Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Haji Ghulam Muhammad and 2 others vs Additional Sessions Judge2025 YLR 512 · Lahore High Court · 2024-06-24Read full judgment →
• Haji and another vs Shabbir Ahmed and others2025 CLC 40 · Sindh High Court · 2024-07-30Read full judgment →
• Haji Ali Muhammad and another vs The Secretary Government of Pakistan2025 CLC 922 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-10-31Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Razzak (deceased) through legal heirs vs MCB Bank Limited2025 SHC KHI 2294 · Sindh High Court · 2025-09-10Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Salman Ahmed vs Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education2025 LHC 2137 · Lahore High Court · 2025-03-20
  contract appointmentremoval from servicewillful absenceenforced disappearanceregular inquiryshow cause noticedue processconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition called into question an order passed by the Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Sahiwal, terminating the contract appointment of the petitioner and imposing the major penalty of removal from service under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 on allegations of willful absence from duty. The core legal questions revolved around the maintainability of a constitutional petition in the face of alternate statutory remedies and the legality of dispensing with a regular inquiry in cases of alleged willful absence while traveling beyond the charges in the show-cause notice. The Lahore High Court held that the constitutional petition was maintainable given the patent illegality and violation of statutory safeguards, and that dispensing with a regular inquiry without compelling reasons—coupled with basing the termination on extraneous allegations regarding the petitioner's family—violated the principles of natural justice and due process under Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The key legal principle laid down is that while regular inquiries may sometimes be dispensed with in cases of absence, doing so arbitrarily without proper adherence to the show-cause notice allegations and denying an effective opportunity of hearing invalidates the disciplinary action.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 is maintainable against a major penalty imposed under the PEEDA Act without filing a departmental appeal when statutory safeguards have been violated?
  • Can a regular inquiry be lawfully dispensed with in every case of alleged willful absence from duty without examining the specific facts and circumstances?
  • Is a competent authority permitted to base a disciplinary removal order on extraneous matters and allegations that travel beyond the scope of the original show-cause notice?
  • Does the imposition of a major penalty without holding a regular inquiry or providing an opportunity of defense violate the right to a fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Muhammad Atif Mumtaz vs Senior Member Board of Revenue, Punjab2025 LHC 426 · Lahore High Court
  Intra-Court Appealcivil service appointmentstatutory rules vs executive instructionsvested rightlegitimate expectationestoppel against statuterecruitment policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal challenges a judgment dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the appointment of a Patwari. The appellant, a resident of a different Tehsil, contested the rejection of his candidacy, arguing that Board of Revenue instructions should supersede the Tehsil-specific residency requirements prescribed in the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2009. The core legal question was whether executive instructions issued post-enactment can override statutory rules, and whether an erroneous advertisement confers a vested right to appointment. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that statutory rules framed under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, prevail over contradictory executive instructions. The Court affirmed that executive branches lack inherent power to make appointments outside the established legal framework. Furthermore, the Court held that an erroneous advertisement does not override statutory provisions, nor does mere participation in a selection process create a vested right to appointment. The principle established is that public appointments must strictly comply with statutory frameworks, and estoppel cannot be invoked against mandatory legal provisions to validate appointments made in violation of eligibility criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Can executive instructions issued after the promulgation of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 override statutory rules regarding appointment conditions?
  • Does an erroneous job advertisement create a vested right to appointment for a candidate who does not meet the statutory eligibility criteria?
  • Can the doctrine of estoppel be invoked against mandatory statutory provisions governing public appointments?
  • Does mere participation in a selection process confer a vested right to appointment in the absence of fulfilling all statutory eligibility criteria?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Farhat Abbas vs The State through the Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore and another2025 SCP 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-02
  pre-arrest bailrule of consistencyfurther inquirycriminal conspiracysupplementary statementtentative assessmentnon-nominated accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioner following the refusal of such relief by the Lahore High Court regarding FIR No. 103/2023, which involves allegations of criminal conspiracy and other offences related to the events of 9th May 2023. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was not nominated in the initial FIR and was implicated through a delayed supplementary statement based on social media content, was entitled to pre-arrest bail. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to confirmation of his ad-interim pre-arrest bail. The Court reasoned that the petitioner had cooperated with the investigation, no recoveries were made from him, and the evidentiary value of the delayed supplementary statement and digital evidence remained a matter for trial. Furthermore, the Court applied the rule of consistency, noting that a co-accused facing similar allegations had already been granted bail. The key principle established is that where the prosecution's case against an accused rests on material requiring further inquiry and the accused has cooperated with the investigation, pre-arrest bail is appropriate, particularly when supported by the rule of consistency.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail when they were not nominated in the FIR and were implicated only through a delayed supplementary statement?
  • Does the rule of consistency apply to the grant of pre-arrest bail when a co-accused facing similar allegations has already been granted relief?
  • Can the evidentiary value of social media content used to implicate an accused be determined at the pre-trial bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Aqeel Anjum and others vs Province of Punjab through Chief2025 PLC (C.S.) 761 · Lahore High Court · 2024-12-11
  upper age limitprovincial autonomyinitial recruitmentfundamental rightsequal protection of lawreasonable classificationservice rulesjudicial review of policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the upper age limit prescribed in the Punjab Revenue Department (Revenue Administration Posts) Rules, 2009 for initial recruitment to the post of Tehsildar and allied posts (BS-16). The core legal question was whether differing upper age limits across provinces for the same post constitute unconstitutional discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution, and whether provincial policy decisions regarding service matters are subject to judicial interference on the ground of disparity with other provinces. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that under Article 240 and the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, provinces possess full autonomy to formulate service rules and policies suited to their respective ground realities and circumstances. The ratio is that a policy decision by one province cannot be cited as a ground for establishing discrimination merely because other provinces have prescribed different age limits or terms of service. The key principle laid down is that provincial governments enjoy wide legislative and executive discretion in framing service rules, and the doctrine of reasonable classification permits different standards across territorial jurisdictions without violating the equality clause, provided the classification rests on a rational basis and is not arbitrary.

  Questions settled

  • Does a difference in upper age limits for government posts between different provinces constitute a violation of the right to equality under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the prescription of upper age limits for initial recruitment through provincial service rules constitutes a justiciable policy decision immune from unwarranted judicial interference?
  • Are provincial governments bound to maintain uniformity with the Federation or other provinces regarding the terms and conditions of service for similar posts?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafeezullah vs Govt of Sindh & Others2025 SHC 102 · Sindh High Court · 2025-01-24Read full judgment →
• Hafeezullah Lashari vs Province of Sindh & Others]2025 SHC LAR 1972 · Sindh High Court · 2025-07-16Read full judgment →
• Hafeezullah Bajkani vs The State and 2 others2025 YLR 1102 · Sindh High Court · 2024-04-08
  cognizance of offencenon-bailable warrantsinfructuous petitioncriminal revisionpolice reporttrial court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged an order passed by a Judicial Magistrate, who, upon receiving a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, took cognizance against the applicant despite the police having placed him in column No. 2 as innocent, and subsequently issued non-bailable warrants (NBWs) against him. The core legal question was whether the applicant could challenge the Magistrate's order after the case had been transferred to the Court of Session and the impugned order had already been executed, resulting in the applicant's arrest and remand to judicial custody. The Court held that since the impugned order had been acted upon and the case was now pending before the Court of Session, which had also taken cognizance, the impugned order had attained finality and was no longer in the field. Consequently, the application was dismissed as infructuous, with the Court noting that the applicant must pursue available legal remedies before the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal revision application be maintained against an order that has already been acted upon and executed?
  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to issue process against an accused placed in column No. 2 of a police report?
  • Is an application challenging a Magistrate's order rendered infructuous once the case is transferred to and cognizance is taken by the Court of Session?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafeez Ahmad vs The State, etc2025 LHC 752 · Lahore High Court · 2025-03-03
  criminal revisionprohibition orderchain of custodynon-exhibition of case propertystatement of accusedbenefit of doubtidentification parade
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a criminal revision petition under Section 435 read with Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenging the judgments of the lower courts whereby he was convicted under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979. The core legal questions involved the legality of a conviction based on unexhibited case property and documents, broken chain of custody of forensic samples, failure to put incriminating material to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and an unproven identity of an unknown accused without an identification parade. The Lahore High Court accepted the revision petition, holding that failure to exhibit recovered articles and forensic reports, severe lapses in maintaining the chain of custody, and omitting to put incriminating evidence to the accused during examination vitiated the trial. The court laid down that a single reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case entitles the accused to an acquittal as a matter of right, and unexhibited items or un-confronted incriminating circumstances cannot be used to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the recovered case property and forensic reports are not formally exhibited during the trial?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution case when the transmitting official of a forensic sample is not produced, thereby breaking the chain of custody?
  • Can incriminating material and recoveries not put to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be considered against him?
  • Does the lack of an identification parade render the identity of an accused, unknown prior to the incident, doubtful?
  • Is a single reasonable doubt sufficient to entitle an accused to an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah Jakhrani vs The State2025 SHC LAR 2220 · Sindh High Court · 2025-09-10
  narcoticscharaschain of custodysafe transmissionchemical examiner reportbenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Judge CNS/Sessions Judge Kashmore @ Kandhkot convicting the appellant under Section 9(i)(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 for the alleged possession of 1500 grams of charas and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for life. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully proved the safe custody and transmission of the recovered contraband to the chemical laboratory and established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of material contradictions and lack of public witnesses. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish an unbroken chain of safe custody and transmission of the case property from the place of seizure to the malkhana and subsequently to the forensic laboratory, and that material contradictions in police testimonies created serious doubts. Consequently, the High Court laid down that any rupture or inconsistency in the chain of custody in narcotics cases vitiates the evidentiary value of the chemical report, and a single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right. The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of safe custody and transmission of narcotics to the forensic laboratory render the chemical examiner's report unreliable?
  • Whether material contradictions regarding the description and pieces of recovered contraband between witness testimonies and the chemical report create a dent in the prosecution's case?
  • Is a single reasonable circumstance creating doubt in a prudent mind sufficient to extend the benefit of doubt to an accused in a criminal case?
