Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Qaiser Rehman alias Imran vs State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 454 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-14
  post-arrest bailattempted rapetwo versionsfurther inquiryconcealment of injuriesmedico-legal certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Qaiser Rehman alias Imran in FIR No. 336/16 registered under Sections 376 and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Shah Kot, District Sahiwal, involving allegations of an attempted rape of an 86-year-old woman. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail in the face of conflicting cross-versions of the incident, including a prior application under Section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and a medico-legal certificate showing injuries sustained by the petitioner. The Lahore High Court held that where rival versions exist and the complainant party has allegedly concealed injuries sustained by the accused during the same occurrence, the matter calls for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court laid down the principle that the correctness of competing versions cannot be determined at the bail stage and warrants further inquiry, entitling the accused to the concession of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when a case involves two competing versions of the same occurrence?
  • Does the concealment of injuries sustained by the accused in the crime report make the case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the correctness of rival versions of an incident be determined at the bail stage?
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• Qaiser Pervaiz vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, R.T.O., Rawalpindi, .2017 PTD (Trib.) 506 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-07-28Read full judgment →
• Qaiser and 2 others vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 327 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-08
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtocular accountmaterial contradictionseyewitness credibilitylife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal jail appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the appellants under Section 302(b) read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the trial court for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt through credible ocular and medical evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the testimony of the eyewitnesses was riddled with material contradictions, improvements regarding their presence at the spot, and inconsistencies with the medical evidence, creating serious doubts regarding the genuineness of the prosecution case. Emphasizing that the benefit of any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellants by extending the benefit of the doubt. The key principle laid down is that where eyewitness testimony is tainted by material improvements and contradictions, and fails to inspire confidence in a capital charge case, it cannot form the basis of a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions and improvements in the testimony of eyewitnesses regarding their presence at the scene are sufficient to create doubt in a murder case?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the common object and specific attribution of injuries warrant the acquittal of the accused?
  • Is the uncorroborated and contradictory testimony of close relatives sufficient to sustain a conviction on a capital charge?
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• Qaiser Abbas, etc vs The State, etcK.L.R. 2017 Criminal Cases 153 · Lahore High Court
  criminal appealcircumstantial evidenceextra-judicial confessionlast-seen evidencebenefit of doubtmurderdeath referenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the convictions and death sentence of the appellants arising from a murder case based entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically extra-judicial confessions and last-seen evidence. The Lahore High Court examined the evidentiary value of extra-judicial confessions and delayed disclosures in last-seen testimony, reiterating that both are weak forms of evidence requiring independent, unimpeachable corroboration, which was absent in this case. The Court emphasized that one tainted piece of evidence cannot corroborate another, and any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right. Consequently, the High Court accepted the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences, acquitted the appellants, and answered the murder reference in the negative by declining to confirm the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession in a criminal trial?
  • Can a delayed statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 form the basis of a reliable last-seen piece of evidence?
  • Whether one tainted piece of evidence can corroborate another tainted piece of evidence in criminal jurisprudence?
  • Is medical evidence alone sufficient to connect an accused person with the commission of a crime?
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• Qaiser Abbas and 8 others vs The Province of Punjab and 2 others2017 LHC 4308 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-22Read full judgment →
• Qadir Dad vs Easel, etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 1216 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-11
  civil revisionpaternitylegitimacypresumption of legitimacyconcurrent findingsdeclaration suitQanoon-e-Shahadat Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent findings of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's suit for a declaration and permanent injunction regarding the paternity of the first respondent. The petitioner, as the father of the deceased alleged father, contended that the first respondent was not the legitimate son of the deceased, challenging a birth entry and seeking a declaration of illegitimacy. The core legal question revolved around whether the strong legal presumption of legitimacy under Article 128 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, was successfully rebutted by the petitioner's evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner failed to present sufficient and reliable evidence to displace the statutory presumption of legitimacy, particularly given that the deceased husband never disowned the child during his lifetime and that the evidence adduced by the petitioner was inadequate. The court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, laying down the principle that concurrent findings of fact will not be disturbed on revisional side without a showing of material misreading or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts can be disturbed in civil revision without establishing misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • How is the legal presumption of legitimacy under Article 128 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 rebutted in a suit for declaration of paternity?
  • Does the failure of a father to disown a child during his lifetime strengthen the presumption of legitimacy under the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
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• Qadir Dad vs Easal etc.2017 LHC 1979 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-11Read full judgment →
• Qadeer Ahmad vs Ejaz Ahmad through L.Rs, and others2017 YLR 1217 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-21
  civil revisionpartition suitjurisdiction of civil courtadmission at barex parte decreemisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby the petitioners' suit for possession through partition of joint properties was dismissed. The trial court had dismissed the suit on the grounds that ownership proof for a commercial property was lacking and the remaining properties were agricultural, falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of the revenue forum, an approach affirmed by the lower appellate court despite the plaintiffs' un-rebutted ex parte evidence. The Lahore High Court examined whether a civil court has jurisdiction over joint agricultural and urban properties and whether an admission made at the bar by counsel against the record is conclusive. The Court held that the lower courts misread the documentary evidence, which actually showed the properties to be residential or commercial rather than agricultural, and that civil courts maintain ultimate jurisdiction over such properties. Furthermore, the Court held that a factual admission made in ignorance of law or record is not binding and does not create an estoppel unless acted upon to another's detriment. Consequently, the revision was accepted, the impugned judgments were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for a fresh decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Civil Court is equipped with jurisdiction to try and decide a suit for possession through partition qua common agricultural and urban properties falling in the joint holding of the parties?
  • Whether an admission against the record and fact made at the bar before a court of law is to be treated as conclusive?
  • Can a plaint of a suit be rejected or returned in piecemeal when multiple properties of mixed nature are involved?
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• Qaddan and others vs The State2017 SCMR 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-08
  Appeal by leaveDeath sentenceLife imprisonmentMitigation of sentenceSection 342 Cr.P.C.MotiveProvocationPremeditationAbatement of appealInfructuous appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned an appeal by leave against convictions and death sentences for offences under Sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 PPC, which had been upheld by the High Court. The core legal question revolved around the mitigation of death sentences to life imprisonment, considering factors like provocation, lack of premeditation, and procedural irregularities regarding the motive. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as abated for one appellant (deceased) and as infructuous for another (sentence served). For the remaining appellants, their convictions were maintained, but their death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment. The Court held that evidence not put to an accused during their statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. cannot be considered against them. It further established that failure by the prosecution to establish motive, coupled with factors like provocation and lack of premeditation, can be a ground for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment.

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• (1) Punnu Khan and 2 Others (2) Arfan Mahmood s/o Punu Khan, caste Jat2017 SC AJK 72 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Punjab Higher Education Commission vs Dr. Aurangzeb Alamgir, etc2017 LHC 1400 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-27Read full judgment →
• Punjab Higher Education Commission vs Dr. Aurangzeb Alamgir and others2017 PLD Lahore 489 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-27
  higher education standardsprovincial autonomycooperative federalismVice Chancellor appointmentSearch Committeeconstitutional interpretationlegislative competenceHigher Education CommissionCouncil of Common Interestsintra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerned a challenge to notifications issued by the Higher Education Department, Government of Punjab, regarding the constitution of a Search Committee and criteria for selecting Vice Chancellors in public sector universities. The core legal questions revolved around the legislative competence of the Province to set standards in higher education, given Entry 12 of Part-II of the Federal Legislative List and the subject of "education" falling in the unwritten Residuary List post-18th Constitutional Amendment. The court also examined the nature of standards set by the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002, and the role of the Council of Common Interests (CCI). The High Court held that both the Federation (setting minimum national standards) and the Provinces (setting higher standards) have legislative power in this area, guided by cooperative federalism. It found Section 14(2) and (4) of the University of the Punjab Act, 1973, and similar provincial provisions, to be intra vires the Constitution. The impugned notifications were declared valid, and the CCI was directed to review HEC standards. The Single Judge's judgment, which had struck down the provincial provisions and notifications, was set aside.

