Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- DR. RIAZ AHMED KHAWAR vs SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, POPULATION1982 PLC (C. S.) 685 · Federal Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- DR. MUHAMMAD RAFIQ vs DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE AND 2 Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition in a rent matter. The respondent-landlord had sought the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from a bungalow leased partly for residence and partly as a hospital, on the ground of personal requirement for himself and his son to set up a legal practice. The Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application, but the District Judge reversed the findings and ordered eviction, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a building partly let out as a hospital constitutes a scheduled building under the relevant rent restriction law, precluding eviction for non-scheduled businesses. The Supreme Court held that the legal practice of a lawyer is a scheduled business and that the premises could be lawfully vacated for the personal residence and scheduled business needs of the landlord and his son. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed with a four-month grace period for vacating the premises.
Questions settled- Whether a building partly let out as a hospital becomes a scheduled building under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
- Can a leased building be ordered to be vacated for the personal use and residence of the landlord or his family members?
- Whether a lawyer's office constitutes a scheduled business allowing eviction of a tenant from a scheduled building?
- DR. MUHAMMAD ELIAS DUBASH vs PUNJAB SERVICE TRIBUNAL AND Other1982 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from an appeal concerning the compulsory retirement of the appellant under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, following an inquiry. The core legal questions involve the interpretation of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, Martial Law Order No. 23, and the bar on jurisdiction under the Provisional Constitution Order of 1981 regarding orders passed by a Martial Law Administrator. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was not entertainable by the Court in view of clause (2) of Article 15 of the Provisional Constitution Order of 1981, which bars any challenge to an order passed by the Martial Law Administrator. The key principle laid down is that orders passed by the Martial Law Administrator are protected from judicial scrutiny under the constitutional provisions of the Provisional Constitution Order, rendering challenges to compulsory retirement orders through service tribunals unmaintainable.
Questions settled- Whether an order passed by a Martial Law Administrator is assailable before a service tribunal?
- Does the Provisional Constitution Order of 1981 bar challenges to orders passed by the Martial Law Administrator?
- Is an appeal competent under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 against a review order rejected by the Martial Law Administrator?
- DR. MUHAMMAD AMIN CHUGHTAI vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB AND Another1982 PLD Lahore 277 · Lahore High Court · 1982-02-13Read full judgment →
- DR. MISS I. ALI MUHAMMAD vs Syed ZAKAULLAH AND ANOTHER1982 CLC 1895 · Lahore High Court · 1982-04-18Read full judgment →
- DR. MASOOD KHAN vs CHAIRMAN, ARBITRATION COUNCIL, WAH AND 2 Other1982 PLD Lahore 532 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This review petition arose from a dispute regarding the territorial jurisdiction of a Union Council to entertain a notice of talaq under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The petitioner, a Pakistani citizen residing in the U.S.A., pronounced talaq against his wife and sent a notice to the Chairman of the Union Council, Wah, who returned it on the ground that the wife did not reside within its territorial limits. A learned Single Judge initially dismissed the petitioner's writ petition holding that disputed questions of residence could not be resolved in writ proceedings. Upon review, the Lahore High Court examined the interpretation of 'last resided' and 'permanently residing' under rule 3 of the Pakistan Muslim Family Laws Rules, 1961. The Court held that the words 'last resided' do not require permanent residence and should receive a liberal construction to include temporary stays after marriage to prevent frustrating the mandatory provisions of section 7. The Court further held that a person can retain permanent residence in Pakistan despite foreign residence and that the Chairman must inquire into and determine jurisdictional questions. The review was allowed with directions regarding the determination of jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Whether the words 'last resided' under rule 3 of the Pakistan Muslim Family Laws Rules, 1961 require permanent residence or include temporary residence?
- Does the Chairman of a Union Council have the authority to determine the question of territorial jurisdiction upon receipt of a notice of talaq?
- Can a Pakistani citizen maintain a permanent residence in Pakistan for the purposes of family law despite acquiring residence abroad?
- Whether a dispute regarding the residence of parties and the jurisdiction of a Union Council under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 is justiciable before a civil court in the first instance?
- DR. M. H. RANDHAWA vs PUNJAB PROVINCE1982 PLC (C. S.) 159 · Lahore High Court · 1981-08-23Read full judgment →
- DR. HASAN ARA AND 6 OTHER Ss vs Mian TAJAMMAL HUSSAIN AND 12 OTHER1982 CLC 653 · Lahore High Court · 1981-11-02Read full judgment →
- DR. FAQIR MUHAMMAD vs MAJ. AMIR MUHAMMAD ETC.S1982 SCMR 1178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-07-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of two petitions for leave to appeal filed by Dr. Faqir Muhammad against decisions of the High Court accepting regular second appeals in a land allotment dispute. The petitioner was allotted a plot under a housing scheme governed by the Punjab Urban Improvement Act, 1952, and executed an agreement granting him permission to enter the land and construct a house subject to plan approval. Following cancellation of his allotment for alleged non-compliance and re-allotment to a third party, the petitioner filed a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, seeking a declaration that he was the owner of the plot and an injunction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal of the suit, holding that the agreement did not confer ownership rights upon the petitioner to entitle him to a declaration of legal character as owner under Section 42. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioner failed to seek the requisite consequential relief of specific performance of the agreement.
