Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- GUL vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 478 · Sindh High Court · 1984-05-12Read full judgment →
- GUL SHER And Another vs The STATE1986 SCMR 1862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal converted into an appeal, seeking post-arrest bail for the petitioners Gul Sher and another, who were implicated in a double murder case. The core legal question is whether the petitioners are entitled to post-arrest bail when no specific role of causing fatal firearm injuries is attributed to them, and the blunt weapon injury allegedly caused by them did not contribute to the death according to the medical evidence. The Supreme Court held that the case falls within the scope of further inquiry under the relevant criminal procedure provisions, making it a fit case for the grant of bail. The court allowed the appeal and admitted the petitioners to bail subject to furnishing appropriate security bonds.
Questions settled- Whether an accused person to whom no specific fatal role is assigned and whose blunt weapon injury did not contribute to the death is entitled to post-arrest bail?
- When can a criminal case be considered a fit case for further inquiry for the purpose of granting bail?
- GUL REHMAN vs The STATE1986 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, Gul Rehman, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his appeal by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld his conviction under sections 409, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, while reducing his sentence. The petitioner contended that the departmental audit report exonerating him was ignored, and material witnesses were not examined. The Supreme Court considered whether the trial for more than three offences committed over a period exceeding one year was lawful, whether the joinder of charges caused prejudice, and whether evidence recorded by a Special Judge lacking jurisdiction could sustain a conviction by the transferee court. Finding that these points required consideration, the Court condoned the delay in filing and granted leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether the trial of an accused for more than three offences of the same kind committed in a period of more than one year is lawful?
- Whether the joinder of charges has caused prejudice to the accused in his defence?
- Whether evidence recorded by a Special Judge from whose Court the case was transferred on the ground of want of jurisdiction can sustain a conviction recorded by the transferee Court?
- GUL MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1986 P Cr. L J 1624 · Sindh High Court · 1985-09-29Read full judgment →
- GUL MUHAMMAD vs D.S/C.S.C.1986 CLC 2853 · Lahore High Court · 1985-12-08Read full judgment →
- GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN vs UMAR DRAZ KHAN1986 CLC 2367 · Lahore High Court · 1982-12-03Read full judgment →
- GUL MUHAMMAD And Others vs The STATE1986 SCMR 1819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the procedural status of an appeal pending before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, specifically regarding the legal representation of the appellants. The core legal question addressed by the Court pertains to the status of counsel engaged for the limited purpose of leave to appeal proceedings versus the subsequent conduct of the main appeal. Upon being informed by the Advocate-on-Record that the previously engaged counsel, Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri, was retained only for the leave to appeal stage and not for the appeal itself, the Court held that it was necessary to ensure the appellants were properly represented. Consequently, the Court directed the issuance of notices to the appellants to arrange for new counsel to prosecute their appeal. Additionally, the Court ordered the office to verify the current status of the appellants' sentences with jail authorities to determine if they had already been served and if the appellants had been released. The Court further directed that this case be fixed for hearing at Rawalpindi, alongside a connected jail petition.
Questions settled- Is counsel engaged for leave to appeal proceedings automatically retained for the subsequent appeal?
- What procedural steps should the Court take when the original counsel disclaims authority to represent appellants in the main appeal?
- Does the Court have a duty to verify if appellants have served their sentences before proceeding with an appeal?
- GUL KHAN AND OTHERS vs THE STATE1986 PLD Karachi 629 · Sindh High Court · 1986-06-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a bail application filed by under-trial prisoners seeking release under the third proviso to subsection (1) of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, due to prolonged detention. The core legal question is the interpretation of the fourth proviso to the same subsection, specifically whether the term "criminal" is restricted to previously convicted offenders or extends to accused persons. The Court held that the term "criminal" is not limited to previous convicts. It reasoned that interpreting it as such would render the phrase "in the opinion of the Court" redundant, as previous convictions are objective facts. Consequently, the Court ruled that it must form an independent opinion regarding whether an accused is a "hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" based on their antecedents and conduct, rather than relying solely on past convictions. Applying this principle, the Court examined the applicants' history of multiple criminal cases involving violence and unlicensed arms and concluded they fell within the mischief of the fourth proviso, thereby denying bail while setting a timeline for trial completion.
Questions settled- Does the term 'criminal' in the fourth proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 refer exclusively to previously convicted offenders?
- Is the court required to form an independent opinion on whether an accused is a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' for the purpose of denying statutory bail?
- Can an accused person be classified as a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' under section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a prior conviction?
- GUL KHAN And 2 Others vs The STATE1986 SCMR 1825(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a conflict of opinion in the High Court regarding the interpretation of the fourth proviso of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The learned Single Judge in the current bail application did not follow the view previously expressed by another Single Judge of the same court in a reported judgment. The core legal question concerns the correct interpretation and application of the said statutory proviso governing bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal in order to resolve the existing judicial conflict regarding the interpretation of the provision. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal to resolve conflicting interpretations of statutory provisions among High Court benches.
Questions settled- How should the fourth proviso of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be interpreted when conflicting views exist in the High Court?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to resolve a conflict of opinion within the High Court?