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• Punjab Employees Social Security Institution vs Zulfiqar Ali and 22017 PLD Lahore 457 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-28
  social security contributionprovincial ombudsmanalternative statutory remedyconstitutional petitionjurisdictiondemand notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged orders passed by the Provincial-Ombudsman and the Governor of the Punjab directing the Punjab Employees Social Security Institution (PESSI) to withdraw a demand notice and de-notify an establishment. The core legal question was whether an employer can bypass statutory remedies provided under the Social Security Ordinance, 1965, to approach the Provincial-Ombudsman regarding a contribution dispute. The Lahore High Court held that the employer was legally bound to exhaust the efficacious statutory remedies available under Sections 57 and 59 of the Social Security Ordinance, 1965, by first raising the dispute before the Institution and subsequently appealing to the Social Security Court, rather than invoking the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The court established that the Ombudsman lacks jurisdiction to intervene in matters where a comprehensive statutory adjudication and appeal mechanism is provided by the legislature for resolving social security contribution disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer is obliged to approach the appropriate forum available under the Social Security Ordinance, 1965, rather than approaching the Provincial-Ombudsman?
  • Whether a complaint before the Provincial-Ombudsman is competent in the presence of statutory remedies available under Section 57 of the Social Security Ordinance, 1965?
  • Whether the Provincial-Ombudsman may take cognizance of a matter regarding social security contributions in the existence of a statutory remedy available to the employer?
  • Whether recommendations or orders of the Provincial-Ombudsman are liable to be implemented when passed without jurisdiction or by bypassing statutory remedies?
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• Pukhrajmal Sagarmal Lunkad (D) vs The Municipal Council, Jalgaon and others2017 SCInd 497 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-02-03
  Town Planning SchemeDevelopment Planlapsing of reservationland acquisitionPlanning Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the dismissal of writ petitions by the High Court regarding the quashing of a Town Planning Scheme and land reservations. The core legal question is whether Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, providing for the lapsing of land reservations upon failure to acquire within ten years, applies to lands reserved under a Town Planning Scheme governed by Chapter V of the Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 127 of the Act does not apply to lands reserved under a Town Planning Scheme, as Chapter V constitutes a self-contained code for implementing such schemes through reconstitution of plots and determination of compensation by an arbitrator, distinct from general Development Plans under Chapter III. The key principle laid down is that the lapsing mechanism under Section 127 is confined to Development Plans and does not invalidate land designations properly processed under a Town Planning Scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, apply to lands reserved under a Town Planning Scheme?
  • What is the effect of a final Town Planning Scheme coming into force under Section 88 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966?
  • Whether the procedure for land acquisition under Section 126 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, must be resorted to for lands required under a Town Planning Scheme?
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• Provincial Government through Chief Secretary N.W.F.P., Peshawar and 52017 PLJ Peshawar 341 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Provincial Government through Chief Secretary G.B. and 5 others vs Faqir Mohammad2017 YLR 969 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-05-05Read full judgment →
• Provincial Government of N.W.F.P. through Chief Secretary and 5 others2017 CLC 908 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-09Read full judgment →
• Provincial Assembly vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Minister and others2017 PLD Peshawar 186 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-13Read full judgment →
• Province of the Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura,etc. vs Syed2017 PSC 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertyrehabilitation settlement schemeforest departmentallotment confirmationmode of proofsuit for possessiondeclaratory decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing revision petitions and upholding decrees in favor of the respondents regarding a suit for possession of evacuee land. The core legal questions involved whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner's memorandum dated 27.02.1965 banning the allotment of evacuee land in possession of the Forest Department operated to invalidate subsequent confirmations, whether documents relied upon were proved in accordance with the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and whether a bare suit for possession was maintainable where title was disputed. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the lower court judgments, holding that allotments confirmed in derogation of the binding memorandum of 1965 are void, that the statutory mode of proving documents under the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984 cannot be dispensed with by mere exhibition without objection, and that a suit for possession without a prayer for declaration is unsustainable when the defendant seriously disputes the plaintiff's title.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allotment of evacuee land confirmed in violation of the Chief Settlement Commissioner's memorandum dated 27.02.1965 is valid?
  • Does the exhibition of a document without objection at the trial dispense with the mandatory requirement of proving its signature and handwriting under the law?
  • Is a bare suit for possession maintainable when the defendant explicitly disputes the plaintiff's title in the written statement without a prayer for declaration?
  • Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner has the lawful authority under paragraph 4-A of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme to restrict the allotment of land required for public purposes?
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• Province of the Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura and others vs Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah and others., Iqbal Ahmad through L.Rs, and others., Fazal Dad Khan and others2017 PSC 8, 2017 SCMR 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-25
  evacuee propertyland allotmentChief Settlement Commissionermemorandummode of proofQanun-e-Shahadat Ordersuit for possessiondeclaration of titleres judicatavoid orderbona fide purchaserForest DepartmentRehabilitation Settlement Scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld lower court decrees granting possession of evacuee land to respondents. The core legal questions revolved around the validity of land allotments confirmed in favor of the respondents, particularly concerning a Chief Settlement Commissioner's memorandum dated 27.02.1965, which banned the allotment of evacuee land in the possession of the Forest Department. Further issues included the proper proof of documents under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, the maintainability of a suit for possession without a declaration of title when title was disputed, and the rights of bona fide purchasers. The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned judgments and decrees. It held that allotments confirmed in derogation of the Chief Settlement Commissioner's valid memorandum were void. The Court emphasized that documents must be strictly proved according to the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and that a suit for possession is improper where title is seriously disputed without seeking a declaration. The Court also clarified that rejection of a plaint does not operate as res judicata and that a void original allotment cannot confer valid rights upon subsequent purchasers.

