Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- Mst. RAZIA KHATOON vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COM MISSIONER1984 CLC 1957 · Sindh High Court · 1983-02-01Read full judgment →
- Mst. RAZIA BEGUM vs PROJECT DIRECTOR, LINES AREA REDEVELOPMENT1984 CLC 2012 · Sindh High Court · 1983-12-11Read full judgment →
- Mst. RASHIDAN BIBI vs SHAFI MUHAMMAD1984 CLC 112 · Lahore High Court · 1983-06-11Read full judgment →
- Mst. RASHIDA KHATOON vs Syed HAMID ALI NAQVI1984 MLD 1112 · Sindh High Court · 1984-10-01Read full judgment →
- Mst. RASHID BIBI vs ABDUL KARIM AND ANOTHER1984 P Cr. L J 1271 · Sindh High Court · 1983-11-27Read full judgment →
- Mst. RANI vs RIAZ AHMAD KHAN AND OTHERS1984 P Cr. L J 2074 · Lahore High Court · 1984-02-21Read full judgment →
- Mst. RAHIMIA BIBI vs FAIZULLAH1984 CLC 2011 · Sindh High Court · 1983-12-20Read full judgment →
- Mst. RAFAQAT BIBI vs THE STATE1984 PLD Federal Shariat Court 39 · Federal Shariat Court · 1984-01-16Read full judgment →
- Mst. RABIA BEGUM vs Mian KHAN TALWALA1984 PLD Quetta 99 · Balochistan High Court · 1984-03-09Read full judgment →
- Mst. QAMARUNNISA vs MUHAMMAD HANIF1984 CLC 1013 · Sindh High Court · 1984-01-22Read full judgment →
- Mst. QAIM KHATOON and another vs KARIM BUX and 6 others1984 MLD 542 · Sindh High Court · 1984-05-08Read full judgment →
- Mst. POPALZAI vs THE DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,KARACHI AND ANOTHER1984 CLC 630 · Sindh High Court · 1983-05-21Read full judgment →
- Mst. PASHA BEGUM vs ISHAQUE AHMED1984 MLD 1147 · Sindh High Court · 1984-10-16Read full judgment →
- Mst. PARVEEN alias PARVEEN FATIMA vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 2493 · Sindh High Court · 1983-12-04Read full judgment →
- Mst. PARVEEN AKHTAR vs GHULAM SARWAR KHAN AND ANOTHER1984 P Cr. L J 1329 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-19Read full judgment →
- Mst. OMARUN NISA vs Mst. ROSHAN ARA BEGUM1984 MLD 234 · Sindh High Court · 1983-10-11Read full judgment →
- Mst. NOORUNNISA AND ANOTHER vs MUHAMMAD SARWAR AND 6 OTHERS1984 PLD Peshawar 25 · Peshawar High Court · 1983-07-25Read full judgment →
- Mst. NOORAN vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 1857 (1) · Lahore High Court · 1983-04-12Read full judgment →
- Mst. NOOR JEHAN vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 1725 · Sindh High Court · 1983-02-15Read full judgment →
- Mst. NOOR JEHAN vs ABDUL RAZZAQ SHAH1984 CLC 2220 · Lahore High Court · 1983-03-18Read full judgment →
- Mst. NEMAT BIBI vs THE STATE1984 PLD Federal Shariat Court 17 · Federal Shariat Court · 1983-08-28Read full judgment →
- Mst. NAZNIN FATIMA AND OTHERS vs Syed HUSSAIN AHMED SHAH AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal arising out of an urban settlement case. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether the High Court and the Settlement Commissioner correctly assumed and effected the transfer of the disputed house to both contesting parties on the basis of its division according to their respective possessions. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner possessed the power to divide the property and had consciously applied his mind to relevant factors, including the separate occupation of the ground floor and first floor by the claimants and the impossibility of determining a prior allottee. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the division and transfer of the property in accordance with possession was lawful and not arbitrary. The key principle laid down is that a Settlement Commissioner may lawfully divide and transfer a disputed property to multiple occupants based on their separate possession where the relevant factors have been consciously considered.
Questions settled- Whether a Settlement Commissioner has the power to divide a house even if lower settlement authorities have declared it indivisible?
- Did the Settlement Commissioner consciously apply his mind to the question of divisibility of the property based on separate possession?
- Is the transfer of a disputed house to its occupants according to their respective possessions lawful under urban settlement laws?
- Mst. NAZIRAN BIBI vs MUHAMMAD ROSHAN AND 2 OTHERS1984 CLC 3330 · Lahore High Court · 1984-05-28Read full judgment →
- Mst. NAZIRA BEGUM vs Mir HUSSAIN KHAN AND OTHERS1984 PLD Azad J & K 1 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1983-10-30Read full judgment →
- Mst. NAWAB BIBI vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, FAISALABAD and others1984 SCMR 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of a shop under settlement laws. The petitioner, who was in possession of the property, had filed a transfer application on Form RS. VIII/House. However, the property was subsequently transferred to third-party respondents. The High Court had upheld this transfer, reasoning that the petitioner's form had been returned to her and, having not been resubmitted, was not pending before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted an entry indicating the form was to be returned to the applicant; however, it found no evidence proving the actual dispatch or receipt of the form by the petitioner. Consequently, the Court held that the contention that the property could not be transferred to a third party while the petitioner's application remained undisposed of carried significant legal force. Leave to appeal was granted, and the interim stay order was maintained pending the final disposal of the appeal, emphasizing the necessity of proof regarding the disposal of pending transfer applications.
