Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- Mst, BUSHRA PERVEEN vs ABDUL RAHMAN1980 PLD Lahore 350 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-11Read full judgment →
- Mst SAEEDA BANO AND ANOTHER vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION1980 CLC 1346 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-28Read full judgment →
- Mst NOOR JEHAN vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1980 P Cr. L J 332 · Sindh High Court · 1979-04-20Read full judgment →
- MRS. SULEMAN vs ABDUL GHAFOOR1980 CLC 316 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal challenges the concurrent judgments of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, Lahore, ordering the appellant's ejectment from a rented property. The core legal questions concerned the locus standi of a single co-landlord to initiate ejectment proceedings and the effect of filing an ejectment petition before the expiration of the thirty-day notice period mandated by Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Court held that while a single co-landlord possesses the locus standi to file such a petition, the instant petition was premature and lacked a cause of action because it was instituted before the statutory thirty-day notice period had elapsed. Furthermore, the Court found that the lower courts misread the evidence regarding the alleged default in rent payment, as they improperly penalized the tenant for failing to produce rent receipts despite the landlord's admission that he never issued them. Consequently, the Court set aside the ejectment order, emphasizing that doubts regarding rent payment should be resolved in favor of the tenant, and dismissed the ejectment application.
Questions settled- Can a single co-landlord institute an ejectment petition against a tenant without impleading other co-landlords?
- Is an ejectment petition filed before the expiry of the thirty-day notice period under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 maintainable?
- Does the non-production of rent receipts by a tenant constitute proof of default when the landlord admits to not issuing receipts?
- MRS. S. R. MALIK vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, EDUCATION DEPARTMENT1980 PLC (C. S.) 653 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-06-14Read full judgment →
- MRS. RUKHSANA BIBI vs PROVINCIAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, SIND1980 PLD Rev. 24 · Sindh Revenue Board · 1979-07-20Read full judgment →
- MRS. M. J. B. SHAH vs SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SIND, EDUCATION1980 PLC (C. S.) 550 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1979-06-19Read full judgment →
- Mrs. HIAM TABBARA vs DIRECTORGENERAL, PAKISTAN COAST GUARDS, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1980 PLD Karachi 44 · Sindh High Court · 1978-08-29Read full judgment →
- MRS. GULZAR, IQBAL vs EDUCATION DEPARTMENT1980 PLC (C.S.) 279(1) · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-12-29Read full judgment →
- MRS. DIANAT FATIMA AND 8 omERss vs Mir ABBAS KHAN AND 2 oTHERs1980 PLD Karachi 271 · Sindh High Court · 1979-03-18Read full judgment →
- MRS. AMINA SULTANA vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB, EDUCATION DEPARTMENT1980 PLC (C. S.) 376 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-03-30Read full judgment →
- MRS. ALI AHMAD ANSARI AND 3 OTHERS vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 2 OTHERS1980 CLC 161 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MRS, VASLI BAI AND 3 OTHERS vs JAMSHED ADERJI DUBASH AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 1009 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-21Read full judgment →
- MONAWAR ALI QURESHI vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB, INFORMATION, CULTURE & TOURISM DEPARTMNT1980 PLC (C. S.) 525 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-05-04Read full judgment →
- MOHSIN RAZA vs DR. BASHIR. AHMAD AND ANOTHER1980 P Cr. L J 180 · Peshawar High Court · 1980-01-08Read full judgment →
- MOHKUM DIN vs GOVERNMENT OF AZAD J & K AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Azad J & K 33 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1980-05-02Read full judgment →
- MOHARAM AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 50 · Sindh High Court · 1979-01-21Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD YAQUB KHAN vs AZIM KHAN AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed his second appeal in a declaratory suit concerning a small piece of open land measuring approximately 8 marlas. The core legal question revolved around whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the joint ownership and unpartitioned status of the disputed land were vitiated by misreading of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts' concurrent findings were based on a proper appreciation of the evidence and that no misreading of evidence was established. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the site remained unpartitioned joint property for the common enjoyment of the surrounding house owners and could not be partitioned.
Questions settled- Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding joint ownership and partition can be assailed on the ground of misreading of evidence in a second appeal?
- Can an unpartitioned open space left for the common use of surrounding residential properties be partitioned when it would result in unusable small bits?
- Does the High Court possess justification to refuse interference in a second appeal when no misreading of evidence by the trial and appellate courts is established?
- MOHAMMAD SARWAR alias FEROZE ALI vs ABDUL GHANI AND 7 OTHERS1980 CLC 946 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Letters Patent Appeal arose from a suit for declaration under custom where the lower appellate court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal on the ground that it was improperly presented because the vakalatnama attached to the memorandum of appeal was not signed by the appellant. The core legal question was whether the failure of an appellant to sign a vakalatnama or memorandum of appeal, where oral instructions were genuinely given to the advocate, renders the presentation an absolute nullity or constitutes a curable irregularity. The High Court held that the primary objective of Order III and Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is to ensure that appeals are filed under authentic authority. Since the appellant had orally instructed the counsel and actively participated in proceedings, the omission to sign the vakalatnama was a mere procedural oversight and curable irregularity. The Court modified the Single Judge's judgment, allowed the appeal, and held the presentation lawful.
Questions settled- Does the failure of an appellant to sign a vakalatnama render the presentation of an appeal a nullity?
- Can a defect in the presentation of a memorandum of appeal under Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be cured after the expiration of limitation?
- Whether oral instructions given to an advocate are sufficient to establish genuine representation so as to treat an unsigned power of attorney as a curable irregularity?
