Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- MUHAMMAD HA FEEZ vs THE STATE1984 PLD Federal Shariat Court 57 · Federal Shariat Court · 1983-12-11Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD GULAB AND AN0THBR vs Haji FAZAL MAHMOOD alias KHAWAR1984 SCMR 967 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petitions challenging their ejectment from commercial shops in Batkhela, Malakand Agency. The landlord filed ejectment applications on grounds including default, personal need, and reconstruction, and the Rent Controller ordered ejectment based on reconstruction, subject to providing subsequent accommodation. The petitioners raised two primary contentions before the High Court: that Batkhela was not an urban area rendering the Rent Restriction Ordinance inapplicable, and that a twenty-year fixed-term lease protected them from eviction. The Supreme Court held that the factual question of whether Batkhela was an urban area could not be raised for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction without proper foundational pleadings and disclosure of facts. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the finding that the disputed document merely stipulated a rent freeze for twenty years rather than creating a fixed-term lease. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the concurrent ejectment orders.
Questions settled- Can a question of fact regarding the urban classification of an area be raised for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction without proper pleadings?
- Does a contractual stipulation preventing rent increases for a specified duration constitute a fixed-term lease protecting against ejectment?
- MUHAMMAD GHAFRAN vs THE STATE1984 MLD 1496 · Lahore High Court · 1984-07-14Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD FAZIL vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 1669 · Lahore High Court · 1983-05-29Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD FAZIL BARLAS vs MESSRS ESSAJEE & SONS1984 CLC 1784 · Sindh High Court · 1983-10-29Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD FAYYAZ alias SHAKOH vs THE STATE1984 PLD Supreme Court 445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under sections 332, 449, 436, and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code, based entirely on circumstantial evidence following the murder of five family members and the burning of their house. The core legal question involves determining whether the circumstantial evidence presented—including motive arising from a frustrated love affair, fingerprint impressions on objects at the crime scene, and subsequent recoveries of stolen property at the appellant's instance—forms an unbroken, complete chain incompatible with the innocence of the accused. The Supreme Court held that despite the exclusion of an extra-judicial confession and a knife recovery, the remaining well-authenticated circumstances, particularly the matching fingerprints on the kerosene hearth and tin along with the recovery of stolen items, conclusively proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that where a case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, the proven facts must form a complete chain that is wholly incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of any other reasonable hypothesis except guilt.
Questions settled- Can a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence be sustained if the proven facts form a complete and unbroken chain pointing solely to the guilt of the accused?
- Whether fingerprint impressions found on objects at the scene of the crime constitute a strong and reliable piece of circumstantial evidence against an accused?
- Does the absence of the accused's name in the initial first information report vitiate a conviction when subsequent reliable circumstantial evidence connects him to the crime?
- MUHAMMAD FAROOQ vs MESSRS DAWOOD HERCULES CHEMICALS LTD.1984 PLC 453 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-09-14Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD FARID KHAN vs WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY1984 SCMR 603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant challenged the dismissal of his service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal on the ground of limitation, without his application for condonation of delay being considered during the hearing which was confined to the merits. His subsequent review application was dismissed by the Tribunal on the ground that it lacked the power to review its orders. Granting leave, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the dismissal was justified without examining the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant had filed an application for condonation of delay, he was entitled to a proper consideration of that application before his appeal could be dismissed on the ground of limitation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision on the question of limitation after hearing the parties, establishing the principle that a litigant is entitled to a hearing and consideration of a delay condonation application before limitation is invoked against them.
Questions settled- Whether an appellant is entitled to a consideration of an application for condonation of delay before an appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation?
- Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the power to review its earlier decisions under the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974?
- What is the proper course of action when a tribunal dismisses an appeal on limitation without hearing the appellant on that question or considering a delay condonation application?
- MUHAMMAD FARAZ AND OTHERS vs ABDUL RASHID KHAN AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a dispute regarding the entry of ownership of forest land in the record-of-rights during initial settlement operations. The core legal questions involved whether an adequate alternative remedy under section 53 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 precluded writ jurisdiction, and whether the High Court erred in substituting its own finding of fact for that of the Board of Revenue in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the revisional order of the Board of Revenue, as the Board had properly found that entries were made without a final order of a competent authority while the dispute was still under enquiry. The Court ruled that while an alternative remedy before a civil court under section 53 exists, parties are not barred from exhausting remedies within the revenue hierarchy, and the Board of Revenue possesses wide revisional powers under section 164. Furthermore, the High Court cannot interfere with factual findings of inferior tribunals in constitutional jurisdiction merely because it considers the decision wrong. The appeal was allowed and the High Court's judgment was set aside.