Questions settled- Can a property be transferred to a third party while a transfer application from a current occupant remains undisposed of?
- Does an entry in a record indicating the return of a transfer form constitute sufficient proof of its actual dispatch and receipt by the applicant?
- Mst. NASREEN AKHTAR vs THE STATE1984 SCMR 123 · Shariat Appellate Bench · 1983-10-14Read full judgment →
- Mst. NASIM MAI vs SHAHADA T1984 MLD 1507 · Lahore High Court · 1981-05-02Read full judgment →
- Mst. MUSHTRI AND 5 OTHERS vs LAJBAR AND 10 OTHERS1984 CLC 1240 · Peshawar High Court · 1984-03-06Read full judgment →
- Mst. MUSHKUN NISA alias SABIHA QUDDUSI vs ISL A MU DDIN--Defendant1984 MLD 30 · Sindh High Court · 1984-01-09Read full judgment →
- Mst. MUSHAROFA BEGUM vs Syed NAYYAR HUSSAIN AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from an Urban Settlement case challenging a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition regarding an alleged illegal increase in the price of transferred property. The core legal question was whether the price of property transferred to the petitioner could be increased after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.). The Supreme Court examined whether the Settlement Commissioner's findings of fact regarding the rental value and property size were subject to interference in writ jurisdiction. The Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's factual determination—based on site inspection and municipal records—that the petitioner's property had a higher rental value than initially assessed was sound. Consequently, the High Court correctly exercised its discretion to dismiss the writ petition, as interference would have perpetuated an injustice. The Court established that where findings of fact regarding property valuation are supported by evidence, they are not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction, particularly when such interference would result in injustice rather than the furtherance of law.
Questions settled- Can the High Court interfere with factual findings regarding property valuation in its writ jurisdiction when such interference would result in injustice?
- Is a property price increase permissible after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed if the initial valuation was subject to contemporaneous correction?
- Does a Settlement Commissioner have the authority to re-evaluate property rental value based on site inspection and municipal records?
- Mst. MURRIAN AND OTHERS vs SULEMAN AND 4 OTHERS1984 PLD SC (A J & K) 63 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1984-02-06Read full judgment →
- Mst. MUQEET FATIMA and another vs Messrs FOUR FRIENDS CORPORATION1984 MLD 523 · Sindh High Court · 1984-07-04Read full judgment →
- Mst. MUMTAZ BEGUM AND 2 OTHERS vs BOMANSHAW BURJORJI GAZDAR AND 2 OTHERS1984 CLC 1820 · Sindh High Court · 1983-08-31Read full judgment →
- Mst. MERAJ BEGUM and others vs Mst. SULTAN ZENAB and others1984 SCMR 1348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court affirming the dismissal of the appellants' writ petition regarding the transfer of an urban property under the Displaced Persons (Rehabilitation and Settlement) Act 1958. The core legal dispute involved the rival claims for the transfer of the entire house or, alternatively, the maintenance of its initial division between claimant and non-claimant parties. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, the contesting parties and their respective counsel reached an amicable agreement to resolve the matter by dividing the disputed house vertically between them, as delineated on a site-plan made part of the record. Acting upon the joint request of the parties, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeal in accordance with the agreed settlement. The holding establishes that urban settlement disputes under the relevant rehabilitation legislation can be resolved and disposed of on the basis of a lawful, mutually agreed vertical division of the property between contesting claimants.
Questions settled- Can an urban property dispute under the Displaced Persons (Rehabilitation and Settlement) Act 1958 be resolved on the basis of a mutually agreed vertical division between contesting parties?
- Whether an appeal concerning the transfer of a displaced person's house can be disposed of in terms of a compromise reached by the parties before the Supreme Court?
- Mst. MEHR TAJA vs Mst. BABO JAN AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which refused to restore a regular Second Appeal that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioner challenged the dismissal, arguing that she had not received notice of the hearing date and that the court was wrongly influenced by a history of adjournments. The core legal question was whether sufficient grounds existed for the readmission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution when the appellant claimed lack of notice. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner was represented by counsel stationed at the seat of the court, the plea regarding lack of notice was untenable. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the case papers were removed to engage new counsel, noting that the original counsel had not withdrawn with the court's permission as required by procedural rules. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, finding no justifiable ground for restoration, and dismissed the petition, emphasizing that procedural rules regarding counsel withdrawal must be strictly followed.
Questions settled- Can an appellant seek restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution on the grounds of lack of notice when represented by counsel?
- Is an application for restoration of an appeal maintainable if the appellant's counsel did not withdraw from the case with the court's permission?
- Does the history of previous adjournments influence a court's decision on an application for restoration of an appeal?
- Mst. MARYAM BANO vs HUSSAIN ALI AND ANOTHER1984 CLC 1961 · Sindh High Court · 1983-10-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner challenged an order passed by a Chairman under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, regarding the validity of a divorce pronounced by her husband. The core legal question was whether a written divorce deed executed by a Shia Muslim husband, absent the oral pronouncement in the presence of witnesses required by Shia jurisprudence, constitutes a valid Talaq, and whether the Chairman possesses jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Ordinance to process such a divorce. The Court held that the divorce was invalid because it failed to comply with the strict requirements of Shia law, which mandates oral pronouncement in Arabic in the presence of two witnesses. Consequently, the Chairman lacked jurisdiction to initiate or confirm proceedings under Section 7, as a valid pronouncement of Talaq is a mandatory pre-condition for the Ordinance's application. The Court established that Section 7 proceedings are not merely mechanical; the Chairman must prima facie ascertain the validity of a Talaq before exercising jurisdiction, as an invalid Talaq cannot trigger the statutory machinery.