- MOHAMMAD NOOR vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 378 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition regarding admission refusal to Ayub Medical College. The petitioner, a third-divisioner in F.Sc. (Medical), contested the college prospectus's ban on third-division candidates, arguing it violated Articles 22(4) and 37(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which mandate the advancement of backward classes. The Supreme Court held that Articles 22(4) and 37(a) are enabling provisions and do not preclude the state from setting minimum educational standards for professional training. The Court affirmed that determining such standards is within the discretion of competent authorities and that reserving seats for backward areas does not necessitate lowering academic requirements. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the allocation of unfilled reserved seats to other areas was permissible under the prospectus. While the petition was dismissed, the Court observed that if the college had indeed admitted another third-divisioner, the petitioner’s case warranted reconsideration to prevent discrimination. The Court declined to address arguments regarding the college's statutory status under the Ayub Medical College (Board of Governors) Ordinance, 1978, as it was not raised below.
Questions settled- Does the reservation of seats for educationally backward classes under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 prohibit the state from setting minimum educational standards for admission?
- Can a candidate challenge the validity of a college prospectus in the Supreme Court if the specific legal ground was not raised before the High Court?
- Is the allocation of unfilled reserved seats to candidates from other areas permissible when the original reserved-category candidates fail to meet the minimum eligibility criteria?
- Does the admission of a single candidate in violation of a stated policy entitle another candidate in a similar position to claim admission on the basis of discrimination?
- MOHAMMAD HANIF alias BILLA vs THE STATE1980 SCMR 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a review petition seeking review of an earlier order of the Supreme Court dismissing the petitioner's leave to appeal against his conviction for murder and sentence of death under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question raised was whether the acquittal of the petitioner of the charge of attempted murder under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, due to the non-production of medical evidence, warranted the acquittal of the petitioner for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether an injured witness's presence could be established without formal medical proof. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the absence of formal medical evidence does not invalidate the testimony of an injured eyewitness whose presence and injury are otherwise established by consistent ocular testimony and unrefuted cross-examination. The court reaffirmed the principles governing the review of criminal judgments and found that the grounds raised merely sought a rehearing of the matter without satisfying the strict conditions for review.
Questions settled- Whether the acquittal of an accused under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 warrants a mandatory acquittal under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 arising from the same occurrence?
- Can the presence and injury of an eyewitness be established in a criminal trial without the formal production and examination of medical evidence?
- Does the failure to examine a medical witness automatically render the testimony of an injured witness unreliable regarding his presence at the scene of the crime?
- MOHAMMAD BAKHSH AND OTHERS vs MOHAMMAD AKBAR AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' second appeal in a declaratory suit concerning land ownership. The dispute originated from a fraudulent mutation entry made in 1939 by a predecessor of the petitioners, altering the rightful ownership shares derived from the common ancestor, Malik Sardar. The respondents, successors of Mir Alam, filed a suit for declaration and correction of revenue entries upon discovering the wrong entry during settlement operations. The trial court dismissed the suit on limitation and lack of cause of action, but the first appellate court reversed the decision and decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, a view upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court addressed contentions regarding res judicata based on prior litigation from 1902, 1905, and 1912. The Supreme Court held that the plea of res judicata was unavailing as the predecessors of the respondents were not parties to the relevant binding litigation, and the mutation entry was rightly challenged. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a revenue mutation based on a previous court decision is binding on parties who were not impleaded in that litigation?
- Can a plea of res judicata be sustained against parties who were not afforded an opportunity to defend their rights in the earlier proceedings?
- Whether beneficiaries of a fraudulent mutation entry in revenue records can successfully plead limitation against rightful owners who remained unaware of the wrong entry?
- MOHAMMAD ASHRAF vs CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS, PUNJAB AND OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 201 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-09-12Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD AKRAM AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 653 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-14Read full judgment →
- Mn. NUSRAT WAHID AND 3 OTHERS vs ADMINISTRATOR, THAL BHAKKAR1980 CLC 334 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-15Read full judgment →
- Mistri ABDUL GHAFOOR (REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS) vs Mst. MEHRAJ1980 PLD Lahore 414 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This regular second appeal arose from an ejectment proceeding under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The tenant was initially proceeded against ex parte and ejected. Subsequently, the Rent Controller recalled the ex parte order. The landlord challenged this recall via a revision petition before the Additional District Judge, who accepted the revision and remanded the case. The Rent Controller then dismissed the tenant's application to set aside the ex parte order, which was affirmed on appeal. The tenant's legal heirs appealed to the High Court, arguing that the revision petition before the Additional District Judge was incompetent and a nullity. The High Court held that revisional powers must be expressly conferred by statute, and no such power exists under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. Furthermore, since a Rent Controller is not a civil court, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is inapplicable. Consequently, the Additional District Judge's revisional order was void ab initio, rendering all subsequent proceedings unsustainable. The appeal was accepted, and the case remanded to the Rent Controller to proceed from the stage of the recalled ex parte order.
Questions settled- Can a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercise revisional jurisdiction over an order of a Rent Controller under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- Is a Rent Controller considered a civil court for the purposes of invoking revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- What is the legal effect of subsequent judicial proceedings that are based on an initial revisional order that was passed without jurisdiction and is a nullity?
- Miss TASNEEM MALIK vs SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.1980 PLC (C. S.) 4 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1975-12-09Read full judgment →
- Miss TAHIRA TALAT vs AZAD GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND ANOTHER1980 PLC (C. S.) 443 · Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal · 1979-03-06Read full judgment →
- Miss SHAUKAT MAHMOOD vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB, EDUCATION DEPARTMENT1980 PLC (C. S.) 364 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-01-06Read full judgment →
- Miss SABIRA MANJIANI vs GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND 5 OTHERS1980 CLC 2112 · Sindh High Court · 1978-09-18Read full judgment →
- Miss RI FAT PARVEEN vs SELECTION COMMITTEE THROUGH PRINCIPAL/1980 PLD Quetta 10 · Balochistan High Court · 1979-06-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition before the Balochistan High Court challenged the validity and reasonableness of Rule 18 of the Admission Policy contained in the Prospectus of Bolan Medical College, Quetta. The impugned rule required domiciled candidates to establish that their parents had an aggregate stay of at least 12 years in Balochistan to be eligible for admission, a requirement not imposed on candidates classified as 'locals'. The petitioner, a high-merit domiciled applicant whose father was a transferable Central Government employee, was refused admission solely for non-compliance with this 12-year requirement. The High Court held that the prospectus rule operates as a bye-law and is liable to be struck down for unreasonableness and discrimination. It held that the rule created an arbitrary sub-classification among domiciled citizens and discriminated against them in violation of Articles 4, 22, and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Declaring the 12-year stay requirement ultra vires, the Court directed the petitioner's admission, ordering the creation of an additional seat if necessary.
