Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Mst. Ilyas Akhtar and others vs Province of Punjab and others2025 CLC 452 · Lahore High Court · 2022-12-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Humaira Wazir vs Muhammad Faisal and others2025 SCP 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-07
  recovery of dowerdowry articlesNikahnama column 16shari sharegold ornamentsmaintenance allowanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a civil petition for leave to appeal arising from a family dispute concerning the recovery of dower, dowry articles, gold ornaments, a specific share in immovable property, and maintenance allowance. The petitioner challenged the High Court judgment that had set aside the Appellate Court's decree regarding 25 tolas of gold ornaments and restricted her dower property claim to a general Shari share rather than a specific house. The core questions before the Court were whether the petitioner successfully proved that 25 tolas of gold ornaments were forcibly snatched by her ex-husband, and whether she could claim a Shari share in a specific, unmentioned property based on a general Nikahnama entry. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the High Court and Trial Court, holding that the allegation of forcible snatching of jewelry was contradicted by the petitioner's own deposition and lacked evidentiary support. Furthermore, where the Nikahnama only recorded an entitlement to a Shari share in ancestral property without identifying specific premises, a claim to a particular house could not be sustained. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a spouse claim the recovery of gold ornaments on grounds of forcible snatching when their own deposition admits handing them over voluntarily on demand?
  • Whether an unspecified entry in a Nikahnama granting a Shari share in ancestral property entitles a party to claim a share in a specific, named house without supporting particulars?
  • Does the failure to raise timely objections to vague property entries in a Nikahnama preclude a subsequent claim to a specific immovable property?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Huma Rafiq and 2 others vs Mst. Huma Rafiq and 2 others2025 CLC 953 · Sindh High Court · 2024-09-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hayat Khatoon vs Province of Sindh and others2025 SHC LAR 2123 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-28
  family pensionwidowed daughterlachesrecurring cause of actiongender discriminationcivil service regulationsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a widowed daughter of a deceased police department midwife, sought the finalization and release of her mother's family pension, which had been stopped after her mother's death in 1995. The respondents denied the claim, arguing that the petitioner was not dependent on her mother as she had an adult son, citing Rule 302(b)(6) of the Civil Service Regulations, and further asserted that the petition was barred by laches. The High Court of Sindh allowed the petition, holding that under Rule 4.10 of the West Pakistan Civil Services Pension Rules 1963 (as amended in 2016), a widowed daughter is entitled to family pension for life or until remarriage. The Court clarified that Rule 302 of the Civil Service Regulations applies only to employees killed or injured in military-related civil service and is inapplicable to ordinary pension cases. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the concept of dependency cannot be used to deny statutory pension rights to women, and that the doctrine of laches does not bar a claim where there is a recurring cause of action and technicalities would perpetuate injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of a widowed daughter to receive a family pension under the West Pakistan Civil Services Pension Rules 1963 can be conditioned upon her financial dependency or the age of her children?
  • Does Rule 302 of the Civil Service Regulations apply to ordinary civil service pension cases, or is it restricted to employees killed or injured while serving in a civil capacity with a military force?
  • Can a constitutional petition seeking pension benefits be dismissed on the ground of laches where the denial of pension constitutes a recurring cause of action?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Haseena w/o Khair Muhammad Depar vs The State & another2025 SHC LAR 1585 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-19
  registration of FIREx-Officio Justice of Peacepolice encounterextrajudicial killingsecond FIRquashing of orderscode of criminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two criminal miscellaneous applications filed by the applicant challenging orders of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Larkana, which dismissed her applications under Section 22-A(6)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking directions for the registration of FIRs against police officials for alleged house trespass, abduction, and the extrajudicial killing of her son. The core legal questions involved whether the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace was justified in refusing to order FIR registration based on police reports and whether a second FIR could be registered for an incident already covered by an existing FIR. The Sindh High Court held that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace correctly exercised quasi-judicial discretion by evaluating the material and finding the allegations motivated and malafide, and further held that under the principle laid down in Mst. Sughra Bibi v. The State, a second or alternate FIR regarding the same incident is legally impermissible when an FIR has already been registered and challan submitted. The applications were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is bound to order the registration of an FIR without evaluating police reports and material on record?
  • Can a second FIR be registered in respect of a single incident when an FIR has already been registered and is under investigation or trial?
  • Does the High Court interfere under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 with orders of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace that show a judicious application of mind?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Haseena vs Ikramullah2025 PHC 122 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-05-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Haneefa Bano vs Province of Sindh & others2025 SHC 364 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hameeda Parveen vs Medical Superintendent PESSI Hospital, I-12, Islamabad and others2025 IHC 82 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-10
  official accommodationequitable reliefclean hands doctrinedeclaration suitpermanent injunctionallotment policylegitimate expectancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal challenges a consolidated judgment and decree dismissing the appellant's suit for declaration and permanent injunction regarding the retention of official hospital accommodation, while decreeing the respondent's suit for mandatory injunction. The appellant, a Staff Nurse, was allotted official accommodation for a fixed period, evidenced by a departmental decision and an affidavit she signed, committing to vacate the premises by a specific date. The core legal question was whether the appellant could claim a right to retain possession beyond the period stipulated in her allotment order based on a plea of legitimate expectancy. The Court held that the appellant was bound by the terms of her allotment and her own affidavit. It emphasized that a suit for declaration and permanent injunction is a discretionary and equitable remedy, requiring the plaintiff to approach the court with clean hands. Finding that the appellant had accepted the temporary nature of the allotment and failed to adhere to her commitment, the Court upheld the dismissal of her suit, affirming that equitable relief cannot be granted to a party acting contrary to their own documented undertakings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff can claim a right to retain official accommodation beyond the period specified in the allotment order?
  • Is the relief of declaration under the Specific Relief Act 1877 a discretionary and equitable remedy?
