Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• M. Saeed Shahzad & Another, Qamar Shahzad vs Province of Sindh &2023 SHC 14 · Sindh High Court · 2023-02-01Read full judgment →
• M. Haroon Ashraf vs Dr. Fayyaz Ranjha and 9 others2023 YLR 767 · Lahore High Court · 2021-11-17Read full judgment →
• M. Hamad Hassan vs Mst. Isma Bukhari and 2 others2023 SCP 197, 2023 SCMR 1434, 2023 PLJ SC 593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-17
  Civil Petition for Leave to AppealConstitutional jurisdictionArticle 199 of the ConstitutionFamily lawDowerMaintenance allowanceDowry articlesFactual findingsScope of judicial reviewMisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition concerning a family court's decree for dower, maintenance, and dowry articles. The core legal question addressed was the permissible scope of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, specifically regarding its power to interfere with factual findings of lower courts. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court erred by adjudicating on facts in its constitutional jurisdiction, which is not meant to be a substitute for an appeal or revision. The Court reiterated that the High Court's role under Article 199 is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors and procedural improprieties, ensuring proper administration of justice, and not to re-examine or reconsider facts already decided by lower courts. Interference is permissible only on limited grounds such as misreading or non-reading of evidence, arbitrary orders, or patent errors of law/fact leading to a miscarriage of justice, but not to re-evaluate facts or substitute the appellate court's opinion. The legislature's intent for finality in family litigation after appellate court decisions was emphasized.

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• M Taimoor Ali vs The State through P.G. Punjab and another2023 SCP 371, 2024 SCMR 209, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-28
  criminal petitionwithdrawal of petitionfresh ground for bailalternate remedynomenclature of the court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order where the petitioner's counsel did not press the petition to approach the Supreme Court, mistakenly believing a fresh ground for bail required a withdrawal. The core legal question concerned the propriety of withdrawing a petition when a fresh ground for relief allegedly arises. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as withdrawn as the counsel opted to avail an alternate remedy, while reiterating the established legal position that if a fresh ground becomes available, counsel should insist on a decision on merits rather than withdrawing. Additionally, the Court observed that the use of the prefix 'august' before the Supreme Court is incorrect, emphasizing that the institution should be referred to strictly as the Supreme Court of Pakistan as designated in the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Should a petition be withdrawn when a fresh ground becomes available prior to the passing of an order?
  • Can a counsel insist on a decision on merits when a new ground for relief arises?
  • What is the correct constitutional designation of the Supreme Court of Pakistan without prefixes?
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• Lutf Ur Rehman and another vs The State and another2023 PCRLJ 1631 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-02-09
  free fightQatl Shibh-i-amddying declarationindividual liabilitycriminal appealcommon objectappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against a conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a dispute over landed property that resulted in a physical altercation and the subsequent death of the complainant. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, whether the incident constituted a free fight, and whether the conviction under section 302(b) was appropriate given the nature of the injuries and the weapons used. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove a common object, establishing instead that the incident was a free fight where individual liability must be assessed. The Court determined that the appellants lacked the specific intent to kill, as the weapons used and the nature of the injuries did not support a charge of premeditated murder. Consequently, the conviction was altered to Qatl Shibh-i-amd under section 316 and section 337-A(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principle laid down is that in cases of a free fight, individual criminal liability must be determined based on the specific role and injury caused by each accused, rather than joint liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does a dying declaration require corroboration to form the sole basis of a conviction?
  • Is a statement recorded by the police during investigation admissible as a dying declaration?
  • How is criminal liability determined in a case of a free fight?
  • Can a conviction under section 302(b) be altered to Qatl Shibh-i-amd if the intent to kill is not established?
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• Lucky Landmark (Pvt.) Ltd. and Another: In the matter of vs Not2023 CLD 639 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-02Read full judgment →
• Lt. Col. (Retd.) Nazar Hussain Islam vs Cooperative Societies Department2023 MLD 1638 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Lt. Col. (R) Muhammad Zubair vs Mst. Sughran Begum and another2023 CLC 1411 · Lahore High Court · 2022-12-16Read full judgment →
• lqbal Khan vs State2023 PHC 86 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-03-27Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Dawood Kukda vs Syed Hashim Raza and 2 others2023 CLC 237 · Sindh High Court · 2022-12-10Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Ali vs The State etc2023 LHC 1228, PLJ 2023 Cr.C. 814, 2024 YLR 1082 · Lahore High Court · 2023-03-29
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlpsychotropic substancesretrospective legislationex post facto lawcontinuing offenceketaminestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This post-arrest bail application concerns FIR No. 57/2022, registered under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, involving the alleged illegal transportation of ketamine. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s actions constituted an offence, specifically considering the timing of ketamine’s classification as a psychotropic substance and the constitutional protection against retrospective criminal punishment under Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Court dismissed the bail application, holding that while the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws prevents punishing past acts that were lawful at the time, the petitioner’s failure to comply with the Control of Narcotic Substances (Regulation of Drugs of Abuse, Controlled Chemicals, Equipment and Materials) Rules, 2001, regarding the transportation of psychotropic substances constitutes a continuing offence. The Court established that even if the initial import was protected, the subsequent transportation without a valid permit after the substance was legally classified as psychotropic violates Section 7 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. Penal statutes must be strictly construed, but continuing breaches of regulatory duties remain prospective in nature.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, protect an accused from prosecution for the transportation of a substance that was classified as psychotropic after its initial import?
  • Can the failure to maintain records or obtain permits for controlled substances under the Control of Narcotic Substances (Regulation of Drugs of Abuse, Controlled Chemicals, Equipment and Materials) Rules, 2001, be treated as a continuing offence?
  • Does the prohibition against ex post facto laws under Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, apply to procedural rules or only to substantive penal provisions?
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• Liaquat Ali vs State etc.PLJ 2023 Cr.C. 299 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-22
  criminal appealmurderchance witnessbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidencesolitary witnessmedical evidencecriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 302(b) and 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, rendered by the trial court. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the reliability of the eyewitnesses, who were classified as chance witnesses, and the corroborative value of medical and recovery evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the presence of the eyewitnesses at the scene, that the testimony of the solitary eyewitness lacked the necessary strong corroboration, and that various loopholes in the medical evidence, motive, and alleged recoveries created serious doubts in the prosecution story. Consequently, the court laid down the principle that the uncorroborated testimony of a chance witness cannot form the basis of a safe conviction on a capital charge, and that any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused as of right. The appeal was accepted, and the appellant was acquitted by giving him the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a chance witness can be relied upon for sustaining a conviction on a capital charge?
  • What is the legal evidentiary value of medical testimony in establishing the identity of an assailant in a criminal trial?
  • When is an adverse inference drawn against the prosecution under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 for withholding material witnesses?
  • Does a single circumstance creating a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution story entitle the accused to an acquittal?
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• Liaquat Ali Khan vs Muhammad Akram & another2023 PLJ SC 641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-07
  specific performancereadiness and willingnessagreement to sellequitable remedyburden of proofcontractual breachimmovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed the appellant’s suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell property. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff had established readiness and willingness to perform their contractual obligations, particularly the payment of the second installment. The Supreme Court, by a majority, affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving the availability of funds to meet the payment obligation. The Court reasoned that specific performance is an equitable remedy under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and is not granted automatically. Furthermore, the Court noted that the agreements contained no clause obliging the defendant to obtain a No Objection Certificate (NOC) before transfer, and the plaintiff failed to prove the defendant’s breach. The key principle laid down is that a plaintiff in a specific performance suit must affirmatively prove their financial readiness and willingness to perform essential terms, and equitable relief may be denied where the plaintiff fails to demonstrate such capacity or where equities favor the defendant.