Questions settled- Whether an adequate alternative remedy being available under section 53 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 bars recourse to writ jurisdiction?
- Whether the High Court can substitute its own finding of fact for that of the Board of Revenue in the exercise of its constitutional writ jurisdiction?
- What is the scope of the revisional powers of the Board of Revenue under section 164 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967?
- Can the High Court interfere with the decision of a tribunal merely because it considers the decision to be wrong?
- MUHAMMAD ESSA vs THE STATE1984 MLD 1479 · Lahore High Court · 1983-04-10Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD EJAZ AHMAD KAHLOON vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB AND 21984 PLC (C. S.) 729 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1983-01-03Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD DIN AND OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD HASSAN KHAN AND OTHERS1984 CLC 3216 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1984-03-28Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BUX vs MUHAMMAD JIAL AND 5 OTHERS1984 P Cr. L J 3175 · Sindh High Court · 1984-06-27Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BUX vs MUHAMMAD ALI1984 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit filed by the successors-in-interest of a deceased refugee, challenging the transfer of land executed by a lambardar under an alleged power-of-attorney. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the transaction was fraudulent and hit by the Transfer of Property Act, which was subsequently upheld by both the appellate court and the High Court in revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the plaintiffs were estopped from challenging the power-of-attorney under the principle of estoppel, and that the courts below committed an illegality under Section 115(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that fraud vitiates the most solemn transactions and the principle of estoppel cannot override this rule. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies strictly to jurisdictional errors, and a mere error of law or fact unrelated to jurisdiction does not warrant revisional interference.
Questions settled- Can the principle of estoppel be invoked to protect a transaction that is vitiated by fraud?
- Does a wrong decision on a point of law or fact by a subordinate court, unrelated to its jurisdiction, satisfy the requirements for revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Whether the commission of an illegality or material irregularity under Section 115(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 must be strictly relatable to the exercise of jurisdiction by a subordinate court?
- MUHAMMAD BUX RIND AND ANOTHER vs GOVERNMENT OF SIND THROUGH SECRETARY, LABOUR & COOPERATION, SIND SECRETARIAT AND 14 OTHERS1984 PLD Karachi 334 · Sindh High Court · 1983-10-05Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BOOTA vs ALLAH LOK AND 2 OTHERS1984 CLC 3118 · Lahore High Court · 1983-12-05Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BOOTA AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1984 SCMR 560 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of Muhammad Boota for the murder of Rana Muhammad Yaqub under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court convicted the appellant based on ocular testimony and the recovery of a revolver and bayonet. The High Court upheld this conviction, relying heavily on the recovery evidence. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the circumstantial evidence, specifically the recovery of weapons, was sufficient to sustain a capital conviction in the absence of forensic corroboration or matching ballistic reports. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was unsafe. The Court reasoned that the recovered revolver could not be linked to the crime as no empty shells were recovered from the scene to match it. Furthermore, the recovery of a blood-stained bayonet was unreliable because the accused had no prior connection to it, and the location was accessible to others. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that circumstantial evidence must be cogent and directly linked to the accused to support a conviction in a capital case.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the recovery of a weapon when no forensic evidence links that weapon to the crime?
- Does the declaration of a prosecution witness as hostile automatically invalidate their entire testimony?
- Is the recovery of a weapon from a location accessible to others sufficient to establish the guilt of an accused?
- Does Section 154 of the Evidence Act 1872 restrict the court's discretion to allow cross-examination of a party's own witness?
- MUHAMMAD BOOTA AND 2 OTHERS vs NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY1984 CLC 256 · Lahore High Court · 1983-11-12Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BILAL AND OTHERS vs Mst. KANIZ FATIMA AND OTHERS1984 CLC 1427 · Lahore High Court · 1983-05-20Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BILAL and anothers vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 2488 · Lahore High Court · 1982-12-10Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 2267 · Lahore High Court · 1983-11-18Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER AND ANOTHER1984 SCMR 1164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the concurrent factual findings of the Settlement authorities. The core legal question was whether the disputed chaubara could be treated as an independent unit and transferred separately to its occupant. The Supreme Court held that the question involved was essentially one of fact, upon which the highest authority in the settlement organization had already recorded a finding that the chaubara constituted an independent and separate unit. Consequently, the High Court was legally justified in refusing to interfere with that finding, and the Supreme Court affirmed the same, holding that the impugned order warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that superior courts exercising constitutional or appellate jurisdiction will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact rendered by specialized settlement authorities unless such findings are shown to be perverse or without jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court can interfere with a finding of fact determined by the settlement authorities regarding the nature of a property?
- Can a disputed chaubara be treated as an independent unit for separate transfer under settlement laws?
- Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against concurrent factual findings of lower forums and settlement authorities?
- MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs PUNJAB VEGETABLE GHEE & GENERAL MILLS LTD.1984 PLC 706 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1984-02-28Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs MUHAMMAD SHAFI1984 CLC 609 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1983-12-23Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND OTHERS1984 CLC 681 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-14Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE /1984 PLC 53 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-09-06Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs BASHIR AHMAD1984 CLC 2934 · Lahore High Court · 1984-04-07Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BASHIR SHAH vs THE CHAIRMAN, WAPDA AND 2 OTHERS1984 PLC (C. S.) 431 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1984-01-11Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BASHIR KHAN vs TE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 2886 · Sindh High Court · 1983-11-07Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BANARAS AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 496 · Lahore High Court · 1983-12-06Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BAKHSH vs THE STATE1984 SCMR 1310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner against the dismissal of his appeal by the High Court, which had confirmed his conviction and death sentence for the murder of his real niece. The prosecution case was supported by the testimony of the deceased's father and sisters, two independent witnesses, the dying declaration of the deceased, and the recovery of a blood-stained hatchet from the petitioner. The core legal question was whether an affidavit filed by the deceased's father (the petitioner's brother) forgiving the petitioner constituted a mitigating circumstance sufficient to reduce the death sentence. The Supreme Court held that forgiveness by the petitioner's brother under the circumstances of this case did not constitute a mitigating circumstance entitling the petitioner to a lesser penalty. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that familial forgiveness does not automatically warrant a reduction of sentence in a murder conviction under the prevailing law.
Questions settled- Does the forgiveness of an offender by the deceased's father constitute a mitigating circumstance sufficient to reduce a death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can a conviction for murder be sustained primarily on the corroborated testimony of close relatives and a dying declaration of the deceased?
- MUHAMMAD BAKHSH vs MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM and others1984 CLC 2653 · Lahore High Court · 1983-04-03Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BAKHSH alias MUHAMMADI vs THE STATE1984 SCMR 1474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, Muhammad Bakhsh, was convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge for murder and theft under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving life imprisonment and one year of rigorous imprisonment, respectively, to run concurrently. The Lahore High Court maintained these convictions and sentences on appeal. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging the reliance on a solitary eye-witness testimony. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, including the testimony of the eye-witness, corroborating medical evidence, and the established motive of land dispute enmity. The Court held that the testimony of a solitary eye-witness is sufficient for conviction when there is no evidence of enmity or motive to falsely implicate the accused. Finding no grounds to interfere with the convictions, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. However, the Court exercised its discretion to grant the petitioner the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the computation of his sentence, modifying the order accordingly.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the testimony of a solitary eye-witness?
- Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a convict seeking leave to appeal?
- Does the absence of enmity between an eye-witness and the accused support the reliability of the witness's testimony?
- MUHAMMAD BAKHSH alias MAMDOO vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 1885 · Lahore High Court · 1982-12-04Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BADAL alias MOFIZUDDIN /Opponent vs MUHAMMAD ISLAM1984 CLC 2086 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AZRAM vs NAWAB AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a criminal incident involving a fatal stabbing and injuries following a Kabaddi match. The core legal question was whether the lower courts correctly appraised the evidence regarding premeditation and vicarious liability, and whether the conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was sustainable given the circumstances. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings that the incident was not a premeditated attack but a sudden quarrel arising from provocation, thereby negating common object and vicarious liability. However, the Court modified the conviction of the primary appellant, Nawab, from murder under Section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court held that while the accused acted with knowledge that his blow was likely to cause death, the absence of premeditation and the heat of the moment precluded the requisite intention for murder. The principle established is that in sudden, unpremeditated altercations, the specific intent required for murder may be absent, necessitating a reclassification of the offense to culpable homicide.
Questions settled- Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained when the evidence proves a sudden quarrel without premeditation?
- Does the absence of premeditation and the presence of a sudden quarrel negate the application of vicarious liability in a criminal assault?
- When should an act causing death be classified as culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than murder?
- MUHAMMAD AZMATULLAH SIDDIQUI AND OTHERS vs REVENUE OFFICER, KOTRI1984 PLD Karachi 413 · Sindh High Court · 1984-04-26Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AZIZUR REHMAN vs CHIEF ENGINEER, PUNJAB BUILDINGS1984 PLC (C. S.) 727 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1983-01-09Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AZIZULLAH vs ABDUL GHAFFAR1984 CLC 2837 · Sindh High Court · 1984-04-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant-landlord filed an ejectment application against the respondent-tenant under Section 13 of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, seeking possession of a disputed shop on the ground of personal bona fide use after his retirement from government service. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, holding that the appellant failed to establish his bona fide requirement and that the parties' 1974 agreement barred eviction. Upon appeal, the Sindh High Court considered whether a mere statement of retirement and a desire to start a business suffices to prove personal need, and whether a landlord can contractually waive the right of ejectment. The Court held that a landlord's personal requirement must be established through an objective assessment of evidence, including the nature of the proposed business, financial resources, and necessary arrangements, and that a mere statement of retirement does not create a presumption of good faith. Furthermore, the Court held that a landlord who explicitly barters away or waives his personal need for valuable consideration cannot subsequently seek ejectment in repudiation of the contract. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a landlord's mere statement of retirement and desire to start a business is sufficient to establish bona fide personal requirement under rent laws?
