Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Nazar Hussain vs Ghulam Murtaza & another2020 SHC 132 · Sindh High Court · 2020-02-06Read full judgment →
• Nazar Hussain etc vs Nasir Ali and M/s Salahudin Suleman Cotton Factory2020 CLD 578, 2020 LHC 405 · Lahore High Court · 2020-02-24Read full judgment →
• Nazar Ali vs Addl. District Judge, etc.2020 [M] C L R 894 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-18Read full judgment →
• Nawab Sher and another vs Ismaeel2020 MLD 14 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-30Read full judgment →
• Nawab Khan son of Hassan Khan, r/o Besak Gadoon, District Swabi vs The2020 PHC 124 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Nawab Ali vs The State2020 MLD 1350 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-02-28
  criminal appealconcurrent sentencesarms ordinancemurder trialsentence reductioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Swabi, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment. At the hearing, the appellant's counsel did not contest the case on merits but requested that the sentence in the arms case be ordered to run concurrently with the sentences awarded in a separate murder case under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, where the appellant's death sentences were earlier commuted to life imprisonment by the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether multiple sentences imposed on the same convict in different trials could be directed to run concurrently. The Peshawar High Court held that under Section 397 read with Section 35(2)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court is empowered to order different sentences inflicted upon one accused to run concurrently. The court accordingly accepted the request and directed that the sentences in both cases shall run concurrently.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple sentences inflicted upon one accused in different trials can be ordered to run concurrently?
  • Does the court have the power under the Code of Criminal Procedure to direct sentences in separate cases to run concurrently?
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• Nawab Ali and others vs StatePLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Karachi) 1319 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-11
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausefurther inquiryShajjah-i-MudihaGhayr Jaifah Badihaocular accountmedical evidencecriminal assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by multiple accused persons charged under Sections 324, 337-A(ii), 337-F(ii), 311, 355, 147, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an alleged assault involving hatchets, cudgels, and the smearing of black oil. The core legal question was whether the accused were entitled to bail, particularly considering that some charges fell outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that while bail is generally granted for offences outside the prohibitory clause, it is not a matter of right and can be refused based on the specific facts and circumstances. The Court distinguished between the accused who caused injuries to vital body parts and those who did not. Consequently, the bail application for the primary accused, who caused head injuries, was dismissed, while the remaining accused were granted bail as their case warranted further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The principle laid down is that bail is not an absolute right even for non-prohibitory offences.