  • Does a party who contradicts their own signed affidavit and documented undertaking forfeit the right to equitable relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hafeezan Bibi etc vs Nazar Muhammad etc2025 LHC 2338, 2025 PLJ Lahore 413 · Lahore High Court · 2025-04-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Fatima & 2 others vs Farooque Ahmed2025 SHC LAR 2245 · Sindh High Court · 2025-09-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghousia Shabbir Ullah vs National University Of Modern Languages, etc2025 IHC 288 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Farzana (widow) and another vs Abid Khan and 2 others2025 PLD Balochistan 37 · Balochistan High Court · 2024-08-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farida Begum vs Learned Full Bench Members, National Industrial2025 IHC 350 · Islamabad High Court
  Voluntary Separation Schemepensionary benefitsestoppelgrievance noticelimitationlabor disputewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Telephone Operator at Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), challenged an order of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which had set aside a Single Member's order in her favor. The petitioner sought pensionary benefits, arguing her service length under the Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) was incorrectly calculated as 17 years instead of over 19 years. The respondents contended that the petitioner had voluntarily opted for the VSS, accepted all financial benefits, and that her grievance petition was barred by limitation. The Islamabad High Court examined whether an employee who voluntarily accepts VSS benefits can subsequently claim statutory pensionary benefits and whether the petition was time-barred. The Court held that VSS is a binding contract under the Contract Act, 1872, and employees who voluntarily accept its benefits are estopped from resiling to claim pensionary benefits. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to serve a mandatory grievance notice within ninety days under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, making the petition hopelessly time-barred. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who voluntarily accepts and receives financial benefits under a Voluntary Separation Scheme is legally estopped from subsequently claiming statutory pensionary benefits?
  • Is a Voluntary Separation Scheme, once opted for and accepted, considered a binding contract regulated under the Contract Act, 1872?
  • What is the legal consequence of failing to serve a timely grievance notice on an employer within the ninety-day statutory period prescribed under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farhat Naseem vs District Petrol Pump Committee through Chairman2025 YLR 263 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fakhra Jabeen, Wasif Ali & another vs Wasif Ali and another, Mrs.2025 SCP 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-28
  Nikahnama interpretationdowerMehrimmovable property as dowerfree consentfamily lawNikah Registrar
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, arose from concurrent family court proceedings concerning the recovery of dower and maintenance. The central legal question involved the correct interpretation of columns 13 and 16 of the Nikahnama (marriage contract), specifically whether immovable property recorded in column 16 is to be read disjunctively from cash dower in column 13 or whether it operates only in lieu of default in the cash amount. The Supreme Court held that the Nikahnama is a civil contract governed by the free consent and true intention of the parties, and that the headings of its columns are not conclusive or sacrosanct. The Court ruled that columns 13 and 16 are distinct; dower agreed in the form of immovable property creates exclusive ownership upon the execution of the Nikahnama and is not conditional upon the non-payment of cash dower. Furthermore, ambiguities in a marriage contract must be interpreted with great care, taking into consideration any disadvantageous position of the bride due to social or cultural norms. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the appellate court's decree in favour of the wife.

  Questions settled

  • Are columns 13 and 16 of the Nikahnama to be read conjunctively or disjunctively?
  • Does the right to claim immovable property recorded as dower in column 16 of a Nikahnama depend on the failure to pay the cash amount recorded in column 13?
  • What is the legal status and evidentiary weight of the headings and columns in a prescribed Nikahnama form?
  • How should ambiguities in the terms and conditions of a Nikahnama be interpreted in light of potential socioeconomic disadvantages faced by a bride?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fakhra daughter of Muhammad Saeed vs he S.P Complaint Cell, District Korangi and others2025 SHC KHI 2086 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-08
  Justice of PeaceSection 22-A Cr.P.Cregistration of FIRmatrimonial disputepost-divorce settlementdishonored chequecivil disputecriminal color
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Miscellaneous Application was filed by the applicant challenging the order dated 26.05.2025 passed by the 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Karachi (East), which dismissed her application under Sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking registration of an FIR against her ex-husband and ex-father-in-law over allegedly dishonored cheques arising out of a post-divorce financial settlement. The core legal question was whether criminal machinery can be invoked under Sections 22-A and 22-B Cr.P.C to resolve financial disputes emanating from matrimonial dissolution and settlement agreements. The High Court dismissed the application, upholding the Justice of Peace's order. It held that the controversy between the parties was purely civil and matrimonial in nature. The Court reiterated the established principle that civil disputes cannot be painted with a criminal color merely to intimidate or pressure opponents, and matters concerning matrimonial financial settlements must be pursued before competent Civil Courts, Family Courts, or through arbitration rather than via criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under Section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be allowed for registration of an FIR where the dispute between the parties is purely of a civil or matrimonial nature?
  • Can financial liabilities arising out of a post-divorce settlement agreement be enforced by initiating criminal proceedings?
  • Whether the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace commits an illegality in refusing to order the registration of an FIR when the dispute is civil in character and lacks criminal intent?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Erum Suleman Ali vs The State & another2025 SHC 509 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-25
  supplementary challancognizance of offencenon-bailable warrantsprotective bailtrial court jurisdictionSection 561-A Cr.PC
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Miscellaneous Application under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenged an order passed by an Additional Sessions Judge issuing Non-Bailable Warrants (NBW) against the applicant. The applicant, not initially named in the FIR or the initial report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was subsequently implicated in a supplementary challan. The core legal question was whether a trial court possesses the authority to take cognizance against an accused named in a supplementary challan after the charge has already been framed against other co-accused. The Court held that under Section 193(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a trial court is competent to take cognizance of an offense against an accused upon receiving a supplementary report from the Magistrate, even at a later stage of the proceedings. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court's power to take cognizance but, in the interest of justice, converted the application into a protective bail plea, granting the applicant seven days to surrender before the trial court while suspending the NBW.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court take cognizance against an accused named in a supplementary challan after the charge has already been framed against other co-accused?
  • Is a trial court empowered under Section 193(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to take cognizance upon receiving a supplementary report from a Magistrate?