  Questions settled

  • Does a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance bear the burden of proving the availability of funds to pay the sale consideration?
  • Is a court obligated to grant specific performance merely because the contract is lawful?
  • Does the failure of a seller to obtain a No Objection Certificate constitute a breach of contract where the agreement contains no such express obligation?
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• Liaqat Zarin and 5 others vs Mst. Noorul Haram and another2023 MLD 688 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-07-04Read full judgment →
• Liaqat University of Medical and Health Sciences (Lumhs) Jamshoro2023 SCP 387, 2024 PLJ SC 347, 2024 SCMR 443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-06
  medical admissionforged documentsprovisional admissionjudicial interferenceeducational institutionsclean hands doctrineacademic discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court order that set aside the cancellation of a student's admission to a medical university. The core legal question was whether a university is justified in cancelling a student's provisional admission upon discovering that the academic credentials submitted for admission were forged or fabricated. The Supreme Court held that the university acted lawfully in cancelling the admission, as the student had submitted a fake mark sheet, and the university's disciplinary actions were within its regulatory authority. The Court emphasized that educational institutions must maintain high standards and possess the autonomy to regulate admissions and discipline without judicial interference, provided no fundamental rights are violated. Furthermore, the Court invoked the principle that those seeking equitable relief must come with clean hands, noting that the student could not benefit from his own illegal act of submitting forged documentation. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and upheld the university's decision to cancel the admission.

  Questions settled

  • Can a university cancel a student's provisional admission upon discovering the submission of forged academic credentials?
  • To what extent should courts interfere in the internal disciplinary and administrative affairs of educational institutions?
  • Does the doctrine of clean hands preclude a student from seeking judicial relief when admission was secured through forged documents?
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• Liaqat Hussain vs Mohammad Ashiq2023 CLC 768 · Lahore High Court · 2022-12-28Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali vs The State2023 MLD 426 · Sindh High Court · 2021-11-26
  criminal appealmurder convictionocular evidencereasonable doubtinterested witnessesrecovery of weaponminor contradictions
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Ubauro, which convicted the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his relative and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given the defense's arguments regarding delayed FIR registration, the status of the witnesses as interested witnesses, and alleged material contradictions in the evidence. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution’s case was proven through consistent ocular testimony, corroborating medical evidence, and the recovery of the murder weapon at the appellant's instance. The Court affirmed that minor discrepancies in witness statements are inevitable and do not undermine the prosecution's case when the core evidence remains reliable and confidence-inspiring. Furthermore, the Court established that the testimony of relatives is admissible provided it is consistent and explains the occurrence, and that the prosecution is not required to provide photographic-like precision in witness depositions to secure a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in the registration of an FIR automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can the testimony of relatives of the deceased be relied upon as eyewitnesses in a murder trial?
  • Do minor contradictions in prosecution evidence warrant the acquittal of an accused?
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• Liaqat Ali vs National Accountability Bureau2023 YLR 637 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-03-26Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali vs Mst. Zulfat and others2023 YLR 1496 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-11-22Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali vs Chief Officer, Municipal Committee, Gojra and 2 others2023 CLC 1673 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-19Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali @ Bao. and others vs The State & another2023 LHC 6906, 2024 YLR 372 · Lahore High Court · 2023-05-30
  criminal appealmurder convictionbenefit of doubtchance witnesspost-mortem delaycircumstantial evidenceacquittalenhancement of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while the connected revision petition seeks enhancement of the sentence. The core legal question is whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly concerning the credibility of the alleged eyewitnesses and the established motive. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. It determined that the eyewitnesses were 'chance witnesses' who could not provide a credible reason for their presence at the crime scene. Furthermore, an unexplained ten-hour delay in the post-mortem examination indicated the fabrication of evidence and the procurement of fake witnesses. The Court also noted that the alleged motive, which targeted the complainant and witnesses, was inconsistent with the fact that they remained unharmed while the deceased was killed. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and dismissed the revision petition, reiterating that the benefit of doubt is a right, not a concession.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a chance witness admissible without independent corroboration or a justifiable reason for their presence?
  • Does a significant delay in conducting a post-mortem examination create a reasonable doubt regarding the authenticity of the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the alleged motive targets individuals who remain unharmed while the deceased is killed?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a legal right for an accused person?
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• Letter of Administration and Succession Certificate of the Estate Of (Late).2023 MLD 30 · Sindh High Court · 2021-09-20Read full judgment →
• Legal Aid Foundation for Victims of Rape and Sexual Assault (Lrsa)2023 PLD Islamabad 195 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-12-16Read full judgment →
• Lazar vs Director General-Hq Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority and 2 others2023 PLJ Karachi 67 · Sindh High Court · 2023-01-24
  writ jurisdictionmaintainabilitydisciplinary proceedingsservice matterCivil Aviation Authoritydismissal from servicenon-statutory rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the dismissal of the petitioner from service by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). The petitioner, a staff member, was dismissed following disciplinary proceedings for corruption, misconduct, and involvement in a fake employment scheme. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to interfere with the disciplinary actions of the CAA, given the nature of its service rules. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the Court determined that the Civil Aviation Authority does not operate under statutory service rules, and therefore, disputes regarding the termination of its employees are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that it would not substitute its own findings for those of the competent authority in such disciplinary matters, particularly where the petitioner had been afforded due process, including a show-cause notice and personal hearing. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the appropriate remedy for such grievances lies in a civil suit for damages rather than a constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable against the Civil Aviation Authority regarding the termination of an employee?
  • Does the Civil Aviation Authority operate under statutory service rules?
  • Can the High Court substitute its findings for those of the competent authority in disciplinary matters under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Lateef Ur Rehman S/O Fazal Ur Rehman vs The State, Akhtar Nawab S/O2023 PHC 502, 2025 YLR 312 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-11-29Read full judgment →
• Lashkar Ali vs Mst. Azizan Khatoon2023 SHC 443 · Sindh High Court · 2023-07-10Read full judgment →
• Land Acquisition Officer and another vs Syed Abdullah Shah and others2023 SHC 808 · Sindh High Court · 2023-10-12Read full judgment →
• Land Acquisition Officer (Ac) Nawabshah and others vs Haji Ghulam Nabi2023 SHC 1178 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Land Acquisition Collector & others vs Shah Youm Khan2023 PHC 74, 2024 CLC 454 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-01-30Read full judgment →
• Lal Zaman vs Farhad Ali2023 PHC 117 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-02-14Read full judgment →
• Lal Zada vs Bakht Afsar and others2023 PHC 558, 2024 MLD 839 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-10-02Read full judgment →
• Lal Muhammad vs The State2023 YLR 395 · Sindh High Court · 2021-03-17
  Qatl-e-Amddeath sentence confirmationocular testimonyinterested witnessesmedical evidencerecovery of weaponcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal jail appeal and confirmation case arise from a judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Shahdadkot, convicting the appellant Lal Muhammad under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the Qatl-e-Amd of his wife and minor daughter, sentencing him to death on two counts, which was referred to the Sindh High Court for confirmation. The core legal question involved the appreciation of direct ocular testimony supported by medical evidence, recovery of the crime weapon, and circumstantial evidence against the appellant's plea of false implication. The High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent and trustworthy eye-witness testimony, corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of the blood-stained dagger. The court laid down the principle that the evidence of related or interested witnesses cannot be discarded where it is consistent, reliable, and corroborated by independent medical and recovery evidence, and that minor discrepancies do not vitiate an otherwise solid prosecution case. The conviction and death sentence were accordingly upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of related and interested eye-witnesses be relied upon without independent corroboration if it is found consistent and trustworthy?
