Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• The State through District and Sessions Judge, Kalat vs Assistant2021 PLJ Quetta 79, 2020 PLD Balochistan 26 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-11-06Read full judgment →
• The State through Deputy Director (Law) vs Sardar Muhammad alias2020 YLR 2636 · Lahore High Court · 2020-06-01
  narcotics controlforfeiture of assetsfreezing of assetsacquittalControl of Narcotic Substances Actproperty releasecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The State appealed against an order of the Special Court (CNS) which directed the release of frozen property belonging to Muhammad Amjad Ali (Respondent No. 5). The Respondent had been an accused in a narcotics case but was acquitted by the trial court in 2001, a decision that remained unchallenged by the State. The core legal question was whether the property of an acquitted accused could remain frozen or forfeited under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, particularly given the Respondent's familial relationship with other convicted co-accused. The High Court held that forfeiture under Section 19 of the Act requires a conviction and a sentence exceeding three years, neither of which applied to the Respondent. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Section 37 regarding the freezing of assets does not justify continued freezing against an acquitted individual simply based on familial ties to convicted persons. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding no illegality in the trial court's order to release the property.

  Questions settled

  • Can the assets of an accused be forfeited under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, if the accused has been acquitted of the charges?
  • Does the freezing of assets under Section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, apply to an acquitted accused solely on the basis of their familial relationship with convicted co-accused?
  • What are the statutory prerequisites for the forfeiture of assets under Section 19 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
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• The State through Deputy Director (Law) vs Muhammad Javed2020 P Cr. L J 1135 · Lahore High Court · 2019-09-16
  chemical examiner reportsummoning of forensic analystlacuna in prosecution caseexpert opinionnarcotics controlcode of criminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged an order passed by the Special Court CNS, Lahore, which dismissed its application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for summoning a Forensic Scientist/Analyst to give evidence and cover deficiencies in a Chemical Examiner's report. The core legal question was whether the provisions of Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be invoked in proceedings under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 to fill inherent flaws or lacunae in a Chemical Examiner's report. The court held that the power under Section 540 is meant to be exercised when essential for a just decision, not to allow the prosecution to fill inherent weaknesses or lacunae in its case, which must otherwise benefit the accused. The court concluded that summoning an expert to cure technical defects and missing test protocols in a report amounts to giving the prosecution a second chance to build its case, contrary to established apex court jurisprudence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be invoked to cover inherent flaws or deficiencies in a Chemical Examiner's report?
  • Can the prosecution utilize Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to fill a lacuna or inherent weakness in its case?
  • Does summoning a forensic analyst to cure technical defects and missing test protocols in a narcotic report amount to filling a prosecution lacuna?
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• The State through Deputy Director (Assets) Regional Directorate Anti-2020 P Cr. L J 84 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-06
  freezing of assetsde-freezing of propertynarcotics assetslimitation for court approvalseven days requirementproclaimed offenderControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the State against the order dated 08.01.2011 passed by the learned Special Court CNS, Lahore, which allowed the application of respondent No. 2 for the discontinuation/de-freezing of certain immovable properties (plots and a bungalow). The core legal questions pertained to the procedural requirement under Section 37(2) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 to place an administrative freezing notice before the Court within seven days, and whether the de-freezing order was valid given that the transaction occurred prior to any valid freezing notice or declaration of proclamation offender. The High Court affirmed the trial court's decision and dismissed the appeal, holding that an administrative freezing notice loses its legal sanctity if not placed before the Court within the mandatory seven-day period under Section 37(2) of the Act. The Court also observed that the property transfer to respondent No. 2 took place before any freezing notice was issued for the subject properties and prior to the main suspect being declared a proclaimed offender.

  Questions settled

  • Does an administrative freezing notice issued under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 lose its sanctity if it is not placed before the court within seven days as required by Section 37(2)?
  • Is an order for freezing assets under Section 37(1) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 interim in nature subject to final determination of forfeiture or release by the court?
  • Can property transferred prior to the issuance of a freezing notice and prior to a suspect being declared a proclaimed offender be lawfully de-freezed?
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• The State through Chairman NAB vs Syed Hamid Umer2020 P Cr. L J 514 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-28
  appeal against acquittalassets beyond known sources of incomecorruption and corrupt practicesbenamidarburden of proofNAB referencedouble presumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the State through the Chairman NAB against the judgment of the Accountability Court, which acquitted the respondent, a customs official, of charges under Section 9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for allegedly accumulating assets beyond his known sources of income. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the essential ingredients of corruption and corrupt practices, specifically establishing the accused's known sources of income and demonstrating that the acquired assets were disproportionate thereto. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the foundational ingredients of the offence, notably omitting to quantify the accused's known sources of income or properly investigate the independent financial standing and business income of the accused's wife, whose name appeared on several disputed properties. Emphasizing the narrow scope of interference against an acquittal where the double presumption of innocence attaches, the Court laid down that mere possession of assets is not an offence without proving known income sources, and an acquittal judgment will not be interfered with unless found perverse or arbitrary.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients that the prosecution must prove to establish an offence under Section 9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to quantify the known sources of income of an accused invalidate a charge of possessing assets disproportionate to known sources?
  • What is the scope of interference by an appellate court against a judgment of acquittal in accountability cases?
  • When does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Section 14(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
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• The State through Ag vs Safir Ullah2020 PHC 216, PLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 1211 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-03-12
  narcoticsacquittal appealforensic reportreasonable doubtmaterial contradictionsControl of Narcotic Substances Actcriminal evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the State against the judgment of the Special Court (CNS), Peshawar, which acquitted the respondent in a case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, regarding the alleged recovery of 72 kilograms of chars. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, given the evidence presented. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal. The Court found material contradictions in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies regarding the sequence of events and the handling of the case property. Furthermore, the Court observed that the Forensic Science Laboratory report was legally deficient as it failed to specify the test protocols applied, rendering it unreliable under established precedents. The Court affirmed that when prosecution evidence is riddled with contradictions and the forensic report lacks mandatory procedural compliance, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused. Consequently, the acquittal was maintained as the prosecution failed to establish its case.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Forensic Science Laboratory report that fails to specify the test protocols applied meet the mandatory requirements for reliance in a criminal conviction?
  • Can an acquittal be maintained where there are material contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses?
  • Is the benefit of the doubt extended to an accused when the prosecution evidence is inconsistent and the forensic analysis lacks procedural compliance?
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• The State through Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa vs Muhammad2020 YLR 2639 · Federal Shariat Court · 2019-11-27
  appeal against acquittalprohibition orderrecovery of liquorsafe custody of samplesdelay in chemical examinationdouble presumption of innocencepolice witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the State under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against the acquittal of the respondents for an offence under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The core legal question was whether the trial court's judgment of acquittal, based on non-compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, delayed safe custody and transmission of samples, and reliance solely on uncorroborated police testimony, warranted interference by the appellate court. The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the appeal in limine, holding that the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is narrow, and since the trial court's view was reasonable, sound, and based on proper appreciation of evidence, the double presumption of innocence enjoyed by the acquitted accused remained intact. The key principle laid down is that unexplained delays in sending samples to the chemical examiner, unsafe custody of case property, non-association of independent local witnesses during recovery from a populated place, and exclusive reliance on police officials without corroboration are fatal to the prosecution's case, and an order of acquittal will not be interfered with unless it is perverse, arbitrary, or based on a misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of interference by an appellate court in an appeal against an acquittal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does an unexplained delay of seven days in sending recovery samples to the laboratory vitiate the prosecution case?
  • Is non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 fatal to a recovery made from a populated place?
  • What is the evidentiary value of police officials' testimonies in narcotics recovery cases when independent local witnesses are not associated?