Questions settled- Can a rule or condition in an educational institution's prospectus be challenged and struck down on the ground of unreasonableness as a bye-law?
- Whether imposing a 12-year provincial stay requirement on parents of domiciled candidates violates the equality guarantees under Articles 4, 22, and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Can the High Court under constitutional jurisdiction direct the admission of an eligible student in a subsequent academic year and order the creation of an additional seat if necessary?
- Whether the fundamental rights under Articles 22 and 25 of the Constitution remain enforceable against discriminatory state actions despite the proclamation of emergency under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977?
- Miss NISHAT SAEED vs CHAIRMAN, NOMINATION BOARD, AZAD JAMMU &1980 PLD SC (A J & K) 1 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
- Miss NASIRA JABEEN vs PAKISTAN AND 7 OTHERS1980 PLD Karachi 128 · Sindh High Court · 1979-09-25Read full judgment →
- Miss NA VEED YOUSUF vs PRINCIPAL, DOW MEDICAL COLLEGE AND OTHERS1980 CLC 1286 · Sindh High Court · 1979-11-17Read full judgment →
- Miss MAJIDA TABASSUM vs GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND 3 OTHERS1980 SCMR 806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition regarding admission to the First Year M.B., B.S. Class at Chandka Medical College, Larkana. The core legal question concerned whether a candidate initially rejected as a third-divisioner could subsequently be admitted, displacing a provisionally selected appellant, through the retroactive awarding of grace marks months after the result declaration and without affording the appellant a hearing. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent awarding of grace marks contravened the spirit of the examination rules requiring marks to be added at the time of result declaration, and that cancelling the appellant's selection without a show-cause hearing was unsustainable. The appeal was allowed, confirming the appellant's right to admission while allowing respondent No. 3 to continue her studies given her advancement.
Questions settled- Can grace marks be awarded to raise a candidate's division months after the formal declaration of examination results?
- Whether a provisionally selected candidate can be displaced from an admission list without being afforded an opportunity of being heard?
- Does the failure of an ineligible candidate to object within the prescribed limitation period bar the subsequent revival of a claim for admission?
- Miss AZRA MAHMOOD vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB, EDUCATION1980 PLC (C. S.) 294 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-01-06Read full judgment →
- MISS ASSIA vs INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, ETC.41 TAX 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two civil petitions for special leave to appeal against a consolidated order of the Lahore High Court, which refused to direct the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to refer questions of law arising from tax assessments for the years 1973-74 and 1974-75. The petitioner, a film artist, challenged the Income Tax Officer's rejection of payment certificates provided by film producers, arguing that the assessment was based on surmises rather than evidence. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal's decision to uphold the rejection of these certificates and the subsequent assessment based on estimates raised a referable question of law. The Supreme Court held that the Income Tax authorities acted within their discretion in rejecting unreliable evidence and making a best-judgment assessment. The Court affirmed that the unreliability of accounts is a question of fact, not law, and that tax authorities are not bound to accept uncorroborated evidence they deem fictitious. The holding emphasizes that as long as the assessment is an honest estimate based on available material, it cannot be disturbed unless the discretion was exercised capriciously.
Questions settled- Is the unreliability of an assessee's accounts a question of fact or a question of law?
- Can an Income Tax Officer reject evidence produced by an assessee without direct proof of its falsity?
- Are Income Tax authorities required to accept uncorroborated certificates of payment as conclusive evidence of income?
- Under what circumstances can a court interfere with a best-judgment assessment made by Income Tax authorities?
- Miss AMTUL JAMIL SAMI vs SECRETARY, HEALTH DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT1980 SCMR 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal concerns the interpretation of admission rules for the Bolan Medical College, Quetta, specifically regarding the 'doctors' children' quota. The petitioner, daughter of a provincial health department doctor, sought admission under the reserved category. Her application was rejected based on Rule 17 of the college prospectus, which prohibits a doctor from availing the reserved seat facility for more than two children. The petitioner argued that her siblings' previous admissions did not count towards this limit. The Supreme Court examined whether the petitioner's two sisters had indeed been admitted under the reserved quota. The Court found that one sister had been admitted under the quota, and another sister's admission, initially provisional, became final after the college withdrew its appeal against a High Court order. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner's claim was barred by the plain language of Rule 17. The Court affirmed that while the rule might lack elegant drafting, its meaning was unambiguous and imposed a reasonable restriction on the privilege conferred, leading to the dismissal of the petition.
Questions settled- Does the admission of a student against a reserved quota under a court order count towards the limit imposed by a prospectus rule restricting the number of children per parent?
- Can a rule in a college prospectus be enforced if it is unambiguous despite being inartfully drafted?
- Does the withdrawal of a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment render the High Court's decision final and binding?
- MISKEEN AND ANOTHER vs AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU &1980 CLC 1514 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1976-07-29Read full judgment →
- MISAL KHAN vs THE STATE1980 PLD Karachi 16 · Sindh High Court · 1979-05-18Read full judgment →
- MIRZO AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 450 · Sindh High Court · 1979-05-12Read full judgment →
- Mirza NAZIR AHMAD vs DIRECTOR-GENERAL, EXCISE & TAXATION, PUNJAB AND OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 117 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-12-03Read full judgment →
- Mirza MUNEER AHMAD vs ALLAH DITTA1980 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of the petitioner-tenant's second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge directing the petitioner's eviction from the disputed shop. The core legal question concerns whether the landlord established good faith regarding the personal requirement of the shop for himself and his son, particularly when the son was undergoing business training elsewhere. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent factual findings of the lower forums regarding personal bona fide need were well-founded, reasoning that training at another shop actually indicated preparation for independent business rather than negating good faith, and declined to interfere with the appreciation of evidence. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's good faith in seeking ejectment for personal use, supported by evidence and attending circumstances, will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court in the absence of misreading of evidence or violation of law.