  • Does the absence of independent public witnesses during an alleged recovery from a public thoroughfare weaken the prosecution's case under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah Chandio vs The State2025 MLD 872 · Sindh High Court · 2025-01-07
  post-arrest bailcustodial deathpolice torturetentative assessmentcriminal bail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application was filed by the applicant seeking post-arrest bail (though later referred to in the judgment context as interim pre-arrest bail being recalled) in a case registered under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relating to a custodial death at a police station. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to pre-arrest or post-arrest bail given the allegations of torture and custodial death supported by eyewitnesses and medical evidence. The Sindh High Court held that sufficient material was available on record connecting the applicant to the offence, and no mala fide was demonstrated for false implication. The court recalled the interim bail and dismissed the application, laying down that deeper appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the bail stage and that custodial death cases involving police officials do not warrant the extraordinary concession of bail when prima facie connection exists.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused involved in a police custodial death is entitled to the grant of bail when sufficient incriminating material is available on record?
  • Can deeper appreciation of evidence be undertaken by the court while deciding a bail application?
  • What is the statutory mechanism for holding an inquiry into the cause of a person's death while in police custody?
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• Habib-ur-Rehman and others vs Abdul Karim (deceased) through L.Rs &2025 SCP 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-28
  rejection of plaintlimitation periodres judicatacourt fee deficiencypossession of immovable propertyconcurrent findingsduty of court to apply law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenges an order of the High Court of Sindh affirming concurrent findings of lower fora which dismissed a suit for declaration and possession following the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and an erroneous application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for possession of immovable property filed within the statutory limitation period under Article 142 of the Limitation Act 1908 can be barred by a mistaken invocation of Section 5, and the proper application of the doctrine of res judicata and provisions regarding court fee deficits under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that judges are duty-bound to apply correct laws irrespective of parties' mistakes, that limitation for possession suits is governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act 1908 rather than Section 5, and that plaints or appeals cannot be dismissed for court fee deficiencies without providing a timeline to cure the defect under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The court laid down principles on the judicial duty to know and apply the law and the strict constituents required for the rejection of plaints and application of res judicata.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 is maintainable in the institution of an original civil suit?
  • Does the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 operate as a bar to presenting a fresh plaint on the same cause of action if the suit is otherwise within limitation?
  • Can a court dismiss a suit or appeal due to a deficiency in court fee without first affording the plaintiff or appellant an opportunity to make good the deficiency within a fixed time?
  • Is it the duty of the judge to apply the correct law even if the parties or their counsel have misdirected themselves or failed to invoke the proper legal provisions?
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• Habib Ullah vs Aman Ullah Khan2025 PHC 214 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-07-25Read full judgment →
• Habib Metropolitan Bank Pakistan Limited vs Presiding Officer District2025 LHC 3436 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Habib Barkat vs Naeem Khilji Io/Ip Police Station Berote Hub and 2 others2025 PCRLJ 453 · Balochistan High Court · 2024-04-26
  criminal quashmentSection 169 CrPCdischarge of accusedplea of alibiinherent powers of High Courtinvestigation procedurecognizable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal quashment petition challenged an order passed by an investigating officer discharging two accused persons under Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case involving abduction, dacoity, and extortion. The core legal question was whether an investigating officer possesses the authority to discharge an accused based on a plea of alibi when prima facie incriminating evidence exists, and whether the High Court can interfere with such an administrative action under its inherent powers. The Court held that the investigating officer’s action was illegal, perverse, and an abuse of process. It determined that the power to discharge under Section 169 is not applicable when sufficient evidence connects the accused to the offence. The Court established that the determination of a plea of alibi is the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court to be decided after evidence is adduced, not a matter for the investigating officer to decide summarily. Consequently, the discharge order was set aside, and the investigating officer was directed to arrest the accused and continue the investigation according to law.

  Questions settled

  • Can an investigating officer discharge an accused under Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 based on a plea of alibi when prima facie evidence exists?
  • Is the High Court empowered under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to set aside an illegal discharge order passed by an investigating officer?
  • Does the determination of a plea of alibi fall within the jurisdiction of the investigating officer or the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Muhammad vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief2025 PLC (C.S.) 755 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-04-07
  pro forma promotiondepartmental inquirycivil servantdisciplinary proceedingsdelayed inquiryretirementwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition concerns the denial of promotion to a civil servant, a Director in the Local Council Board, who was deferred for promotion to BPS-19 due to pending disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner retired from service without the disciplinary inquiry ever reaching a conclusion or finding him guilty. The Court addressed the core legal question of whether the mere pendency of departmental proceedings justifies the indefinite deferral of a civil servant's promotion, particularly when such proceedings are characterized by inordinate delay. The Court held that the pendency of an inquiry should not be used as a tool to deprive a civil servant of their lawful right to promotion, especially when the delay is attributable to the administration's failure to adhere to prescribed timeframes. The ratio establishes that where a civil servant is exonerated or retires without being found guilty, they are entitled to be considered for pro forma promotion from the date they were initially deferred, as the pendency of proceedings cannot be a perpetual hurdle to advancement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere pendency of departmental disciplinary proceedings justify the indefinite deferral of a civil servant's promotion?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to pro forma promotion if they retire before the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings without being found guilty?
  • What is the effect of an inordinate delay in departmental inquiries on a civil servant's right to promotion?
  • Under Fundamental Rule 54A, what happens to disciplinary proceedings against a government servant who attains the age of superannuation before the inquiry is completed?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Mangnejo vs The State2025 SHC 350 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-26
  Control of Narcotic SubstancesCharasChain of CustodySafe CustodyChemical Examiner ReportBenefit of DoubtSection 103 CrPCAcquittal Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was directed against the judgment of the trial court convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for alleged possession of 1,500 grams of charas. The central legal questions concerned whether an unexplained delay in sending samples for chemical examination along with an unproven chain of safe custody vitiates the prosecution's case, and the effect of failing to associate independent mashirs under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Sindh High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that an unbroken chain of custody and safe transmission of contraband to the laboratory are fundamental for relying on the chemical examiner's report. The unexplained five-day delay, lack of documentary evidence of Malkhana storage, omission of independent witnesses, and witness contradictions created reasonable doubt, the benefit of which must be extended to the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary effect of an unexplained delay and a broken chain of safe custody in transmitting seized narcotic samples to the chemical laboratory?
  • Does the statutory exception under Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 entirely dispense with the need to associate private witnesses under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 when practicable?
  • Is a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt sufficient to entitle an accused person to acquittal as a matter of right in a narcotics case?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ali s/o Muhammad Ali Khan Jamali vs The State2025 SHC KHI 2048 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-07
  Anti-Terrorism Courttransfer of casescheduled offencearmed resistanceattack on policejurisdictionterrorismcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged the trial court's order dismissing the applicant's application for the transfer of a case from the Anti-Terrorism Court to a regular Sessions Court. The core legal question was whether an armed robbery and subsequent fatal assault on police officials during escape constituted 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, thereby vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Anti-Terrorism Court. The court held that the deliberate armed assault and resistance against law enforcement officers in a public place fell squarely within the definitions of terrorism under clauses (n) and (o) of subsection (2) of Section 6, as well as clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 6 of the Act. The key principle laid down is that attacks on law enforcement personnel during the discharge of their duties, resulting in fear and insecurity in society, constitute acts of terrorism rather than ordinary heinous crimes, bringing the matter within the exclusive cognizance of the Anti-Terrorism Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an armed assault on police officials during the execution of their duties constitute terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Whether an offence involving serious violence against members of the police force falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Can a case involving the murder of a police official during a robbery be transferred from the Anti-Terrorism Court to a regular Sessions Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmed vs Province of Sindh & others2025 SHC SUK 2014 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-05
  civil servantsuperannuationdate of birth correctionrecovery of salarypension benefitsfair trialwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a retirement notification and the subsequent recovery of salary from the petitioner's pension. The petitioner sought to correct his date of birth in his service record based on academic credentials, which would have extended his service. The core legal questions were whether a civil servant's date of birth can be altered after entry into service and whether the government can recover salaries paid to a civil servant who continued working beyond the retirement date recorded in the service book. The Court held that under Rule 12-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1974, the date of birth recorded at the time of joining is final and unalterable. However, the Court ruled that the government cannot recover salaries paid for services actually rendered without initiating departmental proceedings within one year of retirement, as per Rule 1.8(b) of the West Pakistan Pension Rules, 1963. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that unilateral deduction of pension by the District Accounts Office without a fair hearing violates Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant alter their date of birth in the service record after the initial entry at the time of recruitment?
  • Is the government entitled to recover salary paid to a civil servant for services rendered beyond the retirement date recorded in the service book?
  • Does the unilateral deduction of pension benefits by the District Accounts Office without a hearing violate the right to a fair trial?
  • What is the limitation period for initiating departmental proceedings to recover losses caused by a civil servant under the West Pakistan Pension Rules, 1963?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmed vs CEO Pakistan Steel Mills & others2025 SHC KHI 2068 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-18Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmed Maitlo vs The State2025 SHC SUK 1966 · Sindh High Court · 2025-07-28
  surety withdrawalstopped proceedingsbail bondcriminal procedurerelease of surety
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was moved by the applicant-surety for the withdrawal and return of surety documents in a case where the trial court dismissed an application under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and stopped criminal proceedings without pronouncing a final judgment of acquittal or conviction, while remaining silent on the release of the surety. The core legal question concerned whether a surety can be held indefinitely when proceedings are stopped and how surety documents may be released under such circumstances. The Sindh High Court held that a surety cannot be bound for an indefinite period when trial proceedings are kept in abeyance or stopped, and accordingly allowed the application for the return of surety subject to specific compliance measures, including filing certified copies of the surety's statement, the accused's CNIC, and the P.R. bond. The key principle laid down is that the suspension or stopping of criminal proceedings without final judgment effectively terminates the immediate necessity of keeping a surety engaged indefinitely, permitting the release of surety bonds upon ensuring provisions are made for securing the accused's future attendance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a surety be kept engaged for an indefinite period when criminal proceedings against an accused are stopped without a final judgment?