- GUL AKHTAR vs SULTAN AN KH AN and another1986 MLD 1930(2) · Peshawar High Court · 1986-02-14Read full judgment →
- GRAND BATTERIES Ltd. vs MUHAMMAD YAQUB1986 PLC 296 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-09-21Read full judgment →
- GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, SIALKOT vs KARAMAT ALI1986 PLC 1072 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1984-12-07Read full judgment →
- GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, LAHORE vs ZAHEER-UD-DIN BABAR1986 PLC 507 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-10-22Read full judgment →
- GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, LAHORE vs BASHIR AHMAD1986 PLC 289 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-09-27Read full judgment →
- GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE vs ZAHOOR AHMAD1986 PLC 449 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-09-30Read full judgment →
- GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE vs SARFRAZ1986 PLC 622 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-12-17Read full judgment →
- GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB AND ANOTHER vs S. TASSADAQ HUSSAIN1986 PLD Supreme Court 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from the removal of a Magistrate from service under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975. The Government of Punjab challenged the Service Tribunal's decision, which had set aside the removal. The core legal question concerned whether the authority could validly utilize the summary procedure under Rule 6(3) to remove a civil servant based on vague charges and secret reports without conducting a regular inquiry. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the summary procedure is not inherently illegal for corruption charges, it does not confer arbitrary power. The Court emphasized that when charges are vague and lack full disclosure of the underlying evidence, a regular inquiry is mandatory to satisfy the principles of natural justice. The authority cannot abdicate its decision-making duty to secret agencies or rely on undisclosed reports. The judgment establishes that procedural shortcuts cannot be used to bypass the fundamental requirement of providing the accused with a fair opportunity to defend against specific, substantiated allegations.
Questions settled- Can the summary procedure under Rule 6(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 be used to remove a civil servant without a regular inquiry?
- Does the use of secret reports as the sole basis for disciplinary action against a civil servant violate the principles of natural justice?
- Is an authority required to conduct a regular inquiry when the charges and statement of allegations against a civil servant are vague and lack specific details?
- Can a competent authority abdicate its decision-making responsibility to secret agencies in disciplinary proceedings?
- GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB AND ANOTHER vs EHSANUL HAQ SETHI1986 PLD Supreme Court 684 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the Punjab Service Tribunal's order expunging remarks from a District and Sessions Judge's Annual Confidential Report (ACR). The core legal questions concerned whether the time schedule for recording ACRs is mandatory or directory, whether 'advisory' remarks constitute adverse entries, and the competency of the Acting Chief Justice to initiate such reports. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the remarks. The Court held that ACR time schedules are directory, not mandatory, as no penal consequences are prescribed for non-compliance. It further clarified that 'advisory' remarks are not inherently adverse or stigmatizing unless an officer fails to heed the advice and improve. Additionally, the Court affirmed that the Acting Chief Justice, as the head of judicial administration, possesses plenary powers to initiate ACRs for judicial officers. The Tribunal erred by assuming the reporting officer was influenced by subsequent events without evidence and by questioning the administrative authority of the Chief Justice. The judgment establishes that advisory remarks serve as a caution for self-correction rather than a permanent adverse entry.
Questions settled- Are the time schedules prescribed for recording Annual Confidential Reports mandatory or directory in nature?
- Do 'advisory' remarks in an Annual Confidential Report constitute adverse entries?
- Does the Acting Chief Justice have the authority to initiate Annual Confidential Reports for members of the judicial service?
- Haji MUHAMMAD ZAMAN vs ZAFAR ALI KHAN AND OTHERS1986 PLD Supreme Court 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court passed in revisional jurisdiction, which set aside an appellate judgment in favour of the appellant pre-emptor. The appellant's pre-emption suit had been dismissed in default, but was later ordered to be restored by the District Judge on appeal, who accepted the appellant's factual plea supported by a parcha peshi issued by the court Reader. However, upon a revision petition, the High Court re-examined the Reader and fresh evidence, re-appraised the facts, held the parcha peshi to be a forgery, and reversed the appellate judgment. The core legal question was whether the High Court could record or admit fresh evidence in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to reverse findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that revisional powers are primarily intended for correcting jurisdictional errors and subordinate court mistakes, and erroneous decisions of fact are ordinarily not revisable except under specific limited circumstances, and the High Court improperly re-assessed evidence and recorded fresh testimony. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the revisional judgment, and restored the appellate judgment.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court could have decided a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 so as to reverse the impugned judgment on recording or admission of fresh evidence in its revisional jurisdiction?
- Are erroneous decisions of fact revisable under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can additional evidence be recorded at the revisional stage under section 151 or Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to overturn findings of fact?
- GOVERNMENT OF SIND And Another vs MUHAMMAD ATTIQUE And 44 Others1986 PLC 941 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
- GOVERNMENT OF SIND And Another vs Ch. FAZAL MUHAMMAD And Another1986 SCMR 1838 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind High Court, which dismissed an application filed by the Government of Sind under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners alleged that a decree obtained by the respondents was secured through fraud and misrepresentation regarding an arbitration agreement and previous litigation history. The High Court had dismissed the application on the grounds that the petitioners failed to raise these pleas during earlier proceedings and that the application was time-barred. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying the core legal questions as whether Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is available to a party who failed to raise the plea of fraud or misrepresentation in original proceedings, and what the applicable limitation period is for such an application, particularly considering the provision was enacted in 1980. The Court held that these issues, being matters of first impression, warranted a detailed examination by the appellate court.
Questions settled- Is an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable if the plea of fraud or misrepresentation was not raised in the original proceedings?
- Does Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provide a remedy for parties who were unable to raise the plea of fraud at earlier stages due to reasonable cause?
- What is the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, particularly where the impugned judgment predates the 1980 amendment?
- GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN vs Messrs SUNSHINE DAIRIES Ltd.1986 MLD 1306 · Sindh High Court · 1986-04-13Read full judgment →
- GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN And Others vs MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN And 5 Other1986 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Government of Pakistan sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against orders of the Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had issued clarification orders regarding the payment of salary and allowances to civil servants who had performed duties in Grade-18, despite initial appointment stipulations limiting pay to their lower substantive grades. The principal judgments, which held that these civil servants were entitled to Grade-18 pay and increments, had attained finality as they were not challenged. The Government challenged the Tribunal's subsequent clarification orders, which applied a 'length of service' formula to calculate the arrears. The Supreme Court observed that the principal orders establishing the entitlement had become final and were not under appeal. The Court held that the clarification orders did not exceed the scope of the original judgments and could not be challenged independently of those final orders. Finding no question of law of public importance, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, effectively maintaining the Tribunal's clarification.
Questions settled- Can a clarification order issued by a Service Tribunal be appealed independently if the principal judgment it clarifies has attained finality?
- Does a clarification order that adheres to the scope of a final judgment constitute a new, appealable order?
- Is leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 granted when no question of law of public importance arises?
- GOVERNMENT OF N. W.F.P. Through Chief Secretary And Another vs MUHAMMAD AJMAL And 2 Other1986 SCMR 2007 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Government of N.-W.F.P. against the judgment of the Provincial Service Tribunal, which set aside the retrospective promotion of respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The core legal issue was whether the Government possesses the authority to grant civil servants promotion with retrospective effect in the absence of a specific governing law, rule, or regulation, and whether administrative letters can confer such powers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the Tribunal's decision and refused leave to appeal, holding that the Government failed to produce any rule or regulation authorizing retrospective promotion. The Court laid down the key principle that administrative letters are purely executive instructions that cannot be equated with law or statutory regulations, nor can they be pressed into service to affect or override the established rights of parties regarding seniority and promotion.
Questions settled- Can the Government grant civil servants promotion with retrospective effect in the absence of an express rule or regulation?
- Do administrative letters carry the force of law or regulation to affect the legal rights of parties?
- GOLDEN ROADWAYS TRANSPORT BUS SERVICE OKARA, DISTRICT SAHIWAL vs The EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CANTONMENT BOARD, OKARA, DISTRICT SAHIWAL1986 SCMR 1142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition challenging a notification issued under section 60 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, levying a toll tax by the Cantonment Board, Okara, on motor vehicles, lorries, and buses plying on a portion of the Grand Trunk Road within cantonment limits. The core legal questions involved whether the Cantonment Board was competent to levy a toll tax on a highway not owned by it, whether the levy was justified under Item No. 6 or Item No. 12 of the third schedule of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, and the proper construction of the term 'per trip'. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that ownership of the highway is not a prerequisite for levying a toll thorough, that the tax was validly imposed as a toll under Item No. 6 rather than Item No. 12, and that 'per trip' correctly signifies a one-way entry into the cantonment area. The key legal principles established are that toll thorough can be legally levied for the use of a public highway regardless of the levying authority's ownership of the land, and that tolls are distinct from property taxes on vehicles.
Questions settled- Can a Cantonment Board levy a toll tax on a highway that is not owned by the Board?
- Does the power to levy taxes in the nature of tolls under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 apply to motor vehicles?
- What is the legal definition and distinction between a toll tax and a tax on vehicles?
- How should the expression 'per trip' be construed in the context of a toll tax levied for entry into a cantonment area?
- GOHRAM vs THE STATE---Opponent1986 P Cr. L J 633 · Sindh High Court · 1985-07-03Read full judgment →
- GODHO vs ATTAL AND OTHERS1986 PLD Rev. 20 · Sindh Revenue Board · 1980-02-26Read full judgment →
- GIRDHARI LAL B. BHATTIA vs SAEED AHMAD KAZI1986 MLD 396 · Sindh High Court · 1985-12-28Read full judgment →
- GHULAM SUGHRAN vs BASHIR AHMAD And ANOTHER1986 CLC 2948 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1986-07-14Read full judgment →
- GHULAM SHABBIR And Another vs THE STATE1986 P Cr. L J 869 · Lahore High Court · 1985-10-28Read full judgment →
- GHULAM SARWAR vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 2550 · Lahore High Court · 1986-02-16Read full judgment →
- GHULAM SARWAR MALIK vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN And Another1986 SCMR 1593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal by a civil servant regarding his seniority and consequential promotion benefits within the Tribal Area Group (T.A.G.). The appellant, initially a member of the Provincial Civil Service of Baluchistan, later joined the All Pakistan Unified Grades and subsequently the T.A.G. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having had his seniority claim in the T.A.G. accepted by the Federal Service Tribunal, was entitled to full consequential benefits, including promotion or pro forma promotion, despite having retired. The Service Tribunal had previously held that the appellant's seniority claim was of academic importance only, as he had retired and no junior had been promoted to Grade-20. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant sought these benefits. However, during the proceedings, it was established that the Department had implemented the Tribunal's directions regarding seniority. As the respondents confirmed that all due benefits for the period of service had been provided, the Supreme Court held that the appeal had become infructuous and dismissed it accordingly.
Questions settled- Does an appeal regarding service seniority and promotion benefits become infructuous if the department has already implemented the tribunal's directions and provided all due benefits?
- Can a retired civil servant claim pro forma promotion if the seniority dispute has been resolved in their favor?
- GHULAM SAFDAR vs THE STATE1986 P Cr. L J 2478 · Lahore High Court · 1986-04-12Read full judgment →
- GHULAM SABIR And 12 Others vs THE STATE1986 P Cr. L J 380 · Lahore High Court · 1985-06-11Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RAZA vs THE STATE1986 MLD 2807 · Lahore High Court · 1986-06-10Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASUL vs THE STATE1986 P Cr. L J 2335 · Lahore High Court · 1986-03-15Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASUL vs Ch. SALEEM SHAD1986 P Cr. L J 823(2) · Lahore High Court · 1985-11-19Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASUL KHAN And Another vs Mst. JINDAN And Another1986 SCMR 775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their suit challenging a property alienation made by Mst. Jindan, a limited owner, in 1960. Mst. Jindan and Mst. Mitho, as widows, held their deceased husband's estate as limited owners. In 1933, Mst. Mitho alienated her share, and a family arrangement was allegedly made whereby Mst. Jindan was acknowledged as the full owner of her half share, granting her the right to alienate it. The petitioners, one of whom (Mst. Gaman) was a minor at the time of the arrangement and a beneficiary of Mst. Mitho's earlier alienation through her husband, challenged Mst. Jindan's subsequent gift. All three lower courts concurrently found that a valid family arrangement had taken place, estopping the petitioners from challenging the alienation. The Supreme Court upheld these findings, ruling that the family arrangement, validly entered into in 1933 by the concerned parties, was binding, and the subsequent West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, did not retrospectively invalidate it. Leave to appeal was refused.
Questions settled- Can a family arrangement entered into by limited owners and reversioners bind subsequent heirs who were minors at the time but benefited from a related transaction?
- Does the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, retrospectively invalidate family arrangements validly made prior to its enactment?
- Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding a family compromise generally immune from challenge in the Supreme Court?
- Can a party who has benefited from one part of a family arrangement later challenge another part of the same arrangement?
- GHULAM RASUL JAVED vs DIRECTOR-GENERAL, AGRICULTURE (FIELD), PUNJAB1986 PLC (C.S.) 464 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1985-10-30Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASUL And Others vs The STATE1986 SCMR 1804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the convictions of the petitioners for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while reducing their sentences. The petitioners, convicted of causing grievous hurt and wrongful confinement, sought relief following a compromise reached with the victim, Mirza Mumtaz Beg, who expressed a desire for amicable future relations and stated he had forgiven the assailants without receiving compensation. The core legal question was whether the court should permit the compounding of the offences based on this compromise. The Supreme Court held that given the nature of the attack and the injuries inflicted, the case was not appropriate for compounding. However, the Court established the principle that a genuine compromise and forgiveness by the victim, motivated by a desire for peaceful co-existence, constitutes a valid ground for the mitigation of sentence. Consequently, the Court maintained the convictions but reduced the sentences of imprisonment to the period already undergone and remitted the fines imposed.
Questions settled- Can a criminal conviction be set aside solely on the basis of a compromise between the accused and the victim?
- Does a victim's forgiveness and desire for peaceful co-existence constitute a valid ground for the reduction of a sentence?
- Is a case involving grievous hurt and wrongful confinement suitable for compounding based on a compromise?
- GHULAM RASUL AND OTHERS vs KHUDAI DAD AND ormnts1986 PLD Quetta 130 · Balochistan High Court · 1985-10-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a constitutional petition challenging an order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, Balochistan, which set aside concurrent judgments of the lower revenue forums and remanded the case for deciding the point of limitation and the dispute on merits. The core legal questions involved the mandatory nature of the quorum requirement for a tribunal under Ordinance I of 1968, the legality of recording evidence without the prescribed quorum, and the scope of revisional powers of the Board of Revenue. The High Court held that section 7 of Ordinance I of 1968, which mandates the presence of the President and at least two members to conduct proceedings, is mandatory, and any proceedings conducted in violation thereof are coram non judice and void. The Court further held that the Member, Board of Revenue lawfully exercised revisional jurisdiction under section 12 of the said Ordinance to rectify patent illegalities and procedural irregularities. Consequently, the petition against the remand order was dismissed as incompetent.
Questions settled- Whether the quorum requirement for a tribunal under section 7 of Ordinance I of 1968 is mandatory or directory?
- Do proceedings conducted by a tribunal without the prescribed quorum render the action coram non judice?
- What is the scope of revisional powers of the Member, Board of Revenue under section 12 of Ordinance I of 1968?
- Is a constitutional petition maintainable against an order of remand passed by a revisional authority?
- GHULAM RASOOL vs THE STATE1986 P Cr. L J 1318 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 347 · Sindh High Court · 1985-01-28Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, KARACHI And Another1986 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises out of a dispute over the transfer of a composite property comprising a residential portion and shops under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant, a local in possession of the residential house, applied for its transfer, which was initially rejected based on an erroneous evaluation of rent. While the appellant's appeal was pending, the property was subjected to an earmarking scheme and allotted to respondent No. 2. The High Court's Letters Patent Bench had remanded the case to determine whether the building constituted a single unit and to recalculate the evaluation price. The Supreme Court held that the remand was an unnecessary exercise since the Settlement Commissioner had already rendered a well-reasoned finding that the residential portion and the shops were separate units and that the appellant was entitled to the transfer of the house based on the correct rental evaluation. The Court ruled that the property was not lawfully available for disposal under the earmarking scheme while the appellant's entitlement proceedings were still pending. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench and restored the order of the Settlement Commissioner transferring the residential portion to the appellant.
Questions settled- Whether a composite property can be disposed of under an earmarking scheme while a claimant's appeal regarding entitlement to the residential portion is still pending?
- Is a Letters Patent Bench justified in remanding a case to settlement authorities when the primary questions of fact regarding unit divisibility and rental evaluation have already been cogently determined by the Settlement Commissioner?
- Whether the determination of property unit divisibility and evaluation price falls exclusively within the competence of the Settlement Authorities?
- GHULAM RASOOL vs PIR BAKHSH And Other1986 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a vendee against the Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a civil first appeal from a remand order. The core legal question concerns the approach of the High Court in a first appeal from a remand order where lower courts rendered judgments of variance regarding the true nature of a transaction alleged to be a gift versus a sale in a pre-emption suit. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court should have examined the disputed facts following the rule applicable to judgments of variance, a deeper scrutiny of the record by the Supreme Court revealed that the first appellate judgment was well-founded on evidence and more rational than the trial court's decision. The Court laid down that in cases of variance between lower courts, the High Court must scrutinize the facts, but where the appellate forum's view is sound and rational, interference is unwarranted. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court is required to examine disputed facts in a first appeal from a remand order when lower courts have rendered judgments of variance?
- Can the Supreme Court undertake a deeper scrutiny of evidence when lower courts give conflicting findings regarding the nature of a transaction?
- Does a transaction structured as a gift deserve protection against a claim of pre-emption when found to be a sale?
- GHULAM RASOOL vs FARID BAKHSH and others1986 MLD 2860 · Lahore High Court · 1986-04-08Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL SHAH vs KAMAL KHAN1986 SCMR 1605 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had set aside the eviction order passed against the respondent-tenant by the Rent Controller. The appellant-landlord sought eviction of the respondent from a room forming part of his residential house, which was being used for commercial purposes, on the ground of bona fide personal use as a Baithak. The core legal question was whether a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant for personal residential requirement from premises that, although of a residential character by nature and structure, were let out and used for commercial purposes. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that if premises essentially constitute a part of a residential house by their very nature and structure, the landlord is entitled to seek eviction on the ground of personal residential requirement, notwithstanding their commercial use by the tenant. The key principle laid down is that the physical nature and structure of the premises as residential governs the landlord's right to seek eviction for personal use, regardless of the tenant's commercial usage.
Questions settled- Can a landlord seek eviction of a tenant from premises of a residential character for personal use when the tenant has been using the same for commercial purposes?
- Does the nature and structure of the premises govern the landlord's right to seek eviction on the ground of personal requirement?
- GHULAM RASOOL SAJID vs THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, BADAMI BAGH DIVISION1986 PLC (C.S.) 812 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1986-05-15Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL And Others vs WAHID BAKHSH And OTHER1986 CLC 2443 · Lahore High Court · 1985-11-04Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL And Others vs THE STATE1986 P Cr. L J 1367 · Lahore High Court · 1985-11-22Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL And Others vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 2322 · Lahore High Court · 1985-03-17Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL And Others vs SUBA (Deceased) Represented By Ghulam1986 SCMR 1532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenges the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which decreed a pre-emption suit in favour of the respondent. The petitioners contend that the underlying transaction, a sale deed dated 12-7-1969, was void ab initio because it violated Martial Law Regulation No. 64. Consequently, the Revenue Authorities had refused to sanction the mutation of the sale on 6-12-1969. The petitioners argue that since no valid sale existed in the eyes of the law, there was no transaction capable of being pre-empted, and the lower courts erred in characterizing the transaction as a re-sale or return of property. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether a pre-emption suit is maintainable when the purported sale transaction is legally invalid due to non-compliance with statutory regulations, specifically Martial Law Regulation No. 64, and whether the lower courts misconstrued the nature of the transaction by treating it as a re-sale.
Questions settled- Can a pre-emption suit be maintained against a sale transaction that has been refused mutation due to violation of Martial Law Regulation No. 64?
- Does a sale deed that violates Martial Law Regulation No. 64 constitute a valid sale capable of being pre-empted?
- Is a court justified in decreeing a pre-emption suit by re-characterizing an invalid sale as a re-sale or return of property?
- GHULAM RASOOL And Others vs MUHAMMAD LATIF And OTHER1986 CLC 2830 · Lahore High Court · 1986-04-11Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL And Another vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 1228 · Sindh High Court · 1985-11-05Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL And ANOTHER vs THE STATE---Opponent1986 P Cr. L J 120 · Sindh High Court · 1985-04-13Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL And ANOTHER vs THE STATE and another1986 P Cr. L J 349 · Sindh High Court · 1985-01-28Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL and 3 others vs SUBA through Legal Representatives1986 MLD 1027 · Lahore High Court · 1986-03-03Read full judgment →
- GHULAM RASOOL AND 3 OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD YAR1986 PLD Lahore 45 · Lahore High Court · 1985-11-09Read full judgment →
- GHULAM QADIR vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 423 · Sindh High Court · 1985-04-22Read full judgment →
- GHULAM QADIR vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, HOME1986 PLC (C.S.) 1016 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- GHULAM QADIR vs BASHIR AHMAD and others1986 MLD 2823 · Lahore High Court · 1986-07-07Read full judgment →
- GHULAM QADIR KHAN And 12 Others vs THE MULTAN CENTRAL CO OPERATIVE1986 SCMR 1386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 5-12-1979, which dismissed a constitutional petition concerning the recovery of a loan obtained from the Multan Central Co-operative Bank Limited. The core legal question involved the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain challenges regarding loan recovery proceedings after an award had been made and the principal liability satisfied. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners' liability had been determined, the loan amount repaid, and the challenge raised only technical questions regarding civil court jurisdiction without disputing the underlying debt, the case was not a fit one for the discretionary exercise of granting leave to appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, noting that the High Court's judgment did not suffer from any prima facie legal infirmity.
Questions settled- Whether leave to appeal should be granted merely to examine technical questions of jurisdiction when the underlying financial liability has been satisfied?
- Does the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court warrant interference in concurrent findings regarding loan recovery and civil court jurisdiction?
- GHULAM QADIR and 8 others vs THE STATE1986 MLD 2612 · Sindh High Court · 1986-08-02Read full judgment →
- GHULAM QADIR and 3 others vs REHMAT ALl and another1986 MLD 1948 · Lahore High Court · 1986-09-08Read full judgment →
- GHULAM QADIR Alias QADIR vs THE STATE1986 P Cr. L J 1018 · Lahore High Court · 1984-08-12Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 1416 · Lahore High Court · 1985-10-13Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI vs STATE1986 PLD Rev. 129 · Sindh Revenue Board · 1971-04-05Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI vs QAISAR KHAN And 30 OTHER1986 CLC 1253 · Lahore High Court · 1986-02-07Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI vs MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE And OTHER1986 CLC 2158 · Lahore High Court · 1984-10-20Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI vs MUHAMMAD ASHRAF1986 MLD 1445 · Sindh High Court · 1986-03-26Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI vs Mst. MUKHTAR BEGUM1986 MLD 2066 · Lahore High Court · 1986-07-07Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI vs GHULAM QADIR and others1986 MLD 1940 · Lahore High Court · 1986-09-13Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI vs FARRUKH LATIF And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a writ petition dismissed by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the concurrent findings of the Family Court and the Additional District Judge decreeing a wife's suit for maintenance on the ground that the alleged divorce (Talaq) had not become effective under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The petitioner contended that the wife's participation in proceedings before the Union Council Chairman constituted sufficient notice and service of Talaq. The Supreme Court examined the record and affirmed the lower courts' factual findings that service of notice of Talaq on the wife was not proved and the evidence contained material discrepancies. Reaffirming established precedent, the Supreme Court held that under Section 7 of the Ordinance, a Talaq does not become effective until proper notice is delivered to the Chairman of the Union Council and the statutory ninety-day period for reconciliation expires; failure to provide such notice deems the Talaq revoked. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a Talaq becomes effective under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 without serving formal notice thereof on the Chairman of the Union Council?
