Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Sohail vs Kamran Siddiqui2019 CLC 2008, 2019 SHC 232 · Sindh High Court · 2019-07-12Read full judgment →
• Sohail Nasir son of Nasir vs The State etc2020 YLR 834, 2019 PHC 268 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-24
  circumstantial evidencemurdercriminal appealpointationbenefit of the doubtacquittalchain of evidencepolice recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) and Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder and beheading of the deceased, alongside a connected revision petition seeking enhancement of the sentence to death. The core legal question before the Peshawar High Court was whether the prosecution had successfully proven its case based entirely on circumstantial evidence, including police pointation recoveries, against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The court held that the circumstantial evidence presented—ranging from dubious police pointations and unverified weapon recoveries to contradictory arrest timelines and unproven nexus between the accused and the crime scene—failed to form a complete and unbreakable chain pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitted the appellant of the charges, and dismissed the sentence-enhancement revision petition. The key principle laid down is that where a prosecution case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, every single link in the chain of circumstances must be securely connected and point unequivocally to the guilt of the accused, and any missing links or serious doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence if the links in the chain of evidence are incomplete or doubtful?
  • Whether doubtful police recoveries made on the pointation of an accused can form the basis of a murder conviction?
  • What is the evidentiary value of circumstantial evidence where the prosecution fails to establish a clear nexus between the accused, the crime scene, and the weapon of offence?
  • Does the benefit of a missing link in circumstantial evidence invariably go to the accused?
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• Sohail Iqbal vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 105 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-08
  pre-arrest bailtheft of electricitybailable offenseloss to exchequercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in connection with F.I.R. No. 280/2018, registered under Section 39-A of the Electricity Act, 1910, for the alleged theft of electricity. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the circumstances of the case, including the payment of the outstanding dues. Upon review, the Court observed that the F.I.R. lacked a specified time of occurrence and that the petitioner had already paid the outstanding electricity bills, thereby causing no loss to the exchequer. Furthermore, the Court noted that the offense under Section 39-A carries a maximum punishment of three years and is considered bailable. Since no recovery was required from the petitioner, the Court held that incarceration would serve no useful purpose and would be counterproductive to the administration of justice. Consequently, the Court confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that sending the accused to jail under these circumstances would be unnecessary. The principle established is that where the alleged loss to the exchequer has been satisfied and the offense is bailable, pre-arrest bail should be confirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an offense under Section 39-A of the Electricity Act 1910 considered bailable?
  • Does the payment of outstanding electricity bills constitute a valid ground for confirming pre-arrest bail in a theft of electricity case?
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• Sohail Hussain s/o Ghulam Hussain vs State through Advocate-General for2019 SC AJK 162 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-11-14Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed and 3 others vs National Bank of Pakistan through its2019 PLJ Peshawar 37 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmad etc vs State, etcPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 281 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-28
  benefit of doubtunwitnessed murdercircumstantial evidencecustodial confessionDNA test report admissibilitymurder referenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of his step-mother. The core legal questions involve the evaluation of circumstantial evidence, the admissibility of custodial confessions, the evidentiary value of DNA test reports, and the application of the benefit of the doubt in unwitnessed murder cases. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, as the FIR was based on mere suspicion, the custodial confession was inadmissible, co-accused with identical roles were acquitted, and the DNA report lacked statutory backing under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court established that a single reasonable circumstance creating doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right, and suspicion cannot substitute for proof. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction and death sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Is a confession made by an accused while in police custody admissible in evidence under Article 39 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Whether suspicion, howsoever grave or strong, can be a proper substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case?
  • Is the report of a biochemical expert on DNA covered under Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 as an admissible piece of evidence without formal proof?
  • Can evidence disbelieved against acquitted co-accused be relied upon against the remaining accused without independent corroboration?
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• Sofia Ashfaq vs Haseeb Ashfaq Bhatti and others2019 PLD Islamabad 238, 2019 KLR Civil Cases 34 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-04
  succession certificateeffectiveness of divorceMuslim Family Laws Ordinancesummary proceedingsirregular marriagecivil revisioninheritance rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Sofia Ashfaq, filed a civil revision petition challenging the appellate judgment setting aside the trial court's order granting her a succession certificate in respect of her deceased husband's legacy. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's second marriage was rendered void or invalid because it was contracted before the issuance of the certificate of effectiveness of divorce regarding her first marriage under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and whether summary succession proceedings could determine such disputed matrimonial status. The Islamabad High Court held that proceedings under the Succession Act, 1925, are summary in nature and cannot resolve intricate questions of title or status, which must be adjudicated in a court of plenary jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court held that failure to give notice to the Chairman does not render a divorce ineffective in Shariah, and a marriage contracted during the subsistence of such a period or before the certificate's issuance is at best irregular and not void, especially where the certificate of effectiveness was issued prior to the demise of the second husband, thereby curing any irregularity. The revision petition was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proceedings under the Succession Act, 1925, are summary in nature and preclude the determination of intricate questions of title or matrimonial status?
  • Does the failure to issue a notice of talaq to the Chairman under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, render a divorce ineffective in Shariah?
  • Is a marriage contracted by a woman before the issuance of a certificate of effectiveness of divorce considered void or merely irregular under Islamic law?
  • Can the subsequent issuance of a certificate of effectiveness of divorce prior to the demise of the husband cure an irregularity in a marriage?
  • Is the requirement to furnish surety bonds under Section 375 of the Succession Act, 1925, a necessary safeguard when granting a succession certificate in disputed cases?
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• SNGPL Abbottabad through Regional Manager vs Ahzaz CNG Station and 2 others2019 YLR 1402 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-23Read full judgment →
• Sme Bank Ltd through its President Islamabad vs Izhar ul Haq2019 SCP 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-15
  Intra-Court AppealLaw Reforms OrdinanceRes JudicataWrit JurisdictionService RegulationsMaintainability of Writ PetitionExecution of Judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a service dispute involving an employee of SME Bank Ltd who challenged disciplinary penalties and sought benefits under a Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS). The core legal questions were whether an Intra-Court Appeal (ICA) was maintainable against a Single Judge's decision in a writ petition where the underlying service regulations provided for appeal or review, and whether a second writ petition was maintainable to seek implementation or additional relief denied in an earlier, unappealed judgment. The Supreme Court held that under the proviso to Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, if the original proceedings provided for an appeal or review, an ICA is barred, making the direct appeal to the Supreme Court competent. Furthermore, the Court held that a second writ petition seeking relief that was essentially denied or not granted in a previous, final judgment is barred by the principle of res judicata. The Court established that a party cannot initiate fresh litigation to re-litigate claims that were implicitly denied in prior proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal maintainable against a judgment of a Single Judge in a writ petition if the underlying service regulations provide for an appeal or review?
  • Can a second writ petition be maintained to seek relief that was not granted in a previous, unappealed judgment?
  • Does Article 187 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 empower a High Court to execute its own judgments?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to a second writ petition seeking relief that was implicitly denied in an earlier judgment?
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• Sme Bank Limited through President Islamabad and others vs Izhar Ul Haq2020 [M] C L R 22, 2019 PLJ SC 470, 2019 P.S.C. 1431, 2019 SCP 250, 2019 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-15
  Intra-Court Appealres judicataconstitutional petitionVoluntary Separation Schememaintainabilitydisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent, an Executive Vice President of the appellant bank, who was penalized by withholding Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) benefits due to gross negligence and irregularities. The respondent challenged the penalty through a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court, which allowed the petition only to the extent of directing the payment of VSS benefits, while remaining prayers were unaddressed or implicitly denied. The respondent subsequently filed a second constitutional petition before the Islamabad High Court seeking salaries, allowances, and enhanced VSS benefits, which was accepted. The Supreme Court considered whether an Intra-Court Appeal was barred under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, due to the availability of an appeal under service regulations, and whether a second constitutional petition for the implementation or expansion of a prior judgment was maintainable. The Court held that the Intra-Court Appeal was barred and the direct appeal before the Supreme Court was competent. Furthermore, the Court held that a second constitutional petition for claims not granted in the first petition is barred by the principle of res judicata, as reliefs not expressly granted are deemed refused. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal is barred against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court when the original statutory proceedings provide for a remedy of appeal?
  • Is a second constitutional petition maintainable for claiming reliefs that were sought in a prior constitutional petition but not granted by the court?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to bar a subsequent constitutional petition seeking reliefs that were implicitly denied in an earlier round of litigation?
  • Can a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be utilized for the execution or implementation of a judgment passed in an earlier constitutional petition?
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• Slackness in the Progress of Pending Enqu Iries Relating to Fake BankPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 71, 2019 SCMR 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-07
  suo motu noticefake bank accountsmoney launderingJoint Investigation TeamNational Accountability BureauExit Control Listcorruption and corrupt practices
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu matter under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan arose from widespread reports of fake bank accounts used for money laundering, kickbacks, and unlawful financial transactions involving several high-profile individuals and entities, including the Omni Group. Due to the complexity of electronic data and the inadequacy of specialized investigators within the Federal Investigation Agency, the Supreme Court previously constituted a Joint Investigation Team. The core legal question concerned the legality and scope of the Joint Investigation Team's findings and the appropriate forum to proceed with the investigation and trial of the accused. The Court held that the Joint Investigation Team's report revealed prima facie evidence of cognizable offences involving corruption and money laundering, and directed that the entire record and report be transmitted to the National Accountability Bureau for further inquiry and filing of references before the Accountability Courts in Islamabad/Rawalpindi. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court can constitute a specialized joint investigation team in complex financial crimes under its constitutional jurisdiction and direct the National Accountability Bureau to initiate proceedings based on such findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can constitute a Joint Investigation Team under Article 184(3) of the Constitution for complex financial crimes?
  • Can a Joint Investigation Team probe transactions and activities incidental to its original mandate regarding fake bank accounts and money laundering?
  • Whether the report and evidence collected by a court-appointed Joint Investigation Team can be legally transmitted to the National Accountability Bureau for further proceedings?
  • Do high-profile political figures possess an absolute right to remain off the Exit Control List when under investigation for financial crimes?