  • Whether surety documents can be released when the trial court's order stopping proceedings is silent regarding the release of the surety and P.R. bond?
  • What conditions must a surety fulfill for the return of surety documents when criminal proceedings are in a stopped state?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulshan Bibi vs Ejaz Mehmood2025 PLJ AJ&K 19 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2024-12-06Read full judgment →
• Gulshan Ali Mahar vs The State2025 SHC 184 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-06
  pre-arrest bailconfirmation of interim baildelay in FIRrule of consistencyfurther inquiryforensic reportfair trialpresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application before the High Court of Sindh concerned the confirmation of interim pre-arrest bail for the applicant, a former Police Officer charged under Sections 409 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The allegations involved retaining and allegedly tampering with a government-issued firearm. The court considered several key factors: an unexplained 12-year delay in lodging the FIR, the absence of a forensic or ballistic report to substantiate tampering claims, the rule of consistency as a co-accused had already been granted bail, and the applicant's consistent court attendance without misusing the interim concession. Holding that the matter required further inquiry and that delayed prosecution casts serious doubt on the case under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the High Court confirmed the interim pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained, inordinate delay in lodging an FIR justify the grant or confirmation of pre-arrest bail?
  • Can allegations of tampering with a firearm be accepted at the bail stage without a forensic or ballistic report?
  • Does the grant of pre-arrest bail to a co-accused entitle another accused to similar relief under the rule of consistency?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulshad Ali & others vs SSP District Tando Allahyar & others2025 SHC HYD 1747 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-29Read full judgment →
• Guloo Shaikh vs Province of Sindh and others2025 SHC SUK 2060 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-20
  superannuationpensionary benefitsrecovery of salarydate of birth alterationcivil servantservice recorddisciplinary proceedingslimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns the recovery of salary paid to a civil servant beyond his superannuation date and the subsequent withholding of his pensionary benefits. The core legal questions were whether the date of birth recorded at the time of joining service is final and whether the government can recover salaries paid for services rendered after the superannuation date without timely disciplinary proceedings. The court held that the date of birth recorded at the time of joining is final and cannot be altered. Furthermore, the court ruled that while the department failed to retire the petitioner on time, the petitioner actually performed his duties during the extended period. Since no disciplinary proceedings were initiated within the one-year limitation period prescribed by the West Pakistan Civil Servants Pension Rules, 1963, the government could not recover the salaries paid. The court declared the at-source deduction from the petitioner's pension illegal, emphasizing that pension is a vested right and not charity. The key principle established is that salary paid for actual work performed cannot be recovered after the limitation period for disciplinary action has expired.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the date of birth of a civil servant, once recorded at the time of joining government service, can be altered at a subsequent stage?
  • Can the government recover salary paid to a retired civil servant for services rendered after the date of superannuation without initiating disciplinary proceedings within the statutory limitation period?
  • Is the deduction of alleged excess salary from a pensioner's benefits without a prior hearing and disciplinary inquiry lawful?
  • Does the failure of the department to notify a civil servant of their retirement at the age of superannuation entitle the department to recover salaries paid for work performed during the extended service period?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulistan Spinning Mills Limited vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad etc2025 IHC 398 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Guldad Khan vs Area Incharge SNGPL and 8 others2025 MLD 83 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-10-26Read full judgment →
• Gul Zada S/O Shah Bahadur vs Ld iiird Adj Khi Malir & Others2025 SHC KHI 2094 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-22Read full judgment →
• Gul Tiaz Khan Marwat vs The Registrar Peshawar High Court, Peshawar & others2025 SCP 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  review petitionper incuriamservice rulesright of appealHigh Court employeemiscarriage of justicestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises from a Supreme Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's challenge against his removal from service by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, a High Court employee, possessed a statutory right of appeal against an order of removal passed by the Chief Justice. The Court held that the previous judgment was rendered per incuriam as it failed to consider Rule 12 of the Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1989, read with Rule 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986, which collectively provided an appellate remedy. Consequently, the Court allowed the review petition, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the matter to the Chief Justice of the Peshawar High Court for adjudication by a nominated bench. The judgment reaffirms the principle that a decision failing to account for relevant statutory provisions, thereby causing a miscarriage of justice, constitutes a valid ground for review under the Court's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to consider relevant statutory provisions in a judgment constitute a valid ground for review?
  • Do the Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules 1989 provide a right of appeal against a removal order passed by the Chief Justice?
  • Can a court remand a service matter to the Chief Justice for constitution of a bench when the original dismissal order was found to be per incuriam?
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• Gul Shair Jalbani vs Province of Sindh and others2025 SHC 706 · Sindh High Court · 2025-04-30
  administrative transfercivil servantjudicial reviewservice lawpostingmala fideconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order issued by the Sindh Local Government Board transferring the petitioner from his position as Town Officer, Agra, to the Board’s office in Karachi. The petitioner contended that the transfer was arbitrary, lacked justification, and violated principles of natural justice, asserting he had performed his duties diligently. The core legal question was whether the court should interfere with administrative transfer orders of civil servants. The Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that postings and transfers fall exclusively within the administrative domain of the competent authority. It affirmed that civil servants possess no vested right to remain posted at a specific station or to dictate their place of work. The Court laid down the principle that judicial interference in administrative transfers is impermissible unless the order is proven to be mala fide, discriminatory, or in direct violation of statutory rules. As the petitioner failed to demonstrate any such illegality or malice, the Court declined to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to obstruct the administrative process.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested legal right to remain posted at a specific station of their choice?
  • Under what circumstances can a court interfere with the administrative transfer of a government employee?
  • Is the transfer of a civil servant considered a violation of fundamental rights under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Gujranwala Electric Power Company etc vs Ahsan etc2025 LHC 3379 · Lahore High Court · 2025-05-29
  permanent workmanlabor jurisdictionregularization of servicecontract employmentconcealment of qualificationelectrical undertakingmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment decides multiple writ petitions filed by Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO) challenging the concurrent findings of the Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had ordered the reinstatement and regularization of contract employees as permanent workmen. GEPCO argued that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction because the employees were governed by statutory rules, that GEPCO was not a 'commercial establishment' under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, and that some employees had concealed higher qualifications. The High Court held that GEPCO, being engaged in electrical undertakings, falls within the definition of an 'industry' under Section 2(bb) of the Ordinance of 1968, and its adopted rules were non-statutory, making the master-and-servant principle applicable and vesting jurisdiction in the Labour Court. Consequently, employees who completed nine months of satisfactory service against permanent posts attained the status of permanent workmen. However, for employees who concealed higher qualifications in violation of the advertisement's eligibility criteria, the Court set aside the lower fora's decisions, holding that concealment of material facts vitiates the appointment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a power distribution company (DISCO) fall within the definition of an industry under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Does the mere adoption of WAPDA service rules by an independent corporate entity render those rules statutory so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court?
  • Can an employee who completes nine months of satisfactory service against a post of permanent nature be denied the status of a permanent workman based on a contract clause or government ban?
  • What is the legal effect of an employee obtaining public employment by actively concealing higher qualifications that exceeded the maximum eligibility criteria?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab through Chief Executive Officer/District Health2025 LHC 4069 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Local Government, Elections & Rural Development, Peshawar and others vs Nasir Hayat and others2025 PHC 18 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary C&W Department2025 PHC 238 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Gohar Zaman vs Babar-Ur-Rehman2025 PLD High Court (AJ&K) 31 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2024-09-20
  criminal revisionlimitation periodtime-barredreasonable timelachesindolencesufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition arose from an order passed by the Sessions Judge Bhimber endorsing a complaint for further proceedings under section 492B-C/A.P.C. and section 203H, Cr.P.C. The core legal question was whether a criminal revision petition before the High Court is barred by limitation when the Code of Criminal Procedure, Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court Procedure Rules, and Limitation Act do not explicitly prescribe a limitation period for it. The High Court held that although no statutory period is expressly provided, the rule of prudence, vigilance, and the principle that law helps the vigilant require that such a petition be filed within a reasonable time, which is determined to be ninety days, aligning with civil revisions and analogous writ jurisprudence. The court concluded that the petition, having been filed after 105 days without sufficient explanation for the delay, was time-barred and dismissed it, while directing the government to amend the relevant rules and statutes to bridge the legislative lacuna.

  Questions settled

  • What is the limitation period for filing a criminal revision petition before the High Court when no specific period is provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Can a criminal revision petition filed beyond ninety days be entertained if sufficient cause for the delay is shown?
  • Does Article 155 of the Limitation Act apply to criminal revision petitions filed before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Yaseen s/o Ghulam Rasool vs The State2025 SHC KHI 2026, 2025 SHC KHI 2025 · Sindh High Court · 2025-07-04
  Anti-Terrorism Acttransfer of casefake police encountercustodial killingscheduled offenceSection 561-A CrPCinherent powersprecedent binding effect
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, a police officer accused alongside others of committing qatl-i-amd in a fake police encounter under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, filed a criminal miscellaneous application under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. He challenged the Anti-Terrorism Court's order dismissing his application under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 seeking transfer of the case to a regular Sessions Court, arguing that the offense lacked the intent or objective required for terrorism under Section 6 of the Act as interpreted in Ghulam Hussain v. The State. The High Court dismissed the application, distinguishing the case factually as involving a custodial killing and fake encounter causing widespread public fear and insecurity. The Court held that Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 covers the alleged acts and defence plea under Section 6(2)(n) and (o). It affirmed that the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 is fluid, allowing it to retain jurisdiction when prima facie evidence suggests scheduled offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Anti-Terrorism Court have jurisdiction to try a case involving an alleged fake police encounter resulting in death under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Whether the High Court can interpret statutory provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 that were not specifically addressed or determined by the Supreme Court in prior judgments?