  • Does the failure to name an accused in the initial FIR or Section 173 report preclude a trial court from subsequently taking cognizance against them?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dr. Ismat Bano d/o Ali Muhammad vs The State and others2025 SHC KHI 2186 · Sindh High Court · 2025-09-04
  transfer applicationjudicial biascyber-stalkingjudicial conductcriminal trialtransfer of criminal case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a transfer application filed by the complainant, Mst. Dr. Ismat Bano, challenging an order of the Sessions Court which dismissed her request to transfer a criminal case involving cyber-stalking charges under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. The complainant sought transfer on the grounds that the trial judge made unprofessional and biased remarks, specifically questioning the substance of her case and making inappropriate personal comments. The High Court reviewed the record and found no procedural irregularities or evidence of bias that would warrant transferring the case. While the Court acknowledged that the trial judge's comments were ill-advised and lacked the necessary judicial 'kairos'—the appropriate timing and sensitivity required when addressing sensitive matters—it held that these remarks did not demonstrate actual malice or prejudice sufficient to justify a transfer. The Court emphasized that while judicial language can be improved, isolated remarks do not automatically necessitate the transfer of a trial. Consequently, the application for transfer was dismissed, affirming the trial court's continued jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the making of allegedly unprofessional or insensitive remarks by a trial judge constitute sufficient grounds for the transfer of a criminal case?
  • Is a trial court required to transfer a case if the complainant alleges that the judge expressed an opinion on the merits of the case during proceedings?
  • What is the standard for determining whether judicial remarks warrant the transfer of a case under Section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dadli and 2 others vs The State2025 P Cr. L J 985 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-05-31
  abductioncommon intentionextra-judicial confessioncriminal revisionQanun-e-Shahadat Orderchild witnessrecovery of victim
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal jail revision petition challenges the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts, which convicted the petitioners under Sections 365/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the abduction of a four-year-old child. The core legal questions concerned the admissibility of extra-judicial confessions made while in police custody, the application of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the impact of the prosecution's failure to produce the minor victim as a witness. The Court held that while confessions made in police custody are inadmissible, evidence of facts discovered as a result of such information is admissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that common intention can be inferred from the conduct and circumstances of the accused. Regarding the victim, the Court ruled that the non-production of a four-year-old child as a witness is immaterial when other prosecution evidence is consistent and confidence-inspiring. Consequently, finding no misreading of evidence or material illegality, the Court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a confession made while in police custody admissible as evidence?
  • Under what circumstances does Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 allow for the admission of information provided by an accused in police custody?
  • Does the failure to produce a minor victim as a witness invalidate a conviction for abduction when other evidence is consistent?
  • How is common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 established in the absence of direct affirmative evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bushra Hamid And Others vs Mst. Farzana Nizam And Another2025 SHC 18 · Sindh High Court · 2025-01-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bisma alias Sana vs The State2025 LHC 1029 · Lahore High Court · 2025-03-17
  narcotics possessionbenefit of doubtsample bearerchain of custodycriminal appealacquittalSection 161 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(1)-6c of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 for the possession of 1100 grams of heroin. The core legal questions concerned whether the prosecution's failure to produce the sample bearer in the witness box and the omission to record the statement of a key witness under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 rendered the conviction unsustainable. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt due to these procedural lapses and the failure to exhibit the recovery bag. The Court emphasized that the prosecution must produce the sample bearer in the witness box, as reliance on FIRs or duty officer statements is insufficient to prove the chain of custody. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right, not grace, if a single reasonable doubt is created in the prosecution's narrative. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Is the prosecution required to produce the sample bearer in the witness box to prove the chain of custody in narcotics cases?
  • Does the failure to record the statement of a key witness under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate the prosecution's case?
  • Is the accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right if a single reasonable doubt is created in the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Raqeema vs Bibi Zulekha and 5 others2025 PLD Balochistan 34 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-12-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Fathul Bari vs Ubaid ur Rahman and others.2025 PHC 182 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-06-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bakhan, etc vs Pir Bakhsh, etc2025 LHC 4210 · Lahore High Court · 2025-06-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Azra & others vs The State2025 SHC 16 · Sindh High Court · 2025-01-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ayesha vs Inspector General Of Police (Ig) Islamabad etc2025 IHC 580 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-09-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ayesha and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2025 SHC HYD 1647, 2025 SHC HYD 1694 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Asima vs State2025 PHC 32 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-02-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Areeja Sidiqua vs Capital Development Authority through its2025 IHC 40 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Anita Anam vs General Public and another2025 SCP 3, 2025 SCMR 579, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 575, 2025 PLJ SC 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-01-02
  succession certificatefamily pensionBalochistan Civil Services Pension RulesSuccession ActCode of Civil Procedureres judicatamaintainability of applicationspecial lawsummary proceedingsunmarried daughter
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns an application for a succession certificate for a deceased government officer's family pension. The petitioner, the eldest unmarried daughter, sought her share in the monthly family pension under the amended Balochistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1989. Her application was dismissed by lower courts, which held it was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as she had previously obtained a succession certificate for bank account funds but omitted the pension claim. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Succession Act, 1925, being a special law, provides a summary procedure and does not bar successive applications for succession certificates, thus rendering Order II Rule 2 CPC inapplicable. The Court further found that the High Court erred by not considering the amended pension rules, which entitle an eldest unmarried daughter to a family pension until her marriage. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court for expeditious summary proceedings to determine the petitioner's entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, bar a second application for a succession certificate under the Succession Act, 1925, if an earlier claim was omitted?
  • Can more than one succession certificate be issued under the Succession Act, 1925?
  • Are the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, generally applicable to matters governed by the Succession Act, 1925, a special law?
  • Is an eldest unmarried daughter entitled to a share in monthly family pension under the amended Balochistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1989?
  • What is the nature and scope of proceedings for the grant of a succession certificate under the Succession Act, 1925?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amber Iqbal Khan and 2 others vs Syed Yasir Raza and 3 others2025 YLR 258 · Sindh High Court · 2024-07-22
  habeas corpuscustody of minorwelfare of minorGuardian Courtcriminal jurisdictionGuardians and Wards ActSection 561-A Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Miscellaneous Application challenged an order passed by an Additional Sessions Judge in a habeas corpus petition concerning the custody of two minor children. The trial court had granted custody to the mother but imposed restrictive conditions, including the surrender of passports and a bond. The core legal question was whether the High Court, exercising criminal jurisdiction, should interfere in custody matters or impose conditions when a competent Guardian Court exists. The Court held that the High Court should not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Guardian Court, which is the appropriate forum for adjudicating custody disputes. It emphasized that habeas corpus in custody matters should be an exception rather than a rule, reserved for cases involving criminality or abduction, and should not be used to bypass established family law procedures. The Court affirmed that the paramount consideration in all custody matters is the welfare of the minor. Consequently, the application was disposed of, directing the parties to resolve the permanent custody issue before the Guardian Court, which was instructed to decide the jurisdictional question expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to decide custody disputes of minors?
