Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• M/s. Waqas Developers vs Engr.Lt.Col. (Rtd) Haqnawaz etc.2019 PLJ Lahore 652 · Lahore High Court · 2019-06-26Read full judgment →
• M/s. Vijay Industries vs Commissioner of Income Tax2019 P.S.C. 884 · Supreme Court of India · 2019-03-01Read full judgment →
• M/s. The Attock Oil Co. Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2019 PCRLJ 615, 2019 PTD 934, PTCL 2019 CL. 42 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-16
  super taxmoney billexploration and productionconcession agreementsvires of statuteincome tax ordinancerehabilitation of displaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses a constitutional petition filed by juridical persons engaged in the exploration and production of petroleum products, challenging the vires of Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which was inserted via the Finance Act of 2015 and amended by the Finance Act of 2016 to levy super tax for the rehabilitation of temporarily displaced persons. The core legal questions revolved around whether the levy under Section 4B constitutes a fee rather than a tax and thus could not be validly enacted through a Money Bill, and whether the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act, 1948 overrides the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The court held that the levy falls within the definition of 'tax' under Section 2(63) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and that its enactment through a Money Bill by the National Assembly was constitutionally competent and valid. The court established that the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 acts as a special law regarding income taxation with overriding effect, and disposed of the petitions with directions for the petitioners to approach the tax commissioner for computing specific tax liabilities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the levy of super tax under Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is in the nature of a fee or a tax?
  • Can Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be validly introduced through a Money Bill passed by the National Assembly?
  • Does the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act, 1948 override the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 regarding tax liability?
  • Can the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 undertake an exercise to compute the tax liability of the petitioner companies?
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• M/s. T U Plastic Industry Co. (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan & others2019 PTD 1542, PTCL 2019 CL. 161 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-11Read full judgment →
• M/s. Sweety Textile (Pvt.) Limited, Faisalabad vs Cir, Corporate Zone, Rto, Faisalabad2020 PTD (Trib.) 907, PTCL -2019 CL. 719 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-10-02Read full judgment →
• M/s. Standard Oil Company vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 KLR Civil Cases 430, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 1303 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-09Read full judgment →
• M/s. Standard Chartered Bank Limited vs Mohammad Altaf2019 PLJ Tr.C. (B.C.) 97 · Banking Court · 2019-04-29Read full judgment →
• M/s. Sharif Customs Clearing Agnecy, NWR Plaza, Qayyum Stadium,2020 PTD (Trib.) 1214, PTCL 2019 CL. 254 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2019-01-23Read full judgment →
• M/s. RMC Construction Company vs Gujranwala Development Authority &2019 LHC 3297 · Lahore High Court · 2019-09-23Read full judgment →
• M/s. Peshawar Electric Supply Company, (PESCO), WAPDA House,2020 PTD 1068, PTCL 2019 CL. 731 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-09-26Read full judgment →
• M/s. Pakistan Oilfields Limited through General Manager vs Federation2019 PLJ Islamabad 199, 2020 PCTLR 226, 2020 PTD 110, PTCL 2022 CL.450 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-16Read full judgment →
• M/s. Pakistan International Container Terminal Ltd vs The Sindh Labour2019 SHC 90 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-22
  constitutional petitionlabour appellate tribunalcompensation in lieu of reinstatementhabitual absenteemisconductconsent decreewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a judgment passed by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, which had modified a Labour Court's order by enhancing the lump-sum compensation awarded to an employee in lieu of reinstatement. The core legal question concerned whether the Appellate Tribunal's enhancement of compensation and the finding of a consensual settlement were sustainable, and whether the High Court should interfere under its constitutional jurisdiction. The Sindh High Court held that since the petitioner employer had accepted the initial Labour Court decision granting compensation instead of reinstatement by failing to challenge it, and given that the petitioner's counsel had consented to compensation before the Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal's judgment enhancing the compensation amount based on relevant factors was well-reasoned and fair. The key principle laid down is that a party who accepts an award of compensation by not appealing the initial forum's decision and whose counsel consents to compensation before the appellate forum cannot subsequently challenge the quantum of compensation in constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, absent any jurisdictional error or illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer who fails to challenge a Labour Court's award of compensation in lieu of reinstatement can subsequently contest the quantum of compensation before the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can a counsel give a valid consent regarding compensation on behalf of a client before the Labour Appellate Tribunal without the client's personal presence?
  • Whether the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution can interfere with a concurrent factual finding of lower labour forums regarding compensation where no jurisdictional error is shown?
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• M/s. Noman Abid Co. Limited (Regd.) vs Naveed Haider2019 CLC 2052, 2019 SHC 242 · Sindh High Court · 2019-07-19Read full judgment →
• M/s. Niagra Mills (Pvt.) vs The Cir, Rto, FaisalabadPTCL 2019 CL 485 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-02-01Read full judgment →
• M/s. Naseem Plastic House, Faisalabad vs The Cir, Rto, Faisalabad2019 PTD (Trib.) 1583, PTCL 2019 CL. 152 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-11-06Read full judgment →
• M/s. Mashallah Paper Board Mills, Faisalabad vs The Cir, R.T.O., Faisalabad2019 PCTLR 1248, 2019 PTD 1516, PTCL 2019 CL. 146 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-09-28Read full judgment →
• M/s. Happy Manufacturing Company (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federal Board ofPTCL 2019 CL. 609 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Gulistan Power Generation Limited & 3 others vs Bank of Punjab &2020 CLD 274, 2020 P C T L R 708, 2019 PLJ Lahore 602 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-02Read full judgment →
• M/s. Getz Pharma (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan & others2020 P C T L R 890, 2019 PTD 2209, 2019 SHC 248 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-02Read full judgment →
• M/s. Gaaza Broadcast System Pvt. Ltd vs The Federation of Pakistan &2019 PLD Sindh 332, 2020 PLJ Karachi 38, 2019 SHC 44 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-12Read full judgment →
• M/s. Fiqas (Pvt.) Limited etc vs Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited etc2020 CLD 415, 2019 PLJ Lahore 496 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-20Read full judgment →
• M/s. Commercial Bank International PSC vs M.V. Miski and another2019 SHC 400 · Sindh High Court · 2019-10-02Read full judgment →
• M/s. Combined Industries vs Shabir Hussain and another2019 SHC 88 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-22
  constitutional jurisdictionlabour lawconcurrent findings of factreappraisal of evidencegrievance petitionseverance compensationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a consolidated judgment of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, which awarded compensation to respondents in lieu of reinstatement following their dismissal. The petitioner sought to set aside the orders of the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal, arguing that the forums failed to properly appreciate evidence regarding the respondents' employment status and the time-barred nature of the grievance petitions. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower labour forums. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that its constitutional jurisdiction is limited and discretionary, intended to correct jurisdictional errors or illegality rather than serve as a substitute for appeal or revision. Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional defect or perversity in the concurrent findings of the lower forums, the Court declined to reappraise the evidence. The key principle established is that the High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in constitutional jurisdiction unless substantial injustice or a clear jurisdictional error is proven.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court reappraise evidence in its constitutional jurisdiction when concurrent findings of fact have been recorded by lower labour forums?