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• The State through A.G. KPK vs Subhan Ali2020 MLD 1901, 2020 PHC 298 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-04-27
  appeal against acquittalchance witnessidentification paradepresumption of innocencere-appreciation of evidencecriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the State through the Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, against the acquittal of the respondents by the trial court in a case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence in an acquittal appeal, particularly concerning the reliability of an interested and chance witness, the evidentiary value of a delayed and flawed identification parade, and discrepancies in medical and forensic evidence. The Peshawar High Court held that the testimony of the complainant was unnatural and uncorroborated, the identification parade suffered from legal infirmities and pre-test opportunities of exposure, and the forensic evidence contradicted the prosecution's version of multiple assailants. Upholding the acquittal, the court reiterated the principle that an order of acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence, and appellate interference is warranted only for compelling and substantial reasons where the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable or perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an identification parade conducted after an inordinate delay and without proper safeguards?
  • How should the testimony of a witness whose presence at the crime scene is deemed unnatural and doubtful be treated?
  • Does forensic evidence indicating firing from a single weapon affect a prosecution case alleging multiple active assailants?
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• The State through A.G. KPK vs Faiz Ullah & 03 others2021 YLR 163, 2020 PHC 308 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-04-29
  acquittal appealsole eye-witnessadverse inferencebenefit of doubtQanun-e-Shahadat Ordercriminal proceduremurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the State against the acquittal of respondents in a murder case registered under Sections 302/324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution provided sufficient, unimpeachable evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the reliance on a sole, interested eye-witness and the absence of forensic evidence. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal. The Court held that the prosecution's case was inherently unreliable due to the complainant's inconsistent testimony, the failure to produce available independent witnesses, and the lack of recovered bullet casings despite allegations of indiscriminate firing. Applying Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, the Court drew an adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding independent witnesses. The Court affirmed the principle that conviction must rest on unimpeachable evidence, and any doubt arising from the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence, and appellate interference is only justified by compelling and substantial reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-production of available independent witnesses by the prosecution warrant an adverse inference against its case?
  • Can a conviction for a capital charge be sustained solely on the testimony of an interested witness when the prosecution fails to explain the absence of independent corroboration?
  • What is the effect on the prosecution's case when an FIR is registered at a hospital rather than the nearest police station despite the proximity of the latter?
  • Under what circumstances should an appellate court interfere with a trial court's judgment of acquittal?
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• The State (Chairman National Accountability Bureau) vs Muhammad2020 SHC 346 · Sindh High Court · 2020-05-07
  acquittal appealcorruptionmisappropriationNational Accountability Bureauaccountability courtabuse of process of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal accountability acquittal appeal was filed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) against the order of the Accountability Court, whereby the respondent was acquitted under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a reference concerning corruption, fraud, and misappropriation of public funds. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the respondent under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. in the absence of tangible incriminating evidence connecting him to the crime. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court's acquittal order was well-founded, noting that the respondent was initially a prosecution witness, no transactions tied him to the fraudulent accounts, and the sole witness's testimony failed to implicate him. The court laid down the principle that while acquittals under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. do not carry the double presumption of innocence attached to full trial acquittals, continuing proceedings in the absolute absence of tangible and reliable evidence amounts to an abuse of the process of law, making acquittal proper when no possibility of conviction exists.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be sustained in the absence of tangible and reliable evidence against the accused?
  • Does continuing criminal proceedings where there is no possibility of a conviction amount to an abuse of the process of law?
  • What is the standard of review for an appellate court when examining an order of acquittal passed under Section 265-K Cr.P.C.?
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• The Secretary, Revenue, Division, Islamabad_State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi_ In the matter of vs N_a2020 PTD 966 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2019-05-13Read full judgment →
• The Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad: In the matter of vs N/A2020 PTD 344 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2019-12-20Read full judgment →
• The Secretary, Revenue Division Islamabad: In the Matter of vs N/A2020 PTD 1300, 2020 PTD 1352, 2020 PTD 900 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2020-01-28Read full judgment →
• The Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad: In the matter of vs N/A2020 PTD 976 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2019-05-21Read full judgment →
• The Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad : In the matter of vs N/A2020 PTD 1388 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2020-02-11Read full judgment →
• The Punjab Government Servants Housing Foundation through its2021 [M] C L R 402, 2021 YLR 533, 2020 LHC 2140 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Province of Sindh and another vs Mst. Rasheeda Begum2020 SHC 1262 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-08Read full judgment →
• The People (at the suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions) vs David2020 P SC (Crl.) 200 · Supreme Court of IrelandRead full judgment →
• The Nazir A.M Joint Venture etc vs National Highway Authority through its2020 LHC 1452 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan through its Secretary vs The Special Court through its Registrar2020 [M] C L R 1599, 2020 KLR Civil Cases 1 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Inhabitants Of Village Awan Patti Constituency No.6 Tehsil And District2020 CLC 1739 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2020-06-23Read full judgment →
• The Imperial Electric Company (Private) Limited through Chief Financial2020 CLC 760 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-12-09Read full judgment →
• The General Manager Gulberg Office Of TCS and another vs Syed Naeem2021 [M] C L R 1142, 2020 PLD Lahore 757, 2020 CLD 1053 · Lahore High Court · 2020-06-02Read full judgment →
• The Fauji Foundation Charitable Trust vs Federal Land Commission &2021 P C T L R 584, 2020 SHC 374 · Sindh High Court · 2020-02-27Read full judgment →
• The Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Rawalpindi and others vs Syed Irshad Ali Abid2021 PLC (C.S.) 277, 2020 SCMR 2064 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-29
  advance incrementsincentive schemeservice lawpromissory estoppelvested rightdiscrimination
  Summary & questions settled

  The Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, and others appealed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal granting four advance increments to the respondent for obtaining an LL.B. degree in 2002 under a 1996 incentive scheme. The core legal question was whether an employee who acquired a higher qualification after the discontinuation of the incentive scheme was entitled to advance increments on the grounds of discrimination and promissory estoppel. The Supreme Court held that the incentive scheme had been validly discontinued by notification dated 13.9.2001, prior to the respondent acquiring his degree in 2002, meaning no vested right or promissory estoppel arose. The Court concluded that past cases relied upon by the Tribunal were distinguishable as they involved employees who acquired qualifications before the discontinuation or were decided ex parte without considering the withdrawal notification. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's judgment was set aside, establishing that advance increments cannot be claimed under a repealed incentive scheme when the qualification is obtained after its abolition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee acquires a vested right to advance increments under an incentive scheme that was discontinued prior to the acquisition of the higher qualification?
  • Can the principle of promissory estoppel be invoked when an incentive scheme is withdrawn before the claimant obtains the requisite qualification?
  • Does the granting of relief to other employees under distinguishable circumstances create a case of actionable discrimination?
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• The Director, through Deputy Director vs Messrs Ekada Corporation, Karachi and another2020 PTD (Trib.) 573 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-12-20Read full judgment →
• The Director of Customs Valuation vs Kapa Enterprise & others2020 SHC 850 · Sindh High Court · 2020-11-03Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Rto-II, Lahore vs MessrsPTCL 2021 CL.1, 2020 SCP 178, 2020 SCMR 1822 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-20
  Sales Tax Actsub-delegationjurisdictionCommissioner Inland RevenueFederal Board of Revenueshow cause noticestatutory interpretationtax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  The Commissioner Inland Revenue and related tax authorities challenged a common judgment of the Lahore High Court that set aside show cause notices issued to respondent-taxpayers under section 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The High Court had held that a notification issued by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) appointing Commissioners and delineating their jurisdiction amounted to a delegation of powers, and that a subsequent notification by the Commissioner authorizing subordinate Officers of Inland Revenue (OIRs) to exercise those powers constituted unlawful sub-delegation. The core legal question concerned whether the assignment of jurisdiction by the FBR and the subsequent distribution of territorial and personal limits by the Commissioner among subordinate OIRs constitutes impermissible sub-delegation of tax assessment and recovery powers. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that the FBR does not delegate its own powers when assigning jurisdiction under section 30, since the powers of assessment and recovery are directly vested in OIRs by sections 11 and 31 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Court established that the statutory scheme permits Commissioners to distribute functions and assign jurisdiction to subordinate officers under section 30(3), and the exercise of powers forms an integral part of the functions of an office.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the assignment of jurisdiction by the Federal Board of Revenue to Commissioners of Inland Revenue constitutes a delegation of powers that bars subsequent jurisdictional distribution to subordinate officers?