Questions settled- Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the personal requirement of a shop by a landlord can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
- Does a landlord's son undergoing business training at another shop negate the good faith requirement for personal ejectment?
- Can a plea regarding the appreciation of evidence form a sufficient ground to dislodge concurrent factual findings of lower courts?
- Mirza MUNAWAR AHMAD AND ANOTHER vs OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR AND 31980 PLD Lahore 86 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two intra-court appeals against an order of the Company Judge regarding the ownership of property claimed by both a partnership firm and a company under liquidation. The core legal question was whether the assets of a partnership firm had legally transferred to a company formed by the partners, given that the company was not in existence at the time of the purported transfer agreement, and whether the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan's security interest over the firm's assets remained valid. The Court held that a company cannot be a party to a contract made before its incorporation, nor can it ratify such a pre-incorporation contract. Consequently, the purported transfer of assets was void, and the property remained vested in the partnership firm. The Court further held that a statutory body like the Bank cannot be estopped from performing its statutory duties, and no estoppel arises against a company for ultra vires acts or pre-incorporation conduct. The appeals were accepted, the property was ordered to be released to the firm, and the Bank was permitted to exercise its rights under the credit agreement.
Questions settled- Can a company be a party to or ratify a contract entered into on its behalf before its incorporation?
- Does the doctrine of estoppel apply against a statutory body performing its statutory duties?
- Is a pre-incorporation agreement binding on a company after it is formed?
- Does the dissolution of a partnership require the realization of all assets before it is considered complete?
- Mirza MUHAMMAD YUSUF vs Mst. RAZIA SULTANA1980 CLC 909 · Lahore High Court · 1973-11-15Read full judgment →
- Mirza MOHAMMAD ANWAR BAIG vs Mst. ISMAT JEHAN1980 PLD Lahore 316 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-02Read full judgment →
- MIRZA KHAN vs THE PROVINCE OF PUNJAB1980 SCMR 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a plaintiff in a suit for permanent injunction, sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's rejection of his revision petition. The petitioner had sought to restrain the provincial government from acquiring his land, primarily contending that he was not served with a personal notice under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The trial court and appellate court refused the temporary injunction, finding that the statutory notice requirements were met, the petitioner's case was prima facie weak, and the balance of convenience favored the public purpose acquisition. The High Court affirmed these findings, noting that the petitioner had refused service of the notice and that possession had already been taken and announced publicly. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the prima facie findings of fact did not suffer from any legal defect and that the essential ingredients for a temporary injunction—namely, a prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience—were not satisfied.
Questions settled- Whether the failure to serve a personal notice under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 invalidates acquisition proceedings if a public notice was given and the party refused to receive personal service?
- What are the essential conditions that must be concurrently satisfied for the grant of a temporary injunction in matters of public land acquisition?
- Can a temporary injunction be granted when the balance of convenience and irreparable loss do not favor the petitioner, even if there is an issue raised regarding statutory notice?
- Mirza AZIM BEG CHUGHTAI vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERS1980 P Cr. L J 911 · Sindh High Court · 1979-12-14Read full judgment →
- Mirza ALAMGIR vs MUSHTAQ AHMAD1980 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from a murder case where the respondent was convicted by the trial court under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death for killing the deceased with a knife in the District Courts premises, Multan. Upon appeal, the High Court altered the conviction to Section 304, Part-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, accepting the plea of grave and sudden provocation based on evidence showing the deceased had taunted the respondent and displayed photographs of his sister. The petitioner challenged this judgment before the Supreme Court, arguing that the provocation plea was an afterthought and that eyewitnesses and recoveries were misappreciated. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contentions related to the appreciation of evidence, which is generally not the function of the apex court, and that the High Court's findings on the naturalness of eyewitnesses and the presence of the photographs recovered during the autopsy were unexceptionable. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with the High Court's appreciation of evidence regarding eyewitness testimony in a criminal appeal?
- Does displaying photographs of an accused's sister and taunting him constitute grave and sudden provocation sufficient to alter a murder conviction?
- Whether an appellate court is justified in accepting a plea of grave and sudden provocation based on material brought on record through medical and police testimony during an autopsy?
- Mirza ABDUL AZIZ BEG vs MUSHTAQ AHMED SHEIKH1980 SCMR 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns an eviction order against a tenant for default in rent payment under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core questions were whether a security deposit is adjustable against rent arrears, whether the tenant was in default despite having paid advance rent, and whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its discretion to condone the default. The Supreme Court held that while advance rent is adjustable against arrears, a security deposit held for potential damages is not. It affirmed the finding of default, noting that the specific covenant to pay rent in advance overrode the general statutory grace period. Furthermore, the Court held that the High Court’s refusal to exercise discretion in the tenant's favor was not perverse, given the tenant’s reliance on a false defense regarding payment. The principle established is that a security deposit for damages cannot be adjusted against rent arrears, and a court's refusal to exercise discretionary relief is not subject to interference unless exercised perversely or cursorily.
Questions settled- Is a security deposit held for potential damages adjustable against rent arrears?
- Does a specific lease covenant to pay rent in advance override the general statutory grace period for rent payment?
- Can an appellate court interfere with a discretionary order refusing to condone rent default if the discretion was not exercised perversely?