  • Is a constitutional petition a valid substitute for an appeal or revision against the findings of a labour tribunal?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with the orders of a labour court or tribunal in its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction?
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• M/s. Coca Cola Export Corporation, (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore vs The Collector2020 PTD (Trib.) 950, PTCL 2019 CL. 747 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2019-09-13Read full judgment →
• M/s. Bismillah Cotton Factory, etc. vs Bank of Punjab etc.2019 PLJ Lahore 574 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-07Read full judgment →
• M/s. Baluchistan Wheels Limited vs The Registrar of Industry-wise Trade2019 SHC 390 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-25
  constitutional petitiontrade union registrationalternative remedyaggrieved partylocus standiindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the petitioner-establishment under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenging the order passed by the Registrar Trade Union issuing a registration certificate to the respondent union. The core legal questions involved were whether the petitioner-establishment qualified as an aggrieved party to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction, and whether the petition was maintainable in view of the alternative statutory remedy available under the law. The Sindh High Court held that the petition was incompetent and misconceived because the petitioner failed to establish its status as an aggrieved party capable of impugning the union's registration in constitutional proceedings, and because an adequate alternative remedy was provided under the law. The court laid down the principle that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 is barred where an adequate alternative statutory remedy exists and where the petitioner lacks the requisite locus standi as an aggrieved party.

  Questions settled

  • Can an establishment maintain a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution to challenge the registration of a trade union?
  • Is a constitutional petition barred when an adequate remedy is provided under the Industrial Relations Act?
  • What constitutes an aggrieved party capable of challenging a trade union registration certificate?
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• M/s. A.F. Ferguson & Co. & others vs Pakistan & others2020 PTD 27, 2019 SHC 264 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-09Read full judgment →
• M/s Tamour Ishraq & Company vs Federation of Pakistan, through2020 PLD Islamabad 15, 2019 IHC 172 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-31Read full judgment →
• M/s Strongman Ideal Furniture vs The Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue2019 PCTLR 438, 2019 PCTLR 919, 2019 PTCL .CL 490, 2019 PTD 1890, 2019 LHC · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-10Read full judgment →
• M/s State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Muhammad Sharif2019 LHC 1337 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-22Read full judgment →
• M/s Sing Fuels Pte Ltd vs M.V. "Yasa Aysen" & others2020 CLD 70, 2019 SHC 318 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-29Read full judgment →
• M/s Sindh Club vs (1) Mazhar Hussain & others (2) Muhammad Miskeen &2019 PLC 268, 2018 SHC 1128 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-16
  labour disputewrongful terminationreinstatementback benefitsconcurrent findingsconstitutional jurisdictionworkman
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves constitutional petitions filed by the Petitioner-Club impugning judgments of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Sindh Labour Court, which reinstated the services of the private respondents (a baker and a cook) with back benefits after finding their termination illegal. The core legal questions concern whether the private respondents were permanent employees of the club, whether their termination was lawful, and whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction. The Sindh High Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower forums regarding the employee status and illegal termination were based on proper appreciation of evidence, and that the respondents qualified as workmen under relevant labour laws. The court dismissed the petitions, affirming that concurrent factual findings cannot be lightly interfered with under constitutional jurisdiction in the absence of material illegality or jurisdictional defect. The key principle laid down is that High Courts will not re-evaluate evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of specialized labour tribunals unless an error of law or perverse appreciation of evidence is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain grievance applications filed by employees of a club operating as a commercial establishment?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether employees who have served for more than nine months without formal appointment letters can be deemed permanent workers entitled to protection against summary termination?
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• M/s Shaheen & sons Constructors, Airport Road, Gilgit, Pakistan vs M/s2019 SC AJK 170 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• M/s Muslim Commercial Bank Limited vs Federation of Pakistan and two2020 CLD 829, 2019 PLD Sindh 624, 2019 SHC 108 · Sindh High Court · 2019-04-05Read full judgment →
• M/s K & N International vs M/s Motorway Operations and Rehabilitation2019 IHC 46 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-02Read full judgment →
• M/s Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Limited vs Province of Sindh,2020 PLJ SC 137, 2019 P.S.C. 1447, 2019 PTCL .CL 499, 2019 PTD 1438, 2019 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-22
  sales tax on servicesdefault surchargeexemption notificationamnesty schemeSindh Revenue Boardrepeal and savingretrospective applicationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal assail a judgment of the High Court of Sindh concerning sales tax on services levied on television advertisements under the Sindh Sales Tax Ordinance, 2000. The core legal question revolves around whether the benefit of an exemption and amnesty notification issued by the Sindh Revenue Board under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, exempting penalties and default surcharges, applies retrospectively to tax liabilities accrued prior to the 2011 Act under the repealed 2000 Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the Sindh Revenue Board, established under the Sindh Revenue Board Act, 2010, had the statutory competence with the approval of the Government of Sindh to issue the notification covering past arrears saved under section 83 of the 2011 Act, and neither the courts nor the government could arbitrarily restrict its scope without formally withdrawing or challenging it. The key principle laid down is that taxing instruments and exemptions must be administered with certainty, and statutory exemption notifications covering saved proceedings under repealed tax laws remain fully enforceable unless lawfully withdrawn or substituted by competent authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an exemption notification issued under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 can apply to tax arrears and default surcharges accrued under the repealed Sindh Sales Tax Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does the Sindh Revenue Board have the authority to grant exemptions from penalties and default surcharges in respect of periods prior to the promulgation of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011?
  • Can the government or courts restrict the scope of an exemption notification without it being formally withdrawn, supplanted, or challenged before a court of law?
  • Whether the Sindh Revenue Board is a necessary and proper party under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in proceedings concerning sales tax collections and notifications issued by it?
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• M/s Hongkong Huihua Global Technology Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan2019 IHC 142 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-27
  tax exemptionpermanent establishmentPakistan-source incomewithholding taxcomposite contractoffshore supplyIncome Tax Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed by a non-resident company challenges orders passed by tax authorities rejecting its application for tax exemption under Section 152(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, concerning payments for the offshore supply component of an Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Commissioning contract. The core legal question is whether payments made to a non-resident for offshore supplies under an indivisible composite E.P.C.C. contract involving a permanent establishment in Pakistan constitute Pakistan-source income subject to withholding tax under Section 152(2A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the contract was a single composite undertaking and that the petitioner maintained a permanent establishment in Pakistan due to construction and installation activities exceeding the statutory threshold. The court laid down the principle that offshore supply components that form part of an overall arrangement for the supply, installation, and commissioning of a project involving a permanent establishment do not qualify for tax exemption and are taxable as Pakistan-source business income under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.