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• Province of Sindh, Chief Secretary and 7 others vs Bilqees and 16 others2017 YLR 1713 · Sindh High Court · 2016-06-09Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh vs Haji Razzaq and others2017 PLD Supreme Court 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-25
  court-feeoriginal civil jurisdictionSindh Courts Actordinary original civil jurisdictionDistrict Court jurisdictionChief Court of SindhHigh Court of Sindh
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals concerning whether court-fees are payable on original side suits and appeals in the High Court of Sindh under sections 3 and 4 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The core legal question is whether the original civil jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Sindh qualifies as 'ordinary original civil jurisdiction' within the meaning of section 4 of the said Act, thereby attracting exemptions applicable to Presidency High Courts. Analyzing the historical background of judicial institutions in the subcontinent, the Sindh Courts Act 1926, and the Establishment of West Pakistan High Court Order, 1955, the Supreme Court held that the original civil jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Sindh is of a special nature akin to District Court jurisdiction under section 8 of the Sindh Courts Act, 1926, rather than the ordinary original civil jurisdiction possessed by Chartered Presidency High Courts. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and affirmed the correctness of the view taken in Firdous Trading Corporation v. Japan Cotton and General Trading Co. Ltd.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the original civil jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Sindh is the ordinary original civil jurisdiction within the meaning of section 4 of the Court Fees Act, 1870?
  • Did the Chief Court of Sindh exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction or District Court jurisdiction under section 8 of the Sindh Courts Act, 1926?
  • Are court-fees payable on suits and appeals filed on the original side of the High Court of Sindh?
  • Whether the inclusion of the Chief Court of Sindh within the definition of a High Court under section 219 of the Government of India Act, 1935, changed the nature of its original civil jurisdiction?
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• Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others vs Imran Badar2017 PLC (C.S) 414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-26
  grace markspublic service commissioncompetitive examinationcivil servicemeritconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh directing the Sindh Public Service Commission to award grace marks to a candidate who failed by one mark in a compulsory subject of the Combined Competitive Examination 2013, enabling him to qualify for the interview. The core legal question was whether the Sindh Public Service Commission possessed the legal authority or discretion to award grace marks to candidates in competitive examinations. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory and regulatory framework governing the examinations, specifically the amending notification dated 2nd February 1999 and the Recruitment Management Regulations 2006, expressly prohibited the granting of grace marks and that the power to do so under earlier rules had been deleted. The Court laid down the principle that in the absence of any enabling provision in the applicable statutes, rules, or regulations, courts cannot read extraneous concessions into competitive examination criteria, and strict adherence to merit without grace marks must be maintained to uphold professional competence in the civil service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sindh Public Service Commission have the authority to award grace marks to candidates in competitive examinations under the current legal framework?
  • Can a High Court issue a writ under Article 199 of the Constitution directing the award of grace marks when governing regulations explicitly forbid them?
  • Whether the deletion of provisions allowing grace marks in service rules bars candidates from claiming such concessions on the basis of past practice or discrimination?
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• Province of Punjab vs Qaisar Iqbal etc2017 LHC 3764 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-05Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Secretary, Works And Communication And 52017 MLD 2095 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-01Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Secretary to the Government vs Dr.2018 [M] C.L.R. 1587, 2017 LHC 3865 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-21
  intra court appealchange of cadreseniorityestoppelcivil servantconstitutional jurisdictionretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges a single-bench judgment that allowed writ petitions filed by doctors who sought regularization and seniority from an earlier date (2009) at par with a contract appointee group, after they had voluntarily opted to change their cadre from the General Cadre to the Teaching/Specialist Cadre under amended service rules in 2012. The core legal questions pertained to the maintainability of writ petitions by civil servants regarding appointments by transfer under Article 199, the application of the doctrine of estoppel against employees who accepted prospective terms and conditions placing them at the bottom of the seniority list, and whether a case of discrimination was made out. The Lahore High Court held that while the writ petitions were maintainable because appointments by transfer do not fall strictly within the terms and conditions barred by Article 212 of the Constitution, the learned Single Judge erred on merits in finding discrimination. The Court ruled that the respondents were bound by the express terms of their 2012 appointment letters making their induction prospective and placing them at the bottom of the seniority list, and were estopped from claiming retrospective benefits after voluntarily changing their cadre. The appeals were accordingly allowed and the writ petitions dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether writ petitions filed by civil servants regarding their appointment by transfer are barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether an employee who voluntarily opts for a change of cadre and accepts appointment terms placing them at the bottom of the seniority list is estopped from claiming retrospective seniority?
  • Whether the failure to count previous general cadre service towards teaching cadre seniority constitutes actionable discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether administrative rules or notifications can be given retrospective operation in the absence of explicit statutory authority?
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• Province of Punjab through Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Co_3899e7dc2017 PSC 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  territorial jurisdictionarbitration awardrule of the courtcommercial activities of governmentcivil proceduresubject-matter of reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Province of Punjab arose from a dispute concerning territorial jurisdiction under Section 2(c) and Section 31(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for filing an arbitration award to be made a Rule of the Court. A road construction contract executed in Toba Tek Singh led to arbitration proceedings held in Lahore, culminating in an award against the appellant. The respondent filed an application before the Civil Court at Lahore to make the award a rule of the court, which was contested on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applies to the Government when engaged in commercial activities and how Sections 2(c) and 31(1) of the Arbitration Act operate. The Court held that when the Government engages in commercial activities rather than sovereign functions, it enjoys no special privilege and is subject to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, like any corporate entity. Consequently, Civil Courts at both Toba Tek Singh and Lahore possessed concurrent jurisdiction, making the filing of the award at Lahore competent. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Which court has territorial jurisdiction under Sections 2(c) and 31(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, to file an arbitration award and make it a Rule of the Court?
  • Does Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply to the Government when it engages in commercial and business activities?
  • Can the Government claim sovereign immunity or exemptions from ordinary civil jurisdiction when executing commercial contracts through its departments?
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• Province of Punjab through District Coordination Officer, Gujrat and others vs Malik Ghulam Sarwar Awan and others2017 YLR 182 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-19Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura, etc. vs Syed2017 PLJ SC 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertymode of proofexhibition of documentsForest Department landChief Settlement Commissioner directivesuit for possessiondeclaration of titlebonafide purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for possession filed by the respondents against the Forest Department, Province of Punjab, regarding evacuee property land. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court concurrently accepted the respondents' claims based on unproven documents, including a disputed No Objection Certificate (NOC) and letters. The core legal questions pertained to the admissibility and mode of proof of unauthenticated documents, the binding nature of the Chief Settlement Commissioner's Memorandum dated 27.02.1965 banning the allotment of evacuee lands in possession of the Forest Department, and whether a suit for possession without seeking a declaration of title was maintainable when title was disputed. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower courts' judgments. The Court held that unproven documents cannot be treated as evidence merely because they were exhibited without objection. Furthermore, any confirmation of allotment made after the 27.02.1965 Memorandum in derogation of its terms was void and conferred no title.

  Questions settled

  • Can a document be treated as proved evidence merely because it was admitted and exhibited without objection by the opposing party?
  • Does an allotment of evacuee land confirmed after the issuance of a directive banning such allotment confer valid title?
  • Is a suit for possession maintainable without seeking a declaration of title when the plaintiff's title is expressly disputed by the defendant?
  • Can a subsequent purchaser claim protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act if the vendor's original allotment is void?
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• Professor Dr. Shah Junaid Ahmad Hashmi and 2 others vs Registrar2017 PLJ Islamabad 370, 2017 YLR 1191 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-09Read full judgment →
• Professor (R) Dr. Nasibdar Muhammad vs Government of Khyber2017 PLJ Peshawar 232 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Prof. Malik Arshad Aziz & 142 others vs Finance Department & 5 others2017 SCR 559 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  time-scale promotioncivil service lawmonetary incentiveregular promotionAzad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Actpremature incrementservice structure
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals challenge a High Court judgment that dismissed writ petitions filed by college teachers seeking to prevent the government from amending a "time-scale" promotion policy. The core legal question was whether the time-scale policy, which granted higher pay scales to teachers based on performance, constituted a "regular promotion" under the law, thereby entitling beneficiaries to associated financial benefits like premature increments, or if it was merely a non-substantive monetary incentive. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the time-scale policy is an incentive scheme for monetary benefits rather than a regular promotion. The Court affirmed that under Section 8 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act, 1976, "promotion" is defined as elevation to a higher post. Consequently, the mere grant of a higher pay scale without a corresponding higher post does not constitute a "regular promotion" and does not confer rights to benefits reserved for regular promotions, such as premature increments. The Court clarified that administrative policies cannot override the statutory definition of promotion established by the Civil Servants Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of a higher pay scale under a time-scale policy constitute a regular promotion under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act, 1976?
  • Can a time-scale incentive policy override the statutory definition of promotion which requires a higher post?
  • Are teachers granted higher pay scales under a time-scale policy entitled to premature increments and other benefits associated with regular promotions?
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• Principal, Bolan Medical College, Quetta vs Dr. Sharbat Khan and 42017 YLR 372 · Balochistan High Court · 2016-08-26
  compensatory costsfalse and vexatious defenseallotment disputeconstitutional petitioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from a civil suit concerning the lawful allotment of a residential bungalow at Bolan Medical College, Quetta. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, declaring him the lawful allottee and, inter alia, awarding compensatory costs against the Principal of Bolan Medical College under Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner challenged the cost award before the appellate court, which dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. In the constitutional petition, the core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in exercising discretionary powers to award compensatory costs under Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Balochistan High Court held that the mandatory statutory prerequisites—specifically, a timely objection by the opposite party at the earliest opportunity and the recording of reasoned findings that the defense was false and vexatious to the knowledge of the party asserting it—were not fulfilled. Consequently, the High Court set aside the trial court's judgment and decree to the extent of the compensatory cost award, establishing that Section 35-A cannot be invoked without strictly satisfying its mandatory procedural and substantive requirements.