  • At what stage and under what conditions may an Anti-Terrorism Court exercise its powers under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 to transfer a case to a regular Sessions Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Yaseen and others vs Hussainullah and another2025 SHC 150 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-06Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Yaseen and another vs Government of Balochistan through Secretary Home and Tribal Affairs and 7 others2025 PLC (C.S.) 62 · Balochistan High Court · 2024-10-15
  caretaker governmentpolice recruitmentphysical standardsconstitutional jurisdictionmerit-based appointmentrule relaxationadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the recruitment process for the post of Inspector (BPS-16) in the Balochistan Police. The petitioners, who were candidates, contested the legality of the Caretaker Chief Minister's decision to grant relaxation in mandatory physical standards (height and chest measurements) to certain candidates who had initially failed to meet the criteria prescribed in the advertisement and the Police Rules, 1934. The core legal question was whether a Caretaker Chief Minister possesses the authority to relax statutory physical standards for recruitment, thereby altering the merit-based selection process. The Court held that the relaxation granted was illegal, void ab initio, and contrary to the principles of fair and transparent recruitment. Relying on the dictum in the Khawaja Asif case, the Court emphasized that caretaker governments lack the mandate to make such policy-altering decisions that undermine established rules. Consequently, the Court set aside the recommendations and notifications issued for the candidates who benefited from the unauthorized relaxation, affirming that strict adherence to prescribed physical criteria is essential for maintaining discipline in a uniformed force.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Caretaker Chief Minister have the legal authority to grant relaxation in prescribed physical standards for police recruitment?
  • Can a recruitment process for a uniformed force be sustained if physical criteria are relaxed for specific candidates after the advertisement?
  • Are appointments or relaxations made by a Caretaker Government that deviate from established statutory rules legally valid?
  • Does the relaxation of mandatory recruitment criteria by a caretaker authority violate the principles of fair and transparent public employment?
  Read full judgment →
• Hotak alias Sapak vs The State2025 MLD 70 · Balochistan High Court · 2024-09-11
  illegal weaponrecovery on pointationArms Ordinanceprivate witnesscriminal appealappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Trial Court convicting the appellant under Section 13(e) of the Arms Ordinance 1965 for the possession of an unlicensed .303 bore rifle. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery of the weapon through the appellant's pointation and whether the absence of private witnesses during the recovery rendered the prosecution's case doubtful. The Court held that the prosecution's evidence, including the testimony of the recovery witnesses and the positive forensic report, established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed the conviction, noting that the testimony of the official witnesses remained unshaken during cross-examination. The key principle laid down is that where a recovery is effected based on the disclosure and pointation of an accused person, the strict compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is not mandatory, and the absence of independent private witnesses does not automatically invalidate the recovery or prove fatal to the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the absence of private witnesses during a recovery made on the pointation of an accused fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Does the failure to comply with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 invalidate a recovery of a weapon?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the testimony of official witnesses in an arms possession case?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabir son of Darhoon Khan Phulpoto vs P.O Sindh and 9 others2025 SHC SUK 1994 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-04Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabbir vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary to Defence2025 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 1 · Federal Service Tribunal
  dismissal from servicecivil servanttemporary employeeregular inquirymisconductback benefitsservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal was filed by the appellant challenging his dismissal from service on allegations of immoral activities without a regular inquiry or show-cause notice. The core legal questions involved whether a temporary employee governed by the Civilian Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1973 qualifies as a civil servant under the Federal Service Tribunal Act, 1973, and whether an employee accused of misconduct can be dismissed summarily under terms of temporary employment without holding a regular inquiry. The Federal Service Tribunal held that the appellant, having served continuously for over a decade, acquired the status of a regular employee and fell within the definition of a civil servant, and that termination on allegations of misconduct requires a fair opportunity and a regular inquiry. The Tribunal set aside the dismissal order, directed the reinstatement of the appellant with back benefits, and granted liberty to the department to conduct a regular inquiry into the allegations within a specified timeframe.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee appointed on a temporary basis who serves continuously for a long period acquires the status of a regular employee?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction over a civilian employee working in a defence-connected establishment governed by the Civilian Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1973?
  • Can a temporary employee or contract employee be dismissed on allegations of misconduct without holding a regular inquiry and providing an opportunity of being heard?
  • Whether the time spent pursuing a constitutional petition in the High Court constitutes sufficient ground for condonation of delay and treating the petition as a departmental appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabbir & others vs Province of Sindh & others2025 SHC 356 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-12Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar vs The State and another2025 YLR 83 · Balochistan High Court · 2024-08-30
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailmurderrule of consistencyfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal application was brought by the complainant for the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to respondent No.2 by the trial court in a case registered under sections 302, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question concerned whether strong and exceptional grounds existed to warrant the cancellation of bail already granted to the accused. The Balochistan High Court held that the considerations for granting bail are distinct from those for cancelling bail, and once bail is granted, it cannot be revoked lightly unless the order is patently illegal, the accused has misused liberty, tampered with evidence, absconded, repeated the offense, or new incriminating material has surfaced. Finding that the trial court's order was based on valid considerations such as further inquiry regarding fatal injuries, non-vital bullet placement, enmity, and the rule of consistency, and that none of the requisite cancellation grounds were established, the High Court dismissed the application. The key principle laid down is that cancellation of bail requires exceptional circumstances and proof that the bail-granting order was perverse, arbitrary, or resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • What are the grounds required for the cancellation of bail once granted by a competent court?
  • Does the Balochistan High Court interfere with a bail-granting order in the absence of patent illegality or miscarriage of justice?
  • Can bail be granted on the basis of the rule of consistency when co-accused have already been released on bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs The State2025 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-19
  capital punishmentcommutation of sentencemitigating circumstancesmurder trialdelay in judicial proceedingscriminal appeallife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction and death sentence for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the death sentence remained appropriate given the evidentiary challenges and the prolonged duration of the judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court maintained the conviction but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Court held that while the prosecution established the appellant's involvement, the significant delay in concluding the trial and appeal—resulting in approximately 18 years of incarceration, including 11 years in a death cell—constituted substantial mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, the Court noted the uncertainty regarding individual culpability among multiple assailants and the lack of evidence for premeditation. The key principle laid down is that where judicial delays result in excessive incarceration and the specific role of an accused cannot be clearly differentiated from co-accused, the Court must exercise its discretion to award a lesser sentence, as executing a death penalty after such prolonged detention is harsh and contrary to the principles of life expectancy.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant delay in the conclusion of judicial proceedings and prolonged incarceration in a death cell constitute a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment when the prosecution fails to differentiate the specific role of the accused from other co-accused in a joint criminal act?
  • Is the absence of proof of premeditation a valid ground for exercising judicial discretion to award a lesser punishment under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Raheem vs Papoo and others2025 SHC HYD 1746 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-12Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rabani Butt vs Managing Director Hydral Power Electric Board, Muzaffarabad and 3 others2025 YLR 158 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2024-02-16Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir vs Ghulam Muhammad Kaleen and others2025 SCP 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-23
  agreement to sellspecific performancelimitationtime-barred suitconcurrent findingsleave to appealilliterate vendor
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed his civil revision, thereby upholding concurrent findings of the trial court and appellate court dismissing his suit based on an alleged agreement to sell dated 05.01.1983. The petitioner claimed to have paid earnest money to the respondents' predecessor, with the balance payable upon conclusion of litigation concerning the suit property. That litigation concluded on 24.11.2006, but the petitioner instituted his suit on 09.01.2017 without offering any plausible explanation for the protracted delay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the suit was barred by limitation on its face. The Court also observed that the agreement was ambiguous, lacked proper property description, and involved an illiterate lady whose legal heirs were neither attesting witnesses nor admitted the agreement. Finding no misreading, non-reading, or material irregularity in the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for specific performance instituted more than a decade after the culmination of pending litigation without plausible explanation is barred by limitation?
  • Can an agreement to sell be enforced if it is ambiguous and lacks a proper description of the subject property?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the invalidity and bar of limitation of an agreement to sell warrant interference in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir Tunio and others vs The State2025 SHC LAR 2241 · Sindh High Court · 2025-09-12
  criminal jail appealbenefit of doubtocular vs medical evidencehurttazir sentenceSection 337-N PPCcriminal intimidationacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Jail Appeal was filed against the judgment of the First Additional Sessions Judge/MCTC, Kamber, convicting the appellants under Sections 337-A(i), 337-F(i) read with Section 34, and 506 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (PPC). Upon reappraisal of the evidence, the Sindh High Court observed material contradictions between the ocular account and medical evidence regarding the nature, timing, and locale of injuries. The court highlighted that under Section 337-N PPC, Ta'zir imprisonment for hurt can only be awarded if the accused is a previous convict, habitual, hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal, or if the offence was committed under the pretext of honour; absent such circumstances, only Daman or Arsh applies. Furthermore, the ingredients of criminal intimidation under Section 503 PPC were not satisfied to sustain a conviction under Section 506 PPC. Finding the prosecution's case riddled with reasonable doubts, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can Ta'zir imprisonment be awarded in hurt cases under Section 337-N of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a material discrepancy between ocular testimony and medical evidence entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • What elements must be established to constitute the offence of criminal intimidation under Section 503 read with Section 506 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir Thebo vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and others2025 SCP 268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-06-04
  proforma promotionFundamental Rule 17High-Powered Selection BoardPerformance Evaluation Reportscivil servant promotionsuperannuationBS-22 promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the Sindh High Court's dismissal of a writ petition regarding promotion from BS-21 to BS-22. The petitioner, an Additional IG Police, was superseded multiple times by the High-Powered Selection Board (HPSB) despite unblemished Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) and high seniority, eventually reaching superannuation during the dispute. The central issue was whether the supersession based on unsubstantiated adverse remarks in HPSB minutes was lawful, and whether the petitioner was entitled to consideration for proforma promotion under Fundamental Rule 17. The Supreme Court held that while promotion cannot be claimed as a vested right, consideration within the prescribed rules is a vested right. The High Court erred by relying on minutes without examining the actual PERs. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the High Court's judgment, and remanded the matter to the HPSB for de novo consideration of proforma promotion under FR 17 within two months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant who reaches the age of superannuation after being wrongfully prevented or delayed from promotion can claim proforma promotion under Fundamental Rule 17?
