Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- MESSRS INDUS RIVER CONTRACTORS, TARBELA vs MR. AZIZ AHMAD MEMBER, N.1980 PLD Peshawar 216 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) to adjudicate an individual employment dispute involving the termination of a Senior Administrative Officer employed by an entity declared an 'essential service' under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952. The core legal question was whether the Specified Authority under the 1952 Act possesses inherent jurisdiction to resolve individual service disputes, such as reinstatement, in the absence of specific regulations governing the terms and conditions of that employment. The Court held that while the power to 'regulate' under Section 6(1) of the 1952 Act impliedly includes the power to adjudicate disputes, this jurisdiction is strictly contingent upon the prior framing of valid regulations governing the terms and conditions of service. The Court determined that procedural notifications, such as SRO 97(1)/79, do not satisfy the requirement for substantive regulation. Consequently, the Specified Authority lacked jurisdiction in this matter, and the petitioner’s remedy lay with the ordinary civil courts, as the statutory conditions for the Authority’s intervention had not been met.
Questions settled- Does the Specified Authority under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, have the jurisdiction to adjudicate individual employment disputes in the absence of specific regulations governing the terms and conditions of service?
- Does the term 'regulate' in Section 6(1) of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, include the power to adjudicate individual service disputes?
- Can procedural notifications issued by the Specified Authority serve as a substitute for substantive regulations required to vest the Authority with jurisdiction over employment disputes?
- Does the declaration of an employment as an 'essential service' automatically oust the jurisdiction of civil courts in all employment-related matters?
- MESSRS IMRAN AGENCIES, GUJRANWALA vs THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 446 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-27Read full judgment →
- MESSRS IDEAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER vs Mst. KHAIRUNNISA A.1980 CLC 1375 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil suit was instituted by an insurance company for the recovery of money secured by an equitable mortgage created through the deposit of title deeds. The defendant, a pardanashin lady, denied liability, contending that the plaint was improperly drafted and unverified, the mortgage was unregistered and unenforceable, the suit was barred by limitation under promissory note rules, and she had signed documents without understanding them in English. The Sindh High Court held that the suit was primarily a mortgage suit under Order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, not a promissory note suit, and was governed by the 12-year limitation period under Article 132 of the Limitation Act 1908. A memorandum merely recording a past deposit of title deeds as security does not require registration. The court further held that a pardanashin lady cannot escape liability without pleading fraud, and that the court retains the power under Order I Rule 10 CPC to substitute or add a statutory successor (State Life Insurance Corporation) before signing the judgment.
Questions settled- Does a memorandum acknowledging a past deposit of title deeds as security for a loan require registration to create a valid equitable mortgage?
- Can a court add or substitute a necessary party under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 while dictating or before signing its judgment?
- Can a pardanashin lady avoid contractual liability on the ground of not knowing English without pleading fraud or undue influence?
- What limitation period applies to a suit for recovery of loan secured by an equitable mortgage created through deposit of title deeds?
- MESSRS IBAD & Ca vs PROVINCE OF SIND THROUGH SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION AND WORKS DEPARTMENT AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Karachi 207 · Sindh High Court · 1979-08-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves objections to an arbitration award dated 23-12-1978 passed by the sole arbitrator in a dispute arising from a road construction contract. The plaintiff contractor submitted a tender for road reconditioning, which was accepted, but subsequent disputes arose when the defendants failed to provide designs and drawings under clause 13 of the contract, halting the work. The plaintiff filed an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, leading to a reference to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded a sum to the plaintiff, prompting the defendants to file objections alleging errors apparent on the face of the award, lack of evidence, and that the arbitrator adopted a wrong basis for assessing damages and acted on equitable considerations rather than law. The Sindh High Court held that the interpretation of clause 13 and the assessment of damages fell within the competency of the arbitrator, that insufficiency of evidence or a wrong basis for assessing damages does not furnish a ground to set aside an award under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, and that mere use of the word 'penalize' did not convert damages into a penalty. However, the Court modified the award by setting aside the grant of interest on damages, as an arbitrator has no power to grant interest on damages, and made the award the rule of the court with that modification.
Questions settled- Whether an erroneous view regarding the applicability of a contract clause constitutes an error apparent on the face of the award justifying judicial interference?
- Can an arbitration award be set aside under section 30 of the Arbitration Act on the ground that the arbitrator adopted a wrong basis for assessing the quantum of damages?
- Does insufficiency of evidence or a disagreement over the appreciation of evidence warrant setting aside an arbitration award?
- Whether an arbitrator has the power to grant interest on damages?
- MESSRS HOECHST PAKISTAN LTD., KARACHI vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1980 PLD Karachi 434 · Sindh High Court · 1980-05-18Read full judgment →
- MESSRS HAM DARD LABORATORIES (WAQF) PAKISTAN, KARACHI vs Shah Syed1980 CLC 680 · Sindh High Court · 1978-03-29Read full judgment →
- MESSRS HABIB BANK LTD. vs MESSRS KAYCEE CORPORATION, KARACHI1980 PLD Karachi 143 · Sindh High Court · 1979-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This suit was brought under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by the plaintiff bank for the recovery of Rs. 1,97,169.11 based on a promissory note executed as security for a loan facility. The defendants, although served with summary summons, did not apply for leave to defend within the prescribed ten days. Instead, they moved an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Sind Chief Court Rules, arguing that the suit did not fall within the scope of Order XXXVII because the claim included service charges, sales tax, and godown rent not covered by the promissory note, and required evidence to determine the bank interest rate. The High Court of Sindh held that for a suit to lie under Order XXXVII, the claim must be strictly confined to the instrument itself, allowing for an open-and-shut case without the need for external evidence. Since the plaintiff's claim required proof of additional charges and fluctuating interest rates, it could not be decreed summarily. Consequently, the Court ordered the suit to be tried as an ordinary long cause suit.
Questions settled- Can a suit be maintained under the summary procedure of Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the claim includes charges and interest rates that require external evidence to prove?
- Whether a defendant's failure to apply for leave to defend under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 automatically entitles the plaintiff to a decree if the plaint does not disclose an open-and-shut case based solely on a negotiable instrument?