Questions settled- Can an agreement granting permission to enter land and construct a house confer full ownership rights for the purpose of a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
- Is a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 maintainable without seeking the consequential relief of specific performance where such relief is available?
- Whether cancellation of a plot allotment can be set aside through a suit for declaration of ownership when the plaintiff holds only a conditional agreement to construct.
- DR. BURJOR N. ANKLESARIA vs MRS. ZENOBIA AND Another1982 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the petitioner's second appeal in an ejectment matter. The petitioner, a long-standing tenant of a residential bungalow, contested the ejectment application filed by the respondents, who claimed to be joint owners and landlords by virtue of inheritance and gift. The petitioner disputed their ownership and locus standi, arguing that an oral gift of immovable property was void under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and that no valid attornment had taken place. The core legal question was whether the respondents qualified as 'landlords' under section 2(c) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, so as to maintain an ejectment application. The Supreme Court held that the respondents fell within the definition of 'landlord' as persons for the time being entitled to receive rent, supported by notice and acknowledgment from the previous owner. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the lower courts' findings.
Questions settled- Whether a person claiming ownership through an oral gift can qualify as a landlord under section 2(c) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- Does a communication from a former landlord acknowledging new owners suffice to establish the entitlement to receive rent?
- Whether a tenant can challenge the locus standi of a landlord without claiming ownership of the disputed property themselves?
- DR. BURJOR ANKLESARIA NURSING HOME LTD. vs MOBIN AHMED SIDDIQUI1982 PLC 137 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-05-18Read full judgment →
- DR. BASHIR AHMAD vs Tim. SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1982 CLC 1068 · Lahore High Court · 1981-10-18Read full judgment →
- DR. BASHIR AHMAD vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1982 CLC 1068 · Lahore High Court · 1981-10-18Read full judgment →
- DR. BADSHAH BEGUM vs MUHAMMAD YAQUB AND OTHER1982 CLC 1862 · Lahore High Court · 1981-05-30Read full judgment →
- DR. BADSHAH BEGUM vs MUH A M MA D Y A QU B AND OTHERS1982 CLC 1862 · Lahore High Court · 1981-05-30Read full judgment →
- DR. ABDUR REHMAN vs MUHAMMAD AJMAL KHAN AND OTHERS1982 CLC 1499 · Lahore High Court · 1975-11-30Read full judgment →
- DR. ABDUR REHMAN vs MUHAMMAD AJMAL KHAN AND OTHER1982 CLC 1499 · Lahore High Court · 1975-11-30Read full judgment →
- DR. A. Q. K. AFGHAN vs SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION, RAWALPINDI1982 PLC (C. S.) 214 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1982-02-10Read full judgment →
- DR. A. Q. K. AFGHAN vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION RAWALPINDI1982 PLC (C. S.) 206 · Federal Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- DR. .BANO ABEDIN vs DR. HAQ NAWAZ ARBAB1982 PLD Karachi 818 · Sindh High Court · 1982-04-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal arose from an ejectment application filed by the appellant-landlady against the respondent-tenant on the grounds of default and personal bona fide requirement. The premises, the ground floor of a residential bungalow, had been let out for running a poly-clinic. The Rent Controller and the appellate court dismissed the ejectment application. On appeal, the High Court upheld the concurrent findings on default, noting the tenant's genuine efforts to tender rent. Regarding personal requirement, the Court observed that although the landlady had seven rooms on the first floor, she was an old lady of sixty years who wished to reside on the ground floor, while her married son and his family lived in rented premises. The Court held that the choice of which premises to occupy rests with the landlord. Furthermore, the Court rejected the tenant's argument that a residential bungalow let out for a clinic becomes a non-residential building, ruling that temporary use does not permanently alter its residential character without the Rent Controller's permission under Section 11 of the Ordinance. The appeal was allowed on the ground of personal requirement.
Questions settled- Does the choice of which portion of a property to occupy for personal requirement rest with the landlord or the tenant?
- Does letting out a portion of a residential bungalow for a clinic permanently convert its character into a non-residential building?