- Can a landlord contractually waive the statutory right to seek ejectment of a tenant for personal use?
- Whether the burden lies on the landlord to prove financial resources and arrangements when claiming premises for a new business?
- MUHAMMAD AZEEM vs BASHIR MUHAMMAD AND OTHERS1984 P Cr. L J 3182 · Lahore High Court · 1982-10-11Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AZAM vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 1506 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1984-03-27Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AZAM vs SHABBIR ALI and others1984 SCMR 1505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the acquittal of the accused, who were initially convicted under sections 302, 323, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Following the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court, the accused were arrested pursuant to non-bailable warrants. The core legal question addressed is whether the accused, having been arrested pending the hearing of the appeal against their acquittal, are entitled to bail due to the passage of time. The Supreme Court held that the delay of two years in the disposal of the appeal against acquittal constitutes sufficient grounds for the grant of bail. Consequently, the Court admitted the accused to bail, subject to the furnishing of surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner, Khushab. The principle laid down is that prolonged delay in the adjudication of an appeal against acquittal, during which the accused remains incarcerated, serves as a valid basis for the exercise of judicial discretion to grant bail.
Questions settled- Does a two-year delay in the disposal of an appeal against acquittal entitle the accused to the grant of bail?
- Can the Supreme Court grant bail to an accused person pending the hearing of an appeal against their acquittal?
- MUHAMMAD AZAM vs MUHAMMAD IQBAL AND OTHERS1984 PLD Supreme Court 95 · Shariat Appellate BenchRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a criminal appeal before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court against the Federal Shariat Court's acquittal of the respondent for Zina-bil-Jabr under section 10(3) of the Offence of Zina Ordinance, 1979. The Federal Shariat Court had acquitted the accused on the assumption of a valid, consensual marriage with the prosecutrix, overturning the trial court's conviction.
The core legal questions were whether the trial court failed in its duty to summon essential evidence regarding the alleged Nikah and other material facts, and how the plea of valid marriage interacts with the exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts under the Family Courts Act, 1964.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to discharge its mandatory duty under the second part of section 540, Cr. P. C., to summon evidence essential for the just decision of the case, including the Nikahnama, Nikah witnesses, and statements made by the prosecutrix during investigation. The Court set aside both the trial and appellate judgments and remanded the case for fresh trial. Key principles laid down: (1) under section 540's second part, summoning essential evidence is obligatory, not discretionary, and the rule against "filling gaps" does not apply; (2) a valid marriage is a defence to Zina liable to Tazir, but the burden is on the accused to prove it without doubt; (3) a Family Court's decision on Nikah is binding on the criminal court, and criminal proceedings should be stayed pending Family Court adjudication; (4) courts must actively participate in proceedings under sections 540, Cr. P. C. and 165, Evidence Act to discover truth, particularly where fake evidence or coercion is suspected.
- MUHAMMAD AZAM AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1984 SCMR 1166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' application for the suspension of their sentences pending appeal. The petitioners, convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment, sought relief under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the suspension of sentence was warranted given the significant delay in the appellate process. The Supreme Court observed that more than two years had elapsed since the filing of the appeal, and the record remained unprinted, with further delays anticipated. Holding that the prolonged delay in the hearing of the appeal without fault of the petitioners constituted a valid ground for relief, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and ordered the suspension of the petitioners' sentences. The judgment reinforces the principle that where an appellate court is unable to hear an appeal within a reasonable timeframe due to administrative delays, the suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is appropriate.
Questions settled- Can a sentence be suspended under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 due to the non-printing of the appellate record?
- Does a significant delay in the hearing of an appeal justify the suspension of a life sentence?
- Is the suspension of a sentence permissible when the appellate court is unlikely to fix the appeal for hearing in the near future?