  Questions settled

  • What are the mandatory legal prerequisites for awarding compensatory costs under Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a trial court award compensatory costs under Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without the opposing party raising a timely objection at the earliest opportunity?
  • Is it mandatory for a court to record reasons holding a defense to be false and vexatious to the knowledge of the party before awarding costs under Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Prime Commercial Bank Ltd. vs Knit Knot Pvt. Ltd. etc.2017 PLJ Lahore 172 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-22Read full judgment →
• Prime Commercial Bank Ltd vs Knit Knot Pvt. Ltd., etc2017 PLJ Lahore 172, 2017 P.C.T.L.R. 34 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-22Read full judgment →
• Present: Shehram Sarwar CH. Khadim Hussain and anothers vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 67 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-07Read full judgment →
• Premier Insurance Company of Pakistan Ltd. and another vs Karachi2017 YLR 1551 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-02Read full judgment →
• Premier Battery Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs Karachi Water and Sewerage Board2017 SHC 309 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-15Read full judgment →
• Port Qasim Authority through Secretary vs Director General2017 PTD (Trib.) 390 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-05-18Read full judgment →
• Pirzada alias Peer vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 605 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-27
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtadverse inferenceocular evidencenon-production of witnessesAnti-Terrorism Actburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence awarded by an Anti-Terrorism Court for robbery and firing at a police party. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of the non-production of key witnesses and inconsistencies in the evidence. The Sindh High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant. The court held that the prosecution's failure to produce "star witnesses," such as the complainant and other private individuals, necessitated an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. It established that corroborative evidence cannot sustain a conviction in the absence of direct, substantive ocular evidence. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the burden of proof remains strictly on the prosecution throughout the trial, and the heinous nature of a crime does not relieve the state of its duty to prove the charge through unimpeachable evidence. As the prosecution failed to establish the appellant's identity and participation beyond a shadow of doubt, the benefit of the doubt was extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce star witnesses warrant an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on corroborative evidence in the absence of direct, substantive ocular evidence?
  • Does the heinous nature of a crime relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Is identification of an accused person before the trial court during the trial considered safe for conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Ishaq Ahmad vs Deputy Commissioner Land Acquisition2018 CLC 449, 2018 PLJ Peshawar 208, 2017 PHC 1163 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-30Read full judgment →
• Pir Bux Soomro and anothers vs Province of Sindh through Senior2017 MLD 112 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-27Read full judgment →
• Pir Badshah and another vs Adnan and another2017 P Cr. L J 1531 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-08
  Qatl-i-amdattempted murderocular accountmedical evidence contradictionprevious enmityappreciation of evidenceacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected revision petitions arise out of a judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-V, Kohat, convicting the appellants under sections 302/34 and 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of one person and causing firearm injuries to another, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of ocular testimony in the background of previous enmity, the medical evidence contradicting the ocular account regarding the trajectory of firearm injuries, and the improbability of the occurrence taking place on the day of the funeral of the accused persons' mother. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, noting material contradictions between the medical and ocular evidence and the false implication due to prior enmity. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, acquitted the appellants of all charges, and dismissed the revision petitions seeking enhancement of the sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an injured eye-witness requires corroboration when the witness is closely related to the deceased and an admitted history of enmity exists between the parties?
  • Does a contradiction between the medical evidence regarding the trajectory of firearm injuries and the ocular account warrant the acquittal of the accused?
  • Whether an accused can be convicted for murder on the same day as their mother's funeral when previous enmity suggests a strong possibility of false implication?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Ali and another vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 65 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-10
  post-arrest bailjuvenile offenderstatutory delayabscondencemedical age assessmentmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Pir Ali, in a murder case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions were whether the applicant, who was approximately 13 years old at the time of the incident, was entitled to bail under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, and whether the statutory delay in the trial proceedings warranted the grant of bail. The Court held that the medical evidence established the applicant's status as a juvenile at the time of the offense. Furthermore, the Court observed that the applicant had been in custody for over two years without the charge being framed, constituting a statutory delay. The Court held that mere abscondence does not preclude bail, and in the absence of evidence that the applicant was a previous convict or a hardened criminal, he was entitled to the concession of bail. The key principle laid down is that a juvenile is entitled to bail under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, if they have remained in custody for a continuous period exceeding one year without the conclusion of the trial, provided they are not a previous convict.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of an FIR against an accused constitute a valid ground for refusing bail on the basis of being a hardened criminal?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, if they have remained in custody for more than one year without the trial concluding?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused person automatically disentitle them to the grant of bail?
  • Can a medical certificate determining age at the time of examination be used to calculate the age of an accused at the time of the alleged offense?
  Read full judgment →
• Pioneer Cement Limited vs The Government of the Punjab and others2017 PLC 199 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-11
  social security contributionwage ceilingcharging provisionstatutory interpretationconstitutional petitionvires of notificationemployer contribution
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged various government notifications that increased the wage ceiling for social security contributions, leading to demand notices for additional payments from the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the government could validly recover increased contributions based on notifications adjusting the definition of "employee" under the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, without a corresponding amendment to the charging provision, Section 20, which fixed the maximum contribution limit. The Court held that for the period prior to the 2013 amendment, the notifications were ineffective for recovery purposes because Section 20 explicitly capped contributions, and the definition of "employee" under Section 2(8)(f) was not a charging provision. However, regarding the post-amendment period, the Court upheld the notification dated 12.8.2014, as the 2013 amendment to Section 20 successfully linked the contribution limit to the wage determinations made under Section 71. The key principle laid down is that a charging provision in a statute cannot be bypassed by administrative notifications unless the statute expressly authorizes such linkage.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government recover increased social security contributions by merely amending the definition of 'employee' without amending the charging provision of the statute?
  • Does a notification issued under Section 71 of the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, automatically authorize the recovery of contributions exceeding the limits set in Section 20 prior to its amendment?
  • Is a demand notice for social security contributions valid if it relies on a notification issued after the relevant charging provision of the statute has been amended to link contribution limits to government wage determinations?
  Read full judgment →
• Petition under Sections 276 of the Succession Act, 1925, for Probate2017 PLD Sindh 309 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-22Read full judgment →
• PESCO through Chief Executive and others vs Rabnawaz2017 PLJ Peshawar 172, 2017 MLD 757 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-01Read full judgment →
• PESCO through Chief Executive & others vs Rab Nawaz2017 PLJ Peshawar 172 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-01
  civil revisionjurisdiction of civil courtdetection billprocedural technicalityvaluation of suitelectricity meter disputeunilateral assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts, which had decreed the respondent's suit for declaration and perpetual injunction against a detection bill issued by the petitioner (PESCO). The petitioners raised two primary objections: first, that the plaint failed to include a valuation clause for jurisdiction and court fees as required by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908; and second, that the civil court lacked jurisdiction under Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act 1910. The Court held that the provisions of Order VII Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are procedural and directory, not mandatory, and the omission of a valuation clause does not invalidate a suit where no prejudice is shown. Regarding jurisdiction, the Court determined that Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act 1910 was inapplicable because the meter was checked unilaterally without following the statutory procedure involving an Electric Inspector. Consequently, the civil court retained jurisdiction under Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The revision petition was dismissed, affirming that procedural technicalities cannot override substantive justice.

  Questions settled

  • Is the failure to include a valuation clause in a plaint a fatal defect or a curable procedural irregularity?
  • Does Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act 1910 bar the jurisdiction of civil courts in cases of unilateral meter assessment?
  • Are the provisions of Order VII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory or directory in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Perviz Shah Gillani and another vs Miss Zeeba Hakim and 3 others2017 YLR 1151 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-05Read full judgment →
• Pervez Zaki vs The State through National Accountability Bureau, Balochistan, Quetta2017 P Cr. L J 747 · Balochistan High Court · 2016-11-28
  pre-arrest bailpecuniary jurisdictionNational Accountability Bureaucorruption referencestandard operating procedureexpeditious trialconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition sought pre-arrest bail for the petitioner in a corruption reference filed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The core legal questions concerned the scope of NAB’s pecuniary jurisdiction and whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the completion of the investigation. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail, noting that the investigation was complete and the accused was no longer required for custodial purposes. The Court established that NAB’s power to initiate references is not absolute or arbitrary; it must focus on corruption of large magnitude. The Court emphasized that NAB should adhere to its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), which generally limits its cognizance to cases involving amounts exceeding 100 million rupees. Petty corruption cases should be referred to appropriate agencies like the Federal Investigation Agency or Anti-Corruption Establishment. The Court further observed that the indiscriminate pursuit of minor cases by NAB undermines its primary objective of eradicating large-scale corruption and burdens the judicial system, violating principles of fair and expeditious trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Accountability Bureau have absolute discretion to initiate references regardless of the amount involved?
  • Are petty corruption cases involving amounts below the threshold set in the NAB Standard Operating Procedure triable by the National Accountability Bureau?
  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail when the investigation is complete and the reference has been filed?
  • Can the High Court review the legality of the Chairman NAB's decision to initiate a reference?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervez Ahmed and 6 others vs Director (Corporate Supervision2017 CLD 1142 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2016-11-22
  corporate governanceshareholder approvalsizable part of undertakingTRE CertificateSECP appealCompanies Ordinance 1984associated undertakingdemutualization
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan imposing penalties on the directors of Pervez Ahmed Securities Limited for allegedly disposing of a 'sizable part of the undertaking'—specifically a Trading Rights Entitlement Certificate (TRE Certificate) and Lahore Stock Exchange shares—without obtaining prior shareholder approval, in violation of Section 196(3)(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The core legal question was whether the disposal of these assets, which the appellants claimed were inactive and losing value, constituted a 'sizable part of the undertaking' requiring shareholder authorization. The appellants argued the sale was in the best interest of the company to salvage value before the assets became redundant under the Stock Exchange (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 2012. The appellate authority held that the initial order failed to adequately consider the factual context, specifically the revenue-generating insignificance of the assets and the regulatory pressures imposed by the Demutualization Act. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the respondent for a reassessment of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction's necessity and transparency.