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• Sindh Petroleum & CNG Dealer Association & Others vs Federation of Pakistan & Others2019 SHC 334, 2020 CLC 851 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-03Read full judgment →
• Sindh Industrial Trading Estates Limited vs Joint Registrar of Companies, CCD, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2021 P C T L R 250, 2019 CLD 1358 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2019-06-18Read full judgment →
• Sindh Environmental Protection Agency through Authorized Officer vs Messrs Silver Textile through Owner and 2 others2019 CLD 698 · Sindh Environmental Protection Tribunal · 2019-02-12Read full judgment →
• Sindh Employees Social Security Institution vs Mehran Sugar Mills2019 PLC 1 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-17
  social security contributionstatutory liabilityemployer defaultemployee registrationbeneficial legislationnotified establishmentmedical benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the order of the Social Security Court, which had relieved the respondent (a sugar mill) of its liability to pay social security contributions. The core legal question was whether a notified establishment could avoid statutory contribution obligations by claiming it provided alternative medical arrangements or that the Social Security Institution failed to provide facilities, despite the employer's failure to register its employees. The Court held that the obligation to pay contributions arises by operation of law upon notification of the establishment. It ruled that the employer cannot benefit from its own default, specifically its failure to register employees, which is a prerequisite for accessing benefits. The Court emphasized that the statutory duty to contribute is not contingent upon the actual provision of benefits or the existence of private medical contracts. The principle laid down is that once an establishment is notified under the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, the employer’s liability to contribute is absolute and cannot be defeated by the employer's own non-compliance or alternative arrangements.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer's failure to register employees with the Social Security Institution absolve the employer from the statutory liability to pay social security contributions?
  • Can an employer avoid paying social security contributions by claiming they provided alternative medical arrangements for their employees?
  • Is the liability to pay social security contributions contingent upon the actual provision of medical benefits by the Social Security Institution?
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• Sikandar Hayat Khan Jogazai, etc vs Muhammad Hashim, etc2019 SCP 328, 2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 91, PLD 2019 Supreme Court · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-16
  waqf propertyChief Administrator Auqaflease of waqf propertysettlement of schemecommercial leaseadministration and developmentjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions against the concurrent judgments of the High Court, which had set aside the grant of a 30-year lease of waqf property by the Chief Administrator Auqaf for setting up a petrol pump. The core legal questions involved the scope of the Chief Administrator's powers under the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979, and the Punjab Waqf Properties (Administration) Rules, 2002, to lease out waqf property for commercial purposes, and the mandatory requirement of settling a formal scheme for the administration and development of such property. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that any lease of waqf property must be part of a well-reasoned scheme settled by the Chief Administrator Auqaf to maximize charitable objects or fulfill the waqif's wishes, rather than being done in isolation. Commercial leasing is permissible only as an exception when no viable alternative closer to the waqf's objectives exists, and any extension beyond the statutory lease period must be duly justified. The Court emphasized that the proper formulation of a scheme is a prerequisite for effective administration, ensuring structured discretion subject to judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Can waqf property be leased out for commercial purposes by the Chief Administrator Auqaf?
  • Is the settlement of a formal administrative and development scheme mandatory before leasing out waqf property?
  • What is the maximum permissible duration for the lease of waqf property under the Punjab Waqf Properties (Administration) Rules, 2002?
  • Are decisions concerning the administration and development of waqf properties through schemes subject to judicial review by courts?
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• Sikandar Hameed vs Muhammad Aslam Kamboh & others2019 [M] C.L.R. 1683 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-29Read full judgment →
• Sikandar alias Sikoo vs State2020 YLR 948, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1361 · Federal Shariat Court · 2019-05-10
  criminal appealmurderdacoityidentification paradeeyewitness testimonybenefit of the doubtballistic reportconfession before police
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant, Sikandar alias Sikoo, under Section 398 and Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in relation to an incident of dacoity and murder. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the sole eyewitness, the evidentiary value and legality of the identification parade, the admissibility of police disclosures, and the corroborative value of ballistic and medical evidence. The Federal Shariat Court held that the eyewitness testimony was unreliable due to high stress, weapon focus, and potential prior exposure of the accused. The court further ruled that the identification parade suffered from severe legal and procedural infirmities, police disclosures leading to pointation without subsequent recovery were inadmissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and sending the crime weapon and empty shells together to the Forensic Science Laboratory vitiated the ballistic report. The court laid down principles regarding estimator variables affecting human memory in eyewitness identifications and the strict procedural safeguards required for identification parades, ultimately granting the appellant the benefit of the doubt and setting aside his conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a sole eyewitness under high stress and weapon focus can form the basis of a safe conviction?
  • Does an identification parade conducted without adhering to mandatory precautions and where the accused was exposed to the witness lose its evidentiary value?
  • Whether a joint or delayed recovery of crime weapons and empty shells sent together to the Forensic Science Laboratory renders the ballistic report unreliable?
  • Are pointation and disclosure statements made to the police inadmissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 when no consequential recovery is effected?
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• Sikandar Ali vs The State2019 MLD 1152 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-11
  abductionbenefit of doubtcriminal appealrelevancy of evidencefreewill marriageacquittalQanun-e-Shahadat
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for the offence of abduction under Section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether evidence recorded in subsequent judicial proceedings, specifically the testimony of the alleged abductee, could be utilized to challenge the conviction of the appellant in an earlier proceeding. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly as the alleged abductee, in subsequent proceedings, denied the abduction and testified to a freewill marriage. Invoking Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, the Court determined that such evidence is relevant and admissible. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the benefit of doubt is not a matter of grace but a right of the accused, and that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind is sufficient to warrant acquittal, aligning with the maxim that it is better to acquit ten guilty persons than convict one innocent person.

  Questions settled

  • Can evidence recorded in subsequent judicial proceedings be considered in an earlier criminal trial?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a matter of right for an accused?
  • Does a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitle an accused to acquittal?
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• Sikandar Ali Shah and 18 others vs Province of Sindh through Chief2019 PLC (C.S.) 962 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-07
  Junior School Teacher recruitmentTeachers Recruitment Policy 2012Taluka poolvested rightconstitutional petitionservice mattermerit list
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by petitioners seeking a declaration that the non-issuance of offer letters for the post of Junior School Teacher (JST) by the respondents was illegal and contrary to the Teachers Recruitment Policy, 2012, and seeking a direction to shift and add vacant seats to the Taluka pool. The core legal question was whether candidates who qualified the written test acquired a vested right to appointment and whether vacant need-based seats from union councils lacking qualified candidates must be shifted to the Taluka pool. The Sindh High Court held that mere passing of the written test does not vest a candidate with a fundamental right to appointment, and that the petitioners failed to meet the merit criteria compared to selected candidates who obtained higher marks. The court dismissed the petition, reiterating the principle that courts should not interfere in policy matters of educational institutions and that passing a test alone does not warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

  Questions settled

  • Does passing a recruitment written test create a vested right to be appointed to a public post?
  • Whether unfulfilled need-based vacancies from union councils must be shifted to the Taluka pool under the Teachers Recruitment Policy, 2012?
  • Can the High Court interfere in the policy matters of educational institutions under constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Sikandar Ali and 2 others vs Baddar-U-Din and 4 others2019 CLC 1046 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-14Read full judgment →
• Sidra Khan and another vs Province of Sindh & others2019 SHC 358 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-13Read full judgment →
• Shuhabuddin and another vs The Province of Sindh through Secretary2019 MLD 1192 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-27
  FIR registrationcognizable offencefake police encounterEx-Officio Justice of Peacestatutory dutyextrajudicial killingcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenged an order by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, which refused to direct the registration of an FIR against police officials for the alleged extrajudicial killing of three individuals in a fake encounter. The core legal question was whether the police and the Justice of Peace were justified in refusing to register the FIR regarding a cognizable offense. The High Court held that the officer-in-charge of a police station has a mandatory statutory duty under Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to register an FIR upon receiving information of a cognizable offense, and lacks the discretion to refuse it based on personal belief. The Court emphasized that the Justice of Peace must not act mechanically and must ensure the law is followed, especially in cases involving serious allegations of fake police encounters. Consequently, the Court allowed the application, directed the registration of the FIR, and ordered that the investigation be conducted by an officer not below the rank of ASP/DSP to ensure impartiality.

  Questions settled

  • Does an officer-in-charge of a police station have the discretion to refuse the registration of an FIR when information regarding a cognizable offense is provided?
  • Is the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace required to act mechanically when deciding an application under Section 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a High Court direct the registration of an FIR against police officials if the lower court failed to exercise its jurisdiction correctly?
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• Shrimati Aashi vs Bhesham Lal and another2019 CLC 1159 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-02Read full judgment →
• Shozab Shah and others vs State etc.PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1263 · Lahore High Court
  capital punishmentbenefit of doubtmurder referenceprivate complaintocular accountmotiveappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants challenged their convictions and death sentences under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, recorded by the trial court in a private complaint for the double murder of two brothers. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt through the ocular account, motive, and corroborative evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution case was fraught with serious doubts, contradictions, and unnatural circumstances, including improbable witness presence, an unconvincing motive, and the absence of weapons recoveries. Consequently, the court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellants, set aside their convictions and sentences, answered the murder reference in the negative, and dismissed the connected petition for special leave to appeal against acquittal and revision for enhancement of compensation. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution case suffers from inherent improbabilities, unnatural witness presence, and doubtful corroboration, it is unsafe to maintain capital convictions, and the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether uncorroborated ocular testimony by related witnesses whose presence at the crime scene is unnatural can form the basis of a capital conviction?
  • Does the failure of the investigating agency to recover crime weapons and conduct forensic comparisons warrant drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution?
  • Can a vague and unsubstantiated motive involving third parties sustain a murder charge against the accused?
  • Whether the benefit of the doubt must be extended when the prosecution narrative is fraught with contradictions and delayed autopsies allowing room for deliberation?