- Does a promissory note executed merely as security for a fluctuating loan facility qualify for summary recovery under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- MESSRS EXCELLSIOR AGENCIES vs KASSIMALI1980 CLC 1015 · Sindh High Court · 1979-09-22Read full judgment →
- MESSRS EDULJI DINSHAW LTD. vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KARACHI1980 CLC 2169 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-15Read full judgment →
- MESSRS DADA SONSs vs MESSRS BENGAL OIL MILLS LTD.Respondants1980 SCMR 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves cross-suits for damages for breach of contract and refund of advance deposits following a contract for the sale of cottonseed, which became subject to price control under Martial Law Regulation No. 42 of 1958. The core legal questions concern whether the Central Government possessed the authority to fix the price of cottonseed under the Regulation, whether the contract was frustrated by the fixation of a statutory control price, and whether either party committed an anticipatory breach. The Supreme Court held that the Central Government had the requisite authority to control and fix the price of cottonseed as goods manufactured within Pakistan, and that the Reconstituted Martial Law Regulation was prospective and did not operate retrospectively. The Court concluded that the contract was validly kept alive by the vendors until November 14, 1958, and that the vendors themselves failed to establish readiness to perform or a valid breach by the purchasers. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the general power of price control under Martial Law Regulation No. 42 includes the power to fix prices of manufactured goods, and subordinate price notifications do not possess retrospective effect unless explicitly mandated by law.
Questions settled- Whether the Central Government had the authority to fix the price of cottonseed under Martial Law Regulation No. 42?
- Did the Reconstituted Martial Law Regulation No. 42 operate retrospectively to validate prior notifications from an earlier date?
- Whether a contract for the sale of goods is frustrated by the interposition of a statutory price control order?
- Did the purchasers commit an anticipatory breach of contract by drawing attention to the promulgation of a price control regulation?
- MESSRS CRESCENT STAR INSURANCE CO. LTD. vs MESSRS S. M. ABDULLAH &1980 CLC 1919 · Sindh High Court · 1980-03-17Read full judgment →
- MESSRS CRESCENT PUBLICITY SERVICE vs S. M. YOUNUS AND Others1980 SCMR 779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an eviction application filed against the petitioner, which was initially ordered by the Rent Controller, Karachi, but subsequently set aside by the District Court. Upon the respondents' second appeal to the Sind High Court, the petitioner was ordered to deposit monthly rent. Following the petitioner's default in complying with this deposit order, the High Court struck off the petitioner's defence. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that a single default did not warrant striking off the defence and that the High Court lacked the authority to strike off a defence during a second appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had clearly fallen within the scope of Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in striking off the defence. The Court affirmed that the High Court possesses the power to strike off a tenant's defence for breach of a rent deposit order, even in second appeal proceedings, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Does the High Court have the power to strike off a tenant's defence for failure to comply with a rent deposit order during a second appeal?
- Does a single default in the payment of rent justify the striking off of a tenant's defence under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- MESSRS CONSOLIDATED SUGAR MILLS LTD., KARACHI AND ANOTHER vs UNITED1980 CLC 804 · Sindh High Court · 1979-01-30Read full judgment →
- MESSRS CHAUDHARY BROTHERS, KARACHI vs PEOPLE'S MUNICIPALITY, KOTRI, SIND AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 2026 · Sindh High Court · 1980-02-02Read full judgment →
- MESSRS CAPRI CINEMA vs GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 838(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from constitutional petitions concerning the recovery of licence fees from cinema houses situated within the limits of the Cantonment Board, where the District Magistrate purported to enforce the Cinematograph Rules, 1962. The legality of this action was challenged on the ground that section 124 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, excluded the operation of other Acts regarding the collection of licence fees, a submission that was rejected by the High Court. During the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the promulgation of President's Order No. 13 of 1979 granted exclusive jurisdiction to Cantonment Boards to collect this fee from cinema houses. Consequently, the learned counsel conceded that the petitions had become infructuous and sought to withdraw them. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the petitions as infructuous based on the subsequent change in law.
Questions settled- Does section 124 of the Cantonments Act 1924 exclude the operation of other Acts in the matter of collecting licence fees from cinema houses?
- What is the effect of the promulgation of President's Order No. 13 of 1979 on pending petitions concerning the collection of licence fees by Cantonment Boards?
- MESSRS BURMAH OIL MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs MESSRS COLONY TEXTILE MILLS1980 CLC 512 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-10Read full judgment →
- MESSRS BIBOJEE SERVICES LTD. vs GOVERNMENT OF N.W. F. P. THROUGH SECRETARY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT AND 3 OTHERS1980 CLC 1437 · Peshawar High Court · 1980-01-21Read full judgment →
- MESSRS BARISONS (PAK.) LTD., KARACHI vs PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES AND NATURAL SOURCES AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 470 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-09Read full judgment →
- MESSRS BAIG & COMPANY vs PROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND 4 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 511 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-24Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ANSARI ENTERPRISES vs TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD.1980 PLD Karachi 226 · Sindh High Court · 1978-04-09Read full judgment →
- MESSRS AMIN JUTE MILLS LTD., CHITTAGONG AND ANOTHER vs PAKISTAN1980 PLD Karachi 74 · Sindh High Court · 1978-08-10Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ALMUSLIM GOODS TRANSPORT Co., KARACHI AND ANOTHER vs MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE1980 CLC 86 · Sindh High Court · 1978-10-17Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ALFOZIA RECRUITING AGENCY vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1980 CLC 1511 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-12Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ALFAROOQ SHIPPING Co. LTD. vs MESSRS VASA SHIPPING CO. LTD.1980 CLC 1228 · Sindh High Court · 1980-01-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This suit concerns a claim for specific performance or damages regarding the sale of a vessel, "m. v. ILION." The core legal question was whether an ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from removing or selling the vessel should be confirmed, and whether specific performance was an appropriate remedy. The court vacated the ad-interim injunction, holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness to perform their contractual obligations, having previously repudiated the contract by claiming damages and instructing their bank to withhold payment. The court held that the vessel, being movable property, did not warrant specific performance as pecuniary compensation was an adequate remedy. The key principle laid down is that a party seeking specific performance must prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform; claiming damages for breach constitutes an election to treat the contract as terminated, precluding subsequent claims for specific performance. Furthermore, specific performance for movable property is generally unavailable where monetary compensation is adequate, and the court may instead order security for the claimed damages to safeguard the plaintiff's interest.
Questions settled- Can specific performance be granted for the sale of a vessel if pecuniary compensation is an adequate remedy?