  Questions settled

  • Does the disposal of a Trading Rights Entitlement Certificate by a brokerage house constitute the disposal of a 'sizable part of the undertaking' requiring shareholder approval under the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Can the regulatory requirements of the Stock Exchange (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 2012, justify the sale of company assets without prior shareholder authorization?
  • Is a penalty imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan sustainable if the regulator fails to consider the commercial insignificance of the assets disposed of by the company?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Khan vs The State2017 PHC 557 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-11Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Haider Khan vs The State etc.2017 LHC 560 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-16
  criminal judgmentspeaking ordermandatory requirementsembezzlementremandevaluation of evidenceSection 367 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a judgment of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, which convicted the appellant for embezzlement under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question was whether the trial court's judgment satisfied the mandatory requirements of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the content and reasoning of a criminal judgment. The High Court held that the trial court's judgment was deficient, as it merely summarized prosecution evidence without evaluating it, failed to address the appellant's specific denials, and lacked a proper analysis of the points for determination. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the conviction and remanded the case for a fresh judgment. The key principle laid down is that a criminal judgment must be a 'speaking order' that identifies points for determination, discusses evidence thoroughly, and provides reasoned adjudication. Failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is a fatal illegality, not curable under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal judgment that merely summarizes prosecution evidence without evaluating it satisfy the requirements of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a curable defect under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What are the essential elements required for a valid criminal judgment under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Pepsi-Cola International (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and othersPTCL 2017 CL. 80, 2017 PTD 636 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-19
  value of supplyvaluation committeefederal excise dutysales tax assessmentshow-cause noticerecovery proceedingsconstitutional petitionfiscal jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions challenged show-cause notices issued by the Inland Revenue Department, which sought to recover federal excise duty, sales tax, and income tax by adding advertising and marketing expenses incurred by bottlers to the value of concentrate sold by the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the department could bypass the statutory Valuation Committee and directly initiate recovery proceedings under Section 14 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, based on an alleged undervaluation of supply. The Court held that the determination of the "value of supply" is a distinct assessment process that must precede any recovery action. Because the department disputed the declared value, it was legally required to invoke the mechanism under Section 2(46)(e) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, to constitute a Valuation Committee. The Court ruled that the issuance of recovery notices without such prior assessment was incompetent and ultra vires. Consequently, the Court directed the constitution of a Valuation Committee to determine the correct value, holding the impugned recovery proceedings in abeyance pending this determination.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Inland Revenue Department initiate recovery proceedings under Section 14 of the Federal Excise Act 2005 without a prior assessment of the value of supply?
  • Is the constitution of a Valuation Committee under Section 2(46)(e) of the Sales Tax Act 1990 a mandatory prerequisite when the department disputes the declared value of supply?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional petition against a show-cause notice where the authority acts without jurisdiction?
  • Are assessment and recovery distinct legal processes under the Federal Excise Act 2005 and the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• Pepsi-Cola International (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 MLD 1703 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-05Read full judgment →
• Pepsi-Cola International (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan & OthersPTCL 2017 CL. 80 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-19Read full judgment →
• Pepsi-Cola International (Pvt) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 P.C.T.L.R. 1 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-24Read full judgment →
• Pearl Development Authority Rawalakot Azad Kashmir vs Aj&K2017 YLR 1631 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-03-30Read full judgment →
• Paulley vs Firstgroup PLC2017 SCMR 407 · Supreme Court of United KingdomRead full judgment →
• Paulley vs First Group PLC2017 P.S.C. 415 · Supreme Court of United KingdomRead full judgment →
• Park View Enclave (Private) Limited vs Capital Development Authority and others2017 IHC 269 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-21Read full judgment →
• Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors vs State2017 SCInd 1269 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-10-04
  quashing of FIRSection 482 CrPCcriminal conspiracyforgerysettlement between partiesinherent powers of High Courteconomic offences
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants sought to quash an FIR registered for offences including extortion, forgery, and conspiracy, arguing that they had reached an amicable settlement with the complainant. The High Court of Gujarat refused to quash the proceedings, citing the serious nature of the allegations, the appellants' criminal antecedents, and the fact that they were absconding. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, should be exercised to quash criminal proceedings based on a private settlement. The Court held that while Section 482 allows for quashing to secure the ends of justice, this power is not absolute. Serious offences involving forgery, extortion, and conspiracy, which affect societal interests, cannot be quashed merely due to a settlement. The Court affirmed that courts must evaluate the gravity of the crime and the accused's conduct. Because the allegations involved organized criminal activity and forgery, the Court upheld the refusal to quash, emphasizing that public interest in prosecuting serious crime outweighs private settlements.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court quash a criminal proceeding under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 solely on the basis of a settlement between the accused and the complainant?
  • Does the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 extend to quashing serious offences like forgery and extortion?
  • What factors must a High Court consider when deciding whether to quash an FIR involving a settlement between parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Papla vs The State and another2017 YLR 1858 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-28
  criminal appealmurder convictionbenefit of doubtdelayed FIRmedical evidenceocular testimonyacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and life imprisonment sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given significant discrepancies in the evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The Court identified fatal flaws, including an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report, which suggested the story was a post-facto fabrication. Furthermore, the medical evidence contradicted the ocular account, and the investigating officer's own testimony cast doubt on the reliability of the prosecution's version. The Court reaffirmed the principle that when prosecution evidence is disbelieved regarding co-accused, it cannot be safely relied upon against others without strong independent corroboration. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, ruling that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right, not grace, leading to the appellant's immediate acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution's version of events?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the medical evidence contradicts the ocular account provided by prosecution witnesses?
  • Is it safe to rely on prosecution evidence against an accused if the same evidence has been disbelieved regarding co-accused persons?
  • Does a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitle an accused to acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Panin Muhammad & others vs Mst.Safia Bibi2017 PHC 943 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-28Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Water & Power Development Authority vs M/s CCI - Ag, an Imi2017 SHC 289 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-18Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited vs Religious Affairs and others2017 PLD Islamabad 135 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-13Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab, etc vs Arshad Javed, etc2017 PLJ Lahore 749 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-14Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited vs Administrator General Zakat, Ministry of Religious Affairs, etc2017 IHC 11 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-28Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Employees' Trust vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 PLD Supreme Court 718 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-04
  zakat deductionsahib-e-nisabpension fundstatutory trustcharging sectiondouble taxationcharitable organization exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the High Court dismissing the appellant's constitutional challenges against the compulsory deduction of zakat from the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Employees Pension Fund managed by the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980. The core legal questions pertained to whether the Trust qualified as a sahib-e-nisab, whether it was exempt as a statutory corporation owned by the Federal Government or as a charitable trust, and whether the Pension Fund constituted an asset or a liability. The Supreme Court held that the Trust is an independent, autonomous body not wholly owned by the Federal Government, is not registered as a charitable organization fulfilling statutory exemption criteria, and legally owns and possesses the Pension Fund as an asset subject to zakat. The Court laid down that possession alongside ownership satisfies the charging provisions under Section 3 of the Ordinance, that pension funds held by such trusts do not qualify as mere liabilities or trust amanat exempt from zakat, and that annual deductions do not constitute double taxation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trust established under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organisation) Act, 1996 falls within the definition of sahib-e-nisab under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980?
  • Does the principle of laches apply when zakat is deducted annually from an entity, giving rise to a fresh cause of action each year?
  • Whether an entity that merely possesses assets, rather than holding absolute legal ownership, qualifies as a sahib-e-nisab for compulsory zakat deduction?
  • Whether pension funds managed by an independent trust constitute an asset subject to zakat or a liability held merely as amanat?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2017 PLD Supreme Court 718, 2017 SCP 954 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-04
  compulsory deduction of zakatsahib-e-nisabpension fundstatutory trustdouble taxationcontinuous cause of actionlaches
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the compulsory deduction of zakat from the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Employees Pension Fund managed by the appellant Trust under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980. The appellant contended that it was exempt from zakat deduction as it was wholly owned by the Federal Government, qualified as a charitable trust, or merely held the funds as amanat and a liability for pensioners. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant is an autonomous statutory body corporate not wholly owned by the Federal Government, nor is it registered/approved as a charitable organisation under Section 2(xxiii)(i) of the Ordinance. Furthermore, under Section 3 read with Section 2(xxiii) of the Ordinance, the words 'owns or possesses' operate disjunctively; thus, possessing the fund suffices to render the Trust a sahib-e-nisab liable to compulsory zakat deduction, which does not constitute double taxation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether annual recurring deductions of zakat give rise to a fresh cause of action preventing a constitutional petition from being barred by laches?