  Questions settled

  • Whether payments for offshore supplies under an E.P.C.C. contract are exempt from tax deduction under Section 152(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does an E.P.C.C. contract involving installation and commissioning activities constitute a permanent establishment under Section 2(41)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Are payments received by a non-resident under an indivisible composite contract taxable as Pakistan-source income under Section 101(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• M/s Happy Manufacturing Company (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federal Board of2020 PCTLR 198, 2019 PTD 1922, 2019 LHC 2056 · Lahore High Court · 2019-06-27Read full judgment →
• M/s Ash Associates, Islam Colony, Sialkot Road, Gujranwala through2019 CLC 1303, 2019 LHC 352 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-14
  civil revisionrejection of plaintarbitration agreementstay of proceedingsstep in the proceedingswaiver of arbitrationCode of Civil Procedure 1908
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which rejected a plaint based on an arbitration clause. The core legal questions were whether an application filed under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, could be treated as an application under Section 34, Arbitration Act 1940, and whether the respondents waived their right to arbitration by participating in court proceedings. The High Court held that the two provisions are distinct in nature and procedure; thus, an application for rejection of a plaint cannot be converted into an application for staying proceedings. Furthermore, the Court determined that by seeking multiple adjournments to file a written statement, the respondents had taken 'steps in the proceedings,' thereby waiving their right to invoke arbitration. The Court established that a party must invoke arbitration at the earliest opportunity, and any conduct indicating an intention to defend the suit on merits, such as requesting time to file a written statement, precludes the subsequent invocation of Section 34, Arbitration Act 1940. The petition was allowed, and the lower courts' orders were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be treated as an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Does requesting adjournments to file a written statement constitute a 'step in the proceedings' under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Can a party invoke the right to stay legal proceedings under an arbitration clause after participating in the court proceedings?
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• M/s Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. I.I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi vs The2019 PCTLR 1100, 2020 P SC 86, 2019 SCP 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-31
  central excise dutyexcess duty collectionunjust enrichmentlimitation perioddeemed arrearexpress trustrecovery of tax as debt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a tax dispute regarding excess central excise duty collected by an insurance company under the Central Excises Act, 1944 and the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The core legal question concerned the applicability and recovery mechanism of Section 3-D of the 1944 Act (added by the Finance Act, 1993) concerning excess duty collected and not deposited, along with the issue of limitation and retrospective operation. The Supreme Court held that while Section 3-D applied retrospectively to collections made prior to its enactment via the phrase "has collected", an amount deemed to be an arrear of duty under Section 3-D does not constitute a trust under Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court laid down that since specific departmental recovery machinery (Rule 10 of the 1944 Rules) was inapplicable to Section 3-D duties, the Government's proper remedy to recover such sums in the absence of tailored provisions was by way of a civil suit treated as a debt, governed by the sixty-year limitation period under Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 apply retrospectively to excess duty collected prior to its enactment?
  • Is an amount deemed to be an arrear of duty under Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 regarded as a trust under Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • What is the applicable limitation period and remedy for the recovery of excess duty collected under Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 when standard departmental rules do not provide a recovery mechanism?
  • Does Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 apply to the recovery of excess amounts collected under Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944?
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• M/s Abid Foundry vs Pakistan, through Federal Secretary, Finance and2019 PHC 136 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-03Read full judgment →
• Muzaffar vs The State2019 YLR 719 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-08-17Read full judgment →
• Muzaffar Khan and another vs The State and another2019 YLR 1109 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-06
  criminal appealocular testimonycross-casecorroborative evidencemurder convictionappreciation of evidencemedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals and a revision petition arising from a cross-case incident involving a double murder and injuries. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, given the presence of cross-versions and alleged discrepancies in ocular testimony. The court held that the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the appellant Muhammad Ashraf through consistent, natural, and unshaken ocular testimony of the complainant and eye-witnesses, whose presence at the scene was corroborated by the cross-case registered by the accused party. The medical evidence and recovery of incriminating articles further supported the conviction. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, maintaining the conviction and sentence while upholding the acquittal of other co-accused due to a lack of corroborative evidence. The key principle laid down is that minor, immaterial discrepancies in witness testimony do not undermine the credibility of eye-witnesses when their presence is established and their account is corroborated by independent evidence, such as medical reports and forensic recoveries.

  Questions settled

  • Do minor discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses necessarily adversely affect the credibility of their testimony?
  • Can the presence of eye-witnesses be established by their inclusion in a cross-case registered by the accused party?
  • Is the conviction of an accused sustainable when ocular testimony is corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of incriminating articles?
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• Muzaffar Ali Zaffar and 5 others vs The Collector Land Acquisition, Mangla2020 YLR 451, 2019 P.S.C. 601 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-11-22Read full judgment →
• Muzafar ali vs Federation of Pakistan and 02 others2019 SHC 392 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-25
  master and servantstatutory rulesnon-statutory rulesconstitutional petitionreview applicationterms and conditions of servicePrinting Corporation of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a review application filed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition relating to service disputes between an employee and the Printing Corporation of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the service rules of the Printing Corporation of Pakistan are statutory in nature, thereby making employment terms enforceable through constitutional jurisdiction under the principle of master and servant. The court held that the service rules of the respondent corporation are non-statutory, having been framed pursuant to an agreement with labor unions rather than under direct statutory authority, and publishing them in the official gazette does not render them statutory. Consequently, the relationship between the corporation and its employees is governed strictly by the principle of master and servant, and internal service disputes cannot be enforced through a constitutional petition under Article 199. The court laid down the principle that mere publication of service rules of a non-statutory body in the official gazette does not elevate them to statutory rules without proper statutory backing and governmental approval, and dismissed the review application as no error apparent on the face of the record was made out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service rules of the Printing Corporation of Pakistan are statutory or non-statutory in nature?
  • Can the terms and conditions of service of an employee governed by non-statutory rules be enforced through a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does the publication of service rules of a non-statutory body in the official gazette automatically render them statutory rules?
  • What constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review under Order XLVII read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Mustafa Jamal Kazi and others vs National Accountability Bureau and others2019 YLR 650 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-30Read full judgment →
• Mussa Khan vs Inspector-General Police Gilgit-Baltistan and 5 others2019 P Cr. L J 481 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-10-18
  quashing of proceedingsinherent powersre-investigationpolice investigationcriminal miscellaneousmurder casechallan
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed by the complainant seeking directions for the arrest of certain respondents alleged to have confessed to the murder of the petitioner's son before a local jirga, after an earlier challan had already been submitted against another set of accused who were facing trial. The core legal question was whether the court should invoke its inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to direct police action or re-investigation after the submission of the challan and commencement of trial proceedings. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that the petition was not maintainable, observing that investigation falls within the exclusive domain of the police and that re-investigation should not be ordered ordinarily unless extraordinary circumstances exist, as it creates complications and is often sought to obtain favorable reports. The court laid down the principle that the Chief Court will not routinely interfere in police investigations or order re-investigation after the submission of a challan absent exceptional circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 maintainable for directing police to arrest new suspects after the submission of a challan against other accused?
  • Can the court interfere in the domain of the police regarding the re-investigation of a criminal case?
  • Under what circumstances should a re-investigation of a criminal case be ordered after the completion of the initial investigation and submission of challan?