  • Can the High-Powered Selection Board deny promotion based on adverse allegations regarding reputation and integrity that are unsupported by the civil servant's Performance Evaluation Reports and official dossier?
  • Does a civil servant possess an enforceable legal right to be considered for promotion in accordance with the prescribed rules and criteria?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi Sirohi & Shahmir Sirohi vs Province of Sindh and others2025 SHC SUK 2061 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-20Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa and others vs Province of Sindh & others2025 SHC SUK 1788 · Sindh High Court · 2025-06-26Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa alias Raja Buledi vs The State2025 SCP 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-12
  murder appealbenefit of doubtdelayed FIRcontradictory evidencemotiveweapon recoveryforensic reportacquittalco-accusedabsconding accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned the conviction of Ghulam Mustafa alias Raja Buledi for murder under Section 302(b) PPC. The Supreme Court examined the prosecution's case, noting a significant delay in lodging the FIR after the post-mortem, which suggested deliberations and fabrication. The Court found glaring contradictions in the statements of eye-witnesses, rendering their evidence doubtful. The alleged motive was vague and unproven. Furthermore, the recovery of the weapon and the positive Forensic Science Laboratory report were deemed unreliable as the empties and pistol were deposited together. Concluding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court acquitted the appellant. Crucially, the Court extended the benefit of doubt to the co-convict, Muhammad Akbar, who had not appealed, and to the absconding co-accused, Atta Hussain Buledi, on the principle that if the prosecution evidence is doubtful, the benefit should be extended to all similarly situated accused to ensure complete justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a delay in lodging an FIR, particularly after a post-mortem, create doubt regarding the truthfulness of the prosecution story?
  • Do glaring contradictions in the statements of prosecution eye-witnesses render their evidence unreliable?
  • Can a vague and ambiguous motive, unsupported by specific details or evidence, be proved against an accused?
  • Does the evidentiary value of a positive Forensic Science Laboratory report diminish if crime empties and the weapon of offence are sent to the laboratory together?
  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended to a co-accused or co-convict who has not filed an appeal or is absconding, if the prosecution's evidence is found to be doubtful and their case is not distinguishable?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza vs Addl. Sessions Judge, etc2025 LHC 1023, PLJ 2025 Cr.C. 422 · Lahore High Court · 2025-03-17
  criminal revisioncourt witnessSection 540 CrPCgiven up witnessdefence witnessmurder trialprerogative of prosecutionocular account
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition was filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenging an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Samundari, which dismissed the petitioner's application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon a given-up eyewitness as a Court Witness. The core legal question was whether an uninjured eyewitness given up by the prosecution as unnecessary after examining two other eyewitnesses of the same set must be summoned as a Court Witness. The High Court dismissed the revision petition, holding that the prosecution has the prerogative to produce witnesses of its choice and give up unnecessary witnesses. The court ruled that an uninjured eyewitness of the same ocular account, lacking distinct evidentiary gravity compared to examined eyewitnesses, is not essential to be summoned under Section 540. The petitioner remains entitled to examine such given-up witness as a defence witness under Section 265-F of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to give up an eyewitness as unnecessary when other eyewitnesses of the same ocular account have already been examined?
  • Can an accused compel the trial court under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon an uninjured prosecution eyewitness given up as unnecessary?
  • Under what circumstances is the evidence of an unexamined witness deemed essential for a just decision under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the remedy available to an accused who wishes to examine a witness given up by the prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza Shaikh vs Province of Sindh and others2025 SHC 598 · Sindh High Court · 2025-04-24
  pay protectioncivil servantconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunalterms and conditions of serviceouster of jurisdictionArticle 212
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional Petition was filed by a civil servant seeking a direction for the Government of Sindh to grant him pay protection following his appointment as a Statistical Officer. The petitioner argued that his previous service with the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation entitled him to such protection under a 2016 Policy Circular. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute concerning the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant, specifically regarding pay protection, in light of the constitutional bar on such matters. The Court held that the petitioner, as a civil servant, is governed by the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Relying on Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and the precedent set in Ali Azhar Khan Baloch, the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition, as matters pertaining to terms and conditions of service fall exclusively within the domain of the Service Tribunal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with liberty granted to the petitioner to approach the competent Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a petition regarding the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  • Is a dispute regarding pay protection considered a matter relating to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 bar the jurisdiction of the High Court in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza Lahbar & Others vs Province of Sindh & Others2025 SHC 724 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-08Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza and 4 others vs Government of Balochistan through Chief2025 PLC (C.S.) 47 · Balochistan High Court · 2024-07-30
  constitutional petitionquota systemrecruitment policyfundamental rightsservice lawequal opportunityunder-representation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the recruitment policy dated 03.05.2019 of the Education Department, Government of Balochistan, and a related advertisement, which utilized a quota system based on Regional, Zonal, District, and Union Council levels. The petitioners contended that such quotas violated Article 27 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, arguing that the constitutional protection for such reservations had expired after forty years. The core legal question was whether the quota system for government appointments remained constitutionally valid after the forty-year period mentioned in Article 27. The Court held that the petition was meritless. Relying on the third proviso to Article 27(1) of the Constitution and the principle established in Punjab Public Service Commission v. Hassnain Abbass (2021 SCMR 1017), the Court determined that the quota system had not lapsed. It affirmed that legislation and policies designed to redress the under-representation of specific classes or areas are constitutionally permissible. The Court emphasized that the judiciary cannot interfere with executive policy-making unless it is based on mala fide or mis-exercise of authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the forty-year period mentioned in Article 27 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 render the quota system for government appointments invalid after its expiry?
  • Is a recruitment policy providing for zonal or district-level quotas in government service unconstitutional?
  • Can the judiciary interfere with government recruitment policies regarding quota systems in the absence of mala fide or mis-exercise of authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs The State2025 PCRLJ 93 · Balochistan High Court · 2024-09-06
  restoration of attached propertyabsconderproclamation and attachmentlimitation periodcriminal revisionpossession of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges orders passed by the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's application under Section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the restoration of his attached property. The petitioner was nominated in an FIR under Sections 302, 324, 147, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, declared an absconder, and proceedings under Sections 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 were initiated, leading to the attachment of his property. After his arrest, his restoration application was dismissed on limitation grounds. The core legal question concerns whether the property was legally attached in compliance with Section 88(4) and how limitation under Section 89 is to be reckoned. The court held that since physical possession of the property was never taken and it remained with the petitioner, the attachment was not lawfully completed on the spot, meaning limitation runs from the date of knowledge rather than the date of the order. The court established that the primary objective of attachment under Section 88 is to procure attendance, which was achieved upon the accused's arrest, thereby warranting the release of the attached property.

  Questions settled

  • How is the period of limitation under Section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 reckoned when immovable property is not physically attached in accordance with subsection (4) of Section 88?
  • Whether the attachment of property under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 subsists once the absconding accused has been arrested and is facing trial?
  • What constitutes valid attachment of immovable property under Section 88(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hyder vs The State2025 MLD 682 · Sindh High Court · 2024-05-27
  criminal appealmurder convictionsudden quarreleye-witness testimonySection 161 statement delaypremeditationbenefit of the doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court for murder. The appellant was originally convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased following a dispute over the cutting of a tree. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the reliability of eye-witness testimony and the applicability of the murder provisions. The High Court, upon re-evaluating the evidence, found the complainant's testimony reliable but disregarded another eye-witness due to an unexplained delay in recording their statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that while the murder was proven, the incident occurred during a sudden quarrel without premeditation, lacking prior enmity. Consequently, the Court converted the conviction from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing the appellant to the time already served. The judgment affirms that a conviction can rest on a single reliable eye-witness and that cases lacking premeditation fall under Section 302(c).

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of a single eye-witness?
  • Does a delay in recording a witness statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render the testimony unreliable?
  • Does a murder committed during a sudden quarrel without premeditation fall under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the failure to put a recovered weapon to the accused during a Section 342 statement a fatal defect in the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs The State2025 SHC 166 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-21
  post-arrest bailnarcotics recoverycharasprivate witnessesSection 103 Cr.P.C.Control of Narcotic Substances Acttentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, Ghulam Hussain, sought post-arrest bail in a narcotics case involving the recovery of 2 kilograms of charas, registered under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal questions were whether the non-association of private witnesses under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the recovery, and whether the accused is entitled to bail given the quantity of narcotics and the nature of the offense. The Court held that the application for bail should be dismissed. It reasoned that Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 explicitly excludes the requirement of private witnesses, and that state functionaries' actions are statutorily presumed valid. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that narcotics offenses are crimes against society, and liberal bail discretion is inappropriate where reasonable grounds exist to connect the accused to the crime. The key principle laid down is that in narcotics cases, the statutory exclusion of Section 103 Cr.P.C. validates recoveries made by state functionaries without private witnesses, and the serious nature of drug offenses warrants strict adherence to the prohibition against bail under Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-association of private witnesses during a narcotics recovery invalidate the proceedings under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the recording of video and pictures during a narcotics raid a mandatory requirement of law?
  • Does the exclusion of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 apply to the recovery of narcotics?
  • Can bail be granted in narcotics cases where the accused was arrested red-handed and samples were timely sent to the laboratory?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs The Learned Additional District Judge (East), Islamabad, etc2025 IHC 200 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-03-11Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ghous Miani vs Province of Sindh and others2025 SHC 422 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-19
  civil servantwrit jurisdictionterms and conditions of serviceservice tribunalmisconducttransfer and postingmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a letter issued by the Principal of a government college relieving the petitioner, a civil servant, of his duties and directing him to report to the Director of Colleges. The petitioner alleged the action was illegal and without authority, while the respondents contended that the petitioner was a habitual absentee and guilty of misconduct. The core legal question was whether a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is maintainable regarding the transfer or relieving of a civil servant from a specific post. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable, as the matter pertained to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant. Consequently, the Court ruled that the exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Service Tribunal, and the writ jurisdiction is barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court emphasized that civil servants are subject to transfer and posting at the pleasure of their superiors and that principals have the authority to manage their institutions to maintain an appropriate academic atmosphere.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding the transfer or relieving of a civil servant from a specific post?
  • Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  • Does the pendency of a writ petition before a High Court automatically stay the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant?
  • Does a college principal have the authority to relieve a civil servant of their duties within the institution to maintain academic discipline?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farooq Chandio son of Fateh Khan Chandio and others vs The State2025 SHC 220 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-18
  pre-arrest bailabscondenceacquittal of co-accusedproclamationcriminal proceduretentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a pre-arrest bail application filed by the applicants in relation to Crime No. 29 of 2021, involving charges under Sections 302, 311, 201, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to pre-arrest bail despite being declared absconders, particularly given that a co-accused had already been acquitted on merits by the trial court in a judgment that remained unchallenged by the state. The Court held that the applicants were entitled to bail, reasoning that the acquittal of the co-accused on merits, the lack of medical evidence supporting the alleged injuries to police personnel, and the failure of the trial court to strictly follow the procedural requirements for proclamation under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 undermined the prosecution's case. The Court affirmed the principle that abscondence alone is not a sufficient ground to refuse bail when an accused has a strong case on merits, and that technical grounds should not override the entitlement to bail where no useful purpose would be served by incarceration.

  Questions settled

  • Does the abscondence of an accused automatically disentitle them to the grant of bail if they have a strong case on merits?
  • Can bail be granted to an accused when a co-accused has already been acquitted on merits in the same case?
  • Is the failure to follow the procedural requirements for proclamation under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a relevant factor in bail adjudication?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Fakhruddin vs Province of Sindh & others2025 SHC KHI 2011 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-07Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali soomro vs The State2025 SHC SUK 1619 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-16
  pre-arrest baildishonored chequeSection 489-F PPCnon-prohibitory clausefamily disputemala fidecriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a pre-arrest bail application filed by the accused in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving a dishonored cheque. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the allegations of a financial transaction gone wrong versus the applicant's defense of false implication due to a pre-existing family dispute. The Court observed significant inconsistencies in the prosecution's timeline, particularly regarding the date of the cheque and the alleged transaction, alongside evidence of ongoing matrimonial discord between the applicant and the complainant’s sister. Furthermore, the Court noted that the alleged source of the funds, the complainant's father, was not cited as a witness, creating an evidentiary gap. Holding that the offense did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court confirmed the bail. The key principle laid down is that where an offense is non-prohibitory, bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, especially when the prosecution's case is clouded by personal vendettas and evidentiary inconsistencies.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception for offenses not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a pre-existing family dispute between the parties constitute a valid ground to suspect mala fide in a criminal complaint under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a court grant pre-arrest bail when the prosecution fails to examine the alleged source of funds as a material witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali and another vs The State2025 YLR 532 · Sindh High Court · 2024-05-30
  criminal appealattempt to murderhouse trespassfirearm injurymedical evidencecorroborationminor contradictionsnatural witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under sections 324, 452, 336, 337-A(i), 506(ii), 504, 147, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 arising from an incident involving house-trespass and firearm injuries inflicted upon the complainant's brother due to a dispute over a love marriage. The core legal question addressed is whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt through natural eyewitness testimony corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence, and whether Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was rightly applied despite the absence of repeated gunfire. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that pressing the trigger of a firearm with intent to kill satisfies the ingredients of Section 324, and that minor discrepancies in testimony do not undermine a credible ocular account supported by medical evidence. The key principle laid down is that the rule of corroboration is one of abundant caution rather than a mandatory requirement where direct eyewitness testimony is unimpeachable, truthful, and corroborated by medical proof.

  Questions settled

  • Does pressing the trigger of a firearm satisfy the legal ingredients of an attempt to commit murder under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 even if the accused does not repeat the fire?
  • Can the testimony of injured and related eyewitnesses be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship to the complainant in the absence of mala fides?
  • What is the evidentiary significance of minor discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses when the ocular account is supported by medical evidence?
  • Is independent corroboration of direct evidence a mandatory rule or a rule of abundant caution in criminal trials?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Akbar Chandio vs The State2025 SHC LAR 1976 · Sindh High Court · 2025-07-30
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of the doubtfabricated arrestweapon recoveryocular testimonycontradictionsacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant for offences under sections 302(b) and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question before the Sindh High Court was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in light of material contradictions in the ocular account, dishonest improvements, an unverified medical report, and a demonstrably fabricated arrest and weapon recovery. The court held that multiple glaring discrepancies, including contradictions between eyewitness testimonies and the site sketch, an unauthorized medical officer conducting the postmortem, and undeniable proof of a prior arrest contradicting the alleged recovery date, rendered the prosecution's case unsafe for conviction. The ratio decidendi is that where the foundational elements of the prosecution case—such as the arrest and weapon recovery—are proven to be fabricated, and the ocular account is tainted by material contradictions and interested witnesses, the entire narrative collapses, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt. The court laid down the principle that a doubtful and manipulated investigation vitiates the prosecution case, requiring the immediate acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a demonstrably fabricated arrest and weapon recovery vitiate the entire prosecution case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when material contradictions exist between the ocular testimony and the site sketch prepared by the Tapedar?
  • What is the evidentiary value of eyewitness accounts that suffer from dishonest improvements and uncorroborated interested witnesses?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to associate independent witnesses from a busy public place create a reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs The State & 2 others2025 SHC SUK 1850 · Sindh High Court · 2025-07-11
  criminal revisiontransfer of criminal casejudicial biasfair trialapprehension of biasdue processcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Revision challenges an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Naushahro Feroze, which transferred a criminal case from the 2nd Civil Judge & Judicial Magistrate, Kandiaro, to the 1st Civil Judge & Judicial Magistrate, Kandiaro. The core legal question was whether a criminal trial, already at the evidence-recording stage, should be transferred based on unsubstantiated allegations of bias and the trial judge’s "no objection" to the transfer. The High Court held that the transfer order was unsustainable. It ruled that a judicial officer’s suggestion to parties to consider a compromise does not constitute bias or prejudice. Furthermore, a trial judge’s "no objection" to a transfer request does not relieve the Sessions Court of its duty to independently determine if a transfer is legally justified. The Court emphasized that mere apprehension of an adverse order, unsupported by cogent evidence, is insufficient to warrant a transfer. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the original trial court to proceed from the stage it had reached.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judicial officer's suggestion to parties to enter into a compromise constitute evidence of bias?
  • Can a Sessions Court transfer a criminal case based solely on the trial judge's no objection to the transfer?
  • Is a mere apprehension of an adverse judicial order a sufficient ground for the transfer of a criminal case?
  • Does a criminal revision lie against an order passed by a Sessions Court regarding a criminal transfer application?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs Ghulam Haider2025 LHC 5546 · Lahore High Court · 2025-09-12Read full judgment →
• Ghous Bux Pahore son of Khawand Bux vs The State2025 SHC LAR 1970 · Sindh High Court · 2025-07-31
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryoutraging modestyinterested witnessesbenefit of doubtcriminal forcefamily dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 354-A, 506/2, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alleging assault and an attempt to outrage the modesty of the complainant. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the allegations of false implication arising from pre-existing family and property disputes. The Court held that the case warranted further inquiry, thereby granting bail to the applicant. The Court reasoned that the essential ingredients of Section 354-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860—specifically the deliberate intent to disrobe or outrage modesty—were not clearly established, as the incident appeared to be a scuffle stemming from ongoing litigation. Furthermore, the Court noted the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the presence of interested witnesses, and the absence of medical evidence to corroborate the assault. The principle laid down is that where the prosecution's narrative is clouded by significant doubt, animosity, and lack of corroborative evidence, the benefit of doubt at the bail stage must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a scuffle arising from property disputes automatically satisfy the intent requirements of Section 354-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can bail be granted under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when there is an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and a history of litigation between the parties?
  • Is the absence of medical evidence a significant factor in determining whether a case requires further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghous Bux and 31 others vs Province of Sindh and others2025 SHC SUK 2105 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-27
  regularization of serviceswork-charged employeesrecovery of salarydue processdisciplinary proceedingsjudicial reviewcivil serviceretrospective regularization
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the Finance Department's orders directing the recovery of allegedly excess salary payments from the petitioners, who were former work-charged and contingency-paid employees regularized in the Public Health Engineering Department. The core legal questions were whether the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013 applied to these employees to justify retrospective recovery, and whether the Finance Department could unilaterally order such recoveries without disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013 explicitly excludes work-charged and contingency-paid employees from its scope, rendering the Finance Department’s reliance on it legally flawed. Furthermore, the Court ruled that any recovery of pecuniary loss from civil servants requires adherence to due process, specifically disciplinary proceedings under the Sindh Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1973. Unilateral recovery without affording an opportunity of hearing violates the constitutional right to a fair trial. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned recovery orders, allowing the department to initiate proper disciplinary proceedings if they seek to recover funds from in-service or retired employees, while prohibiting recovery from family pensions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013 apply to work-charged and contingency-paid employees?
  • Can the Finance Department unilaterally order the recovery of alleged excess salary payments from civil servants without conducting disciplinary proceedings?
  • Is a recovery order issued without affording an opportunity of hearing to the affected civil servant a violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can excess salary payments be recovered from the family pension of a deceased civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazi S/O Muhammad Khan vs The State2025 SHC 240 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-24
  post-arrest bailsodomyunnatural offencenon-compoundable offenceaffidavit of no objectionprohibitory clausemedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The present criminal bail application was filed on behalf of the applicant/accused seeking post-arrest bail in FIR No. 285 of 2024 registered under Section 377 and Section 377-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Sukhan, Malir, Karachi. The core legal questions involved whether a complainant's affidavit of no-objection in a non-compoundable heinous offence warrants bail, and whether the accused made out a case for post-arrest bail given the medical evidence and prima facie association with the crime. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that affidavits of no-objection filed by complainants carry no legal validity in non-compoundable heinous offences, that the medical and circumstantial evidence strongly implicated the accused within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that the grave nature of the offence and risk of tampering precluded the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an affidavit of no-objection submitted by a complainant in a non-compoundable heinous offence has legal validity for granting bail?