- MUHAMMAD AYYUB vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 2889 · Sindh High Court · 1983-11-29Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AYYUB QURESHI vs CHAIRMAN, WAPDA AND OTHERS1984 PLC (C. S.) 133 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1983-10-05Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AYYUB KHAN vs Ch. MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND ANOTHER1984 CLC 2259 · Lahore High Court · 1983-08-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Lahore, which decreed respondent No. 1's suit for possession through specific performance of a contract of sale regarding a plot of land. The appellant had purchased the plot at an open auction from the Lahore Improvement Trust and subsequently agreed to sell it to respondent No. 1 for Rs. 68,000. Disputes arose regarding the stipulated period for registration, the actual consideration amount mentioned for tax purposes, and the procurement of clearance certificates. The core legal questions involved whether time was the essence of the contract, whether the agreement was void due to an unlawful collateral term regarding deflated consideration, and whether the plaintiff remained ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The Lahore High Court held that time was not of the essence in the sale of immovable property, that the lawful main contract for sale could be severed from the collateral deflated price agreement, and that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the specific performance decree.
Questions settled- Whether time is the essence of a contract for the sale of immovable property where a specific period for completion is fixed?
- Can an agreement of sale be specifically enforced if a collateral term relating to the sale price for tax purposes is found to be unlawful?
- Whether a party can unilaterally revoke an agreement to sell upon the expiry of a stipulated time limit when time is not of the essence?
- MUHAMMAD AYYAZ vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 2967 · Lahore High Court · 1984-04-13Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AYUB vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 1826 · Lahore High Court · 1984-04-17Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AYUB vs SADIK ALI KHAN and another1984 SCMR 1402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the disputed transfer of a property in Rohri, District Sukkur, originally transferred to the appellant via a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) in 1959. The property was subsequently resumed and auctioned to the respondent following an alleged default in payment. The Settlement Commissioner, in revision, set aside the resumption, finding no evidence that the appellant was served notice regarding the default. The High Court, however, interfered with this finding based on presumptions of service and held that the Settlement Commissioner lacked revisional jurisdiction once a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) was issued. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court erred in interfering with the Settlement Commissioner's findings of fact based on mere surmises rather than the record. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that the Settlement Commissioner retains revisional jurisdiction even after the issuance of a P.T.D., consistent with established precedent. The Court concluded that the initial transfer to the appellant was never legally cancelled, rendering the subsequent auction invalid, and restored the Settlement Commissioner's order.
Questions settled- Can a High Court interfere with findings of fact recorded by a Settlement Commissioner based on mere presumptions?
- Does a Settlement Commissioner retain the power of revision after a Permanent Transfer Deed has been issued to an auction purchaser?
- Is an auction sale of property valid if the original transfer order was not legally cancelled due to lack of notice to the original transferee?
- MUHAMMAD AYUB vs MUHAMMAD SI DDIQUE AND OTHERS1984 P Cr. L J 1224 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1984-02-26Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AYUB vs Mst. NASIM AKHTAR AND ANOTHER1984 P Cr. L J 160 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1983-06-26Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN vs THE CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND 21984 PLC (C. S.) 700 · Federal Service Commission · 1984-03-25Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN vs Rai ABDUL QAYYUM and others1984 SCMR 1231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a rent ejectment matter where the petitioner, a tenant, challenged an eviction order affirmed by the District Judge and upheld by the Lahore High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. The core legal questions concerned whether the tenant was in default of rent payment and whether the service of notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, was validly effected. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts, noting that the notice was properly addressed and deemed served, and that the tenant had failed to comply with the rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the Ordinance, leading to the striking off of his defence. The Court held that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to re-examine findings of fact established by competent authorities. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, though the Court granted the tenant a three-month grace period to surrender possession based on his undertaking to vacate and pay outstanding rent.
Questions settled- Can a High Court interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with concurrent findings of fact recorded by rent tribunals?
- Does the refusal to accept a properly addressed registered notice constitute valid service of notice under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- Is a tenant who fails to comply with a rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 liable for eviction due to default?
- MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN vs ADDL. D. C. (GENERAL), SHEIKHUPURA AND 21984 CLC 544 · Lahore High Court · 1983-12-11Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AYAZ vs MAZEED KHAN AND ANOTHER1984 SCMR 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged the order of the Peshawar High Court, which had granted bail to the respondent in a criminal case involving charges of murder and causing injuries. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had exercised its judicial discretion properly in granting bail, particularly in light of the circumstances surrounding the incident. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that the High Court had observed that a person from the accused's side was also found dead at the crime scene with a weapon nearby, yet the prosecution had failed to provide any explanation regarding the circumstances of that individual's death. Finding no infirmity or error in the exercise of discretion by the High Court in granting bail, the Supreme Court held that the impugned order was not exceptionable. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that the appellate court will not interfere with the discretionary grant of bail by a lower court unless it is shown to be arbitrary or based on a misreading of the record.