  • Is a writ of habeas corpus an appropriate remedy for determining the permanent custody of a minor?
  • Should the High Court impose conditions on custody in habeas corpus proceedings when a Guardian Court is the competent forum?
  • What is the paramount consideration for courts when deciding the custody of a minor?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amber Fahad, Etc vs Ch. Iqbal Ahmed, Etc2025 IHC 222 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-04-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Alia Rani d/o Rehmatullah vs The Senior Superintendent of Police and2025 SHC KHI 2049 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-18
  Ex-Officio Justice of Peacelodging of FIRelectronic forensicscyber crimesblackmailquashing of orderNational Cyber Crimes Investigation Agency
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenged an order passed by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, which dismissed the applicant's request for directions to record her statement and lodge an FIR against the proposed accused for allegedly taking compromising photographs and attempting to blackmail her into a porn racket. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace's refusal to order the registration of a criminal case where the allegations lacked bona fides, supporting evidence, and clear timelines, alongside the availability of specialized remedies under electronic crimes legislation. The court held that an FIR need not be ordered in every case, especially where information lacks credibility and does not disclose a clear cognizable offence. The court laid down that electronic forensic examinations are best conducted by specialized agencies like the National Cyber Crimes Investigation Agency under the relevant cybercrime laws rather than standard police procedures, and that remedies under general criminal law and specialized cybercrime regimes may run concurrently.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is bound to order the registration of an FIR in every complaint regardless of the lack of bona fides and supporting evidence?
  • Can remedies under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 be pursued concurrently?
  • Does the examination of data hidden in smartphones for digital crimes require investigation by specialized agencies rather than ordinary police officers?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Afia Qalandar Anjum vs The State & others2025 IHC 420 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-05-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aarzoo Meena Khalid vs Learned Addl. District Judge, Rawalpindi and another2025 LHC 4628 · Lahore High Court · 2025-06-02Read full judgment →
• Mst Saira Zarin vs Mohammed Aslam and others2025 SHC LAR 1590 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-15Read full judgment →
• Mst Rubeena Chohan vs Abdul Haq & others2025 SHC 442, 2025 PLJ Karachi 124 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-28Read full judgment →
• Mst Maria & another vs P.O Sindh & Others2025 SHC 434 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-26Read full judgment →
• Ms. Shehzadi vs Home Secretary Government of Sindh & Others2025 SHC 112 · Sindh High Court · 2025-01-28Read full judgment →
• Ms. Priyanka Devi D/o Raj Kumar vs The State2025 SHC KHI 1603 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-30
  criminal revisionforged degreeusing forged documentmens reabenefit of doubtexcessive sentencevisa fraud
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant filed a criminal revision application before the High Court of Sindh against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Karachi (South), which had upheld her conviction under Section 471 PPC while altering her sentence to time already undergone with a fine. The case originated from a FIA inquiry initiated on information from the U.S. Consulate General, alleging that the applicant submitted a forged University of Karachi degree and transcript to obtain a U.S. visa. The core legal questions involved whether a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum under Section 471 PPC invalidates the conviction and whether the essential mens rea—knowing or having reason to believe the document was forged—was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court allowed the revision, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the applicant. The Court held that a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum renders the conviction under that section unsustainable despite subsequent appellate modifications. Additionally, when co-accused are acquitted on the same evidence and intent remains unproven, the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does awarding a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum under Section 471 PPC render the conviction unsustainable?
  • Can a conviction under Section 471 PPC stand without proof that the accused knew or had reason to believe the document was forged?
  • Does the alteration of an illegal sentence by an appellate court cure the fundamental legal flaw in the original sentence?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt under Section 471 PPC when co-accused involved in arranging the forged documents are acquitted on the same evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Nadia Sarwar vs Mr. Aqeel Abbas And 4 Others2025 IHC 16, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 358 · Islamabad High Court · 2024-12-31
  workplace harassmentFederal Ombudsmanrepresentation before Presidentstandard of proofspecial lawCode of Criminal Procedureretaliation at workplacemisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition arises from an order passed by the President of Pakistan setting aside the judgment of the Federal Ombudsman for Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace, which had found two bank employees guilty of workplace harassment and imposed major penalties. The core legal questions involved whether the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies to proceedings before the Ombudsman under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010, whether evidence beyond initial departmental complaints is inadmissible as new pleas, and whether the Ombudsman's findings suffered from misreading of evidence. The Islamabad High Court held that the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not apply to the Ombudsman's proceedings as the Act is a special law providing its own flexible procedure, that pre-litigation departmental complaints are not formal pleadings and do not bar subsequent detailed evidence, and that the President's order was based on a misreading of evidence. The High Court restored the Ombudsman's judgment, laying down principles regarding the standard of proof in workplace harassment cases, the non-applicability of criminal procedure codes to specialized harassment tribunals without explicit provision, and the evaluation of corroborative witness testimony in workplace harassment claims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to proceedings before the Ombudsman under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010?
  • Can evidence of harassment incidents not detailed in initial informal departmental complaints be treated as inadmissible new pleas before the Ombudsman?
  • Whether an internal bank inquiry committee constituted contrary to the mandatory requirements of the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010 has any legal sanctity?