- Can a landlord seek ejectment for residential purposes of a premises let out for a non-residential purpose without the Rent Controller's permission to convert under Section 11 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- DOST MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1982 PLD Karachi 1000 · Sindh High Court · 1980-08-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal against a conviction for murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution's case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence, including a retracted judicial confession, extra-judicial confessions, recoveries of a blood-stained knife and shalwar, and 'last seen' evidence. The High Court found the judicial confession unreliable due to non-compliance with legal formalities, lack of corroboration, and illegal detention of the accused. The extra-judicial confessions were deemed untrustworthy as they were made to interested and inconsistent witnesses. The recoveries were also discredited due to inconsistencies in witness testimony and an unexplained delay of over two months in sending the articles for chemical analysis. The 'last seen' evidence was considered weak and unreliable, given the witnesses' motives and inconsistencies. The Court held that tainted evidence cannot corroborate other tainted evidence and that conviction cannot rest on mere suspicion. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the accused appellant was acquitted.
Questions settled- What are the requirements for a judicial confession to be considered voluntary and true?
- Can a conviction for murder be based solely on circumstantial evidence?
- What factors render a judicial confession unreliable?
- When is 'last seen' evidence considered a weak form of circumstantial evidence?
- Can tainted evidence corroborate other tainted evidence in a criminal trial?
- DOST MUHAMMAD vs DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1982 CLC 1112 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-23Read full judgment →
- DOST MUHAMMAD vs ABDUL RASHID1982 SCMR 905 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an ejectment order against the petitioner-tenant regarding a commercial shop. The landlord had sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment, personal requirement for himself and his sons, and the need for reconstruction. The Rent Controller initially ordered ejectment based solely on the reconstruction ground, rejecting the claims of default and personal requirement. The Additional District Judge maintained the ejectment order, affirming the reconstruction ground and reversing the finding on personal requirement, while upholding the finding against default. The High Court subsequently dismissed the tenant's second appeal, affirming the lower courts' findings and additionally finding that the default in rent payment was established. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the findings of the lower courts were based on the appreciation of evidence. The Court reiterated the principle that it will not re-appraise evidence in such proceedings where no substantial question of law or principle is raised, thereby maintaining the concurrent findings of the courts below.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a petition for leave to appeal where concurrent findings of fact have been reached by lower courts?
- Is it permissible for a High Court in second appeal to reverse a finding of fact regarding default in rent payment if the findings of the lower courts were concurrent?
- Diwan KEWALRAM vs MESSRS FAROOQUE & Co., HYDERABAD1982 CLC 156 · Sindh High Court · 1981-02-18Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, KARACHI vs MRS. NUZHAT1982 PLC 855 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-02-20Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, KARACHI vs MRS. NASIM1982 PLC 747 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-03-23Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, KARACHI vs ABDUL KARIM1982 PLC 219 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS SUKKUR AND ANOTHER vs AKHLAQUE AHMAD1982 PLC 777 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-03-01Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS KARACHI vs S. M. S. CHISHTI1982 PLC 122 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-05-18Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT PAKISTAN RAILWAYS' SUKKUR AND 2 OTHERS vs ABDUL RAZZAQUE AND 2 OTHERS ,1982 PLC 458 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-01-03Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL MANAGER, SIND ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs MUHAMMAD1982 PLC 292 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-04-15Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, SIALKOT AND Aiiiothers vs GANDA1982 SCMR 244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order remanding a dispute over the cancellation of a land allotment. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in remanding the case to the Settlement authorities to determine whether land allotted to the respondent was legally part of a protected forest area and thus ineligible for allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court’s decision to remand the matter for fresh determination was appropriate given that the parties' rights remained unresolved and factual contentions regarding the forest notification and consolidation proceedings required further adjudication. The Court affirmed that where critical questions regarding the status of land—specifically whether it was validly notified as protected forest—remain disputed and unresolved, it is proper for the High Court to remand the case to the competent authority for a fresh decision rather than interfering prematurely. The Court declined to make observations on the merits of the forest notification, leaving those issues open for the remand proceedings.
Questions settled- Is it appropriate for the High Court to remand a case for fresh determination when the status of land as a protected forest remains disputed?
- Can a party be permitted to raise a new plea regarding the validity of a forest notification for the first time during remand proceedings?
- Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order that directs a competent authority to resolve unresolved factual disputes regarding land allotment?
- DIN MUHAMMAD vs DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS1982 PLC 1058 · Labour Court · 1980-02-08Read full judgment →
- DILSHAD BIBI vs MUHAMMAD YUNAS AND Other1982 SCMR 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the orders of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's applications for the cancellation of bail granted to the respondents in a case involving charges under section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion perversely or arbitrarily in granting bail to the accused, particularly in light of identification parade evidence and the F.I.R. The Supreme Court held that the petition was without merit and dismissed it. The Court reasoned that the validity of the challenged orders depended entirely on the propriety of the initial High Court order granting bail, which had not been filed by the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the High Court had exercised its discretion perversely or arbitrarily under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that the burden lies on the petitioner to provide the relevant orders and demonstrate that the lower court's discretion was exercised arbitrarily or perversely to warrant interference in bail matters.