- Does a claim for damages for breach of contract constitute an election to treat the contract as terminated?
- Is a plaintiff required to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract to obtain specific performance?
- Does the passing of property in goods necessarily occur upon delivery?
- MESSRS ALBARIO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs ASSESSING AUTHORITY, EXCISE AND TAXATION DEPARTMENT, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 414 · Lahore High Court · 1979-03-13Read full judgment →
- MESSRS AHMED INVESTMENT LTD., KARACHI vs M. V. _SUNRISE IV_ AND ANOTHERS1980 PLD Karachi 229 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This suit was brought under the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court for the recovery of Rs. 9,92,800 against a foreign vessel (defendant No. 1) and its foreign owner (defendant No. 2) for short-landing of cargo. The vessel was arrested under Rule 731 of the Chief Court Rules (O.S.). The defendants sought unconditional release, raising preliminary objections that the suit was barred under Section 35 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 because it joined both the ship in rem and the owner in personam, and that they were protected under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1925 due to insufficiency of marks. The High Court modified the arrest order, reducing the security amount. It held that Section 35 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 is jurisdictional, not procedural, and does not bar the joinder of owners in an action in rem. The Court laid down that when an owner voluntarily appears to defend an action in rem, they submit to personal liability, and the action effectively proceeds as an action in personam.
Questions settled- Does Section 35 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 bar a plaintiff from joining the owner of a vessel as a co-defendant in an action in rem?
- What is the legal effect of a shipowner entering a voluntary appearance to defend an admiralty action in rem?
- Can an action in rem be defeated under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 solely on the ground of misjoinder of the ship's owner as a party?
- MEssits LINK ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD. vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1980 PLD Lahore 469 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-06Read full judgment →
- Member, Board of Revenue AKBAR ETC. vs Mst. SARWAR SULTAN1980 PLD Rev. 7 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1978-07-29Read full judgment →
- MEHRAJ DIN vs MUHAMMAD ISMAIL1980 SCMR 764 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from an ejectment order passed against the petitioner, who constructed a khokha on an open space contiguous to the respondent's property and operated a fruit-selling business. The core legal question concerns the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant, established through the tender of rent by money orders. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly relied on documentary evidence and the testimony of a postal official to prove that the petitioner had remitted rent to the respondent, thereby acknowledging him as landlord and rendering the petitioner a defaulter upon non-payment. The petition was dismissed, upholding the ejectment, with a four-month grace period granted to vacate the premises upon continued payment of rent.
Questions settled- Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant can be established by the tender of rent through money orders?
- Does the failure to examine marginal witnesses invalidate documentary evidence when supported by the testimony of a postal official?
- Can a tenant resile from the position of having accepted a landlord after tendering rent to him?
- Mehr GUL KHAN vs THE STATE1980 SCMR 545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a miscellaneous application filed in a dismissed criminal review petition, seeking clarification and amplification of previous observations made by the Supreme Court regarding documents relating to the petitioner's alleged minority at the time of the offence. The petitioner had been sentenced to death under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and his appeals and review petitions had already been dismissed. The petitioner contended that the Executive Government, while considering a mercy petition, erred by referring him to a Medical Board instead of relying solely on the birth and medical certificates presented to the Court, thereby allegedly violating the Court's observations. The core legal question was whether the miscellaneous application seeking clarification was competent and whether the Executive authorities were bound by specific modes of inquiry when dealing with mercy petitions. The Supreme Court held that the application was incompetent, misconceived, and constituted a prohibited second review under the rules, clarifying that no mandatory directions or restrictions had been imposed on the Executive Government regarding how it should evaluate a mercy petition.
Questions settled- Does a miscellaneous application seeking clarification of previous observations in a dismissed review petition amount to an incompetent second review?
- Can the Supreme Court's refusal to take notice of new documents at the review stage be construed as a binding direction to the Executive Government on how to evaluate a mercy petition?
- Is an application challenging the evidentiary procedure adopted by the Executive Government during a mercy petition maintainable before the Supreme Court?
- MEHR DIN vs NAZAR HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER1980 P Cr. L J 1067 · Lahore High Court · 1978-03-31Read full judgment →
- MEHDI KHAN vs FAQIR MUHAMMAD AND 4 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 110 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a suit for possession by way of pre-emption regarding a land sale. The core legal question was whether the death of one of several principals terminates a power of attorney, thereby invalidating a subsequent sale deed, and whether a one-day delay in depositing Zarpanjum and court fees warrants dismissal of the suit. The court held that under Section 201 of the Contract Act, 1872, the death of one principal terminates the agency, rendering the registered sale deed ineffective. Consequently, the limitation period for the pre-emption suit commenced from the date of the subsequent oral sale, not the registered deed. Furthermore, the court ruled that procedural technicalities, such as a minor delay in depositing funds, should not be used to defeat substantive rights when the party acted in good faith. The court emphasized that courts should prioritize substantial justice over rigid procedural adherence. The judgment establishes that agency terminates upon the death of any principal and that trial courts possess the discretion to condone minor procedural delays to ensure the determination of cases on their merits.
Questions settled- Does the death of one of several principals terminate a power of attorney?
- Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit run from an invalid registered sale deed or a subsequent valid oral sale?
- Can a court condone a one-day delay in the deposit of Zarpanjum and court fees in a pre-emption suit?
- MEGNA INDUSTRIES LTD., GUJRANWALA vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE, RAWALPINDI41 TAX 148 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- MEER MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs Mirza MUHAMMAD ASHRAF AND 4 OTHERS1980 CLC 1984 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition was filed against an order of the trial court making an arbitration award a rule of the court without providing the petitioner an opportunity to file objections. The respondent had applied to make the award a rule of the court, and the petitioner was proceeded against ex parte. After the arbitrator filed the award, the trial court immediately made it a rule of the court based on the statements of the arbitrator and the respondent. The Lahore High Court addressed whether the revision petition was maintainable and whether the trial court erred in failing to issue notice of the filing of the award. The Court held that because no notice of the filing of the award was given, the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to object, meaning the order did not fall under the appealable category of refusing to set aside an award under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940. Consequently, a revision petition was competent. The Court ruled that Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 mandatorily requires the court to give notice of the filing of the award to the parties to allow them to file objections within the 30-day limitation period under Article 158 of the Limitation Act 1908. The petition was accepted, and the case was remanded.