  Questions settled

  • Is bail a matter of right for offences that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused for offences falling outside the prohibitory clause?
  • Does the existence of enmity between parties serve as a ground for granting bail?
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• Nawab Ali and 8 others vs StatePLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Karachi) 1537 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-11
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausefurther inquiryShajjah-i-Mudihacriminal assaultbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application arises from FIR No. 186/2019 registered at Police Station Daharki under Sections 324, 337-A(ii), 337-F(ii), 311, 355, 147, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, wherein nine applicants sought post-arrest bail. The core legal question involved whether the applicants were entitled to post-arrest bail, particularly considering that certain offences attributed to them fell outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that applicants Abdul Ghafoor and Gul Hassan, who were attributed specific roles of causing head injuries declared as Shajjah-i-Mudiha and supported by recoveries and positive chemical reports, were not entitled to bail despite the offences falling outside the prohibitory clause, as bail in such cases is not a matter of right. Conversely, the remaining applicants, whose attributed injuries fell under Section 337-F(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and who were no longer required for investigation, were granted post-arrest bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for further inquiry. The key principles laid down are that bail in cases outside the prohibitory clause is not a right and can be refused based on the gravity of specific roles, and that delay or lack of necessity for further detention warrants bail under further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Is bail in offences falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to be granted as a matter of right?
  • Can post-arrest bail be refused to an accused whose case falls outside the prohibitory clause when specific active roles and weapon recoveries are attributed?
  • Does a case warrant further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the accused are attributed minor injuries not on vital parts of the body and are no longer required for investigation?
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• Nawab Ali @ Nawab Nabu vs The State2020 SHC 554 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-10
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausehurtcriminal proceduretentative assessmentbail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the accused, Nawab Ali, who was charged with causing injuries to the complainant using the butt of a gun. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail given the nature of the injuries attributed to him and the fact that the offense did not fall within the prohibitory clause of the relevant criminal procedure law. The Court observed that while the accused was armed, he did not discharge the weapon, and the specific injury attributed to him under Section 337-F(v) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 carried a maximum punishment of five years, thereby placing it outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Finding no evidence of previous convictions and noting the accused's regular appearance before the Trial Court, the Court confirmed the interim bail. The principle laid down is that where an offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of the bail statute, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, provided the accused is not a previous convict.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offense punishable by five years imprisonment fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a Trial Court cancel bail without reference to the High Court if the accused misuses the concession?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the specific injury attributed to them does not fall within the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Naveed vs National Database and Registration Authority through Chairman NADRA and 3 others2020 MLD 157 · Sindh High Court · 2019-01-07Read full judgment →
• Naveed Ullah s/o Haji Aman Ullah vs Superintendent Aso, MCC, CustomsPTCL 2020 CL. 234 · Customs Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Naveed Ahmed Khan and others vs The State through Advocate General of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzaffarabad and others2020 KLR Criminal Cases 233 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Naveed Ahmed Khan and another vs The State through Advocate General2020 YLR 1003 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-09-12Read full judgment →
• Naveed Ahmed Abro vs Province of Sindh and 04 others2020 SHC 836 · Sindh High Court · 2020-10-29Read full judgment →
• Nauman Azhar vs Celavs Private Limited through Authorized Officer and others2020 CLC 675 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-11-21Read full judgment →
• National Saving Central Directorate, Islamabad through its DG & another vs Muhammad Farooq Raja2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 135, 2020 SCP 240, PLD 2021 Supreme Court · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-02
  dual nationalityBahbood Saving Certificatelocus poenitentiaepromissory estoppellegitimate expectationpublic functionaryadministrative lawvested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the eligibility of a dual national to participate in the 'Bahbood Saving Certificate Scheme.' The respondent, a Pakistani national holding dual citizenship with Denmark, invested in the scheme, which was subsequently challenged by the National Saving Centre on the grounds of ineligibility due to dual nationality. The core legal question was whether the authority could retrospectively disqualify the respondent and recover profits after the investment had been accepted and benefits disbursed. The Supreme Court held that the authority had a duty to scrutinize eligibility prior to accepting the investment. Once a right has accrued to a citizen, the authority cannot unilaterally withdraw it, particularly when the citizen acted in good faith. Invoking the principles of locus poenitentiae, promissory estoppel, and legitimate expectation, the Court affirmed that the authority was precluded from acting detrimentally against the respondent due to its own prior failure to verify eligibility. The petition was dismissed, upholding the respondent's entitlement to the scheme's benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public authority retrospectively disqualify a citizen from a financial scheme after accepting their investment and disbursing benefits?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae prevent an authority from withdrawing a benefit once a right has accrued to a citizen?
  • Is a dual national eligible to participate in the Bahbood Saving Certificate Scheme?
  • Does the doctrine of promissory estoppel apply to prevent government functionaries from acting detrimentally against citizens who acted in good faith based on the authority's representations?
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• National Power Parks Management Company (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federal2020 PLJ Lahore 292, 2020 PTD 1001, 2020 LHC 834 · Lahore High Court · 2020-03-09
  advance income taxconstitutional petitiontax creditjurisdiction of taxation officerstatutory interpretationappealable ordersrecovery notices
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged orders rejecting the petitioner's advance tax estimates and issuing recovery notices under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question concerned whether tax authorities possess the jurisdiction to scrutinize and reject such estimates and whether the resulting orders are appealable. The Court held that the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2018, specifically the provisos to section 147(6) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, explicitly confer jurisdiction upon the Commissioner to examine and reject advance tax estimates if the documentary evidence is found unsatisfactory. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the rejection of such estimates, which effectively increases the taxpayer's liability, constitutes an appealable order under section 127 of the Ordinance. The judgment establishes that advance tax is a provisional payment and its recovery mechanism is distinct from final tax assessment. It further emphasizes that statutory amendments must be interpreted to give full effect to the legislative intent, rejecting arguments that would render specific provisos redundant or ineffective.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Commissioner have the jurisdiction to reject an estimate of advance tax furnished by a taxpayer under section 147 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is an order rejecting an advance tax estimate and increasing the taxpayer's liability appealable under section 127 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can tax authorities recover advance tax as if it were tax due under an assessment order before the final determination of income tax liability for the tax year?
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• National Institutional Facilitation Technologies (Pvt.) Limited through duly2020 [M] C L R 1634, 2020 PLD Islamabad 378 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-05-05
  public procurementtender processbid evaluationbid correctionjudicial reviewconstitutional petitionconsortiumtrack and trace systemFederal Board of RevenueLaw Division opiniontransparencyfairnessarbitrarinessWednesbury principle
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two writ petitions challenging the Federal Board of Revenue's (F.B.R.) decision to grant a five-year license to Messrs National Radio and Telecommunication Corporation (N.R.T.C.) for establishing and operating a track and trace system for tobacco products. The petitioners, competing bidders, assailed the F.B.R.'s acceptance of N.R.T.C.'s post-bid clarification to correct its financial bid from Rs.0.731 to Rs.731 per 1,000 stamps. The core legal questions revolved around the maintainability of a petition by a consortium member, the scope of judicial review over concluded contracts, the permissibility of altering bids under Public Procurement Rules, and the validity of contradictory legal opinions from the Law Division. The Court held that the process for allowing N.R.T.C.'s bid correction suffered from material irregularity and unreasonableness, setting aside the license award and the grievance redressal committee's decision, and allowing the F.B.R. to initiate a fresh bidding process.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition filed by one member of a consortium maintainable when challenging a public contract award?
  • Can a High Court interfere with a concluded contract in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can a procuring agency allow a bidder to alter or modify its financial bid after bids have been opened under Rule 31 of the Public Procurement Rules, 2004?
  • Is a legal opinion from the Law Division, which is based on irrelevant case law and contradicts a prior opinion, a valid basis for a public authority's decision?
  • Can a procuring agency waive a material error in a financial bid that fundamentally changes the quoted amount after bids have been opened?
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• National Highway Authority through Director (Legal) vs Lilley International2021 PLJ Islamabad 12, 2020 CLC 608, 2022 [M] CLR 1387, KLR 2022 Civil · Islamabad High Court · 2019-12-11Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority through Chairman vs M/s. Sarco (Private)2020 PLJ Islamabad 181 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-10Read full judgment →
• National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, Islamabad vs Gujranwala Energy (Pvt.) Limited2020 CLC 173 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-18
  Intra-Court AppealmaintainabilityLaw Reforms Ordinanceoriginal orderNEPRAreview jurisdictionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of a Single Bench of the High Court that had allowed a constitutional petition filed by the respondent. The core legal question was whether an Intra-Court Appeal is maintainable against an order passed by a Single Judge in a constitutional petition when the underlying statute provides a remedy of review. The appellant, the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, sought to impose fines on the respondent for defaulting on annual license fees. The Court held that the appeal was not maintainable. Relying on the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, and the principles established in Mst. Karim Bibi v. Hussain Bakhsh (PLD 1984 SC 344), the Court determined that if the law governing the original proceedings provides for an appeal, revision, or review, an Intra-Court Appeal is barred. The Court found that the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (Review Procedure) Regulations, 2009, expressly provided the Authority with the power to review its own decisions, thereby satisfying the statutory bar against filing an Intra-Court Appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal maintainable against an order passed by a Single Judge in a constitutional petition if the governing statute provides a remedy of review?
  • Does the existence of a suo motu review power under the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (Review Procedure) Regulations, 2009, constitute a remedy of review for the purposes of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  • What is the definition of an 'original order' under the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
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• National Construction Limited, through Authorized Officer and others vs National Industrial Relations Commission and others2021 PLJ Quetta 89, 2020 PLC 82 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-11-25
  limitationcondonation of delayex parte orderindustrial relationsconstitutional petitionappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Balochistan High Court disposes of forty-three constitutional petitions filed by National Construction Limited challenging orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) Quetta Bench and its Full Bench. The petitioner-employer had failed to properly contest the initial proceedings before the NIRC Bench, leading to an ex parte order directing the payment of outstanding dues and salaries to the respondent employees. Subsequently, the employer's appeals before the Full Bench of the NIRC were dismissed as time-barred due to a delay of twenty-two days without a satisfactory explanation. The core legal question revolved around the condonation of delay in filing statutory appeals and whether a time-barred matter can be examined on its merits. The High Court held that the law of limitation must be strictly applied, that delay defeats equity, and that where a matter is barred by time, a court or tribunal cannot go into the merits of the controversy. The petitions were accordingly dismissed in limine, upholding the principle that the law assists the vigilant and not the indolent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate forum is justified in dismissing an appeal as time-barred when the delay in filing has not been explained by plausible reasons?
  • Can a court or tribunal examine the merits of a controversy when the matter is admittedly barred by the period of limitation?
  • Does the expiry of the limitation period create a valuable right in favour of the opposite party?
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• National Command Authority through D.G.SPD and 2 others vs Miskeen2020 CLC 2089 · Lahore High Court · 2020-01-14Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan vs Pakistan Textile City Limited & others2021 CLD 194, 2020 SHC 314 · Sindh High Court · 2020-04-22Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan vs Amna Export (Pvt.) Ltd. & others2020 CLD 1243, 2020 SHC 388 · Sindh High Court · 2020-06-09
  leave to defendbanking suitstatement of accountBankers' Books Evidence ActFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinancetriable issuesmarkup claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a leave-to-defend application filed by the Defendants in a suit for recovery of finance brought by the National Bank of Pakistan. The core legal questions involve whether the Bank's statement of account, characterized by vague 'transfer' entries, constitutes prima facie evidence under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, and whether the Defendants raised substantial questions of fact regarding disbursements and repayments to warrant leave to defend. The Court held that the Bank's statement of account, which failed to specify the nature of 'transfer' entries, lacked the necessary clarity and completeness to serve as prima facie evidence. Furthermore, the Court found that the Bank's failure to support its markup claim with a statement of account and the ambiguity regarding post-expiry disbursements created triable issues. Consequently, the Court granted the Defendants leave to defend, establishing the principle that a bank's statement of account must be clear, detailed, and complete to attract the evidentiary presumption under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, and that vague entries require corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Does a bank's statement of account containing vague 'transfer' entries satisfy the requirements for prima facie evidence under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891?
  • Does the failure of a bank to support a claim for markup with a statement of account constitute non-compliance with Section 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a bank sue on the original finance agreement when it has also received bills of exchange as collateral for the same debt?
  • Does the disbursement of funds after the expiry of a finance agreement create a triable issue regarding the entitlement to markup?
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• National Bank Of Pakistan through President and 5 others vs Mumtaz2020 PLC (C.S.) 398 · Lahore High Court · 2019-11-06
  law reforms appealpromotion policyeligibility for promotionvested rightoperational requirementspro rata allocationservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 challenges an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside a promotion decision regarding the respondent on the premise that the qualifying marks threshold of 64 lacked a proper promotion policy. The core legal question concerns the distinction between mere eligibility for promotion and an enforceable vested right to be promoted against limited vacancies governed by operational requirements and pro rata regional allocations. The court held that meeting minimum eligibility criteria does not guarantee promotion, and where promotions are subject to available vacancies and competitive benchmarks determined by a valid promotion policy, a candidate falling below the cut-off cannot claim entitlement to promotion. The key principle laid down is that eligibility for consideration and a vested right to promotion are distinct concepts, and administrative promotion decisions aligned with institutional policies and vacancy constraints are lawful and sustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does eligibility for promotion confer a vested right to be promoted under all circumstances?
  • Can an employee challenge a promotion decision based on a cut-off threshold when they meet only the minimum eligibility criteria?
  • Whether vacancies allocated on a pro rata basis justify restricting promotions to candidates securing higher qualifying marks?
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• National Bank Of Pakistan through Branch Manager vs Muhammad Raies2020 CLD 784 · Lahore High Court · 2020-02-12
  recovery of financecost of fundspersonal guaranteecontinuing guaranteedeath of guarantorbanking courtremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the Banking Court regarding the recovery of a finance facility. The core legal questions involve the extent of a customer's liability for the cost of funds from the date of default, and the enforceability of a personal guarantee and the liability of a deceased guarantor's estate under continuing guarantee terms. The court held that a customer is liable to pay the cost of funds from the date of default rather than the date of institution of the suit, and that the death of a guarantor does not extinguish liability for transactions executed during their lifetime when the guarantee contains a continuation clause. The court modified the decree against the principal debtor to include costs of funds from the date of default and remanded the matter regarding the guarantor to the Banking Court for a fresh decision based on evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a customer is liable to pay the cost of funds from the date of default or from the date of institution of the suit?
  • Does the death of a guarantor extinguish liability for finance facilities availed during the guarantor's lifetime under a continuing guarantee?
  • What is the effect of a clause in a personal guarantee stating that the guarantee shall not be determined by the death of the guarantor?
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• National Accountability Bureau through Chairman vs Shabbir Ahmed Malik2020 PLJ SC 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Voluntary ReturnNational Accountability OrdinancePlea Bargainarrears of land revenuecriminal proceedingsaccountability referencevitiation of settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that quashed National Accountability Bureau (NAB) references against respondents who defaulted on payments under a Voluntary Return (VR) settlement. The core legal question was whether such default allows NAB to recover the outstanding amount as arrears of land revenue under Section 33E of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, or whether the default vitiates the settlement, allowing NAB to resume criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that a VR settlement under Section 25(a) is a one-time facility strictly contingent upon the full deposit of the determined amount. Unlike a Plea Bargain, which creates a debt recoverable under Section 33E, a VR settlement is not a long-term repayment arrangement; failure to pay the full amount renders the settlement void, thereby allowing NAB to proceed with investigations. The Court established that Section 33E is inapplicable to VR defaults. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the references were restored, with the Court noting that partial payments may be adjusted against future liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does default in payment under a Voluntary Return settlement under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, allow the National Accountability Bureau to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue?
  • Does a Voluntary Return settlement under Section 25(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, constitute a binding agreement if the full determined amount is not deposited?
  • Is there a legal distinction between a Voluntary Return under Section 25(a) and a Plea Bargain under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, regarding the recovery of outstanding amounts?
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• National Accountability Bureau through Chairman vs Muhammad2020 PLC (C.S.) 448, 2020 PLJ SC 243, 2020 P SC 219, 2020 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-06
  Compulsory retirementUnauthorized absenceExtraordinary leaveDisciplinary proceedingsMisconductService lawGovernment employeeNAB
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns disciplinary proceedings initiated by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) against an Upper Division Clerk for continuous unauthorized absence from duty, resulting in compulsory retirement. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the major penalty of compulsory retirement could be sustained when the same office order also directed the treatment of the unauthorized absence as extraordinary leave (EOL) without pay. The Islamabad High Court had set aside the compulsory retirement, but the Supreme Court allowed NAB's appeal. The Supreme Court held that the treatment of unauthorized absence as EOL without pay, often for the purpose of settling an employee's dues, does not nullify or render redundant a major penalty of compulsory retirement imposed after due application of mind to the employee's misconduct. The Court clarified that Rule 9(3) of the Revised Leave Rules, 1980, which allows for retrospective grant of EOL, is intended for genuine cases where a major penalty might be too harsh, not to automatically condone misconduct where a penalty has been validly imposed.