Questions settled- Is a written divorce deed executed by a Shia Muslim husband valid without oral pronouncement in the presence of witnesses?
- Does the Chairman have jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 to process an invalid Talaq?
- Is a valid pronouncement of Talaq a pre-condition for initiating proceedings under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
- Mst. MARIAM vs Haji AHMAD1984 CLC 2865 · Sindh High Court · 1984-03-21Read full judgment →
- Mst. MARIAM AND 3 OTHERS vs ABDUL RASHID1984 CLC 1571 · Sindh High Court · 1983-12-19Read full judgment →
- Mst. MARIAM and 12 others vs MUHAMMAD ISHAQ1984 MLD 1088 · Sindh High Court · 1984-10-17Read full judgment →
- Mst. MAJIDAN KHANUM vs DISTRICT JUDGE, VEHARI1984 CLC 3270 · Lahore High Court · 1984-04-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition challenged two orders of the District Judge, Vehari, which dismissed the petitioner's revision petitions filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The first revision petition was dismissed on the ground of non-compliance with the pre-presentation notice requirements under Order XLIII Rules 3 and 4 CPC, while the second revision petition was dismissed as time-barred. The core legal questions were whether Order XLIII Rules 3 and 4 CPC apply to revisional proceedings under Section 115 CPC, and whether a revision petition can be dismissed as barred by time under the Limitation Act.
The Lahore High Court accepted the writ petition, holding that Order XLIII Rules 3 and 4 CPC govern appeals under Order XLIII read with Section 104 CPC and do not extend to revisions under Section 115 CPC. The Court further held that no period of limitation is prescribed for revisional applications, distinguishing statutory limitation from the equitable doctrine of laches. The impugned orders were declared to be without lawful authority and the matter was remanded for decision on the merits.
Questions settled- Do the notice requirements under Order XLIII Rules 3 and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to revision petitions under Section 115 CPC?
- Can a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be dismissed as time-barred under the Limitation Act?
- What is the legal distinction between statutory limitation and the doctrine of laches in revisional proceedings?
- Mst. LATIFA KHANUM AND OTHERS vs Syed ZAHOORUL HASSAN (REPRESENTED1984 CLC 1009 · Sindh High Court · 1983-08-17Read full judgment →
- Mst. LAKHAN vs ABDUL REHMAN AND OTHERS1984 P Cr. L J 2102 · Lahore High Court · 1982-12-19Read full judgment →
- Mst. KHURSHID KHATOON AND 7 OTHERS vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SANGHAR AND OTHE s1984 CLC 2404 · Sindh High Court · 1983-04-24Read full judgment →
- Mst. KHURSHID BEGUM vs DR. MUHAMMAD RAFIQ AND OTHERS1984 P Cr. L J 1530 · Lahore High Court · 1984-05-15Read full judgment →
- Mst. KHAISTA JAN AND OTHERS vs HAFIZURREHMAN AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a revisional order of the Peshawar High Court dated 1-11-1983, which restored the trial court's order substituting the respondents as plaintiffs in a pending suit. The core legal question is whether purchasers of suit property during the pendency of a suit can be impleaded as plaintiffs under Order XXII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, notwithstanding a rival pre-emption suit filed by tenants based on the same sale. The Supreme Court held that the order of the trial court allowing the substitution of the purchasers as plaintiffs was just, fair, and in accordance with the principles governing the impleading of necessary parties, thereby upholding the High Court's decision. The key principle laid down is that pendente lite purchasers may be permitted to be joined as parties to protect their acquired interest when the original plaintiffs' and defendants' competing claims involve issues affecting the underlying title and tenancy rights.
Questions settled- Can a purchaser of suit property during the pendency of a suit be impleaded as a plaintiff under Order XXII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Whether pendente lite purchasers are entitled to be joined as necessary parties when their purchased interest is subject to the outcome of the ongoing litigation?
- Does a rival pre-emption suit filed by tenants bar the impleading of a purchaser who acquired the property during the pendency of the original suit?
- Mst. KHAIRUNNISA vs M. A. REHMAN BILGRAMI1984 CLC 3072 · Sindh High Court · 1983-12-06Read full judgment →
- Mst. KHADIJA BEGUM AND 7 OTHERS vs Syed NAZAR HUSSAIN1984 CLC 2090 · Sindh High Court · 1983-11-16Read full judgment →
- Mst. KAWAKAB BEGUM/ vs ABUL FAZAL KAUSAR/Opponent1984 CLC 1686 · Sindh High Court · 1983-09-20Read full judgment →
- Mst. KARIM KHATOON vs THE STATE1984 PLD Supreme Court 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by Mst. Karim Khatoon against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court, which reduced her sentence for perjury to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner had initially made a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 alleging abduction and rape against her husband and three others, but resiled from it during the trial, claiming police pressure. Consequently, the trial court convicted her under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner sought a reduction of sentence to the period already undergone, pleading police coercion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing to show leniency. The Court held that perjury is a heinous social and moral offense, condemned in Islamic injunctions (Surah An-Nisa: 135), which undermines the judicial system. It emphasized that courts must firmly curb perjury by awarding stiffer sentences rather than taking a lenient approach.