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• Muslim Commercial Bank Limited vs Robert Francis2019 CLD 996 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-30Read full judgment →
• Muslim Commercial Bank Limited through duly Constituted Attorney vs Sajida Naqi Riaz and others2019 CLC 1371 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-12Read full judgment →
• Mushtaque Hussain through L.Rs. and another vs Province of Sindh2019 YLR 730 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-16Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmed vs Sardar Aftab Akbar Khan, Etc2019 MLD 1313, 2019 LHC 360 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-08
  election petitionsummary rejectionverification of pleadingssecurity depositElections Act 2017Election Tribunalcorrupt practicesreturned candidate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an election petition challenging the candidature of a returned candidate in the 2018 General Elections. The core legal question was whether an Election Tribunal possesses the authority to summarily reject an election petition for non-compliance with statutory mandates, specifically regarding security deposits, verification of pleadings, and the provision of full particulars of alleged corrupt practices. The Court held that the Election Tribunal is empowered to summarily reject an election petition at any stage if it suffers from material legal flaws, such as the failure to deposit the requisite security under Section 142 of the Elections Act, 2017, or improper verification under Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court emphasized that election laws are stringent, and non-compliance with mandatory provisions is not a curable defect after the limitation period expires. Furthermore, the judgment established that statutory provisions prevail over conflicting rules and mandated that, for future cases, Oath Commissioners must explicitly endorse the administration of oaths on election petitions to ensure validity.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Election Tribunal summarily reject an election petition for non-compliance with statutory requirements under the Elections Act, 2017?
  • Is the failure to deposit the required security for costs under Section 142 of the Elections Act, 2017, a ground for the summary dismissal of an election petition?
  • Does the failure to verify an election petition in accordance with Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, constitute a fatal defect that cannot be cured?
  • In the event of a conflict between the provisions of the Elections Act, 2017, and the Election Rules, 2017, which provision prevails?
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• Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhera vs President of Pakistan through Secretary to the President, etc2020 PLD Islamabad 1, 2019 IHC 134 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanpersona designatapresidential adviceparliamentary democracylocus poenitentiaeremoval from officeconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhera, challenging a notification dated 12-06-2019 whereby the President of Pakistan withdrew his appointment as Federal Tax Ombudsman ab initio. The Federal Government contended that the appointment, made on the advice of the Prime Minister, was void because the President acts as persona designata under Section 3(1) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance 2000, and thus must act independently of executive advice. The High Court analyzed the constitutional scheme of parliamentary democracy under Article 48, distinguishing between administrative functions and adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The Court held that since appointing the Federal Tax Ombudsman is an administrative function conferred on the President qua President, the President is constitutionally mandated to act on the advice of the Prime Minister. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned notification, restoring the petitioner to his office, and emphasized that statutory independence of such offices must be protected from arbitrary executive withdrawal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the President of Pakistan acts as persona designata or in his constitutional capacity when appointing the Federal Tax Ombudsman under Section 3(1) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance 2000?
  • Is the President of Pakistan bound by the advice of the Prime Minister when performing administrative statutory functions as opposed to quasi-judicial functions?
  • Can an appointment to a statutory office with a guaranteed tenure be withdrawn ab initio by the executive after it has been acted upon and vested rights have been created?
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• Mushtaq Ahmed Raza Headmaster Govt. Boys High School & another2019 P SC 1712, 2019 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 109 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-04-16Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmad vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 558 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-05
  criminal appealmurderintoxicationvoluntary intoxicationburden of proofSection 302 PPCcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s admitted state of intoxication at the time of the occurrence entitled him to a lesser sentence or mitigation under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, based on the provisions of Sections 85 and 86 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court held that while the appellant was intoxicated, he failed to discharge the burden of proving that such intoxication was involuntary—specifically, that the intoxicant was administered without his knowledge or against his will. The Court affirmed that under Section 86 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, a person committing an offense while voluntarily intoxicated is liable as if they were sober. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were upheld, as the appellant could not establish the necessary conditions for legal absolution or mitigation regarding his state of mind during the commission of the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Does voluntary intoxication provide a defense or grounds for mitigation in a murder charge under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What is the burden of proof on an accused claiming intoxication as a defense under Section 85 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a person who commits an offense while voluntarily intoxicated liable as if they were sober under Section 86 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Mushtaq Ahmad vs Judge, Banking Offences Court No. 2, Lahore2019 CLD 318, 2019 LHC 225 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-18Read full judgment →
• Mushraf Khan vs Mst. Syed Begum2019 SC AJK 90 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-04-25Read full judgment →
• Mursleen vs Syed Ehsan Shah2019 YLR 1330 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-11-13Read full judgment →
• Mureed Sultan and another vs The State through P.G., Punjab and another2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-03
  compromisecompounding of offenceseffect of an acquittalmurderPakistan Penal Codepost-conviction compromisewaiver of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants filed a criminal petition for leave to appeal challenging a Lahore High Court judgment that had modified their death sentences to life imprisonment for murder. During the pendency of the petition, the applicants filed an application seeking their release based on a compromise reached with the legal heirs of the deceased. A verification report confirmed the genuineness of the compromise. The Supreme Court accepted the compromise under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The majority held that the composition of the offence results in the setting aside of the conviction and an acquittal under Section 345(6). A concurring opinion by Qazi Faez Isa, J., agreed with accepting the compromise and releasing the petitioners, but held that compounding an offence has 'the effect of an acquittal' rather than operating as a literal acquittal of the charge, as the finding of guilt recorded by the trial court remains intact when legal heirs forgive a convicted murderer. The key principle laid down is that while a valid compromise between legal heirs and a convicted murderer warrants the release of the convict and brings the sentence to an end, the conceptual distinction between an acquittal and the effect of an acquittal must be maintained in view of Islamic injunctions and statutory text.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal distinction between an acquittal and the effect of an acquittal under Section 345(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 upon a post-conviction compromise?
  • Does a compromise between the legal heirs of a deceased and a convicted murderer erase the finding of guilt recorded by a court of law?
  • Can a criminal convict be acquitted of the charge solely on the basis of a compromise accepted under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mureed Hussain vs StatePLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1472 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-30
  circumstantial evidencemurder referencejoint recoveryDNA analysisbenefit of the doubtcriminal appealstrangulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge convicting the appellant under Sections 302(b), 367-A, and 364 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a connected Murder Reference. The core legal questions involve the reliability of circumstantial evidence, the evidentiary value of joint extra-judicial confessions and joint recoveries, and the admissibility and integrity of DNA analysis when samples are delayed in transit. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence, noting material contradictions in the ocular testimony, flaws in the joint recovery in the dark, and unjustified delays in dispatching swabs for DNA profiling which rendered the report doubtful. Consequently, the conviction and death sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted on the benefit of the doubt. The key principle laid down is that in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, every link in the chain must be conclusively proven without gaps, and joint recoveries or delayed forensic samples cannot sustain a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of a joint extra-judicial confession and a joint recovery pointing to a dead body?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending forensic swabs for DNA analysis compromise the reliability of the DNA report?
  • How must circumstantial evidence be evaluated when the prosecution relies on a chain of events to prove guilt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the basis of last-seen evidence when the witnesses' presence is doubtful and contradictory?