  • Can a Commissioner of Inland Revenue authorize subordinate Officers of Inland Revenue to exercise powers and perform functions under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue possess the power of assessment and recovery of tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to enable it to delegate such powers?
  • Whether the exercise of powers forms an integral part of the functions of a statutory office under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
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• The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore, etc vs M_s Hamza Nasir Wire, Lahore, etc2021 P T C L R 738, PTCL 2021 CL.1, 2020 PTD 1790, 2020 SCMR 1822, 2020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-20
  Sales Tax Act 1990delegation of powerssub-delegationjurisdiction of tax officersshow cause noticestatutory interpretationtax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of show-cause notices issued by Officers of Inland Revenue (OIRs) under Section 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Taxpayers challenged these notices, arguing that the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) had unlawfully sub-delegated powers to subordinate OIRs through a notification, following an earlier notification from the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) assigning jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the CIR could distribute jurisdictional and functional authority to subordinate OIRs or if such action constituted impermissible sub-delegation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interpretation. The Court clarified that the FBR’s assignment of jurisdiction does not involve delegating its own powers, as the FBR is not an OIR and lacks assessment powers. Instead, the CIR exercises independent statutory authority under Section 30(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, to organize subordinate officers. The Court established that the exercise of powers is an inherent part of the functions of an office, and the CIR’s distribution of jurisdictional limits is a valid administrative act, not unlawful sub-delegation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue delegate its own powers to Commissioners of Inland Revenue when assigning jurisdiction under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can a Commissioner of Inland Revenue delegate or assign jurisdictional limits to subordinate Officers of Inland Revenue under Section 30(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Is the issuance of a show-cause notice under Section 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, a function that forms part of the powers of an Officer of Inland Revenue?
  • Does the principle of 'nemo dat quod non habet' apply to the delegation of functions by the Federal Board of Revenue to Commissioners of Inland Revenue?
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• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs The Secretary Revenue Division and othersPTCL 2021 CL. 616, 2020 SCP 194, 2021 PCTLR 655, 2021 PSC 295, 2021 PTD 11, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-28
  tax exemptionfinal tax regimefranchisee commissionaffected areasadvance tax deductiontax refund
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, concerning whether a taxpayer operating as a mobile phone franchisee in District Nowshera was entitled to a tax exemption under clause (126F) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the said Ordinance, which granted tax exemptions on profits and gains derived by taxpayers located in moderately affected areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and PATA. The core legal question was whether the respondent, whose commission income was subject to advance tax deduction treated as a final tax under section 233, could claim the exemption, and whether section 169 bar on refunds precluded relief. The Supreme Court held that the respondent fell squarely within the category of primary affectees intended to benefit from the exemption clause, as its business was located and operated within a moderately affected area. The Court ruled that the final tax regime provisions under section 169 did not negate the substantive tax exemption, and the return of incorrectly deducted tax merely restored the lawful position rather than constituting a barred refund. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a taxpayer whose business is located inside a moderately affected area is entitled to the tax exemption provided under clause (126F) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the application of the final tax regime under section 169 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 bar a qualifying taxpayer from claiming a substantive tax exemption?
  • Whether the return of tax incorrectly deducted as advance tax due to the failure of the Commissioner to issue an exemption certificate constitutes a barred refund under section 169(2)(e) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• The Collector Of Sales Tax And Federal Excise vs Messrs Agro Chemical2020 PTD 679 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-29Read full judgment →
• The Collector Of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Quetta vs Fazal2020 PT D 1821 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs vs M/s. Afeef Trading & Furniture2020 SHC 806 · Sindh High Court · 2020-10-26Read full judgment →
• The Collector Of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs vs Muhammad Arif Ur Rehman and another2020 PTD 627 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-12Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of CustomsPTCL 2020 CL. 281, 2020 PTD 47 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-22Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs MCC vs Abid Ali2020 SHC 1332 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-14Read full judgment →
• The Chairman NAB vs Ramzan Sugar Mills Limited etc2020 LHC 2215 · Lahore High Court · 2020-10-14Read full judgment →
• The Bank Of Punjab vs Fazal Abbas and another2020 CLD 977 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-08
  recovery of financebanking courtstatement of accountmandatory requirementsplaintBankers' Book Evidence Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal challenged a judgment and decree of the Banking Court, which dismissed the appellant bank's suit for recovery of finance facilities. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellant complied with the mandatory procedural requirements for filing a recovery suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, specifically regarding the contents of the plaint and the proper certification and production of statements of account. The Court held that the appellant failed to comply with Section 9(3) of the Ordinance, as the plaint did not specify the finance availed, amounts paid, or the breakdown of the claimed dues. Furthermore, the Court found that the statements of account were not certified under the Bankers' Book Evidence Act, 1891, and were not produced in evidence by a properly authorized person. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the principle that strict compliance with the mandatory procedural requirements of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is a prerequisite for the maintainability and success of a recovery suit filed by a financial institution.

  Questions settled

  • What are the mandatory requirements for a plaint filed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a statement of account be admitted in evidence if it lacks the certification required by the Bankers' Book Evidence Act, 1891?
  • Is a suit for recovery liable to be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to specify the finance availed and payments made in the plaint?
  • Does the production of documents by an unauthorized person render the evidence inadmissible in a banking suit?
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• The Bank Of Khyber vs Muhammad Tariq Ikram and 4 others2020 CLC 1344 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-08Read full judgment →
• The Bank Of Khyber through Authorized Attorneys vs Municipal Corporation2020 LHC 3135, 2021 CLD 340, 2021 PLD Lahore 108 · Lahore High Court · 2020-11-17Read full judgment →
• The Assistant Commissioner, Srb, Karachi vs Messrs Telenor Pakistan Ltd2020 PTD (Trib.) 1964 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-05-14Read full judgment →
• The Assistant Commissioner, SRB vs Messrs Jadoon Flying Coach Services2020 PTD (Trib.) 1834 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-04-16Read full judgment →
• The Asia & Pacific Alliance of Ymca vs Khalid Malik and Ors2020 SHC 922 · Sindh High Court · 2020-02-11Read full judgment →
• The Ansar Burney Trust International, & another vs The Prime Minister of Pakistan, & others2020 SHC 1092 · Sindh High Court · 2020-11-26Read full judgment →
• Tesco through its Chief Executive vs Omer Steel Furnaces through Muhammad Omer and others2021 YLR 433, 2020 PHC 420 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-06-09Read full judgment →
• Teradata Ireland Limited and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and 4 others2020 PTD 1316 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-06-02Read full judgment →
• Telenor Micro Finance Bank Limited through Authorized Person vs The State2020 CLD 359 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-21
  FIR registrationJustice of Peacemicrofinance institutioncriminal liabilitycivil vs criminal disputecollateral verification
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, a microfinance bank, challenged an order of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace dismissing its application under sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C. for the registration of an FIR against a jeweller who had verified fake and imitation gold ornaments pledged as loan collateral. The core legal question was whether the dispute was purely of a civil nature barring criminal proceedings, and whether a microfinance institution could initiate criminal proceedings despite the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The Sindh High Court held that the replacement of genuine collateral with imitation jewelry by a professional jeweller raised a prima facie criminal liability not barred by civil remedies or the existence of an indemnity clause. The court further held that a microfinance institution is not a banking company under the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001, and is entitled to seek the registration of an FIR. The criminal miscellaneous application was accordingly allowed, and the concerned SHO was directed to record the statement and proceed under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the verification of fake gold ornaments by a professional jeweller hired as a schroff constitutes a criminal offence or a purely civil breach of agreement?