Questions settled- Does the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail in a murder case warrant interference by the Supreme Court if no infirmity is found?
- Is the presence of an unexplained death on the accused's side at the crime scene a relevant factor for the court to consider when deciding a bail application?
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs YAQOOB AND ANOTHER1984 SCMR 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal challenging the orders of the High Court suspending the sentences of Fazal Ellahi and Yaqoob under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Both respondents were convicted under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving sentences of life imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment with fines. The High Court suspended their sentences upon forming a tentative view from the judgment that the specific part attributed to one respondent was not established and that the question of vicarious liability required consideration, placing both respondents on par. The core legal question was whether the High Court acted injudiciously in suspending the sentences based on a tentative opinion formed from the trial judgment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its discretion in forming a tentative opinion on the face of the judgment, and the suspension orders were not injudicious. The petitions were accordingly dismissed, establishing that an appellate court may exercise its discretion to suspend a sentence under section 426 Cr.P.C. by forming a tentative assessment of the merits of the case from the trial judgment.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court suspend a sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 based on a tentative opinion formed from the trial judgment?
- Whether the High Court's exercise of discretion in suspending a sentence can be interfered with when it is based on a tentative assessment of the merits?
- Does parity in the case of co-accused justify the suspension of sentence for one based on the reasoning applied to another?
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs UNITED BANK LTD. AND ANOTHER1984 PLC 1029 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-11-29Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 2518 · Lahore High Court · 1983-11-26Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs SHER AHMED AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 4i9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises out of the acquittal of the respondents for the murder of Ashraf by the trial court, which was upheld by the High Court in revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether interference with concurrent findings of fact regarding acquittal was warranted upon a reappraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's counsel raised no question of law and failed to provide any compelling reason for the court to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily reappraise evidence to interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal in the absence of a substantial question of law or serious legal error by the lower courts.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence to interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal?
- Does the dismissal of a petition against acquitted co-accused affect the case of an absconding co-accused?
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs SHABBIR HUSSAIN and 10 others1984 CLC 2798 · Sindh High Court · 1981-03-31Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs PUNJAB URBAN TRANSPORT CORPORATION1984 PLC 957 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-07-03Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs PAKISTAN RAILWAYS THROUGH CHIEF PERSONNEL1984 PLC 1413 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, JHANG1984 PLC 723 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-01-28Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs FEDERAL LAND COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI and 51984 MLD 271 · Sindh High Court · 1984-04-10Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM SHAH JAFFARY vs PUNJAB AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT1984 PLC 1265 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM DHUDDI vs THE CHAIRMAN, AREA ELECTRICITY BOARD, WAPDA, QUETTA CANTT1984 PLC 915 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM CHISHTI vs CHAIRMAN, WAPDA AND 2 OTHERS1984 PLC (C. S.) 21 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1983-10-08Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM ARAIN vs PUNJAB AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT &1984 PLC 636 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND OTHERS vs SHERDIL KHAN AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a remand order passed by the Additional District Judge, Peshawar. The respondent, a diploma-holder, filed a suit challenging his non-promotion and the validity of a government notification regarding transfers and postings, while inadvertently failing to challenge the primary notification regarding the promotion of others. During the suit's pendency, the respondent filed an application under Order XXIII, Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking withdrawal of the suit with permission to file a fresh one. The trial court dismissed the suit on a preliminary issue regarding a statutory bar under the Specific Relief Act 1877 without deciding the withdrawal application. The appellate court set aside this dismissal and remanded the case, directing the trial court to first decide the withdrawal application. The Supreme Court upheld the remand order, holding that the appellate court correctly identified that the trial court could not determine the suit's competency or jurisdiction without first addressing the pending application for withdrawal, as the respondent's cause of action depended on the proper identification of the challenged notification.
Questions settled- Can a trial court dismiss a suit on a preliminary issue without first deciding a pending application for withdrawal of the suit with permission to file a fresh one?
- Is a remand order legally infirm if the appellate court directs the trial court to first dispose of a pending application for withdrawal of the suit?
- Does an appellate court have the discretion to remand a case for fresh decision when the trial court failed to address a procedural application that could impact the cause of action?
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND ANOTHER vs PUNJAB AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT1984 PLC 756 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND ANOTHER vs MIR AFZAL alias MIR AFSAR AND ANOTHER1984 SCMR 1050 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Aslam and another against Mir Afzal alias Mir Afsar and another. The core legal question sought to be agitated in the petition stood already adjudicated by the apex court in a prior precedent, which ran counter to the petitioners' primary plea on the merits. Upon reviewing the settled legal position, the court held that no useful purpose would be served by proceeding further with the matter as it did not constitute a fit case for the grant of leave to appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that matters conclusively settled by binding precedent cannot be reopened.