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• Shoukat Khan &. Company through Managing Director Shoukat Ali vs Chief2019 [M] C.L.R. 18 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-01-09Read full judgment →
• Shoukat Hayat Awan vs Additional Inspector General Police Karachi Range2019 SHC 140 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-10
  double jeopardyservice tribunal jurisdictionterms and conditions of serviceshow cause noticepolice misconductconstitutional petitiondepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a Sub-Inspector of the Sindh Police Department challenging a show cause notice and departmental inquiry proceedings initiated against him on allegations of misconduct and involvement in a criminal case. The core legal questions involved whether the initiation of fresh departmental proceedings and issuance of a second show cause notice after the initial dismissal order was set aside on technical grounds for want of proper authorization violated the principle of double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan and Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain a service matter barred by Article 212 read with the Sindh Service Tribunals Act 1973. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the bar under Article 212 ousted its constitutional jurisdiction regarding terms and conditions of civil servants, including disciplinary proceedings and show cause notices. Furthermore, the court held that departmental disciplinary proceedings following the setting aside of an order due to a lack of competency by the original authority did not constitute a fresh prosecution or double jeopardy, as appeal and continuation proceedings are a continuation of the original matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the issuance of a second show cause notice after a previous dismissal order is set aside for lack of departmental authorization amounts to double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 to entertain petitions relating to show cause notices and disciplinary proceedings against civil servants?
  • Whether the principles of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict under Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to departmental disciplinary proceedings in a uniformed force?
  • Does the mere issuance of a show cause notice or initiation of an inquiry constitute a punishment or adverse final order affecting a civil servant's terms and conditions?
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• Shoukat Ali vs The State etcPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 1709, 2019 YLR 1961, 2019 LHC 1530 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-09
  narcotics recoverychain of custodysafe custodychemical analysisbenefit of doubtcriminal appealnarcotic substances
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of 1130 grams of heroin. The core legal question is whether the prosecution successfully established an unbroken chain of safe custody for the recovered narcotic substance and the sample sent for chemical analysis. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the safe custody and secure transmission of the evidence. Significant discrepancies were noted regarding the number of parcels received by the Punjab Forensic Science Agency compared to those allegedly sent, unexplained delays in the delivery of the sample, and a failure to account for the return of the remaining sample portion. Consequently, the Court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that in narcotics cases, establishing an unbroken chain of safe custody from the point of recovery to the chemical examiner and subsequent production in court is mandatory, and failure to do so entitles the accused to an acquittal based on the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Is the prosecution required to prove an unbroken chain of safe custody for recovered narcotics from the point of recovery to the chemical examiner?
  • Does a discrepancy in the number of parcels received by a forensic agency compared to those allegedly sent undermine the prosecution's case?
  • What is the legal consequence when the prosecution fails to prove the safe custody and transmission of narcotic samples?
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• Shoukat Ali vs The State and others2019 P Cr. L J 1622 · Lahore High Court · 2019-06-19
  quashment of FIRcriminal breach of trustinvestment versus entrustmentcivil disputeabuse of processpartnership business
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks the quashment of an FIR registered under section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a business dispute between the petitioner and the complainant concerning a joint hotel business and monetary investment. The core legal question revolves around whether a civil dispute involving an investment partnership and money recovery can legitimately be converted into a criminal case for criminal breach of trust under the garb of the word 'trust'. The Lahore High Court held that the transaction constituted a civil investment rather than an entrustment of specific property, and the mere mention of 'trust' in the FIR without the requisite ingredients does not attract penal provisions. The court further held that utilizing criminal proceedings to exert pressure in civil matters amounts to an abuse of process. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the impugned FIR was quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an investment of money in a joint business transaction attracts the provisions of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 and Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the mere insertion of the word 'trust' in an FIR suffice to constitute an offense under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the underlying transaction is a civil investment?
  • Can a purely civil or business dispute regarding money recovery and rendition of accounts be pursued through criminal prosecution?
  • Are vague and unspecific allegations of life threats sufficient for prosecution and framing of a criminal charge?
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• Shoaib Ullah Cheema vs Additional Registrar of Companies, S.E.C.P. etc2019 SCP 12, 2019 CLD 227, 2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 415, 2020 P SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-15
  winding upcompanies ordinancedirect appealsupreme court jurisdictionofficial liquidatorpost-winding up ordersintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal regarding the removal of an official liquidator of a company under liquidation, involving a preliminary question on the scope of direct appeals to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The core legal question was whether Section 10(1) permits a direct appeal to the Supreme Court against post-winding-up orders passed by a Company Judge, or if such appeals are restricted solely to the initial winding-up order, leaving other orders subject to intra-court appeal under Section 10(2). Reviewing conflicting precedents, a larger bench of the Supreme Court held that Section 10(1) applies to a winding-up order as well as any order, decision, or judgment made in winding-up proceedings after a company has been ordered to be wound up. Overturning the narrower interpretation in Kamaluddin Qureshi's case and endorsing Ibrahim Shamsi's case, the court laid down the principle that post-winding-up orders are directly appealable to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1).

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 permit a direct appeal to the Supreme Court against orders passed after a company has been ordered to be wound up?
  • Whether an order passed by a Company Judge in winding-up proceedings subsequent to the winding-up order is appealable under Section 10(1) or Section 10(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Does the phrase 'where the company ordered to be wound up' in Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 confine appeals exclusively to the initial winding-up order?
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• Shoaib Ullah Cheema & others vs Additional Registrar of Companies, S.E.C.P. etc2019 PLJ SC 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  winding up proceedingscompany lawappellate jurisdictionCompanies Ordinance 1984maintainability of appealofficial liquidatorSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, against an order passed by a Company Judge during winding-up proceedings. The core legal question was whether the right of appeal to the Supreme Court is restricted solely to the initial winding-up order or extends to subsequent orders passed after the company has been ordered to be wound up. The Supreme Court held that Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, permits direct appeals to the Supreme Court against both the winding-up order and any subsequent order or decision made by the Company Judge once the company has been ordered to be wound up. The Court reasoned that the statutory language, specifically the use of the word 'any' regarding orders, decisions, or judgments, reflects a legislative intent to avoid intermediary intra-court appeals after the winding-up process has commenced. Consequently, the Court overruled the contrary precedent in Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Company and affirmed the interpretation established in Ibrahim Shamsi v. Bashir Ahmed Memon.

  Questions settled

  • Does a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, lie against orders passed by a Company Judge subsequent to the winding-up order?
  • Is the scope of Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, limited only to the initial order of winding up a company?
  • Does the phrase 'where the company ordered to be wound up' in Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, include orders passed after the commencement of winding-up proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Shoaib Ahmad and others vs The State and others2019 P Cr. L J 57 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-03-30
  anti-terrorism courtjuvenile justiceoverriding effectterrorismconfessional statementrecovery of dead bodysentence enhancementcctv evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions for the murder of a minor child, involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The core legal questions were whether the Anti-Terrorism Court had jurisdiction to try the accused, who claimed juvenile status, and whether the offence constituted terrorism. The court held that the Anti-Terrorism Court possessed valid jurisdiction, noting that the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 has an overriding effect over other laws and that the court had been designated to exercise powers of a Juvenile Court. The court affirmed the convictions, finding the brutal nature of the murder, which caused widespread public terror and shock, satisfied the definition of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The key principle laid down is that the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 takes precedence over the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000, and that juvenile status does not preclude trial by an Anti-Terrorism Court for heinous offences, nor does it automatically entitle an offender to a lesser sentence when the crime is committed in a barbaric and pre-planned manner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 have an overriding effect over the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000 regarding the trial of juvenile offenders?
  • Can an Anti-Terrorism Court exercise the powers of a Juvenile Court?
  • Does the murder of a child that creates widespread public terror fall within the definition of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Is a confession leading to the recovery of a dead body admissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Shikra vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1514 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-21
  murderdeath sentence commutationocular evidencequantum of sentenceextenuating circumstancescriminal appealbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction and death sentence for the murder of the complainant's brother. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the ocular account and the appropriateness of the capital punishment imposed by the trial court. The High Court upheld the conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, finding the eyewitness testimony consistent and corroborated by medical evidence, despite the close relationship between the witnesses and the deceased. However, the Court modified the sentence from death to life imprisonment. The ratio established is that while a conviction may be sustained on credible ocular evidence, the quantum of sentence must be carefully evaluated against extenuating circumstances. The Court held that where the prosecution fails to substantiate the motive, the recovery of the weapon is inconsequential, and the accused committed only a single act of firing without repetition, the maximum penalty of death is not justified. Consequently, the Court ruled that the ends of justice are better served by life imprisonment, extending the benefit of doubt regarding the severity of the sentence to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment if the prosecution fails to prove the motive?
  • Is the testimony of closely related eyewitnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the absence of repetition of fire constitute an extenuating circumstance for the reduction of a death sentence?
  • Can a conviction be maintained if the recovery of the murder weapon is deemed inconsequential?
  Read full judgment →
• Shewaiz Rasool alias Shabi vs The State, etcPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 580, 2019 SCMR 1448, 2019 SCP 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-14
  criminal appealacquittalprinciple of consistencyjoint liabilityappreciation of evidencecapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Shewaiz Rasool, for his alleged involvement in a quadruple murder case. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, alongside several co-accused, committed the murders using automatic weapons. While other co-accused were previously tried and convicted, the Supreme Court had already acquitted the appellant's co-accused, Muhammad Rafi, and others in related proceedings. The core legal question was whether the appellant's case could be distinguished from his co-accused who had already been acquitted by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the appellant was identically placed with the acquitted co-accused, as the prosecution assigned joint firing without specific motive or distinct roles. Citing the principle of consistency, the Court found that the reasons for the acquittal of the co-accused—including issues regarding the identity of assailants, the improbability of witness presence, and the lack of motive—applied equally to the appellant. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence, ordering the appellant's immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person be convicted when co-accused, who were identically placed and assigned similar roles, have already been acquitted by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the lack of a proven motive and the improbability of witness presence at the crime scene constitute sufficient grounds for acquittal in a murder case?
  • Is it legally permissible to maintain a conviction against one accused when the evidence against him is identical to that of co-accused who were acquitted due to evidentiary deficiencies?