  • Does an offence under Section 377-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can post-arrest bail be granted when the accused is explicitly nominated in the FIR with a specific role and corroborated by medical evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazi Rehman vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB) through its2025 PHC 194 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ghazi Khan vs Province of Sindh & Others2025 SHC 712 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-28Read full judgment →
• Ghazi Khan Pathan & Marzak Khan vs The State2025 SCP 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-04-23
  constructive possessionnarcotics transportationofficial witnessesdriver liabilitypassenger acquittalsecret compartmentscontrol of narcotic substances
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition arises out of concurrent convictions under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, where a truck intercepted by excise police yielded narcotics hidden in secret compartments. The core legal questions involve the evidentiary value of official witnesses, the application of constructive possession to the driver of a vehicle carrying contraband, and the criminal liability of a front-seat passenger without proven knowledge or control. The Supreme Court held that official witnesses are competent unless mala fide is shown, that the driver of a vehicle is in constructive possession and presumed to have knowledge of concealed contraband especially when attempting to flee, but that a passenger merely sitting in the front cannot be convicted without independent evidence linking them to the illicit items. The Court laid down that vehicle drivers bear responsibility for narcotics found under their control, whereas mere passengers lacking possessory rights or awareness are entitled to acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of official excise witnesses hold evidentiary value in the absence of proven mala fides or enmity?
  • Is a vehicle driver legally presumed to have constructive possession and knowledge of contraband recovered from secret cavities within the vehicle?
  • Can a front-seat passenger be convicted for narcotics found concealed in a vehicle without evidence showing their knowledge or control?
  • Whether the benefit of concurrent running of sentences under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies when convictions arise out of the same transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazi Arab vs The State2025 SCP 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-07-22
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clauserule of consistencyconfessional statementcorroborationtentative assessmentcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a murder case registered under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal questions were whether the delay in FIR registration, the reliance on a co-accused's confession, and the principle of consistency warranted the grant of bail. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the delay in the FIR was sufficiently explained, and the petitioner's case was not at par with a co-accused who had been granted bail, thus rendering the rule of consistency inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court held that while a co-accused's confession requires independent corroboration at the bail stage, the recovery of the crime weapon and incriminating items on the petitioner's pointation provided sufficient prima facie evidence. The Court affirmed that where an offence falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and reasonable grounds exist to believe the accused committed the offence, bail should be refused absent exceptional circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of consistency apply when the role attributed to an accused is distinguishable from that of a co-accused who has been granted bail?
  • Can a confessional statement of a co-accused be used to deny bail if it is supported by independent incriminating material?
  • Does a delay in lodging an FIR automatically entitle an accused to the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Is a tentative assessment of incriminating material permissible at the bail stage for offences falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazi and Vindur by caste Mari vs The State2025 SHC 352 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-24
  post-arrest bailpolice encountermurderheinous offenceprompt FIRAnti-Terrorism Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed by applicants Ghazi and Vindur arising out of Crime No. 142 of 2023 registered at Police Station Tando Masti Khan, District Khairpur, for offences including murder and terrorism. The core legal question revolves around whether the applicants are entitled to post-arrest bail given their nomination in the FIR with a specific role of firing during an armed encounter with a police party, which resulted in the deaths of a police official and a private person, and injuries to another. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that the applicants were directly implicated in a heinous crime involving capital punishment, the FIR was lodged promptly ruling out deliberation, and sufficient material existed prima facie connecting them to the offence. The key principle laid down is that bail in heinous, non-bailable offences carrying capital punishment cannot be claimed as a right where direct roles, prompt FIR registration, and supporting forensic evidence prima facie link the accused to the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused nominated in a prompt FIR with a specific role of firing at a police party during an encounter is entitled to post-arrest bail for offences carrying capital punishment?
  • Does the prompt lodging of an FIR within hours of the incident eliminate the possibility of deliberation and false implication at the bail stage?
  • Is bail a matter of right in non-bailable offences involving heinous crimes where prima facie material connects the accused to the commission of the offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Gharibwal Cement Limited & another vs The Province of Punjab & others2025 LHC 4940 · Lahore High Court · 2025-07-04Read full judgment →
• Gabriel Francis vs The Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore2025 LHC 209 · Lahore High Court
  judicial misconductdismissal from servicebail on fake reportjudicial immunityextraneous considerationscontrol of narcotic substancesdisciplinary proceedingssubordinate judiciary
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal was filed under Section 5 of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act, 1991 against the notification imposing the major penalty of dismissal from service upon the appellant, an Additional District & Sessions Judge, following disciplinary proceedings for misconduct under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999. The core legal question was whether a judicial officer can be subjected to disciplinary action and major penalty for granting bail in a narcotics case by deviating from prescribed procedures and relying on a fake chemical examiner report for extraneous considerations. The court held that while judicial orders are protected when passed in good faith, absolute immunity does not apply when extraneous considerations, mala fide intent, and corruption are established on record. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the penalty of dismissal from service. The key principle laid down is that judicial immunity does not extend to orders tainted by corruption, collusion, or deliberate deviation from established legal procedures for extraneous motives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judicial officer enjoys absolute immunity from disciplinary action for judicial orders passed in violation of mandatory statutory procedures?
  • Does the protection afforded under the Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850 cover judicial acts tainted by mala fide and extraneous considerations?
  • Whether general reputation of corruption combined with proven procedural deviation in granting bail warrants the imposition of a major penalty upon a judicial officer?
  • Is an administrative authority bound by the recommendations of a hearing officer in departmental disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Frontier Holdings Limited through its Chief Executive, Islamabad and another (in both cases) vs Petroleum Exploration Pvt. Limited through its Chief Executive Officer, Islamabad (in both cases)2025 SCP 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-29
  foreign arbitral awardenforcement of foreign arbitral awardspro-enforcement biasintra-court appealinterim reliefarbitration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal arising from an intra-court appeal order passed by the Islamabad High Court, which suspended an interim relief granted by a Single Judge in aid of the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The core legal questions concern whether an intra-court appeal is maintainable against orders passed under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration, Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, and whether courts should maintain a pro-enforcement bias by granting interim protective measures during the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards without prematurely interfering under the New York Convention. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the questions raised and suspended the operation of the impugned order of the Division Bench, thereby restoring the interim restraining order passed by the Single Judge. The key principle laid down is that foreign arbitral awards enjoy a binding character under international law and domestic legislation, requiring courts to adopt a pro-enforcement bias and protect the integrity of the enforcement process through appropriate interim measures.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an intra-court appeal is maintainable against orders passed under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration, Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011?
  • Can courts grant interim protective measures in aid of the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award?
  • Whether a Division Bench of a High Court can interfere at the interim stage with the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award without satisfying the grounds of non-enforcement under the New York Convention?
  Read full judgment →
• Frequency Allocation Board vs Southern Network Limited & others2025 SHC 208 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-10Read full judgment →
• Fida Hussain and another vs The State and another2025 LHC 656 · Lahore High Court · 2025-02-28
  qatl-e-amdbenefit of doubtocular evidencemedical evidenceCCTV admissibilityconfession of co-accusedcriminal appealaccomplice testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for qatl-e-amd under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the ocular account, the admissibility of CCTV footage, and the evidentiary value of a co-accused's statement. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The court found significant discrepancies between the ocular account and medical evidence, particularly regarding the time of death and the number of injuries, rendering the eyewitnesses' presence doubtful. Furthermore, the court ruled that the CCTV footage was inadmissible for failing to meet established legal requirements for proof and authentication. The court also clarified that a statement made to police by a co-accused does not constitute a valid confession and cannot serve as substantive evidence against others. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellants, reiterating the principle that a single reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case entitles the accused to an acquittal as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Does a conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the time of death and injury count render the prosecution case doubtful?
  • Can a video recording or CCTV footage be admitted as evidence without complying with the specific authentication requirements laid down by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a statement made by a co-accused to the police constitute a valid confession that can be used as substantive evidence against other accused persons?
  • Is an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony sufficient to base a conviction upon?
  Read full judgment →
• Fida Hussain @ Saboo vs The State2025 SCP 110, 2025 SCMR 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-01-29
  sentence enhancementlife imprisonmentdeath penaltymitigating factorsSection 302(b) PPCcriminal appealjudicial discretionmiscarriage of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a High Court judgment that enhanced the appellant's sentence from life imprisonment to death for the murder of his wife. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in enhancing the sentence under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, despite the trial court having recorded reasons for the alternate sentence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its enhancement. The Court affirmed that Section 302(b) PPC prescribes two distinct, alternate legal sentences—death or life imprisonment—and neither is inherently 'normal.' The choice between them must be based on the facts and circumstances of each case. While Section 367(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 requires trial courts to record reasons for awarding life imprisonment, this does not mandate automatic enhancement by appellate courts. The power to enhance sentences must be exercised sparingly, only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice, and not merely because an appellate court would have imposed a harsher penalty. Consequently, the life imprisonment sentence was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Is the sentence of death the 'normal' penalty for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does Section 367(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require an appellate court to enhance a sentence if the trial court failed to record reasons for not awarding the death penalty?
  • What is the standard for an appellate court to exercise its power to enhance a sentence awarded by a trial court?
  • Are the punishments of death and life imprisonment under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 considered alternate legal sentences?
  Read full judgment →
• Feroz Khan vs The State2025 PHC 280 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-07-25
  hostile witnessArticle 150 Qanun-e-Shahadatcross-examinationretraction of statementconcessional statementcriminal revisionexamination-in-chief
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition assailed the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Bara Khyber, which had allowed the prosecution's application to declare its witness (PW-2) hostile after the defence had completed cross-examination. The High Court reviewed the provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 regarding examination of witnesses and declaring a witness hostile under Article 150. The core question was whether a prosecution witness can be declared hostile and subjected to cross-examination by the party calling him after the opposing party has already concluded cross-examination. The Court held that discretion under Article 150 must be exercised during examination-in-chief when the witness shows hostility or deviates from a previous statement. Once cross-examination by the defence is fully recorded, there is no concept of declaring the witness hostile merely due to concessions made or retraction during cross-examination. Distinguishing between hostility and retraction, the Court noted that a witness's testimony must be evaluated in its totality by the trial court. The revision petition was accepted and the impugned order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a prosecution witness be declared hostile under Article 150 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 after the defence has concluded cross-examination?