  Read full judgment →
• Murad Ali Bangalani and 5 others vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 95 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-09
  anti-terrorism acttransfer of casejurisdictiondefinition of terrorismsense of fear and insecuritycriminal revisionpolice picket
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged an order passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court dismissing the applicants' application under Section 23-A of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for the transfer of cases to the ordinary trial court. The prosecution alleged that the accused attacked a police picket, fired upon police personnel, confined them, and took compromising photographs to blackmail them regarding illegal irrigation water supply. The core legal question was whether the alleged acts fell within the purview of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Sindh High Court held that while the acts against the police were serious, they did not constitute terrorism because they occurred in secluded areas and closed rooms without members of the public present, thus lacking the requisite design or impact of creating a sense of fear, awe, or insecurity in society under Section 6 of the Act. The court laid down the principle that for an act to qualify as terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it must satisfy both the specific actionable offences under Section 6(2) and the overarching intent and societal impact requirements of Section 6(1)(b) or (c).

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offence committed against police officials in a secluded area constitutes terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • What are the dual requirements under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for an act to fall within the purview of anti-terrorism laws?
  • Can an act meeting the criteria of Section 6(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court without satisfying the impact requirements of Section 6(1)?
  Read full judgment →
• Murad & another vs Aga Khan Health Services Pakistan through Nadeem2019 PHC 200 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-09-02Read full judgment →
• Muqarab Khan Panni and 5 others vs Collector Land Acquisition (Dor), Haripur and 2 others2019 [M] C.L.R. 1399 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muqarab Khan Panni and 5 others vs Collector Land Acquisition2019 PLJ Peshawar 30 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muqadas Bibi vs State etc.PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1522 · Lahore High Court · 2019-06-20
  charas recoverycontrol of narcotic substancessample separationalteration of convictionsentencing policymitigation for womencriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the alleged possession of four kilograms of charas, resulting in a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for four years and four months. The core legal question was whether drawing samples from only one piece of each multi-piece recovered narcotic packet, rather than from each individual piece, vitiates the conviction under Section 9(c) or warrants conversion to a lesser offense based on the weight of the actual samples tested. The Lahore High Court held that where a narcotic substance consists of multiple pieces, a sample must be drawn from each piece as per the precedent set by the Supreme Court, and failing to do so restricts the punishable weight to the mass of the tested samples alone. Consequently, the Court altered the conviction from Section 9(c) to Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, applied mitigating sentencing principles regarding female offenders, and reduced the sentence accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to draw samples from each individual piece of a multi-piece narcotic recovery restricts the punishable weight to the mass of the tested samples?
  • Can a conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 be altered to Section 9(b) based on improper sample collection?
  • Are female offenders entitled to a reduced sentence under the established sentencing policy for narcotic offenses?
  Read full judgment →
• Muqadar Shah vs StatePLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 552, 2020 YLR 1259, 2019 PHC 348 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-05Read full judgment →
• Muqadar Hussain Khan vs Yasir Saadat Khan2019 [M] C.L.R. 1333, 2019 CLC 723 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-26Read full judgment →
• Munir Masih etc vs Secretary Local Government & Community2019 LHC 425 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-23Read full judgment →
• Munir Masih and others vs Secretary Local Government and Community Development and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 590 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-23
  regularization of serviceswork charge employeesdaily wagesconstitutional petitionterms and conditions of serviceequality before law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, work-charge and daily-wages employees serving as "Khakroob" in the Tehsil Municipal Administration since 2007, filed a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking regularization of their services after continuous service spanning eleven years. The core legal question was whether daily wages and work-charge employees performing permanent functions for a prolonged period are entitled to regularization in line with settled judgments. The Lahore High Court allowed the petition, holding that the petitioners' case was squarely covered by the precedent in Province of Punjab through Secretary Communication and Works Department and others v. Ahmad Hussain (2013 SCMR 1547). The Court laid down the principle that public functionaries must voluntarily extend the benefit of judgments rendered by superior courts to all similarly placed employees without compelling them to engage in prolonged litigation, in accordance with the dictates of good governance and equality before the law under Article 25 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether daily wages and work-charge employees who have served for a long duration against permanent posts are entitled to regularization?
  • Do public functionaries have a duty to extend the benefit of a settled legal point to similarly placed employees who were not parties to the original litigation?
  • Whether artificial breaks in the service of work-charge employees defeat their right to regularization?
  Read full judgment →
• Munir Malik and another vs The State2019 YLR 770 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-20
  Anti-Terrorism ActOcular evidenceCommon intentionCriminal appealJurisdiction by consentNon-compoundable offenceWeapon recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment sentences imposed by the Anti-Terrorism Court for murder, attempted murder, and weapons offenses. The appellants contended they were falsely implicated due to a minor dispute and argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, despite their prior consent to the forum. Furthermore, they sought acquittal based on an alleged compromise with the complainant party. The Court held that the prosecution successfully established guilt through consistent ocular testimony, corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of crime weapons matching the forensic reports. The Court affirmed that minor contradictions in witness statements do not invalidate the prosecution's case. Regarding jurisdiction, the Court ruled that the appellants could not challenge the forum after consenting to it. Crucially, the Court held that non-compoundable offenses, particularly those under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, cannot be settled through private compromise, and the complainant's "no objection" to acquittal holds no legal value. Consequently, the convictions were upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the jurisdiction of a trial court after having previously consented to its jurisdiction?
  • Does a private compromise between parties regarding a non-compoundable offense under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 have legal validity?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on ocular account alone when corroborated by medical evidence and weapon recovery?
  • Are minor inconsistencies in witness statements sufficient to discredit the entire prosecution case?
  Read full judgment →
• Munir Hussian alias Munawar alias Muno vs The State2019 YLR 51 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-01
  narcoticscharas recoverysafe custody of case propertybenefit of the doubthostile witnessillegal detentioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge/Special Court for CNS Ghotki, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and sentenced to four and a half years rigorous imprisonment with a fine. The core legal questions involved the credibility of police testimony without independent corroboration, the presence of material contradictions, failure to establish safe custody and transmission of the recovered contraband, and the plausibility of the defence plea regarding previous illegal detention through a habeas corpus petition. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to a hostile mashir, missing Malkhana entries, failure to examine the carrier of the samples to the chemical examiner, and unconvincing police evidence juxtaposed with the appellant's defence. The court laid down the principle that the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right when discrepancies impair the reliability of prosecution evidence and safe custody of the case property is unestablished.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution's failure to examine the Malkhana incharge and the official who transported samples to the chemical examiner vitiates the proof of safe custody?
  • Can a conviction for narcotics possession be sustained on uncorroborated police testimony riddled with material contradictions?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution case when a mashir is declared hostile and contradicts the arresting officer?
  • Does the prior filing of a habeas corpus petition regarding illegal police detention substantiate a defence plea of false implication?