  • What is the applicable standard of proof in cases concerning workplace harassment under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Mahvish Butt vs Fed. of Pakistan and Others2025 SHC KHI 2066 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-11Read full judgment →
• Ms. Jahanara etc vs Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation2025 LHC 814, 2025 PLJ Lahore 475 · Lahore High Court · 2025-03-17Read full judgment →
• Ms. Aisha Qazi D/o Qazi Muhammad Ismail vs The State2025 SHC 288 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-04Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Naina Syed, Mst. Naureen Ahmad Tarar vs The Secretary Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training and others, Federal Board of Revenue and others2025 IHC 36 · Islamabad High Court
  doctrine of mergerexecution of decreeservice tribunalleave refusalconstitutional jurisdictioncivil servantsseniority dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses two service matters involving the execution and implementation of judgments passed by the Federal Service Tribunal and subsequently dealt with by the Supreme Court. In the first matter, the appellant sought implementation of a Supreme Court order refusing leave to appeal against a tribunal judgment, invoking Article 187(2) of the Constitution. In the second matter, the petitioner sought implementation of a Supreme Court order passed after granting leave to appeal. The core legal questions concern the application of the doctrine of merger to leave-refusal orders versus orders passed after granting leave, and whether the High Court or the Federal Service Tribunal possesses the primary jurisdiction to execute such orders under Article 187(2) of the Constitution read with Section 5(3) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Court held that the doctrine of merger does not apply when leave to appeal is refused, leaving the tribunal's original judgment intact, whereas an order passed on merits after granting leave attracts the doctrine of merger. Furthermore, with the insertion of Section 5(3) empowering the Federal Service Tribunal to execute its own decisions, matters pertaining to the implementation of service tribunal judgments or consequent Supreme Court appellate orders should be executed by the tribunal as the court of first instance. Consequently, the intra-court appeal was dismissed, and the writ petition was converted and transmitted to the Federal Service Tribunal for execution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of merger apply when the Supreme Court refuses to grant leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Whether the High Court has concurrent jurisdiction under Article 187(2) of the Constitution to execute orders of the Supreme Court arising from service tribunal judgments?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the power to execute its own decisions under Section 5(3) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Which forum is competent to execute an appellate order of the Supreme Court modifying a service tribunal judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Farzana vs Qamran Constructions (Pvt) Ltd and another2025 SHC 152 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-03Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Farzana Nasir vs Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd2025 LHC 3584 · Lahore High Court · 2025-05-21Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Farah Shoukat vs Mr. Khursheed Inamulah2025 SHC KHI 1591 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-29Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Anjum Malik and others vs Mst. Neelofer Malik and others2025 IHC 184 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-03-28Read full judgment →
• Mr. Zafar Aslam Khan, Peshawar vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-PTCL 2025 CL. 156 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2024-12-17Read full judgment →
• Mr. M Jahangir Muggo, Faisalabad vs The Cir, Zone-Aeoi, LahorePTCL 2025 CL. 163 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2024-10-07Read full judgment →
• Mr. Hassan Najam, Natalia Najam And Another vs The Judge Family Court2025 IHC 348 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mr. Amir Sajjad vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Jhelum Zone and others2025 LHC 3156 · Lahore High Court · 2025-05-14Read full judgment →
• Mr. Altaf Nazim vs Mr. Riaz Hussain2025 SHC 142 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-21Read full judgment →
• Mr. Abdul Haleem Siddiqui vs Sidra Ali & others2025 SHC KHI 1510 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-22Read full judgment →
• Mossin Wali vs The State2025 YLR 1038 · Sindh High Court · 2024-07-26
  post-arrest bailreduction of bailenhancement of bailembezzlementbanking fraudinherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from cross-applications filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking reduction and enhancement respectively of a bail amount fixed at Rs.1 Crore in connection with FIR No. 12/2024 involving alleged misappropriation and embezzlement of Rs. 2.1 Crore through fake Term Deposit Receipts by a former professional banker. The core legal question addressed is whether the quantum of bail fixed at approximately fifty percent of the allegedly embezzled amount warrants reduction due to financial constraints or enhancement to match the full misappropriated sum. The Sindh High Court held that the bail amount of Rs.1 Crore is reasonable, consistent with the gravity of the charge, and justified under the inherent powers of the court read with Section 5(7) of the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984, and that neither the accused nor the complainant presented sufficient grounds for altering the surety amount. The key principles laid down include that bail amounts must be commensurate with the gravity of the offence and the magnitude of the alleged financial misappropriation, and that a low current personal bank balance does not constitute a valid ground for reducing a reasonable bail sum when substantial funds have been allegedly siphoned off.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the quantum of bail fixed at fifty percent of the allegedly embezzled amount can be reduced in the absence of contemporaneous documentary proof of financial hardship?
  • Whether a complainant can successfully seek the enhancement of a bail amount without furnishing fresh information or supporting case law?
  • Does a low current account balance of the accused justify reducing a bail amount when substantial funds were allegedly misappropriated and concealed outside the banking system?
  Read full judgment →
• Molvi Asim @ Muhammad Asim vs The State2025 SHC LAR 1978 · Sindh High Court · 2025-07-30Read full judgment →
• Mol Pakistan Oil & Gas, Pakistan Oil Field Limited, Al-Haj Pakistan2025 IHC 216 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mohsin Lal Chaudhary vs Shaukat Ali2025 LHC 1238, 2025 PLJ Lahore 613 · Lahore High Court · 2025-03-18Read full judgment →
• Mohsin Ali vs The State and another2025 IHC 372 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-06-02
  abductioncriminal appealbenefit of doubtsupplementary statementrecovery evidencemedical examinationpresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence under Section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged abduction of the complainant's daughter for Zina. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, given the delayed nomination of the accused, the unnatural circumstances of the alleged recovery, and the victim's refusal of a medical examination. The High Court held that the prosecution's case was riddled with doubts, rendering the conviction unsustainable. The Court emphasized that a delayed supplementary statement naming an accused without explanation is inherently suspicious and lacks evidentiary value. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the absence of independent witnesses during a recovery in a populated area, combined with the victim's refusal to undergo a medical examination, severely weakens the prosecution's narrative. The Court reiterated the principle that if a single circumstance creates a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind, the accused is entitled to an acquittal as a matter of right, not grace, based on the presumption of innocence. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delayed supplementary statement naming an accused without explanation possess legal evidentiary value?
  • Is the absence of independent witnesses during an alleged recovery sufficient to cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Does the refusal of a victim to undergo a medical examination in a rape or abduction case weaken the prosecution's evidence?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammed Hassan vs Province of Sindh and others2025 SHC 426 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-21
  reinstatement in servicesacked employeesproject employeesregularization of servicenegative equalitylachesconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking the reinstatement of the petitioner into service by extending the benefits of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act 2016. The petitioner, originally appointed as a temporary Junior Clerk in a project under the defunct Sindh Arid Zone Development Authority, had his services discontinued in 1997 upon the closure of the project. The core legal questions were whether a project employee qualifies as a "sacked employee" under Section 2(b) of the Act, and whether the regularization of other employees on humanitarian grounds creates a vested right under Article 25 of the Constitution. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the definition of "sacked employee" under Section 2(b) of the Act does not encompass project-based employees whose employment naturally terminates upon project completion. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Article 25 does not recognize the concept of negative equality; hence, illegal or discretionary benefits granted to others cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Finally, the petition was also barred by laches due to an unexplained 23-year delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a project employee whose services were terminated upon the closure of a project falls within the definition of a sacked employee under Section 2(b) of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act 2016?