  Read full judgment →
• Sherbaz vs Liaqat Ali2019 YLR 602 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-10-01Read full judgment →
• Sheraz Pervaiz Mustafa vs The Special Judge (Rent), Lahore and others2019 MLD 2095, 2019 LHC 2465 · Lahore High Court · 2019-06-27
  rent tribunal jurisdictionlandlord and tenant relationshipex-parte eviction orderleave to contestoral tenancypunjab rented premises actdue processfair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Lahore High Court addresses multiple writ petitions arising from rent disputes, specifically challenging orders dismissing appeals against ejectment on the ground of limitation under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, as well as an order concerning an application for leave to contest. The core legal questions involve the applicability of limitation provisions, the necessity of establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant before assuming jurisdiction, and the standard required for passing ex-parte eviction orders. The court held that while the Rent Tribunal has summary powers, it must positively ascertain and establish the relationship of landlord and tenant through unimpeachable evidence, especially in ex-parte proceedings or when dealing with oral or non-compliant tenancies, rather than relying on mechanical or perfunctory scrutiny. Consequently, the appellate and ex-parte eviction orders were set aside, and the ejectment applications were remanded for fresh determination in accordance with the law and judicial guidelines. The key principle laid down is that the existence of a valid tenancy and default must be independently and consciously satisfied by the Tribunal before assuming jurisdiction and ordering eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Tribunal assume jurisdiction and pass an eviction order without positively ascertaining the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Whether the payment of a fine under Section 9 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, automatically confers jurisdiction on the Rent Tribunal to order eviction without proof of tenancy?
  • Is a Rent Tribunal required to independently evaluate and satisfy itself regarding the existence of tenancy and breach when proceeding ex-parte against a tenant?
  • Do the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, relating to setting aside ex-parte orders apply to proceedings before a Rent Tribunal where express provisions are absent?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheraz and another vs The State2019 YLR 1476 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-09
  post-arrest baildacoityfurther inquiryrecoverycriminal liabilitybail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two post-arrest bail applications filed by the applicants, Sheraz, Shahmir, and Muhammad Muid Iqbal, in relation to FIR No. 123/2018 registered at Police Station Sahil, Karachi, for an alleged offence of dacoity under Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to the grant of post-arrest bail given the evidentiary material available at the pre-trial stage. The Court held that the applicants were entitled to bail, observing that no recovery of stolen property was effected from them, and the complainant's wife's statement implicated only two individuals, casting doubt on the applicants' involvement. Furthermore, the Court noted the applicants' status as teenagers/borderline adults and the contention that they were merely present at the scene without criminal intent. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case rests on material requiring further probe, and where there is an absence of incriminating recovery or specific identification, the case for further inquiry is established, justifying the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of recovery of stolen property from an accused justify the grant of post-arrest bail in a dacoity case?
  • Can a trial court cancel bail without reference to the High Court if the accused fails to appear?
  • Does a statement by a prosecution witness implicating only a limited number of persons entitle co-accused to bail on the grounds of further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Zaman vs State, etcPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 155 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-03
  circumstantial evidenceextra-judicial confessionrecovery of weaponopen place recoverymedical evidencemurder appealcorroborative evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the judgment dated 28.03.2009 of the trial court convicting him under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentencing him to life imprisonment. The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, comprising an alleged extra-judicial confession before witnesses, the recovery of a bloodstained wooden rod and wrist watch, and medical evidence. The core legal questions before the Lahore High Court were whether an uncorroborated extra-judicial confession is sufficient to sustain a conviction, and whether recoveries made from an open, accessible place possess evidentiary value. The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence. The Court held that an extra-judicial confession is inherently a weak form of evidence requiring independent corroboration, particularly when made to persons who are neither village elders nor relatives and who failed to apprehend the accused. Furthermore, recoveries made from an open place accessible to the public carry no legal value, and medical evidence alone cannot identify the perpetrator of a crime.

  Questions settled

  • Is an uncorroborated extra-judicial confession sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does a recovery made from an open and accessible place hold evidentiary value against an accused?
  • Can medical evidence alone establish the identity of the perpetrator in a case based on circumstantial evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Wali and others vs Provincial Government and others2019 P.S.C. 1042 · Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan · 2017-09-07Read full judgment →
• Sher Shamsuddin and others vs Atta Muhammad and others2019 YLR 513 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-04Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad Zafar and 2 others vs Pakistan International Airlines2019 PLC (C.S.) 709 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-06
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilitymaster and servantpassage policystatutory corporationservice rulesdiscriminatory policy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, retired employees of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC), filed a constitutional petition seeking a declaration that Admin Order No. 07/2012, which enhanced passage and ticket facilities for specific management groups, is discriminatory and unlawful, and prayed that the same benefits be extended to them under the consolidated passage policy. The core legal questions were whether a constitutional writ under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable against PIAC regarding service matters and passage policies, and whether the passage policy issued under Admin Order No. 07/2012 is a non-justiciable internal policy decision. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the passage rules of PIAC are non-statutory instructions for internal management and control, and therefore the relationship between PIAC and its employees is governed by the principle of master and servant. The court laid down the principle that internal policy decisions and non-statutory service benefits of a statutory corporation do not create vested rights enforceable through constitutional jurisdiction in the absence of a statutory violation or breach of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable against Pakistan International Airlines Corporation regarding service matters and passage policies?
  • Are the passage policies and internal administrative orders issued by Pakistan International Airlines Corporation statutory in nature?
  • Whether the modification of passage and ticket facilities for retired employees by a statutory corporation can be challenged as discriminatory through a writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad alias Shero vs The State2019 MLD 1250 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-04-24
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymurdercommon intentioncriminal conspiracyBalochistan High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal bail application filed by the accused, Sher Muhammad alias Shero, seeking post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 05 of 2018 registered at Police Station 298 RD, District Sohbat Pur, under Sections 302, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the accused is entitled to post-arrest bail where he is nominated in the FIR and was allegedly present with the main assailant, but no active role of firing or direct causation of death is attributed to him, and whether his case falls within the scope of further inquiry under criminal jurisprudence. The Balochistan High Court held that since the role attributed to the applicant was merely taking the deceased to the place of occurrence, and it remained to be ascertained whether the murder was pre-planned or occurred at the spur of the moment, the case warranted further inquiry. The court consequently allowed the bail application, granting post-arrest bail subject to the furnishing of surety bonds, establishing the principle that tentative assessment of record pointing toward further inquiry entitles an accused to bail where specific overt acts of the fatal assault are absent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused nominated in the FIR without any specific role of firing or fatal assault is entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of further inquiry?
  • Does accompanying the main perpetrator to the place of occurrence constitute sufficient ground to deny bail when the question of pre-planning requires evidence at trial?
  • When can a criminal case be considered one of further inquiry under bail jurisprudence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Khan vs The State2019 YLR 413 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-08-20Read full judgment →
• Sher Khan and 2 others vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 1310 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-02-04
  post-arrest bailanti-terrorismschool burningconfessional statementhardened criminalfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by petitioners accused of burning down a girls' primary school, an act which allegedly spread terror and fear in the area. The petitioners were charged under sections 457, 436, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with sections 6 and 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the evidence, specifically a confessional statement recorded under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, despite not being nominated in the initial FIR. The Court refused the bail application, holding that the petitioners were hardened criminals whose actions of burning a school had maligned the country's reputation internationally. The Court emphasized that such acts constitute an offence against society and that individuals involved in such desperate criminal activities should not be released. Consequently, the bail petition was dismissed, and the trial court was directed to conduct day-to-day proceedings to conclude the trial within six months.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burning of a school constitute an offence against society justifying the refusal of bail?
  • Can a confession recorded under section 21-11 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 be considered sufficient incriminating evidence to deny bail?
  • Is the non-nomination of an accused in an FIR a sufficient ground for the grant of bail when other incriminating evidence exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Dil vs The State2019 MLD 1730 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-05-07
  post-arrest bailmisuse of bail concessionprohibitory clausefurther inquiryrepetition of offencecriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who was booked for offences under sections 436 and 457 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in FIR No. 17/2019. The petitioner sought bail after the Additional Sessions Judge refused it, arguing that he was not named in the FIR, there were no eyewitnesses, and he was physically incapacitated. The State opposed the bail, contending that incriminating material was discovered during the investigation and that the petitioner had misused the concession of bail granted in a previous case (FIR No. 21/2019) by committing a more heinous offence while on bail. The Court held that while the petitioner was not named in the FIR, he was implicated by witness statements recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the offence under section 436 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 falls within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that bail may be refused if there is a risk the accused will repeat the offence.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be refused if there is a likelihood that the accused will repeat the offence?
  • Does the commission of a new offence while on bail disentitle an accused from the discretionary relief of bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if they were not named in the FIR but were implicated during the investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Awan and another vs The State2019 MLD 125 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2017-01-04
  suspension of sentencecompoundable offencescompromisecriminal appealbaillegal heirsmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, convicted for offences under sections 302, 324, 337-A, 114, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, sought suspension of their sentences pending appeal. The core legal question was whether the court could suspend the sentences of the convicted petitioners following a compromise reached between the petitioners and the legal heirs of the deceased, as well as the injured parties. The Court observed that the legal heirs of the deceased and the victims had appeared, recorded their statements, and confirmed a valid compromise, expressing no objection to the release of the petitioners. The Court held that since the offences of murder and hurt are compoundable under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and a genuine compromise had been effected, there was no legal impediment to accepting it. Consequently, the Court allowed the suspension of the sentences and granted bail to the petitioners, emphasizing that courts should facilitate compromises in compoundable offences to promote peace, tranquility, and harmony.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court suspend a sentence pending appeal based on a compromise between the parties in compoundable offences?