Questions settled- Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the core question sought to be agitated stands already decided by the Supreme Court?
- Does a petition serve any useful purpose if the main plea on merits goes against settled precedent?
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND 9 OTHERS vs FINANCIAL ADVISOR & CHIEF1984 PLC 1550 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM alias ACCHA AND OTHERS vs THE STATE1984 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for murder and simple hurt. The core legal questions involved whether the incident was a sudden fight attracting Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the trial court was bound under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to examine injured defence witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the occurrence took place without premeditation during a sudden quarrel where both sides suffered injuries, bringing the principal offender's case under Exception 4 to Section 300, and further held that the trial court erred in failing to exercise its mandatory powers under the second part of Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to examine material witnesses essential for a just decision. The court laid down the principle that the second part of Section 540 imposes a mandatory duty on the court to summon witnesses whose evidence is essential for the just decision of the case, and altered the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Questions settled- Whether a sudden quarrel without premeditation during a fight attracts Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Is it mandatory for a trial court under the second part of Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon and examine a witness if their evidence appears essential for the just decision of the case?
- Whether individual liability can be fastened on accused persons when an incident arises out of a sudden flare-up without a common object or premeditation?
- Muhammad Aslain Mian, WALAYAT vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 1429 · Lahore High Court · 1983-02-11Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASIF vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 544 · Lahore High Court · 1983-12-19Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAFAppellaat vs Ch. MUHAMMAD SAFDAR1984 CLC 1890 · Sindh High Court · 1983-10-25Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs THE STATE1984 MLD 1584 · Lahore High Court · 1983-08-29Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs PAKISTAN ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD. LAHORE AND ANOTHER1984 PLC 1281 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs MEMBER (REVENUE) BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE AND 18 OTHERS1984 CLC 2950 · Lahore High Court · 1984-05-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the petitioner claiming to be a tenant of the disputed agricultural land under paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (Martial Law Regulation No. 115). The Collector and Additional Commissioner decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner, but the Member, Board of Revenue accepted the respondents' revision and dismissed the suit, holding that a lessee does not qualify as a tenant entitled to a right of pre-emption. The core legal question was whether a lessee (Thekedar) holding land for a fixed period under a lease agreement falls within the definition of a 'tenant' under paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, so as to exercise the statutory right of pre-emption. The Lahore High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that a lessee is distinct from a tenant and is excluded from the definition of a tenant under the Land Reforms Regulation, its notifications, and subsequent amendments. The court laid down the principle that the special right of pre-emption granted under Land Reforms legislation is intended exclusively for actual tillers and cultivating tenants to improve their socio-economic conditions, and does not extend to commercial lessees or fixed-term leaseholders.
Questions settled- Whether a lessee cultivating agricultural land under a fixed-term lease agreement qualifies as a tenant for the purpose of claiming a right of pre-emption under paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
- Did the Land Commission's notifications validly exclude lessees from the definition of tenants under Martial Law Regulation No. 115?
- Does the Land Reforms Regulation (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 explicitly exclude lessees from the definition of a tenant?
- Can a revisional authority interfere with concurrent findings of subordinate courts where those findings are based on a misinterpretation of law regarding tenant status?
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs MANAGING DIRECTOR PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT1984 PLC 470 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-03-20Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs KARACHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION1984 PLC 584 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1984-02-28Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs DOST MUHAMMAD and another1984 SCMR 1505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions arise out of concurrent findings of the lower courts decreeing a suit for possession by way of pre-emption, which was upheld by the District Judge and subsequently by the Lahore High Court in revision. The core legal questions involved whether the District Judge failed to exercise jurisdiction by not deciding all relevant issues, whether un-rebutted evidence must be accepted, and whether the pre-emptor waived their right or failed to comply with court-fee orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the leave to appeal, holding that the contentions were without merit because the petitioners' counsel had not pressed the remaining issues before the District Judge, amounting to an abandonment of those pleas, and that the pre-emptors had successfully proved their superior right of pre-emption. The key principle laid down is that points not pressed before the lower appellate court cannot be agitated as a ground of failure to exercise jurisdiction in higher forums, and the concurrent findings based on proper appreciation of evidence regarding superior pre-emptive rights will not be interfered with.
Questions settled- Whether the failure of an appellate court to decide issues that were not pressed by counsel amounts to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction?
- Can a party agitate issues in a higher forum that were explicitly abandoned or not pressed before the lower appellate court?
- Whether the absence of later Jamabandis not completed at the time of the institution of the suit affects the proof of a superior right of pre-emption?
