 of the 1972 Regulation to enforce liabilities incurred under the 1959 Regulation. The Supreme Court held that the concession under Paragraph 9(a) was restricted to 'existing owners' whose holdings exceeded the ceiling at the inception of the 1959 Regulation, not to subsequent acquisitions. Furthermore, Paragraph 32 of the 1972 Regulation preserved obligations and liabilities incurred under the 1959 Regulation, allowing the authorities to enforce them. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the concession to retain additional land up to 36,000 Produce Index Units under Paragraph 9(a) of the Land Reforms Regulation 1959 is available to owners whose holdings exceeded the prescribed ceiling after the enforcement of the Regulation?
  • Does Paragraph 32 of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 empower the Land Commission authorities to enforce liabilities and obligations incurred under the repealed Land Reforms Regulation 1959?
  • Does the vesting and resumption of excess land under Paragraph 16 of the Land Reforms Regulation 1959 occur automatically by operation of law upon the ceiling being exceeded, or does it require an adjudicatory order?
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• Thal Development Authority vs Maula Bakhsh through L.Rs, and others1989 SCMR 2021 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-12
  leave to appealland sale cancellationThal Development Authoritycivil revisionwrit petitioncontractual conditions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal arising from separate judgments of the Lahore High Court concerning the cancellation of land sales by the Thal Development Authority. In the first instance, the respondent successfully obtained a decree against the Authority regarding the cancellation of a land sale due to alleged contravention of conditions, including non-payment, which was upheld by the High Court in civil revision. In the second instance, the petitioners challenged the departmental cancellation of their land sale, but their writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that both petitions shared common legal features and that the conflicting outcomes in the High Court required reconciliation. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both cases to determine whether the Authority's actions were legally justified. The Court directed that the appeals be prepared on the existing record, allowed for the filing of additional documents, and ordered the continuation of an existing stay order in one of the petitions pending final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when two High Court judgments on similar facts reach conflicting conclusions?
  • Can the Supreme Court consolidate petitions for leave to appeal that arise from similar circumstances involving the same statutory authority?
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• Thakur Inder Singh And 2 Others vs The Senior Member, Federal Land1989 MLD 509 · Sindh High Court · 1988-12-19Read full judgment →
• Tej Bhan Madan vs Iind Additional District Judge And Other1989 MLD 1845 · Supreme Court of India · 1988-05-09Read full judgment →
• Tehsin Miran Gillani and another vs Chairman, Central Board of Revenue,Government of Pakistan1989 PLC (C.S.) 558 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-30Read full judgment →
• Tehsin Miran Gillani And Another vs Chairman, Central Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan1989 CLC 1596 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-30Read full judgment →
• Tax Commissioner Of Income Tax, Kanpur. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Kanpur. vs Saran Engineering Co. Ltd., M_S. British India Corporation LtdPTCL 1989 FC. 91 · Supreme Court of IndiaRead full judgment →
• Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. vs Union of India And Other1989 MLD 3173 · Supreme Court of India · 1988-05-06Read full judgment →
• Tasleem Ahmad Alias Pappu vs The State1989 MLD 2922 · Lahore High Court · 1989-03-29Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs The State1989 P Cr. L J 1740 · Lahore High Court · 1989-03-13Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mahmood vs Water and Power Development Authority through its Chairman1989 SCMR 1842 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-02
  service tribunaldisciplinary proceedingsremoval from servicedismissalnon-reading of evidenceleave to appealWAPDA employees
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions directed against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal concerning the disciplinary proceedings and subsequent dismissal, modified to removal from service, of a Line Superintendent in WAPDA. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal failed to consider material documentary evidence on record, specifically a report by the Executive Engineer supporting the employee's contention. The Supreme Court held that there was force in the contention that the Tribunal overlooked relevant evidence, and consequently granted leave to appeal to both parties. The key principle laid down is that overlooking or failing to read material evidence on record by an adjudicatory tribunal warrants the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal's order suffers from non-reading of evidence when material documents on record are overlooked?
  • Can the competent authority enhance a penalty under Rule 12 of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978?