Questions settled- Whether leniency in sentence should be granted to a witness convicted of perjury under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 on the ground of police pressure?
- Can a witness who resiles from a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be summarily proceeded against and convicted under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- What is the duty of courts regarding the sentencing of offenders who commit perjury during judicial proceedings?
- Mst. KARIM KHATOON vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS1984 CLC 430 · Lahore High Court · 1983-02-11Read full judgment →
- Mst. KARIM JAN AND 3 OTHERS vs ANWAR KHAN AND ANOTHER1984 PLD Peshawar 111 · Peshawar High Court · 1983-11-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition arises out of a suit for declaration and alternate possession filed by the petitioners-sisters against their brother, the respondent, challenging a 1943 relinquishment mutation regarding agricultural land. The trial court decreed the suit, but the appellate court dismissed it, holding that the mutation was validly attested and that the respondent had acquired title through adverse possession. Upon revision, the Peshawar High Court examined the evidence, noting that the revenue entries carried a presumption of truth which the petitioners failed to rebut, and that their inaction for nearly three decades, coupled with their failure to challenge a subsequent similar relinquishment mutation, indicated acquiescence. The Court held that a mutation, though not a document of title per se, creates a presumption of truth when incorporated in the Jamabandi, and that an invalid transfer or a mutation ignoring co-sharers constitutes an overt act amounting to ouster, converting a co-sharer's possession into adverse possession after the statutory period. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed with costs.
Questions settled- Whether a mutation in the revenue record operates as a document of title?
- Can adverse possession be claimed against a co-sharer upon the attestation of a mutation ignoring their name?
- What is the effect of an invalid transfer on the nature of possession held by the transferee?
- Whether failure to challenge a related relinquishment mutation affects the credibility of a party's claim over disputed property?
- Mst. KARIM BIBI AND OTHERS vs HUSSAIN BAKHSH AND ANOTHER1984 PLD Supreme Court 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the appellants' Letters Patent Appeal as incompetent pursuant to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The property in dispute involved shops transferred under settlement laws, leading to conflicting transfer orders and subsequent revisional proceedings. The core legal question was whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order of a Single Judge in constitutional jurisdiction is barred under the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, when the original order in the proceedings was appealable under the law applicable at the time it was passed, notwithstanding the subsequent abolition of the right of appeal. The Supreme Court held that the competency of a Letters Patent Appeal depends on whether the original order commencing the proceedings was subject to appeal under the law applicable at the time of such original order, rather than the law in force when the constitutional petition or appeal was filed. The Court laid down that 'proceedings' embrace the entire course of action from inception to execution, and the appealability of the 'original order' must be determined with reference to the date of its passage.
Questions settled- Whether a Letters Patent Appeal is barred under section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, if the original order in the proceedings was appealable when passed?
- Does the relevent date for determining the appealability of the 'original order' under the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, refer to the date of the original order or the date of filing the constitutional petition?
- What constitutes the 'original order' and 'proceedings' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 for the purpose of barring an Intra-Court Appeal?
- Mst. KANIZ BEGUM and others vs Mst. AKBAR JAN and another1984 SCMR 1493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiffs examines the validity of a waqf created by the predecessor-in-interest of the parties in favour of a mosque via a registered deed shortly before his death. The appellants challenged the waqf on the grounds that it was contingent, executed during Marzul Maut (deathbed illness), and that the beneficiary mosque lacked legal status because it was located on the site of a former Hindu temple. The trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court concurrently dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, holding the waqf to be valid, immediate, and free from the taint of Marzul Maut, while confirming the factual existence and legal capacity of the mosque. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the declaration of waqf was immediate and absolute, that asthma and dysentery did not constitute Marzul Maut under the circumstances, and that a functional mosque established on the site of a former temple can legally be the beneficiary of a valid Muslim waqf.
Questions settled- Whether a waqf deed reserving the right of residence for the appropriator and a designated Mutawalli during their lifetimes renders the waqf contingent or invalid?
- Does the illness of asthma and dysentery, where the maker actively attends to routine duties and personally gets the deed registered, constitute Marzul Maut?
- Can a mosque established on a site where a Hindu temple previously existed legally serve as a valid beneficiary of a Muslim waqf?
- Mst. KALSOOM BAI and another vs MUHAMMAD ISMAIL and 20 others1984 MLD 138 · Sindh High Court · 1982-05-30Read full judgment →
- Mst. JIVI and 6 others vs Mst. SABRI SAHIB KHATOON1984 MLD 1211 · Sindh High Court · 1984-11-21Read full judgment →
- Mst. JHANDO AND ANOTHER vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER1984 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examines whether a disputed property formed part of evacuee House No. 9 previously transferred to the appellants' predecessor-in-interest, Mst. Eido, or remained undisposed of property subject to subsequent transfer. The dispute arose over overlapping claims and conflicting reports regarding portions of houses in D.G. Khan, where a portion occupied by a licensee was later treated as a separate unallotted property. The High Court had dismissed the appellants' constitutional petition on the ground that the determination of property units by settlement authorities was a question of fact not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court examined the survey and taxation records, finding that Mst. Eido held a Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) for the entire House No. 9 and that admissions made by the opposing party confirmed her possession. The Supreme Court held that the settlement authorities acted against the record and surmises in treating the disputed portion as a separate property. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order and affirming Mst. Eido's status as the lawful transferee of the entire house inclusive of the disputed portion.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court can interfere with a finding of fact by settlement authorities regarding whether a property constitutes a single unit or separate properties?