- MIRPURKHAS SUGAR MILLS LTD. vs THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND THE CONTROLLING AUTHORITY, DISTRICT THARPARKAR AND 4 OTHERS1980 PLD Karachi 237 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Mir SANAM KHAN AND OTHERS vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 92 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-15Read full judgment →
- MIR HASSAN AND ANOTHER vs DEPUTY REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, ZHOB1980 PLD Quetta 43 · Balochistan High Court · 1980-04-26Read full judgment →
- Mir GHULAM NABI AND 7 OTHERS vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 567 · Sindh High Court · 1979-08-07Read full judgment →
- Mir DOST MUHAMMAD vs GOVERNMENT OF BALUCHISTAN AND 3 OTHERS1980 PLD Quetta 1 · Balochistan High Court · 1979-05-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenges the conviction and sentence of the petitioner under various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code by a Tribunal constituted under the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance II of 1968, along with the appellate and revisional orders confirming the same. The core legal questions addressed relate to whether the failure to afford the accused an opportunity of being heard regarding the constitution of the Tribunal violates mandatory statutory provisions, whether the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance II of 1968 empowers authorities to order investigations into scheduled offences, and whether taking cognizance without fulfilling statutory prerequisites renders subsequent proceedings void. The court held that the mandatory provisions of section 6 of the Ordinance requiring the hearing of parties before constituting a Tribunal were flagrantly violated, that the Ordinance only provides for trials and not investigations, and that acting without jurisdiction renders the entire proceedings ab initio void. The court laid down the principle that where a statute prescribes a specific procedure for doing something, it must be done in that exact manner or not at all, and that any foundational illegality vitiates all subsequent superstructure of orders.
Questions settled- Whether the failure to give the accused an opportunity of being heard regarding the appointment of Tribunal members under section 6 of the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance II of 1968 vitiates the trial?
- Does the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance II of 1968 empower the Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner to order an investigation into scheduled offences?
- What is the legal effect of a foundational illegality or lack of jurisdiction on subsequent appellate and revisional orders?
- Whether the right to be defended by a legal practitioner of choice under Article 10 of the Constitution and section 27 of the Ordinance of 1968 is absolute and determinable in writ jurisdiction when facts are disputed?
- Mir BALOCH KHAN AND 3 OTHERS vs OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, FEDERAL LAND1980 CLC 1316 · Sindh High Court · 1979-08-29Read full judgment →
- MIR ALAM KHAN vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 1152 · Peshawar High Court · 1980-04-01Read full judgment →
- MIR AFZAL AND 6 OTHERS vs SAMIUR REHMAN AND 34 OTHERS1980 CLC 1446 · Peshawar High Court · 1980-01-22Read full judgment →
- MILITARY ESTATES OFFICER, HAZARA CIRCLE, ABBOTTABA AND ANOTHER vs PIR1980 CLC 1467 · Peshawar High Court · 1979-12-23Read full judgment →
- Mian USMAN SAIGAL vs THAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY1980 CLC 1296 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-10Read full judgment →
- Mian SAEED HASSAN vs SADIQ KHAN AND ANOTHER1980 PLD Lahore 431 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-12Read full judgment →
- Mian NASIRUDDIN QURESHI vs UNITED BANK LTD., ABBOTTA'BAD1980 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his revision petition regarding the restoration of a civil suit. The respondent Bank had originally filed a suit for recovery, which was dismissed for default under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial court subsequently restored the suit, a decision the petitioner challenged unsuccessfully in the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petition for leave to appeal was filed 29 days beyond the prescribed limitation period. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, citing Article 162-A of the Limitation Act 1908 and alleged medical treatment in Karachi. The Supreme Court held that the petition was time-barred, noting that the application for condonation was not supported by an affidavit and that the reliance on Article 162-A was legally misconceived, as the petition failed to meet the sixty-day filing requirement mandated by the Rules of the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for being time-barred without addressing the merits of the underlying civil dispute.
Questions settled- Is a petition for leave to appeal filed 29 days beyond the prescribed period maintainable without a valid explanation for the delay?
- Does an application for condonation of delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal require supporting evidence such as an affidavit?
- What is the limitation period for filing a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
- Mian MUMTAZ ABDULLAH vs SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 361 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1978-12-05Read full judgment →
- Mian MUHAMMAD NAZEER AND ANOTHER vs THE LAND ACQUISITION1980 CLC 687 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-26Read full judgment →
- Mian MUHAMMAD HAFIZ ETC. vs AZIZ AHMAD ETC.1980 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from an interlocutory order passed in a civil suit pending for over thirteen years. The respondent had failed to file their list of witnesses within the time prescribed under Order XVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, but subsequently filed an application for condonation of delay, which the trial court allowed on payment of costs. The petitioner challenged this order through a revision petition and a subsequent writ petition, both of which were dismissed. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the question of whether to condone the delay in filing the list of witnesses was within the discretion of the trial court. Although the trial court may have acted in breach of the procedural provisions, resulting in an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, the order was not without jurisdiction. Consequently, a writ petition was a misconceived remedy. The Court emphasized that accepting the petitioner's contention would make a fetish of technicalities and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Does a trial court have the jurisdiction to condone delay and allow a party to file a list of witnesses after the prescribed period under Order XVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is an order passed in erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by a trial court deemed to be an order without jurisdiction?
- Can a writ petition be maintained against an interlocutory order of a trial court that condones delay in filing a list of witnesses?
- Mian MUHAMMAD BAKHSH vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (IND.) AND ANOTHER1980 SCMR 759 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a civil miscellaneous petition seeking the restoration of a civil review petition that was previously dismissed for default due to non-appearance. The core legal question is whether the withdrawal of an Advocate-on-Record without following the prescribed procedural rules constitutes a sufficient ground for restoring a dismissed petition and absolves the petitioner from appearing at the hearing. The court held that since the Advocate-on-Record had not officially withdrawn in accordance with the applicable rules, the responsibility to appear remained with the counsel and no separate intimation was required to be sent to the petitioner, rendering the restoration application groundless. The court accordingly dismissed the petition and directed the office to strictly adhere to the rules in future filings. The key principle laid down is that an unprocedural or non-compliant cessation of representation by an Advocate-on-Record does not excuse default of appearance or furnish a valid ground for restoring a dismissed petition.
Questions settled- Does the withdrawal of an Advocate-on-Record furnish a sufficient ground to restore a petition dismissed for default if the withdrawal was not made in accordance with the Supreme Court Rules, 1966?