Questions settled- Is a revision petition maintainable against an order making an award a rule of court where no notice of the filing of the award was ever issued to the affected party?
- Is it mandatory for a court to issue notice to the parties under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 after an arbitration award is filed?
- What is the limitation period for a party to file objections to an arbitration award after it is filed in court?
- MAZHAR KHAN vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 1085 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-09Read full judgment →
- Master CHIRAGH DIN vs Mian ANWAR RASHID1980 CLC 650 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-06Read full judgment →
- Master ABDUL RASHID vs SUBMARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, SECTOR 2, RAWALPINDI AND 3 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 356 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-12Read full judgment →
- MAROO vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 363 · Sindh High Court · 1978-11-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal revision application sought the quashing of proceedings initiated against the applicant under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, alleging he was a habitual thief and dangerous person. The core legal question was whether the material presented by the police sufficiently established the "habit" required by the statute to justify such proceedings. The Sindh High Court held that the proceedings constituted an abuse of the process of the court and ordered them quashed. The Court emphasized that "habit" under Section 110 implies a tendency resulting from the frequent repetition of offenses, which must be proved by aggregate instances rather than isolated incidents or mere suspicion. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that evidence of general repute must be derived from respectable and independent witnesses within the accused's locality, rather than relying exclusively on police officers, whose testimony may be influenced by hostility or bias. Consequently, as the evidence failed to establish the requisite habitual criminality, the proceedings were terminated and the applicant's bail bonds were discharged.
Questions settled- What constitutes "habit" for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Can proceedings under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be sustained based solely on police allegations of isolated incidents?
- Is evidence of general repute from police officers sufficient to establish habitual criminality under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- When can a High Court quash proceedings pending before a Sub-Divisional Magistrate?
- MARDMAN HARIPAL vs MARDMAN OMEZAI AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan dismissing a writ petition concerning a century-old tribal land dispute over a common grazing pasture known as 'Narkhezai Jungle'. The core legal question involved whether the execution proceedings and preparation of a new demarcation plan violated applicable legal frameworks, including the Baluchistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976, and whether the matter stood automatically transferred to a Shariat forum. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings were merely execution and implementation of previous decisions rather than a new 'suit' or 'appeal' attracting Section 7 of the Regulation, and that the petitioner had acquiesced to the procedure. The Court laid down that execution proceedings of tribal jirga awards do not constitute new substantive proceedings requiring full statutory forums if they merely implement prior final decisions in accordance with the parties' joint statements.
Questions settled- Does Section 7 of the Baluchistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976 apply to execution proceedings and miscellaneous matters?
- Can a party challenge execution proceedings after participating in them and raising no initial objection?
- Does the preparation of a new implementation plan in execution of an old jirga award amount to a new case requiring transfer to a Shariat forum?
- MARDAN ALI vs GULISTAN AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 889 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the respondents under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Gakhar Khan. The Supreme Court examined the prosecution case, which relied on ocular evidence from interested and chance witnesses, motive, and alleged abscondence. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the ocular testimony was contradicted by medical evidence regarding the time of death and the number of injuries, that the alleged motive could not furnish corroboration due to an admitted blood-feud, and that the abscondence of the respondents was not legally proved under section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Holding that the High Court's re-evaluation of the evidence was reasonable and based on a careful appreciation of the record, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with an acquittal and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether an appellate court should interfere with the trial court's appreciation of evidence in a criminal appeal?
- Can the testimony of a chance witness be accepted without strong corroboration in cases of admitted enmity?
- How does a material discrepancy between ocular evidence and medical evidence affect the prosecution case?
- Whether abscondence can be used as corroborative evidence when proclamations under section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are not produced?
- MAQSOOD AZIZ vs THE STATE AND 4 OTHERS1980 P Cr. L J 427 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-13Read full judgment →
- MAQSOOD AHMED vs SUMMARY MILITARY COURT, PISHIN AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Quetta 71 · Balochistan High Court · 1980-05-19Read full judgment →
- MAQBUL AHMED TABASSAM vs THE STATE1980 SCMR 907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had previously dismissed the petitioner's Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, thereby upholding his conviction and death sentence for murder. The petitioner sought to re-argue the case, contending that the prosecution's eye-witnesses were biased due to their relationship with the deceased, that independent witnesses were ignored, that the extra-judicial confession was unreliable, and that the right of private defence and mitigating circumstances were not properly considered. The Supreme Court examined the grounds for review and determined that all arguments presented had already been thoroughly addressed and rejected during the initial hearing of the main petition. The Court held that the power of review is not intended to facilitate a rehearing of a case already decided on its merits after full consideration of the evidence. Consequently, finding no merit in the attempt to re-litigate settled issues, the Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, reaffirming that the initial judgment was based on a sound assessment of the evidence and legal principles.
Questions settled- Is a review petition maintainable for the purpose of a rehearing of a case previously dismissed on merits?
- Does the power of review allow for the re-examination of evidence already considered in the main petition?
- Under what circumstances can a review petition be dismissed by the Supreme Court?
- MAQBOOL AHMED vs INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU &KASHMIR AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 112 · Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal · 1980-01-01Read full judgment →
- MAQBOOL AHMAD vs BEGUM MUSARRAT SHAUKAT HAYAT KHAN1980 SCMR 750 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from an ejectment petition filed by the respondent against the petitioner for a disputed quarter transferred to the respondent. The respondent sought ejectment and an order was passed under section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance directing the petitioner to deposit arrears of rent from 1-11-1965 to 1-11-1968. The petitioner failed to comply, leading to his defence being struck off and an order for possession. The core legal question was whether voluntary payment of time-barred rent for a prior period could be subsequently adjusted against the rent ordered to be deposited for a later period under section 13(6). The Supreme Court held that where a sum of money has been voluntarily appropriated towards a particular debt, it cannot thereafter be adjusted against another debt, and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that voluntary appropriation of a payment towards a specific debt is final and cannot be re-adjusted for subsequent liabilities.
Questions settled- Whether rent voluntarily paid for a period prior to the limitation period can be subsequently adjusted towards a fresh rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
- Can a sum of money voluntarily appropriated towards a particular debt be thereafter adjusted against some other debt?