  • Can a microfinance institution lodge an FIR for offences related to financial institutions under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is a microfinance institution considered a banking company under the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001?
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• Telconet Private Limited vs I.E.S.C.O. and others2020 IHC 44 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-01-30Read full judgment →
• Telconet Private Limited vs I.E.S.C.O and others2020 CLC 1434, 2022 PCTLR 1665 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-02-14Read full judgment →
• Tehseen Ahmed H. Qureshi & others vs Ld. Distt: & Session Judge2020 SHC 708 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-20Read full judgment →
• Tbea Company (Private) Limited through Faisal Anwar vs Al'wasay2020 CLC 106 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-01
  arbitrationappointment of arbitratormutual consentcivil revisionSection 20sub-contract disputejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arose from a dispute between a contractor and a subcontractor regarding the payment of rental charges and the ownership of machinery. The respondent filed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the Civil Court unilaterally appointed an arbitrator nominated by the respondent without the petitioner's consent. The petitioner challenged this order, arguing that consent is the essence of arbitration and that Section 20(4) of the Act requires mutual consent for such appointments. The Lahore High Court allowed the revision petition and set aside the impugned order. The Court held that the consent of both parties is a sine qua non for appointing an arbitrator under Section 20(4) of the Act, and the court has no jurisdiction to unilaterally appoint an arbitrator proposed by only one party when the other party dissents. The trial court was directed to appoint a new arbitrator with the mutual consent of both parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court has the jurisdiction under Section 20(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to unilaterally appoint an arbitrator proposed by one party without the consent of the other?
  • Is the consent of both parties a mandatory requirement for the appointment of an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • What is the legal effect of an award passed by an arbitrator who was appointed without the mutual consent of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Tayyab Khan and another vs Mrs. Basheera Begum and others2020 YLR 2458 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-04Read full judgment →
• Taufiq Said vs The State2020 PHC 236, 2021 KLR Criminal Cases 207, 2021 YLR 468 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-05-07Read full judgment →
• Tasneem Jalal vs Deputy Director ANF, etc2020 P SC (C rl.) 139, 2020 SCMR 454, 2020 SCP 4 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-15
  retrospective punishmentforfeiture of propertynarcotic substancesforeign convictionfundamental rightsconstitutional protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the application of the punishment of forfeiture of property under section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1995 to an offence committed prior to its introduction. The appellant's predecessor-in-interest was convicted by a United States court in September 1993 for drug offences committed in 1992. Subsequently, in 1995, the Federal Government sought forfeiture of his assets in Pakistan under section 37 of the newly promulgated Ordinance. The core legal question was whether section 37 could be applied retrospectively to a foreign conviction for an act predating the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the punishment of forfeiture could not be imposed retrospectively, as Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 protects individuals against retrospective punishment or penalties greater than or different from those prescribed at the time the offence was committed. The Court ruled that section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1995 is not applicable to an offence committed before its promulgation, thus setting aside the forfeiture order and allowing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1995 applies to an offence committed prior to its promulgation?
  • Does Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 protect against the imposition of a penalty or forfeiture not in existence at the time an offence was committed?
  • Can a conviction by a foreign court be utilized to forfeit assets in Pakistan under laws enacted after the commission of the offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasar Mehmood and another vs The State and others2020 SCMR 1013 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-05
  Test identification paradeCriminal convictionRobberyHomicideWitness identificationForensic evidenceProof beyond doubtAdverse inferenceCompounding of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses petitions challenging convictions for robbery and homicide, where the petitioners were identified by an injured witness in a test identification parade. The core legal questions revolved around the validity of convictions based on a solitary witness, alleged flaws in the test identification parade, and the impact of a missing witness. The Supreme Court declined leave, upholding the convictions. The Court held that a test identification parade is not an immutable ritual and its fairness depends on the exigencies of each case, conducted in a non-collusive manner. It emphasized that dogmatic standards with empirical exactitude cannot be applied to identification, and prosecution is not required to provide hyper-technical details. The Court found the identification by witnesses, coupled with forensic evidence and the subsequent compounding of murder by one petitioner, constituted proof beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of one witness was deemed not to raise an adverse inference when other witnesses were available.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the identification by a solitary witness in a test identification parade?
  • Do alleged flaws in a test identification parade, such as lack of detailed description of features or roles, automatically render it inconsequential?
  • What is the purpose and scope of Article 22 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 regarding the establishment of identity?
  • Does the absence of one witness from the witness box necessarily cast an adverse inference against the prosecution case?
  • What standards apply to the conduct of a test identification parade under Police Rules, 1934 and High Court Rules and Orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Tarruf Ali vs Inspector General of Police Sindh and 02 others2020 SHC 76 · Sindh High Court · 2020-01-24Read full judgment →
• Tarique and 3 others vs The State2020 YLR 2509 · Sindh High Court · 2019-07-26
  criminal revisionbenefit of doubtSection 103 CrPCSection 342 CrPCpolice encountermedical evidenceacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged the conviction and sentence of the applicants for various offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an alleged police encounter. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, whether the failure to associate private witnesses in a populated area violated Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether medical evidence not put to the accused during their Section 342 examination could be used against them. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the applicants beyond reasonable doubt due to significant evidentiary gaps, including the unexplained failure to secure independent witnesses despite the incident occurring in a populated area, contradictions regarding the timing of medical examinations, and the failure to confront the accused with medical evidence during their examination. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the applicants, reiterating the principle that the benefit of any reasonable doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate private witnesses in a populated area during a police raid constitute a violation of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can medical evidence be used to maintain a conviction if it was not put to the accused during their examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  Read full judgment →
• Tarique alias Kaloo vs The State2020 MLD 1883 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-11
  criminal appealnarcotics controlbenefit of doubtpolice witnessesindependent mashirschemical examinersafe custodyacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Judge for CNS, Tando Allahyar, convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and sentencing him to imprisonment for life with a fine. The core legal questions involved the reliability of uncorroborated police testimony, non-association of independent witnesses in a populated area, procedural lapses regarding the safe custody and delayed transmission of the sample to the Chemical Examiner, and exclusive possession of the alleged narcotics. The Sindh High Court held that material contradictions among prosecution witnesses, failure to join independent mashirs, lack of proof regarding safe custody of the case property, and absence of exclusive possession created serious and reasonable doubts in the prosecution's case. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of the charge by extending the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of police officials alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, when material contradictions exist?
  • Does the failure of the police to associate independent witnesses from a populated locality vitiate recovery proceedings under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in sending narcotics samples to the Chemical Examiner and the failure to produce malkhana registers?