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• National Accountability Bureau thr. its Chairman, Islamabad vs Shabbir2020 SCP 6, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 193, 2020 P SC 240, 2020 PSC (Crl.) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-08
  Voluntary ReturnNational Accountability OrdinancePlea BargainArrears of Land RevenueCriminal ProsecutionAccountability CourtNAB References
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals challenge a High Court judgment that quashed National Accountability Bureau (NAB) references against public office holders. The core legal question was whether default in payment under a Voluntary Return (VR) settlement, pursuant to Section 25(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999, vitiates the settlement, thereby permitting NAB to resume criminal proceedings, or whether NAB is restricted to recovering the unpaid amount as arrears of land revenue under Section 33E of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that a VR settlement is a one-time facility strictly contingent upon the full deposit of the determined amount. Consequently, any default or partial payment vitiates the settlement, rendering it void and allowing NAB to proceed with investigation and prosecution. The Court clarified that Section 33E is inapplicable to VR defaults, as it pertains to Plea Bargain arrangements or court-determined sums, not voluntary settlements. The key principle laid down is that VR is a voluntary, one-time facility requiring full deposit; failure to pay terminates the settlement, reviving the NAB's authority to prosecute the accused for the underlying offences.

  Questions settled

  • Does default in payment under a Voluntary Return settlement under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 vitiate the settlement?
  • Can the National Accountability Bureau recover unpaid amounts from a defaulted Voluntary Return settlement as arrears of land revenue under Section 33E of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  • Is a Voluntary Return settlement under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 a one-time facility requiring full deposit of the determined amount?
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• Nasrullah vs The StatePLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Quetta) 711, 2020 YLR 644 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-08-29
  criminal appealidentification paradebenefit of doubtsite planforensic evidenceocular testimonyacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased and related offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concern the reliability of the identification parade, the evidentiary value of the site plan, the impact of unexplained delays in FIR registration, and the admissibility of recovery evidence. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the identification parade was conducted in violation of established guidelines, rendering it unreliable. Furthermore, significant contradictions regarding the timing of the occurrence, the presence of ocular witnesses, and discrepancies between multiple site plans created substantial doubt. The Court also noted that the recovery of the weapon from an open place, coupled with an unexplained delay in forensic analysis, failed to corroborate the prosecution's narrative. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellant, and ordered his acquittal, emphasizing that the prosecution must prove its case through consistent, credible evidence rather than improved or inconsistent accounts.