  • Are offences of murder and hurt compoundable under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a formal statement from legal heirs required for the court to accept a compromise in a criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Ali vs D.G. Pakistan Rangers, etc2019 PLD Lahore 474, 2019 LHC 1658 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-23
  service benefitsinheritanceTarkanomineebenevolent fundintra-court appealPakistan Rangers
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal challenges the dismissal of a writ petition filed by the father of a deceased Pakistan Rangers Constable, seeking a share in the service benefits paid to the deceased's widow as the designated nominee. The core legal question was whether post-death service benefits, such as welfare funds, compensation, and six-month pay, constitute inheritable estate ('Tarka') distributable among all legal heirs under Sharia, or whether they are non-inheritable grants payable solely to the nominated beneficiary pursuant to relevant service rules. The Lahore High Court held that financial benefits which an employee could not claim or receive during their lifetime, being in the nature of grants or compensation arising after death, do not form part of the deceased's estate and are not heritable by all legal heirs, but are instead payable strictly in accordance with applicable service regulations to the designated nominee or entitled family members. The court reaffirmed that only benefits receivable by the employee during their lifetime constitute part of the estate. The appeal was consequently dismissed as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-death service benefits such as compensation and welfare funds form part of the estate ('Tarka') of a deceased employee to be distributed among all legal heirs under Sharia?
  • Can financial benefits that did not become payable to an employee during their lifetime be treated as heritable assets?
  • Does the nomination of a specific person for service benefits override the general law of inheritance regarding amounts payable only after an employee's death?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Alam vs The State2019 MLD 1434 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-10-31
  post-arrest bailcircumstantial evidenceprohibitory clauseprima facie casemurderfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, who was implicated during the investigation for the murder of his stepmother under sections 302 and 460 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner sought bail, arguing that the case was false, he was not named in the FIR, and the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to connect him to the crime, thereby invoking the principle of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The prosecution opposed the bail, citing strong circumstantial evidence, including the petitioner's motive, his presence at the scene, and the recovery of his vehicle and a .30 bore pistol allegedly used in the commission of the offence. The Court held that the recovered evidence, including the vehicle and weapon, sufficiently linked the petitioner to the crime, establishing a prima facie case. Consequently, the Court dismissed the bail application, affirming that the offence fell within the prohibitory clauses of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the petitioner was implicated by evidence collected during the investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a weapon and vehicle during investigation constitute sufficient grounds to deny post-arrest bail in a murder case?
  • Can an accused be denied bail if they were not named in the initial FIR but were implicated during the investigation?
  • Does an offence punishable by death or life imprisonment fall within the prohibitory clauses of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Shell Pakistan Limited vs Registrar Trade Unions and others2019 IHC 146 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-26
  trade union registrationcontract workersemployer and employee relationshipoutsourcingalternative remedywrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed by Shell Pakistan Limited impugned an order passed by the Registrar Trade Unions allowing an application for the registration of a trade union of workers engaged through service providers at the petitioner's establishment. The core legal questions concerned whether contract workers engaged through service providers can form a trade union in the principal employer's establishment, whether the Registrar's order was sustainable despite pending proceedings before the National Industrial Relations Commission, and whether an employer has a right of appeal under Section 12 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that workers employed through contractors or service providers against permanent functions within an establishment's premises fall within the definition of workers entitled to register a trade union under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Court also reaffirmed that Section 12 of the Act does not provide an employer a right of appeal, making a constitutional petition under Article 199 maintainable against without-jurisdiction orders, and that outsourcing through service providers cannot be used as a sham to deprive long-term workers of their statutory rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer have a right of appeal under Section 12 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 against the registration of a trade union?
  • Can workers employed through a contractor or service provider form a trade union in the principal establishment where they perform their duties?
  • Whether the Registrar of Trade Unions is bound to await the outcome of proceedings before the National Industrial Relations Commission regarding employment status before deciding a trade union registration application?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Riazuddin vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 622 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-12
  narcotics smugglingconscious possessionburden of proofchemical analysis reportpointationrepresentative samplesprocedural irregularityControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for smuggling a large quantity of narcotics. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution established the appellant's conscious possession of 1745 kg of Charas, and whether procedural lapses—specifically the non-compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the delay in submitting samples for chemical analysis—vitiate the conviction. The Court held that the prosecution successfully established the appellant's direct involvement and knowledge through his pointation of the container and recovery of export documents. The Court affirmed that under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, once the prosecution proves physical custody or direct concern, the burden shifts to the accused to prove lack of knowledge. It further ruled that Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is excluded in narcotics cases, and procedural rules regarding sample submission are directory rather than mandatory. While limiting the conviction's basis to the 58 kg actually tested, the Court upheld the life imprisonment sentence, dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate private witnesses under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate a conviction in narcotics cases?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 once the prosecution establishes physical custody or direct concern?
  • Is a delay in sending narcotic samples to a chemical examiner fatal to the prosecution's case if no tampering is alleged?
  • Where representative samples are not taken from every packet of recovered narcotics, is the accused liable for the entire quantity or only the quantity tested?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Rehan Ahmed vs Judicial Magistrate-II, South, Karachi and 22019 MLD 636 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-15
  dishonoured chequeSection 489-F PPCabuse of processquashment of FIRrecovery of moneycriminal proceedingsmala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal miscellaneous applications seeking the quashment of FIRs registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a complainant can initiate successive criminal proceedings for dishonoured cheques when those cheques were already in their possession at the time of lodging earlier FIRs against the same accused for similar transactions. The Court held that the complainant’s practice of lodging FIRs sequentially, rather than simultaneously, constituted a misuse of the process of law intended to coerce the applicant into settlements. Consequently, the Court allowed the applications and quashed the impugned FIRs. The key principle laid down is that Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is not a tool for the recovery of business debts. Where a complainant possesses multiple dishonoured cheques but chooses to initiate criminal proceedings piecemeal to exert pressure, such conduct is an abuse of process. Judicial Magistrates are empowered to intervene under Section 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to prevent such vexatious litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be utilized as a tool for the recovery of business debts?
  • Is it an abuse of process for a complainant to lodge successive FIRs for dishonoured cheques that were already in their possession when earlier FIRs were filed?
  • What is the duty of a Judicial Magistrate when a complainant uses criminal proceedings to force a settlement in a civil dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Raees vs Mst. Rehana Batool and others2019 CLC 1757 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-18Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Nadeem vs The State & another2019 MLD 790, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 252, 2019 LHC 60 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-18
  pre-arrest bailprohibitory orderfreedom of expressionright to peaceful protestobstruction of public movementwrit of the State
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by Sheikh Muhammad Nadeem, who apprehended arrest in a case registered under sections 188 and 341 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Ganj Mandi Rawalpindi, following allegations that he and his co-accused violated a prohibitory order issued under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and obstructed public movement. The core legal question is whether pre-arrest bail should be granted in anticipation of arrest for offences allegedly committed during a protest that disrupted civic life and challenged the writ of the State. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the grant of pre-arrest bail in cognizable offences is an extraordinary measure where arrest remains the rule, and that no cause can justify disrupting civic life or challenging the state's writ. The key principle laid down is that freedom of expression and peaceful protest are subject to law and do not permit the disruption of public life, and pre-arrest bail cannot be claimed merely because an offence is bailable or carries a minor penalty when statutory functions are prima facie supported by a presumption of regularity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted merely on the ground that an offence is bailable or carries a minor penalty?
  • Is the exercise of the right to peaceful protest subject to law and the primary responsibility of loyalty to the State?
  • What is the legal standard for granting pre-arrest bail in cognizable offences?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Asim Farooq vs Federation of Pakistan etc2019 LHC 3025, 2020 KLR Civil Cases 106, 2019 PLD Lahore 664 · Lahore High Court · 2019-08-30Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Akhtar Aziz vs Mst. Shabnam Begum and others2019 KLR Supreme Court 305, 2019 P.S.C. 1002, 2019 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-04
  specific performanceagreement to sellconsensus ad idemearnest moneydiscretionary reliefsecond appealimmovable propertypower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from a suit for specific performance of a contract based on a handwritten receipt. The appellant claimed that Respondent No. 8 agreed to sell property owned by his wife, daughters, and brother. The trial and first appellate courts decreed the suit, but the High Court reversed the decision, instead ordering the refund of earnest money with markup. The Supreme Court examined whether the receipt constituted a valid, enforceable contract. It held that for a document to be treated as a contract for the sale of immovable property, it must clearly identify the parties, the consideration, and the property, and demonstrate consensus ad idem. The Court found the receipt deficient as it lacked a specific description of the property and was signed by a party without written authority from the actual owners. Furthermore, the document was not attested by two witnesses as required by the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order. The Court affirmed that specific performance is a discretionary relief and cannot be granted where the essential ingredients of a contract are missing or where it would be inequitable.

  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Adeel Imtiaz vs Faysal Bank Limited & Others2019 SHC 459 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-05Read full judgment →
• Shehzad Iqbal Malik vs Additional District Judge, Lahore, etc2019 KLR Civil Cases 180 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-29Read full judgment →
• Shehzad Iqbal Malik vs Additional District Judge and 2 others2019 CLC 1320 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-29Read full judgment →
• Shehzad Ahmed vs Zafar alias Zafri and 4 others2019 IHC 122 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-15
  abduction for ransomcapital sentence referenceanti-terrorism lawcorroboration of evidencevictim testimonycriminal appealsafe administration of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment addresses criminal appeals and a capital sentence reference arising from the abduction of a minor for ransom. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the reliability of the victim's testimony, and whether the trial court correctly applied the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Court held that the prosecution successfully established the guilt of three appellants based on the victim's consistent, confidence-inspiring testimony, which was corroborated by the recovery of the victim and marked ransom money from the crime scene. However, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish all ingredients necessary to attract the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Consequently, the Court upheld the convictions and sentences under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, but set aside the convictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The key principle laid down is that while a conviction can be sustained on the testimony of a solitary witness, it must be consistent and corroborated by other reliable evidence, and the application of anti-terrorism laws requires strict proof of the specific ingredients of the offence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of a solitary witness?
  • Does the statement of an abductee carry substantial evidentiary value in kidnapping cases?
  • Are the ingredients of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, automatically satisfied in cases of abduction for ransom?
  • Is it permissible to uphold convictions under the Pakistan Penal Code while setting aside convictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act in the same case?