- Is a separate intimation of the date of hearing required to be sent to a petitioner when their Advocate-on-Record has failed to properly withdraw from the case?
- Can an application for restoration of a dismissed review petition be entertained in disregard of the procedural rules?
- MIAN JAN vs THE STATE1980 PLD Peshawar 92 · Peshawar High Court · 1979-07-30Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ZOR ENGINEERING LTD. vs STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN1980 PLD Lahore 534 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent orders of the lower courts rejecting the petitioner's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in a suit seeking to declare a certificate of valuation issued by a referee under a building contract as illegal and mala fide. The core legal question is whether the courts below correctly applied Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to reject the plaint based on the pendency of a prior suit for damages and outside material supplied by the defendant. The Lahore High Court held that while considering the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, courts must examine solely the statements made within the plaint itself and cannot rely on defences or material provided by the opposite party or a previously instituted suit at the pre-trial stage. The court laid down the principle that competency and a statutory bar under clause (d) are distinct, and a decision on the rejection of a plaint cannot be based on outside material or a premature assessment of the merits before written statements and issues are framed.
Questions settled- Whether a court can look into material supplied by the opposite party or consult a previously instituted suit when considering the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Are the competency of a suit and a legal bar under clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 distinct legal questions?
- Does a plaint disclosing a basis for challenging a certificate issued under a contract disclose a cause of action at the pre-trial stage?
- MESSRS ZAHID PRESS LTD. vs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD.1980 CLC 1279 · Sindh High Court · 1979-09-23Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ZAHEER ANWAR ETC. vs S. M. ABBASI AND ANOTHER1980 SCMR 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition involving a dispute between landlords and tenants. The core legal question concerns the lawful resolution and compromise of ejectment proceedings between the contesting parties. The Court held that the compromise reached between the parties, whereby the petitioners agreed to hand over possession of a specific room with an attached bath to respondent No. 1 while retaining an adjacent room as a tenant under respondent No. 1, is lawful. The petition was accordingly disposed of in terms of the compromise, establishing that the landlord-tenant relationship for the retained portion will be regulated by the applicable laws of the urban area. The key principle laid down is that courts will endorse and dispose of matters in accordance with lawful compromises voluntarily entered into by the parties.
Questions settled- Can parties compromise an ejectment matter before the Supreme Court?
- Will the Supreme Court dispose of a petition in terms of a lawful compromise reached between parties?
- Messrs YAKUB ASSOCIATES vs Mst. PHOOL BANO1980 CLC 1136 · Sindh High Court · 1980-01-11Read full judgment →
- MESSRS VARIETY TRADERS, KARACHI vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1980 PLD Karachi 30 · Sindh High Court · 1977-08-07Read full judgment →
- MESSRS UNIVERSAL MERCHANTS vs COMMISSIONER OF KARACHI AND 21980 CLC 704 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions challenged the validity of octroi tax imposition and rate enhancement on liquor by the Karachi Municipal Corporation. The petitioners argued that octroi interfered with inter-provincial and foreign trade, falling under the Central Government's exclusive legislative competence, and that the 1967 rate enhancement was procedurally invalid. The Court held that octroi is a tax on the import of goods for local consumption, use, or sale, not a tax on trade, and thus remains within provincial and municipal competence. Regarding the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, the Court ruled that the 'Model Tax Schedule' under Section 35 serves as guidance rather than a binding maximum rate. Furthermore, the requirement of 'previous sanction' under Section 33 is satisfied if the government approves the tax proposal before it becomes legally enforceable through collection. However, the Court held that enhanced tax rates cannot be applied retrospectively to goods imported and stored in bonded warehouses prior to the notification date. The principle established is that 'levy' in a fiscal context encompasses the entire process of imposition, requiring sanction before the tax is legally recoverable.
Questions settled- Does the imposition of octroi by a municipal committee on goods entering a city constitute an interference with inter-provincial or foreign trade?
- Does the 'Model Tax Schedule' under Section 35 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, impose a binding maximum limit on tax rates?
- What is the legal meaning of 'previous sanction' under Section 33 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, regarding the imposition of municipal taxes?
- Can enhanced tax rates be applied retrospectively to goods stored in a bonded warehouse prior to the notification of the new rates?
- MESSRS UNITED ELECTRIC & REFRIGERATION COMPANY vs VEB DEUTSCHE1980 CLC 921 · Sindh High Court · 1979-09-05Read full judgment →
- MESSRS UNITED BANK LTD., KARACHIDecree Holder vs Mst. ASMA ZAFARUL1980 CLC 565 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from an application filed by the judgment-debtor under Section 151 read with Order XXI, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside an execution sale. Following a mortgage decree, the subject property was put up for public auction twice, but no bidders participated. Consequently, the High Court Nazir secured a private offer higher than the approximate value specified in the proclamation, which was accepted by the court after notice to the judgment-debtor's advocate. The core legal questions pertained to whether an executing court possesses inherent powers to accept a private offer when public auctions fail, and whether the application to set aside the sale was barred by limitation under Article 166 of the Limitation Act 1908. The High Court of Sindh dismissed the application, holding that the executing court has implied inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to accept a reasonable private offer to execute its decree when public auctions yield no results, and that the application filed beyond 30 days from the sale was time-barred.
Questions settled- Does an executing court have inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to accept a private offer for an attached property when public auctions yield no bidders?
- Is the limitation period for filing an application under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 governed by Article 166 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- Does the issuance of a sale certificate constitute a new terminus a quo for computing limitation to set aside an execution sale?
- Can an execution sale be set aside under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without proving that a material irregularity caused substantial injury to the applicant?
- Is an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable after an execution sale has been confirmed and the executing court has disposed of the execution application?