Questions settled- Does the failure to provide the initial bail order in a petition for cancellation of bail preclude the appellate court from reviewing the exercise of discretion?
- Is the identification of an accused in a parade the sole factor relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- What must a petitioner demonstrate to successfully challenge the grant of bail by a High Court?
- DIL MURAD AND Another vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 745 · Sindh High Court · 1981-05-12Read full judgment →
- DIL MUHAMMAD vs NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION AND 31982 PLC 496 · Lahore High Court · 1981-12-12Read full judgment →
- Di. M. S. HABIB AND 3 OTHERS vs SECOND SIND LABOUR COURT AND ANOTHER1982 PLC 958 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-06-15Read full judgment →
- Dewan JAIRAM DASS AND Another vs Syed NIAMAT ALI AND 4 Other1982 PLD Quetta 14 · Balochistan High Court · 1981-10-03Read full judgment →
- DEPUTY SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Another vs Syed ZULFIQAR ALI SHAH1982 SCMR 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner against the judgment of the High Court at Lahore. The core legal question concerns whether subsequent transferees of confirmed land allotments are entitled to notice and an opportunity of being heard prior to the cancellation of such allotments. The Supreme Court held that since the allottees were competent in law to transfer the lands upon confirmation without requiring prior consent from settlement authorities, the transferees acquired a valid interest and were entitled to notice on the fundamental principles of natural justice before any cancellation. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the validity of the underlying allotments must be determined by the settlement authorities in the presence of the affected transferees.
Questions settled- Are subsequent transferees of confirmed land allotments entitled to notice before the cancellation of such allotments?
- Whether allottees of confirmed land are competent to transfer the lands without obtaining prior consent from settlement authorities?
- Does a transferee acquire a legal interest when purchasing land from an allottee whose allotment is subsequently challenged?
- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (NATIONALISATION), HYDERABAD vs Syed ZAHOORUL1982 CLC 1640 · Sindh High Court · 1978-02-09Read full judgment →
- DEPUTY COMMISSIONER vs ABDUL KARIM MOOSA AND OTHER1982 C L, C 1542 · Sindh High Court · 1981-10-25Read full judgment →
- Department vs Assessee46 TAX 21 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
- DENIS LUCIEN ROBIDOUX vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 813 · Sindh High Court · 1978-03-25Read full judgment →
- DAWOOD vs MUHAMMAD YASIN1982 PLD Supreme Court 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged a judgment of the Sind High Court which allowed a landlord's second appeal and ordered the tenant to vacate a commercial shop on the grounds of personal requirement for the landlord's son and for reconstruction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether a landlord's pleas for ejectment on the grounds of personal use and reconstruction are mutually destructive, and whether combining them in a single application bars eviction. The Supreme Court held that the two grounds are not mutually destructive and can be validly combined, as the statutory provisions governing tenant protection and reconstruction can be harmoniously satisfied. The Court ruled that a landlord may seek eviction for both personal use and reconstruction simultaneously, provided the requirements are bona fide, and that the tenant's statutory rights under subsections (4), (5), (5-A), and (5-B) of section 13 do not negate the landlord's right to develop property.
Questions settled- Whether the grounds of personal use and reconstruction under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 are mutually destructive?
- Can a landlord combine the grounds of personal requirement and reconstruction in a single ejectment application against a tenant?
- How do the statutory safeguards in subsections (4), (5), (5-A), and (5-B) of section 13 operate when eviction is ordered on both personal use and reconstruction?
- Does subsection (5-B) of section 13 restrict a landlord from converting or changing the nature of a building upon reconstruction?
- DAWOOD AND 3 Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1982 P Cr. L J 296 · Sindh High Court · 1982-04-13Read full judgment →
- MAQSOOD KHAN vs The STATE1982 SCMR 757 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant, Maqsood Khan, for the murder and robbery of a young girl, Mst. Hamida, under Sections 302 and 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant was sentenced to death and rigorous imprisonment. The prosecution's case rested on the testimony of a ten-year-old child eye-witness, identification parades, extra-judicial confession, and the recovery of stolen ornaments and sickles. The appellant challenged the reliability of the child witness, the validity of the identification parade, and the admissibility of the recoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1872. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no universal rule discarding child witness testimony. The Court ruled that a child's evidence is admissible and reliable if it passes close scrutiny, is consistent, and is corroborated by subsequent conduct and physical evidence. The Court also upheld the recoveries as valid corroborative evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1872.
Questions settled- What are the legal tests to determine the reliability and credibility of a child witness's testimony in a criminal trial?
- Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the testimony of a single child witness if it is corroborated by circumstantial evidence and recoveries?
- Whether the recovery of stolen ornaments at the instance of an accused in custody is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1872 as corroborative evidence?