  Read full judgment →
• Munir Hussain vs The State2019 SHC 432 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-06
  post-arrest baildomestic violenceprohibitory clausetentative assessmentcriminal procedurebail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Munir Hussain, who was charged under Sections 337-A(iii), 337-A(i), and 337-L(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly causing injuries to his wife. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the specific allegations, the medical evidence, and the nature of the offense. The Court held that the applicant was not entitled to bail, finding that the FIR contained specific allegations corroborated by a medical certificate, and the offense fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court emphasized that at the bail stage, only a tentative assessment of evidence is required, and deeper appreciation is not permitted. It further noted that domestic violence cases require strict judicial scrutiny. Consequently, the bail application was dismissed, with directions to the trial court to expedite the proceedings and to the prison authorities to ensure the applicant receives necessary medical treatment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offense falling under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 warrants the grant of bail when the accused is nominated in the FIR with specific allegations?
  • Does the delay in lodging an FIR automatically entitle an accused to bail if the delay is reasonably explained?
  • Can the court conduct a deep appreciation of evidence at the bail stage of criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmed and others vs The State and others2019 SCMR 2006 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-09
  murderunlawful assemblyindiscriminate firingvicarious liabilityexaggerated nominationinjured witnessacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a double murder and murderous assault incident involving eighteen named and eight unknown accused. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners, as part of an unlawful assembly, trespassed into the complainant's house and fired shots resulting in two deaths and one injury. While the Trial Court and High Court maintained the petitioners' convictions based on specific attributions of shots, the Supreme Court observed significant inconsistencies. Key issues included the implausibility of twenty-six assailants firing indiscriminately yet resulting in only single wounds to each victim, the acquittal of numerous co-accused on the same evidence, and the lack of forensic support for precision attribution during a crisis. The Court held that the massive exaggeration of the number of assailants and the identical placement of the petitioners with acquitted co-accused rendered the prosecution's story improbable. Applying the principle of caution in cases of exaggerated nominations, the Court concluded it was unsafe to maintain the convictions, subsequently acquitting the appellants.

  Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad etc vs Govt. of the Punjab etc2019 PLC (C.S) 1020, 2019 LHC 478 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-12
  regularization of servicecontract employeesdevelopment to non-developmentservice lawwrit jurisdictionpublic employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges an order by the Secretary (Regulations), Services & General Administration Department, Government of the Punjab, which rejected the petitioners' request for regularization of their services. The core legal question is whether contract employees of a project, which was converted from a time-bound development project to a permanent non-development department, are entitled to regularization under the notification dated 14.10.2009. The Court held that since the project was transferred to the non-development side and the petitioners were recruited through a transparent, merit-based process, they are entitled to regularization. The Court emphasized that the government's own actions in converting the project status and the existence of the posts rendered the petitioners eligible for permanent status. Relying on the principle established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in similar cases, the Court held that employees of such projects cannot be arbitrarily terminated when the project itself becomes a permanent department. The impugned order was set aside for failing to consider these settled legal principles and the specific directions of the Division Bench, and the respondents were directed to process the petitioners' regularization.

  Questions settled

  • Are contract employees of a project entitled to regularization if the project is transferred from development to non-development status?
  • Can the government refuse to regularize contract employees who were recruited through a transparent and merit-based process after the project they serve in becomes a permanent department?
  • Does the expiry of a contract period preclude the regularization of services if the employee has continued to serve under court orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad and another vs The State and others2019 SCMR 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-15
  MurderAttempted murderAcquittalBenefit of doubtOcular evidenceCorroborationFalsus in uno falsus in omnibusSifting grain from chaffCriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a criminal appeal by Munir Ahmad against his conviction for murder and attempted murder, and a cross-petition by the complainant challenging the acquittal of co-accused and the alteration of Munir Ahmad's death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether evidence disbelieved for co-accused could be relied upon against the appellant without strong independent corroboration, considering the non-applicability of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus." The Supreme Court held that while the principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" is not applicable and courts must sift grain from chaff, if a set of witnesses is disbelieved for acquitted co-accused, their evidence can only be believed against the appellant if strong independent corroboration exists. Finding no such corroboration, particularly after the appellate court disbelieved recovery and motive, the Supreme Court concluded there was no credible evidence against Munir Ahmad and acquitted him by extending the benefit of doubt. The complainant's petition was consequently dismissed.

  Read full judgment →
• Muneer Ahmad Sheikh and another vs Director-General NAB Karachi2019 SCMR 1738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-06-15
  post-arrest bailpre-arrest bailselective prosecutionaccountabilityillegal appointmentsequal treatmentNational Accountability Bureau
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two petitions before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, one seeking post-arrest bail and the other seeking pre-arrest bail, after both were declined by the High Court. The petitioners were accused of maneuvering the appointments of their close relatives in the Sindh Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority by bypassing merit. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail when other similarly situated co-accused, including those who conducted inquiries and exonerated them, were neither arrested nor prosecuted, and where another accused with an identical role was granted pre-arrest bail without challenge. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and granted bail, holding that the law regulating accountability must be applied across the board and not in a lopsided or selective manner. The Court laid down the principle that selective prosecution and unequal application of accountability laws against similarly situated accused persons justify the exercise of judicial discretion to grant bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether selective prosecution and the failure to arrest or prosecute similarly situated co-accused persons justify the grant of bail to an accused?
  • Can bail be granted where the law regulating accountability is not applied across the board against all alleged accomplices?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if another co-accused with an identical role has been granted bail and the prosecution has not challenged that concession?
  Read full judgment →
• Munawar son of Anwar rind vs The State2019 SHC 534 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-17
  narcotics recoverybenefit of doubtsafe custody of samplescriminal appealacquittalprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, following the alleged recovery of 1100 grams of charas. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the safe custody of the recovered contraband and the reliability of the recovery proceedings. The Court found significant inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence, noting the failure to associate independent witnesses despite prior information, contradictions between the complainant and the recovery witness regarding the weighing method, and the failure to produce Malkhana records or examine the Malkhana in-charge. Relying on established precedents regarding the necessity of proving safe custody and transmission of samples, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The judgment reinforces the principle that an accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right, even if only a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce Malkhana records or examine the Malkhana in-charge create a fatal flaw in a narcotics case?
  • Is the prosecution required to prove the safe custody and transmission of samples to the Chemical Examiner in narcotics cases?
  • Does an inconsistency between the complainant and a recovery witness regarding the weighing method of contraband entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Munawar Hussain & another vs The State2019 LHC 4320 · Lahore High Court · 2019-12-04
  video link evidencerecording testimonyongoing statutedynamic interpretationwitness protectioncriminal proceduremodern devices in evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous matter arises from an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, filed in pending murder appeal proceedings, seeking permission to record the testimony of an overseas legal heir through video link from Dubai. The core legal question addressed is whether Pakistani criminal courts possess the legal authority to record witness testimony via video conferencing when the governing statute does not explicitly provide for it. The Lahore High Court held that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, being an ongoing and living statute, must be interpreted dynamically to accommodate technological advancements. Consequently, courts can permit the recording of evidence via video conferencing by invoking Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, and inherent powers, provided that comprehensive mandatory protocols are strictly observed to ensure witness identification, prevent coaching, and safeguard fairness.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal courts in Pakistan record witness evidence through video conferencing under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What statutory provisions empower Pakistani courts to admit evidence obtained through modern technological devices?