  • Whether minor contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses are sufficient to create doubt in an otherwise proven case?
  • Does the failure of an accused to offer a plausible explanation under Section 342 Cr.P.C. support the prosecution's case?
  • Is a death sentence justified where a person commits double murder of close family members inside his own house?
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• Lal Muhammad and another vs The State and another2023 YLR 1754 · Sindh High Court · 2022-04-18
  narcotics recoverycharassafe custodychemical examiner reportburden of proofconscious possessioncriminal appealCNSA 1997
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under sections 6/9(C) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for possessing 176 kilograms of charas concealed in secret shelves of a truck. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully established the safe custody and transmission of the recovered narcotics, whether the evidence of police witnesses was credible without independent corroboration, and whether the appellants discharged the burden of proof regarding their defence of false implication. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt through an unbroken chain of custody, prompt deposit of samples, and corroborating independent evidence, while the appellants failed to substantiate their plea of false implication or displace the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The court affirmed the conviction and dismissed the appeal, laying down the principle that once the prosecution establishes physical custody and safe transmission of narcotics, the burden shifts to the accused under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and Article 121 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 to prove their innocence by preponderance of probability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in sending narcotic samples to the chemical examiner vitiates the trial when safe custody and intact seals are duly proved?
  • Does the testimony of police officials require mandatory independent corroboration to sustain a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • How does the statutory burden of proof under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 apply when an accused raises a plea of false implication?
  • Whether failure to cross-examine prosecution witnesses on crucial aspects like conscious possession and identity of case property establishes the truth of those facts?
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• Lal Jan vs The State2023 SCMR 1009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-01
  narcotics recoverychain of custodyforensic science laboratorybenefit of doubtcriminal appealsafe transmission
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner Lal Jan impugned the judgment of the Peshawar High Court which dismissed his appeal against conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, resulting in a sentence of 25 years simple imprisonment and a fine. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the case and noted a fatal flaw in the prosecution's evidence: the police constable responsible for transmitting the sample parcels to the Forensic Science Laboratory was never produced at trial to establish safe transmission, leaving an unexplained gap in the chain of custody. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that failure to prove safe custody and transmission of narcotics samples creates a serious doubt in the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the impugned judgment, and acquitted the appellant on the benefit of doubt. The key principle laid down is that non-production of the official who transmitted narcotics samples to the laboratory breaks the chain of safe custody, entitling the accused to the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce the official who transported narcotics samples to the forensic laboratory break the chain of custody?
  • Can an accused be acquitted of a narcotics offense when the safe transmission of the recovered substance is not established?
  • Does the non-production of the courier constable entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
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• Lal Bux S/o Shafi Muhammad Brohi vs State2023 SHC 421 · Sindh High Court · 2023-06-22
  narcotics possessionchain of custodysafe custodychemical examiner reportcriminal appealacquittalControl of Narcotics Substances Act 1997
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for the possession of narcotics under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established an unbroken chain of safe custody and transmission of the recovered narcotics, which is a prerequisite for a valid conviction. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody. Key lapses included the failure to examine the Malkhana In-Charge, the absence of the person who transported the samples to the laboratory, the lack of a road certificate, and an unexplained four-day delay between the samples leaving the Malkhana and reaching the chemical examiner. Furthermore, the Malkhana register was not produced. The court emphasized that the chain of custody is vital; any break in this chain renders the chemical examiner's report unreliable. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant, establishing that safe custody is a fundamental ingredient for conviction in narcotics cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in the transmission of narcotics samples to the chemical laboratory vitiate the prosecution's case?
  • Is the examination of the Malkhana In-Charge necessary to establish the chain of safe custody in narcotics cases?
  • What is the legal consequence of a broken chain of custody regarding the reliability of a chemical examiner's report?
  • Can a conviction under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997 be sustained if the prosecution fails to produce the Malkhana register?
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• Lal Bux and 2 others vs Government of Sindh through Executive District2023 PLD Sindh 44 · Sindh High Court · 2022-03-04Read full judgment →
• Lal Bux alias Lal vs The State2023 YLR 321 · Sindh High Court · 2022-04-20
  narcoticsCNS Actchain of custodysafe transitchemical examiner reportbenefit of doubtpolice witnessescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for alleged possession of charas. The core legal questions involved the reliability of police testimony without independent association in a populated area, the consequence of a delay in sending samples to the chemical examiner, and the legal effect of a broken chain of custody. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the safe custody and safe transmission of the recovered narcotics due to an unexplained nine-day delay before reaching the laboratory, rendering the chemical examiner's report unreliable. Furthermore, the failure to associate independent witnesses from a public place during recovery cast serious doubt on the prosecution's case. The court laid down the principle that an unbroken chain of custody is essential for relying on a chemical examiner's report under the CNS Act, and any reasonable doubt arising from lapses in investigation entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in transmitting recovered narcotic samples to the office of the Chemical Examiner vitiate the conviction if safe custody is not established?
  • Is the failure to associate independent private witnesses from a populated vicinity during a street recovery fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • What is the legal effect of a broken chain of custody on the evidentiary value of a Chemical Examiner's report under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • How many circumstances creating a reasonable doubt are required to entitle an accused to an acquittal as a matter of right?
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• Lakson Tobacco Company Limited and others vs NWFP through Secretary2023 PLJ SC 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  tobacco development cessfiscal statute interpretationlegislative competenceprovincial taxationultra virestobacco quotaregulatory fee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a Peshawar High Court judgment upholding the validity of the Tobacco Development Cess levied under the North West Frontier Province Finance Act, 1999. The appellants challenged the levy on grounds of legislative competence, arguing that the Province lacked authority to tax tobacco, and contended that the term 'tobacco quota' used in the Act was vague, rendering the tax unenforceable. The Supreme Court addressed whether the levy was unconstitutional, whether the legislative field was occupied by Federal law, and whether the fiscal statute suffered from fatal ambiguity. The Court held that the levy was constitutional, reaffirming that the Provincial Assembly has the prerogative to impose such a cess for development purposes within the province. It further held that the term 'tobacco quota' was sufficiently clear when read in the context of the regulatory framework governing tobacco purchases. The Court affirmed the principle that fiscal statutes should be saved rather than destroyed where possible, and that the cess, being in the nature of a fee, was validly imposed for the benefit of the industry and growers.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Tobacco Development Cess levied under the North West Frontier Province Finance Act, 1999, unconstitutional?
  • Does the term 'tobacco quota' in the North West Frontier Province Finance Act, 1999, provide a sufficiently certain basis for the levy of a cess?
  • Can a provincial legislature impose a development cess on tobacco production without encroaching on federal legislative domains?
  • Is a levy that is collected for a specific development purpose in the nature of a fee rather than a tax?