  • Can a project employee claim regularization of services as a matter of right in the absence of statutory backing?
  • Does Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 protect a claim of negative equality where a benefit was previously granted to others illegally or on purely humanitarian grounds?
  • Can a constitutional petition for reinstatement in service be entertained when there is an unexplained delay of over two decades?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammed Faheem Khan and others vs Moiz Ali and others2025 SHC 420 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-18
  work-charged employeesregularization of servicesKarachi Development Authoritymaster and servantlabor disputeSindh Industrial Relations Act 2012constitutional petitionalternate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses constitutional petitions filed by work-charged and daily wager employees of the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) seeking regularization of their services. The core legal questions involve whether work-charged employees have a vested right to regularization under statutory law or the Constitution, and whether the High Court can entertain service disputes of this nature under its writ jurisdiction when labor laws provide an alternate remedy. The Court held that work-charged employees are excluded from the regularization statute and cannot claim regularization as a matter of right. Furthermore, since such employees qualify as 'workmen' under labor legislation, their disputes relating to termination and terms of employment must be adjudicated before the appropriate Labor Tribunal rather than through constitutional petitions. The key principles laid down are that work-charged employees are governed by labor laws rather than civil service regulations, negative equality cannot be claimed under Article 25 of the Constitution, and the High Court will not exercise constitutional jurisdiction when efficacious alternate remedies exist under labor statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether daily wagers and work-charged employees are entitled to regularization of service under the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act 2013?
  • Does Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 encompass the concept of negative equality to claim regularization based on allegedly irregular regularizations of other employees?
  • Whether employees of the Karachi Development Authority engaged on a work-charged basis fall within the definition of worker or workman under the Sindh Industrial Relations Act 2012?
  • Can the High Court entertain a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 for service grievances of work-charged employees when an alternate remedy is available under labor laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammed Bux Kalhoro vs Province of Sindh & others2025 SHC LAR 2100 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-21Read full judgment →
• Mohammed Adnan vs PTCL and others2025 SHC 432 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-21
  voluntary surrender of serviceseparation bonusmonthly pensionbenevolent grantgroup insurancerecurring cause of actiondoctrine of lachesfederal employee
  Summary & questions settled

  The Petitioner sought directions against Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) for the release of monthly pension, benevolent grant, and group insurance benefits of his deceased wife, who had retired under a Voluntary Surrender of Service (VSS) Scheme. The core legal questions involved whether an employee short of the qualifying length of service for a pension is entitled to it after accepting a separation bonus, and whether claims for a benevolent grant and group insurance are maintainable despite a delay in approaching the court. The Sindh High Court held that the deceased employee's voluntary acceptance of the separation bonus and execution of a waiver form precluded any claim for a monthly pension, as affirmed by Supreme Court precedents. However, the court held that the claims for a benevolent grant and group insurance—governed by statute and funded through salary deductions—involve a recurring cause of action and do not suffer from fatal laches. The court partly allowed the petition, directing the employer to forward the petitioner's claim on the prescribed form to the Board of Trustees for determination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who accepts a separation bonus under a Voluntary Surrender of Service scheme is entitled to claim a monthly pension despite falling short of the qualifying length of service?
  • Does the doctrine of laches bar a constitutional petition claiming statutory benefits based on a recurring cause of action?
  • Are the spouse and legal heirs of a deceased retired employee entitled to a benevolent grant and group insurance when the employee dies after retirement before attaining the age of seventy years?
  • What is the statutory obligation of the head of a department regarding the forwarding of claims for a benevolent grant and group insurance under the Federal Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Rules, 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ishaq Khan vs District Magistrate Bagh having its office at2025 PLJ AJ&K 128 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Miss. Seema Sanam vs Province of Sindh & others2025 SHC SUK 1352, 2025 SHC SUK 1356, 2025 SHC SUK 1358 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-13Read full judgment →
• Miss Sana, Hamid Murtaza, Registrar High Court of Sindh & Another vs Province of Sindh & Others2025 SHC 714 · Sindh High Court · 2025-04-21Read full judgment →
• Mirza Mehboob (since deceased) through his legal heir Ahmed Ali Rauf2025 SHC KHI 1831 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mirza Imtiaz Baig vs Mirza Hamayun Ashraf Baig and another2025 LHC 4621 · Lahore High Court · 2025-06-17Read full judgment →
• Mirza Aslam Baig vs Federation of Pakistan & Others2025 SHC 594 · Sindh High Court · 2025-04-11Read full judgment →
• Miraj Zubair vs Rpo, etc2025 LHC 29, 2025 PLJ Lahore 262 · Lahore High Court · 2025-01-08Read full judgment →
• Mir Shams ud Din vs Mir Zia ud Din and 5 others2025 CLC 130 · Balochistan High Court · 2024-09-12Read full judgment →
• Mir Saifullah Mugheri vs Station House Officer, P.S Hyderi and others2025 YLR 782 · Sindh High Court · 2024-05-16
  registration of FIRJustice of Peacecognizable offensecivil disputeprivate complaintquashing of orderconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed to assail the order of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Larkana, whereby the applicant's request for directions to register an FIR regarding the alleged theft of dowry articles by his brothers and nephews was dismissed on the ground that the matter involved a civil dispute over inherited property. The core legal question was whether the Justice of Peace erred in refusing to direct the registration of the FIR under Sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that where the police have already negated the applicant's version and given adverse comments, no impartial investigation can be expected from them, making a direct private complaint an adequate and proper remedy. The court dismissed the application, laying down the principle that where a civil dispute exists and police are unlikely to conduct an impartial investigation, the appropriate recourse is to file a direct complaint before the trial court rather than seeking constitutional or discretionary remedies for FIR registration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Justice of Peace is justified in refusing to order the registration of an FIR when the dispute between the parties is primarily of a civil nature concerning inherited property?
  • Is a direct private complaint considered an adequate remedy when the local police have already expressed an adverse opinion against the complainant's version?