- Does a Permanent Transfer Order for a house include an adjacent disputed portion shown to be part of the same property in survey and taxation records?
- Whether admissions made by a party in pleadings and judicial proceedings regarding the ownership and status of evacuee property are binding?
- Mst. JANNA TAN vs Ch. ABDUL HAMID, ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND 21984 CLC 345 · Lahore High Court · 1983-10-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenges the orders of the Guardian Judge and the Additional District Judge, Jhang, which granted the custody of a minor girl to her father. The core legal questions were whether the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and whether the lower courts correctly determined the welfare of the minor, particularly regarding the mother's remarriage. The High Court held that the appellate court possessed the requisite jurisdiction under the Guardian and Wards (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980, as the order appealed against was passed after the Ordinance's commencement. Regarding custody, the Court set aside the lower courts' findings, ruling that they misread the evidence by placing undue emphasis on the mother's remarriage as a disqualification. The Court emphasized that the paramount consideration in custody matters is the welfare of the minor. Given the father's circumstances as a domestic servant without female relatives and the mother's ability to provide care and education, the Court concluded that the minor's welfare is best served by remaining in the mother's custody.
Questions settled- Does the remarriage of a mother to a person not related to the minor automatically disqualify her from the custody of the minor?
- Does the Guardian and Wards (Amendment) Ordinance 1980 confer appellate jurisdiction on the District Court for orders passed by the Guardian Judge after its commencement?
- Is the welfare of the minor the paramount consideration in determining custody disputes under the Guardian and Wards Act 1890?
- Mst. JANAT BIBI vs Hafiz MAULA BAKHSH AND OTHERS;1984 CLC 368 · Lahore High Court · 1983-10-08Read full judgment →
- Mst. JANA BAI vs Mst. GHULSHAN AND ANOTHER1984 CLC 1061 · Sindh High Court · 1984-01-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This First Rent Appeal challenges the order of the Rent Controller directing the eviction of the appellant-tenant from the disputed premises on the ground of personal bona fide requirement under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether a landlord can set up a new ground of personal requirement in evidence that is entirely at variance with the pleadings in the original ejectment application without seeking an amendment. The court held that a party cannot succeed on a case not pleaded and that evidence adduced outside the scope of the pleadings cannot form the foundation for a judicial decision. The appellate court set aside the Rent Controller's order, ruling that evidence at variance with pleadings is inadmissible, but permitted the respondents an opportunity to seek an amendment of their ejectment application regarding specific subsequent grounds if legally permissible. The key principle laid down is that judicial determination must be founded strictly upon the case pleaded in the parties' pleadings, and parties cannot be allowed to shift their stance during evidence without amending their pleadings.
Questions settled- Can a landlord succeed on a ground of personal requirement not pleaded in the original ejectment application?
- Is a Rent Controller justified in looking into evidence that is de hors the scope of the pleadings?
- Whether evidence adduced on issues outside the pleadings can be made the foundation for granting relief to a party?
- Mst. JAMILA vs THE SECRETARY LABOUR AND COOPERATIVE DEPARTMENT and others1984 CLC 3527 · Sindh High Court · 1984-03-27Read full judgment →
- Mst. JAMILA KHATOON AND ANOTHER vs Mst. TAJUNNISA AND OTHERS1984 PLD Supreme Court 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had dismissed the appellant's Second Appeal as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the period of thirty-seven days spent by the appellant in supplying the requisite stamp for a certified copy of the judgment should be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act in computing the period of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was required under the Sind Civil Court Rules to deposit the requisite stamp within seven days of the communication of the copying fee, and that the failure to do so without sufficient cause meant the intervening delay could not be treated as 'time requisite' for obtaining copies. The Court affirmed that while section 12 confers a substantive right to exclude time properly required, the appellant must act with reasonable promptitude and diligence, and cannot claim exclusion for delays attributable to their own default.
Questions settled- Whether the period spent in supplying the stamp for a certified copy can be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act when the appellant fails to deposit it within the prescribed time under the rules?
- Does section 12 of the Limitation Act confer an absolute right to exclude time regardless of the appellant's diligence or default?
- What is the legal meaning of the term 'time requisite' under section 12 of the Limitation Act in relation to obtaining certified copies?
- Mst. HURMAT and anothers vs FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION and 2 others1984 CLC 2572 · Sindh High Court · 1983-11-02Read full judgment →
- Mst. HUMNA BIBI AND OTHERS vs NIAZ GUL AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a property dispute concerning land originally held by Adam Khan, whose four sons were recorded as joint owners in the 1901-1902 Jamabandi. In a subsequent revenue settlement, the name of one son, Allah Khan, was omitted, prompting his heirs to file a civil suit for a declaration of ownership in 1976. The trial court decreed the suit, and the lower appellate court dismissed the petitioners' appeal, holding that the land devolved upon all four sons and no alienation by Allah Khan was proven. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent revision petition in limine, declining to re-appreciate the evidence. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the background of the case and held that the High Court's refusal to interfere with concurrent factual findings in revisional jurisdiction was justified. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that revisional courts will not undertake a re-appreciation of evidence where no misreading of evidence is established, and consequently dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court can re-appreciate evidence in revisional jurisdiction when no misreading of evidence is pointed out?