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• Tariq Latif Sheikh and 7 others vs President, Cantonment Board, Multan and 2 others1989 SCMR 2019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-07
  leave to appealinterim orderno-confidence motionCantonment Boardnecessary partieswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The eight elected Members of the Multan Cantonment Board sought leave to appeal against an interim order passed by the Lahore High Court, which stayed proceedings regarding a no-confidence motion moved against the respondent. The core legal question concerned the propriety of interfering with an interim regulatory order of short duration passed without impleading necessary parties, which allegedly created a stalemate in the Cantonment Board. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that leave to appeal should not be granted at this interim stage, as the order was capable of rectification or modification upon proper application and hearing before the High Court. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will generally decline to interfere with short-duration interim orders of the High Court, expecting parties to seek modification or speedy adjudication before the High Court rather than invoking apex court jurisdiction prematurely.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against an interim regulatory order of short duration passed by the High Court?
  • Can an interim stay order passed by the High Court be modified or rectified upon an application by the affected parties?
  • Is it appropriate to approach the Supreme Court against an interim order without first seeking adjudication and modification in the High Court?
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• Tariq Butt vs Javaid Paul and others1989 SCMR 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-31
  landlord and tenantrent restrictionevictionrent noteestoppelbona fide conductdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a tenant's challenge to an eviction order passed under the Rent Restriction Law, which was upheld by the High Court. The primary legal question was whether the petitioner could deny the landlord-tenant relationship based on a dispute regarding the landlord's ownership of the property, particularly when a rent note had been executed. The Supreme Court held that the execution of a rent note by the tenant in favour of the respondent landlord established the relationship, regardless of the timing of the registered sale deed's registration versus its execution. The Court determined that the tenant could not successfully deny this relationship or rely on the pendency of litigation between the landlord and third parties to avoid eviction. Furthermore, the Court found the tenant's conduct lacked bona fides because he denied sending rent to the landlord, thereby disentitling him to discretionary relief. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently refused, affirming that a tenant who has executed a rent note is estopped from denying the landlord's status in eviction proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant deny the relationship of landlord and tenant after having executed a rent note in favour of the landlord?
  • Does the pendency of litigation regarding the ownership of a property between a landlord and a third party allow a tenant to deny the landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Is a tenant entitled to discretionary relief in eviction proceedings if their conduct regarding the payment of rent is found to be lacking in bona fides?
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• Tariq Bokhara of Pakistan vs Union Bank OF'the Middle East Ltd..1989 MLD 2016 · Sindh High Court · 1988-08-30Read full judgment →
• Tariq And 2 Others vs The State1989 MLD 2634 (2) · Federal Shariat Court · 1988-12-06Read full judgment →
• Tario Mahmood vs The State1989 P Cr. L J 286(1) · Lahore High Court · 1988-10-16Read full judgment →
• Tanvirul Haq vs The StateK.L.R 1989 Criminal Cases 188 · Lahore High Court · 1989-01-18Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Textile Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central1989 PTD 1137 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-03Read full judgment →
• Talizar Khan vs Khalil-Ur-Rehman and others1989 PLD Peshawar 262 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-06-24Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain vs The StateK.L.R.1989 Criminal Cases 358 · Lahore High Court · 1988-11-07Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain vs The Commissioner, Rawalpindi and another1989 SCMR 751 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-10
  leave to appealinquiry procedurecompetent officerimposition of penaltyservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal challenging the legality of an inquiry process and the subsequent imposition of a penalty. The petitioner, Talib Hussain, contended that the inquiry was conducted by an officer lacking the requisite competence and that the penalty imposed was not in accordance with the law. Upon preliminary consideration of these contentions, the Court determined that the issues raised required a deeper examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the procedural requirements for the inquiry were satisfied and whether the penalty was legally sustainable. The Court directed that the appeal be prepared based on the existing record, while granting the parties liberty to file additional documents within a period of two months to facilitate a comprehensive review of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Does an inquiry conducted by an officer lacking competence invalidate the resulting penalty?
  • Is a penalty imposed without adherence to legal requirements sustainable in law?