  Questions settled

  • Does an identification parade conducted in a police lockup without following established judicial guidelines lose its evidentiary value?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are significant contradictions between multiple site plans prepared by the investigating officer?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon from an open place, without forensic matching to crime scene casings, sufficient to support a conviction?
  • Does an unexplained delay in the registration of an FIR, when coupled with inconsistencies in witness testimony, entitle an accused to the benefit of the doubt?
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• Nasrullah Khan and another vs Mst. Khairunnisa and others2020 SCMR 2101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-03
  limitationrejection of plaintfraudulent transfergift deednon-joinder of necessary partybarred by timecause of action
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from concurrent decisions of the lower courts rejecting a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as being barred by time. The appellants, claiming to be donees of the disputed property through a registered gift deed executed in 1980, filed a suit in 2008 seeking a declaration that a subsequent sale deed dated 1985 and related transfers were fraudulent, void ab initio, and of no legal effect. The core legal questions involved the computation of the period of limitation, knowledge of the transactions, and the legal effect of non-joinder of a necessary party. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was hopelessly barred by time as the cause of action accrued to appellant No. 2 in 1985 upon execution of the sale deed, and to appellant No. 1 in 1991 upon attaining majority. The Court laid down that the law of limitation is founded upon public policy and State interest to ensure diligence and prevent stale claims, and that the omission to implead the attorney who executed the disputed sale deeds—who was a necessary party—was fatal to the plaintiff's case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit filed in 2008 challenging a sale deed executed in 1985 is barred by limitation when the plaintiff attained majority in 1991?
  • Does the non-joinder of the person who executed the disputed sale deed as an attorney render the suit fatal?
  • Whether the law of limitation is a mere technicality or is founded upon public policy and State interest?
  • Can a party claim ignorance of a registered gift deed and a subsequent sale transaction for nearly two decades to bypass the law of limitation?
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• Nasreen Kausar vs Mst. Hoor Afzal and 2 others2020 YLR 992 · Sindh High Court · 2019-04-19Read full judgment →
• Nasira vs Judicial Magistrate and 5 others2020 PLD Lahore 489 · Lahore High Court · 2019-08-02Read full judgment →
• Nasir Mehmood Raza and others vs Secretary Prosecution Public2021 PLJ Lahore 105, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 1578 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-21
  service lawpromotionfitness for promotionwrit jurisdictionconstitutional petitionservice tribunal jurisdictionperformance evaluation reportscivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the decisions of the Provincial Selection Board-I (PSB-I) to defer the petitioners' promotion to the post of District Public Prosecutor (BS-19). The core legal questions were whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate matters of promotion fitness, given the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution, and whether the deferment of promotion based on vague allegations of "questionable reputation" was legally sustainable when contradicted by the petitioners' positive Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs). The Court held that the petition was maintainable, as the determination of fitness for promotion is excluded from the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction, thereby bypassing the constitutional ouster clause. On merits, the Court ruled that the deferment was unlawful because the authorities failed to consider the petitioners' unblemished service records and positive PERs, which explicitly rated them as "honest" and "very good." The key principle laid down is that promotion authorities must base their decisions on objective material, such as annual confidential reports, rather than relying on unsubstantiated, subjective allegations of questionable integrity that contradict official service assessments.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute regarding the fitness of a civil servant for promotion?
  • Is the determination of a civil servant's fitness for promotion excluded from the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • Can a promotion authority defer a civil servant's promotion based on vague allegations of questionable reputation while ignoring positive performance evaluation reports?
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• Nasir Iqbal and others vs The State and others2020 P Cr. L J 1410 · Lahore High Court · 2019-11-26
  narcotics traffickingchain of custodychemical examiner reportrepresentative samplingsafe custodycriminal appealtampering of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged transportation of narcotics. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution successfully established the chain of custody for the recovered contraband and whether the chemical examiner’s reports were admissible and reliable. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found that the prosecution did not establish the safe custody of the case property, noting that the iron box containing the narcotics showed signs of tampering. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the chemical examiner's reports were inadmissible because they were photocopies rather than originals, and the prosecution failed to prove the safe transmission of samples. Additionally, the sampling procedure was deemed defective as it failed to produce representative samples. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellants. The judgment reaffirms that strict adherence to chain of custody protocols and the production of original, valid forensic reports are essential prerequisites for a conviction in narcotics cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for narcotics possession be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove the safe custody of the case property?
  • Are photocopies of chemical examiner reports admissible in evidence to prove the nature of recovered contraband?
  • Does a failure to follow Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, render a chemical examiner's report a nullity?
  • Is it necessary for the prosecution to produce representative samples of narcotics to secure a conviction?
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• Nasir Aziz and another vs The State2020 YLR 1429 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-02-24
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsconscious knowledgefurther inquiryrecovery from vehicleControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by two accused, Nasir Aziz and Abid Ali, who were apprehended in a vehicle from which eleven kilograms of heroin were recovered. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, who were passengers in the vehicle driven by a co-accused, could be denied bail despite the absence of direct recovery from their persons and the lack of evidence regarding their conscious knowledge of the narcotics stored in the vehicle's trunk. The Peshawar High Court held that the petitioners were entitled to bail, noting that while the quantity of narcotics was significant and the offense heinous, the mere nature of the crime does not disentitle an accused to bail when the case requires further inquiry. The court established the principle that in cases of recovery from a vehicle, the issue of 'conscious knowledge' regarding the contraband by passengers is a matter for trial, and where the prosecution fails to establish immediate possession or prior involvement, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry, warranting the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a large quantity of narcotics from a vehicle automatically disentitle passengers to the concession of bail?
  • Is the question of 'conscious knowledge' of narcotics stored in a vehicle's trunk by passengers a matter for trial rather than bail stage?
  • Does the absence of direct recovery from the person of an accused in a narcotics case warrant the grant of bail on the basis of further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ali Shah Bukhari and 2 others vs The Commissioner (SMD), Securities2020 CLD 929 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2019-12-26Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ahmed vs Province of Sindh & Others2020 SHC 1222 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-07Read full judgment →
• Naseer vs The State2020 SHC 4 · Sindh High Court · 2020-01-10
  post-arrest bailtheft of electric transformerprohibitory clausedelay in FIRrule of consistencycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant Tarique Ali in Crime No. 21 of 2019 registered under Sections 462, 379, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Khanoth, District Jamshoro, concerning the theft of electric plates and damaging an electric transformer. The core legal question is whether the applicant is entitled to post-arrest bail considering the delay in the FIR, the unseen nature of the incident, the rule of consistency with co-accused who were already granted bail, and the non-applicability of the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant has made out a good prima facie case for bail as the offenses do not fall within the prohibitory clause, there was an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, co-accused had already been granted bail, and the accused was no longer required for investigation. The court laid down the principle that bail should be granted under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the case falls outside the prohibitory clause, co-accused on similar facts have been enlarged on bail, and no exceptional circumstances exist to withhold the relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in the registration of an FIR without satisfactory explanation entitles an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • Does the rule of consistency apply when co-accused facing similar allegations have already been granted bail?
  • Can post-arrest bail be granted when the offenses charged do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseer Khan vs The Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad2020 PLD Peshawar 74 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-09-18Read full judgment →
• Naseer Khan vs Said Qadeem and others2020 SCMR 293, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-27
  proclaimed offendersection 512 Cr.P.C.fair trialright to cross-examineremand of casemurder trialun-cross-examined statementcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which accepted the respondent's appeal against his conviction and sentence for murder, setting them aside and remanding the case for a fresh trial with an opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses whose statements were previously recorded under section 512, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, son of the deceased, challenged this remand. The Supreme Court observed that the initial proceedings declaring the respondent a proclaimed offender were flawed and bogus, rendering the subsequent section 512 Cr.P.C. proceedings legally infirm. Furthermore, under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, fair trial is a fundamental right, and an un-cross-examined statement generally does not qualify as substantive evidence for conviction when the accused becomes available during trial. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to remand the matter to ensure a fair trial and afford the accused an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses was just and proper, emphasizing that procuring witness attendance in a State case is the responsibility of the State. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an un-cross-examined statement of a witness recorded under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be relied upon as valid evidence for recording a conviction when the accused subsequently appears before the court?
  • Does the introduction of Article 10A in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 make a fair trial a fundamental right requiring the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses?
  • Whose responsibility is it to procure the attendance of prosecution witnesses in a criminal State case where witnesses are residing abroad?
  • Can proceedings undertaken to declare an accused a proclaimed offender be treated as bogus if they fall short of legal requirements, thereby affecting subsequent proceedings under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseer Ahmed and 2 others vs The State2020 MLD 282 · Sindh High Court · 2019-01-01
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsinvestigating officercomplainant as investigatorrecovery witnessfurther inquiryPolice Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by three applicants facing charges under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of 6000 grams of hashish from each individual. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to bail given the circumstances of their arrest and the procedural irregularities in the investigation. The Court held that the applicants were entitled to post-arrest bail. The ratio of the decision rests on several factors: the failure of the raiding police party to associate independent private witnesses despite having prior information; the lack of evidence regarding any purchaser at the scene; and the procedural impropriety of the complainant police officer also acting as the investigating officer. The Court emphasized the principle that a police officer who leads a raiding party and acts as a complainant should not investigate the same case, as this violates the Police Rules, 1934, and compromises the fairness of the investigation. Consequently, the Court found that the case against the applicants required further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Can a police officer who is the complainant and a witness to the recovery also act as the investigating officer in the same case?
  • Does the failure to associate private witnesses during a raid conducted on a tip-off constitute a ground for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Is the assignment of an investigation to a police officer who is not the officer-in-charge of the relevant police station valid under the Police Rules 1934?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseem Akhtar vs Ghulam Qasim etc2020 PLJ Lahore 462 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-18Read full judgment →
• Naseem Abbas Shah vs The State and others2020 P Cr. L J 164 · Lahore High Court · 2019-06-21
  pre-arrest bailpost-arrest bailcancellation of bailmala fiderevenue record forgeryembezzlementfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves multiple petitions for pre-arrest and post-arrest bail, alongside petitions for the cancellation of bail, arising from a single FIR involving allegations of forgery, fraud, and embezzlement of mutation fees in revenue records. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners are entitled to bail given the nature of the allegations, the completion of the investigation, and the potential for mala fide intent by the complainant. The Court held that where the investigation is complete, the accused are no longer required for custodial interrogation, and the complainant's allegations appear to be motivated by mala fide, bail is appropriate. Regarding the cancellation of bail, the Court held that in the absence of evidence showing misuse or abuse of the concession of bail, and given the advanced stage of the proceedings, cancellation is not warranted. The key principle laid down is that the Court may evaluate the presence of mala fide from the facts and circumstances of the case to determine the entitlement to bail, and that bail should not be cancelled absent specific grounds of misuse.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court evaluate the presence of mala fide on the part of a complainant when deciding a bail application?
  • Is bail liable to be cancelled solely because the accused was named in the FIR, absent evidence of misuse or abuse of the concession of bail?
  • Does the completion of an investigation and the submission of a report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a ground for granting bail?
  • When does a case qualify for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseebullah vs The State2021 PLD Balochistan 127 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-07-28Read full judgment →
• Nasar Shah vs The State2020 P Cr. L J 952, 2020 PHC 54 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-23
  criminal appealjudgment writingCode of Criminal Proceduremandatory provisionssentencingAnti-Terrorism Actunlawful assembly
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court, which convicted the appellant under sections 324/34 and 353/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sections 7(c) and 7(h) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and section 15-AA of the Arms Act. The core legal question was whether the trial court’s judgment, which contained internal contradictions regarding the findings on specific charges and failed to explicitly address or sentence the accused under sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, complied with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Peshawar High Court held that the trial court failed to follow the mandatory provisions of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which requires specific findings and distinct sentences for each offense. The court established that a conviction cannot be implied or presumed; rather, the trial court must explicitly award a distinct sentence for every offense of which the accused is found guilty. Consequently, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the case was remanded for re-writing.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court judgment that fails to explicitly address charges under sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 violate Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a trial court impliedly sentence an accused for an offense without explicitly awarding a distinct sentence in the judgment?
  • Is a trial court required to provide separate sentences for each offense of which an accused is found guilty under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Naqeebullah and others vs The State and others2020 MLD 1492 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-03-31
  circumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtsupplementary statementforensic science agencycriminal appealQatl-e-Amdchain of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against a conviction under Section 302(b) read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and a revision petition seeking sentence enhancement. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellants' guilt through circumstantial evidence, specifically regarding the evidentiary value of a supplementary statement and the integrity of forensic evidence. The court held that the prosecution failed to establish a continuous, unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence connecting the appellants to the crime. The court emphasized that a supplementary statement nominating an accused after an initial FIR against unknown persons carries no higher evidentiary value than a statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, unexplained delays in forensic analysis and discrepancies between recovered crime empties and alleged weapons created reasonable doubt. Consequently, the court acquitted the appellants, affirming the principle that in cases dependent on circumstantial evidence, any missing link or reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessitates acquittal, as the burden of proof must be discharged beyond any shadow of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does a supplementary statement nominating an accused after the initial FIR have the same evidentiary value as the FIR itself?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in sending recovered crime weapons and empties to the forensic laboratory?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence if the chain of events is incomplete?
  Read full judgment →
• Nakeef son of Suhrab Nindwani vs The State2020 SHC 1086 · Sindh High Court · 2020-11-26
  post-arrest bailpolice encounterfirearm injuriesfurther inquiryprohibitory clauseineffective firingrecovery of weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two post-arrest bail applications arising from a single police encounter resulting in FIRs for offences under sections 324, 353, 402, 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 23(i)A of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail given that he sustained firearm injuries during the alleged shootout while no police personnel were injured, and questions of ineffective firing and doubtful recovery arose. The Sindh High Court allowed the bail applications, holding that where the prosecution story lacks probability, no police personnel sustained injuries despite close range, and the case falls outside the prohibitory clause or requires further inquiry, the accused should not be deprived of freedom. The key principle laid down is that an accused is entitled to bail on the ground of further inquiry when doubts exist regarding participation or the truth of the prosecution's version, and the damage of wrongfully detaining an innocent person outweighs the temporary relief of bail granted to a potentially guilty one.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when he sustains firearm injuries during an alleged police encounter but no police personnel receive any injuries?
  • Does an offence punishable under section 402 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the absence of independent witnesses to an arrest and recovery conducted upon spy information creates sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of bail?
  • Is deeper appreciation of evidence permissible at the stage of deciding a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Najmul Hassan & others vs Mst. Romana Qamar & others2020 SHC 1128 · Sindh High Court · 2020-11-24Read full judgment →
• Najeebullah Khan Niazi and Ors vs Province of Sindh and Others2020 SHC 1224 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-07Read full judgment →
• Najeeb Ullah vs The State2020 IHC 118 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-06-02
  narcoticsjuvenile offendersentencing leniencyfirst-time offenderrehabilitationcriminal appealsentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under Section 9(C) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, where the appellant was sentenced to 10 months rigorous imprisonment for the possession of 1100 grams of charas. The core legal question concerns the appropriate sentencing approach for a first-time offender who was a juvenile at the time of the offense. The court, while upholding the conviction upon finding no material contradictions in the prosecution's evidence, exercised judicial discretion regarding the sentence. The court held that first-time offenders, particularly those who were juveniles at the time of the crime, deserve a lenient view to facilitate rehabilitation and avoid the stigma of incarceration. Relying on precedents and international conventions regarding juvenile justice, the court determined that the appellant's interests were better served by avoiding further imprisonment. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal but modified the sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone by the appellant, emphasizing the principle that sentencing should prioritize reformation over retribution for novice offenders.