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• Lakson Tobacco Company Limited and others vs NWFP through Secretary2023 SCMR 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-13
  tobacco development cessprovincial fiscal powerfee versus taxstrict construction of fiscal statutesconstitutional petitiontobacco quota
  Summary & questions settled

  These four appeals assail a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the levy of the tobacco development cess introduced under the North West Frontier Province Finance Act, 1999. The core legal questions involved the constitutionality of the cess, whether it encroached upon the Federal legislative domain, whether fiscal statutes were void for vagueness regarding the taxable event and taxpayer, and whether the reference to a tobacco quota fixed by the Pakistan Tobacco Board was unceasingly enforceable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the tobacco development cess is in the nature of a fee rather than a tax, as the proceeds are specifically utilized for the development of tobacco-growing areas and the benefit of stakeholders, and that its imposition by the Provincial Assembly is constitutionally valid. The key principle laid down is that fiscal levies exacted for a specific regulatory or developmental purpose conferring a direct advantage to the payers constitute a fee within the Provincial legislative competence, and fiscal statutes must be construed fairly to give effect to the legislative intent without defeating operational provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the levy of a tobacco development cess by a Provincial Assembly is ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does a development cess levied for specific developmental services in a particular sector qualify as a fee rather than a tax?
  • Can a fiscal statute be declared void for vagueness when it references targeted requirements or quotas established under regulatory rules?
  • Does the imposition of a provincial tobacco development cess conflict with federal legislative domains under the Federal Legislative List?
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• Lahore Tax Bar Association vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2023 LHC 6550, PTCL 2024 CL. 26, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 310, 2024 PTD 281 · Lahore High Court · 2023-12-18
  Appellate Tribunal Inland RevenueMustafa Impex doctrinejudicial tribunalde facto doctrineappointment rulesconstitutional validityreading down doctrinemerit-based recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Lahore Tax Bar Association, challenged the constitutional validity of Section 130 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020. The core legal questions concerned whether the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) is a judicial tribunal, the validity of appointments made on a contract basis against permanent posts, and the constitutional authority of the Prime Minister to frame rules and make appointments independently of the Federal Cabinet. The Court held that the ATIR is a judicial tribunal and that executive authority vests exclusively in the Federal Cabinet, not the Prime Minister individually. Consequently, the Court read down the term 'Prime Minister' in Section 130(2) to 'Federal Government' and declared the 2020 Appointment Rules ultra vires for lack of Cabinet approval. Invoking the de facto doctrine, the Court allowed existing incumbents to continue temporarily while mandating the promulgation of new, transparent rules within thirty days and the completion of fresh recruitment within forty-five days thereafter, emphasizing that appointments to permanent posts must follow a competitive, merit-based process.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue a judicial or administrative tribunal?
  • Can the Prime Minister unilaterally exercise statutory powers assigned to the Federal Government without Cabinet approval?
  • Are appointments to permanent posts on a contract basis legally permissible?
  • Can the doctrine of reading down be applied to save the constitutionality of a statutory provision?
  Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority through Director General and Director Land2023 MLD 2118 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-02Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority and another vs D.G. Khan Cement2023 MLD 11 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-24Read full judgment →
• Laeeq Ahmad vs Addl. District Judge, Kasur, etc2023 LHC 2301 · Lahore High Court · 2023-04-20Read full judgment →
• Kse Stockbrokers Association and 63 others vs Chairman, Securities And Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Secp) and others2023 CLD 181 · Sindh High Court · 2022-04-13Read full judgment →
• Kohat Cement Factory Limited vs Law Parliamentary Affairs & Human Right2023 PHC 18 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Kohat Cement Factory Limited through Assistant Manager vs Law, Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights Department, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary and 4 others2023 PLD Peshawar 82 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-01-26Read full judgment →
• Kishwar Khan and 3 others vs Jan Afroza (Widow) and others2023 YLR 254 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-05-26Read full judgment →
• Kishanchand and others vs Syed Mohammad Zulfiqar Naqvi and others2023 YLR 261 · Sindh High Court · 2022-01-12Read full judgment →
• Kiramat Khan vs Ig, Frontier Corps and others2023 SCMR 866 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-18
  condonation of delaylimitationSection 14 Limitation Actvoid orderFederal Service TribunalFrontier Corpsdue diligencegood faith
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal in limine as time-barred. The core legal questions pertained to whether the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for pursuing a remedy before a wrong forum, whether delay in filing a departmental appeal could be condoned without a formal application, and whether the law of limitation applies to an allegedly void order. The Supreme Court held that since the law regarding the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal for Frontier Corps employees was settled in 2004, the petitioner failed to show due diligence or good faith in approaching the High Court. Furthermore, limitation runs even against a void order, and every day of delay must be explained with a valid application for condonation. Finding no question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is a litigant entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 when pursuing a remedy before a wrong forum despite settled law regarding jurisdiction?
  • Does the law of limitation apply to an order that is alleged or claimed to be void?
  • Can delay in filing a time-barred departmental or service appeal be condoned without a formal application explaining each day's delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Revenue Authority (Kpra) through Director General, Peshawar vs M_s. Legacy Pharmaceutical (Pvt.) Limited, Peshawar Appeal_ Sales Tax Reference No. 58-P of 2022PTCL 2023 CL. 413 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Revenue Authority (Kpra) through Director General, Peshawar vs Messrs Legacy Pharmaceutical (Pvt.) Limited, Peshawar2023 PTD 56 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-10-28Read full judgment →
• Khursheed Ahmed Uqabi and 2 others vs Talib Hussain and 13 others2023 PLD High Court (AJK) 79 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2023-01-23Read full judgment →
• Khursheed Ahmad and 3 others vs Province of Punjab through Collector2023 PLD Lahore 245 · Lahore High Court · 2022-07-06Read full judgment →
• Khurram Shehzad vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad and another2023 PLD Federal Shariat Court 286 · Federal Shariat Court · 2023-02-07
  KhulaFamily Courts ActFederal Shariat Courtdissolution of marriageconsent of husbandrepugnant to injunctions of Islamreconciliationirrevocable divorce
  Summary & questions settled

  This Shariat Petition filed before the Federal Shariat Court challenged the constitutionality and validity of Section 10(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, on the ground that the grant of Khula by a court without the husband's consent is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. The core legal question was whether a family court can decree a dissolution of marriage through Khula without the husband's consent when reconciliation efforts fail. The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that courts of competent jurisdiction are empowered to dissolve marriages through Khula upon failure of reconciliation, even without the husband's consent. The court reaffirmed its earlier Full Bench ruling in Saleem Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2014 FSC 43), clarifying the legal nature and effect of Khula under Islamic law, including its operation as a single irrevocable divorce and the distinction between Talaq and Khula.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 10(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 violate the injunctions of Islam by permitting Khula without the husband's consent?
  • Can a court of competent jurisdiction decree Khula when reconciliation efforts fail and the husband does not agree to the divorce?
  • What is the legal effect of Khula under Islamic law regarding its operation as an irrevocable divorce and the requirement of Halala?
  Read full judgment →
• Khurram Shahzad vs Zeeshan Nawaz, etc2023 LHC 3780, 2023 PLJ Lahore 719, 2025 YLR 13 · Lahore High Court · 2023-06-16Read full judgment →
• Khurram Shahzad vs Province of Punjab through Deputy Commissioner2023 PLC (C.S.) 1375 · Lahore High Court · 2022-07-06
  government accommodationallotment policyvested rightcivil revisionspecific reliefvoid ab initiotenancy-at-will
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a serving police official holding the rank of Superintendent of Police, filed a civil revision assailing concurrent judgments of the courts below which dismissed his suit for declaration and permanent and mandatory injunction against the withdrawal of the allotment of a government-owned residence in Lahore. The core legal questions involved whether a police official, not belonging to the cadre of the Services and General Administration Department, is eligible for the allotment of government accommodation under the Punjab Government Residences Allotment Policy, 2021 and whether such an allotment, being void ab initio, confers any vested right of occupation. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner was ineligible for the allotment from the outset under both the applicable 1997 policy and the 2021 Allotment Policy, rendering the initial allotment void and making him an occupant at will liable to eviction. The Court laid down the principle that government servants have no vested legal right to residential accommodation, that an authority competent to issue an order possesses the inherent power to rescind or recall it, and that a grace period for policy transitions does not cure an allotment that was illegal from its inception.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a police official not belonging to the cadre of the Services and General Administration Department is eligible for the allotment of government residential accommodation under the Punjab Government Residences Allotment Policy, 2021?
  • Does a government servant have a vested legal right or claim to the allotment of government-owned residential accommodation?
  • Whether the grace period provided for existing allotments under an allotment policy covers an allotment that was illegal and void ab initio from its inception?
  • Can an authority vested with the jurisdiction to pass an order rescind or recall the same under the General Clauses Act 1956?
  • Does the occupation of a government residence by an allottee amount to a tenancy-at-will terminable by the State at any time without cause shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Khurram Mughal through duly Constituted Attorney vs Mrs. Naureen2023 CLD 905 · Sindh High Court · 2022-12-12Read full judgment →
• Khurram Imtiaz vs Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad and 3 others2023 PCRLJ 640 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-12-07
  writ petitionconcealment of factsclean hands doctrineregistration of FIRabuse of processfalse affidavitsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 impugned an order of the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing a petition under Section 22-A/B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the registration of an FIR against respondents. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to constitutional relief and the registration of a criminal case despite concealing material facts, filing multiple overlapping petitions across different forums, and submitting false affidavits and certificates. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition with special costs, holding that a litigant who approaches the court with unclean hands, conceals facts, and abuses the judicial process through multiple vexatious proceedings forfeits the right to discretionary and equitable relief under constitutional jurisdiction. The court laid down the principle that discretionary constitutional remedies are denied to litigants who engage in misrepresentation and abuse court processes, and directed initiation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner for submitting false affidavits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner who conceals material facts and files multiple overlapping petitions is entitled to discretionary relief under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained when the petitioner has given false certificates and submitted false affidavits before the courts of law?
  • Whether the High Court can impose special costs on a litigant for exhibiting reprehensible and contemptuous conduct by abusing the judicial process?
  Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bakhsh and another vs The State2023 MLD 1983 · Lahore High Court · 2022-11-14
  abatement of appealdeath of appellantcriminal appealdeath sentenceservice benefitslex foriSection 544-A CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal filed by a convict against his conviction and death sentence, which remained pending before the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the appeal abates upon the death of the appellant, and if legal heirs possess the right to continue the proceedings to preserve the deceased's service benefits. The Court held that the appeal stands abated pursuant to Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It clarified that while an appeal against a sentence of fine may survive, compensation awarded under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, does not constitute a fine. The Court affirmed the principle of lex fori, noting that jurisdiction is conferred by domestic law, not foreign precedents. It established that the death of an accused results in the abatement of criminal proceedings ab initio, effectively nullifying the conviction. Consequently, the Court ruled that legal heirs cannot continue the appeal to secure service benefits, as death terminates both criminal and departmental inquiries, and the murder reference was answered in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal appeal abate upon the death of the appellant under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Can legal heirs continue a criminal appeal after the death of the appellant to secure service benefits?
  • Does compensation awarded under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, constitute a fine for the purposes of abatement?
  • Does the death of a civil servant during the pendency of a criminal appeal terminate pending departmental inquiries?
  Read full judgment →
• Khemchand son of Bheru Mal, Bheru Mal/legal heirs vs The State2023 SHC 934 · Sindh High Court · 2023-10-12
  murdercapital punishmentmitigating circumstancejudicial confessioninterested witnessunproven motivecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his real brother and sentencing him to death, along with a compensation order under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular evidence from related and interested witnesses, the voluntariness and admissibility of a retracted judicial confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the impact of an unproven motive on the quantum of sentence. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent ocular testimony, medical evidence, and a voluntary confession, maintaining the conviction. However, regarding the sentence, the Court held that the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive serves as a mitigating circumstance sufficient to commute the death penalty to imprisonment for life. The key principle laid down is that while related eyewitness testimony and judicial confessions can sustain a murder conviction, an unproven motive acts as a mitigating factor warranting the lesser alternative sentence of life imprisonment instead of capital punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sole evidence of related or interested eyewitnesses is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder when corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence?
  • Can a retracted judicial confession be legally admissible and relied upon for awarding a conviction if found to be voluntary?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive operate as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether an unproven motive not put to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be used against him for awarding capital punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawar Mumtaz, etc vs Deputy Commissioner, etc2023 LHC 791 · Lahore High Court · 2023-03-07Read full judgment →
• Khawar Mehmood vs Gul Faraz Ahmed and another2023 IHC 342 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-11-22
  Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005criminal complaintlocus standiattorneyactus reusmens realawful authorityacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a conviction under Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, wherein the appellant was sentenced to three years imprisonment for allegedly grabbing a plot. The core legal questions were whether criminal proceedings can be initiated through an attorney and whether the appellant’s actions satisfied the statutory requirements for illegal dispossession. The Islamabad High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and acquitting the appellant. The Court held that criminal proceedings cannot be initiated through an attorney, as the law requires a complainant to have personal knowledge of the offence. Furthermore, the Court established that an offence under Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, requires proof of both actus reus and mens rea, specifically that the accused entered the property without lawful authority to dispossess the owner or occupier. Because the appellant was initially authorized by the owner to occupy the property, the essential ingredients for the offence were absent. Consequently, the Court ruled that the complainant, not being the owner or occupier, lacked the standing to initiate these proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be initiated through an attorney?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • Does a person who is neither the owner nor the occupier of a property have the standing to file a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • Is an accused who enters a property with the owner's permission liable for illegal dispossession under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Zakir-ur-din & 03 others vs Province of Sindh and Others2023 SHC 168 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-06
  quo warrantopublic appointmentmerit-based recruitmentconstitutional petitionad-hoc appointmentSindh Employees' Social Security Institutecivil service rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199(1)(b)(ii) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking a writ of quo warranto against private respondents holding positions as Paramedical Staff within the Sindh Employees' Social Security Institute (SESSI). The petitioner challenged the extension of these appointments, alleging they were made without advertisement, based on political influence, and in violation of a prior restraining order issued by the Court in CP No.D-5196/2017. The core legal question concerned the validity of contingent, stop-gap appointments made by the respondent institution. The Court, upon reviewing the matter and the precedent set in CP No.D-5196/2017, held that all appointments must adhere to a fair, competitive process on open merit, in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. The Court disposed of the petition by directing the respondents to avoid filling posts on a contract or ad-hoc basis, mandating that recruitment for BPS-1 to BPS-15 posts be conducted through open advertisement and regular service modes, ensuring compliance with the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 and relevant recruitment rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether appointments to public office made without advertisement and competitive process are sustainable under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the Court have the authority to mandate that government recruitment for BPS-1 to BPS-15 be conducted through open merit and regular service?
  • Are public appointments on a contract or ad-hoc basis permissible in light of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules 1974?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja vs Abdur Razzaq & others2023 PHC 604 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-11-02Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Tariq Siddiq vs Chairman, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.2023 MLD 611 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-29Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Muhammad Azam vs Azad Government of The State of Jammu &2023 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 103 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2023-03-07Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Izharul Hasan and others vs Province of Sindh and others2023 SHC 329 · Sindh High Court · 2023-05-22Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Izhar-ul-Hassan and 3 others vs Province of Sindh and 8 others2023 CLC 1296 · Sindh High Court · 2023-05-22Read full judgment →
• Khateeb Hussain and others vs State and othersPLJ 2023 Cr.C. 857 · Lahore High Court · 2023-02-21
  qatl-i-amdanti-terrorism actdeath sentence confirmationdefinition of terrorismabetmentocular accountbenefit of the doubtpost-mortem examinationyoung age mitigating circumstance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and capital sentence reference arise from the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court, Bahawalpur, convicting the appellants for the murder of an associate professor and vice-principal of a college. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the crime constituted terrorism under the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997, and whether abetment was established against the co-accused. The Lahore High Court held that the ocular testimony, corroborated by medical evidence and prompt registration of the FIR, firmly established the guilt of the primary appellant for premeditated murder. However, the Court ruled that a personal vendetta or private crime does not constitute 'terrorism' merely because it creates fear or shock in society, unless the specific statutory intent or mens rea of terrorism is proven. Consequently, convictions under the Anti-terrorism Act were set aside for the main appellant, though his death sentence under the Pakistan Penal Code was maintained. Regarding the co-accused charged with abetment and glorification, the Court found the evidence insufficient and granted him the benefit of the doubt, resulting in his acquittal. The key principles laid down emphasize that private crimes driven by personal motives do not qualify as terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997, and that young age alone does not constitute a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence in brutal murder cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does a brutal murder committed out of personal annoyance or private vendetta qualify as an act of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Whether young age of an accused by itself constitutes a sufficient mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Can a conviction for abetment be sustained when eyewitnesses admit to having no personal knowledge or evidence of instigation by the accused?
  • Does the creation of fear, shock, or insecurity in society automatically transform a private crime into an act of terrorism without proof of statutory mens rea?
  Read full judgment →
• Khanzada Muhammad Rafique Khan vs Hussain-Ur-Rehman and 462023 YLR 74 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-05-09Read full judgment →
• Khan Zada and one another vs The State2023 PHC 157, 2024 MLD 1645 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-03-06Read full judgment →
• Khan Wazir and others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secratery Revenue and others2023 PHC 42 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khan vs Sheen Gul2023 PHC 293 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-06-08Read full judgment →
• Khan Afsar vs Mst. Qudrat Jan widow and others2023 PLJ SC 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-10
  redemption of mortgagelimitation periodmortgagor and mortgageeconcurrent findingssupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from concurrent findings of three courts below and revenue authorities regarding a property dispute involving the redemption of a mortgaged property. The core legal question centered on the commencement of the sixty-year period of limitation for a mortgagor to redeem a mortgaged property under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908, specifically whether limitation begins from the date of the mortgage creation or from the expiry of the fixed term of the mortgage. The Supreme Court held that where a mortgage is for a fixed term, the right of redemption and the consequent sixty-year limitation period accrue only upon the expiry of that fixed term, rather than from the date of creation. The Court laid down the principle that the commencement of the limitation period for redemption depends strictly on the terms of the mortgage agreement regarding fixed dates or periods, and where a twenty-year term was fixed, limitation commenced upon the expiration of that twenty-year period. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • When does the period of limitation for a mortgagor to redeem a mortgaged property commence under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Does the limitation period for redeeming a mortgage start from the date of the mortgage creation or from the expiry of the fixed term of the mortgage?
  • What is the starting point of limitation for redemption when a specific date is fixed for payment of the mortgage debt?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Afsar vs Mst. Qudrat Jan widow and others, Abdul Latif and others2023 SCP 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-10
  mortgage redemptionlimitation periodaccrual of cause of actionfixed term mortgageconcurrent findingsproperty law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the limitation period for a redemption suit of mortgaged property. The core legal question was whether the sixty-year limitation period under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908, commences from the date of the mortgage's creation or from the expiry of the fixed term of the mortgage. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action for redemption accrues only when the right to redeem becomes exercisable under the terms of the mortgage agreement. The Court clarified that where a mortgage has a fixed term, the limitation period begins upon the expiry of that term, not the date of the mortgage's creation. Applying this principle, the Court found that since the twenty-year mortgage term expired in 1955, the respondents' suit filed in 2010 was well within the sixty-year limitation period. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, finding no illegality in the lower courts' concurrent findings, and affirmed that the commencement of limitation depends strictly on the specific terms of the mortgage agreement.

  Questions settled

  • When does the limitation period for a suit for redemption of mortgaged property commence under Article 148 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the limitation period for redeeming a mortgage with a fixed term begin from the date of the mortgage's creation or the expiry of the term?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts in a property dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Afsar vs Mst. Qudrat Jan (widow) and others2023 PLD Supreme Court 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-10
  mortgage redemptionlimitation periodfixed-term mortgageaccrual of cause of actionimmovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the limitation period for a suit for redemption of mortgaged property. The core legal question was when the sixty-year limitation period under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908, commences for a mortgage with a fixed term. The petitioner argued limitation began from the date of the mortgage creation, while the respondents contended it began upon the expiry of the mortgage term. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action for redemption accrues only when the right to redeem arises under the terms of the mortgage agreement. Consequently, where a mortgage has a fixed term, the limitation period commences upon the expiry of that term, not the date of the mortgage's creation. Applying this principle, the Court found the respondents' suit was filed within the sixty-year limitation period following the expiry of the twenty-year mortgage term. The Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, dismissing the petition and refusing leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • When does the limitation period commence for a suit for redemption of a mortgage with a fixed term?
  • Does the limitation period for redeeming a mortgage run from the date of the mortgage's creation or the expiry of the mortgage term?
  • Is a suit for redemption of mortgaged property maintainable if filed within sixty years of the expiry of the fixed mortgage term?
  Read full judgment →
• Khamiso vs The State2023 PCRLJ 908 · Sindh High Court · 2020-10-07
  statement of accusedsection 342 Cr.P.Cincriminating evidencecapital punishmentmurder referenceremandvitiation of trialfair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) and Section 504 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a death sentence and imprisonment, which was submitted for confirmation under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the failure of the trial court to put all material incriminating pieces of evidence to the accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the trial and causes a miscarriage of justice. The Sindh High Court held that omitting to put crucial incriminating evidence—such as the confessional statement, motive, weapon recovery, and chemical examiner reports—to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is an incurable illegality that prejudices the accused and vitiates the conviction. The court laid down the principle that every material piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution must be explicitly put to the accused during Section 342 examination, and failure to do so renders the conviction unsustainable, requiring a remand of the case for a fresh trial from that stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to put material incriminating evidence to an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate the trial?
  • Is the omission to examine an accused on all incriminating circumstances curable under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a conviction and death sentence be maintained based on evidence that was never put to the accused for explanation during his examination?
  • What is the legal consequence when a trial court fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Khamiso and another vs The State2023 YLR 1048 · Sindh High Court · 2022-10-05
  murderqatl-i-amdgrave and sudden provocationeyewitness testimonydelay in FIRmedical corroborationcriminal appealwater dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for qatl-i-amd arising from a sudden altercation over the wastage of irrigation water. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eyewitness testimony, the explanation of delay in lodging the First Information Report, the medical corroboration, the evaluation of a defence plea of alibi and false implication, and the applicability of the exception of grave and sudden provocation to convert the conviction to Section 302(c). The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent ocular accounts corroborated by medical evidence and prompt explanations for procedural delays, while the defence failed to substantiate any alibi or establish the elements of grave and sudden provocation. The court laid down the principle that invoking grave and sudden provocation requires discharging the burden of proof regarding the loss of self-control and proportionality of retaliation, which cannot be raised as a vague afterthought on appeal when the trial defence was complete denial and alibi. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay of fifteen hours in lodging the First Information Report is fatal to the prosecution case when a plausible explanation relating to medical treatment and jurisdictional disputes is provided?