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• Talib Hussain vs Badar Ul Salam And Another1989 CLC 1099 · Lahore High Court · 1989-03-20Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain Alias Goga vs The State1989 MLD 2842 · Lahore High Court · 1988-11-07Read full judgment →
• Taleh Muhammad Khan vs Bahadur Ali Khan and 15 others1989 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 38 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-01-09Read full judgment →
• Talea Bibi And Others vs Mst. Saleem Akhtar And Other1989 MLD 929 · Lahore High Court · 1988-12-07Read full judgment →
• Tajammal Hussain vs The State1989 PLD Supreme Court 747 · Shariat Appellate Bench · 1989-07-03Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad vs The State1989 PLD Peshawar 137 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-01-24Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad vs Superintendent of Police, Sahiwal and another1989 PLC (C.S.) 284 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1986-05-03Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad vs National Bank of Pakistan1989 SCMR 1260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-13
  ex parte decreepecuniary jurisdictionremand of casecivil appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent filed a recovery suit against the petitioner in the Court of Civil Judge at Gujranwala, which was decreed ex parte. The petitioner's application to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed by the trial court, but on appeal, the Additional District Judge remanded the matter. After procedural transfers, the Additional District Judge dismissed the application while modifying the decree terms. The High Court accepted the respondent's subsequent appeal, holding that the Additional District Judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the application, which could only be disposed of by the Civil Judge. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerned the competence of an Additional District Judge with unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction to try a suit falling within the competence of a Civil Judge. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the jurisdictional competency of the Additional District Judge, laying down principles regarding the distribution and exercise of judicial powers among subordinate civil courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Additional District Judge enjoying unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction is competent to try a suit or application which fell within the competence of a Civil Judge?
  • Does an appellate court have the authority to remand a case for a fresh decision on an application for setting aside an ex parte decree?
  • What is the effect of amendments made in Ordinance XIX of 1979 by Ordinance II of 1983 on the jurisdiction of trial courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad vs Muhammad Hussain And 4 Other1989 MLD 3206 · Lahore High Court · 1989-03-21Read full judgment →
• Taj Malook vs E.A.C.I, Swat and 3 others1989 PLD Peshawar 86 · Peshawar High Court · 1988-12-06Read full judgment →
• Taj Din vs Zafar Iqbal Shah, S.H.O. And Another1989 MLD 4788(1) · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-02Read full judgment →
• Taj Din vs Mst. Kalsoom Bibi1989 SCMR 1229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-13
  leave to appealspecific performancecivil revisionnew pleaauction land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld a decree for specific performance in favor of the respondent concerning land purchased in auction from the Provincial Government. The core legal question centered on whether the decree for specific performance was warranted given the contentions regarding the nature of the relief claimed and alleged default by the respondent. The Supreme Court held that points not urged before the High Court cannot be entertained for the first time in the apex court, and accordingly refused leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will generally decline to entertain contentions and points that were not pressed or raised before the lower appellate or High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise new contentions before the Supreme Court that were not urged before the High Court?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against a concurrent decree for specific performance when the points raised were not pressed below?
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• Taj Din And Others vs Zillah Council And 2 Other1989 MLD 270 · Lahore High Court · 1987-05-10Read full judgment →
• Taj Din And Others vs Muhammad Ramzan And Other1989 MLD 234 · Lahore High Court · 1989-01-22Read full judgment →
• Wazir Khan vs The StateK.L.R. 1989 Criminal Cases 411 · Lahore High Court · 1989-01-31Read full judgment →
• Taj Din and Other vs Babu Shah DinK.L.R 1989 Revenue Cases 151 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-13Read full judgment →
• Tahir Sultan and 9 others vs Government of the Punjab and another1989 SCMR 1058 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-21
  ad hoc appointmentcivil servant removalsubjective satisfactionpublic interestmala fideservice tribunalregularization
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, ad hoc appointees in the Labour Department, challenged their removal from service ordered by the Governor of Punjab under Section 11-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, as amended by the Civil Servants (Amendment) Ordinance, 1978. The Punjab Service Tribunal had previously upheld their removal, finding their initial appointments were irregular, lacked Public Service Commission approval, and were secured through political pressure. The Supreme Court examined whether the Governor's power under the amended Section 11-A was validly exercised. The Court held that the power of removal under Section 11-A is broad, exercisable without impediment regarding terms and conditions, and is subject only to the temporal condition that the appointment occurred between January 1, 1972, and July 5, 1977. The Court affirmed that such removal is based on the subjective satisfaction of the Governor and, in the absence of proven mala fides, is presumed to be in the public interest, even if not explicitly stated in the notification. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Governor's power to remove civil servants under Section 11-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974 subject to the requirement of explicit mention of 'public interest' in the removal notification?
  • Does the burden of proving mala fide exercise of power in the removal of a civil servant lie with the petitioner?
  • Are appointments made between January 1, 1972, and July 5, 1977, subject to the removal powers granted under the Civil Servants (Amendment) Ordinance 1978?