  Read full judgment →
• Shehbaz Ahmad and another vs State & anotherPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 347, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1186 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-05
  post-arrest bailProhibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Orderrecovery witnessexclusive possessionnon-bailable offencesstatutory interpretationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from FIR No. 29 of 2019, involving allegations of manufacturing liquor under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the nature of the recovery and the statutory provisions involved. The Court held that the petitioners were entitled to bail, noting that the contraband was recovered from a room not in their exclusive possession, and the prosecution failed to establish the charge of selling intoxicants. Furthermore, the Court observed that the mandatory requirements of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding independent recovery witnesses were violated. Relying on the principle established in Tariq Bashir v. The State, the Court emphasized that for offences punishable by less than ten years, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal the exception. As the investigation was complete, the petitioners were non-convicts, and no exceptional circumstances existed to justify continued detention, the Court granted post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception for offences punishable by imprisonment of less than ten years?
  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses during recovery proceedings violate the mandatory provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused in the absence of exceptional circumstances such as likelihood of abscondence or tampering with evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheharyar Waqas Malik and another vs Province of Sindh through Home Secretary, Karachi and 15 others2019 YLR 2623 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-20Read full judgment →
• Shazia Parveen vs Additional District Judge and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 1300, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 1308, 2019 CLC 1475 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-24Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali vs The State, etc2019 PLD SC 577, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 145, 2019 SCP 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-16
  retracted confessionkidnapping for ransomquantum of sentencevoluntary confessionanti-terrorismdeath penalty commutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for kidnapping for ransom and murder. The appellant was convicted by an Anti-Terrorism Court under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, receiving death sentences. The prosecution's case rested on witness testimony, cell phone data, and a judicial confession. The appellant retracted this confession during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court examined the voluntariness and truthfulness of the confession, finding it free from duress and corroborated by the recovery of the body. The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that a retracted confession, if found voluntary and truthful, can form the basis of a conviction. However, regarding the quantum of sentence, the Court observed that the primary motive was ransom and the death resulted from the administration of tranquilizers rather than direct violence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal against conviction but commuted the death sentences to imprisonment for life, maintaining the fines and compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted confession form the basis of a conviction if it is found to be voluntary and truthful?
  • Does the administration of tranquilizers leading to death in a kidnapping case warrant the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is a judicial confession reliable if the magistrate has administered necessary warnings and recorded the details in their own hand?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali vs Director Settlement Survey & Other2019 SHC 530 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-17Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali Khatian vs Additional District & Sessions Judge 1st, South2019 SHC 174 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-13
  Ex-officio Justice of Peaceregistration of FIRcognizable offenceright of audienceinherent powersquashing of proceedingspolice investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Miscellaneous Application challenged an order passed by the Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi South, acting as an Ex-officio Justice of Peace under Section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, whereby the Station House Officer was directed to register an FIR based on a complaint alleging cognizable offences. The core legal questions involved whether a proposed accused has a right of audience before an Ex-officio Justice of Peace orders the registration of an FIR, and whether the High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash or restrain such a pre-FIR direction. The Sindh High Court dismissed the application, holding that a proposed accused has no right of audience at the stage of directing FIR registration, as the function of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace is quasi-judicial and complementary to police investigations. The Court laid down that an SHO is statutorily bound to record an FIR upon receiving information disclosing a cognizable offence, and no inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A can be invoked to obstruct the recording of an FIR or police investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a proposed accused has a right of audience before an Ex-officio Justice of Peace passes an order for the registration of an FIR under Section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to restrain the registration of an FIR ordered by an Ex-officio Justice of Peace?
  • Does a Station House Officer have the authority to refuse to record an FIR when information disclosing a cognizable offence is conveyed?
  • Is the function performed by an Ex-officio Justice of Peace under Section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 judicial, executive, or quasi-judicial in nature?
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• Shaukat Ali Khan vs Federation of Pakistan & others2019 PLC (C.S.) 1527, 2019 LHC 1904 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-08
  leave preparatory to retirementleave encashmentcivil servantsuperannuationdiscretionary powersconstitutional petitiondiscrimination
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Deputy Director at the Pakistan Central Cotton Committee nearing retirement, applied for encashment in lieu of leave preparatory to retirement (L.P.R.) under Rule 18-A of the Revised Leave Rules, 1980. The competent authority instead forced him to proceed on L.P.R. The core legal question was whether encashment in lieu of L.P.R. is a right of an employee or the sweet discretion of the competent authority, and whether the authority can refuse an option for encashment duly exercised under Rule 18-A. The Lahore High Court held that once a civil servant opts for leave encashment under Rule 18-A, the competent authority has no discretion to refuse it and must issue a formal sanction for cash compensation. The court established that leave encashment is a normal statutory entitlement rather than a concession, that discretionary powers must be exercised fairly and not arbitrarily under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and that forcing an employee on L.P.R. against their option amounts to discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether encashment in lieu of leave preparatory to retirement is a right of an employee or discretion of the competent authority under the Revised Leave Rules, 1980?
  • Can a competent authority refuse an option for leave encashment validly exercised by a civil servant under Rule 18-A of the Revised Leave Rules, 1980?
  • Does an order forcing a retiring civil servant to proceed on leave preparatory to retirement instead of granting leave encashment violate Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
  • Is a civil servant discriminated against under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, when similarly situated colleagues are granted leave encashment but he is forced to take L.P.R.?
  Read full judgment →
• Sharjeel Khan vs Federation of Pakistan M_o Law & Justice through Secretary and 4 others2019 PLJ Islamabad 41 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Sharjeel Inam Memon and others vs National Accountability Bureau2019 YLR 1426 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-02Read full judgment →
• Sharafat Ali vs Provincial Government and others2019 P.S.C. 1044 · Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan · 2018-05-23Read full judgment →
• Shankar Lal vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Defence2019 PLC (C.S.) 1196 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-20
  sacked employeereinstatementwrit jurisdictionPakistan Steel Millsbeneficial legislationnon-discriminationcontractual employment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought reinstatement in service under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010, following the termination of his contract as an engineer at Pakistan Steel Mills. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner qualified as a sacked employee under the Act and whether Pakistan Steel Mills, a public sector entity, was subject to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court and the provisions of the Act. The Court held that Pakistan Steel Mills, being under the dominative control of the State, is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioner met the criteria of a sacked employee under Section 2(f) of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010, as his employment fell within the specified timeframe and his contract was not renewed. The Court emphasized the principle of consistency and non-discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution, noting that a similarly situated colleague had been reinstated, and consequently ordered the petitioner's reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Is a public sector company funded and controlled by the State subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the non-renewal of a contract for an employee appointed between 1993 and 1996 constitute termination within the meaning of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010?
  • Can an employer deny reinstatement to an employee under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010, if a similarly situated colleague has already been granted such relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamsuddin Dal vs The Director General NAB Sindh2019 MLD 419 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-01Read full judgment →
• Shams ur Rehman vs Military Accountant General, Rawalpindi and another2020 P SC 757, 2020 SCMR 188, 2019 SCP 379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-18
  locus poenitentiaeestoppelservice lawrecovery of salaryerroneous promotionselection gradegood faith
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Senior Auditor, was granted a selection grade (BPS-15) by the department, which he held for nine years. Subsequently, the department cancelled this grade, citing an erroneous grant, and ordered the recovery of the salary and benefits paid during that period. The petitioner challenged this before the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal and subsequent review petition. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the core legal question was whether the department could recover emoluments paid to an employee for a higher grade that was erroneously granted but held in good faith for a significant period. The Court held that while the department could correct the erroneous grant of the grade, it could not recover the salary and benefits already paid to the petitioner, as he was not at fault. The Court applied the principles of locus poenitentiae and estoppel, ruling that because the petitioner performed the duties of the higher post in good faith, the department was precluded from recovering the past emoluments, and the Tribunal erred in failing to rectify this in its review jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government department recover salary and benefits paid to an employee for a higher grade that was erroneously granted but held in good faith?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae prevent the recovery of emoluments paid to an employee for a post held due to a departmental error?
  • Is a department estopped from recovering salary paid for a higher grade if the employee performed the duties of that grade for a significant period without fault?
  Read full judgment →
• Shams Uddin vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1041 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-12Read full judgment →
• Shamim Begum vs Azizul Hasan Khan2019 CLC 1557, 2019 SHC 50 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-08Read full judgment →
• Shamim Akhtar vs Govt of Sindh & Ors2019 SHC 356 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-12
  contractual employeeregularization of servicewrit jurisdictionterms and conditions of servicestatutory resolutioncivil servant statusreasonable classification
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of the Sindh Social Welfare Council, challenged his demotion from BPS-15 to BPS-14 and sought regularization of his service, claiming entitlement to benefits under the Council's 1971 Resolution. The respondent argued that the petitioner was a contract employee, not a civil servant, and thus ineligible for regularization or the financial benefits claimed. The Court held that while the Sindh Social Welfare Council is a 'person' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the province under Article 199 of the Constitution, the petitioner is not a civil servant as defined under the Sindh Civil Servants Act 1973, and his service matters fall outside the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Court further determined that the petitioner failed to establish a vested right to regularization under the Sindh (Regularization of Ad-hoc and Contract Employees) Act 2013. However, noting the petitioner's long service, the Court directed the competent authority to reconsider his entitlement to benefits under Clause 19 of the 1971 Resolution, ensuring a non-discriminatory decision in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee of the Sindh Social Welfare Council a 'civil servant' under the Sindh Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to interfere in the internal service matters of the Sindh Social Welfare Council?
  • Can a contract employee claim a vested right to regularization under the Sindh (Regularization of Ad-hoc and Contract Employees) Act 2013 without meeting the statutory criteria?
  • Does the 1971 Resolution governing the Sindh Social Welfare Council create a statutory entitlement for employees to receive benefits comparable to government servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamas-ur-Rehman vs State2020 MLD 916, PLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 524, 2019 PHC 360 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-08
  revision petitionadverse remarksexpunctionsurety verificationaudi alteram partemtransit bail
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, who acted as a verifier of sureties for transit bail granted to accused persons, filed a revision petition challenging adverse remarks recorded against him in an order passed by the Sessions Judge under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether a court can record unverified adverse remarks and direct disciplinary action against a surety's verifier without providing an opportunity of being heard or any evidentiary basis. The court held that the role of a surety verifier is limited to confirming local residence, while determining surety fitness remains the sole judicial prerogative of the court, and that recording adverse remarks without affording the person an opportunity to be heard violates the principle of audi alteram partem. Consequently, the petition was allowed and the adverse remarks against the petitioner were expunged. The key principle laid down is that adverse remarks against a non-party or collateral participant cannot be recorded without evidence and without affording an opportunity of defense.