- MESSRS THE MONT BLANC INDUSTRY (REGD.) vs ABDUL AZIZ1980 CLC 396 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-26Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SULEMAN & Co. vs ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1980 CLC 2183 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-22Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SHAUKAT & RAZA LTD, KARACHI vs THE KARACHI DEVELOPMENT1980 CLC 346 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from an application filed by the applicants under Clause 4 of the Second Schedule read with Section 41 of the Arbitration Act 1940 and Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking a temporary injunction to restrain the respondent from encashing certain bank guarantees pending arbitration. The applicants had issued a notice to the respondent requesting the appointment of an arbitrator, but filed the injunction application before any arbitrator was appointed or any reference was made.
The core legal question before the Sindh High Court was whether arbitration proceedings can be said to have commenced upon service of a notice requesting the appointment of an arbitrator so as to maintain an application for interim injunction under Section 41 of the Arbitration Act 1940.
The High Court held that the application was not maintainable. The court ruled that the deeming provision in Section 37(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 regarding the commencement of arbitration applies strictly for the purposes of Section 37 and the Limitation Act 1908, and does not apply to Section 41. In order to invoke the court's powers under Section 41 to grant interim relief, actual arbitration proceedings must be pending before an arbitrator, authority, or court. Because no arbitrator had been appointed, no arbitration proceedings were in existence, rendering the injunction application premature and non-maintainable.
Questions settled- Does the deeming provision in Section 37(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 apply to determine the commencement of arbitration proceedings for the purpose of Section 41?
- Can a court issue an interim injunction under Section 41 of the Arbitration Act 1940 before an arbitrator is appointed?
- Are arbitration proceedings deemed to be pending merely upon the service of a notice requesting the appointment of an arbitrator?
- MESSRS SHAH NOOR STUDIOS vs W. Z. STUDIOS1980 CLC 433 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition arose from a suit filed by the respondent-company seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from printing a film at another laboratory, and a direction to hand over the film to the respondent for printing pursuant to a contract. The trial court refused a temporary injunction and dismissed the suit as incompetent, holding that a contract involving personal service and technical processing could not be specifically enforced under Section 21(b) of the Specific Relief Act, thereby barring an injunction under Section 56(f). The Additional District Judge allowed the respondent's appeal on merits even though the film had already been handed over. The High Court set aside the lower appellate court's judgment, holding that a court must examine whether a suit is barred by law under Order VII Rule 11 CPC from the face of the plaint. Since the contract involved personal skill/service and third parties were not bound by it, specific performance was legally barred, making the suit incompetent. The trial court's order was restored with the modification that the plaint stood rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
Questions settled- Can a contract involving personal service or technical skill be specifically enforced under the Specific Relief Act?
- Whether an injunction can be granted to prevent the breach of a contract whose specific performance is barred by law?
- Is it mandatory for a court to reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at the initial stage if the suit is barred by law on the allegations in the plaint?
- Can a person who is not a party to a contract be bound by its obligations or compelled to perform it?
- MESSRS SARWAR KHANIMRAN KHAN vs ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND 21980 PLD Peshawar 20 · Peshawar High Court · 1979-08-19Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SADIQUEEN TRADERS, KARACHI vs S. M. ALAM, SECTION OFFICER, MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 1851 · Sindh High Court · 1979-11-25Read full judgment →
- MESSRS QUAID CAP HOUSE vs SECRETARY, DIVISIONAL EVACUEE TRUST1980 PLD Karachi 261 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-15Read full judgment →
- MESSRS PLATINUM OIL Co. vs ANWAR, ALI1980 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against an order of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal as barred by time under Section 15(4) of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question concerned whether an appeal against an order of remand passed by the appellate court on the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant was barred by limitation, and whether an allegedly void order regarding evacuee property could bypass limitation periods. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the appeal as time-barred, and further noted that the petitioner had failed to deposit rent as directed by the Rent Controller, resulting in his defense being struck off. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that statutory limitation periods for rent appeals must be observed and that a party in default of rent deposit orders is not entitled to discretionary relief.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal against an order of remand passed by the appellate court under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 is subject to the limitation period prescribed by the law?
- Can an order allegedly void in law bypass the statutory limitation period for filing an appeal?
- Is a tenant who fails to deposit rent as directed by the Rent Controller entitled to relief from the court?
- MESSRS PLASTICRAFTERS LTD. KARACHI vs MESSRS MANIAR INDUSTRIES LTD.1980 CLC 812 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-26Read full judgment →
- Messrs PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATES vs REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 1272 · Sindh High Court · 1979-09-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal under section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, challenged the order of the Registrar of Trade Marks refusing registration of the word "SOLO" as a trade mark for cigarettes and tobacco products. The appellant's application was opposed by the second respondent on grounds of deceptive similarity with their registered mark "POLO". Although the Registrar rejected the objection regarding similarity, he refused registration suo motu on the ground that the word "SOLO" possessed geographical significance under section 6(1)(d) of the Act, an objection raised belatedly without formal pleadings. The core legal question was whether the Registrar could take suo motu notice of an unpleaded geographical objection outside the statutory rules of opposition. The Sindh High Court held that the Registrar erred in taking suo motu notice of a belated objection without proper pleadings and evidence, and further found that the word "SOLO" lacks any prominent geographical significance known to the public in Pakistan. The appeal was allowed, the impugned order set aside, and registration directed.
Questions settled- Can the Registrar of Trade Marks take suo motu notice of an unpleaded objection regarding the geographical significance of a trade mark?
- Whether the word "SOLO" possesses a geographical significance that bars its registration as a trade mark under the Trade Marks Act, 1940?
- Does an objector need to raise specific grounds in the notice of opposition in accordance with the Trade Marks Rules?