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• Tahir Rashid vs The State1989 P Cr. L J 1741 · Lahore High Court · 1989-03-28Read full judgment →
• Tahir Naveed and others vs Qasim Rasool and others1989 SCMR 1951 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-16
  leave to appealejectmentagreement of salelandlord and tenant relationshipnotice under Section 13-Adefault in payment of rentPunjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the Lahore High Court passed in its constitutional jurisdiction, which set aside an eviction order upheld by the Additional District Judge. The petitioners entered into an agreement to sell with the original owner of a property occupied by the contesting tenants and issued notices under Section 13-A of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance requiring payment of rent prior to the execution of the registered sale-deed. Following non-payment, the Rent Controller and the appellate authority ordered eviction on default. The High Court set aside the eviction, holding that notices issued before the execution of the registered sale-deed did not satisfy Section 13-A, precluding default. The petitioners contended that under the agreement to sell they became 'landlords' under Section 2(c) entitled to rent, making the tenants defaulters upon failure to pay after notice. The Supreme Court found that the contention required detailed examination and granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a purchaser under an agreement to sell qualify as a 'landlord' under Section 2(c) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance entitled to receive rent prior to the execution of a registered sale deed?
  • Is a notice under Section 13-A of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance legally valid and effective if issued after the execution of an agreement to sell but prior to the registration of the sale deed?
  • Can a tenant be held to be in default of payment of rent if notice of transfer is served prior to the formal execution of a registered sale-deed and no subsequent notice is issued?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Khan vs Ghulam Hussain1989 MLD 4178 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-03Read full judgment →
• Tahir Ahmad Khan vs Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department1989 PLC 937 · Labour Court · 1989-01-19Read full judgment →
• Taher Ali and 2 others vs Messrs SH. Miran Bux, Karam Bux and another1989 SCMR 403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-14
  evictiondefault in payment of rentlump sum rentrent controllerleave to appealtenancy agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from the judgment of the Sind High Court, which upheld the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller dismissing the petitioners' eviction application against the respondents. The core legal question was whether the respondents committed a wilful default in the payment of rent so as to warrant their eviction from the demised premises. The Supreme Court held that no ground for interference was made out, affirming the factual findings of the lower forums that it was the established practice of the landlords to collect rent in a lump sum annually, and that the tenants had deposited the rent in court upon apprehending avoidance by the landlords. The key principle laid down is that where a landlord habitually accepts rent in a lump sum on an annual basis pursuant to the course of conduct and tenancy terms, a sudden eviction action instituted without prior demand or bill presentation does not constitute a wilful default by the tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the habitual collection of rent in a lump sum annually precludes a landlord from claiming wilful default without prior notice or bill presentation?
  • Can a tenant deposit rent in court upon reasonable apprehension that the landlord is avoiding collection to create a ground for eviction?
  • Does a concurrent finding of fact regarding a settled practice of rent payment warrant interference by the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Tabassum Sultana vs I.M.T. Associated Tractors Ltd., Lahore1989 PLC 501 · Labour Court · 1988-12-22Read full judgment →
• Tabassum Jamil vs The State1989 P Cr. L J 237 · Sindh High Court · 1988-03-07Read full judgment →
• Tabassum Jamil vs The State1989 SCMR 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-12
  criminal petitionbail refusalmurderfirearm attributionocular evidencesupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court of Sind, which upheld the refusal of pre-trial bail to the petitioner by the Sessions Judge. The petitioner is charged with offenses under sections 302, 307, and 380/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for allegedly participating in a double murder and theft alongside a co-accused. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the existence of a prompt First Information Report, specific ocular testimony, direct attribution of firearm use, and supporting weapon recoveries. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly evaluated the material on record, noting the presence of direct charges, independent eyewitnesses, and a lack of established mala fides or false implication. Consequently, the Court affirmed the refusal of bail and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, laying down that where prima facie sufficient incriminating evidence exists connecting an accused to a capital charge, bail ought not to be granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail when named in a prompt First Information Report with a specific role attributed in a capital offense?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon and presence of independent eyewitnesses constitute reasonable grounds precluding the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Whether mere distance of arrest from the scene of the crime renders the presence of the accused doubtful at the bail stage?