- Does the omission of a co-owner's name in a subsequent revenue settlement extinguish his inheritance rights without proof of alienation?
- Mst. HOOK BAI vs WARIS MASOOD1984 CLC 3030 · Sindh High Court · 1984-02-29Read full judgment →
- Mst. HIDAYAT BIBI vs NOOR MUHAMMA D1984 P Cr. L J 3088 · Lahore High Court · 1983-11-18Read full judgment →
- Mst. HASSAN JAN AND 6 OTHERS vs Mst. HASSAN JAN AND 23 OTHERS1984 PLD Peshawar 202 · Peshawar High Court · 1984-04-29Read full judgment →
- Mst. HASHMAT BIBI vs MUHAMMAD RAFIQ AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions raise the common legal question of whether an out-of-court award made during the pendency of litigation can be treated as an agreement or compromise for the adjustment of a suit under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, even in the absence of the consent of all parties. The Supreme Court noted conflicting judicial precedents on the matter from various High Courts, as well as its prior observation in Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Akram regarding awards from arbitrations out of court. Considering that the specific provision of Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, had not been directly considered previously in that context, the Court deemed it necessary to examine the controversy to provide an authoritative pronouncement. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions.
Questions settled- Can an award made out of court during the pendency of litigation be considered as an agreement or compromise for the adjustment of a suit under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the absence of consent of all the parties?
- Whether parties are entitled to sue or defend on the basis of an out-of-court award that has neither been filed nor made a rule of Court if it has been accepted and acted upon by mutual consent?
- Mst. HASHMAT BIBI vs Mst. AMINA BIBI AND OTHERS1984 CLC 1623 · Lahore High Court · 1983-06-13Read full judgment →
- Mst. HAMIDA BEGUM vs HUSSAIN BHAI1984 MLD 1149 · Sindh High Court · 1984-10-13Read full judgment →
- Mst. HALIMA vs BASHIR AHMAD1984 CLC 1774 · Sindh High Court · 1983-08-07Read full judgment →
- Mst. HAJIANI FATIMA vs MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE1984 MLD 1032 · Sindh High Court · 1984-12-22Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hajiani FATIMA vs KHALEEL AHMAD1984 CLC 2104 · Sindh High Court · 1983-08-15Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hajiani FATIMA vs HABIBUR REHMAN and 7 others1984 P Cr. L J 2794 · Sindh High Court · 1984-04-23Read full judgment →
- Mst. HAFEEZ BIBI AND OTHERS vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LAND) AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their review application by the High Court, which had earlier dismissed their writ petition challenging a land allotment decision by the Settlement Commissioner. The petition for leave to appeal was barred by 28 days, with the explanation for delay deemed unsatisfactory, particularly regarding the period after copies of documents were obtained. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the petitioners were essentially attempting to challenge the original order of the High Court, which had become final by efflux of time, as a refusal to review does not provide a fresh period of limitation. The Court held that a party cannot bypass the finality of a basic order by framing the petition as an appeal against the dismissal of a review application. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred and unsustainable.
Questions settled- Does the dismissal of a review application provide a fresh period of limitation to challenge the original order?
- Can a petitioner bypass the limitation period for challenging a primary order by filing an appeal against the order refusing review?
- Is a delay in filing a petition adequately explained when the period between obtaining necessary copies and filing the petition remains unaccounted for?
- Mst. GULLAN vs ALLAH DITTARespon dent1984 P Cr. L J 1047 · Lahore High Court · 1975-01-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed an application alleging that the respondent had forcibly taken her minor daughter, Bilquis, from her custody. Upon the production of the minor in court, she expressed a clear desire to live with her mother and testified that she had been forcibly removed by the respondent with police assistance. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to restore custody when a minor has been removed through illegal means, despite the existence of Family Courts for custody disputes. The Court held that when custody is obtained in an illegal and improper manner without recourse to due process, the High Court is competent to intervene under its habeas corpus jurisdiction to restore the minor to the petitioner. The principle laid down is that while the ultimate determination of permanent custody rights remains the domain of the Family Court, the High Court may exercise its jurisdiction to rectify illegal detention and restore the status quo ante pending formal legal proceedings.
Questions settled- Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to restore a minor to a parent when the minor was forcibly removed?
- Does the existence of Family Courts preclude the High Court from intervening in cases of illegal detention of a minor?
- Is the restoration of a minor to a parent by the High Court under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, considered a final adjudication of permanent custody rights?
- Mst. GULAB JAN vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 1222 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1984-03-14Read full judgment →
- Mst. GHULAM SAKINA vs KHALIQ BARI1984 CLC 71 · Sindh High Court · 1983-05-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This first rent appeal was filed by the landlady under Section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 against the order of the Rent Controller dismissing her ejectment application against the tenant. The ejectment was sought on grounds of rent default and personal bona fide requirement of the shop for her son to establish an electric business. The tenant contended that rent was collected in lump sums per custom and that a security deposit of Rs. 3,000 was held by the landlady. The High Court held that upon expiration of a lease agreement, statutory rules govern rent payments, and prior acceptance of delayed rent does not alter mandatory statutory payment terms. However, as the landlady held a refundable security deposit exceeding the alleged arrears of rent, such deposit was liable to be adjusted against the arrears, precluding eviction on the ground of default. Regarding personal requirement, the Court held that un-cross-examined evidence established bona fide need and neither the tenant nor court can dictate the suitability of a location for the landlord's intended business. The appeal was allowed, and eviction ordered on the ground of personal bona fide use.