  • Is an accused entitled to an acquittal as a matter of right if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding their guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Saeed vs The State2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 81, PLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 19, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 27, · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  white-collar crimecorruptiondisproportionate assetsbenamidarsentence reductionconcurrent findingsplea-bargain
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioner, a former public servant, for corruption and corrupt practices. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven the charges of amassing assets disproportionate to known income through 'benamidar' transactions, and whether the sentence imposed was excessive given the petitioner's age and health. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt were well-founded, noting that the defense failed to rebut evidence during cross-examination and that the petitioner had a history of similar conduct. While the Court affirmed the conviction, confiscation of assets, and fine, it exercised judicial discretion to reduce the term of imprisonment from seven years to five years, citing the petitioner's advanced age and poor health. The judgment reinforces the principle that while white-collar crimes demand strict accountability due to their detrimental societal impact, courts may exercise leniency in sentencing based on humanitarian grounds such as age and physical condition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to cross-examine a witness on specific evidence constitute an admission of that evidence?
  • Can an appellate court reduce a sentence for corruption based on the advanced age and poor health of the convict?
  • Are concurrent findings of guilt by lower courts subject to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal error?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs The State2020 P Cr. L J 350 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-30
  narcotics controlheroin recoverybenefit of the doubtcriminal appealcontradictory testimonychain of custodyacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge/Judge CNS, Chakwal, convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged possession of 1110 grams of heroin, sentencing him to six years rigorous imprisonment with a fine. The core legal question before the Lahore High Court was whether the prosecution successfully established the recovery and safe custody of the narcotics beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that material contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses regarding the preparation and sealing of parcels, as well as failures in recording entries and handling case property, created serious doubts in the prosecution's case. Consequently, the High Court set aside the conviction, allowing the appeal and acquitting the appellant on the basis of the benefit of the doubt, reaffirming the settled principle that any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses regarding the sealing of narcotic parcels entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Is the prosecution obliged to prove its case against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt in narcotics trials?
  • Does an accused person have a right to be acquitted if an element of reasonable doubt exists regarding their guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Punjab Overseas Pakistani Commission and 2 others2020 PLD Lahore 49 · Lahore High Court · 2019-09-18Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Punjab Labour Court No.2, through Presiding Officer and others2020 PLC 173 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-21
  gratuity claimlabour court jurisdictionpayment of wagesvoluntary retirementworkman statusgrievance petitionindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the judgment of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's grievance petition by the Punjab Labour Court. The petitioner, a former security guard, sought the recovery of gratuity payments following his voluntary resignation. The core legal question was whether a claim for the recovery of gratuity could be adjudicated under Section 33 of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, or if it fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the authority established under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The Court held that the petitioner, having voluntarily retired, did not qualify as a 'worker' or 'workman' under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, and thus could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court for such claims. The Court affirmed that claims regarding the non-payment of gratuity must be agitated before the authority appointed under Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the lower forums correctly determined they lacked jurisdiction to entertain the grievance petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Labour Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim for the recovery of gratuity under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010?
  • Is a person who has voluntarily retired considered a 'workman' for the purpose of filing a grievance petition under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010?
  • Which forum is the appropriate authority to adjudicate claims regarding the non-payment of gratuity under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Punjab Labour Court No. 2 through its Presiding Officers2020 PLJ Lahore 268 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-21
  gratuity claimlabour court jurisdictionPunjab Industrial Relations ActPayment of Wages Actgrievance petitionvoluntary retirementworker status
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the judgment of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's grievance petition by the Punjab Labour Court. The petitioner, a former security guard, sought the recovery of gratuity following his voluntary resignation. The core legal question was whether a claim for the recovery of gratuity is maintainable under Section 33 of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, or if such a claim falls exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower forums correctly determined they lacked jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that claims for gratuity must be agitated before the authority appointed under Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner, having voluntarily retired, did not qualify as a worker under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, and thus could not invoke its grievance redressal mechanism for this specific monetary claim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claim for the recovery of gratuity be agitated under Section 33 of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010?
  • Does the authority appointed under Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, have exclusive jurisdiction over claims for the recovery of gratuity?
  • Does a person who has voluntarily retired qualify as a worker under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, for the purpose of filing a grievance petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Masood vs The Addl. District Judge, etc2020 [M] C L R 343 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-18Read full judgment →
• Tariq Maqsood and others vs Municipal Corporation etc2020 PLJ Lahore 371 · Lahore High Court · 2019-09-16Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mahmood Shah vs The State and another2020 P Cr. L J 608 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-18
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryembezzlementcorroboration of evidencestatement of co-accusedprohibitory clausecriminal misconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two post-arrest bail petitions arising from FIR No. 10/19, involving allegations of large-scale embezzlement of IESCO funds through the creation of bogus billing scrolls and fake bank statements. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, who were not initially named in the FIR and were implicated solely through supplementary statements of co-accused or witnesses, were entitled to bail. The court held that the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail. It reasoned that the prosecution failed to recover incriminating material from the petitioners or establish a direct link to the alleged crime beyond the uncorroborated statements of co-accused. The court emphasized that the evidentiary value of such statements requires independent corroboration at the trial stage. Furthermore, the court noted that the investigation regarding the petitioners was complete, and the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the case against the petitioners warranted further inquiry under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be granted bail when the prosecution's case relies solely on the uncorroborated statement of a co-accused?
  • Does the absence of incriminating material recovered from an accused justify the grant of bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • Are offences that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 eligible for post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Liaqat vs General Manager Human Resource of Mari Petroleum2020 PLC (C.S.) 1419 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-05-19
  master and servantwrit jurisdictioncontractual employmentmaintainabilityreinstatementnon-statutory rulesconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a contract employee of Mari Petroleum Company Ltd., filed a constitutional petition seeking reinstatement and back-benefits after his services were terminated. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 to reinstate an employee of a company where the relationship is governed by the principle of master and servant and the company's rules are non-statutory. The Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable. It reasoned that Mari Petroleum Company Ltd. is a private limited company without controlling shares held by the Government of Pakistan, and its employment rules are non-statutory. Consequently, the relationship between the parties is purely contractual, governed by the principle of master and servant. The Court affirmed the principle that employees of such entities cannot invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court for reinstatement or termination disputes, but must instead seek remedies through a suit for damages in a court of plenary jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contract employee of a company with non-statutory rules invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court for reinstatement?
  • Does the principle of master and servant apply to employees of a company where the Government of Pakistan does not hold controlling shares?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable for the reinstatement of an employee whose services were terminated under a contract of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Liaqat Ali Khan vs The State2020 P Cr. L J 759 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-20
  post-arrest bailcyber-crimeharassmentPrevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016dignity and modestytentative assessmentbail concession
  Summary & questions settled

  This post-arrest bail application concerns an accused charged under Sections 16, 20, and 21 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, and Sections 419 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for allegedly engaging in cyber-stalking, harassment, and the dissemination of edited, objectionable pictures of the complainant’s family. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to the concession of bail despite prima facie evidence linking him to the alleged offences. The Sindh High Court dismissed the application, holding that although the charged offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, bail remains a concession rather than an absolute right. The court established that where there is sufficient technical evidence—such as IP logs and subscriber details—connecting an accused to crimes against the dignity and modesty of individuals, particularly in the context of cyber-crimes, the court must prioritize the protection of societal interests and the victim's rights over the accused's liberty at the tentative assessment stage.

  Questions settled

  • Is bail a right or a concession for offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the existence of prima facie technical evidence, such as IP logs and subscriber details, justify the denial of bail in cyber-crime cases?