  • Whether a statutory trust created by government notification but functioning autonomously qualifies as being wholly owned by the Federal Government for exemption from zakat under Section 2(xxiii)(b) of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980?
  • Whether a statutory employees' pension fund trust can claim zakat exemption under Section 2(xxiii)(i) of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 without fulfilling the specific registration and approval requirements prescribed therein?
  • Whether possessing assets, without full beneficial ownership, is sufficient to classify an entity as a sahib-e-nisab liable to compulsory deduction of zakat under Section 3 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980?
  • Whether the deduction of zakat from a pension trust fund and subsequent potential zakat liability on individual pensioners constitutes double taxation?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. through Authorized Officer2017 PLC 238 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-16
  National Industrial Relations CommissionVoluntary Separation Schemeunfair labour practicejurisdiction of NIRCdefinition of workerestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition, along with connected matters, was filed by the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. assailing orders passed by the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission, which had dismissed the company's appeals against a Single Member's decision accepting the private respondents' petitions. The core legal question centered on whether the National Industrial Relations Commission had jurisdiction under the National Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 to entertain petitions challenging a Voluntary Separation Scheme filed by former employees who had opted for it and whose services had ceased. The Lahore High Court held that the Commission lacked jurisdiction as the private respondents did not qualify as workmen in relation to an industrial dispute under the statute, failed to substantiate any unfair labour practice, and were estopped from challenging the Voluntary Separation Scheme after voluntarily exercising their option. Consequently, the petitions were allowed, the impugned orders were set aside, and the original petitions filed before the Commission were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who has opted for a Voluntary Separation Scheme can subsequently challenge the same before the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have jurisdiction to entertain grievance petitions from persons whose services were terminated otherwise than as a result of an industrial dispute?
  • Whether the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 1973 survived the repeal of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can a former employee who is no longer in service maintain a petition before the National Industrial Relations Commission without establishing an unfair labour practice?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. through Authorized Attorney2017 PTD 1359 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-03-07
  fiscal statuteprovincial autonomysales taxconstitutional validitypresumption of constitutionalitytelecommunication serviceslegislative competencefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), challenged the imposition of a 19.5% sales tax on internet, email, and data services under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, contending the levy was discriminatory, irrational, and violative of fundamental rights. The core legal question concerned the provincial legislature's competence to impose such a tax and whether the specific rate was unconstitutional due to alleged unreasonableness. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the provincial legislature possessed the constitutional mandate to levy the tax under the post-Eighteenth Amendment framework. The court ruled the tax was intra vires and not discriminatory. The judgment affirmed that fiscal statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality and cannot be struck down merely for being harsh, unreasonable, or causing hardship, unless they are confiscatory. Furthermore, the court emphasized that it should not interfere with legislative policy or wisdom regarding tax rates, and that provincial autonomy permits federating units to make distinct economic decisions, negating claims of discrimination based on inter-provincial variations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a provincial legislature have the constitutional competence to levy sales tax on internet and data services?
  • Can a fiscal statute be declared unconstitutional solely on the grounds of being unreasonable, harsh, or causing hardship to the taxpayer?
  • Is a tax rate discriminatory merely because it varies between different provinces?
  • What is the standard of judicial review for the constitutionality of a fiscal enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. (PTCL) through President2017 MLD 773 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-29Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd vs Government of KPK through Secretary Law etc2017 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2017-03-07Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Muhammad Dilpazeer2017 PLJ Islamabad 153 · Islamabad High Court
  Voluntary Separation SchemeNational Industrial Relations CommissionWorkman statusGrievance petitionLimitation periodStatutory terms of servicePensionary benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions filed by the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited challenging orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) regarding pensionary benefits claimed by former employees under a Voluntary Separation Scheme. The court addressed whether former employees who voluntarily separated are 'workmen' entitled to invoke NIRC jurisdiction, whether the grievance petitions were barred by limitation, and whether the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 applies to employees with statutory terms of service. The High Court allowed the petitions, setting aside the NIRC orders. It held that the respondents, having voluntarily separated, did not qualify as 'workmen' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, as their departure was not linked to an industrial dispute. Furthermore, the court ruled that the mandatory grievance procedure under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 must be strictly followed, and that the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is inapplicable to employees whose terms of service are statutory, as they are governed by specific legislative protections.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who voluntarily separates from service under a scheme qualifies as a 'workman' to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  • Does the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 apply to employees whose terms of service are statutory?
  • Is a grievance petition maintainable under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 without the service of a mandatory grievance notice?
  • Can the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission be invoked for the enforcement of rights where the separation from service was not a result of an industrial dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Employees Old Age2017 NLR Labour 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  statutory bodyEmployees' Old-Age Benefitscorporate statusstatutory interpretationincorporationlabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) qualifies as a 'statutory body' under Section 47(f) of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, thereby exempting it from paying mandatory contributions. The appellant argued that its creation under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, conferred statutory body status. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the appellant was incorporated as a company limited by shares under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, rather than being brought into existence directly by a special statute. The Court clarified that for an entity to be a 'statutory body,' its birth must be caused by a special statute, not merely incorporated under the provisions of an existing general law like the Companies Ordinance. Consequently, the Court held that PTCL is not a statutory body and is liable to pay contributions under the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, from the date of its incorporation. The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does an entity incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, qualify as a 'statutory body' simply because it was formed pursuant to a reorganization statute?
  • What is the defining characteristic of a 'statutory body' in the context of exemption from the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976?
  • Is a company limited by shares, even if initially owned by the Federal Government, considered a statutory body for the purposes of Section 47(f) of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd vs Tajammul Hasnein etc.2017 LHC 288 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-16
  Voluntary Separation SchemeNIRC jurisdictionunfair labour practiceindustrial disputeworkman definitiongrievance petitionestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves constitutional petitions filed by Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited challenging orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission regarding the Voluntary Separation Scheme. The core legal question was whether the Commission had jurisdiction to entertain grievance petitions filed by former employees who had opted for the scheme, and whether those employees qualified as 'workmen' under the relevant labor laws. The Court held that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. The employees, having opted for the Voluntary Separation Scheme and been terminated, did not fall within the definition of 'workman' under the National Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, as their termination did not arise from an 'industrial dispute.' The Court established that an employee whose services are terminated pursuant to a voluntary scheme, absent an underlying industrial dispute, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Commission. Furthermore, employees who voluntarily opt for separation schemes are estopped from subsequently challenging the validity of those schemes before the Commission, particularly when they fail to establish specific acts of unfair labor practice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have jurisdiction to hear a grievance petition from an employee who has voluntarily opted for a separation scheme?
  • Can an employee whose services were terminated pursuant to a voluntary separation scheme be considered a 'workman' under the National Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002?
  • Are the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 1973 still operative following the repeal of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Is an employee who has voluntarily accepted a separation scheme estopped from challenging the scheme before the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd.(PSO), through its Deputy General2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  tax evasionexport to Afghanistanpetroleum leviesCentral Excise DutySales Taxpenalties and finescustoms fraudNational Accountability Bureaudisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from proceedings against Pakistan State Oil Company Limited (PSO) concerning eighteen consignments of petroleum products cleared for export to Afghanistan without payment of domestic levies, which were clandestinely diverted and sold in the local market. Upon detection of the fraud by customs intelligence, PSO deposited the evaded amount of Central Excise Duty, Sales Tax, and Petroleum Development Levy, attributing the fraud to tanker owners, and sought withdrawal of adjudication proceedings. The Additional Collector (Adjudication) imposed substantial penalties under the Central Excise Act 1944 and Sales Tax Act 1990, an order sustained by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and the Peshawar High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave, holding that the post-detection deposit of evaded levies does not absolve perpetrators from penalties, criminal prosecution, or disciplinary action. The Court further directed the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to investigate and prosecute the responsible functionaries of PSO and Customs, and ordered the initiation of departmental disciplinary proceedings against them.