  • Can the defence of grave and sudden provocation be successfully raised for the first time during the hearing of an appeal when the accused maintained a plea of complete denial and alibi throughout the trial?
  • Does the repetition of fatal blows to vital parts of the deceased's body with sharp weapons negative the proportionality requirement necessary to establish the exception of grave and sudden provocation?
  • Whether minor discrepancies between the initial report, inquest report, and medical examination regarding the seat and number of injuries are material enough to discredit the ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Khaliq Dad vs Nadir Khan and others2023 PCRLJ 1276 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-12-21
  acquittal appealsection 249-A Cr.P.C.cross casescounter versionsaggressor and aggressedsimultaneous trialmiscarriage of justicere-appreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged the order of the trial court whereby an application under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was accepted and the respondents were acquitted of the charge in a criminal case arising from a tribal clash. The core legal questions involved the propriety of acquitting an accused under section 249-A before the conclusion of prosecution evidence, and the proper procedure for conducting trials in cross-cases or counter-cases arising from the same incident. The Balochistan High Court held that while there is no strict bar of limitation for filing an acquittal application, propriety demands that a fair opportunity be given to the prosecution to establish its case on merits, and that cross-cases concerning the same incident with conflicting versions must be tried side by side by the same court and disposed of simultaneously to avoid conflicting judgments and properly determine the aggressor. The appeal was partly allowed, the acquittal order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for a joint and simultaneous conclusion alongside the counter-case.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of acquittal under section 249-A or 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 enjoy the same sanctity and presumption of double innocence as an acquittal after a full-fledged trial?
  • Is it proper for a trial court to entertain an application under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and acquit the accused before the prosecution evidence is fully recorded?
  • What is the required procedure for conducting trials in cross-cases or counter-cases arising out of the same incident with different versions?
  • Can cross-cases involving conflicting versions of the same incident be tried separately by different or identical courts without simultaneous pronouncement of judgments?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalida Parveen vs Divisional Director Schools Elementary & Secondary2023 PLJ AJ&K 153 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Khalid son of Abdul Hameed, Muhammad Imtiaz @ Muhammad Fayyaz2023 SHC 363 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khalid Safdar Makhdoom vs Government of the Punjab through Secretary2023 PCRLJ 1373 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-31
  under-trial prisonermedical boardlocus standiaggrieved personjudicial reviewright to healthprison rulesconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the constitution of a special medical board and its report declaring his incarcerated son to be malingering, as well as the executive authority exercised by the health secretary in the matter. The core legal questions involved the locus standi of a prisoner's father to invoke constitutional jurisdiction, the competence of executive authorities to constitute medical boards for under-trial prisoners, and the proper forum for regulating a prisoner's medical examination. The High Court held that the prisoner's father qualifies as an aggrieved person with locus standi, and that matters concerning an under-trial prisoner's custody, medical examination, and hospital transfer fall within the jurisdiction of the trial court/magistrate rather than executive functionaries. Consequently, the court declared the constitution of the special board and its report to be without lawful authority and directed the trial court to entertain fresh applications in this regard, while also ordering an inquiry into the procedural violations surrounding the prisoner's hospital transfer. The key principles laid down are that prisoners retain fundamental rights to life and dignity, that close relatives have standing to challenge illegal detentions or medical neglect, and that the regulation of a prisoner's custody and medical evaluation lies exclusively with the judicial authority rather than the executive.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the father of an incarcerated under-trial prisoner has the locus standi to maintain a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution challenging actions affecting the prisoner's health and custody?
  • Do executive authorities possess the jurisdiction to independently entertain complaints from private parties and constitute special medical boards for prisoners, or does such power vest in the trial court or magistrate regulating the prisoner's custody?
  • What are the mandatory procedures under the Prison Rules, 1978, for transferring an under-trial prisoner to a hospital outside the jail premises or to another station?
  • Does an arrested person or under-trial prisoner retain fundamental rights to life, dignity, and appropriate healthcare while lodged in prison?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Pervaiz vs Samina, etc2023 SCP 375, 2024 SCMR 142, 2024 PLJ SC 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-20
  mehrdowerfrivolous litigationmaintenancefamily lawcompensatory costssubsistence of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged a High Court judgment that upheld a decree for the recovery of mehr (dower) and maintenance in favour of his wife, the respondent. The core legal question was whether a husband is obligated to pay the mehr during the subsistence of the marriage, particularly when the nikahnama does not specify a mode of payment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the husband is legally obligated to pay the mehr upon the wife's demand, regardless of the subsistence of the marriage. The Court affirmed that the impugned judgment was in accordance with the law, noting that the petitioner's refusal to pay was untenable and constituted frivolous litigation. The Court laid down the principle that the mere filing of an appeal or challenge against a judicial decision does not render that decision ineffective or excuse non-compliance. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that courts should not hesitate to impose costs, including compensatory costs, to discourage unnecessary litigation and ensure that judicial orders are respected and complied with promptly.

  Questions settled

  • Is a husband obligated to pay mehr to his wife during the subsistence of the marriage?
  • Does the filing of an appeal against a judgment automatically stay or render the judgment ineffective?
  • What is the legal consequence when a nikahnama does not specify the mode of payment for dower?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood vs The State and others2023 PCRLJ 1283 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-26
  murder referencejudicial confessionocular evidencerelated witnessesdeath sentenceabscondencecriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arose from the trial court's judgment convicting the appellant for the murder of his ex-wife and causing injuries to his mother-in-law. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular evidence from related witnesses, the impact of the appellant's judicial confession, the evidentiary value of long abscondence, and whether the death sentence was warranted. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent ocular testimony, corroborated by medical evidence, the recovery of the weapon, and the appellant's repeated judicial confessions. The court rejected arguments regarding the delay in post-mortem examination, noting the priority given to treating the injured victim. It affirmed that related witnesses are competent if their testimony is trustworthy and confidence-inspiring. The court established that a judicial confession, when voluntary and corroborated by other evidence, constitutes strong proof of guilt. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, upheld the conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and confirmed the death sentence, finding no mitigating circumstances to warrant leniency.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of related witnesses be relied upon for conviction in a murder case?
  • Does a voluntary judicial confession made during trial proceedings provide sufficient basis for conviction?
  • Is long abscondence of an accused considered a strong piece of corroborative evidence?
  • Does a delay in conducting a post-mortem examination automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
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• Khalid Mehmood vs Chaklala Cantonment Board through its CEO and others2023 SCP 213, 2023 SCMR 1843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-21
  second review petitionreview jurisdictionSupreme Court Rulesmaintainabilitycomplete justiceinherent jurisdictionstare decisisfinality of judgments
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the order of the Institution Officer of the Supreme Court returning an application filed as a second review petition. The core legal question was whether a second or subsequent review petition, or an application seeking similar relief under Articles 187 or 184(3) of the Constitution or under the guise of a curative review, is maintainable before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Court held that a second review petition is completely barred and not maintainable under Article 188 of the Constitution read with Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules 1980. The key principles laid down are that review jurisdiction is strictly circumscribed by statute and rules, can only be exercised once in respect of any judgment or order passed in original or appellate jurisdiction, cannot be extended through inherent powers under Article 187 or Article 175(2) of the Constitution, and that foreign jurisprudence allowing curative reviews is inapplicable due to differing constitutional texts.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second or subsequent review petition maintainable before the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Does Article 187 of the Constitution confer independent jurisdiction to initiate proceedings or entertain a second review?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise suo motu review jurisdiction a second time under Article 188 of the Constitution?