  • Can an accused be denied bail for offences involving the violation of an individual's dignity and modesty even if the punishment is less than the threshold of the prohibitory clause?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Ahmad Pathan, Udc (BPS 11 and 5 others vs Federal Board Of Revenue2020 PLC (C.S.) 1041 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-01-30
  vested rightsdepartmental promotionretrospective effectservice matterwaiting listrecruitment rulesjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, Upper Division Clerks (UDCs) at the Federal Board of Revenue, challenged an office circular dated 28.10.2018 which abolished a waiting list for promotion to the post of Inspector. The petitioners, having passed the Departmental Promotion Examination under previous rules, argued that they had acquired vested rights to promotion that could not be extinguished retrospectively by the new rules. The respondents contended that the matter related to terms and conditions of service and was thus not maintainable before the High Court. The Court held that while a department has the prerogative to formulate new recruitment rules, it cannot retrospectively take away vested rights acquired by employees under previous rules. The Court determined that the controversy regarding the vires of the circular did not fall within the scope of 'terms and conditions of service' barred from judicial review. Consequently, the Court directed the respondent department to treat the petitions as representations and decide the matter in accordance with the law and the principle that vested rights cannot be abolished retrospectively.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government department retrospectively abolish a waiting list for promotion to the detriment of employees who have already qualified under previous rules?
  • Does a challenge to the vires of an office circular regarding promotion rules fall within the scope of 'terms and conditions of service' that would bar High Court jurisdiction?
  • Do employees who have passed a departmental examination and are placed on a waiting list acquire a vested right to promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Ahmad Lodhi, Ex Deputy Assistant Director, Airport Security vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary, Aviation Division, Government of Pakistan and 2 others2020 PLC (C.S.) 427 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-03
  Airport Security ForcePakistan Army Actwrit jurisdictioncivil servantdisciplinary proceedingsservice matterouster of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the dismissal of the petitioner, a former Airport Security Force (ASF) employee, seeking reinstatement and back benefits. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, inducted into service prior to the 1984 amendments, remained a civil servant governed by the Civil Servants Act 1973, or was subject to the Pakistan Army Act 1952, thereby ousting the High Court's writ jurisdiction. The Court held that the petitioner’s service was governed by the Pakistan Army Act 1952, pursuant to the ASF (Amendment) Ordinance 1984, which incorporated Chapter IV into the Airports Security Force Act 1975. Consequently, the Court determined that the disciplinary proceedings were valid and that the writ petition was not maintainable due to the statutory bar on jurisdiction under Section 7A(4) of the Airports Security Force Act 1975. The key principle laid down is that the specific provisions of the Airports Security Force Act 1975 and the Pakistan Army Act 1952 prevail over the general provisions of the Civil Servants Act 1973 regarding the terms and conditions of ASF personnel.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Airport Security Force governed by the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 to review disciplinary orders passed against Airport Security Force personnel?
  • Do the provisions of the Airports Security Force Act 1975 prevail over the Civil Servants Act 1973 regarding the terms and conditions of service for Airport Security Force personnel?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner (Legal), Inland Revenue, Regional Tax Office, Hyderabad vs Messrs Fateh Textile Mills LtdPTCL 2020 CL. 247, 2020 PTD 203 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-16Read full judgment →
• Tara Chand vs Imtiaz Ali and another2020 MLD 1176 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-20
  criminal acquittal appealbenefit of doubtburden of proofSection 342 statementforged documentsdouble presumption of innocenceappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged the judgment of the Civil and Judicial Magistrate, Matiari, which acquitted the respondents of charges under Sections 406, 420, 468, and 506/2 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant alleged that the respondents obtained a loan by mortgaging forged vehicle documents and subsequently issued threats. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal was based on a proper appraisal of evidence or if it warranted interference. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court identified major contradictions in the prosecution's evidence, including the complainant's inability to specify the loan transaction date and the lack of verified documentation. Furthermore, the court emphasized that evidence not confronted to the accused during their statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 cannot be considered against them. Reaffirming the principle of double innocence in acquittal appeals, the court ruled that interference is only permissible if the acquittal is capricious or perverse, which was not established here.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment that is not capricious or perverse?
  • Can evidence not put to an accused during their statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be considered against them?
  • Does the prosecution's failure to prove the essential facts of a transaction beyond reasonable doubt entitle the accused to an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Tapal Tea Pvt Ltd vs Pakistan and Ors2020 SHC 794 · Sindh High Court · 2020-10-20Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Ahmad Zaffar vs Punjab Education Foundation, etc.2020 [M] C L R 280 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-17Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Daud vs Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar etc2020 PHC 92 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Tanveer Chishti vs City Police Officer and other2020 PLD Lahore 453, 2021 PLJ Lahore 56, 2020 LHC 908 · Lahore High Court · 2020-03-19Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Asim vs Pakistan Institute Of Fashion And Design, Lahore and others2020 PLC (C.S.) 1537 · Lahore High Court · 2020-09-14
  constitutional jurisdictionnon-statutory rulesmala fideprobationary periodconfirmation in servicemaster and servantdiscriminatory treatment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant Registrar at the Pakistan Institute of Fashion and Design, challenged the extension of his probationary period, the refusal to issue a formal confirmation notification, and the subsequent decision of the Senate to dispense with his services. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a constitutional petition against an institute governed by non-statutory service rules and whether the High Court can interfere when administrative actions are tainted with mala fide, discrimination, and arbitrariness. The Lahore High Court held that while writ petitions are ordinarily not maintainable against non-statutory service rules, exceptional circumstances such as patent illegality, perversity, or floating mala fide on the surface bring the matter within the constitutional jurisdiction of the Court. The Court found that the service statutes were framed pursuant to powers under a parent statute and that the respondents acted with mala fide by manufacturing adverse ACRs and violating statutory confirmation provisions. Consequently, the petition was allowed, the order dispensing with the petitioner's services was set aside, and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained against an entity governed by non-statutory service rules?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere in service matters in the presence of proven mala fide and arbitrary administrative actions?
  • Does a probationer acquire the status of a confirmed employee upon the expiry of the statutory probationary period?
  • Can adverse Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) lacking initialization dates or completed by unauthorized officers be relied upon to deny confirmation?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Ahmed Tahir vs The State and 2 others2020 YLR 2661 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-08
  corruptionmisuse of authorityNational Accountability Ordinancebenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittalmens reaprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an appeal against conviction by Tanveer Ahmed Tahir and an appeal against acquittal by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) regarding Syed Fida Hussain Shah, both arising from alleged corruption involving fake petrol invoices in the Sindh Police Department. The core legal question was whether the accused committed corruption under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999 (NAO) or if their actions constituted mere procedural irregularities. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt against Tanveer Ahmed Tahir, noting a lack of mens rea, insufficient evidence of personal gain, and the absence of specific charges. Consequently, his conviction was set aside. Regarding the NAB's appeal against the acquittal of Syed Fida Hussain Shah, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding no perversity in the trial court's reasoning. The judgment reaffirms that procedural irregularities or negligence by public officials do not equate to criminal corruption under the NAO without evidence of dishonest intention, personal gain, or misuse of authority, and that the prosecution bears the burden of proof.

  Questions settled

  • Does a procedural irregularity or negligence by a public official in financial matters constitute corruption under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999?
  • Is the prosecution required to specify the exact sub-section of Section 9(a) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999 in the charge to ensure the accused can prepare a defense?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove mens rea or personal gain preclude a conviction for corruption under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999?
  Read full judgment →
• Talat Parvaiz and 2 others vs The State2020 YLR 1225 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-04
  narcotics transportationconscious possessioncharas recoveryexcise officials testimonynon-applicability of section 103 Cr.P.C.burden of proofcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Court CNS, whereby the appellants were convicted under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life for transporting 100 kilograms of charas in a troller. The core legal questions involved whether the appellants as drivers were in conscious possession and control of the narcotics recovered from the vehicle, whether the non-association of private mashirs violated Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and whether the testimony of excise officials without independent corroboration was sufficient for conviction. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the person on the driving seat of a vehicle is presumed to have knowledge and control of articles found therein, that Section 103 Cr.P.C. is explicitly excluded in narcotics cases by Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and that police or excise officials are competent witnesses whose testimonies can form the basis of a conviction in the absence of proven animosity. The key principles laid down include the attribution of knowledge of contraband to the driver of a vehicle, the non-applicability of Section 103 Cr.P.C. to narcotics searches, and the shifting of the burden of proof onto the accused under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the driver of a vehicle can be held legally responsible for the transportation of narcotics recovered from hidden compartments of the vehicle?
  • Does the non-association of private persons as mashirs of arrest and recovery vitiate a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can the uncorroborated testimony of police or excise officials be relied upon to sustain a conviction for a narcotics offence in the absence of proven enmity?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 once the prosecution establishes a prima facie recovery?
  Read full judgment →
• Talal Ahmed vs Province of Sindh & Others2020 SHC 170 · Sindh High Court · 2020-02-19Read full judgment →
• Tajay alias Tajbar and another vs MSt. Hasina Bibi and others2020 P Cr. LJ 868 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-13
  criminal appealmurderocular testimonymedical evidenceforensic ballisticsminor contradictionssurviving witnesslife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Peshawar High Court addresses a criminal appeal and a connected criminal revision arising from a judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge/Izafi Zilla Qazi, Matta Swat, which convicted the appellants under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the complainant's mother and sentenced them to life imprisonment, alongside a conviction under section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965 for one of the appellants. The core legal questions involved the credibility of related and alleged chance witnesses, minor contradictions and omissions between the First Information Report and ocular testimony, the absence of charring marks in medical evidence, and the corroborative value of weapon recoveries. The court held that minor contradictions or omissions caused by age, illiteracy, or lapse of memory do not discredit otherwise consistent and confidence-inspiring ocular testimony, especially when supported by medical evidence, prompt registration of the FIR, and positive forensic reports. Furthermore, the court clarified that the absence of blackening or charring does not negate a close-range gunshot when the weapon is pressed tightly against the skin. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were upheld, and the revision for sentence enhancement was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor variations and omissions between the First Information Report and the statements of eye-witnesses in court are fatal to the prosecution case?
  • Does the absence of blackening or charring marks around a gunshot wound conclusively disprove that the weapon was fired at close or contact range?
  • Can a passerby or witness present on a public thoroughfare be categorized as a chance witness whose testimony must be discarded?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused on the same set of evidence automatically entitle the remaining convicted appellants to an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Tajamal Hassan (Deceased) through his legal heirs vs Member, Board of Revenue_Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner, etc2020 KLR Revenue Cases 18, 2020 [M] C L R 1027 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Taj Ali Khan vs The State and 4 others2020 YLR 696 · Federal Shariat Court · 2019-04-15
  criminal appeal against acquittalabductionZinaappellate jurisdictionprosecutrix testimonyreasonable doubtmisreading of evidenceSection 164 statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging the acquittal of respondents by the Additional Sessions Judge in a case involving allegations of abduction and Zina. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal, based on the prosecutrix's inconsistent statements and the prosecution's failure to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, was perverse or based on misreading of evidence. The Federal Shariat Court upheld the acquittal, holding that the appellate jurisdiction to disturb an acquittal is limited and only exercisable where gross injustice or perversity exists. The Court found the trial court’s judgment to be well-reasoned and balanced, noting that the prosecutrix provided contradictory versions of events across different judicial proceedings, rendering her testimony unreliable. The key principle laid down is that criminal cases must be decided on their peculiar facts, and where two views are possible, the view favoring the accused must be preferred. Furthermore, the prosecution bears the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, which was not met in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case?
  • Can a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be treated as substantive evidence if the accused was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness?
  • Does the principle of 'two views' require the court to prefer the view favoring the accused in criminal trials?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj Ali Khan & Fidaullah vs The State etc2020 PHC 436 · Lahore High Court · 2020-09-24Read full judgment →
• Taimoor Mirza vs Maliha Hussain and others2020 CLC 1029 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-01
  family courtcross-examinationelectronic evidenceemail admissibilityadditional evidenceguardianship and wardsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged orders passed by the lower appellate court and family court in a guardianship and visitation matter, wherein the petitioner was restrained from confronting the respondent during cross-examination with an email printout and from introducing additional evidence. The core legal question centered on whether a party can confront a witness in family proceedings with digital documents like emails, despite the non-strict applicability of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order and Civil Procedure Code. The Sindh High Court held that although the technical rules of evidence do not strictly apply in family courts under Section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, basic principles of evidence and jurisprudence—such as the right to effectively cross-examine and impeach a witness using previous statements and electronic documents—must be upheld. The court laid down the principle that emails and other digital communications originated by a witness can be used to confront them during cross-examination, provided they are relevant, and discussed the methods for authenticating electronic evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party confront a witness during cross-examination in family proceedings with digital documents such as emails?
  • Does the non-applicability of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order and the Code of Civil Procedure under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 bar the application of basic principles of evidence?
  • Is it mandatory to formally list or plead a document in the plaint before it can be used to confront a witness during cross-examination?
  • How can electronic mail and digital communications be authenticated and admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings?
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• Tahira Bibi vs Station House Officer and others2020 PLD Lahore 811 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-29
  constitutional petitionpolice harassmentNikah registrationchild marriagefundamental rightsright to educationMuslim Family Lawsin loco parentis
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by a petitioner seeking protection from police harassment following her marriage by free will. The core legal questions concerned the protection of fundamental rights against state harassment and the systemic failures in the registration of marriages, particularly regarding age verification and the accurate completion of Nikahnama forms. The Court allowed the petition, directing official respondents to cease harassment. The judgment established that the right to life under Article 9 includes the right to a dignified life and education. It laid down that Nikah Registrars are legally obligated to verify the age of parties using authentic documents like NADRA records and must accurately fill all Nikahnama columns. Furthermore, the Court held that Union Councils have a mandatory duty to initiate complaints against violations of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929. Emphasizing the Court's role in loco parentis, the judgment mandated that authorities implement strict Standard Operating Procedures to prevent child marriages and ensure accountability for administrative negligence in marriage registration processes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 include the right to education?
  • Are Nikah Registrars legally required to verify the age of marriage parties using authentic documentation?
  • Does a Union Council have a mandatory duty to file complaints against violations of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929?
  • Can a Nikah Registrar be held liable for failing to accurately fill all columns of a Nikahnama?
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• Tahir Zeb and others vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-25
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycommunity of intentionsudden incidentvehicular assaultmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking post-arrest bail for the petitioners in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the co-accused ran over the deceased with a vehicle due to a dispute over a car sale, while the petitioner, Shair Zaib, was sitting in the passenger seat. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's presence in the passenger seat during a sudden, unconventional vehicular assault established a community of intention sufficient to deny bail. The Supreme Court held that the suddenness of the incident and the unconventional method used by the co-accused placed the petitioner's culpability and shared intention within the remit of further inquiry. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner, while dismissing the petition as not pressed regarding the co-accused driver.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mere presence of an accused in the passenger seat of a vehicle used by a co-accused to run over a victim constitutes a community of intention sufficient to deny bail?
  • Does an unconventional and sudden mode of assault by a co-accused bring the case of a passenger within the scope of further inquiry for the purpose of granting bail?