  Questions settled

  • Whether adverse remarks can be recorded against a surety verifier without providing an opportunity of being heard?
  • What is the extent of the role and responsibility of a surety verifier in bail proceedings?
  • Is it the prerogative of the court to determine the solvency and fitness of a surety?
  Read full judgment →
• Sham Lal and 6 others vs M.E.O. Abbottabad and Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others2019 CLC 591 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-04-13Read full judgment →
• Shalimar Recording and Broadcasting Company vs The Commissioner, Inland Revenue (Appeals), etc2019 PCTLR 935, PTCL 2020 CL. 64, 2019 PTD 2082, 2019 IHC 112 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-08Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Khan vs The State etc2019 MLD 951, 2019 PHC 13 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-15Read full judgment →
• Shakeel and another vs The State2019 MLD 1554 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-10
  extortionillegal firearmadverse presumptionreasonable doubtmaterial witnessanti-terrorismcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court, which convicted the appellants for extortion and illegal possession of a firearm. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt, given the inconsistencies in witness testimonies and the recovery process. The High Court held that the prosecution's case was riddled with fatal contradictions, including the failure to produce material witnesses, conflicting accounts regarding the arrest and recovery of the weapon, and unexplained discrepancies in the forensic evidence. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants. The key principle laid down is that where material witnesses are withheld, the court may draw an adverse presumption under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Furthermore, the judgment reaffirms that significant contradictions in prosecution evidence regarding the time, place, and manner of recovery, coupled with unexplained delays and discrepancies in handling case property, create reasonable doubt, necessitating the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court extend the benefit of a judgment to a non-appealing co-accused in a criminal trial?
  • Does the failure to produce material witnesses warrant an adverse presumption against the prosecution under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Are contradictions between prosecution witnesses regarding the time and place of recovery of a weapon sufficient to create reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Ahmed Khan vs Khursheed Alam and another2019 PLD Sindh 619 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-16
  local inspectioncriminal trialappreciation of evidencediscretionary powerCode of Criminal Procedurejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenged the dismissal of a request for local inspection under Section 539-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether a trial court is duty-bound to conduct a local inspection at the initial stage of a trial to determine the veracity of allegations, and whether such inspection is a mandatory requirement. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the power to conduct a local inspection is discretionary, not mandatory. The court affirmed that such inspections are intended to assist the judge in properly appreciating evidence already on record, rather than acting as a substitute for evidence or a means to gather new facts. A key principle laid down is that a judge must not become a witness by collecting new material during an inspection. Consequently, local inspections should be conducted sparingly, preferably after the examination of witnesses, to avoid the risk of the court unconsciously assuming the role of a witness. The court cannot be compelled to conduct an inspection where no necessity is demonstrated at the trial's initial stage.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court legally obligated to conduct a local inspection at the initial stage of a criminal trial?
  • Can a local inspection conducted by a judge or magistrate serve as a substitute for evidence in a criminal trial?
  • At what stage of a criminal trial is it most appropriate for a judge to exercise the power of local inspection?
  • Does the power of local inspection under Section 539-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 allow a judge to collect new material during the inspection?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Ahmed Bhatti vs Government of Punjab, etc2019 KLR Civil Cases 130, 2019 KLR Civil Cases 61, 2019 PLC (C.S) 729, 2018 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-09
  civil servantdeputationconstitutional petitionservice matterjurisdictional bartransfer ordermaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant on deputation to the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), challenged his transfer order via a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The core legal question was whether a civil servant on deputation to an authority ceases to be a civil servant, thereby exempting them from the jurisdictional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution regarding service matters. The Court held that the petitioner remained a civil servant for all intents and purposes. It reasoned that the exclusion clause in Section 2(b)(i) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974 applies only to individuals sent on deputation to the province from the Federation, another province, or an authority, not to a provincial civil servant sent on deputation to an authority. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as not maintainable, affirming that transfer is a term and condition of service governed by service laws, and the constitutional bar under Article 212 remains applicable. The Court also noted that even if the petitioner were not a civil servant, the LDA rules are non-statutory, further barring constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant on deputation to a local authority cease to be a civil servant under the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against the transfer of a civil servant serving on deputation?
  • Does the exclusion clause in Section 2(b)(i) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974 apply to a provincial civil servant sent on deputation to an authority?
  • Are the service rules of the Lahore Development Authority considered statutory or non-statutory?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Ahmad vs Chairperson TEVTA, etc.2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 188 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 2017-04-14
  service appealpromotion quotaseniority listacquiescencefinality of judgmentseniority-cum-fitness
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, Senior Instructors in BS-16, challenged the effective date of their promotion to BS-17, arguing they were entitled to promotion from the date of a 2009 notification rather than the date of their actual promotion order in 2014. The appellants had previously litigated the matter, resulting in a 2012 Tribunal order directing the department to prepare a joint seniority list and promote them based on seniority-cum-fitness. The department complied, finalized the seniority list without objection from the appellants, and promoted them in 2014. The core legal question was whether the appellants could re-litigate the effective date of their promotion after failing to challenge the 2012 Tribunal order or the subsequent seniority list. The Tribunal held that the appellants had acquiesced to the previous order and the finalized seniority list by failing to challenge them at the appropriate time. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeals, ruling that the current proceedings effectively sought a review of the 2012 judgment, which the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to grant, and that the previous order had attained finality.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the effective date of promotion after failing to object to a finalized seniority list prepared pursuant to a previous court order?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to review its own earlier judgment in a subsequent appeal?
  • Does the failure to challenge a Tribunal's order before the Supreme Court constitute acquiescence to that order?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaikh Noor Muhammad vs The State2019 MLD 1692 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-09
  pre-arrest baildishonoured chequeforgeryprohibitory clausefurther inquiryfraudcheatingbail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for pre-arrest bail filed by the accused, who was charged under Sections 420, 468, 471, and 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following allegations of fraud, forgery, and the issuance of a dishonoured cheque. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to the confirmation of pre-arrest bail given the nature of the allegations and the statutory provisions involved. The Court held that the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Emphasizing that the essential ingredient of Section 489-F—the issuance of a cheque with dishonest intent—requires evidence to be proven at trial, the Court determined that the case necessitated further inquiry. Consequently, the Court confirmed the interim pre-arrest bail, noting that the observations made were tentative and would not prejudice the merits of the case at trial. The principle established is that where the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause and the element of dishonest intent is contested, the case warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offence of issuing a dishonoured cheque under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the determination of dishonest intent in a case involving a dishonoured cheque a matter that requires further inquiry at trial?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be confirmed when the alleged offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzada Sohail Kamran Khan and 2 others vs Chairman of State Life2019 PCRLJ 587, 2019 PTD 128 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-03
  writ jurisdictioncommission agentsemployee statusadvance income taxmaintainabilityState Life Insurance Corporationtax deduction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, claiming to be employees of the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, sought a declaration of their employment status and a restraining order against the Corporation to prevent the deduction of advance income tax from their commissions under Section 233 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether commission agents of the Corporation qualify as 'employees' and are thus exempt from such tax deductions. Relying on precedent established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the Court held that commission agents do not fall within the definition of 'employees' as prescribed by the State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973, which requires full-time employment on a monthly salary. Consequently, the Court determined that the Corporation is legally entitled to deduct advance income tax from the petitioners' commissions. The petition was dismissed on the grounds that the petitioners failed to establish the status of 'aggrieved persons' necessary to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, rendering the petition not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Are commission agents of the State Life Insurance Corporation considered employees for the purpose of tax exemption?
  • Is a constitutional petition filed by commission agents seeking a declaration of employment status maintainable?
  • Does the State Life Insurance Corporation have the legal authority to deduct advance income tax from the commissions of its agents under Section 233 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzada Sikandar ul Mulk and 4 others vs Shahzada Sikandar ul Mulk and 4 others2019 [M] C.L.R. 447 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Shahzada Dawood and 7 others vs Appellate Bench (SECP) and another2019 CLD 508 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-01Read full judgment →
• Shahzad vs The State2019 YLR 1718 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-19
  post-arrest baildacoityidentification paradeprohibitory clausefurther inquirycriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal bail application filed before the Sindh High Court arising out of Crime No. 379/2017 registered under Sections 392, 395, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Shah Latif Town, Karachi. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail given his identification in an identification parade and prima facie connection to the alleged dacoity, notwithstanding arguments regarding delayed identification and false implication due to land disputes. The court dismissed the bail application, holding that sufficient tentative evidence, including successful identification by witnesses before a magistrate and recoveries on the accused's pointation, connected the applicant to the heinous offence, and bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right in such circumstances. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is prima facie connected to an offence through credible identification and investigation material, and unsubstantiated pleas of enmity are raised without documentary proof, post-arrest bail will be denied.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the accused has been successfully identified by witnesses during an identification parade conducted by a magistrate?
  • Does an unsubstantiated plea of old enmity regarding property disputes constitute a sufficient ground for further inquiry to warrant the grant of bail?
  • Whether bail can be claimed as an absolute right in offences that fall outside or within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzad alias Sajjad vs State etcPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1390 · Lahore High Court · 2019-06-27
  post-arrest bailControl of Narcotic Substances Actchars recoverybilateral blindnessfurther inquiryprevious involvementlack of conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arose out of FIR No. 381/19 registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 at Police Station Sanda, Lahore. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner was apprehended on spy information carrying 1510 grams of chars in a shopper bag, after he attempted to flee upon seeing the police and was encircled. The petitioner argued that this account was implausible because he suffered from complete bilateral blindness. A jail medical report confirmed the diagnosis of bilateral blindness with non-viable eyes due to macular dystrophy and chorioretinal abiotrophy. Addressing the State's objection regarding the petitioner's prior involvement in six narcotics cases, the Lahore High Court noted he had not been convicted in any case. Consequently, the High Court held that the prosecution's narrative of an attempted flight became doubtful, bringing the case squarely within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The bail petition was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a medical diagnosis of bilateral blindness render a prosecution narrative of the accused attempting to run away upon seeing police a matter of further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.?