- MAQBOOL AHMAD CHEEMA vs MUHAMMAD IKRAM1980 CLC 361 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-21Read full judgment →
- MANZOOR HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1980 PLD Lahore 438 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-25Read full judgment →
- MANZOOR AHMAD vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 624 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-06Read full judgment →
- MANZOOR AHMAD vs S. TASLIM HUSSAIN AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from an order of the Service Tribunal. The core legal question involved whether the Service Tribunal was justified in proceeding ex parte against the petitioner and deciding the service appeal without considering the detailed written objections filed by the petitioner regarding a seniority dispute among Upper Division Clerks. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal committed an error in concluding that the petitioner failed to furnish written comments in time or was not entitled to a hearing, especially when the petitioner was present at the final hearing and the government had adopted a new stance altering seniority positions. The Court set aside the impugned decision of the Service Tribunal and remanded the matter for a fresh decision after affording a proper hearing to all concerned parties, establishing that affected civil servants must be heard on merits when contesting seniority disputes before tribunals.
Questions settled- Whether the Service Tribunal can proceed ex parte against a party who has filed detailed written objections within the prescribed time?
- Is it mandatory for the Service Tribunal to hear affected civil servants on merits in a seniority dispute even if the government concedes the claim of the appellant?
- Whether an order passed by the Service Tribunal without considering the objections and hearing the contesting respondents is sustainable in law?
- MANZOOR AHMAD vs Mat. FATIMA BIBI1980 SCMR 756 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal against eviction from a residential house on the ground of default in rent payment and denial of the landlord-tenant relationship. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could evade eviction and the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller by claiming that an unregistered agreement to mortgage executed by the respondent's son altered his status from a tenant to a mortgagee, absolving him from paying rent. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact against the petitioner regarding the lack of proof of execution and absence of valid authorization or special power of attorney in favor of the respondent's son to execute the document were unexceptionable. Since the petitioner admitted to being a rent defaulter for over a decade and failed to establish his plea, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a tenant denying the landlord-tenant relationship based on an unproved or unauthorized agreement cannot escape eviction proceedings for prolonged rent default.
Questions settled- Whether a tenant who denies the relationship of landlord and tenant can evade eviction proceedings without establishing an alternative binding legal status?
- Does an unproved agreement to mortgage executed without a valid special power of attorney absolve a tenant from paying rent under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
- Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the failure to prove the execution of a document be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal?
- MANSOOR BABAR vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1980 SCMR 710 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the order of the Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's appeal as time-barred following the rejection of his condonation application. The petitioner, an Assistant Films Producer, faced disciplinary proceedings under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, resulting in his reduction in rank from Grade 18 to Grade 16. His review petition was rejected, and his subsequent appeal to the Service Tribunal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, with the petitioner seeking condonation on the ground that he misdirected his appeal to his departmental Director. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the Service Tribunal's factual determination refusing condonation of delay. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The Court laid down the principle that the Supreme Court does not sit in appeal over findings of fact recorded by Tribunals where the Tribunal has properly exercised its jurisdiction and applied its mind.
Questions settled- Will the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact recorded by a Service Tribunal on an application for condonation of delay?
- Is misdirecting an appeal to a departmental head a valid ground for condonation of limitation before the Service Tribunal?
- MANSOOR AZHAR FAROOQI vs CHIEF SECRETARY, PUNJAB GOVERNMENT1980 PLC (C. S.) 547 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-05-04Read full judgment →
- MAMMORA AND 6 OTHERS vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 463 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-07Read full judgment →
- Malika NIAZ BEGUM AND OTHERS vs CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION1980 CLC 2163 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-05Read full judgment →
- Malik SHAH NAW AZ KHAN vs LIAQAT SULTAN KHAN ETC.1980 CLC 462 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-13Read full judgment →
- Malik REHMAT DIN vs AZAD KASHMIR GOVERNMENT AND ANOTHER1980 PLC 400s · Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal · 1980-06-15Read full judgment →
- Malik RAHIM BAKHSH vs Mst. MUNIRA AKHTAR1980 PLD Peshawar 246 · Peshawar High Court · 1980-05-02Read full judgment →
- Malik NOOK. BADSHAH vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KOHAT AND ANOTHER1980 PLD Peshawar 265 · Peshawar High Court · 1980-06-07Read full judgment →
- Malik NAJIBULLAH KHAN ETC. vs Malik MUHAMMAD BAHADAR ETC.1980 CLC 1216 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal arose from a suit filed by the donor (plaintiff) seeking a declaration that a gift of land and residential houses made in favour of his brother (the original defendant) had been revoked. The trial and lower appellate courts concurrently decreed the suit on the ground that delivery of possession had not been proved, rendering the gift incomplete and revocable. Before the High Court, the appellants argued that because the gift concerned an undivided share in joint property (mushaa) made by one co-sharer to another, actual delivery of possession was unnecessary, and that a prior consent decree operated as res judicata. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Muslim law, even a gift of an undivided share in property must be accompanied by delivery of possession in some form to be complete. The Court further held that a consent decree, being a convenient device to avoid stamp duty, does not bar an inquiry into the actual completion of the gift, and declined to disturb the concurrent findings of fact.
Questions settled- Is delivery of possession necessary to complete and validate a gift of an undivided share in joint property (mushaa) under Muslim law?
- Does a consent decree in a prior suit operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent inquiry into whether a gift was completed by delivery of possession?
- Can a concurrent finding of fact regarding the non-delivery of possession of gifted property be disturbed in a second appeal?
- Malik NAJIB ULLAH KHAN ETC. vs SAIF ULLAH ETC.1980 CLC 2155 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This regular second appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing a civil suit filed by Mst. Fateh Bibi challenging a gift deed dated 5th February 1949 executed in favour of Malik Sultan Mahmood regarding a large agricultural estate, or alternatively seeking its revocation. The core legal questions involved the validity and completion of the gift through the delivery of possession, whether the lower appellate Court erred in failing to consider certain evidentiary documents, and whether admissions were properly utilized under the law. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both lower courts had correctly found that the execution of the gift deed and the delivery of possession were duly proved by concurrent findings of fact based on sound oral and documentary evidence, and that no grounds were made out for second appellate interference. The key principles laid down include that a lower appellate court is not bound to explicitly reference every item of evidence provided there is substantial consideration of all relevant points, and that findings of fact based on concurrent evaluations will not be disturbed in second appeal without a demonstrable error of law.