  Questions settled

  • Does the subsequent deposit of evaded taxes and levies absolve a party or its functionaries from statutory penalties and criminal liability for tax fraud?
  • Can a state enterprise avoid penalties for tax evasion on goods meant for export by attributing the diversion solely to private transport contractors?
  • Can the Supreme Court refer detected revenue fraud involving public officials to the National Accountability Bureau and direct in-house disciplinary proceedings alongside upholding statutory penalties?
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• Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd. (PSO), through its Deputy General2017 P.C.T.L.R. 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  petroleum exporttax evasioncustoms dutysales tax penaltycentral excise dutyNational Accountability Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The subject matter of these proceedings involves eighteen consignments of petroleum meant for export to Afghanistan that were clandestinely diverted to the local market instead, causing a significant loss to the government exchequer in evaded Central Excise Duty, Sales Tax, and Petroleum Development Levy. Show-cause notices were issued under various revenue and customs statutes. Although the Pakistan State Oil Company Limited (PSO) subsequently deposited the evaded taxes and levies, the Additional Collector imposed penalties and additional tax, which were upheld by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question concerned whether interference was warranted against the concurrent findings imposing penalties and fines for tax evasion under the garb of export. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prompt deposit of evaded levies did not absolve the perpetrators or facilitators from penalties and criminal scrutiny, and accordingly dismissed the petition while directing inquiry by the National Accountability Bureau and departmental disciplinary proceedings against responsible officials of PSO and Customs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the subsequent deposit of evaded taxes and levies absolves a company from penalties and fines imposed under revenue laws?
  • Whether High Court judgments upholding concurrent findings of tax evasion and penalties warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct the National Accountability Bureau to inquire into tax evasion and facilitation by corporate and government functionaries?
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• Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd. (PSO), through Deputy General2017 P.C.T.L.R. 262, 2017 PLJ SC 398, 2017 SCMR 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-10
  tax evasionpetroleum levycustoms fraudinstitutional liabilitysales tax penaltydisciplinary proceedingsNational Accountability Bureau
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a sales tax reference by the Peshawar High Court, which upheld penalties imposed on the Pakistan State Oil Company Limited (PSO) for the evasion of duties and levies. The core legal question was whether the prompt deposit of evaded taxes by PSO, following the detection of fraudulent local sales of petroleum consignments meant for export to Afghanistan, absolved the company and its functionaries from penalties and further investigation. The Supreme Court held that the deposit of evaded levies did not mitigate the underlying fraud or the culpability of those involved. The Court affirmed the imposition of fines and penalties, reasoning that such evasion necessitates not only the recovery of taxes but also criminal and disciplinary consequences for the perpetrators. The key principle laid down is that the payment of evaded taxes after detection does not immunize an entity or its officers from accountability, and where institutional fraud is suspected, the authorities must initiate criminal and disciplinary inquiries against specific individuals responsible for facilitating the evasion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prompt deposit of evaded taxes and levies after detection absolve an entity from penalties and criminal liability?
  • Can an entity avoid disciplinary and criminal proceedings for tax evasion by paying the evaded amount after the fraud is discovered?
  • Is the imposition of penalties under the Sales Tax Act 1990 and Central Excise Act 1944 justified when petroleum products meant for export are clandestinely sold in the local market?
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• Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd. (PSO) through its Deputy General2017 PLJ SC 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  petroleum export fraudevasion of leviessales tax penaltycentral excise dutycustoms Actdisciplinary proceedingsNational Accountability Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The subject matter of the present proceedings involves eighteen consignments of petroleum meant for export to Afghanistan that were clandestinely supplied in the local market, causing a revenue loss of Rs. 9.5 million to the government exchequer in Central Excise Duty, Sales Tax, and Petroleum Development Levy. The core legal question concerned the legality of imposing penalties and fines on Pakistan State Oil Company Limited (PSO) when the evaded taxes and levies were subsequently deposited following the detection of the fraud. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prompt deposit of evaded levies did not absolve the perpetrators or facilitators from penal consequences, and declined to interfere with the concurrent findings imposing penalties and fines. The Court laid down the principle that the prompt return of evaded taxes upon detection cannot be used to stall further investigations or shield responsible officers and facilitators from criminal, penal, and disciplinary actions, and directed the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) along with relevant authorities to conduct inquiries and initiate disciplinary proceedings against the responsible functionaries of PSO, Customs, and the Federal Board of Revenue.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prompt deposit of evaded taxes and levies after detection exempt a company and its functionaries from statutory penalties and fines?
  • Can the return of evaded duties be utilized to stall further criminal investigations and disciplinary proceedings against facilitating officers?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can direct the National Accountability Bureau to inquire into tax evasion and fraudulent export schemes involving public sector entities?
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• Pakistan State Oil Company Limited vs Cantonment Board Clifton and another2019 CLC 1253, 2017 SHC 341 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-26Read full judgment →
• Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd. through G.M. vs Collector of Customs,through Additional Collector of Customs and 2 others2017 PTD 397 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-04
  customs reference applicationbonded warehousepetroleum products development surchargeexemption from customs dutysupplies to Pakistan navyremand proceedingsjurisdiction of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of 82 special custom reference applications filed under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969 by Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd. against a common order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, which upheld the recovery of duties and taxes on High Speed Diesel Oil supplied to the Pakistan Navy from a bonded warehouse. The core legal questions involved whether the tribunal erred in following precedents, whether limitation and factual aspects were properly investigated pursuant to Supreme Court remand orders, and the applicability of exemptions under Section 106 of the Customs Act, 1969. The Sindh High Court held that the legal merits regarding the non-availability of exemption under Section 106 had already been conclusively decided against the applicant up to the Supreme Court in prior rounds of litigation, and that the High Court's reference jurisdiction is restricted to questions of law and cannot be invoked to reopen settled factual controversies or concurrent findings. Consequently, the reference applications were dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can examine factual controversies while exercising reference jurisdiction under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does Section 106 of the Customs Act, 1969 provide an automatic exemption from import duty and taxes on the supply of oil products to Pakistan Navy ships without establishing that the vessel proceeded to a foreign destination?
  • Whether an issue conclusively decided by the Supreme Court in an earlier round of litigation can be reopened through subsequent reference applications?
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• Pakistan Soap Manufacturer Association through Chairman vs Customs Appellate Tribunal and 2 others2017 PTD 1207 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-16Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways Employees Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. through its2017 [M] C.L.R. 1367 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-06-22Read full judgment →
• Pakistan PVC Limited General Employees Union vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary M_o Finance, Islamabad and another2017 PLC 92, 2017 PLJ Karachi 82 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-07
  privatizationgratuitycost of living allowancegolden hand shake schemelabor rightsvested rightsstate-owned industrial units
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed by the staff union of a privatized state-owned industrial unit seeking a directive for the payment of outstanding gratuity and cost of living allowance owed to its members. The core legal question concerned whether the government and the Privatization Commission could withhold admitted financial liabilities owed to employees following the privatization of the industrial unit, citing administrative delays and internal departmental examinations. The Court held that since the liability of Rs 21.262 million was admitted by the respondents, there was no justification for further delay. It directed the respondents to deposit the entire admitted amount with the Nazir of the Court within fifteen days for subsequent disbursement to the employees. The Court affirmed that gratuity and cost of living allowances constitute vested rights and are integral parts of wages. It established that administrative inefficiency, inter-departmental disputes, or contractual arrangements between the government and private buyers cannot be used to deprive employees of their legitimate, earned dues, and that employers bear a mandatory responsibility to ensure prompt payment of final settlement dues.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government withhold admitted financial liabilities owed to employees of a privatized entity due to administrative delays?
  • Are gratuity and cost of living allowances considered part of wages for the purpose of final settlement?
  • Does a contractual arrangement between the government and a private buyer regarding privatization liabilities absolve the government of its obligation to pay employee dues?
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• Pakistan PVC Limited General Employees Union through General2017 PLC 92 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-07
  constitutional petitionprivatizationgratuitycost of living allowancegolden hand shake schemeterminal duesvested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the staff union of Pakistan PVC Limited through its General Secretary seeking directions for the payment of outstanding gratuity and cost of living allowance to ex-employees following the privatization of the industrial unit in 1992. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the employees to their admitted dues and the unjustified delay in disbursement by the authorities. The Sindh High Court held that once the liability of Rs. 21.262 Million for gratuity and cost of living allowance was admitted by the Privatization Commission, there was no justification to withhold the payment, especially given the decades of financial hardship suffered by the employees and the demise of numerous workers. The court directed the respondents to deposit the admitted liability with the Nazir of the court for onward disbursement to the entitled employees. The key principle laid down is that gratuity and cost of living allowance constitute integral parts of wages and vested rights, and state authorities cannot indefinitely delay the prompt payment of legitimate terminal dues to workers under the guise of inter-departmental examinations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the government authorities can withhold admitted terminal dues and gratuity of employees of a privatized industrial unit indefinitely?
  • Are gratuity and cost of living allowance considered part of wages and vested rights of employees?
  • What is the liability of the Privatization Commission and the federal government regarding the payment of legal dues to workers of state-owned units sold to private buyers?
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• Pakistan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (Ppma) through Authorized Signatory vs The Controller of Patents and another2017 CLD 427 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-30Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Ordnance Factories through Manager Legal, Wah Cantt. and 32017 CLC 918 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-07Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Oilfields Limited vs Executive Director, Corporate2017 CLD 479 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2016-08-01
  share registrarlisted companiescorporate governancestatutory complianceSecurities and Exchange Commission of PakistanCompanies Ordinance 1984transparency
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal filed under Section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, challenging an order issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Commission). The core legal question was whether a listed company is mandatorily required to appoint an independent share registrar under Section 204A of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, despite the Appellant's arguments regarding practical inconvenience, the low percentage of physical shares, and the alleged unconstitutionality of the provision's insertion via a Finance Act. The Commission upheld the impugned order, ruling that Section 204A(2) constitutes an absolute statutory requirement that all listed companies must comply with to ensure transparency and shareholder protection. The Commission further held that any potential constitutional defects regarding the insertion of the provision via Finance Acts were cured by the subsequent enactment of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Amendment) Act, 2013, which regularized past actions. The key principle established is that mandatory statutory requirements for corporate governance cannot be bypassed based on a company's internal assessment of necessity or pending legislative proposals.