  • Can past involvement in criminal cases without any conviction serve as a ground to refuse post-arrest bail when the case otherwise falls within further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahvaiz alias Shoaibi vs State & another2020 KLR Criminal Cases 138, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1017 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-14
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clauseattempt to commit qatl-e-amdShajjah-i-mudihahpre-arrest vs post-arrest bailcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from FIR No. 139 of 2018, involving charges under Sections 324, 337-A(ii), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the injury and the applicability of the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the injury, categorized as Shajjah-i-mudihah, and the absence of repeated blows suggested a lack of intent to kill, rendering the application of Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 questionable at this stage. Consequently, the offense did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court emphasized that for non-bailable offenses punishable by less than ten years, bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, absent extraordinary circumstances like risk of abscondence, evidence tampering, or prior conviction. The Court also clarified that considerations for pre-arrest and post-arrest bail are distinct, allowing the petition and granting bail subject to sureties.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offense punishable by less than ten years imprisonment fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Are the legal considerations for granting pre-arrest bail the same as those for post-arrest bail?
  • Does the failure to repeat a blow with a deadly weapon negate the intent required for an attempt to commit qatl-e-amd under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahrukh Jatoi vs The State2019 SHC 132 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-13Read full judgment →
• Shahnaz Parveen through Attorney vs The Additional District Judge-III, Karachi East and 3 others2019 MLD 1008 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-11Read full judgment →
• Shahnawaz son of Ghulam Hussain vs The State2019 SHC 423 · Sindh High Court · 2019-10-25
  benefit of doubtchain of custodyforensic evidenceanti-terrorismillegal weaponsexplosive substancescriminal appealrecovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal appeals against convictions and sentences handed down by an Anti-Terrorism Court for offenses involving explosive substances and illegal arms. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt, given the evidence presented. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, citing significant evidentiary gaps: the unexplained two-day delay in sending recovered items to the forensic laboratory, discrepancies regarding the chain of custody of the seized weapons, the failure to associate private witnesses in a thickly populated area despite the opportunity to do so, and contradictions in the testimony regarding who handled the investigation. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants. The key principle laid down is that the benefit of doubt is a fundamental right of an accused; even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind is sufficient to warrant acquittal, as the prosecution bears the burden of proving its case beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate private witnesses in a populated area during a recovery operation create reasonable doubt?
  • Is the unexplained delay in sending recovered items to a forensic laboratory a ground for acquittal?
  • Does a contradiction in the chain of custody regarding who handled the investigation and evidence entitle an accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Can an accused be acquitted if there is a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahnawaz Jalil vs Rani & Company and Others2019 CLD 1338, 2019 SHC 68 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-13
  trademark infringementinterim injunctionregistered trademarkTrade Marks Ordinancepassing offbalance of convenienceRegistrar of Trademarks
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Sindh High Court in a trademark dispute, whereby the appellant was restrained from using its registered trademark and from continuing proceedings before the Registrar of Trademarks. The core legal question was whether a registered trademark holder could be restrained from using its registered mark through an interim injunction while opposition proceedings regarding the same remained pending adjudication before the Registrar. The Sindh High Court held that granting final relief at an interim stage, which effectively decides the main suit and bypasses the statutory forum, is unsustainable. The court established that a registered trademark constitutes property conferring statutory rights under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, and a party cannot be deprived of the benefits of such property without due process of law. Consequently, the impugned interim order was set aside, and the interlocutory application was remanded for a de novo determination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a registered trademark holder can be restrained from using its registered mark by way of an interim injunction while proceedings before the Registrar of Trademarks are pending?
  • Can final relief be granted at an interim stage under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What is the scope and purpose of an interim order under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether a party can be deprived of the benefits of a registered trademark without due process of law and prior adjudication by the competent forum?
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• Shahina Masood & 09 others vs Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection Against Harassment at Workplace & 2 others2019 [M] C.L.R. 1697, 2020 MLD 597, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 186, 2019 IHC 128 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-24
  harassment at workplacesexual harassmentFederal Ombudsmanjurisdictionexhaustive definitionbreach of contractcivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment of the Islamabad High Court addresses four writ petitions challenging the jurisdiction of the Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection Against Harassment at Workplace. The complaints filed before the Ombudsman pertained to workplace grievances, contractual disputes, and administrative civil service matters, none of which alleged acts or conduct of a sexual nature. The core legal question was whether the Ombudsman's jurisdiction extends to generic workplace harassment or is strictly confined to 'harassment' as defined under Section 2(h) of the Protection Against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act 2010. The High Court held that the statutory definition of 'harassment' under Section 2(h) is exhaustive, requiring the act, conduct, or attitude complained of to be sexual in nature. The court declared that ordinary dictionary definitions or generic workplace grievances cannot confer jurisdiction on the Ombudsman. Consequently, all proceedings and orders passed by the Ombudsman in these matters were set aside as illegal and without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the definition of 'harassment' under Section 2(h) of the Protection Against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act 2010 exhaustive or extensive?
  • Does the Federal Ombudsman for Protection Against Harassment have jurisdiction over generic workplace disputes that lack acts or conduct of a sexual nature?
  • Can ordinary dictionary meanings of harassment be applied to extend the statutory jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act 2010?
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• Shahida Parveen & Another vs Sardar Atif Ali Sanjrani & Others2020 PLC (C.S) 1553, 2019 SHC 256 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-06
  second appealburden of proofsale-cum-exchange agreementconcurrent findingsadditional evidencepower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a second appeal filed against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts, which dismissed the appellants' suit for declaration, cancellation, and injunction regarding a property dispute stemming from an alleged Sale-cum-Exchange Agreement. The core legal question involves whether the lower courts erred in dismissing the suit due to the appellants' failure to prove the agreement, lack of proper authority of the attorney, and failure to produce attesting witnesses and the original agreement. The Sindh High Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of evidence, noting that the appellants failed to establish their claim or produce the agreement as additional evidence in the appellate court. The key principle laid down is that the burden of proof in a civil suit rests heavily on the plaintiff to substantiate claims and produce essential documents, and concurrent factual findings of lower courts will not be disturbed in second appeal without showing any illegality or jurisdictional defect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts can be interfered with in a second appeal without showing any illegality or infirmity?
  • Does a plaintiff bear the burden of proving a claim and producing the primary document upon which the suit is based?
  • Can a witness acting as an attorney execute an agreement without a valid power-of-attorney at the relevant time?
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• Shahid vs THe State2019 SHC 304 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-26
  criminal appealacquittalbenefit of doubtpolice encounterunlawful assemblyevidentiary valuefalse implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentencing of the appellants by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, for offences under Sections 324 and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellants formed an unlawful assembly and fired at a police party to deter them from discharging their duties. The appellants denied the charges, claiming false implication and lack of independent evidence. Upon review, the Court noted that the police failed to associate any independent witnesses despite having prior information, and no injuries were sustained by the police personnel nor damage caused to the police vehicle. Furthermore, the Court observed that co-accused persons involved in the same incident had already been acquitted. Citing the principle established in Tariq Pervaiz vs the State (1995 SCMR 1345), the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellants, and cancelled their bail bonds, affirming that the benefit of doubt is a right of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is the absence of independent witnesses in a police encounter case sufficient to create reasonable doubt?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused persons in the same incident provide grounds for the acquittal of remaining appellants?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a right of the accused in criminal proceedings?
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• Shahid Umar vs Chairman NAB and 2 others2019 P Cr. L J 370 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-12
  post-arrest bailhardship bailNAB referencerule of consistencyexpeditious trialcorruptionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by an accused facing corruption charges under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail on the grounds of "hardship" due to prolonged incarceration and trial delay, despite previous bail rejections on merits. The Court held that while statutory bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is inapplicable to NAB cases, the judiciary retains discretionary power to grant bail on hardship grounds where the trial is inordinately delayed without fault of the accused. Emphasizing Article 10(A) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, regarding the right to a fair and expeditious trial, the Court determined that the "rule of consistency" applies where co-accused with similar roles have been granted relief. The principle laid down is that courts must balance the heinous nature of corruption against the constitutional right to liberty, assessing whether the trial can realistically conclude in the near future, thereby preventing indefinite detention of an under-trial prisoner.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused in a NAB case be granted bail on the grounds of hardship despite the absence of statutory provisions for bail due to delay?
  • Does the non-compliance of a court direction to conclude a trial within a specific timeframe constitute an independent ground for bail?
  • Is the rule of consistency applicable when determining bail for co-accused in a corruption reference?
  • Does Article 10(A) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 provide a basis for granting bail in cases of prolonged pre-trial detention?
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• Shahid Ullah son of Rasool Khan vs The State etc2020 MLD 1303, 2019 PHC 282 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-31
  jail criminal appealSection 302(c) PPCsudden fightheat of passionaltercationknife blowsentence reductionprompt FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail criminal appeal was preferred by the appellant against his conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court for committing murder with a knife. The prosecution case rested on prompt reporting, eyewitness testimony of the complainant and an independent shopkeeper, medical evidence, recovery of the crime weapon, and the appellant’s absconsion. The Peshawar High Court evaluated whether the established facts warranted conviction for intentional murder under Section 302(b) PPC or culpable homicide under Section 302(c) PPC. The Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the appellant caused the deceased's death, but observed that the incident was devoid of premeditation or personal motive. It arose out of a sudden altercation and brawl regarding the return of a friend's pigeon, during which the appellant acted in the heat of passion without cruelty or undue advantage. Consequently, the conviction was altered to Section 302(c) PPC, and the sentence of life imprisonment was reduced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offence falls under Section 302(c) PPC rather than Section 302(b) PPC when a fatal injury is inflicted during a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation?
  • Can substitution of a singularly charged accused in a murder case be readily inferred in the absence of previous enmity?
  • Does the absence of personal motive and premeditation justify altering a murder conviction from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) PPC?
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• Shahid Saleem vs Bank Al-Falah Limited2019 CLD 181 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-20Read full judgment →