Questions settled- Does a landlord's past acceptance of delayed rent in lump sums create a binding practice that excuses future rent defaults under statutory rent laws?
- Can a security deposit held by a landlord be adjusted against arrears of rent to disentitle the landlord from seeking ejectment on the ground of default?
- Can a court or tenant challenge the suitability of a demised shop for the specific business for which the landlord seeks personal bona fide use?
- Mst. GHULAM FATIMA vs Mst. SAT BHARA1 AND OTHERS1984 CLC 869 · Lahore High Court · 1983-05-17Read full judgment →
- Mst. GHOUSIA IQRAR vs SIND LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL,KARACHI AND ANOTHER1984 PLC 1400 · Sindh High Court · 1984-05-30Read full judgment →
- Mst. FEROZ BEGUM vs Mst. FATIMA BEGUM1984 CLC 2121 · Sindh High Court · 1983-08-15Read full judgment →
- Mst. FAZAL BIBI vs MUHAMMAD RAF1Q and another1984 SCMR 1373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court setting aside the respondent's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his wife and infant son, substituting it with a conviction under Section 304, Part I of the same Code, and reducing the sentence to life imprisonment on the ground of grave and sudden provocation. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in applying Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based on conjecture regarding sudden provocation arising from suspected immorality. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning regarding grave and sudden provocation was indeed conjectural and untenable on the record. However, the Supreme Court declined to grant leave, reasoning that even if the conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were restored, the death sentence might not be warranted given the circumstances involving family honour and suspected immorality, rendering an alteration of conviction without sentence interference an exercise in futility. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court can rely on conjecture to find grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal solely to alter a conviction back to Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the sentence of death is still unlikely to be imposed?
- Does the murder of an infant during an act directed at the spouse form part of the same transaction influenced by family honour?
- Mst. FAZAL BIBI AND OTHERS vs Mst. AZIZ BEGUM AND OTHERS1984 SCMR 1155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer and subsequent auction of a property (chaubara) in Faisalabad, originally transferred to Abdul Karim by the Settlement Department. Following Karim's death, his heirs failed to pay the transfer price, leading to the property's resumption and auction to Haji Din Muhammad. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, upon remand of the case, possessed the jurisdiction to restore the auction in favor of the purchaser, despite an earlier, final order by the Additional Settlement Commissioner that had set aside the auction and remanded the case solely for the purpose of identifying legal heirs and determining the transfer price. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner acted beyond the scope of the remand order. The principle established is that an authority acting on remand is strictly bound by the terms of the remand order; it cannot reopen or alter issues that have already been conclusively decided and have attained finality, particularly when the original order setting aside an auction remains unchallenged.
Questions settled- Can a subordinate authority, acting on a remand order, reopen issues that have already been conclusively decided by a superior authority?
- Does an authority acting on remand have the jurisdiction to restore an auction that was previously set aside by a final, unappealed order?
- Is a remand order binding on the authority to which the case is remanded?
- Mst. FATIMA vs AHMED KHAN ANSARI and another1984 MLD 1226 · Sindh High Court · 1984-12-12Read full judgment →
- Mst. FATIMA BI AND 15 OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD AMIN1984 PLD Karachi 63 · Sindh High Court · 1983-09-24Read full judgment →
- Mst. FAROSHIA AND 2 OTHERS vs Mst. ZARINA AND ANOTHER1984 PLD Peshawar 134 · Peshawar High Court · 1983-12-19Read full judgment →
- Mst. FARIDA KHANUM vs EHSAN ELAHI and 2 others1984 MLD 116 · Lahore High Court · 1984-02-26Read full judgment →
- Mst. FARIDA AND OTHERS vs REHMATULLAH AND ANOTHER1984 PLD Peshawar 117 · Peshawar High Court · 1983-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition arose from a suit for declaration of ownership regarding land inherited by the plaintiffs from their deceased father, Nadir Khan. The plaintiffs claimed inheritance shares under Muslim Law, while the defendants contended that succession was governed by custom, as the death occurred prior to the enforcement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, in the relevant area. The core legal question was whether the Act applied retrospectively to successions occurring before its enforcement. The Court held that, pursuant to Section 6 of the Act, only Sections 3, 4, and 5 possess retrospective operation, while Section 2 regarding general succession does not. Consequently, the inheritance was governed by custom. However, the Court observed that the lower courts failed to account for the fact that one defendant had confessed judgment. The Court held that a suit must be decreed to the extent of a defendant's admission. Accordingly, the revision was partly accepted, granting the plaintiffs a declaration regarding the share of the defendant who confessed judgment.
Questions settled- Does Section 2 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, have retrospective operation?
- Which sections of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, are retrospective in operation?
- Can a court decree a suit based on a defendant's confession of judgment?
- Mst. FARIDA AND OTHERS vs NOOR MUHAMMAD1984 CLC 1649 · Sindh High Court · 1983-04-09Read full judgment →
- Mst. FARAH NAZ AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE AND Twits1984 SCMR 646 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from two criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan: one by the convict challenging her conviction and life imprisonment sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and another by the deceased's brother seeking the enhancement of her sentence to death. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot and killed her fiance at Shakar Parian Hills after their families' relations soured. The appellant claimed an unidentified person shot the deceased. One learned judge of the Supreme Court proposed reducing the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, finding that the circumstances (including a torn shirt and missing cassettes) pointed to a sudden fight or provocation. However, the majority of the bench disagreed, holding that the eye-witness testimony was natural and credible, the motive's obscurity did not undermine direct evidence, and there was no basis to apply any exceptions to murder. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, maintaining the conviction and the lesser sentence of life imprisonment.