Questions settled- Whether a lower appellate court is required to explicitly mention and discuss every single item of evidence or document considered by the trial court in its judgment?
- Can the High Court in second appeal interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution and completion of a gift deed through delivery of possession?
- Whether the failure to confront a witness with a prior statement under section 145 of the Evidence Act vitiates the proof of a document whose execution is entirely denied?
- Is a suit for declaration and permanent injunction maintainable without a prayer for possession where the plaintiff is found not to be in possession at the time of instituting the suit?
- Malik MUZAFFAR KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB AND 2 OTHERS1980 SCMR 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a constitutional petition and subsequent inter-court appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had challenged a notification issued by the Government of the Punjab under section 3 of the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance 1969, appointing a one-man tribunal of inquiry into conflicts and incidents involving political rivals in Kalabagh and Mianwali. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance 1969 lapsed upon the withdrawal of Martial Law in 1972, whether the Ordinance stood repealed by constitutional provisions regarding provincial legislation, and whether section 3 of the Ordinance or the impugned notification suffered from excessive delegation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Ordinance continued validly as an existing law under the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972 and the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, was further validated by the Validation of Laws Act 1975, and that neither the statute nor the notification suffered from excessive delegation. The key principle laid down is that laws enacted during previous regimes continue in force as existing laws under successive constitutional frameworks unless expressly altered, repealed, or amended, and do not lapse merely due to the withdrawal of Martial Law or change of governance.
Questions settled- Whether the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance 1969 lapsed automatically upon the withdrawal of Martial Law in April 1972?
- Whether an existing law promulgated during a previous regime continued in force under the Interim Constitution of Pakistan and the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Whether section 3 of the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance 1969 suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power?
- Whether a notification appointing an inquiry tribunal under the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance 1969 is void for want of specific and definite terms of reference?
- Malik MUZAFFAR KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB THROUGH CHEIF1980 CLC 384 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-04Read full judgment →
- Malik MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs REHMAT ALI AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 1163 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-22Read full judgment →
- Malik MUHAMMAD KHURSHID vs SECRETARY, EDUCATION ETC.1980 PLC (C. S.) 157 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-11-10Read full judgment →
- Malik MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs PUNJAB LOCAL COUNCIL ELECTION AUTHORITY1980 CLC 2036 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-05Read full judgment →
- Malik MANZOOR HUSSAIN vs MUHAMMAD BASHIR AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition filed by Malik Manzoor Hussain challenging the refusal of the courts below to grant him interim relief during the pendency of his suit for a permanent injunction to restrain respondents from constructing shops and buildings on a joint plot of land. The core legal question concerns whether a co-sharer is entitled to an interim injunction to stop construction on a joint holding prior to partition. The Supreme Court held that where a structure already existed on the property and ongoing construction was nearing completion, the balance of convenience lay in favour of the respondents, and stopping construction would cause them irreparable harm. The Court dismissed the petition, finding the lower courts' decisions fully justified on the record and not arbitrary or capricious, thereby affirming that interim injunctions in such property disputes depend on the specific factual context, including the state of existing construction and balance of convenience.
Questions settled- Is a co-sharer automatically entitled to an interim injunction to stop construction on a joint holding without partition?
- Does the existence of prior structures and advanced construction on a joint plot shift the balance of convenience against granting an interim injunction?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts refusing interim relief if such findings are not arbitrary or capricious?
- Malik JAVED AZAM AND 4 Other vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, ETC.1980 PLC (C. S.) 32 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-09-17Read full judgment →
- Malik JAN MUHAMMAD vs SHUKARUDDIN AND 6 OTHERS1980 CLC 186 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Regular First Appeal challenges the trial court's order rejecting the appellant-plaintiff's plaint in a pre-emption suit under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to an alleged deficiency in court-fee resulting from incorrect harvest periods in the statement of net profits. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in summarily rejecting the plaint without invoking sections 9, 10, and 28 of the Court Fees Act 1870 when the revenue officials' statements of net profits were contradictory and unreliable. The Lahore High Court held that the trial court erred in resorting to summary rejection under Order VII, Rule 11 without first determining the correct court-fee through a local commission under section 9 of the Court Fees Act 1870, especially as the appellant had not acted contumaciously or with mala fides. The court laid down the principle that where statements of net profits prepared by revenue officials are contradictory and unreliable, the court must utilize statutory mechanisms under sections 9, 10, and 28 of the Court Fees Act 1870 to ascertain the correct court-fee rather than summarily penalize the litigant by rejecting the plaint.
Questions settled- Can a plaint be summarily rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for deficient court-fee when statements of net profits prepared by revenue officials are contradictory and unreliable?
- Whether the trial court is required to issue a commission under section 9 of the Court Fees Act 1870 when annual net profits of pre-emption land have been wrongly estimated?
- Does a pre-emptor's initial payment of tentative court-fee and subsequent compliance with court orders constitute contumacy or mala fides warranting the dismissal of the suit?
- What is the proper procedure under the Court Fees Act 1870 when a document is found to be insufficiently stamped through mistake or inadvertence?
- Malik JAHANGIR KHAN AND Other vs PUNJAB GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 33 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-10-26Read full judgment →
- Malik HAMID ALI vs DIRECTOR, TECHNICAL EDUCATION, PUNJAB AND ANOTHER1980 PLC (C. S.) 574 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-06-21Read full judgment →
- MALIK GOODS TRANSPORT COMPANY vs MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ1980 CLC 373 · Sindh High Court · 1978-10-16Read full judgment →
- Malik GHULAM ABBAS vs Malik MUHAMMAD MUMTAZ KHAN AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 718 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These writ petitions challenged the election of various members to local councils in Punjab. The core legal question was whether disqualifications for membership of Parliament or Provincial Assemblies, particularly concerning association with unregistered political parties, applied to local council elections under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, and whether such disqualifications applied if incurred after nomination but before the notification of election results. The Court held that Section 21(f) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, incorporates by reference the disqualifications applicable to Parliament and Provincial Assemblies under the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977. The Court ruled that these disqualifications are continuing in nature and apply to local council members. It further held that Section 29 of the Ordinance imposes a mandatory duty on the government to remove members who incur such disqualifications. Consequently, the Court declared the elections of the disqualified members void, affirming that writs of quo warranto are maintainable against them, as their continued holding of office is illegal.