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• Tahir Mehmood, Junior Technical Teacher B-9 (Wood Work) Government2020 SC AJK 80 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Tahir Mahmood Gujjar, D.S.P. vs The State etc.2020 PLD Lahore 703, PLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 1026, 2020 LHC 711 · Lahore High Court · 2020-03-16
  habeas corpusillegal detentionmonetary compensationpolice misconductsummary inquirySection 491 Cr.P.C.criminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges an order by the Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, directing the petitioner, a Deputy Superintendent of Police, to pay compensation to four individuals for their illegal detention. The core legal question was whether a court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 491 or Section 491(1A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, possesses the authority to award monetary compensation to a victim of illegal detention. The Court held that awarding such compensation is a recognized and permissible practice in habeas corpus proceedings to deter illegal police practices, as established by various precedents. However, the Court found that the Sessions Judge failed to conduct a necessary summary inquiry to definitively identify the specific official responsible for the illegal detention. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Sessions Judge with directions to conduct a summary inquiry—either personally or through a Magistrate or senior police official—to establish liability before imposing any compensation. The judgment affirms that while courts have the power to award tentative compensation, liability must be clearly established through proper inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court award monetary compensation to a detenu while exercising jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a summary inquiry required to establish the liability of a police official before ordering them to pay compensation for illegal detention?
  • Does the award of compensation in habeas corpus proceedings preclude the victim from filing a separate civil suit for damages?
  • Do Sessions Judges possess the authority to exercise powers under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Tahir Bharwana S/o Sikandar Hayat Bharwana vs The Collector ofPTCL 2020 CL. 238 · Customs Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Tabasam Ashraf, Lady Extension Officer, B-16, Agriculture Department Azad2020 SC AJK 42 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  service appeallimitation periodofficial gazetteconstructive noticeseniority notificationcondonation of delayquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal as time-barred. The core legal question was whether a seniority notification published in the official gazette constitutes sufficient communication to trigger the limitation period for filing an appeal, and whether the appellant could introduce new factual grounds regarding her leave status for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal’s decision. The Court held that the appellant failed to justify the significant delay in filing the appeal and that new factual claims not raised before the lower forum are inadmissible. The Court established that an order published in the official gazette is deemed communicated to the public from the date of publication. Furthermore, it reaffirmed the principle that a party must explain the delay for each day, and that questions of fact not raised before the lower tribunal cannot be introduced for the first time in appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the publication of a notification in the official gazette constitute valid communication for the purpose of calculating the limitation period?
  • Can a party raise a new question of fact before the Supreme Court that was not pleaded before the Service Tribunal?
  • Is a party required to explain the delay for each and every day when seeking condonation of delay in a service appeal?
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• Tabasam Ashraf vs Azad Jammu And Kashmir Government through Chief2021 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 70, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 936 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2020-02-07
  service appeallimitationcondonation of delayofficial gazettedeemed communicationseniority notificationquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal regarding a seniority notification as time-barred. The core legal question was whether an appeal filed nearly nine months after the issuance of a seniority notification published in the official gazette was within the period of limitation, and whether publication in the official gazette amounts to communication of the order under the relevant law. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that publication of a notification in the official gazette constitutes deemed communication to the affected parties from the date of publication, and an appellant must explain each day's delay. The Court established that where the law requires publication in the official gazette rather than personal service, limitation runs from the date of such publication, and questions of fact not raised before the tribunal cannot be agitated for the first time before the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the publication of a notification in the official gazette constitute deemed communication of an order for the purpose of computing limitation?
  • Can a question of fact that was not raised before the Service Tribunal be permitted to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Is an appellant required to explain the delay of each and every day in filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
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• Syeda Nawazish Arooj vs University of Azad Jammu & Kashmir through Registrar and 5 others2020 P SC 500 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-09-12Read full judgment →
• Syeda Nawazish Arooj vs University of Azad Jammu & Kashmir through its Registrar, Muzaffarabad and 5 others2020 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 21 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-09-12Read full judgment →
• Syeda Anis Sughra Jafri and others vs Province Of Sindh through Chief2020 PLC (C.S.) 557 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-19
  Constitutional petitionfake appointmentsalary arrearsmedical fitness certificateservice lawquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a set of Constitutional Petitions filed by individuals claiming to be appointed as Junior School Teachers (JST) in BPS-09, seeking a declaration of entitlement to salary payments from the date of their respective appointments. The Petitioners alleged that their salaries were arbitrarily stopped despite their continuous service. The Respondents contended that the Petitioners' initial appointments were fraudulent, citing that their medical fitness certificates were found to be fake and fabricated by the Civil Surgeon, Services Hospital, Government of Sindh. The core legal question was whether the Petitioners were entitled to salary payments when the foundational documents for their employment were disputed as fraudulent. The Court held that the Petitioners failed to establish their entitlement to salaries. It reasoned that the finding regarding the fake medical certificates constituted a question of fact that could not be resolved through Constitutional jurisdiction. The Court established the principle that where the foundational documents of appointment are proven or prima facie established as fake or fabricated, the claim for salary payments cannot be sustained, and such factual disputes are not amenable to relief under Constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claim for salary payments be entertained in a Constitutional petition when the foundational appointment documents are disputed as fake?
  • Is a finding by a medical authority regarding the authenticity of a medical certificate a question of fact that precludes relief in Constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure to establish the validity of appointment documents bar a claim for salary arrears?
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• Syed Zia-Ul-Hussnain Shamsi etc vs Government Of Punjab Through Chief2020 PLJ Lahore 325 · Lahore High Court
  trans-provincial organizationPayment of Wages Actjurisdiction of Authority18th Amendmentstatutory appealmaintainability of writ petitionlabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two sets of petitions challenging the jurisdiction of the Authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The first set, filed by employers, challenged the Authority's competence post-18th Amendment and the merits of wage orders. The second set, filed by financial institutions, challenged the Authority's jurisdiction over trans-provincial organizations and the qualifications of the appointed Authority members. The Court held that the Authority lacks jurisdiction over financial institutions because they are trans-provincial organizations, a matter within the federal legislative domain. Regarding the employers' petitions, the Court ruled that the challenge based on the 18th Amendment is meritless as the Province adopted the federal law via the Punjab Payment of Wages (Amendment Act) 2014, and Article 270AA(6) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 preserves federal laws until amended or repealed. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the employers' petitions as not maintainable, noting that a statutory remedy of appeal exists under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 have jurisdiction over financial institutions that operate as trans-provincial organizations?
  • Does the provincial legislature have the competence to legislate on matters involving trans-provincial organizations?
  • Are writ petitions maintainable against orders passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 when a statutory remedy of appeal is available?
  • Did the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 render the Authority established under the federal Payment of Wages Act, 1936 incompetent?
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• Syed Zameer Hussain Kazmi vs Chief Commissioner, ICT, Islamabad and others2020 IHC 136 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Syed Zain-Al-Abidin vs The State2020 SHC 1106 · Sindh High Court · 2020-11-27Read full judgment →
• Syed Zain ul Abideen vs Federal Board of Revenue & others2021 PLD Sindh 130, 2020 SHC 294 · Sindh High Court · 2020-04-16Read full judgment →
• Syed Zahid Hassan Rizvi vs The Province of Sindh & 03 others2020 SHC 250 · Sindh High Court · 2020-03-17
  constitutional petitionup-gradation of postpay scalecivil servicepromotionlength of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought a direction from the Sindh High Court for the up-gradation of his post as a Compounder from BPS-9 to BPS-16, alleging discrimination as his colleagues had allegedly been placed in BPS-16. The core legal question was whether an employee is entitled to claim up-gradation to a higher pay scale as a matter of right without fulfilling the requisite conditions and length of service. The court held that up-gradation is restricted to the post and not the person occupying it, does not amount to promotion, and requires department restructuring or reform in the public interest, alongside meeting the mandatory length of service. Consequently, the court dismissed the constitutional petition, ruling that the petitioner lacked the requisite length of service and that personal up-gradation is impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether up-gradation of a post applies to the office or the person occupying it?
  • Does up-gradation of a post constitute promotion in stricto sensu?
  • Is an employee entitled to claim up-gradation to a higher pay scale without fulfilling the mandatory length of service?
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