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• Syedul Mukhtiar Siddiqui vs The State1989 P Cr. L J 1932 · Sindh High Court · 1989-04-26Read full judgment →
• Syed Zulifqar Ali Shah and others vs S T at E1989 PLD Peshawar 6 · Peshawar High Court · 1988-10-17Read full judgment →
• Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah vs The State1989 P Cr. L J 2428 · Sindh High Court · 1989-03-15Read full judgment →
• Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah vs The Lahore Development Authority and another1989 SCMR 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-03
  waqf propertycompulsory acquisitioneminent domainTown Improvement ActStanding Order No. 28Land Acquisition Actcivil suit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the compulsory acquisition of land by the Lahore Development Authority, which the appellant claimed was waqf property and thus exempt from acquisition. The core legal question was whether waqf property is immune from acquisition under the Town Improvement Act 1922, particularly in light of Standing Order No. 28, which restricts the acquisition of religious or waqf institutions. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition was lawful. The Court reasoned that Standing Order No. 28, being an administrative instruction, is not incorporated into the Town Improvement Act 1922 and does not limit the statutory power of acquisition. The Court further established that the principles of Mohammadan Law do not override statutory acquisition powers, and any challenge regarding the repugnancy of such laws to Islamic injunctions must be pursued before the Federal Shariat Court. Additionally, the Court affirmed that civil courts lack jurisdiction to determine compensation disputes, which must be resolved through the special procedures prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the validity of the acquisition.

  Questions settled

  • Is waqf property immune from compulsory acquisition under the Town Improvement Act 1922?
  • Does Standing Order No. 28 apply to acquisitions made under the Town Improvement Act 1922?
  • Can a civil suit be maintained to dispute the amount of compensation for acquired land?
  • What is the proper forum for challenging the vires of a law on the grounds of repugnancy to Islamic injunctions?
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• Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah vs Member, Federal Land Commission, Federal1989 MLD 2484 · Sindh High Court · 1989-01-18Read full judgment →
• Syed Zulfiqar Ali Gillani vs Chairman, Local Councils, Election1989 SCMR 1197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-14
  election disputenomination paperswrit jurisdictionmisreading of recordlocal council electionalternative remedytampering of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside the rejection of a candidate's nomination papers for a local council election. The core legal questions were whether the High Court erred in entertaining a writ petition when an alternative remedy was available, and whether the High Court improperly interfered with findings of fact regarding the alleged tampering of nomination papers. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction, finding that the election authorities had misread the record by ignoring material features of the nomination papers, which showed a crude attempt to alter the ward number. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision to set aside the election of the unopposed candidate and directed fresh elections. The key principle laid down is that while the High Court should generally avoid interfering with factual findings, it possesses the authority to correct obvious misreadings of the record by election authorities, especially when such errors result in the unlawful exclusion of a candidate from the electoral process.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with election authority decisions based on a misreading of the record?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against an election dispute if the objection regarding alternative remedy was not pressed before the High Court?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to set aside an election where nomination papers were rejected due to a fraudulent alteration of the ward number?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Zia-Ud-Din vs Director, Food Department,Government of the Punjab and another1989 PLC (C.S.) 282 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1986-04-29Read full judgment →
• Syed Zahoor Haider vs Messrs Allwin Engineering Industries1989 PLC 32 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1988-02-09Read full judgment →
• Syed Zahid Hussain vs Hoechst Pakistan Limited and 2 others1989 PLC 309 · Sindh High Court · 1988-12-01Read full judgment →
• Syed Zafar Hussain And Others vs Pakistan And Other1989 MLD 4885 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-02Read full judgment →
• Syed Wilayat Shah vs Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others1989 PLC (C.S.) 167 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1988-09-27Read full judgment →
• Syed Wahid Hussain vs Abdullah Bhatti1989 MLD 581 · Sindh High Court · 1988-11-27Read full judgment →
• Syed Tufail Ahmad And Another vs Yusuf Ali Khan, Advocate1989 CLC 1877 · Pakistan Bar Council · 1989-06-01Read full judgment →
• Syed Tehzeebul Hasnain Zaidi vs Pakistan Steel Fabricating Co. Ltd.1989 PLC 990 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1988-11-20Read full judgment →
• Syed Tariq Farooq vs Nasruddin and anothers1989 PLD Quetta 1 · Balochistan High Court · 1988-08-25Read full judgment →
• Syed Sultan Shah vs The State1989 MLD 4644 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-08Read full judgment →
• Syed Sultan Alam vs Secretary, Sind Public Service Commission and others1989 PLC (C.S.) 783 · Sindh High Court · 1988-10-13Read full judgment →
• Syed Suitan Shah vs The StateK.L.R. 1989 Shariat Cases 41 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-08Read full judgment →
• Syed Shujaat Ali vs Chief Secretary, Government of Sind and others1989 PLC (C.S.) 909 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1989-03-06Read full judgment →