  • What mandatory protocols must be observed when recording a witness's testimony via video link?
  • Is the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, considered an ongoing statute subject to dynamic interpretation?
  Read full judgment →
• Munawar Ali vs Province of Sindh through Addl. Chief Secretary2019 CLC 1917 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-12Read full judgment →
• Munawar Ali vs Ld. Incharge Session Judge2019 SHC 524 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-16Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz vs The State2019 SHC 508 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-13Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Khan and 13 others vs Muhammad Anwar Khan and 4 others2019 [M] C.L.R. 961, 2019 PLJ AJ&K 58, 2019 YLR 1310 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-01-30Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Hussain and 3 others vs Public Service Commission of Azad2019 KLR Supreme Court 391, 2020 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 1, PLJ 2019 SC · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-03-05Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz alias Taja and others vs The State and others2019 P Cr. L J 781 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-17
  murderdeath sentence conversionimprisonment for lifeappeal against acquittalocular testimonymedical evidencemitigating circumstanceshatchet injury
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected murder reference and acquittal appeal arise out of a judgment by the trial court convicting the appellant for murder under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to death, while acquitting co-accused. The core legal questions involve the assessment of ocular and medical evidence in a daylight murder, the sustainability of an acquittal, and the determination of the quantum of sentence where extenuating circumstances exist. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of both the appellant and the respondent through consistent and natural ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence and recoveries. However, considering mitigating circumstances such as a single blow attributed without repetition, the court dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding conviction but modified the death sentence to imprisonment for life, while setting aside the respondent's acquittal, convicting him under Section 302(b), and sentencing him to imprisonment for life. The key principles laid down include that close relationship of prosecution witnesses does not discredit their testimony if it is trustworthy and natural, and that mitigating circumstances warrant a reduction of the death penalty to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Does the close relationship of prosecution witnesses with the deceased render their testimony untrustworthy?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with a judgment of acquittal recorded by a trial court?
  • Whether the infliction of a single blow without repetition constitutes a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Is medical opinion regarding a single weapon stroke sufficient to override independent physical dimensions of multiple wounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Ahmed Qureshi vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Karachi and 8 others2019 YLR 2703 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-06Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Ahmad vs The StatePLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 104, 2019 KLR Criminal Cases 350 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-22
  murderqatl-e-amdchance witnessbenefit of the doubtimprovements in testimonymedical evidence contradictionweapon recoverycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Mumtaz Ahmad, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the Qatl-e-Amd of his wife, Mst. Gulzar Bibi. The prosecution case rested on an ocular account provided by related and distant chance witnesses, medical evidence, alleged motive, and the recovery of a weapon. The core legal questions involved the credibility of chance witnesses, the effect of dishonest improvements in testimony, the corroborative value of delayed FIRs and medical examinations, and the evidentiary significance of firearms and empties sent together to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The Lahore High Court held that the eyewitnesses failed to prove their presence at the scene, made material and dishonest improvements regarding the weapon used, and that the medical evidence contradicted the ocular account regarding distance and timing. Furthermore, sending the crime empties and the weapon to the forensic lab on the same day rendered the recovery inconsequential. The Court set aside the conviction and sentence, extending the benefit of the doubt to the appellant and acquitting him.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of chance witnesses can be relied upon without independent corroboration of their presence at the crime scene?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution case when eye-witnesses make dishonest improvements regarding the weapon used in the crime?
  • Does the simultaneous transmission of crime empties and a recovered weapon to the Forensic Science Laboratory render the recovery inconsequential?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  Read full judgment →
• Mumshad @ Irshad @ Shadoo and another vs State etc2019 YLR 2403, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 625 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-05
  sudden fightculpable homicideforensic evidencesuppression of injuriescriminal appealmurder referencepremeditation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against a conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and a cross-appeal against the acquittal of co-accused. The core legal question was whether the incident constituted premeditated murder or a sudden fight, and the evidentiary value of forensic reports when samples are dispatched post-arrest. The Court held that the prosecution suppressed injuries sustained by the accused party, and the incident occurred at the spur of the moment without premeditation. Consequently, the Court converted the conviction from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing the sentence from death to fourteen years imprisonment. The Court affirmed the acquittal of the co-accused, finding no merit in the complainant's appeal. The key principle laid down is that where an incident arises from a sudden fight without premeditation, and the offender does not act in a cruel or unusual manner, the offense falls under Section 302(c) rather than 302(b). Additionally, forensic evidence sent after the accused's arrest lacks evidentiary value.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused party affect the prosecution's case?
  • What is the evidentiary value of forensic reports where samples are sent to the laboratory after the arrest of the accused?
  • Under what circumstances does a murder charge fall under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 instead of Section 302(b)?
  • Can a conviction for murder be converted to Section 302(c) if the incident occurred during a sudden fight without premeditation?
  Read full judgment →
• Multan Jan vs the State2020 P Cr. L J 88, 2019 PHC 215 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-09-18
  narcotics controlsafe custody of samplessafe transmissionconfession during trialplea of guiltbenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the alleged transportation of charas. The core legal questions involve the evaluation of safe custody and safe transmission of recovered contraband and FSL samples, the legality of a conviction based on an alleged confession made during trial while in judicial custody, and the proper procedure for recording a plea of guilt. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the safe custody and safe transmission of the narcotics and samples due to unexplained delays and missing links in evidence, which created serious doubt. Furthermore, the court held that an admission or confession obtained from an accused in judicial custody without adhering to mandatory statutory safeguards and procedural requirements cannot serve as the sole basis for a capital or severe conviction. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of the charge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure of the prosecution to prove safe custody and safe transmission of narcotics samples to the FSL vitiates the conviction?
  • Can an admission or statement made by an accused while in judicial custody form the sole basis for a conviction without following mandatory procedural safeguards?
  • Does a plea of guilt after an initial denial of the charge require independent supporting evidence before a conviction can be recorded?
  • Whether a confession recorded on oath is admissible in evidence under criminal law?
  Read full judgment →
• Multan Electric Power Company through Chief Executive, Multan vs Muhammad Islam2019 PLJ Lahore 410 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Multan Electric Power Company (MEPCO) through Chief Executive and another vs M_s. Asim Qaiser and Co. through Managing Partner and 4 others2019 PLJ Lahore 466 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-02Read full judgment →
• Mukhtiar Shah vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 313 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-28
  post-arrest bailcross-versionfurther inquiryprivate defencecriminal trialaggression
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under Sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner is entitled to bail when the case involves cross-versions of the same incident, where both the complainant party and the accused party allege the other was the aggressor and both sides suffered casualties. The court held that in instances of cross-versions arising from the same incident, the determination of which version is true requires a detailed appraisal of evidence, which is the province of the trial court. Consequently, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court granted bail to the petitioner, establishing the principle that where cross-cases exist, the uncertainty regarding which party acted as the aggressor constitutes sufficient grounds for the grant of bail pending trial, as the trial court must record and evaluate evidence to resolve the conflicting versions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a cross-version in a criminal case entitle an accused to bail on the ground of further inquiry?