  Questions settled

  • Is a first-time offender who was a juvenile at the time of the offense entitled to a reduction of sentence to the period already undergone?
  • Does the sentencing of a juvenile offender require consideration of international conventions and rules regarding the protection of children?
  • Can an appellate court modify a sentence to the period already undergone based on the appellant's status as a first-time offender?
  Read full judgment →
• Najeeb Ullah vs The State and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 124, 2020 SCMR 1241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-07
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal petitionpolice investigationbail granted
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court refusing him post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 289 dated 30.08.2019 under sections 324, 334, 34, 337-A(ii), and 337-F(v) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, registered at Police Station Jandanwala, District Bhakkar. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's case warranted the grant of post-arrest bail under the principle of further inquiry. The Supreme Court observed that according to successive police investigations, the petitioner was found to be empty-handed and did not cause any injury, and nothing was recovered from him during the investigation. Holding that the petitioner had been behind bars since 14.11.2019 and his case fell within the ambit of section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 as calling for further inquiry, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to the appellant subject to furnishing appropriate bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a case where police investigations conclude that the accused was empty-handed and caused no injury fall within the scope of further inquiry for bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when nothing is recovered from him and he has been behind bars for a significant period?
  Read full judgment →
• Najam-ul-Haq vs The State2020 SHC 268 · Sindh High Court · 2020-04-02
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationconditional bailfrozen bank accountcorruptionprotective bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed before the Sindh High Court in connection with multiple FIRs registered under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The core legal question revolves around whether post-arrest bail should be granted or maintained when an accused fails to comply with conditional bail terms regarding financial deposits due to financial constraints and frozen bank accounts. The court held that the applicant is entitled to post-arrest bail by consent, subject to depositing a specific partial amount from his frozen bank account with the National Bank of Pakistan and providing further time for the remainder. The key principle laid down is that where non-compliance with a conditional bail order stems from genuine financial incapacity and frozen assets, and where the prosecution and investigating agencies consent to a revised structured payment plan, bail may be granted or restored with appropriate safeguards to secure the disputed liability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted or restored when an accused fails to comply with conditional deposit orders due to frozen bank accounts and financial hardship?
  • Can a trial court cancel bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 upon non-fulfillment of repayment conditions?
  • Whether bail recalled merely due to the absence of the accused and counsel can be converted into protective bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Najaf Iqbal vs Shahzad Rafique2020 CLD 1427, 2020 SCMR 1621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-06
  summary suitnegotiable instrumentspresumption of considerationdishonored chequerecovery suitrebuttal of presumptionhandwriting expert
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2) of the Constitution arose from a summary suit for recovery of Rs. 700,000/- filed under Order XXXVII of the C.P.C. based on a dishonored cheque. The appellant-defendant, a former employee of the respondent, contended that the cheque was part of a lost wallet/chequebook and that the respondent failed to prove the underlying transaction involving mobile SIMs and cards. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the High Court reversed this on appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a statutory presumption of consideration attaches to negotiable instruments. The Court held that since the appellant admitted the cheque belonged to his account and failed to produce a handwriting expert to dispute his signatures after the bank manager testified to 'insufficient funds' and 'payment stopped' as reasons for dishonor, the presumption remained unrebutted. The Court further clarified that once the instrument's execution is established, the plaintiff is not required to prove the underlying transaction details in the same manner as a regular civil suit.

  Read full judgment →
• Naimatullah Khan Advocate and others vs Federation Of Pakistan2020 SCMR 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-07
  encroachmentamenity plotpublic parkvoid ab initiopublic auctiontrust propertyultra viresdemolition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose under the Supreme Court of Pakistan's original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, concerning the removal of encroachments, preservation of public amenities, and the legality of land allotments in Karachi. The core legal questions involved whether the Government of Sindh could regularize or lease public land for commercial/residential purposes without a public auction, and whether the Board of Trustees of the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) possessed the statutory authority to allot, lease, or sell port land to its employees for housing societies. The Supreme Court held that under Section 10-A of the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912, any disposal of public land for commercial purposes without an open auction is void ab initio. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the KPT Act 1886 does not authorize the Board of Trustees to alienate trust land for private housing, declaring all such leases to its employees ultra vires and void. The Court ordered the demolition of illegal structures, restoration of public parks, and the cancellation of unlawful allotments.

  Questions settled

  • Is the disposal of public land for commercial purposes by the government valid without holding an open auction under the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912?
  • Does the Board of Trustees of the Karachi Port Trust have the statutory authority under the Karachi Port Trust Act 1886 to allot or lease port land to its employees for residential housing societies?
  • Can the Supreme Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, cancel lease and allotment transactions of public functionaries that are found to be ultra vires and void ab initio?
  Read full judgment →
• Naimatullah Khan Advocate and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2020 SCMR 1510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-13
  amenity plotsload-sheddingelectricity supplycollective punishmenturban planningland usecivil miscellaneous applications
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of Civil Miscellaneous Applications (CMAs) and Human Rights Cases heard by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding various civic, utility, and land-use disputes in Karachi. The court addressed issues ranging from the management of electricity supply by K-Electric—specifically regarding load-shedding practices, overcharging, and collective punishment through area-wide power disconnection—to the unauthorized use of amenity plots for private commercial purposes, such as marriage halls. The court held that the practice of disconnecting electricity for an entire area due to individual consumer default is unjustifiable and requires Federal Government intervention. Regarding land use, the court reaffirmed that amenity plots must be reserved strictly for public purposes and cannot be utilized for private commercial ventures. Furthermore, the court dismissed several applications for non-prosecution, withdrawal, or because they had become infructuous due to prior court orders or demolition actions. The court emphasized the necessity of proper land usage and directed relevant authorities, including the Commissioner Karachi, to submit reports on pending grievances to ensure compliance with urban planning and utility regulations.