- DAWJI DADABHAI & CO. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (WEST) KARACHI45 TAX 208 · Sindh High Court · 1981-11-17Read full judgment →
- DAULAT KHAN vs BAHADUR KHAN AND Other1982 SCMR 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, pre-emption, and alternatively for the refund of advance money. The core legal question concerned whether an indivisible agreement to sell involving multiple vendors, where the sale price was stated in a lump sum and one vendor was not a signatory, was capable of specific performance. The Supreme Court held that since the price could not be bifurcated and the contract stood as a single indivisible unit, it was not capable of specific performance. The Court laid down the principle that where a contract for sale involving multiple vendors specifies a lump sum price without proportioning shares and fails against a non-signing vendor, the entire contract fails and cannot be specifically enforced.
Questions settled- Whether an agreement to sell with a lump sum price involving multiple vendors can be specifically enforced when it fails against one of the vendors?
- Can a contract for sale be bifurcated when the price is stated in a lump sum and proportions are not known?
- DARYAB YOUSAF vs WAPDA1982 PLC (C. S.) 354 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1982-04-24Read full judgment →
- DARAZ ALI AND Others vs NATHU KHAN1982 CLC 2399 · Lahore High Court · 1982-03-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition challenges an appellate judgment in a pre-emption suit, raising questions regarding the retrospective application of procedural amendments and the calculation of limitation. The core legal question concerns whether the enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge via the Punjab Civil Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1978, allowed the High Court to validly transfer a pending appeal to the District Judge. The Court held that the amendment was procedural in nature, as it merely enlarged the forum's jurisdiction without affecting substantive rights, and thus applied retrospectively. Consequently, the transfer of the appeal was a valid procedural act. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the valuation for court-fee purposes in pre-emption suits is based on the year preceding the institution of the suit, not the appeal. Finally, the Court ruled that the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commences from the date of attestation of the mutation, not the date of entry, confirming the suit was filed within the statutory period. The petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does an amendment enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of a District Judge apply retrospectively to pending appeals?
- Is the transfer of an appeal from the High Court to a District Court due to a change in pecuniary jurisdiction a procedural act?
- Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commence from the date of entry of a mutation or the date of its attestation?
- Is the valuation for court-fee purposes in a pre-emption suit calculated based on the year preceding the institution of the suit or the appeal?
- DARAZ ALI AND Another vs NATHOO KHAN1982 SCMR 1219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision filed by the vendees-defendants against a pre-emption decree. The core legal questions involved the computation of limitation due to the erroneous return and transfer of a first appeal concerning pecuniary jurisdiction, and whether the proper court-fee had been paid based on the definition of land revenue including rates and cesses under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court held that the procedural delays and return of the appeal by the court did not prejudice the plaintiff's timely filed appeal, as the jurisdictional value fell within the enhanced pecuniary limits of the District Court, and that the factual finding regarding the court-fee and land revenue was properly determined. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does an act of the court in erroneously returning an appeal affect the computation of limitation for the appellant?
- Whether land revenue for the purpose of determining court-fee in a pre-emption suit includes rates on account of increase in the value of land due to irrigation under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967?
- Can a plea regarding the starting point of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit, not pressed before the lower appellate and high courts, be permitted to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
- DAD vs The STATE1982 PLD Karachi 360 · Sindh High Court · 1980-07-20Read full judgment →
- Da. MISS I. ALI MUHAMMAD vs Syed ZAKAULLAH AND ANOTHER1982 CLC 1895 · Lahore High Court · 1982-04-18Read full judgment →
- Da. BURJOR AN,KLESARIA NURSING HOME LTD. vs ZAFAR IQBAL1982 PLC 553 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-03-23Read full judgment →
- D. P. EDULII & Co. LTD. vs SECRETARY, EXCISE & TAXATION AND Other1982 PLD Lahore 817 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-10Read full judgment →
- CRESCENT TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE45 TAX 47 · Lahore High Court · 1980-11-07Read full judgment →
- CRESCENT SUGAR MILLS & DISTILLERY LTD., FAISALABAD vs CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD AND 2 Other1982 PLD Lahore 1 · Lahore High Court · 1981-09-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Intra-Court Appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition wherein the appellant sugar mill challenged an abatement order passed by the Central Board of Revenue under Rule 4 of the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972. The appellant had sought full excise duty exemption due to production shortfall beyond its control. Although oral hearings were conducted in 1977 by one Member of the Board, the final abatement order was rendered nearly a year later by a different Member without affording a fresh hearing. The High Court considered whether deciding an administrative or quasi-judicial matter without a personal hearing by the deciding officer, after substantial delay, violates principles of natural justice. The Lahore High Court accepted the appeal, holding that natural justice mandates that the person deciding must hear the party. Relying on the maxim audi alteram partem, the Court ruled that an order passed on notes by a predecessor after a year's gap is void for lack of lawful authority. The matter was remanded for fresh determination within one month.
Questions settled- Can a statutory authority pass an order affecting a party's rights on the basis of a hearing conducted a year earlier by a different officer?
- Whether the principle of audi alteram partem must be read into a statute where the provision does not expressly provide for an oral hearing?
- Does an inordinate delay of nearly one year between the hearing and the rendering of an administrative or quasi-judicial order necessitate a fresh hearing?
- Whether an order passed by a public authority without affording an adequate opportunity of hearing is void and without lawful authority?
- CRESCENT JUTE PRODUCTS LTD.. JARANWALA vs WORKERS' UNION , .1982 PLC 483 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-12-08Read full judgment →
- COTOTEXTIL vs INTER-AGENCIES LTD.1982 CLC 1090 · Sindh High Court · 1981-11-10Read full judgment →
- COTOTEXTIL vs INTER AGENCIES LTD.1982 CLC 1090 · Sindh High Court · 1981-11-10Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF TAXES, CHITTAGONG ZONE vs FREE SCHOOL STREET PROPERTIES LTD_46 TAX 165 · Supreme Court of BangladeshRead full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF TAXES AND ANOTHER vs MALLICK BROTHERS45 TAX 182 · Supreme Court of Bangladesh · 1981-02-01Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, LAHORE vs MESSRS GENERAL EQUIPMENT1982 PLD Supreme Court 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals, by special leave, arise from a common judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing applications under section 17(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, to direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to state a case and refer a question of law regarding whether steel almirahs manufactured by the respondent were exempt from sales tax as products of hammer works under Sales Tax Notification No. 9 dated June 27, 1951. The core legal question was whether the determination of an article being a product of hammer works is a question of law or fact, and how the exemption notification should be construed. The Supreme Court held that the process used for the manufacture of a particular article is a question of fact, and that the finding of the Tribunal that the goods were products of hammer work could not be disturbed. The Court laid down the principle that the statutory exemption does not require the manufacturing process to consist entirely of hammer work; rather, hammer work must be the dominant feature in producing the article.
Questions settled- Whether the question of what process is used for the manufacture of a particular article is a question of fact or law?
- Does the exemption for products of hammer works under Sales Tax Notification No. 9 require the manufacturing process to consist entirely of hammer work?
- Can the High Court go behind a finding of fact recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the manufacturing process?
- COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, LAHORE vs GENERAL EQUIPMENT MERCHANTS, LAHORE46 TAX 48 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals, by special leave, arose from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing applications under Section 17(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, which sought to direct the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to refer a question of law regarding whether almirahs manufactured by the respondent were exempt from sales tax as products of hammer works under Sales Tax Notification No. 9 dated 27th June, 1951. The core legal questions involved the interpretation of the exemption notification and whether the determination that an article is a product of hammer works constitutes a question of law or a question of fact. The Supreme Court held that the manufacturing process does not need to be exclusively manual or solely composed of hammer work; rather, hammer work must be the dominant feature in the production. Furthermore, the Court held that the determination of the manufacturing process used to produce a particular article is a pure question of fact, and no question of law arises from the Tribunal's finding on this matter. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the manufacturing process of an article must be entirely the result of hammer work to qualify for sales tax exemption under Notification No. 9 dated 27th of June, 1951?
- Is the question of what process is used for the manufacture of a particular article a question of fact or a question of law?
- Can the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal be directed to state a case and refer a question to the Court when the underlying finding is one of fact?
- COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX vs HAJI E. DOSSA & SONS LTD.46 TAX 64 · Sindh High Court · 1981-12-22Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX vs HAJI E. DOSSA & SONS LTD46 TAX 64 · Sindh High Court · 1981-12-22Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX vs CRESCENT PAK SOAP & OIL MILLS LTD.45 TAX 226 · Sindh High Court · 1981-04-22Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KARACHI vs EASTERN FEDERAL UNION1982 PLD Supreme Court 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a certificated appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning tax assessments under the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947. The core legal question was whether the assessment for the chargeable accounting period ending December 31, 1952, which had become time-barred under the original section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act, could be revived and validated by the subsequent introduction of section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, via the Finance Act, 1957. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that although procedural statutes generally operate retroactively, they cannot be given retrospective effect to take away an accrued vested right or to reopen a past and closed transaction where the limitation period under the repealed provision had already expired before the amendment. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision that the assessment was time-barred and without legal validity.
Questions settled- Whether an amendment substituting limitation periods in a tax statute can revive an assessment that had already become time-barred under the repealed provision?
- Do procedural amendments operating retroactively affect vested rights accrued upon the expiry of a limitation period?
- Whether the provisions of section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, apply of their own force upon incorporation into the Business Profits Tax Act without awaiting subordinate notification?
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KARACHI (EAST) vs YASIN ALI AKBAR H.1982 PLD Karachi 847 · Sindh High Court · 1982-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment addresses 179 income-tax references concerning the taxability of dividends received by shareholders from companies enjoying income-tax exemption under Section 15-BB of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The core questions involved whether such dividends were inherently exempt and the validity and retrospective application of subsequent legislative amendments. The court held that, prior to legislative intervention, dividends from tax-exempt companies were also exempt in the hands of shareholders, aligning with the Supreme Court of Pakistan's precedent. While acknowledging the Legislature's power to enact curative and retrospective legislation, including the insertion of Section 15-BB(4-AA) by Finance Ordinance, 1972 (XXI of 1972) to tax such dividends, the court determined that the Post-Constitution (President's Order 5 of 1972), which purported to extend the Ordinance, could not grant retrospective effect to Section 15-BB(4-AA) for any period earlier than December 20, 1971, due to the limitations imposed by Article 279(4) of the Interim Constitution, 1972. Consequently, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's decision to exempt dividends for periods prior to December 20, 1971, was upheld.
Questions settled- Are dividends received by shareholders from companies enjoying a tax holiday under Section 15-BB of the Income-tax Act exempt from tax?
- Can an Ordinance promulgated by the President lapse if not approved by the National Assembly within six weeks of its re-assembly?
- Can a President's Order issued under Article 279 of the Interim Constitution, 1972, extend the life of an Ordinance indefinitely?
- Can an amendment to a tax law be given retrospective effect to a date earlier than December 20, 1971, under Article 279(4) of the Interim Constitution, 1972?
- Does the pendency of income tax references before the High Court prevent an assessment from being considered a past and closed transaction for the purpose of retrospective legislation?
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CENTRAL, KARACHI vs MESSERS EASTERN1982 PLD Karachi 680 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-10Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (WEST), KARACHI vs MESSERS FATEH TEXTILE1982 PLD Karachi 679 · Sindh High Court · 1982-01-25Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (EAST), KARACHI vs EBRAHIM D. AHMED1982 PLD Karachi 470 · Sindh High Court · 1982-01-24Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (CENTRAL) KARACHI vs MESSERS NEW1982 PLD Karachi 684 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This reference concerns the assessment of an insurance company regarding reserves for unexpired risks in fire and marine accounts. The core legal question was whether the Income-tax Officer possessed the jurisdiction to restrict these reserves and whether such reserves constituted expenditure under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Court held that the Income-tax Officer is generally bound to accept the balance of profits as disclosed by the accounts submitted to the Controller of Insurance under the Insurance Act, 1938, except for excluding specific expenditures not permissible under Section 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Court further determined that reserves for unexpired risks do not constitute expenditure because they are not irretrievably paid out. Additionally, the Court ruled that administrative circulars issued by the Central Board of Revenue, which sought to restrict these reserves to a specific percentage, lacked the force of law and were not binding on the assessee. The principle established is that the Income-tax Officer cannot look behind the accounts accepted by the Controller of Insurance unless to exclude impermissible expenditures.
Questions settled- Does the Income-tax Officer have the jurisdiction to disallow or restrict reserves for unexpired risks in insurance accounts?
- Do reserves for unexpired risks in insurance business constitute expenditure under the Income-tax Act 1922?
- Are administrative circulars issued by the Central Board of Revenue regarding insurance reserves binding on an assessee?
- Is the Income-tax Officer bound to accept the balance of profits disclosed in accounts submitted to the Controller of Insurance?
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX. WEST BENGAL vs RAIGHARH JUTE MILLS LTD.45 TAX 272 · Bombay High Court · 1981-07-27Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL vs ASIATIC OXYGEN &45 TAX 87 · Bombay High CourtRead full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI,ZONE, RAWALPINDI vs M. BAHAR45 TAX 134 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal addressed whether interest paid by an assessee-firm on amounts received from minor relatives, which was held inadmissible for exemption under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 1922 as borrowed capital, could alternatively fall within the scope of the general residuary provision of Section 10(2)(xvi) of the same Act as an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the special rule of interpretation 'generalia specialibus non derogant' applies where a special clause and a general clause cover the same narrow subject matter restrictively, it does not bar the application of a general clause if the two provisions are not mutually destructive or conflicting in substance. The Court found that the transaction constituted a loan and was appropriately deductible under Section 10(2)(iii), but that allowing it under Section 10(2)(xvi) was equally valid because the interest paid was indeed an expenditure incurred exclusively for business purposes. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether interest paid on amounts received from relatives which is inadmissible under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 1922 can be allowed as an expenditure under Section 10(2)(xvi)?
- Does the rule of interpretation 'generalia specialibus non derogant' exclude the application of the general residuary clause for business deductions when a specific clause exists?
- When does the occasion to apply the rule that things special derogate from things general arise in the interpretation of tax statutes?
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI, ZONE, RAWALPINDI vs M. SAHAR45 TAX 134 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the tax deductibility of interest payments made by an assessee firm to minor relatives on deposited sums. The core legal question was whether interest payments, if found inadmissible under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 1922 (which specifically addresses interest on borrowed capital), could alternatively be claimed as a business expenditure under the residuary Section 10(2)(xvi). The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had allowed the deduction under Section 10(2)(xvi), despite finding the arrangement did not strictly constitute 'borrowed capital' under Section 10(2)(iii). The Supreme Court held that the principle of 'generalia specialibus non derogant' (special provisions derogate from general ones) only applies when the scope of the general and special clauses is identical and creates a conflict. The Court determined that the interest payments in this case were, in fact, deductible under Section 10(2)(iii) as borrowed capital. Consequently, the Court affirmed the allowance of the deduction, holding that where an expenditure qualifies under both a specific and a general clause, the classification is immaterial, and the deduction remains valid.
Questions settled- Does the principle of 'generalia specialibus non derogant' preclude claiming a deduction under a general clause if it fails to meet the criteria of a specific clause?
- Can an expenditure be allowed as a deduction under a general clause if it also qualifies under a specific clause?
- Are interest payments on deposits used for business purposes considered 'borrowed capital' under the Income Tax Act 1922?
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI-II vs MEDIRATTA ENGINEERING45 TAX 95 · Delhi High CourtRead full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI vs PUNJAB ELECTRICS LTD.45 TAX 120 · Delhi High Court · 1981-11-11Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI vs M.K. SMT. PRA1AP KUMARI OF ALWAR45 TAX 116 · Delhi High Court · 1979-11-12Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI vs B.N. Kirpal And M.L. PUNJAB45 TAX 120 · Delhi High CourtRead full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DACCA ZONE, DACCA vs ALAUDDIN AND BROTHERS45 TAX 35 · Supreme Court of BangladeshRead full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DACCA vs ADAMJEE SONS LTD_46 TAX 170 · Supreme Court of BangladeshRead full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CHITTAGONG ZONE vs STERLING PLYWOOD45 TAX 174 · Supreme Court of BangladeshRead full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY CITY vs ABDULLAHBHAI M. MOONIM45 TAX 112 · Bombay High Court · 1981-04-06Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, AMRITSAR vs OMPARKASH BEHL45 TAX 123 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1979-09-09Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, AMRITSAR vs OM PARKASH BEHL45 TAX 123 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1979-09-09Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, (EAST), KARACHI vs EBRAHIM D. AHMED AND OTHERS45 TAX 232 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX WEST BENGAL vs RAIGHARH JUTE MILLS LTD.45 TAX 272 · Bombay High Court · 1981-07-27Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs SRI RANILAKSHMI GINNING, SPINNING &46 TAX 15 · Madras High CourtRead full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs Smt. P.K. KOCHAMMU AMMA, PEROKE46 TAX 176 · Supreme Court of India · 1980-09-22Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs SARASWATHI PUBLICITIES45 TAX 162 · Madras High Court · 1979-07-02Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs S.K. SANJAN CHETTIAR & SONS.46 TAX 52 · Madras High Court · 1981-10-20Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs S. ZORASTER AND CO.46 TAX 94 · Rajasthan High Court · 1979-09-11Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs HIMALAYA DRUG CO.46 TAX 182 · Allahabad High Court · 1982-03-04Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs EASTERN FEDERAL UNION INSURANCE46 TAX 6 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This certificated appeal under Section 66-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 read with Section 19 of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 arose from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning the assessment of business profits tax for the chargeable accounting period ending 31-12-1952. The core legal question was whether the extension of the limitation period from four to six years via the incorporation of Section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 into the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 by the Finance Act, 1957 applied retroactively to permit assessment after the original four-year limitation period had already expired on 31-12-1956. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the assessment made on 31-1-1958 was time-barred and invalid. The Court laid down the principle that while procedural amendments generally operate retrospectively, they cannot be given retroactive effect to revive a dead claim or extinguish a vested right where the limitation period under the unamended law had already expired before the amendment came into force.
Questions settled- Does a procedural amendment extending a period of limitation operate retroactively to revive tax liability that had already become time-barred under the unamended law?
- Can an assessment under the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 be validly made after the four-year limitation period under Section 14 has expired prior to the enactment of the Finance Act, 1957?
- Whether Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 protects an assessee's vested right from being defeated by a subsequent amendment extending time limits for assessment?
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs EASTERN BANK LTD.46 TAX 56 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-09Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs BUSH BOAKE ALLEN (INDIA) LTD.46 TAX 185 · Madras High Court · 1981-10-20Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs BHILAI ENGINEERING CORPORATION PVT.46 TAX 79 · Madhya Pradesh High CourtRead full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs BHARAT NIDHI LTD.46 TAX 36 · Delhi High Court · 1981-08-17Read full judgment →