  • Does the Supreme Court possess inherent jurisdiction under English common law or equity to entertain a curative review beyond constitutional and statutory limits?
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• Khalid Mehmood Khan and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance and others2023 IHC 34 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood & another vs Ramzan & Allah Dino2023 SHC 375 · Sindh High Court · 2023-06-02Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehboob vs Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan, Civil Secretariat, Quetta and 4 others2023 PLC (C.S) 705 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-08-01
  civil servantservice tribunaljurisdictionsuspensionterms and conditions of servicewrit jurisdictionmala fidemaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a BPS-19 civil servant in the Irrigation Department, challenged a notification suspending him from his position as Project Director, Awaran Dam, alleging mala fide actions and procedural irregularities, including the appointment of a junior officer to his post. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain a petition concerning the suspension and transfer of a civil servant, given the constitutional framework governing service matters. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable, citing the exclusive jurisdiction of Service Tribunals over matters relating to the terms and conditions of service. Relying on the constitutional bar established by Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the Court affirmed that the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 is ousted in such service-related disputes, even where allegations of mala fide are raised. The Court further noted that the petitioner, having been merely transferred to the post rather than appointed according to specific Planning Commission guidelines, lacked the tenure protection he claimed. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, with the petitioner granted liberty to approach the appropriate Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to hear a petition regarding the suspension of a civil servant?
  • Can allegations of mala fide against government functionaries override the bar on High Court jurisdiction imposed by Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are disputes regarding the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant exclusively triable by Service Tribunals?
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• Khalid Khan vs Mst. Rukhsana and others2023 PHC 269 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-07-03Read full judgment →
• Khalid Iqbal and others vs Mst. Yaseen and others2023 CLC 963 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-19Read full judgment →
• Khalid Inam vs Mrs. Summaya Rehman & others2023 SHC 254 · Sindh High Court · 2023-04-06Read full judgment →
• Khalid Hameed & another vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa & four2023 PHC 582 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khairat Ali vs Saqib Ashfaq and others2023 CLC 926 · Lahore High Court · 2022-01-31Read full judgment →
• Khair Muhammad vs The State2023 MLD 299 · Sindh High Court · 2021-08-30
  pre-arrest bailmisappropriationwheat procurementabsconsionmala fideprohibitory clauseanti-corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from three criminal cases in which the applicant sought pre-arrest bail for offenses relating to the misappropriation of government wheat bags while posted as a Food Supervisor, involving charges under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question was whether pre-arrest bail could be granted where offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, absent proof of mala fide and given the accused's prolonged absconsion. The Sindh High Court held that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy requiring demonstration of mala fide or ulterior motives by the prosecution, which was absent here, and noted that the applicant had remained an absconder for approximately four years and failed to join the investigation. Consequently, the court dismissed the bail applications and recalled the interim pre-arrest bail previously granted, laying down that absence from the prohibitory clause alone does not warrant pre-arrest bail without establishing mala fide.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of an offense from the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically entitles an accused to pre-arrest bail?
  • Is proof of mala fide or ulterior motive on the part of the complainant or investigating agency a mandatory prerequisite for the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • What is the legal effect of long-term absconsion by an accused person seeking the extraordinary remedy of pre-arrest bail?
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• Khadim Hussain vs Additional District Judge, Layyah and 12 others2023 YLR 729 · Lahore High Court · 2022-05-11Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain & Others vs Fida Hussain Dero2023 SHC 856 · Sindh High Court · 2023-10-19Read full judgment →
• Khadija Shah vs The State, etc.2023 LHC 5020 · Lahore High Court · 2023-10-11
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryvicarious liabilityanti-terrorismsocial media evidenceSection 161 Cr.P.C.criminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Khadija Shah, sought post-arrest bail in connection with F.I.R. No. 1271/2023, involving various offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, following violent protests. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the evidence presented, specifically regarding her alleged role in inciting violence and anti-state activities. The Court observed that the petitioner was not named in the initial F.I.R. and that subsequent statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, appeared to be improvements upon the original complaint. Furthermore, forensic reports verifying the authenticity of social media content attributed to the petitioner were pending. The Court held that the prosecution's case against the petitioner required further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, particularly noting her subsequent apology for a controversial tweet. Consequently, the petition was accepted, and the petitioner was granted post-arrest bail, establishing the principle that where evidence is inconclusive and requires further investigation, the benefit of doubt at the bail stage favors the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the introduction of an accused's name in a statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, after the registration of an F.I.R. without naming them, constitute grounds for further inquiry?
  • Can bail be granted when forensic reports verifying the authenticity of digital evidence relied upon by the prosecution are still pending?
  • Does an apology for a controversial social media post impact the determination of guilt for the purpose of bail?
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• Kh. Muhammad Fazil vs Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (decd.) thr. L.Rs. & another2023 SCP 368, 2024 SCMR 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-10
  rejection of plaintcourt feefunctus officioconditional orderenlargement of timefresh suitcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for declaration where the Trial Court directed the plaintiff to pay deficient court fees by a specified date, with a rider that non-compliance would result in the automatic rejection of the plaint. On the specified date, the plaintiff failed to pay, but the Trial Court, on its own motion and without any application, granted an extension. The Revisional Court and the High Court set aside this extension, holding that the Trial Court had become functus officio. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, affirming that once a conditional order is passed with a deeming clause for rejection, non-compliance results in automatic rejection, rendering the court functus officio and stripping it of jurisdiction to extend time under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court deprecated the practice of passing conditional orders, noting they strip courts of their statutory discretion, and clarified that under Order VII Rule 13, the rejection of a plaint for non-payment of court fees does not preclude the filing of a fresh suit within the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Trial Court become functus officio after the expiry of a deadline set in a conditional order that deems a plaint rejected upon non-compliance?
  • Can a court on its own motion enlarge the time for depositing court fees under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without any application or sufficient cause shown by the defaulting party?
  • Does the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for non-payment of court fees preclude the plaintiff from filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action?
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• Kh. Muhammad Azam, Kh. Nawaz Ali, Kh. Ghazanfar Ali, sons, Tahira Kousar2023 SC AJK 32 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2023-05-15Read full judgment →
• Khursheed Anwar Habib vs Muhammad Amin and another2023 CLD 352 · Sindh High Court · 2021-08-13
  criminal revisionacquittalbenefit of doubtfraudcriminal breach of trustrevisional jurisdictionpresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, representing Bank Alfalah Limited, invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Sindh High Court to challenge the judgment of the Special Court (Offences in Banks), Karachi, which acquitted the respondent of charges under sections 420 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by extending him the benefit of the doubt. The core legal question concerned whether the trial court erred in acquitting the respondent and whether the prosecution successfully established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt despite discrepancies in the evidence and the testimony of a court witness concerning a disputed deposit slip. The High Court held that the trial court's conclusion was not perverse, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the prosecution's case suffered from material contradictions and a failure to conclusively disprove the defense's documents or eliminate reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that in criminal revisions against acquittal, a double presumption of innocence attaches to the accused, and appellate or revisional interference is unwarranted unless the impugned judgment suffers from glaring errors, non-reading or misreading of evidence, or is palpably perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Whether revisional interference is warranted against an acquittal judgment that is based on a plausible evaluation of evidence and affords the accused the benefit of doubt?
  • Does the presumption of double innocence preclude interference with an acquittal unless the trial court's findings are perverse, arbitrary, or suffer from serious material infirmities?
  • Whether discrepancies in the complainant's statements regarding material dates and events are sufficient to create reasonable doubt in a criminal charge?
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