  Questions settled

  • Can an electricity provider disconnect power to an entire area due to the default of individual consumers?
  • Is the use of an amenity plot for a private marriage hall a valid legal use?
  • Should a petitioner approach the High Court for the execution of a judgment previously passed by that same High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Naimatulla Khan Advocate and others vs Federation Of Pakistan and others2020 SCMR 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-21
  Karachi Circular Railwaysright to lifepublic transportationencroachment on railway landPakistan Railwaysconstitutional obligationsArticle 184(3)housing societies on public land
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan exercised its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution regarding the stalled revival and operation of the Karachi Circular Railways (KCR) and widespread illegal encroachments on Pakistan Railways land. Addressing severe public transportation deficits in Karachi, the Court examined key constitutional fundamental rights and statutory limitations under railway legislation. The Court held that the right to safe, humane, and dignified public transportation is an integral component of the fundamental right to life under Article 9, interconnected with Articles 14, 15, 18, 25, 37, and 38. It held that the State and its organs cannot abdicate this mandatory constitutional obligation by indefinitely delaying projects through bureaucratic paperwork or external dependency. Furthermore, interpreting the Railways Act 1890, Railway Board Ordinance 1959, and Railway Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002, the Court held that railway land can only be utilized for railway operations and infrastructure. The Court held that converting railway land into private housing societies or allowing private allotments for employees is strictly impermissible under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fundamental right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution encompass the provision of public transportation by the State?
  • Can land acquired or reserved for Pakistan Railways be converted into a private housing society for railway employees under the Railways Act, 1890?
  • Does the Supreme Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution remain bound by interim orders of a High Court obtained through misrepresentation or fraudulent documents?
  Read full judgment →
• Naim Anwar, Chief Executive Officer vs Director (Insurance), Securities And Exchange Commission Of Pakistan2020 CLD 1255 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2019-12-18Read full judgment →
• Nahida Jabeen vs Agha Muhammad and 6 others2020 P Cr. L J 763 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-09-26
  appeal against acquittalvicarious liabilitycommon intentionocular evidenceinjured witnessmurdermisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal against an acquittal judgment passed by an Additional Sessions Judge, Quetta, regarding charges of murder and assault. The core legal question was whether the trial court’s acquittal of the respondents was perverse, given the ocular and medical evidence presented by the prosecution. The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the acquittal. It held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent testimony of injured eye-witnesses, which was corroborated by medical evidence, despite the absence of recovered weapons. The court reaffirmed that the mere close relationship of witnesses to the deceased does not discard their testimony if it is trustworthy and confidence-inspiring. Furthermore, it established that vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applies when participants act with a common intention, even if individual fatal roles are unascertainable. Finally, it emphasized that while the scope of interference in acquittals is narrow, appellate courts must intervene when trial court findings are artificial or based on misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the close relationship of prosecution witnesses to the deceased automatically invalidate their testimony?
  • Can a conviction be sustained under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the individual fatal role of each accused is not ascertainable?
  • Is the non-recovery of weapons of offense fatal to the prosecution's case if ocular and medical evidence are otherwise convincing?
  • Under what circumstances may an appellate court interfere with a trial court's judgment of acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Naheeda Jabeen vs Agha Muhammad and othersPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Quetta) 657 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-09-06
  appeal against acquittalcommon intentionvicarious liabilityinjured eye-witnessmedical evidencedelay in FIRmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against the trial court's judgment acquitting the respondents of charges under sections 302, 337-ADF, 354, 147, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in connection with an incident where the complainant's husband sustained fatal injuries and family members were injured. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and whether the trial court erred in acquitting the respondents. The Balochistan High Court held that the ocular testimony of injured and related eye-witnesses was natural, consistent, and corroborated by medical evidence, and that delay in lodging the FIR was adequately explained. The court set aside the acquittal, ruling that the respondents acted in furtherance of a common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principles laid down are that minor discrepancies do not discredit otherwise reliable injured eye-witnesses, that close familial relationship does not disqualify a witness whose presence is natural, and that vicarious liability applies under Section 34 when a pre-planned attack by an armed assembly results in fatal injuries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in lodging an FIR is fatal to the prosecution case when adequately explained?
  • Can the testimony of related and injured eye-witnesses be relied upon without independent corroboration?
  • Does the failure to recover the weapon of offense invalidate an otherwise proven ocular and medical account?
  • How is common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 established in the absence of an individually assigned fatal blow?
  Read full judgment →
• Naeemullah vs Controlling Authority, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education Malakand Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 2 others2020 PLC (C.S.) 227 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-11
  service lawdiscretionary powerspromotiondeputationcontrolling authoritygood governanceconstitutional petitionBISE Malakand
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by an Assistant Controller Examinations seeking a declaration that he is eligible and should be considered for promotion or posting as Controller of Examinations in the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Malakand, alleging that the respondents' refusal to consider him was illegal and discriminatory. The core legal question was whether the Controlling Authority, while possessing the discretion under the relevant rules to fill the post of Controller of Examinations by direct recruitment, deputation, or promotion, is bound to exercise that discretion fairly, transparently, and without discrimination against internal eligible candidates. The Peshawar High Court held that although the Controlling Authority holds discretion in filling the post, discretionary powers must be exercised reasonably, judiciously, and in a non-discriminatory manner in accordance with good governance and fundamental rights. The Court allowed the writ petition, directing the respondents to consider the petitioner for the post by strictly adhering to the applicable rules and criteria within one month.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Controlling Authority is bound to exercise its discretion in a judicious and non-discriminatory manner when deciding to fill the post of Controller of Examinations by promotion or deputation?
  • Does an employee of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education possess a right to be considered for promotion alongside external candidates under the applicable service rules?
  • Can administrative discretion regarding appointments in statutory boards be exercised arbitrarily without considering eligible internal candidates?
  Read full judgment →
• Naeemullah Samoo vs Province of Sindh & 02 others2020 SHC 980 · Sindh High Court · 2020-02-25Read full judgment →
• Naeem Gul vs The Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Customs House, Peshawar and another2020 PTD (Trib.) 1113 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2019-05-10Read full judgment →
• Naeem alias Titu and 4 others vs The State2020 YLR 74 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-25
  criminal appealmurder referencetest identification paradejoint identification paradebenefit of doubtdacoity with murderocular accountalibiacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected murder reference arise from a judgment of the trial court convicting and sentencing the appellants for offenses under Sections 302, 396, 397, 324, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in connection with an FIR lodged for dacoity and murder. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the ocular testimony, the legal validity of a joint test identification parade, and the establishment of the identity of the assailants who allegedly committed the crime at dark hours without a known source of light or description of body features in the initial report. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt due to major discrepancies, including an improper joint test identification parade, lack of source of light during nighttime, and documentary evidence showing one appellant was incarcerated at the time of the incident. The court laid down the principle that a joint test identification parade holds no legal sanctity and that a single reasonable circumstance creating doubt in the prosecution's case entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether holding a joint test identification parade of multiple accused persons strips the identification proceedings of legal sanctity?
  • Does the statement of an injured prosecution witness require greater scrutiny with care and caution?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the FIR is lodged against unknown persons without mentioning body features or a source of light during a nighttime occurrence?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadir Ali and others vs Province Of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others2020 P Cr. L J 659 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-22
  quashment of FIRconstitutional petitioninvestigation stagealternative remedycriminal procedurehigh court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the quashment of FIR No. 219 of 2016 registered under sections 506/2, 420, 147, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Sakrand, District Shaheed Benazirabad. The core legal question addressed by the court is whether a constitutional petition for quashment of an FIR is maintainable while the criminal case is still at the investigation stage. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that at the investigation stage of a criminal case, constitutional jurisdiction or provisions relating to quashment are not attracted, and the court will not interfere with ongoing investigations in the absence of mala fides. The court laid down the principle that accused persons have adequate alternative remedies to raise factual and legal contentions before the Investigating Officer or seek discharge before the trial court prior to the framing of the charge, and courts must refrain from prematurely halting investigations or expressing opinions on the merits of unchallaned cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable for the quashment of an FIR while the case is still under investigation?
  • Can the High Court interfere with or stop the investigation of a criminal case in the absence of mala fides against the Investigating Officer?
  • What are the appropriate forums for an accused to raise factual and legal grievances when a criminal case is at the investigation stage?
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• Nadeem Waqar Khan vs Javed Masood Ahmed Khan2020 PLD Sindh 8 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-26
  illegal dispossessionpartnership disputecriminal revisioncivil disputebusiness partners
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges an order dismissing a complaint filed under sections 3 and 4 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the applicant and respondent No.1 are real brothers and business partners, meaning the dispute did not constitute forcible dispossession under the Act. The core legal question is whether the remedy under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is available to a partner against a co-partner for alleged dispossession from a partnership business premises. The court held that the remedy under the Illegal Dispossession Act is not meant to settle civil disputes or act as a substitute for civil suits, and since partners are presumed to be in joint possession or control of partnership property, one partner cannot invoke this Act against another. The court affirmed that civil remedies remain available and dismissed the criminal revision application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the remedy under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is available to a partner against another partner for alleged dispossession?
  • Can the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 be used as a substitute for a civil suit to settle business and property disputes?
  • Does a partner have presumed possession or control over the partnership business premises?
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• Nadeem vs The State2020 SHC 34 · Sindh High Court · 2020-01-14
  narcotics possessionreduction of sentencecharas recoverycriminal appealmitigating circumstancesfirst offender