Questions settled- Does Section 21(f) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, incorporate by reference the disqualifications applicable to members of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies?
- Are disqualifications for local council membership limited to the date of nomination, or are they continuing in nature?
- Is the government duty-bound under Section 29 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, to remove a member who incurs a disqualification after their election?
- Can a writ of quo warranto be issued against a local council member whose disqualification was discovered after the election results were notified?
- Malik ABDUL REHMAN vs SECRETARY, CO-OPERATIVES, PUNJAB1980 PLC (C. S.) 50 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-09-17Read full judgment →
- Makhdumzada Syed HASSAN MAHMUD vs CITY COOPERATIVE BANK LTD.1980 PLD Karachi 37 · Sindh High Court · 1976-03-09Read full judgment →
- MAJOR (Rm.) FAZAL MUHAMMAD KHAN vs SARDAR KHAN AND 3 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 33 · Lahore High Court · 1979-02-12Read full judgment →
- MAJIDULLAH KHAN vs N.W.F.P. THORUGH BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 728 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner assailed an order of the Peshawar High Court allowing an application to implead respondents 4 and 5 as necessary parties in a pending writ petition concerning the cancellation of an agricultural land allotment. The core legal question was whether auction purchasers, who deposited the auction price during the pendency of a status quo order following an allegedly illegal cancellation of a prior allotment, qualify as necessary parties in a writ petition challenging that cancellation. The Supreme Court held that until the legality of the cancellation of the prior allotment is finally determined, the land cannot be treated as available for disposal by auction, and auction purchasers acquiring interests during a status quo order do not acquire a vested interest entitling them to be impleaded as necessary parties. The key principle laid down is that third-party auction purchasers pendente lite, whose alleged rights stem from an uncertain or sub-judice cancellation of a prior allotment, are not necessary parties to a writ petition challenging the initial cancellation.
Questions settled- Whether auction purchasers who deposit the auction price during the pendency of a status quo order are necessary parties to a writ petition challenging the cancellation of a prior allotment?
- Can land be considered available for disposal by auction while the legality of the cancellation of a prior allotment remains sub judice?
- MAJID HUSSAIN AND 5 OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 154 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-21Read full judgment →
- MAHMOODULHASSAN vs MUHAMMAD JAMEEL1980 CLC 829 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-14Read full judgment →
- MAHMOOD vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, WEST PAKISTAN AND 7 OTHERS1980 CLC 854 · Sindh High Court · 1979-09-09Read full judgment →
- MAHMOOD Convict vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 68 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-26Read full judgment →
- MAHMOOB ALAM vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 368 · Sindh High Court · 1974-09-22Read full judgment →
- MAHFOOZUR REHMAN BABAR AND 10 OTHERS vs FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION1980 PLD Karachi 427 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenges the orders passed by the Member, Federal Land Commission and the Additional Chief Land Commissioner regarding agricultural land disputes. The core legal questions involved whether the authorities failed to properly construe the applicable circular regarding unconfirmed sale agreements and whether the principles of natural justice and mandatory procedural rules requiring notice and hearing to affected purchasers were violated during suo motu revisional proceedings. The Court held that the revisional authority acted without jurisdiction and in violation of mandatory rules by failing to provide an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners who possessed vested rights as purchasers under a part-performed agreement, and that the Federal Land Commission misconstrued the circular regarding sale agreements. The Court laid down that failure to afford a mandatory hearing under the applicable land reform rules renders a revisional order void, and that bona fide sale agreements must be scrutinized in accordance with applicable administrative circulars.
Questions settled- Does a failure to afford an opportunity of hearing under the Sind Land Reform Rules render a revisional order without jurisdiction?
- Whether purchasers under an agreement to sell acquire vested rights entitling them to notice in land revenue proceedings?
- Did the Federal Land Commission misinterpret the circular regarding the scrutiny of unapproved sale agreements?
- MAHER ALAVI vs PAKISTAN AND 5 OTHERS1980 PLD Karachi 609 · Sindh High Court · 1980-06-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the annulment of the petitioner’s election as President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry by the Director, Trade Organization, under Section 9(2)(e) of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961. The core legal question was whether the Director possessed the authority to annul the election based on the alleged irregularities cited in his report. The Court held that the impugned order was without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The ratio decidendi established that while the Director has the power to annul elections, this power is not unfettered; it must be exercised for "justifiable reasons" pertinent to the election. The Court emphasized that not every irregularity warrants annulment; only those that materially affect the election result or render it a nullity in law justify such drastic action. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that administrative decisions under this Ordinance are subject to judicial review to ensure they are not based on irrelevant considerations, misconstruction of law, or an absence of factual basis.
Questions settled- Does the Director, Trade Organization, have the authority to annul the election of a trade organization's President?
- Are irregularities in an election sufficient to justify annulment if they do not materially affect the election result?
- Is an order of the Director, Trade Organization, annulling an election subject to judicial review by the High Court?
- Can a person who is not a member-elect of a Managing Committee act as a proxy holder in a trade organization election?
- MAHBOOB ALI DHALLA vs ABDUL MALIK AHMED HABIB1980 CLC 1056 · Sindh High Court · 1979-11-27Read full judgment →
- MADAD KHAN vs SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, DISTRICT JHANG AND ANOTHER1980 PLC (C. S.) 26 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1978-07-03Read full judgment →
- M. SULEMAN vs S. ZAHID HUSSAIN QADRI ETC.1980 CLC 783 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-06Read full judgment →
- M. SALEEM MALIK vs THE STATE1980 SCMR 780 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing his bail application in a criminal case involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The petitioner, having obtained leasehold rights to land already acquired by the Karachi Development Authority (K.D.A.), was arrested following an investigation into illegal land sales. The petitioner challenged his detention and the jurisdiction of the Summary Military Court, arguing the offence was exclusively triable by a Special Judge, Anti-Corruption. The Supreme Court addressed whether it should interfere with the High Court's refusal of bail. The Court held that, regardless of the jurisdictional argument regarding the trial forum—which remained pending in a separate constitutional petition—the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the land were highly suspicious, particularly as the lessor lacked the right to convey land for which compensation had already been received. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the bail refusal but directed the High Court to expedite the hearing of the pending constitutional petition. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Should the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's refusal of bail when the underlying jurisdictional challenge regarding the trial forum is pending in a separate constitutional petition?
- Does the suspicion surrounding the underlying transaction justify the denial of bail pending the resolution of jurisdictional arguments?
- M. M. YUNUS vs PUNJAB PROVINCE ETC_1980 PLC (C. S.) 608 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-04-20Read full judgment →
- M. M. K. A. ZAI vs THE COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by way of a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court and a subsequent order dismissing a review application. The core legal question concerned whether the petition for leave to appeal was barred by limitation and whether sufficient grounds existed for condoning the delay in filing. The Supreme Court held that the review application filed before the High Court was not maintainable and misconceived, and the petitioner was negligent in obtaining a certified copy of the judgment, rendering the petition for leave time-barred without sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The key principle laid down is that the pursuit of a futile and misconceived review application, coupled with negligence in obtaining certified copies, does not constitute a sufficient ground for condoning delay under limitation principles, and that observations preserving statutory powers of authorities to revise assessments render hypothetical grievances misconceived.
Questions settled- Whether the pursuit of a misconceived review application constitutes sufficient ground for condoning delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
- Whether negligence in collecting a certified copy of a judgment justifies the dismissal of a time-barred petition?
- M. K. JASKANI vs MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE1980 PLC (C. S.) 495 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1979-02-14Read full judgment →
- M. HAMEED MALIK vs M. BASHIR SHEIKH1980 CLC 281 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-28Read full judgment →
- M. A. SHAIKH vs CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND 3 OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 572 · Sindh Service Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
- M. A. QADAR FAROOQUI AND 2 OTHERS vs THE MASTER PLAN DEPARTMENT1980 PLD Karachi 486 · Sindh High Court · 1980-05-04Read full judgment →
- M UHAM MAD BOOTA vs FARZAND ALI AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 1124 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1980-01-11Read full judgment →
- M IR ZAMAN vs KHALILUR REHMAN AND 2 OTHERS1980 P Cr. L J 1160 · Peshawar High Court · 1980-05-09Read full judgment →
- LT.COL. FARZAND ALI vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN1980 SCMR 909 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from review applications filed against a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan which had dismissed the appeals of the petitioners regarding their compulsory retirement from public service. The core legal questions involved the scope of the Supreme Court's review jurisdiction, whether alleged errors of law or fact in the main judgment constituted errors apparent on the face of the record warranting review, and whether general allegations of mala fides without proper particulars and against deceased persons could sustain a review petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the review applications, holding that a review is not a rehearing of an appeal and that mere incorrectness of a conclusion or a difference of opinion does not constitute an error apparent. The Court laid down that review is an exceptional remedy limited to cases where something obvious has been overlooked, that mala fides must be pleaded with particularity against the actual decision-making authority, and that a review cannot be used to reargue a case or introduce new grounds not properly pleaded.
Questions settled- Whether mere incorrectness of a conclusion reached in a judgment constitutes a sufficient ground for the exercise of review jurisdiction?
- Can a review petition be entertained on the basis of general allegations of mala fides not pleaded with particularity in the original review petition?
- Whether the question of retirement of a civil servant in the public interest is justiciable before superior courts?
- Does a review petition permit the re-argument of an appeal or the summoning of records to re-examine findings already adjudicated?
- LT.Col. Ch. JAN MUHAMMAD vs LT. COL. M. A. SATTAR AND 8 OTHERS1980 SCMR 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court vacating an ad interim stay order granted in a second appeal concerning ejectment proceedings. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in vacating a conditional stay order when the petitioner failed to comply with the condition of depositing monthly rent. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was unexceptionable, ruling that a conditional stay order granted as a concession can be properly withdrawn upon the non-fulfilment of the terms upon which it was issued. The key principle laid down is that a party who misuses or fails to comply with the conditions attached to a discretionary stay order cannot maintain the benefit of that order, and the court retains the power to vacate it upon default.
Questions settled- Can a conditional stay order be vacated if the party fails to fulfill the terms on which it was granted?
- Whether the High Court is justified in withdrawing an ad interim stay when the petitioner defaults on depositing rent?
- LATE MAJOR ZARIF HUSSAIN vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had overturned a single judge's decision regarding the non-renewal of a horse-breeding land lease. The petitioner, representing the legal heirs of the late Major Zarif Hussain, initially challenged the termination of the lease based on clause (14) of the lease agreement, arguing that the lessee was entitled to a hearing regarding renewal. However, as the original lessee had passed away, the Court determined that the argument regarding clause (14) had become academic. The petitioners further attempted to raise a new claim under clause (16) of the lease agreement, asserting entitlement to the tenancy as legal heirs. The Supreme Court held that it could not grant leave to examine a totally new claim that was not raised before the High Court. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, observing that the petitioners were free to approach the respondents for relief under the relevant clause if so advised. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the Supreme Court will not grant leave to examine academic questions or new claims not previously agitated.
Questions settled- Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to examine questions that have become academic due to the death of the original party?
- Can a petitioner raise a new claim in the Supreme Court that was not pleaded or argued before the High Court?
- LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR ETC. vs ABDUL QAYYUM MALIK ETC.1980 SCMR 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from two petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the Land Acquisition Collector against a Lahore High Court judgment that enhanced the compensation awarded to landowners for land acquired for the Lahore Airport. The Collector had assessed the land's value purely as agricultural land, whereas the High Court determined that the land possessed potential building site value due to its proximity to the airport and a nearby residential colony, subsequently awarding compensation based on the rates claimed by the landowners. The petitioner contended that because the land fell within the "funnel area" under the Works of Defence Act 1903, building activities were restricted, stripping the land of any building potential. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the petitioner failed to factually prove the land fell within the restricted area. Legally, the Court ruled that a conditional restriction on construction, which allows for exemptions or written approvals, does not strip land of its inherent potential building value, and the possibility of the restriction being waived or removed must be considered when determining compensation.
Questions settled- Does a conditional statutory restriction on construction completely deprive land of its potential value as a building site for the purpose of determining acquisition compensation?
- Can a notification restricting land use under the Works of Defence Act 1903 be relied upon to reduce land value if the acquiring authority fails to factually identify the acquired land within the restricted zone?
- Whether the possibility of the removal or waiver of a building restriction is a relevant factor in assessing the market value of acquired land?
- LALOO vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 748 · Sindh High Court · 1979-06-26Read full judgment →