  • Is a case involving conflicting versions of an incident, where both parties suffered casualties, suitable for the grant of bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should the determination of which party was the aggressor in a cross-case be decided at the bail stage or by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mukhtiar Hussain vs Muhammad Aslan2019 PLJ Lahore 508 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-23Read full judgment →
• Mukhtiar Ali vs The State and 4 others2019 P Cr. L J 1201 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-18
  Ex-Officio Justice of PeaceJurisdictionRevenue recordsCriminal ProcedureQuashing of proceedingsStatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenged an order passed by the Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, which directed a revenue official to update revenue records based on a registered sale deed. The core legal question was whether an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace possesses the jurisdiction under Section 22-A(6)(iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to issue directives to revenue authorities. The High Court held that the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that Section 22-A(6)(iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is explicitly limited to issuing directions to police authorities concerning the non-registration of criminal cases, transfer of investigations, or neglect of duty by police officials. It does not extend to the oversight of revenue authorities or the maintenance of revenue records. Consequently, the High Court set aside the order, establishing the principle that an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace cannot exercise powers beyond those statutorily granted, and any order issued in excess of such jurisdiction is void and subject to interference by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace have the jurisdiction under Section 22-A(6)(iii), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to issue directions to revenue authorities?
  • Is the scope of Section 22-A(6)(iii), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 limited exclusively to the oversight of police authorities?
  • Can an order passed by a judicial officer in excess of jurisdiction be set aside by the High Court even if the applicant was not a party to the original proceedings?
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• Mukhtiar Ahmad etc vs The State etc2020 PLD Lahore 759, 2019 LHC 3867 · Lahore High Court · 2019-09-25
  mandatory judgment contentsomission in chargeremand of casecriminal appealunlawful assemblyCode of Criminal Procedure 1898Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected revision challenge a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident involving murder and hurt. The core legal question before the Lahore High Court was whether the trial court's failure to record any findings or verdict regarding charges framed under Sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 constitutes a curable irregularity or an illegality necessitating a remand of the case. The High Court held that complying with the mandatory requirements of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to explicitly determine and record findings on every charge is essential, and its omission is an illegality that cannot be cured under Section 537 or rectified under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for a fresh decision on the unaddressed charges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a trial court to record findings on specific charges framed against an accused renders the judgment illegal and liable to be set aside?
  • Can an omission by a trial court to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be cured under Section 537 of the Code?
  • Is the High Court empowered under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to bypass regular trial procedures and cure fundamental judgment defects?
  • What are the legal consequences when a trial court convicts an accused on some charges while entirely omitting to adjudicate upon co-existing major charges such as rioting and unlawful assembly?
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• Mukhtar Ali vs Azad Govt. & others2019 SC AJK 128 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-05-21
  service lawpromotionseniorityminimum qualificationcivil servantsupersessioneligibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal regarding his non-promotion to the post of Superintendent of Police (SP). The appellant, a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), contended that despite being senior in the seniority list, he was bypassed for promotion in favor of a junior officer. The core legal question was whether the appellant, who lacked the mandatory educational qualification of graduation, could claim a vested right to promotion or allege discrimination. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that promotion is not an absolute right and is contingent upon fulfilling prescribed qualifications. The Court affirmed that under Section 8 of the AJ&K Civil Servants Act, 1976, and the relevant service rules, only civil servants possessing the minimum prescribed qualifications are eligible for promotion. Since the appellant failed to meet the graduation requirement and did not challenge the validity of the qualification notification itself, his supersession was lawful. The Court established that a civil servant cannot claim promotion against established rules or plead discrimination when they lack the mandatory eligibility criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant who lacks the prescribed minimum qualification eligible for promotion?
  • Can a civil servant claim a vested right to promotion despite failing to meet the mandatory educational criteria?
  • Does the failure to promote a senior officer who lacks the required qualification constitute illegal discrimination?
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• Mukhtar Ahmad vs Provincial Government2021 CLC 9, 2019 PHC 258 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-09-26Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Ahmad vs Province of Punjab, etc2019 LHC 4057 · Lahore High Court · 2019-12-03Read full judgment →
• Mukarram Khan and 5 others vs Maab Zada and 3 others2019 MLD 1924 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-28Read full judgment →
• Mujeeb-ur-Rehman etc vs Mehr-un-Nissa alias Tanzeel Begum etc2019 CLC 1352, 2020 [M] C L R 1595, 2019 PHC 82 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Mujahid Islam Zahid vs The State etc2019 LHC 1591, 2019 MLD 1610 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-29
  rapekidnapping of minorocular testimonyplea of alibicriminal appealidentification of accusedmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment sentences imposed by the trial court under Sections 364-A and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the rape and kidnapping of a minor girl. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution successfully established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the defense's contentions regarding the delay in FIR registration, alleged misidentification of the appellant, a negative forensic report, and a plea of alibi. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and sentences. It held that the ocular testimony of the victim, corroborated by medical evidence, was consistent and reliable despite the trauma suffered. The Court further ruled that the delay in reporting was explained by the victim's critical medical condition, and the plea of alibi was unsubstantiated as the appellant failed to produce evidence during the investigation. Additionally, the Court clarified that the use of a nickname in the FIR does not create reasonable doubt when the identity of the accused is otherwise established and consistent throughout the trial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of a nickname in an FIR create reasonable doubt if the accused's identity is otherwise established?
  • Is a plea of alibi valid if the accused fails to produce supporting evidence during the investigation?
  • Can a delay in registering an FIR be excused if the victim was in a critical medical condition?
  • Is the ocular testimony of a minor victim sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape?
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• Mujahid Iqbal vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 1432 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-18
  juvenile offenderanti-terrorism courtexclusive jurisdictionpolice custodycriminal revisionjuvenile court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision and connected writ petition arise from an order passed by the Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Hazara Division, declining police custody of a juvenile respondent on the ground that the Anti-Terrorism Court lacked jurisdiction to try a juvenile. The core legal question was whether an Anti-Terrorism Court or a Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try terrorism offences committed by a juvenile. The Peshawar High Court held that the insertion of the word 'exclusively' in Section 21-G of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, being later in time and supported by Section 14 of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, gives the Anti-Terrorism Court precedence. Furthermore, pursuant to a notification dated 30.05.2012 issued under Section 4(1) of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, all Anti-Terrorism Courts were designated to exercise the powers of Juvenile Courts. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order, allowing police custody before the Anti-Terrorism Court. The key principle laid down is that Anti-Terrorism Courts possess the requisite jurisdiction to try juveniles for terrorism-related offences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Anti-Terrorism Court or a Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try terrorism offences committed by a juvenile?
  • Does the insertion of the word 'exclusively' in Section 21-G of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 take precedence over Section 4(3) of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000?
  • Can Anti-Terrorism Courts exercise the powers of Juvenile Courts pursuant to the federal notification dated 30.05.2012?
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