- What is the effect of a husband's failure to serve notice of Talaq on the Chairman under Section 7(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
- Whether the participation or appearance of a wife before the Chairman of the Union Council dispenses with the statutory requirement of serving notice of Talaq under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
- GHULAM NABI vs DIRECTOR, G.M.B. PROJECT, HYDERABAD1986 PLD Rev. 121 · Sindh Revenue Board · 1970-09-28Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI vs DIAM And Another1986 SCMR 1424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding a murder case. The petitioner Khamisa challenged his conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while the complainant challenged the acquittal of the respondent Daim. The prosecution alleged that the accused were hired assassins who murdered the deceased, Muhammad Jahangir. The Supreme Court examined the validity of the dying declaration, the impact of the failure to prove motive against the accused, the delay in recording witness statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the lack of an identification parade. The Court held that the conviction of Khamisa was justified, noting that the recovery of a weapon matching the crime scene evidence corroborated the prosecution's case. Regarding Daim, the Court upheld his acquittal, finding that the prosecution failed to establish his common intention or active role in the crime, thus entitling him to the benefit of the doubt. The Court affirmed that failure of motive does not necessarily invalidate a prosecution case when other evidence is sufficient.
Questions settled- Does the failure to prove motive against an accused necessarily invalidate the entire prosecution case?
- Can the late recording of witness statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be excused if the prosecution case was disclosed earlier?
- Is the acquittal of a co-accused justified when no active role or common intention is established by the evidence?
- GHULAM NABI vs ABDUL RAHMAN and another1986 MLD 323 · Sindh High Court · 1986-01-19Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI And Others vs THE STATE1986 P Cr. L J 988 · Lahore High Court · 1984-04-08Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI And Others vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 749 · Lahore High Court · 1985-05-31Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI And Others vs Mst. SADIQAN1986 SCMR 1176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment in a pre-emption suit. The respondent had successfully pre-empted a sale made in favour of the petitioners, asserting a superior right of pre-emption. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent, a decision which was subsequently upheld by the District Judge in the first appeal and by the High Court in the second appeal. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Additionally, a separate civil miscellaneous petition was filed seeking the initiation of contempt of court proceedings against the petitioners. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the case did not involve any substantial question of law warranting interference by the apex court. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition for leave to appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the application for contempt proceedings was without substance and did not necessitate any judicial action. Accordingly, both the petition for leave to appeal and the application for contempt proceedings were dismissed by the Court.
Questions settled- Does a pre-emption suit involving concurrent findings of fact by lower courts raise a question of law sufficient for Supreme Court interference?
- Are contempt of court proceedings warranted when a petition for leave to appeal against a pre-emption decree is dismissed?
- GHULAM NABI And Others vs FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION1986 CLC 1054 · Lahore High Court · 1985-10-13Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI And Another vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 1736 · Sindh High Court · 1985-06-16Read full judgment →
- MANZOOR AHMAD KHAN vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 2368 · Lahore High Court · 1985-12-03Read full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI And Another vs THE STATE And Other1986 SCMR 1524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves cross-petitions arising from a criminal trial concerning a murder and assault incident stemming from a prior quarrel and motive of revenge. Ghulam Nabi was convicted of murder and attempted assault, while co-accused Rashid and Ghulam Farid were initially convicted by the trial court, subsequently acquitted by the High Court, which maintained Ghulam Nabi's conviction. Ghulam Nabi sought leave to appeal against his conviction, whereas the complainant filed a petition against the acquittal of the co-accused. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court of Pakistan pertained to whether the testimony of injured eye-witnesses, partially disbelieved regarding certain co-accused, could safely form the basis of maintaining a conviction for another accused without independent corroboration, and conversely, whether such witnesses should be fully believed as to all assailants when their presence at the scene is established by their injuries. The Supreme Court held that the reasoning adopted by the High Court in accepting the testimony against one accused while rejecting it against others lacked convincing strength. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions for a thorough examination of the issues raised. The key principle laid down is that the reliability of injured eye-witnesses requires careful scrutiny and consistent evaluation when their evidence is sought to be split regarding different accused persons.
Questions settled- Can the testimony of an injured eye-witness be relied upon for convicting one accused when the same testimony has been disbelieved regarding other co-accused?
- Whether the presence of injuries on the persons of eye-witnesses guarantees the truthfulness of their account as to the identity of all assailants?
- Does the rejection of prosecution evidence against certain co-accused necessitate independent corroboration for maintaining the conviction of the remaining accused?
- GHULAM NABI And 3 Others vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 1658 · Sindh High Court · 1986-01-05Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MUSTAFA vs THE STATE1986 MLD 2911 · Sindh High Court · 1986-10-28Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MUSTAFA vs Mst. GHULAM SAKINA AND ANOTHER1986 PLD Lahore 324 · Lahore High Court · 1986-03-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenges the judgment of the Family Court decreeing a suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula in favor of the respondent and dismissing the petitioner's suit for restitution of conjugal rights. The core legal question was whether a wife can be granted dissolution of marriage on the ground of khula when she fails to formally prove other specific issues like cruelty or non-maintenance on technical grounds. The Lahore High Court held that even if a wife fails on individual issues, the court can examine the overall facts and circumstances on record, such as the bitterness caused by a pronounced and revoked divorce and failed reconciliation efforts, to satisfy its conscience that the spouses cannot live within the limits prescribed by Allah. The court ruled that failure on specific technical issues does not preclude a decree of khula if a fixed aversion and hatred are established. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine.
Questions settled- Whether a wife is entitled to a decree of khula when she fails to prove specific issues like cruelty or non-maintenance on technical grounds?
- Can a court rely on the overall circumstances and failed reconciliation efforts to satisfy its conscience for granting khula?
- Whether a wife's firm decision not to live with her husband, coupled with an atmosphere of intense hatred, is sufficient to dissolve a marriage on the basis of khula?
- GHULAM MUSTAFA vs I.-G. GOVERNMENT OF THE Punjabthrough Inspector-1986 PLC (C.S.) 281 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1985-05-27Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MUSTAFA vs AKHTAR ALI and othersShahenshah Hussain for Petitionet1986 MLD 2143 · Election Tribunal · 1986-01-18Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MUSTAFA And Others vs YAQUB And Other1986 SCMR 1045 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the validity of an allotment of a building site (Ihata No. 115) to the appellants and its subsequent cancellation in favor of the respondents. The core legal questions were whether the appellants held a valid allotment order for the disputed land and whether such an allotment could be cancelled and re-allotted to others without notice or legal justification. The Supreme Court held that the appellants possessed a valid allotment order under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme, which created a vested right. The Court determined that because the land was already validly allotted to the appellants, it was not 'available property' for subsequent transfer to the respondents. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court, restoring the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Lands). The key principle laid down is that land once validly allotted under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme cannot be subsequently transferred to other parties, as it ceases to be available property for such allotment.
Questions settled- Can land that has been validly allotted under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme be subsequently transferred to another party?
- Does an allottee of a building site under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme acquire a vested right that prevents subsequent cancellation without notice?
- Is land that has been reserved for the extension of a village Abadi and subsequently allotted as a building site considered 'available property' for later allotment as agricultural land?
- GHULAM MUSTAFA And Another vs THE STATE-1986 P Cr. L J 1635 · Sindh High Court · 1985-12-15Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MUSTAFA AND 4 OTHERS vs RASOOL BUX1986 PLD Rev. 26 · Sindh Revenue Board · 1985-09-22Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MUSTAFA AND 3 OTHERS vs Mst. ZAITOON AND 5 OTHERS1986 PLD Azad J & K 100 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1986-01-12Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MURTAZA vs MUHAMMAD YASIN And ANOTHER1986 CLC 1577 · Lahore High Court · 1986-02-16Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MURTAZA vs ABOUL REHMAN And Other1986 SCMR 792 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an order by the District Judge, Sargodha, directing the petitioner to surrender possession of a demised shop to the respondent-landlord. The core legal question was whether the landlord had established a bona fide personal requirement for the premises and whether the existing lease agreement precluded eviction by creating a perpetual tenancy. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's findings, holding that the District Judge had correctly appreciated the evidence regarding the landlord's bona fide need. Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the lease agreement contemplated a perpetual tenancy, finding no evidence that the landlord intended to deprive himself of statutory rights under rent laws. The Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its limited constitutional jurisdiction by refusing to interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on a proper interpretation of the lease agreement. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that constitutional jurisdiction is not a substitute for re-evaluating factual findings properly determined by lower courts.
Questions settled- Does a lease agreement providing for rent enhancement necessarily create a perpetual tenancy that bars a landlord from seeking eviction?
- Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide requirement in the exercise of its limited constitutional jurisdiction?
- Is a landlord debarred from seeking eviction under rent laws if the lease agreement contemplates a continuance of tenancy on enhanced rent?
- GHULAM MURTAZA RIZVI vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB Through Secretary1986 PLC (C.S.) 947 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1985-07-18Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MURTAZA and another vs THE STATE1986 MLD 1220 · Sindh High Court · 1986-05-07Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MURTAZA And 7 Other vs ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, BUREWALA1986 PLC (C.S.) 208 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1985-05-04Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MUHI UD DIN vs TILE STATE1986 P Cr. L J 1024 · Lahore High Court · 1984-06-26Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MUHAMMAD vs UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL1986 SCMR 907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant sought to sue the United States Agency for International Development (U.S.-AID) for salary arrears and compensation. The trial court dismissed the application to sue in forma pauperis, ruling that the respondents enjoyed diplomatic immunity. The High Court affirmed this decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether the dismissal order was appealable and whether the immunity certificate issued by the Federal Government was conclusive. The Court held that the dismissal order, based on the bar of immunity, effectively functioned as a rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and was thus appealable. Regarding the immunity certificate, the Court affirmed that under Section 4 of the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act 1972, such a certificate is conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle that objections regarding the mode of proof of a document must be raised at the earliest opportunity in the trial court and cannot be entertained for the first time during appellate proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, confirming the respondents' diplomatic immunity.
Questions settled- Whether an order dismissing an application to sue in forma pauperis on the ground of diplomatic immunity is appealable?
- Can an objection regarding the mode of proof of a document be raised for the first time at the appellate stage?
- Is a certificate issued by the Federal Government regarding the diplomatic status of a foreign mission conclusive evidence under the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act 1972?
- Does the State Immunity Ordinance 1981 apply to pending revision proceedings?
- GHULAM MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1986 P C r. L J 1887 · Lahore High Court · 1985-12-03Read full judgment →