Questions settled- Does the obscurity or failure of the prosecution to prove a motive undermine direct and reliable eye-witness evidence in a murder trial?
- Can a plea of sudden provocation or self-defence be sustained in the absence of any explanation or evidence from the accused regarding the events immediately preceding the offense?
- Whether a lesser penalty of life imprisonment instead of death is appropriate under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 where the offender is of tender age and the motive remains obscure?
- Mst. FAKHR UNNISA vs MOHIBULLAH KHAN1984 PLD Peshawar 94 · Peshawar High Court · 1983-10-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves two revision petitions challenging the dismissal of pre-emption suits by the lower courts, which held the suits were time-barred. The core legal question concerned whether the vendee had established the date of possession to trigger the limitation period under the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, and whether consent decrees obtained by the vendee constituted a valid sale for pre-emption purposes. The High Court held that the lower courts committed a gross error by misreading evidence and incorrectly placing the burden of proof on the pre-emptor. The Court ruled that the vendee failed to provide cogent evidence of the possession date, and that consent decrees are not sales for pre-emption purposes. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower judgments, finding the suits were filed within the limitation period. The key principle laid down is that the burden of proving the date of possession rests on the vendee when asserting it to defeat a pre-emption claim, and that appellate courts may interfere in revision where lower courts misread evidence or misplace the burden of proof on mixed questions of law and fact.
Questions settled- Does a consent decree obtained through a court suit constitute a sale for the purposes of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950?
- On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish the date of possession in a pre-emption suit when the vendee claims it to defeat the limitation period?
- Can a High Court interfere in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when lower courts have misread evidence regarding a question of fact?
- Is the question of limitation in a pre-emption suit considered a mixed question of law and fact?
- Mst. FAIZ ILAHI AND ANOHER vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 1857 (2) · Lahore High Court · 1983-03-15Read full judgment →
- Mst. FAHMIDA PERVEEN vs MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM AND ANOTHER1984 P Cr. L J 2977 · Lahore High Court · 1984-06-17Read full judgment →
- Mst. ELVINIA alias GUDDI vs THE STATE1984 P Cr. L J 2911 · Sindh High Court · 1981-01-06Read full judgment →
- Mst. DAULAN AND ANOTHER vs NOORA AND 3 OTHERS1984 CLC 1211 · Lahore High Court · 1984-02-18Read full judgment →
- Mst. CHAGHI AND 4 OTHERS vs BACHOO1984 PLD Quetta 92 · Balochistan High Court · 1984-03-02Read full judgment →
- Mst. BIVI vs GHULAM RASOOL and 2 others1984 MLD 458 · Lahore High Court · 1984-02-11Read full judgment →
- Mst. BHAG N vs MUHAMMAD YOUNUS1984 CLC 3151 · Lahore High Court · 1983-05-25Read full judgment →
- Mst. BEGUM JAN vs ABDUL RASOOL1984 CLC 755 · Sindh High Court · 1983-11-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal was filed against the order of the Rent Controller, Sukkur, which dismissed the appellant's ejectment application. The appellant had sought eviction of the respondent on the ground of personal bona fide requirement, falsely asserting in her application that she was a widow and that she resided with her children at a relative's house. During cross-examination, she admitted that her husband was alive and that she held only a minor share in the premises. The Rent Controller dismissed the application due to this material misstatement. The High Court upheld the dismissal, holding that a party approaching the court must do so with clean hands. While a single incorrect averment may not always be fatal, a deliberate misrepresentation of widowhood to gain the court's sympathy severely undermines the landlord's bona fides. The Court concluded that such misrepresentation casts doubt on the credibility of the personal requirement claim, and dismissed the appeal, reserving the appellant's right to file a fresh application under Section 14 of the Ordinance now that her husband had actually expired.
Questions settled- Does a material misrepresentation regarding a landlord's marital status in an eviction application adversely affect the credibility of their claim of personal bona fide requirement?
- Can a landlord who approaches the rent controller with unclean hands succeed in proving a bona fide personal need?
- Can a subsequent change in circumstances, such as the actual death of a spouse during pendency, validate a misrepresentation of widowhood made in the original ejectment application?
- Mst. BATOOL BEGUM vs MUHAMMAD YOUNUS KHAN1984 SCMR 1188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte decree for specific performance of a sale. The core legal question concerned the determination of limitation and the date of knowledge for setting aside an ex parte decree, specifically whether the courts below correctly computed time based on a disputed entry of presence before a revenue official. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts misread the record regarding the appellant's presence and knowledge on 30 October 1974, as the entry relied upon was defective and unreliable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned judgments and decrees were set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a fresh trial with an opportunity of hearing for both parties.
Questions settled- Whether an application to set aside an ex parte decree is barred by limitation when based on a disputed date of knowledge derived from a misread revenue record?
- Can a court rely on a defective and unverified noting regarding a party's presence before a revenue officer to determine the starting point of limitation?
- Whether the High Court and District Judge erred in failing to properly scrutinize the material relied upon to establish the date of knowledge of the ex parte decree?
- Mst. BASHIRAN vs SULTAN1984 CLC 2306 · Lahore High Court · 1983-12-16Read full judgment →