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SCHOOLS), SARGODHA DIVISION AND ANOTHER1984 PLC (C. S.) 742 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs ABDUL KHALIQ1984 CLC 906 · Lahore High Court · 1983-02-14Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF AND OTHERS vs THE STATE1984 PLD Federal Shariat Court 59 · Federal Shariat Court · 1983-08-07Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 3202 · Federal Shariat Court · 1981-07-24Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHIQ vs Sardar ABDUL HAYE KHAN AND 2 OTHERS1984 PLD Peshawar 78 · Peshawar High Court · 1983-10-07Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHIQ AND OTHERS vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 903 · Lahore High Court · 1982-02-01Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHIQ AND 2 OTHERS vs Faqir MASOOM KHAN AND 2 OTHERS1984 PLD Peshawar 150 · Peshawar High Court · 1984-01-22Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHFAQ vs THE STATE1984 SCMR 1229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the appellant challenged the death sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the appellant, being 16 years and 6 months old at the time of the incident, was entitled to a lesser sentence than death due to his age. The Supreme Court reviewed the circumstances of the crime, noting that the appellant had previously been dismissed from employment by the deceased following a dispute with another labourer, for which he had threatened revenge. The Court observed that the appellant subsequently attacked the deceased in his home, inflicting thirteen dagger wounds in a cruel and merciless manner. The Court held that despite the appellant's young age, the brutality and premeditated nature of the attack demonstrated that he was a desperate individual undeserving of leniency. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the death sentence was maintained, establishing that age alone does not mitigate the sentence in cases of extreme brutality.
Questions settled- Does the age of a sixteen-year-old offender automatically entitle them to a lesser sentence than death in a murder case?
- Can the brutality of a crime outweigh the mitigating factor of a young age when determining the quantum of sentence?
- MUHAMMAD ASHFAQ and 3 others vs KARAM ALI TAR MUHAMMAD1984 CLC 2564 · Sindh High Court · 1983-05-30Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASGHAR vs THE STATE1984 SCMR 1077 · Shariat Appellate Bench · 1984-04-03Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASGHAR vs THE SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, FOOD1984 CLC 1453 · Lahore High Court · 1984-03-26Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASGHAR vs REGIONAL MANAGER, PUNJAB AGRICULTURAL1984 PLC 880 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASGHAR vs Mst. 1NAYAT BEGUM and another1984 SCMR 1266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a dispute concerning the transfer of a shop in Moti Bazar, Rawalpindi, originally purchased in an open auction by respondent Mst. Inayat Begum in May 1962. Due to an administrative failure to record the adjustment of a compensation book towards the transfer price, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner resumed the shop in December 1975 and subsequently transferred it to the petitioner under Scheme No. VIII. The respondent challenged the resumption via a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court, which set aside the resumption and transfer orders, holding that since more than twenty-five percent of the price had been paid, the proviso to paragraph 2 of the re-constituted Scheme No. VIII barred resumption. An Intra-Court appeal having failed, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authority had the power to resume the property given the statutory protection against resumption. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the resumption was illegal and without jurisdiction because the respondent was protected by the statutory provision prohibiting resumption when over twenty-five percent of the transfer price was paid.
Questions settled- Whether the Settlement Authority has the power to initiate resumption proceedings when more than twenty-five percent of the transfer price has already been paid?
- Can discretionary relief in constitutional jurisdiction be denied on the ground of laches where the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction?
- What is the appropriate recourse for the Department in case of default in payment of the transfer price under Scheme No. VIII?
- MUHAMMAD ASGHAR vs DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN1984 PLC 1665 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1984-07-24Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASGHAR vs DISTRICT JUDGE, SIALKOT and 3 others1984 SCMR 1225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a vendee in a pre-emption suit against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his constitutional petition challenging the revisional order of the District Judge refusing him permission to lead additional evidence. The core legal question concerns whether an order allowing or refusing additional evidence amounts to a 'case decided' so as to be amenable to revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether revisional jurisdiction in such circumstances should be controlled by discretionary constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that an authoritative pronouncement on the question is required, suspended the decision of the District Judge ad interim, and allowed the trial court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously while granting leave.
Questions settled- Does an order granting or refusing permission to produce additional evidence amount to a case decided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is an interlocutory order allowing additional evidence amenable to revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- How should the revisional jurisdiction of a court in interlocutory matters be controlled by the discretionary constitutional jurisdiction possessed by superior courts?
- MUHAMMAD ASGHAR MAHMOOD AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 3129 · Lahore High Court · 1984-05-01Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASGHAR GONDAL vs Mst. GHULAM SUGHRA AND 2 onmks1984 CLC 3493 · Lahore High Court · 1984-07-10Read full judgment →