  Questions settled

  • Is the appointment of an independent share registrar a mandatory requirement for listed companies under Section 204A of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Can a listed company be exempted from the statutory requirement to appoint a share registrar based on the low volume of physical shares?
  • Does the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Amendment) Act, 2013, regularize amendments previously made to the Companies Ordinance, 1984, through Finance Acts?
  • Can a company rely on a draft bill to argue against the enforcement of existing mandatory statutory provisions?
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• Pakistan Mobile Communications Ltd., Islamabad vs - And Warid2017 PLJ Islamabad 316 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-15Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Mobile Communication Limited and 9 others vs Nazir Ahmed2017 CLD 927 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-01-01
  ultra vires businessmemorandum of associationprize schemespenaltiescorporate authoritySecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an appeal filed under section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 against an order passed by the Respondent penalizing Pakistan Mobile Communications Limited and its directors under section 476 and section 496 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for engaging in ultra vires business by launching unauthorized reward and prize schemes ("SMS Khazana Scheme") through SMS. The core legal question was whether the promotional prize schemes launched by the telecommunication company fell within the scope of its authorized business objects or its Memorandum of Association as a marketing activity, or constituted an illegal ultra vires business. The appellate forum upheld the impugned order, holding that the prize schemes were unauthorized and illegal as they were not supported by the company's memorandum of association and adversely affected the general public. The key principle laid down is that companies cannot conduct reward or prize schemes that fall outside their stated corporate objects and Memorandum of Association, and such unauthorized schemes constitute an illegal ultra vires business.

  Questions settled

  • Whether launching unauthorized reward and prize schemes by a telecommunication company constitutes an ultra vires business under the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Can promotional prize schemes be justified as marketing activities under the objects clause of a company's Memorandum of Association?
  • Whether the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan has the power to impose penalties on directors and officers for carrying on ultra vires business?
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• Pakistan Match Industries, Pvt Ltd, Risalpur, Nowshera vs Collector of Sales2017 PHC 1170 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-06Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Freight of Forwarders Association through General Secretary vs Province of Sindh through Secretary and anotherPTCL 2017 CL. 527, 2017 PTD 1 · Sindh High Court · 2016-06-02
  legislative competencetaxation of services18th Amendmentfederal excise dutyprovincial sales taxultra viresconstitutional lawdivision of powerstaxing eventterminal taxesshipping agentsfreight forwardersFederal Legislative Listconstitutional amendmentpith and substance
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a significant constitutional issue concerning the legislative competence to impose fiscal levies on services in Pakistan, particularly after the 18th Amendment. The core legal question was whether this power vested solely with the Federation, exclusively with the Provinces, simultaneously yet exclusively in both, or was common and concurrent. The Sindh High Court held that prior to the 18th Amendment (August 14, 1973, to October 18, 2010), the exclusive power to tax services lay with the Federation under Entry No. 44 of the Federal Legislative List, rendering the Federal Excise Act, 2005, valid and the Sindh Sales Tax Ordinance, 2000, ultra vires. Post-18th Amendment (from October 19, 2010), the power to tax services shifted exclusively to the Provinces, recognized by the "exception" added to Entry No. 49, making the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, generally valid from July 1, 2011. However, specific provisions of the 2011 Provincial Act relating to shipping agents were declared ultra vires as they encroached upon the exclusive federal power to levy terminal taxes under Entry No. 53. The court emphasized that under Pakistan's constitutional scheme, taxing powers are divided, not shared, meaning there is no concurrent taxing power.

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• Pakistan International Freight of Forward Association. vs Province of SindhPTCL 2017 CL. 527 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs The Board of Trustees, EOBI and others2017 PLC 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-09
  establishmentsfactorymanufacturing processold-age benefitsstatutory body exemptionflight kitchenengineering departmentrepair and maintenance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenged the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court of Sindh, which had upheld orders declaring the kitchen and engineering departments of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) to be "establishments" under the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. The core legal questions revolved around whether the appellant's kitchen and engineering departments constitute "establishments" or "factories" under the relevant labor laws, and whether Section 47 of the Act exempts the appellant from its application. The Supreme Court held that the flight kitchen, engaging in mass-scale food production, and the engineering department, engaging in the repair and maintenance of aircraft including those of third parties, both fall within the definition of a "factory" under the Factories Act, 1934, and consequently constitute "establishments" under the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. The Court further held that the proviso to Section 47(f) did not exempt the engineering department since it serviced external entities. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the applicability of the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether individual departments or sub-organizations of an enterprise can be treated as separate "establishments" under the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976?
  • Does a flight kitchen engaged in mass-scale food production constitute a factory and thereby an establishment under the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976?
  • Whether the repair and servicing of aircraft by an airline's engineering department constitutes a manufacturing process under the Factories Act, 1934?
  • Does the proviso to Section 47(f) of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 exempt an engineering workshop that provides repair and maintenance services to external entities?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through Deputy General2017 PLC (C.S.) 343 · Sindh High Court · 2016-06-06
  cadet pilottermination of servicefake intermediate certificatereinstatementmanaging director powershigh court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court Appeal arises from a judgment and decree passed by a learned single Judge in a civil suit, whereby the respondent's suit for declaration and permanent injunction was decreed. The respondent, appointed as a Cadet Pilot by Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, had his services terminated on the ground of possessing a fake intermediate certificate. Upon appeal, the Managing Director of PIAC personally heard the respondent, disregarded the termination letter, and directed verification of the academic record, which was subsequently verified as genuine by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education. The core legal question was whether the Managing Director was competent to reinstate the employee and whether the termination order remained in the field. The court held that under the Personnel Policies Manual and Board resolutions, the Managing Director was duly empowered to order reinstatement, and acts done by the Managing Director were construed as acts of the PIAC Board. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the judgment of the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Managing Director of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation is competent to order reinstatement of a terminated employee under the Personnel Policies Manual?
  • Whether acts lawfully done by the Managing Director are construed as acts done by the PIAC Board of Directors?
  • Does a subsequent verification of an academic certificate by the concerned education board nullify a prior allegation of a fake certificate?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (Piac) vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2017 PLJ Islamabad 101 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (Piac) vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 PLJ Islamabad 101, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 602 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-18
  Wafaqi Mohtasibjurisdictionpublic sector appointmentexecutive functionmal-administrationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) challenging an order passed by the President of Pakistan on a representation under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983. The core legal question was whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib and subsequently the President had the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint and issue directions regarding matters of appointment and recruitment in a public sector corporation where no allegation of maladministration was established. The Islamabad High Court held that appointments and recruitments in public sector entities are executive functions falling outside the jurisdiction and domain of the Wafaqi Mohtasib under Article 9 of the Ombudsman Order, and consequently, neither the Mohtasib nor the President possessed the authority to entertain such complaints or issue directions for the accommodation of candidates. The petition was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether matters of appointment and recruitment in a public sector company fall within the jurisdiction of the Wafaqi Mohtasib under Article 9 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983?
  • Does the President have the authority on a representation under Article 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, to issue directions for appointment when the Mohtasib lacked initial jurisdiction?
  • Whether an unselected candidate on a waiting list has a vested right to appointment after the completion of an induction process and commencement of training?
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• Pakistan International Airline and others vs Noreen Naz Butt2017 PLC (C.S.) 923 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-24
  Intra Court AppealMaster and Servantstatutory rulesreinstatementwrit jurisdictionmaintainabilitylachesalternate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal was filed by Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) challenging a Single Judge's decision that reinstated the respondent into service. The respondent’s contract had not been extended in 2005, leading her to file a writ petition after a five-year delay. The appellants contended that the relationship was governed by non-statutory rules and that the writ petition was barred by laches and the availability of an alternate remedy. The High Court examined whether constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 could be invoked for service matters involving a corporation without statutory rules. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court held that in the absence of statutory rules, the relationship between PIA and its employees is governed by the principle of 'Master and Servant.' Consequently, a servant cannot be thrust upon an unwilling master through writ jurisdiction. The Court further noted that the respondent failed to exhaust alternate remedies. The appeal was accepted, and the impugned judgment was set aside, affirming that constitutional petitions are not maintainable for individual service grievances where no statutory rules are violated.

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