  • Does a witness's retraction or concession made during cross-examination automatically render the witness hostile?
  • How should the trial court evaluate and appreciate the evidence of a witness who has been declared hostile?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government2025 LHC 274 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad vs Muhammad Atiq-ur-Rehman and others2025 SCP 80, 2025 SCMR 790, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-05
  pay protectionFundamental Rule 22statutory autonomous bodycivil servantservice lawprecedentper incuriam
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil petition for leave to appeal against a Federal Service Tribunal (FST) judgment that granted pay protection to a former employee of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) upon his appointment to a government post. The core legal question was whether an employee of a statutory autonomous body, which utilizes Special Pay Scales rather than Basic Pay Scales, is entitled to pay protection under Fundamental Rule 22 upon joining government service. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the FST judgment. The Court held that employees of statutory autonomous bodies constitute a distinct category and cannot claim the benefit of Fundamental Rule 22, which is reserved for civil servants transferring between government posts. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the FST’s reliance on previous decisions was misplaced, as those were either in personam or ignored binding precedent. The key principle laid down is that statutory autonomous body employees are not entitled to pay protection under Fundamental Rule 22 when switching to government service, and lower tribunals are bound by Supreme Court precedents settling questions of law under Article 189 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of statutory autonomous bodies entitled to pay protection under Fundamental Rule 22 upon appointment to government service?
  • Does a judgment of the Supreme Court dismissing a petition on technical grounds constitute a binding precedent for future cases?
  • Is the decision of a tribunal rendered in ignorance of binding Supreme Court precedents considered per incuriam?
  • Can an employee of an autonomous body claiming pay protection rely on the equality clause to equate their status with contract employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Revenue Division & others vs Dewan Motors (Pvt) Ltd. and others2025 SCP 26, 2025 SCP 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-02-07
  Constitutional Benchjurisdictioncoram non judiceTwenty-sixth AmendmentSupreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act 2023Customs Act 1969judicial overreachcase fixation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the jurisdictional demarcation between the Regular Benches and the newly constituted Constitutional Benches of the Supreme Court of Pakistan following the Twenty-sixth Constitutional Amendment. The core legal question was whether civil petitions challenging the vires of Section 221-A(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Bench under Article 191A of the Constitution. The Court held that the Regular Bench lacked jurisdiction to hear these matters, as they involved the constitutionality of a law, a subject reserved for the Constitutional Bench. Consequently, the Court declared the orders passed by the Regular Bench on 13.01.2025 and 16.01.2025 to be coram non judice, recalled them, and held that any superstructure built upon such void orders must collapse. The judgment affirms that the Constitutional Bench has exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the interpretation of the Constitution, original jurisdiction under Article 184, and appellate jurisdiction under Article 185(3) regarding the constitutionality of laws, emphasizing that jurisdictional boundaries established by the Constitution cannot be bypassed by judicial orders or administrative errors in case fixation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Regular Bench of the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of a law after the insertion of Article 191A in the Constitution?
  • What is the legal effect of an order passed by a Bench of the Supreme Court that lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter?
  • Are the Committees constituted under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act 2023 and Article 191A of the Constitution the exclusive fora for determining the bench composition for specific categories of cases?
  • Does the doctrine of 'sublato fundamento cadit opus' apply to proceedings conducted by a Bench that lacked the requisite constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan & Another vs Premium Textile Mills Limited & 242025 SHC 110 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Federal Public Service Commission, through its Chairman, Islamabad vs Dr. Shumaila Naeem and Others2025 SCP 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  domicile changefemale civil servantdirect recruitmentservice lawgender equalityconstitutional interpretationcivil service quota
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the eligibility of a female civil servant to change her domicile to that of her husband for the purpose of 'direct recruitment' to a higher post, despite the general rule that domicile is frozen upon entry into service. The Supreme Court addressed whether such a change is permissible under service law. The Court held that while the domicile of a civil servant is generally frozen upon induction to maintain administrative stability and prevent manipulation, a gender-sensitive, purposive interpretation of the law—consistent with Article 25(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973—permits a one-time concession for female civil servants. Consequently, a female officer may exercise a one-time choice to adopt her husband's domicile for 'direct recruitment' to a higher post. The Court further clarified that 'direct recruitment' and 'initial recruitment' are functionally interchangeable, allowing in-service candidates to compete for such positions. This judgment emphasizes substantive equality and gender justice, ensuring that constitutional protections for women are integrated into service jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a female civil servant change her domicile to that of her husband during service for the purpose of direct recruitment?
  • Does the domicile of a civil servant freeze upon initial entry into government service?
  • Are the terms 'direct recruitment' and 'initial recruitment' interchangeable in Pakistani service law?
  • Do Sections 15 and 16 of the Succession Act, 1925 apply to Muslims regarding the automatic change of domicile upon marriage?
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• Federal Public Service Commission through its Secretary, Islamabad vs Kashif Mustafa and others2025 SCP 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-08
  intra-court appeallaw reforms ordinancelimitation and delayfrivolous litigationpublic bodiesabuse of processcosts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a time-barred petition filed by the Federal Public Service Commission against respondents, challenging previous judicial orders concerning the maintainability of an intra-court appeal. The core legal question addressed is whether an intra-court appeal is maintainable before the High Court when the governing statute of the original proceedings already provides an alternate remedy of appeal, revision, or review, and whether public bodies can file meritless and heavily delayed petitions without attracting penalties. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as hopelessly time-barred, frivolous, and vexatious, holding that the availability of an alternate statutory remedy bars an intra-court appeal under Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, irrespective of whether the remedy was actually availed. Furthermore, the Court established that public institutions cannot abuse judicial processes for bureaucratic self-preservation or risk-averse governance, imposing exemplary costs under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and mandating internal departmental accountability for initiating unwarranted litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the availability of an alternate remedy under a special statute bar the filing of an intra-court appeal before the High Court?
  • Whether an inordinate delay without sufficient cause warrants the dismissal of a petition filed by a public statutory body?
  • Can exemplary costs be imposed on public institutions for initiating frivolous and vexatious litigation?
  • What are the legal consequences when public bodies utilize judicial forums for bureaucratic self-preservation rather than legitimate legal redress?
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• Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through its Director2025 IHC 270 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• FBR through its Chairman and others vs President of Pakistan, and others2025 IHC 12, 2025 PLJ Islamabad 102 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-01-22Read full judgment →
• Fazul son of Eiddan Bharo vs The State2025 SHC SUK 536 · Sindh High Court · 2025-03-20
  criminal appealrecovery of armssafe custodyforensic science laboratoryreasonable doubtSection 342 Cr.P.C.acquittalpolice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under Section 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, for the alleged possession of illicit ammunition and magazines. The core legal questions concerned whether the prosecution proved the recovery beyond reasonable doubt, established the safe custody and transmission of the case property, and whether the trial court erred in relying on evidence not put to the accused during his examination. The High Court held that the prosecution case was riddled with fatal infirmities, including material contradictions between the complainant and the mashir regarding the incident's circumstances, failure to maintain proper Malkhana records, and an unexplained 26-day delay in transmitting the case property to the Forensic Science Laboratory. Furthermore, the court held that the FSL report could not be considered against the appellant as it was not put to him during his statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, affirming that a single reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Can an FSL report be considered against an accused if it was not put to them during their statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a failure to prove the safe custody and transmission of case property to the forensic laboratory entitle an accused to acquittal?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal if there is a single circumstance creating a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
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• Fazal Wahab and others vs The State2025 PCRLJ 103 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-10-11
  criminal revisionjoinder of chargesjoint trialcriminal breach of trustconsolidation of FIRssame transactionCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition, filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenges a trial court order that refused to consolidate charges against the petitioners in three separate FIRs. The core legal question was whether multiple FIRs, registered against the same accused for criminal breach of trust arising from a single inquiry and occurring within a twelve-month period, could be consolidated for a joint trial. The Peshawar High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the trial court’s order and directing the consolidation of the charges. The Court held that, pursuant to Section 222(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, offences of criminal breach of trust committed within a one-year period may be treated as a single offence. The Court established that where accused persons commit crimes jointly in the same transaction with continuity of intention, a joint trial is permissible under Sections 234 and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, emphasizing that the bifurcation of such charges would cause unnecessary prejudice to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can multiple FIRs involving the same accused and the same transaction be consolidated for a joint trial?
  • Does the limitation of three offences under Section 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to charges of criminal breach of trust?
  • Is a joint trial permissible when offences are committed within a twelve-month period and arise from the same inquiry?
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• Fazal Ullah son of Ghulam Ali Alavi and others vs Federation of Pakistan2025 SHC LAR 2177 · Sindh High Court · 2025-09-04Read full judgment →
• Fazal Khaliq vs The State2025 YLR 233 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-12-30
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtcommon intentionchain of custodyadverse inferencefirearms expert reportabscondencemurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for murder and attempted murder. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the establishment of common intention, the reliability of forensic evidence, and the proof of motive. The Peshawar High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant. The court held that where the prosecution fails to establish common intention, individual liability must be proven, which the prosecution failed to do. Furthermore, the court ruled that forensic reports are not corroborative evidence when the chain of custody is compromised by discrepancies in sealing and documentation. The court also applied Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding material witnesses. Emphasizing that any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right, the court concluded that abscondence alone is insufficient to prove guilt absent other reliable evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-production of a material eye-witness warrant an adverse inference against the prosecution under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the chain of custody for forensic evidence is compromised?
  • Is abscondence alone sufficient to prove the guilt of an accused in a criminal case?
  • Does the failure to prove common intention require the prosecution to establish the specific individual act of each accused?
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• Fazal Hanan & another vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary E & S Education & others2025 PHC 216 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Fayyaz Ahmed vs Learned Special Judge (Rent) and 2 others2025 LHC 4411 · Lahore High Court · 2025-06-16Read full judgment →