- MESSRS PAKISTAN PROGRESSIVE CEMENT INDUSTRIES LTD. vs SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL EXCISE AND LAND CUSTOMS AND 4 OTHERS1980 CLC 1845 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MESSRS PAK. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION Co., KARACHI vs CHIEF ENGINEER, P.W.D., KARACHI AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 226 · Sindh High Court · 1978-03-28Read full judgment →
- MESSRS NAWAB BROTHERS vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1980 PLD Karachi 600 · Sindh High Court · 1980-05-04Read full judgment →
- MESSRS NATIONAL MOTORS LTD., KARACHI vs MESSRS SULEMAN HAJI1980 CLC 600 · Sindh High Court · 1979-02-12Read full judgment →
- MESSRS MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM CHIRAGH MUHAMMAD vs PAKISTAN THROUGH COMMANDER, 8TH DIVISION, HEADQUARTER ARMY, QUETTA1980 SCMR 388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant entered into five supply agreements with the respondent, which were subsequently rescinded by the respondent. The appellant filed a suit for the refund of a security deposit and damages for breach of contract. The trial court decreed the suit, awarding both the security deposit and damages. On appeal, the High Court upheld the refund of the security deposit but set aside the damages, reasoning that the appellant failed to prove actual loss, dismissing the appellant's evidence on arbitrary grounds regarding the nature of the documentation and the witnesses. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court erred in rejecting the evidence and failing to remand the case. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's rejection of the evidence based on the lack of stamp duty and the status of the witnesses was legally unjustified, particularly as no objections were raised during trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment regarding damages and remanded the case for a proper re-examination of the evidence.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court reject evidence on grounds of document stamping if no objection was raised during the trial?
- Is it legally justifiable for an appellate court to dismiss witness testimony based on the social status or profession of the witnesses?
- Should an appellate court remand a case when the initial judgment on damages was reached through an arbitrary assessment of evidence?
- MESSRS MUHAMMAD AMINMUHAMMAD BASHIR LTD. vs DEPUTY1980 CLC 2132 · Sindh High Court · 1979-11-14Read full judgment →
- MESSRS MIDDLE EAST CONTRACTORS, MIRPUR vs PROJECT DIRECTOR, RESETTLEMENT ORGANIZATION, MANGLA DAM PROJECT (WAPDA) AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Azad J & K 12 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1979-11-26Read full judgment →
- MESSRS MANDIWALLA ESTATES LTD. vs GOVERNMENT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 838(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a series of petitions challenging the authority of the Provincial Government to levy and recover property tax on properties situated within Cantonment areas by declaring them urban rating areas under the Sind Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, in light of the Cantonment Board's statutory power to levy tax under the Cantonments Act, 1924. The High Court had previously ruled against the petitioners, relying on precedent. However, during the proceedings, the Cantonment Board conceded that it would not collect tax from property owners as it was receiving its due share from the Provincial Government. Furthermore, the subsequent promulgation of President's Order No. 13 of 1979 granted exclusive jurisdiction to Cantonment Boards to collect property tax. Consequently, the Court found the petitions had become infructuous. In view of these developments and the concession made by the Cantonment Board, the petitioners withdrew their petitions, and the Supreme Court dismissed them accordingly.
Questions settled- Can the Provincial Government levy property tax on properties located within a Cantonment area under the Sind Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958?
- Does the Cantonment Board have exclusive jurisdiction to collect property tax following the promulgation of President's Order No. 13 of 1979?
- MESSRS MACDONALD LAYTON COSTAIN LTD., KARACHI vs STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN1980 PLD Karachi 87 · Sindh High Court · 1979-04-14Read full judgment →
- Mst. SUGHRAN MAI vs THE STATE1980 PLD Lahore 386 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought the quashment of proceedings pending against the petitioner, Mst. Sughran Mai, under Sections 10 and 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The core legal questions involved the validity of a marriage contracted by a minor girl upon attaining puberty without the consent of her guardian, the doctrine of kafa'at (social equality) in Islamic law, and whether an irregular or valid marriage precludes a charge of zina under the Ordinance. The court held that an adult or pubescent Muslim girl may contract a valid marriage of her own free will, that lack of guardian consent or social inequality (ghair kafoo) does not render a marriage void so as to constitute zina, and that the continuation of proceedings where no evidence of the alleged offence exists is an abuse of the process of the court. The proceedings against the petitioner were accordingly quashed.
Questions settled- Can a Muslim female who has attained puberty contract a valid marriage of her own free will without the consent of her guardian?
- Does a marriage contracted in ghair kafoo render the marriage void so as to constitute zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
- Whether the High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings when the evidence does not disclose any offence?
- Does an irregular (fasid) marriage attract the penal consequences of hadd or tazir for sexual intercourse between the spouses?
- MESSRS M. RAFIQUE & Co., GUJRANWALA vs BADARUDDIN1980 CLC 1300 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-21Read full judgment →
- MESSRS LATIF TEXTILE & CALENDERING MILLS vs COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Karachi 335 · Sindh High Court · 1980-01-14Read full judgment →
- MESSRS KARSAZ CONSTRUCTION Co. vs DIRECTOR OF WORKS & CHIEF1980 CLC 890 · Sindh High Court · 1979-04-07Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ISMAIL BROTHERS vs KEWALRAM1980 SCMR 776 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent-landlord against the petitioner-tenant for the eviction of an open plot of land in Karachi, on the grounds of reconstruction and personal use by the landlord's family. The Rent Controller allowed the eviction, but the District Court (First Appellate Court) set aside the order, holding that pleas of reconstruction and personal use are mutually destructive and that obtaining building sanction after filing the application rendered it premature. The Sind High Court restored the eviction order in second appeal. Upon further petition, the Supreme Court held that a landlord's claim for reconstruction is not necessarily inconsistent with a claim for personal use, and that the relevant statute only requires the landlord to obtain necessary building sanction before the Controller passes an order of eviction, not necessarily before filing the application. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's view and ruling that the petitioner's construction of a factory without pleading it in the written statement did not bar eviction.
Questions settled- Whether a landlord's claim for reconstructing demised premises is mutually destructive with or inconsistent with a claim that the premises are required in good faith for personal or family use?
- Does Section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 require a landlord to obtain municipal sanction for reconstruction before filing an eviction application, or before the Rent Controller passes an order of eviction?
- Can a tenant raise the defense of having constructed a factory on the demised premises at great cost when no such plea was raised in the written statement?
- MESSRS INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL SERVICES LTD. vs SECRETARY, TOURISM1980 CLC 2071 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-25Read full judgment →