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9(C) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 for the possession of 7000 grams of charas and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for five years with a fine. The core legal question was whether the conviction was sustainable based on the evidence and whether mitigating circumstances warranted a reduction in sentence. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through unshattered ocular and chemical evidence, upholding the conviction. However, considering mitigating factors such as the appellant being a first-time offender, having already served the substantial part of his sentence, and facing protracted trial proceedings, the court exercised judicial discretion to reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone while maintaining the fine and conviction. The key principle laid down is that while a conviction based on solid evidence under narcotic laws will be upheld, appellate courts may temper the sentence to the period already undergone in light of mitigating circumstances like reform, clean antecedents, and protracted custody.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conviction under Section 9(C) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 is sustainable when police and mashir evidence remains unshattered during cross-examination?
  • Can an appellate court reduce a sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone in narcotics cases based on mitigating circumstances such as reform and being a first-time offender?
  • Whether a chemical examiner's positive report regarding recovered contraband corroborates the ocular testimony in a narcotics case?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Mumtaz Qureshi vs Pakistan Petroleum Limited and others2020 PCTLR 187, 2019 CLD 1374 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-30Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Kiani vs M/s American Lycetuff (Pvt) Limited and others2021 CLD 7, 2020 LHC 2918 · Lahore High Court · 2020-12-03Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Khan and 2 others vs The State2020 YLR 2461 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-26
  suicide bombingidentification paradebenefit of the doubtcapital punishmentanti-terrorismcriminal appealappreciation of evidencehulia
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the convictions and death sentences imposed by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offences including murder and terrorism, arising from a suicide bombing incident. The appellants contested the prosecution's case, primarily challenging the reliability of the identification parade and the delay in lodging the FIR. The core legal question was whether the identification evidence, in the absence of prior descriptions (hulia) and given the procedural flaws in the identification parade, was sufficient to sustain capital convictions. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the appellants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that identification of unknown suspects requires strict adherence to procedural guidelines, including the recording of specific physical features in the FIR or initial statements. Because the witnesses provided no prior description other than the suspects having beards, and the identification parade was conducted with significant procedural irregularities, the Court found the identification unsafe. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellants, and extended them the benefit of the doubt, reiterating that courts must ensure innocent individuals are not sacrificed to the exigencies of anti-terrorism efforts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a prior description (hulia) of the accused in the FIR or initial police statement render an identification parade unreliable?
  • Can a conviction in a capital case be sustained solely on the basis of an identification parade where the accused were previously in police custody?
  • Is a confession made before the police admissible as evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Does a delay in filing an FIR necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case if the delay is adequately explained?
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• Nadeem Alias Chitta vs The State2020 P Cr. L J 1373 · Sindh High Court · 2019-10-21
  Anti-Terrorism ActCriminal AppealBenefit of DoubtRecovery of ExplosivesIllicit ArmsEvidentiary ContradictionsAcquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant by an Anti-Terrorism Court for possession of explosive substances and illicit arms. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt amidst significant evidentiary discrepancies. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution's case was riddled with fatal flaws, including unsealed case property, mismatched serial numbers on recovered items, and the failure to associate independent witnesses despite the occurrence in a populated area. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The judgment lays down the principle that the benefit of doubt is a right of the accused, not a concession, and that even a single reasonable doubt in the prosecution's narrative necessitates acquittal. Furthermore, the court cautioned against the routine application of the Anti-Terrorism Act to ordinary criminal matters, noting that such practices misuse the special legal regime and undermine the efficacy of Anti-Terrorism Courts in addressing genuine terrorist activities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to seal case property and discrepancies in serial numbers of recovered items create reasonable doubt in a criminal trial?
  • Is the benefit of doubt to an accused a matter of grace or a legal right?
  • Can ordinary criminal acts be prosecuted under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses in a populated area during a recovery operation affect the credibility of the prosecution's case?
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• Nadeem Ahmad vs Saif ur Rehman, etc2021 MLD 354, 2020 LHC 2834 · Lahore High Court · 2020-11-11Read full judgment →
• Nadeem A. Shaikh & Ors vs Fed. of Pakistan and Others2020 SHC 260 · Sindh High Court · 2020-03-20Read full judgment →
• Nadar Wali vs Sumaya Gul and another2020 P SC (Crl.) 677, 2020 SCMR 414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-03
  cognizance of offencesforged documentsfamily court proceedingswritten complaintcriminal procedureremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which set aside the acquittal of the petitioner and remanded the case to the trial court for proceedings. The core legal question concerns whether the trial court could take cognizance of offences involving forged documents used in judicial proceedings without a written complaint from the concerned court, as mandated by statute. The Supreme Court held that the trial court could not take cognizance of the offences under section 195(1)(b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure without the requisite written complaint from the concerned court, and remanding the case for trial on unrelated offences was unjustified. The key principle laid down is that where a statute bars taking cognizance of certain offences without a formal written complaint from the relevant court, proceeding with trial without such a complaint is a nullity, and the proper legal course is for the concerned court to file the necessary written complaint.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court take cognizance of offences related to forged documents produced in judicial proceedings without a written complaint from the concerned court?
  • Whether remanding a case for trial on offences not made out or committed during court proceedings is legally sustainable?
  • What is the proper legal remedy when a trial court lacks cognizance for want of a statutory written complaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Nabi Bux Khaslheli vs The State2020 SHC 66 · Sindh High Court · 2020-01-22
  criminal appealrule of consistencyacquittalappreciation of evidenceShajjah-e-Khafifadirect complaintcontradictory evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under Section 337-A(i), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, handed down by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s conviction could be sustained when co-accused, charged on the same set of evidence, had been acquitted, and whether the prosecution evidence was reliable given the material contradictions and the existence of long-standing enmity. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, citing significant discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence and the unexplained delay in filing the direct complaint. Crucially, the Court applied the 'rule of consistency,' holding that once prosecution evidence is disbelieved regarding co-accused persons, it cannot be relied upon to convict the remaining accused without independent, unimpeachable corroboration. Finding no such corroboration and noting the trial court's inconsistent treatment of the evidence, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. This judgment reaffirms that the rule of consistency is a fundamental safeguard against arbitrary convictions in criminal trials.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be maintained against an accused when co-accused charged on the same set of evidence have been acquitted?
  • Does the rule of consistency require independent corroboration when prosecution evidence is disbelieved for some co-accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on evidence that is contradictory regarding the nature and seat of injuries?
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• Nabi Bakhsh vs The State2020 MLD 1580 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-03-19
  criminal appealrash and negligent drivingqatl-i-khatastatement of accusedburden of proofvehicular accidentacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Sections 320, 279, 337-G, 337-A(i)(ii)(iii), and 337-F(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing death and injuries through a vehicular accident resulting from an overturned passenger vehicle. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved rash and negligent driving beyond a reasonable doubt and whether a conviction could be sustained solely on a statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without evaluating the prosecution's evidence. The Balochistan High Court held that none of the ocular witnesses supported the prosecution's case regarding rash and negligent driving, the complainant was hostile, and the trial court erred by ignoring prosecution evidence and improperly relying on a fractured portion of the accused's statement coupled with unverified physical inspection of the vehicle months later. The court laid down that the prosecution must independently prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, that high speed alone does not constitute rashness or negligence, and that an accused's statement under Section 342 must be accepted or rejected in toto. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does driving a vehicle at a high speed alone constitute a rash and negligent act under criminal law?
  • Must an accused's statement recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be accepted or rejected in toto?
  • Can a court convict an accused solely on the basis of a statement under Section 342 without independently evaluating and believing the prosecution evidence?
  • Is medical evidence considered substantive proof to identify the culprit in a criminal trial?
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• Nabeela Kiran vs Government Of Punjab and others2020 PLC (C.S.) 560 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-25
  resignationvoluntary resignationservice lawintra-court appealnatural justicecompetent authoritywithdrawal of resignation
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal challenges an order dismissing a writ petition concerning the resignation of an education department employee. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s resignation was a voluntary act or a form of protest against non-congenial working conditions, and whether the competent authority properly adjudicated the resignation and the subsequent request for withdrawal. The Court held that the competent authority failed to discharge its legal obligation to investigate the circumstances surrounding the resignation, specifically failing to ascertain if the decision was voluntary or compelled by harsh conduct. The Court emphasized that authorities must ensure a resignation is not merely a complaint or a result of duress before accepting it. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter to the Chief Executive Officer, Khanewal, directing a fresh decision on the appellant's representation after affording a right of audience. The judgment reinforces the principle that an employer must verify the voluntariness of a resignation, particularly when allegations of a hostile work environment are raised, to ensure compliance with natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Is a competent authority legally obligated to ascertain whether a resignation is voluntary or submitted under duress before accepting it?
  • Does a resignation submitted as a protest against non-congenial working conditions constitute a valid voluntary resignation?
  • What is the correct test to determine whether an employee's resignation was voluntary or compelled by the employer's conduct?
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• NAB through its Chairman vs Muhammad Shafique2020 P SC 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-06
  compulsory retirementunauthorized absenceextraordinary leavedisciplinary proceedingsmisconductadministrative discretionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a government employee, was compulsorily retired by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) following a 66-day unauthorized absence. The High Court set aside this penalty, reasoning that because the office order imposing the retirement also treated the absence as extraordinary leave (EOL) without pay, the penalty was legally inconsistent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if this treatment of absence invalidated the major penalty. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the treatment of unauthorized absence as EOL without pay is merely an administrative mechanism to settle dues and does not condone the underlying misconduct or nullify a major penalty imposed for that same misconduct. The Court clarified that the power to grant EOL retrospectively under the Revised Leave Rules, 1980 is discretionary and not automatic. Furthermore, the Court established that an administrative order imposing a major penalty for misconduct remains valid even if it contains a superfluous or redundant clause treating the period of absence as EOL, as the latter does not constitute a penalty or condonation of the unauthorized absence.