  • Can the High Court decline to interfere with the order of the Justice of Peace refusing to direct the registration of an FIR under Section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Nooroze Ali vs The State2025 MLD 597 · Sindh High Court · 2025-01-01
  criminal appealoffshoot caseunlicensed weaponacquittalSindh Arms Actappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the appellant's conviction and sentence under Section 25 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, for the possession of an unlicensed weapon. The appellant had been apprehended following an alleged abduction incident, which formed the basis of a separate main case. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having been acquitted in the main case, was entitled to acquittal in this subsequent case, which the court identified as an offshoot of the main proceedings. The High Court observed that the trial court's reliance on the prosecution's evidence in this case was inconsistent with the acquittal in the main case, where the alleged victim denied the occurrence of the incident. Holding that the recovery of the weapon was rendered doubtful by the acquittal in the main case, the Court set aside the conviction. The principle laid down is that when an accused is acquitted in a main case, they are entitled to acquittal in an offshoot case arising from the same facts and circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal in an offshoot case if they have already been acquitted in the main case?
  • Does the acquittal of an accused in a main case render the recovery of an unlicensed weapon in an offshoot case doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Muhammad vs Naeemullah and 2 others2025 P Cr. L J 974 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-07-21
  transfer applicationjudicial biasreal likelihood of prejudicetransfer of criminal casefair trialreasonable apprehension
  Summary & questions settled

  This transfer application was filed before the High Court of Balochistan seeking the transfer of a murder case, registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, from the Sessions Judge, Kalat, to another competent court due to alleged bias of the presiding judge. The core legal question was whether vague allegations, apprehension, and claims that the opposing party boasted of receiving court favor constituted sufficient legal grounds to establish judicial bias and justify transferring the case. Dismissing the application in limine, the High Court held that transfer of a criminal case cannot be ordered as a matter of routine or on the whims of a party. The Court reiterated the established principle that to demonstrate judicial bias, an applicant must provide trustworthy evidence of a real likelihood of prejudice, pecuniary interest, or personal hostility based on visible acts or expressions of the judge, rather than relying on mere assumptions, bald statements, or capricious apprehensions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party's mere apprehension of bias without tangible evidence justify the transfer of a case to another court?
  • Can a case be transferred based on the opposing party's claims that they will receive favor from the court?
  • What legal standard and evidence must be established to prove judicial bias for transferring a matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Muhammad Raza vs Mst. Sehar & Others2025 SHC HYD 1152 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-07Read full judgment →
• Mir Muhammad Farid and 2 others vs Ex-Offico Justice of Peace/Sessions2025 PLD High Court (AJ&K) 18 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2024-10-17Read full judgment →
• Mir Mohammed Brohi vs Federation of Pakistan & others2025 SHC LAR 1594 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-29
  wrongful terminationmisconductgrievance noticedate of birth discrepancylabor lawreinstatementback benefitswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the concurrent findings of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which dismissed the petitioner's grievance against his termination. The petitioner was dismissed for alleged misconduct regarding a discrepancy in his date of birth records. The core legal questions were whether the alleged discrepancy constituted misconduct warranting dismissal, whether the employer initiated disciplinary proceedings within the statutory timeframe, and whether the petitioner’s departmental appeal satisfied the requirement for a grievance notice. The Court held that the employer failed to initiate disciplinary proceedings within the mandatory one-month period prescribed by the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, rendering the dismissal void. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a departmental appeal or representation effectively functions as a grievance notice under labor laws. Consequently, the NIRC orders were set aside, and the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated with back benefits. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary action for misconduct must strictly adhere to statutory timelines, and procedural requirements like grievance notices should be interpreted liberally to ensure access to justice rather than being used to defeat claims on technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Does a departmental appeal or representation satisfy the statutory requirement of a grievance notice under labor laws?
  • Can an employer initiate disciplinary proceedings for misconduct after the one-month limitation period prescribed by the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 has expired?
  • Does a discrepancy in the date of birth recorded in service documents automatically constitute fraud or misconduct?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Mohammad Sangi vs Anwar ellahi & others2025 SHC 388 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-21Read full judgment →
• Mir Hassan vs The State2025 YLR 645 · Balochistan High Court · 2024-11-25
  circumstantial evidencecriminal appealbenefit of doubtforensic reportconfessional statementmurder convictionrecovery of weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal jail appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, rendered by the Trial Court. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution had successfully established guilt through circumstantial evidence, specifically regarding the reliability of a video clip, medical evidence, and the recovery of an alleged crime weapon. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that the medical evidence was contradictory, the video evidence lacked forensic verification, and the recovery of the weapon was inconclusive as the forensic report failed to link the blood found on the knife to the deceased. Furthermore, the confessional statement of a co-accused was deemed inadmissible. The court reiterated the principle that in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete, unbroken chain of events connecting the accused to the crime; failing this, the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused, resulting in acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence where the chain of events is incomplete?
  • Is a weapon recovered with bloodstains sufficient to establish guilt without a forensic report linking the blood to the deceased?
  • Does a confessional statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 remain admissible if it is involuntary and lacks an opportunity for reflection?
  • Can video evidence be relied upon in a criminal trial without forensic analysis to rule out tampering or artificial manipulation?
  Read full judgment →
• Millat Tractors Ltd. Sheikhupura Road, Shahdra, Lahore and others vs Mst.2025 MLD 889 · Lahore High Court · 2024-04-17Read full judgment →
• Military Estates Officer, Peshswa r Circle, Peshawlr Cantt & Others vs Haji2025 PHC 48 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mian Sohaib ul Rehman vs Muhammad Bashir through L.Rs2025 LHC 4075 · Lahore High Court · 2025-06-12
  illegal dispossessionfunctus officiocriminal revisionrestoration of possessionfinality of judgmentacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's application for the restoration of possession of a plot. The core legal question was whether a trial court, having acquitted the accused in a complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, retains jurisdiction to entertain a subsequent application for the restoration of possession, and whether the court remains functus officio after signing its final judgment. The Lahore High Court held that once the trial court passed the judgment of acquittal on 20.07.2011, it became functus officio and lacked the authority to review or alter its order, except for correcting clerical errors. The Court observed that the petitioner failed to justify the legal basis for his application, which had been filed long after the complaint proceedings concluded. Consequently, the Court dismissed the revision petition, affirming that a criminal court cannot review its own final judgment or entertain post-acquittal applications for possession, emphasizing the finality of judicial orders under criminal jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court become functus officio after signing a judgment of acquittal in a case under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • Can a criminal court review or alter its own final judgment after it has been signed?
  • Is a party entitled to seek restoration of possession from a criminal court after the main complaint has been decided and the court has become functus officio?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Akram vs Federation of Pakistan etc2025 LHC 681 · Lahore High Court · 2025-03-06Read full judgment →
• Mian Haseeb Madni vs The State & another2025 LHC 4767 · Lahore High Court · 2025-04-07
  post-arrest bailcyber crimedefamationpublic moralitydiscretionary powerelectronic crimebail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail petition filed by the accused, Mian Haseeb Madni, in connection with F.I.R. No. 124/2024, involving allegations under the Prevention of Electronic Crime Act, 2016 and the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, a YouTuber, was accused of disseminating false and defamatory video content on social media alleging that the complainant, a police official, committed Zina with a colleague. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail, particularly given that the alleged offences were outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that bail is not a right in every case, even where the prohibitory clause does not apply, particularly when the offence is heinous and impacts public morality. Finding that the petitioner's prima facie involvement was established by incriminating material and that the act caused severe public humiliation and mental shock, the Court dismissed the petition. The judgment reaffirms that courts may exercise discretion to refuse bail in non-prohibitory cases where exceptional circumstances and the nature of the offence warrant such denial.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be refused in offences that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the concession of bail an absolute right for offences carrying a penalty of imprisonment up to three years?
  • Does the dissemination of false and defamatory content on social media constitute grounds for refusing bail in the interest of public morality?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Dad vs SHO Police Station a Section Ghotki & Others2025 SHC SUK 1632 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-02
  registration of FIRJustice of Peacedishonour of chequecognizable offencecriminal investigationSection 489-F PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenges an order passed by the Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Ghotki, which dismissed the applicant's request for the registration of an FIR regarding dishonoured cheques. The core legal question was whether the Justice of Peace erred in refusing to direct the registration of an FIR when the applicant alleged the commission of a cognizable offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court held that the impugned order was unsustainable because the dishonour of cheques constitutes a cognizable offence, and the defence plea raised by the accused regarding the discharge of the debt is a matter for investigation by the police, not a ground for the Justice of Peace to refuse registration. The court set aside the impugned order and directed the Station House Officer to record the applicant's statement and proceed in accordance with the law. The key principle laid down is that where a complaint discloses a cognizable offence, the Justice of Peace must direct the registration of an FIR, leaving the verification of defence pleas to the investigative process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Justice of Peace can refuse to direct the registration of an FIR when the complaint discloses a cognizable offence?
  • Is the plea of discharge of debt a valid ground for the Justice of Peace to decline the registration of an FIR for a dishonoured cheque?
  • Does the dishonour of a cheque constitute a cognizable offence under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What is the appropriate forum for an accused to raise a defence regarding the repayment of a loan in a case involving dishonoured cheques?
  Read full judgment →
• Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad vs M/s Mirza Muhammad Ismail &2025 IHC 358 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-05-30Read full judgment →
• Metro Pakistan (Private) Limited through constituted representative vs Province of Sindh through Senior Member, Board of Revenue and another2025 MLD 156 · Sindh High Court · 2024-05-08Read full judgment →
• Metro Flex Industries Pvt. Ltd. and others vs Government of Pakistan and others2025 IHC 528 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Taj Vegetable Oil Processing Unit (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Federal Secretary Finance and Revenue Division, Islamabad and others2025 PTD 399 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-10-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines Limited vs Commissioner Inland2025 PTD (Trib.) 153 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2024-01-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sitara Dildar Fuels (Private) Limited through Chief Executive Office2025 PTD 631 · Lahore High Court · 2024-05-07Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Ship Breaker's Association and others vs Government of Balochistan, through Secretary Ministry of Planning and Development, Quetta and 2 others2025 CLC 769 · Balochistan High Court · 2024-10-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nortex Corporation vs The Collector of Custom (Adjudication-I)2025 PTD (Trib.) 465 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2024-01-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Logistics Cell vs Assistant_Deputy Commissioner and others2025 PTD 614 · Lahore High Court · 2024-09-12
  Alternative Dispute Resolutiontax liabilitystate-owned enterpriseinterim reliefcoercive measuresmediationtax dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by a state-owned enterprise (SOE) seeking interim relief against tax-related coercive measures, citing the failure of the Federal Board of Revenue to establish an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) committee as mandated by law. The core legal question was whether the court could grant interim relief to an aggrieved party when the statutory ADR mechanism, specifically required for tax disputes involving SOEs under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, remains non-functional. The Court held that the establishment of an ADR committee is a mandatory statutory requirement under Section 134A(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Consequently, the Court directed the Federal Government to establish the necessary ADR committee on an immediate basis. Pending the formation of this committee, the Court granted interim relief, restraining the authorities from taking coercive measures against the Petitioner. The judgment reaffirms the principle that courts should exhibit a pro-mediation bias to alleviate the burden on the judicial system and facilitate the amicable settlement of tax disputes, consistent with established jurisprudence regarding the importance of ADR in tax litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for the Federal Board of Revenue to establish an Alternative Dispute Resolution committee under Section 134A(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a court grant interim relief against coercive measures when the statutory Alternative Dispute Resolution forum is not yet functional?
  • Does the mandatory requirement to apply for Alternative Dispute Resolution apply to state-owned enterprises regardless of the tax liability threshold?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khadija Waseem Butt vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone2025 PTD (Trib.) 566 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2024-08-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Insaf Textile Printing Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Faisalabad vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Corporate Zone, Rto, Faisalabad2025 PTD (Trib.) 418 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2024-01-22Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Qasam Shad vs Muhammad Iqbal Malik and others2025 CLC 370 · Islamabad High Court · 2024-10-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Faisalabad Electric Supply Company Ltd., Faisalabad vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Large Taxpayers' Office, Faisalabad2025 PTD (Trib.) 602 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2022-05-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Coca-Cola Export Corporation Pakistan through Authorized2025 PTD (Trib.) 638 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2024-04-26Read full judgment →