  Questions settled

  • Does treating a period of unauthorized absence as extraordinary leave without pay automatically condone the misconduct of the employee?
  • Can an administrative order imposing a major penalty for misconduct coexist with a direction treating the period of absence as extraordinary leave?
  • Is the power to grant extraordinary leave retrospectively under the Revised Leave Rules 1980 mandatory or discretionary?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Zafa Pharmaceuticals Labs (Pvt) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan &2020 CLC 1784, 2020 SHC 240 · Sindh High Court · 2020-03-13Read full judgment →
• M/s. Universal Insurance Company Ltd. through Manaing Director vs M/s.2021 CLD 120, 2020 PLJ Lahore 582 · Lahore High Court · 2020-09-17Read full judgment →
• M/s. U & I Garments Private Limited vs Federation of Pakistan & Others2020 SHC 848 · Sindh High Court · 2020-11-03Read full judgment →
• M/s. TNB Liberty Power Limited, Islamabad vs Federation Of Pakistan2020 PLJ Islamabad 122 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Security and Management Services Pvt. Ltd vs Authority (North Zone),2020 [M] C L R 1417 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-28
  ex-parte orderunpaid wagesservice of noticealternate remedyconstitutional petitionpayment of wages
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a constitutional petition challenging an ex-parte order passed by the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, whereby an employee's claim for unpaid wages was accepted. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner-company was properly served with notices prior to being proceeded against ex-parte and whether the constitutional petition is maintainable in the presence of an adequate alternate remedy of appeal under the Payment of Wages Act. The Lahore High Court held that the record demonstrated proper service of notices through courier and registered post, and that the petitioner failed to substantiate claims of non-service. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where service of notice is duly established and an alternate statutory remedy of appeal is available, a constitutional petition against an ex-parte order is not maintainable, and assertions of non-service without supporting evidence cannot displace the presumption of regular service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against an order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act when an alternate remedy of appeal is available under section 17 of the Act?
  • Does the mere omission of full address details on a courier receipt vitiate the presumption of service when delivery at the destination is established?
  • Can an ex-parte order be set aside on the ground of non-service of notice when the record shows proper dispatch and receipt of notices?
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• Noor Ahmed Samejo vs The State2020 SHC 1226 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-07
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausedelay in FIRcriminal procedurehurt case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal bail application filed by applicant Noor Ahmed Samejo seeking post-arrest bail in Crime No. 70/2020 registered at Police Station Tangwani, under sections 337-F(v), 147, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the applicant is entitled to post-arrest bail where there is an unexplained delay in the registration of the FIR and the charged offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that the unexplained delay of 56 days in lodging the FIR creates reasonable doubt regarding the allegations, and since the offence is punishable with imprisonment up to five years and falls outside the prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C., the grant of bail is a matter of right rather than grace. The court laid down the principle that accused persons involved in offences not falling within the prohibitory clause and where further inquiry is warranted are entitled to post-arrest bail as a matter of right, consistent with established precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay of 56 days in the registration of an FIR create reasonable grounds for the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Is an accused charged with an offence punishable up to five years that falls outside the prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C. entitled to bail as a matter of right?
  • Whether the applicant made out a sufficient case for post-arrest bail under section 497 Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• M/s. Peshawar Electric Supply company Peshawar vs Commissioner Ir, Rto, PeshawarPTCL 2020 CL. 324 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-12-16Read full judgment →
• M/s. Pak Steel Mills & another vs Federation of Pakistan & Others2020 SHC 456 · Sindh High Court · 2020-06-30Read full judgment →
• M/s. New Dadu Sugar Mills (Pvt) Ltd., Karachi vs The Commissioner Inland2020 PCTLR 1203 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-09-30Read full judgment →
• M/s. Muhammad Yousaf Tea Seller, Faisalabad vs The Cir (Lyallpur Zone),PTCL 2019 CL. 78 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-11-15Read full judgment →
• M/s. Muhammad Asif vs Bashir Ahmed and others2020 PLJ Tr.C. 19 · Punjab Environmental Tribunal · 2014-05-19Read full judgment →
• M/s. Mehran Oils (Pvt) Limited vs Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority2020 SHC 362, 2021 PLD Sindh 67 · Sindh High Court · 2020-05-18Read full judgment →
• M/s. Mangla View Resort(Pvt.) Ltd vs Commissioner Inland Revenue,PTCL 2020 CL. 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-19
  long-term contractsincome taxpercentage of completion methodburden of prooftaxable profitconstruction contracts
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the applicability of Section 36 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which governs the taxation of profits derived from long-term contracts. The appellant, a private company, challenged the tax authorities' application of the 'percentage of completion method' for calculating profits on construction contracts that extended beyond a single tax year. The core legal question was whether the appellant's contracts fell within the definition of 'long-term contracts' under Section 36, thereby necessitating the use of the percentage of completion method for tax purposes. The Court held that because the appellant failed to produce the relevant contractual documents to substantiate its claim that the contracts did not meet the criteria for long-term status, the burden of proof was not discharged. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower authorities' decisions. The key principle laid down is that the taxpayer bears the onus of producing the necessary record to establish that a contract falls outside the ambit of Section 36, and in the absence of such evidence, the court will not speculate on the applicability of the provision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie with the taxpayer to produce contractual records to demonstrate that a contract falls outside the scope of Section 36 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • What constitutes a long-term contract for the purposes of profit calculation under Section 36 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Is the determination of costs allocated to a long-term contract a question of fact that precludes re-appraisal by the Supreme Court?
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• M/s. Mahvash and Jahangir Siddiqui Foundation, Karachi vs The2021 PTD (Trib.) 1456, 2020 PCTLR 754 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-10-30Read full judgment →
• M/s. Liberty Mills Limited vs Federation of Pakistan & others2020 SHC 1270 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-09Read full judgment →
• M/s. Latif International (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad vs The Cir(a), Rto, FaisalabadPTCL 2020 CL. 265 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-04-17Read full judgment →
• M/s. Khyaban Packages, Faisalabad vs The Cir(Zone-Hi), Samundri Road,PTCL 2020 CL. 142 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-11Read full judgment →
• M/s. K-Electric Supply Company Limited and 2 others vs Fayyaz Ahmed2020 PLJ Karachi 96 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Iqbal Brothers Engineering Works, Faisalabad vs The Cir(a), Rto,PTCL 2020 CL. 255 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-05-27Read full judgment →
• M/s. Ihsan Sports through Managing Partner vs M/s. Pakistan Cargo2020 PLJ Lahore 158 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Humak Engineering (Pvt) Ltd. Islamabad through C.E.O. vs Model2020 PLJ Islamabad 109 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →