Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Global Quality Foods Pvt. Ltd. through Company Secretary-- vs Hardee's Food Systems, Inc2016 PLD Sindh 169 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-19
  franchise agreementexclusive territoryforeign arbitrationforum selection clausestay of proceedingspermanent injunctionassignment of rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Sindh High Court resolves three interlocutory applications arising in a suit for permanent injunction concerning franchise rights for Hardee's Restaurants in Sindh. The core legal questions involved whether multiple agreements—specifically an International Development Agreement, a Multi-Unit License Agreement, and a New Development Rider—should be read together to grant the plaintiff exclusive territory rights, whether the dispute was subject to foreign arbitration, and whether the suit should be stayed or the plaint rejected due to an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for exclusivity because the International Development Agreement had been validly terminated prior to the assignment, leaving only the non-exclusive Multi-Unit License Agreement in force. Furthermore, the court held that claims falling outside arbitration were governed by a foreign forum selection clause designating courts in the United States. Consequently, the court dismissed the injunction and arbitration stay applications, and instead of rejecting the plaint, stayed the suit to allow the plaintiff to pursue remedies in the agreed foreign jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple commercial agreements executed together can be read to subsist and confer exclusive rights when the parent agreement has been terminated?
  • Does a multi-unit license agreement for operating a single restaurant confer exclusive territorial rights upon the licensee?
  • Whether a suit for permanent injunction should be rejected or stayed when the parties have agreed to a foreign exclusive jurisdiction and choice of law clause?
  • Can a party claim rights under a parent development agreement that was terminated prior to the execution of an assignment deed limited to a secondary license agreement?
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• Giajlam Qasim and others vs The State and others2016 YLR 687 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-11
  kidnapping for ransomtest identification paradebenefit of the doubtcapital sentencere-appraisal of evidencetainted evidenceanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting and sentencing the appellants to death under Section 365-A read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 for kidnapping for ransom. The core legal questions pertained to the reliability of the foundational FIR, the evidentiary value of test identification parades where witnesses gave contradictory or partial identifications, and the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt in a capital case. The Lahore High Court held that material contradictions in the FIR, manipulation of timelines, flaws in the test identification parades, and the failure of the prosecution to prove its case through unimpeachable evidence rendered the convictions unsafe. The court established that a tainted piece of evidence cannot corroborate another tainted piece and that where identification evidence is indivisible and fails as to one co-accused, it loses its sting against others similarly placed. Consequently, the court acquitted the appellants by extending the benefit of the doubt and answered the capital sentence reference in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of prosecution witnesses to identify one co-accused during a test identification parade vitiates the identification of another co-accused placed in an identical position?
  • Can a tainted piece of evidence corroborate another tainted piece of evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Whether contradictions between the medical evidence and the prosecution's narrative regarding a witness's unconsciousness are fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Is it safe to maintain capital convictions based on circumstantial evidence that fails to exclude every hypothesis of innocence?
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• Ghulam Zakriya vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary2016 YLR 719 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-03Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Yasin vs The State, etc.K.L.R. 2016 Criminal Cases 102 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-30
  pre-arrest bailhonour killingmurdercompounding of offencesprohibitory clausewaiver and compromise
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged murder of his 16/17-year-old daughter in the name of honour. The core legal question was whether pre-arrest bail could be granted in an honour killing case where legal heirs had purportedly pardoned the accused. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy that cannot be extended to an accused facing a prima facie case of murder, particularly when the offence is heinous, affects the society at large, and falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court laid down that a compromise or waiver by legal heirs in cases of honour killing cannot be routinely accepted without satisfying statutory conditions and obtaining the mandatory approval of the trial court, and such offences do not warrant the concession of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pardon by legal heirs is sufficient to entitle an accused to pre-arrest bail in an honour killing case?
  • Does an offence committed in the name of honour fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a compromise be allowed for a murder committed in the name or on the pretext of honor without the approval and conditions imposed by the trial court?
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• Ghulam Yasin vs The State and anotherK.L.R. 2016 Criminal Cases 102, 2017 PLD Lahore 103 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-30
  pre-arrest bailbail before arresthonour killingqatl-i-amdcompounding of offencesprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a petition filed by Ghulam Yasin seeking pre-arrest bail in case FIR No. 323 of 2015 registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code at Police Station Satyana, District Faisalabad, for the alleged murder of his minor daughter. The core legal question revolves around whether pre-arrest bail can be granted to an accused charged with honour killing merely on the basis of a compromise or pardon by the legal heirs. The court held that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy and cannot be granted to an accused against whom a prima facie case of murder in the name of honour is made out, as such offences are against the society and state, and compromise provisions are strictly regulated under the law. The key principle laid down is that honour killing cases do not warrant the concession of pre-arrest bail, and compounding of such offences requires strict adherence to statutory conditions and court approval.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pardon by the legal heirs of the deceased entitles an accused to pre-arrest bail in a case of honour killing?
  • Does an offence committed in the name of honour fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a compromise in an offence committed under the pretext of karokari or similar customs be effected without the approval of the trial court?
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• Ghulam Yahya and others vs WAPDA through Chairman WAPDA and others2016 YLR 1786 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-06Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Yahya & others vs Water and Power Development Authority2016 PLJ Peshawar 226 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ghulam Sher etc vs Mst. Bibi Shan etc2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-23
  inheritanceparentagebirth certificatecustomary lawlimitationshari sharerevisional jurisdictionpublic documents
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from two civil revision petitions challenging concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts, which partially decreed the plaintiff's suit for a declaration regarding her inheritance rights. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff, Mst. Bibi Shan, was the lawful daughter and legal heir of the deceased Habibullah, and whether her claim was barred by limitation or affected by prior alienations and judicial decrees under customary law. The Peshawar High Court held that the concurrent findings establishing the plaintiff's parentage through birth registers and official certificates were legally correct and that a legal heir may seek their Shari share without being barred by time. However, the Court also held that the plaintiff could not claim rights in property that was the subject matter of a subsisting compromise decree passed in favor of Abdullah unless that decree was challenged. The Court maintained the appellate court's judgment with the modification regarding the excepted property subject to the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the parentage of a person can be proved through public documents such as birth and death registers under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Does a legal heir's suit for claiming a share in inheritance become time-barred after the passage of a long period like 70 years?
  • Can a widow under customary law execute a complete sale of property inherited from her husband as a limited owner?
  • Whether a compromise decree affecting the suit property remains binding if it is not specifically challenged by a claimant legal heir?
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• Ghulam Shabir and Otherss vs The State and otherssPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Karachi) 460, 2016 MLD 1714 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-30
  post-arrest bailadvertent negligencerecklessnesspublic servant liabilityWAPDA negligencecriminal negligencebail rejection
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns post-arrest bail applications filed by two WAPDA employees, a lineman and a Line Superintendent, charged under Sections 318, 319, 337-G, 337-H, and 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The charges arose following a tragic incident where a vehicle struck low-hanging high-tension electricity wires, resulting in seventeen deaths and numerous injuries. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to bail given the nature of the alleged negligence and the statutory classification of the offenses. The High Court dismissed the bail applications, holding that the applicants’ conduct constituted "advertent negligence" or recklessness, as they were aware of the risks associated with their duties yet failed to maintain the safety of the transmission lines. The court established that public servants cannot evade liability for gross negligence resulting in loss of life by merely alleging mala fide or citing the negligence of others. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the gravity of the consequences—the loss of multiple lives—precludes a lenient approach to bail, regardless of the complainant's lack of objection.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that a complainant has no objection to bail mandate the grant of bail in cases of gross negligence?
  • Can public servants avoid criminal liability for negligence resulting in death by claiming the negligence of others?
  • Is negligence resulting in death considered 'advertent negligence' when the actor is aware of the risk?
  • Does the failure of a public servant to maintain safety standards constitute a ground for denying bail in a case involving multiple fatalities?
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• Ghulam Shabir and another vs StatePLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Karachi) 460 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-30
  post-arrest bailadvertent negligencegross negligenceWAPDAelectrocutionbailable offenceno objection by complainantpublic duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This order disposes of two post-arrest bail applications filed by employees of WAPDA/SEPCO in a case registered under Sections 318, 319, 337G, 337H, and 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a tragic electrocution incident. A passenger Coaster's luggage hit hanging low-clearance 11,000-volt electric wires, resulting in 17 deaths and over 20 injuries. The applicants contended that the alleged offences were bailable, their names were absent from the FIR or added falsely, and the complainant had issued a no-objection. The High Court rejected both bail applications, holding that public servants in utility services owe a duty of extra care. The Court held that advertent or gross negligence resulting in significant loss of life cannot be treated as a routine bailable matter merely by examining provision titles without regard to the catastrophic consequences. Collateral negligence by third parties does not absolve officials of their bounden duty, nor does a complainant's no-objection bind the court where multiple victims are involved.

  Questions settled

  • Can post-arrest bail be refused in offences otherwise claimed as bailable if gross negligence leads to widespread loss of human life?
  • Does collateral negligence by a third party relieve a public official from criminal liability for their own negligence?
  • Is a complainant's no-objection statement binding on the court when deciding bail in a case involving multiple victims?
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• Ghulam Shabbir Malik vs The State and another2016 LHC 1310, 2016 P Cr. L J 1365 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-06
  criminal appealEmigration Ordinanceacquittalburden of proofreasonable doubtwitness contradictionfraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Court (Central), Faisalabad, under sections 17 and 22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, for allegedly defrauding a complainant by promising foreign employment and providing fake visa documents. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the violation of the Emigration Ordinance. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, noting that the alleged victim was never produced as a witness, and significant contradictions existed in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses regarding the payment of money. Furthermore, no evidence confirmed the appellant was an Overseas Employment Promoter or that he possessed illicit documents. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reaffirms the principle that a conviction cannot be sustained on disjointed, unreliable evidence, and that any reasonable doubt created in the prosecution's case warrants the acquittal of the accused, consistent with established Supreme Court precedents regarding the burden of proof in criminal trials.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce the alleged victim as a witness create a reasonable doubt in a criminal case?
  • Can a conviction under the Emigration Ordinance, 1979 be sustained where the prosecution fails to establish that the accused is an Overseas Employment Promoter?
  • Does a material contradiction in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses regarding the payment of money warrant the acquittal of the accused?
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• Ghulam Shabbir Malik vs The State & another2016 LHC 1310 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-06
  emigration fraudunlawful emigrationreceiving money for foreign employmentbenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittalcontradictory evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Court (Central), Faisalabad, convicting the appellant under sections 17 and 22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, for allegedly defrauding the complainant's brother by promising foreign employment and providing fake visa documents. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, including the receipt of money and the appellant's status or actions violating the Emigration Ordinance. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case due to material contradictions in witness testimonies, non-production of key witnesses including the alleged victim and the father, lack of recovery of incriminating material or fake documents, and absence of proof that the appellant was an Overseas Employment Promoter or acted in violation of the relevant statute. Consequently, the court laid down the principle that a conviction cannot be sustained on unreliable and disjointed evidence, and any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case warrants the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under sections 17 and 22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979 can be sustained when the prosecution fails to produce the primary victim and crucial eyewitnesses?
  • Does the failure to recover any fake emigration documents or passports from the accused vitiate a charge under the Emigration Ordinance, 1979?
  • Whether material contradictions regarding the handing over of alleged tainted money between prosecution witnesses create sufficient doubt to warrant acquittal?
  • What is the legal effect of a single reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case on the accused's liability?
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• Ghulam Sarwar vs Muhammad Javed and others2016 YLR 1901 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-25Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar Khan Lalwani, vs StatePLJ 2016.Cr.C. (Lahore) 689 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-11
  disproportionate assetsknown sources of incomebenami transactionburden of proofstatutory presumptionaccountability courtpublic officebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and criminal revision challenge the judgment of the Accountability Court convicting the appellant, a public servant, under Section 10(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for acquiring assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, and seeking enhancement of the sentence. The core legal questions involved the extent of the prosecution's initial burden of proof under Section 14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, regarding assets disproportionate to known sources of income and alleged benami transactions, and whether a conviction can be sustained when the prosecution fails to establish this initial onus. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution must first produce convincing, affirmative evidence establishing the foundational facts—including the accused's known sources of income, the value of the properties, and a nexus for benami transactions—before any statutory presumption of guilt or shift in the burden of proof under Section 14 can be invoked against the accused. The court laid down the principle that failure of the prosecution to discharge its initial onus of proving the core ingredients of corruption and corrupt practices entitles the accused to an acquittal, regardless of any weaknesses in the defense evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 shift the initial burden of proof to the accused before the prosecution establishes its case?
  • What are the essential ingredients that the prosecution must prove in a charge of acquiring assets disproportionate to known sources of income?
  • Can a conviction for a benami transaction be sustained when the prosecution fails to adduce evidence regarding the source of consideration and the real owner?
  • Is an accused's conviction justified solely on the basis of weak defense evidence when the prosecution fails to discharge its initial onus?
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• Ghulam Sarwar Khan Lalwani vs The StatePLJ 2016.Cr.C. (Lahore) 689, 2016 P Cr. L J 1343 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-11
  Accountability Referencedisproportionate assetsbenami transactionpresumption of guiltburden of proofpublic officeacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a former DIG (Prisons), was convicted by an Accountability Court under Section 10(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for acquiring assets disproportionate to his known sources of income and for benami transactions. The appellant challenged his conviction, while the State sought an enhancement of his sentence. The Lahore High Court examined the scope of Section 14 of the Ordinance regarding the presumption of guilt. The Court held that the statutory presumption under Section 14(c) does not shift the initial burden of proof from the prosecution, which must first establish a prima facie case with tangible evidence of disproportionate assets and a nexus between the accused and the benami properties. Finding that the prosecution failed to provide evidence of the appellant's known sources of income during the acquisition period or prove the source of funds for the benami properties, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and dismissed the revision petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presumption under Section 14 of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 shift the initial burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused?
  • What essential ingredients must the prosecution prove to establish a charge of possessing assets disproportionate to known sources of income?
  • What factors must be established by the prosecution to prove that a transaction is benami in nature?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the weakness of the defence evidence when the prosecution has failed to discharge its initial burden of proof?
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• Ghulam Sarwar (Late) through Legal Heirs, etc. vs Mst, Naseem Akhtar, etc2016 PLJ Lahore 991 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-01
  civil revisiongift transactionTamleek Namadelivery of possessionburden of proofinheritancefraud and impersonationconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts whereby a suit for declaration filed by the respondents against a registered Tamleek Nama (gift-deed) and mutation was decreed. The core legal question involved the validity of the gift transaction executed by the elderly predecessor-in-interest in favor of one son, to the exclusion of other legal heirs, amidst allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, impersonation, and lack of delivery of possession. The Lahore High Court held that the beneficiary of a gift transaction is burdened with proving the essential ingredients of a gift under Islamic law—namely declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession—as well as fulfilling formal attestation and production requirements under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Court ruled that mere registration of a gift-deed does not cure the absence of delivery of possession or discharge the beneficiary's primary duty to establish valid execution through competent attesting witnesses. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the revision, affirming that concurrent findings of fact based on sound appreciation of evidence do not warrant interference in revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere registration of a gift-deed cure the want of delivery of possession under Islamic law?
  • What is the burden of proof on a beneficiary when a gift transaction is challenged on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, and impersonation?
  • Whether non-examination of attesting witnesses of a gift-deed is fatal to the establishment of a valid gift?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact recorded by courts below be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction without establishing any jurisdictional defect or illegality?
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• Ghulam Sakina and another vs Mst. Mumtaz Begum2016 C.L.R. 191, 2016 CLC 1164 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-06
  pecuniary jurisdictioncivil revisionlack of jurisdictionprejudicevaluation of suitremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges judgments of the lower courts where a Civil Judge Class-II decreed a suit for declaration and possession valued at Rs. 12,00,000, despite lacking pecuniary jurisdiction exceeding Rs. 50,000 at the relevant time, and where the first appellate court failed to address the jurisdictional objection. The core legal question was whether a decree passed by a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction without causing prejudice is a nullity, and how prejudice is determined. The Lahore High Court held that trying a high-value suit through an insufficiently empowered and experienced junior judicial officer causes inherent prejudice and failure of justice to the affected parties, especially when compounded by the appellate court's omission to address the issue. Consequently, the High Court set aside the judgments of both lower courts and remanded the suit to the Civil Judge 1st Class for a fresh decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a decree passed by a Civil Judge exceeding their pecuniary jurisdiction is liable to be set aside?
  • How is the term prejudice measured in the context of a court exercising unauthorized pecuniary jurisdiction?
  • Does the trial of a high-value suit by a junior Civil Judge without requisite pecuniary jurisdiction cause inherent prejudice to the litigants?
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• Ghulam Raza vs Samo Khan and 25 others2016 YLR 2138 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-15
  Illegal Dispossession Actcriminal revisioncivil litigationestoppelapprobate and reprobatepossessiontitle dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged the dismissal of a complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings under the Act are maintainable when the title and possession of the subject property are already sub-judice before a civil court, and whether the complainant’s contradictory stances regarding possession in various legal proceedings bar the claim. The High Court upheld the trial court's dismissal, holding that when a question of title is pending before a competent civil court, criminal proceedings should be stayed or dismissed until the civil dispute is resolved. The Court further emphasized that the applicant’s inconsistent positions—admitting the respondents' possession in one suit while claiming dispossession in the complaint—violated the principle of estoppel. The Court ruled that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by taking contradictory stances to suit their convenience. Consequently, the revision application was dismissed, affirming that the civil court must first determine the title and possession before any criminal action under the Illegal Dispossession Act can be pursued.

  Questions settled

  • Is a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, maintainable when the title and possession of the property are already sub-judice in a civil court?
  • Does the principle of estoppel prevent a litigant from taking contradictory stances regarding possession in different legal proceedings?
  • Should criminal proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, be stayed pending the outcome of a civil suit regarding the same property?
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• Ghulam Rasul (deceased) through his Legal Heirs etc. vs Ihsan Ullah2016 LHC 2190, 2016 PLJ Lahore 955 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul (deceased) through his legal heirs etc vs Ihsan Ullah2016 LHC 2190 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-25Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs Nasir Iqbal and 4 others2016 PLJ Lahore 273 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-24Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs Govt. of Punjab through District Officer (Revenue), Sahiwal etc2016 LHC 1505 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-03Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs Government of Punjab through District Officer2016 MLD 1660 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-03
  review petitionwithdrawal of suitstate landproprietary rightsillegal occupantCharagahCode of Civil Procedureregular lessee
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenges an order of the Lahore High Court that dismissed a civil revision as withdrawn. The petitioner sought to recall the withdrawal order to instead withdraw the original civil suit, aiming to bypass concurrent adverse judgments regarding his claim for proprietary rights over state land. The core legal questions were whether a litigant can withdraw a suit after it has been adjudicated on merits, and whether an illegal occupant of state land classified as Charagah is entitled to proprietary rights under the 2003 policy. The Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the petitioner, having failed to prove status as a regular lessee and occupying resumed land, had no legal claim. The Court ruled that a party cannot withdraw proceedings to circumvent binding judgments that have attained finality, particularly when doing so would perpetuate injustice or prejudice the state. The principle established is that courts will decline withdrawal requests where the intent is to prevent the finality of adverse decisions or to avoid the consequences of illegal occupation, as equity is not available to those who do not come with clean hands.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party withdraw a suit after it has been decided on merits by the trial and appellate courts?
  • Is an illegal occupant of state land entitled to claim proprietary rights under the 2003 policy?
  • Does the court have the discretion to refuse the withdrawal of a suit if it would perpetuate injustice or defeat the ends of justice?
  • Is land classified as Charagah eligible for allotment or sale to private individuals under the 2003 policy?
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• Ghulam Rasool vs Bibi Mazharam2021 [M] C L R 226, 2016 LHC 4046 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-08
  civil revisionpre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadburden of proofconcurrent findingspostman
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's suit and appeal regarding a right of pre-emption. The core legal question is whether the failure to produce the Postman to prove the factum of Talb-i-Ishhad, when the vendee denies receipt of the notice, is fatal to a pre-emption suit. The Lahore High Court held that where a vendee denies the sending and receipt of notice in the written statement, the production of the Postman is mandatory to prove Talb-i-Ishhad, and failure to do so extinguishes the pre-emptor's superior right of pre-emption. The petition was accordingly dismissed based on the binding dictum of the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Is the production of the Postman necessary to prove Talb-i-Ishhad when the vendee denies receiving the notice?
  • What is the legal consequence on a pre-emption suit if the pre-emptor fails to prove the factum of Talb-i-Ishhad?
  • Do concurrent findings of fact by lower courts warrant interference in civil revision when essential evidence is missing?
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• Ghulam Rasool vs Abdul Ghafoor and 8 others2016 LHC 3090 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-18
  inheritance mutationconstructive possessionrevisional jurisdictionOrder VIII Rule 5 CPCpleadingsexclusion of inheritancelimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision challenges the appellate court's judgment regarding the inheritance of the deceased, Barkat Ali, who died issueless. The core legal question was whether the petitioner (nephew) was entitled to inherit alongside the respondents (successors of the deceased's brother, Imam Din), which depended on whether the petitioner's father (Babu) predeceased the deceased. The court held that the petitioner failed to specifically deny the assertion in the plaint that his father had died before the deceased, constituting an admission under Order VIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, the court affirmed that evidence cannot be led on facts not pleaded. It held that as the brother of the deceased was alive at the time of death, he excluded the nephew from inheritance. Additionally, the court ruled that the claim was not time-barred, as co-sharers are deemed to be in constructive possession of the property. The court upheld the appellate court's decision, emphasizing that in revisional jurisdiction, the findings of the first appellate court are preferred when based on proper appraisal of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to specifically deny an allegation in a written statement constitute an admission under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party lead evidence on a material fact that was not specifically pleaded in the written statement?
  • Does the law of limitation apply to a claim for inheritance where the claimant is a co-sharer in constructive possession?
  • In the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, should the findings of the trial court or the first appellate court be preferred when they are at variance?
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• Ghulam Rabbani vs Member Judl., Board of Revenue etc2016 LHC 4098 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-04Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rabani vs Muhammad Fiaz and anothers2016 CLC 1547 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-11-19
  pre-emption suitdecretal amountenlargement of timerestoration of appealinterim injunctionnon-prosecutionCivil Procedure Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment affirming the first appellate court's decision to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money. The appellant contended that the appellate court lacked authority to extend time suo motu and that the interim injunction suspending the deposit deadline lapsed when the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that an appellate court possesses the discretionary power under Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 to enlarge the time for depositing decretal amounts, which may be exercised even without a formal application. Furthermore, the Court established that when an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution is restored, all ancillary and interlocutory orders—including interim injunctions—automatically revive and become operative with retrospective effect, rendering separate restoration applications for such orders unnecessary. Consequently, the Court found no illegality in the lower courts' proceedings, affirming that the appellate court acted within its statutory jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed, confirming the validity of the extension granted to the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court extend the time for depositing the decretal amount in a pre-emption suit?
  • Does an interim injunction automatically revive upon the restoration of an appeal that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Can a court exercise its power under Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 to enlarge time without a formal application?
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• Ghulam Qasim vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 311 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-02
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsbhang recoverychemical examiner reportcriminal history
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Ghulam Qasim, sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, concerning the alleged recovery of 10 kilograms of bhang. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail pending trial given the circumstances of the recovery and the absence of a chemical examiner report. The Lahore High Court held that the petition should be allowed, noting that no particular part of the recovered substance was specified in the FIR to conclusively determine applicability, the Chemical Examiner's report was still awaited, the petitioner had been incarcerated for seven months, was no longer required for investigation, and had no previous criminal history. The court established that where the exact nature and categorization of the recovered substance remain unconfirmed and pending chemical analysis alongside statutory delay, a case is made out for the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the Chemical Examiner's report regarding the recovered substance is awaited?
  • Does the absence of a previous criminal history and prolonged incarceration justify the grant of bail in narcotics cases?
  • Whether uncertainty regarding the exact nature of the recovered substance constitutes a ground for further inquiry under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
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• (1) Ghulam Qadir, etc. (in C.A. 510/2012) (2) Ayas Khan. (in C.A. 934/2012)2016 SCP 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil revisionnon-prosecutionrevisional jurisdictionlimitation periodinherent powerssufficient causeprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether a civil revision petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, once admitted to regular hearing, can be dismissed for non-prosecution. The Supreme Court held that a revisional court possesses the inherent power to dismiss such petitions for non-prosecution when the petitioner fails to appear, particularly in adversarial proceedings initiated by a party. The Court clarified that while revisional jurisdiction is supervisory, it does not compel the court to decide on merits if the petitioner is negligent or indolent. The judgment distinguishes between suo motu revisions, which the court must decide on merits, and those filed by parties, which are subject to dismissal for non-prosecution. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that applications for the restoration of dismissed revisions are governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908, and that the principle of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 must be strictly satisfied. The Court emphasized that limitation is a matter of positive law, not a mere technicality, and that courts should not be burdened by the negligence of parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil revision petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be dismissed for non-prosecution after it has been admitted to regular hearing?
  • Does the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to applications for the restoration of a civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Is the revisional court required to decide a revision petition on merits even if the petitioner fails to appear?
  • Can a revisional court exercise inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to dismiss a revision petition for non-prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir vs The State and others2016 SCMR 2096 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-02
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal procedureFIRmurderbail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Ghulam Qadir, in a murder case registered under Section 302 and Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the circumstances of his implication. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was initially listed as an eye-witness in the FIR and was only implicated as an accused a day later based on a statement from the deceased's mother, who was not present at the scene. Furthermore, the investigation concluded that the co-accused was responsible for the injuries, and the petitioner's involvement remained ambiguous. Holding that the case against the petitioner fell within the scope of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and noting that the investigation was complete, the Court granted bail. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case against an accused is based on questionable subsequent implication and the investigation is finalized, the accused is entitled to bail for further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the subsequent implication of an eye-witness as an accused in a murder case constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the investigation is finalized and the prosecution's case rests on ambiguous evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir and others vs Sh. Abdul Wadood and others2016 PLD Supreme Court 712 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-04-28
  civil revisiondismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of revisioninherent powers of courtlimitation periodsufficient causeCode of Civil ProcedureLimitation Actsupervisory jurisdictionadversarial litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court addressed appeals concerning whether a civil revision filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), once admitted to regular hearing, can be dismissed for non-prosecution. The Court held that a civil revision, when invoked at the behest of a party, can be dismissed for non-prosecution even after admission, as such proceedings are adversarial. However, if the revisional court takes *suo motu* cognizance, the matter should be decided on merits. The Court clarified that dismissal for non-prosecution and subsequent restoration of a civil revision are permissible through the court's inherent powers under Section 151 CPC, and by applying the procedure of Order IX, Rules 8 and 9 CPC via Section 141 CPC. The residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applies to applications for restoration of civil revisions and restoration of restoration applications, with the principle of "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act being attracted. The Court emphasized that law aids the vigilant, not the indolent, and limitation is not a mere technicality. Consequently, *Muhammad Sadiq v. Mst. Bashiran* (PLD 2000 SC 820) was declared not good law to the extent it held that a civil revision cannot be dismissed for non-prosecution.

  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir and 2 others vs Shabbir Hussain Cheema2016 CLC 322 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-29Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nazik etc. vs ZTBL etc.2016 PLJ Lahore 582 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-25Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nasar Khan vs The State2016 YLR 1618 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-26
  narcotics transportationrecovery of charassecret cavity of vehicledriver responsibilitypublic mashirsacquittal of co-accusednarcotics appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the appellant's conviction under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and sentence of life imprisonment with a fine, stemming from the recovery of 85 kilograms of charas from secret compartments of a truck driven by him. The core legal questions involved whether the driver of a vehicle is criminally responsible for narcotics found concealed in secret cavities, and whether the non-association of private witnesses and the acquittal of a co-accused vitiates the appellant's conviction. The court held that the driver of a vehicle is in charge, control, and possession thereof, and is presumed to have knowledge of articles being transported in it, including concealed narcotics. The court further held that section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 excludes the strict requirement of public mashirs under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, particularly at early morning hours. The appeal was dismissed and the conviction maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Is the driver of a vehicle legally responsible for narcotics recovered from secret compartments of the vehicle?
  • Does the non-association of private persons as mashirs vitiate a recovery under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused passenger automatically entitle the driver of the vehicle to an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi vs Muhammad Irfan and 2 others2016 P Cr. LJ 1134 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-29
  acquittal appealextra-judicial confessioncircumstantial evidencemurderbenefit of doubtrecovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondents by the trial court for offences under sections 302 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in connection with a murder case. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence, extra-judicial confessions, and recoveries. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution failed to complete the chain of circumstances pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused. The court laid down the principle that extra-judicial confessions require strict credibility and corroboration, that recoveries of incriminating items must be free from doubt with clear chemical examiner support, and that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal judgment unless it is perverse or arbitrary, as the presumption of innocence is further strengthened by a trial court acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an extra-judicial confession alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction without strong corroborative evidence?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove blood grouping on a recovered weapon render the recovery inconclusive?
  • Whether an appellate court should interfere with a judgment of acquittal when the prosecution fails to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances?
  • What is the evidentiary value of unexamined material witnesses whose source of information is not disclosed by the complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi Qureshi vs Mushtaq Ahmad Qureshi2016 YLR 2078 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-22Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi Chaudhary etc, vs Returning Officer, etc.2016 PLJ Lahore 343 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-05Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi and 2 others vs The State2016 PLD Sindh 135 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-16
  concurrent sentencesinherent powerssentencing discretionexecution of sentencemultiple convictionscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application concerns a request by the applicants to have their sentences for multiple convictions arising from a single incident run concurrently. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses the jurisdiction to order sentences to run concurrently when the trial court failed to exercise such discretion in its original judgment. The High Court allowed the application, directing that the sentences awarded in the four separate cases arising from the same incident run concurrently. The Court held that while Section 35 and Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 govern the concurrent running of sentences, the High Court retains inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to rectify inadvertent omissions by trial courts regarding the mode of execution of sentences. It further established that where multiple convictions stem from a single incident, it is appropriate to exercise judicial discretion to order concurrent sentences, as this relates to the ancillary matter of punishment execution rather than a substantive review of the judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the power to order sentences to run concurrently under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the trial court failed to do so?
  • Can sentences for multiple convictions arising from the same incident be ordered to run concurrently?
  • Does the trial court have the jurisdiction to modify its own judgment to order concurrent sentences after the initial sentencing?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa, Etc. vs Evacuee Trust Property Board, Etc.2016 NLR Service 152 · Balochistan High Court · 2015-08-13
  constitutional petitionservice tribunal jurisdictiondeputationterms and conditions of servicerepatriationillegal appointmentdisciplinary action
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, regular employees in the Revenue Department, challenged the transfer and posting of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as Tehsildars, arguing their initial appointments in the Evacuee Trust Property Board were illegal and that their deputation violated rules. The core legal question concerned the maintainability of the constitutional petition before the High Court regarding terms and conditions of service in light of the Service Tribunals Act, and the legality of the deputation and appointments. The Balochistan High Court held that the petition was not maintainable as the matter pertained to the terms and conditions of service and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Balochistan Service Tribunal Act, 1974. The Court further directed that the deputation period of the private respondents shall not be extended, that they must be repatriated to their parent department, and that the parent department must initiate disciplinary action against them and the persons responsible for their irregular appointments and deputation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a constitutional petition regarding the transfer and posting of civil servants on deputation lie before the High Court or the Service Tribunal?
  • Whether matters pertaining to terms and conditions of service of civil servants are barred from High Court jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • What action is required when the deputation period of a government employee expires without extension?
  • Can the parent department take disciplinary action against a civil servant on deputation whose initial appointment is alleged to be bogus?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa, Etc. Muhammad Nawaz, Etcimtiaz Alias Kalosahib2016 NLR Criminal 278 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs The State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 702, 2016 KLR Criminal Cases 277 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-23
  murder appealcapital punishmentchance witnessbenefit of the doubtmedical evidence contradictiondelayed forensic reportmurder referencecriminal acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a connected murder reference for confirmation of the death sentence. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt through trustworthy ocular testimony, medical evidence, and corroborative recoveries. The Lahore High Court held that the eye-witnesses were chance witnesses whose presence at the crime scene was highly doubtful, their testimony contradicted medical evidence, and delayed dispatch of crime empties to the forensic lab rendered recoveries unreliable. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitting the appellant on the benefit of the doubt, and answered the murder reference in the negative. The key principle laid down is that multiple infirmities in ocular and circumstantial evidence, creating even a single instance of reasonable doubt, are sufficient to warrant the acquittal of an accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eye-witnesses who fail to provide convincing reasons for their presence at the crime scene can be relied upon to sustain a capital conviction?
  • Does a contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the location of injuries create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case?
  • What is the evidentiary value of crime empties sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory only after the arrest of the accused?
  • Can supportive pieces of evidence like recoveries advance the prosecution case when the primary ocular account is found untrustworthy?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 702 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-23
  murder appealchance witnessesocular accountmedical evidence contradictionbenefit of doubtweapon recoverydeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a connected murder reference seeking confirmation of the death sentence. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony from chance witnesses, the corroborative value of medical evidence and delayed forensic weapon recoveries, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the eye-witnesses were unconvincing chance witnesses whose presence at the crime scene was doubtful and whose testimony contradicted the medical evidence regarding the injuries. Furthermore, the delayed transmission of crime empties to the forensic laboratory rendered the recovery evidence suspect. The court established that when the main ocular account is untrustworthy, supporting recovery evidence cannot sustain a conviction, and a single reasonable doubt warrants acquittal. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the murder reference was answered in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of chance witnesses can be relied upon without a cogent explanation for their presence at the crime scene?
  • Does a contradiction between the ocular account and the medical evidence render the prosecution case doubtful?
  • Can supportive evidence like weapon recovery sustain a conviction when the primary ocular testimony is found untrustworthy?
  • What is the legal effect of delayed transmission of crime empties to the Forensic Science Laboratory?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs Shafi Muhammad through L.Rs. and 2 others2016 MLD 168 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-30Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs Director General, Agriculture, etc.2016 C.L.R. 450 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-02
  contract employmentwrit jurisdictiontermination of serviceshow-cause noticereinstatementcontract appointment policydepartmental appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the termination of the petitioner’s contract employment as a Supervisor under the National Program of Improvement of Water Courses. The petitioner alleged that his termination was unlawful, citing illness and prior criminal proceedings as reasons for his absence, and claimed he was denied a fair opportunity of hearing. The core legal question was whether the termination of a contract employee, who failed to respond to multiple show-cause notices and did not raise the plea of medical incapacity before the departmental authorities, was sustainable. The Court held that the petition was meritless. It observed that the petitioner failed to respond to show-cause notices and did not assert his medical condition during the departmental appeal process. Consequently, the Court ruled that pleas not raised before competent authorities cannot be introduced for the first time in writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under the Contract Appointment Policy, 2004, a terminated contract employee is not entitled to reinstatement, and the department acted within its authority given the petitioner's non-compliance with contractual obligations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a plea of medical incapacity in a writ petition if it was not raised before the departmental authorities?
  • Is a contract employee entitled to reinstatement after termination under the Contract Appointment Policy, 2004?
  • Does the failure to respond to show-cause notices justify the termination of a contract employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs A.S.J. Chunian and others2016 PLD Lahore 251 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-21Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa and The State vs The State and Ghulam Mustafa2016 LHC 1434 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-21
  murder referencebenefit of doubtappreciation of evidenceSection 342 statementgrave and sudden provocationocular evidencecorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against a conviction and sentence of death, alongside a murder reference for confirmation of the sentence. The appellant was convicted for the murder of two individuals. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt given the inconsistencies in the ocular account, and whether the appellant's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, admitting the killings under grave and sudden provocation, could sustain a conviction when the prosecution's evidence was found unreliable. The Court held that the prosecution's evidence was riddled with doubts, including unexplained delays in the post-mortem examinations and the disbelieving of eyewitness testimony regarding co-accused persons. The Court reaffirmed the principle that a conviction cannot be based solely on an accused's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which can only serve to corroborate otherwise reliable prosecution evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and declined to confirm the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based solely on an admission made by an accused in a statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does the testimony of witnesses disbelieved against co-accused require independent corroboration to be reliable against the remaining accused?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution evidence is found to be unreliable and the occurrence appears to have remained unwitnessed?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza alias Bubal vs The State & another2016 LHC 187 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-03
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryextra-judicial confessionsupplementary statementmurderdacoitycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner Ghulam Murtaza alias Bubal sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 653 dated 28.08.2015 registered under Sections 302 and 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Gadai, District Dera Ghazi Khan. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the weak nature of the evidence implicating him, including a delayed supplementary statement, a dark-night occurrence with unidentified assailants, recovery of non-incriminating items, and an alleged extra-judicial confession. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner's involvement fell within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, noting that the investigation was complete and continued incarceration served no useful purpose. The petition was consequently allowed, admitting the petitioner to bail subject to surety bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail when implicated through a delayed supplementary statement based on weak evidence in a dark-night occurrence?
  • Does the recovery of a non-weapon item and an alleged extra-judicial confession warrant continued incarceration during trial?
  • When does a criminal case constitute a case of further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza alias Bubal vs State & anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 601 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-03
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymurderdacoityextra-judicial confessiondark-night occurrencesupplementary statement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner Ghulam Murtaza alias Bubal sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 653 dated 28.8.2015 under Sections 302 and 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, registered at Police Station Gadai, District Dera Ghazi Khan, concerning a robbery and murder during a dark-night occurrence involving unknown masked assailants. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry warranting the grant of post-arrest bail given the weak supplementary statement, delayed identification based on belief, non-identification of features in the FIR, and questionable recovery of a veil coupled with an extra-judicial confession. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner's continued incarceration served no useful purpose and that his case fell within the scope of further inquiry under the law. The Court established the principle that reliance on weak supplementary statements, belief-based implication in dark-night occurrences without facial descriptions, and questionable extra-judicial confessions or non-weapon recoveries justify admitting an accused to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the accused is implicated through a delayed supplementary statement based purely on suspicion in a dark-night occurrence?
  • Does the recovery of an item other than the weapon of the offence and an alleged extra-judicial confession warrant further inquiry into the guilt of the accused?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the initial FIR describes unknown masked assailants without mentioning any identifying features?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad- vs Messrs Anand Kohistan Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory and Oil Mills through Proprietor2016 CLC 243, 2016 CLD 421 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-30Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 574 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-04
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancescharas recoverychemical examiner reportfurther inquirysearch and seizurestatutory exclusion
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed by the accused under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging the dismissal of his bail plea by the Sessions Court regarding an offense under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997. The core legal question was whether the applicant, found driving a vehicle containing 43 kilograms of charas, was entitled to bail despite the statutory bars, given his defense of being an unwitting taxi driver and allegations of procedural irregularities in the search and sample dispatch. The High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that the recovery of a large quantity of narcotics from the applicant's possession, coupled with the positive chemical analysis report, established a prima facie case. The court affirmed that Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 excludes the application of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding searches. Furthermore, it held that a delay in dispatching samples is only significant if it causes prejudice, and that the 72-hour limit under the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules 2001 is the governing standard.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 exclude the application of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to searches conducted under the Act?
  • Is the delay in dispatching narcotic samples to the chemical examiner fatal to the prosecution's case if the samples were sent within 72 hours?
  • Does the recovery of a large quantity of narcotics from a vehicle driven by the accused constitute sufficient grounds to deny bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Rizwana Yasmeen and others2016 SCMR 1286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-18
  dowry articlesreview petitionconstitutional jurisdictionerror apparent on the face of the recordquantum of awardleave to appealfamily dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the High Court dismissing a review petition. In the main constitutional petition, the High Court had fixed the value of dowry articles decreed in favor of the respondent at Rs. 500,000, adjusting the conflicting sums decreed by the Trial Court and Appellate Court. The petitioner did not directly challenge the main constitutional judgment but instead sought review before the High Court, raising objections under the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976. The High Court dismissed the review application on the grounds that no error apparent on the face of the record existed, the statutory objection was never raised during previous stages, and the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to adjust the quantum of the financial award. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that new factual objections regarding unclaimed dowry articles cannot be entertained for the first time arising out of review proceedings when they were not raised before the Trial Court. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection under the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976 be raised for the first time in a review petition before the High Court?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction in constitutional proceedings to modify or increase the quantum of a financial award for dowry articles?
  • Can a party in proceedings arising out of a review petition raise a new factual ground regarding unclaimed dowry articles that was not raised before the Trial Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs M/s Anand Kohistan Cotton Ginning and2016 CLC 243 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-30
  second appealconcurrent findingsrecovery suitsale of goodsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two second appeals filed against concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower appellate court, which maintained the trial court's decrees in favor of the respondent partnership firm for the recovery of unpaid amounts for cotton seeds supplied to the appellant. The core legal question centered on whether the concurrent factual findings regarding the supply of goods and non-payment could be disturbed in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the suits were barred. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the appellant failed to point out any misreading of evidence, legal error, or procedural defect, and failed to substantiate his defense of substandard goods or advance payments. The court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact based on sound evidence and admissions cannot be interfered with in second appeal unless a substantial question of law or procedure under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is made out.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of interference in concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a defendant avoid liability for goods received without proving the defense of substandard quality or returning the goods?
  • Whether a second appeal is maintainable without demonstrating any error of law or substantial procedural defect?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore2016 C.L.R. 1079 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Member (Judicial-III) Board of Revenue Punjab2016 LHC 1585 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad Qureshi vs Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and otherss2016 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 275 · Federal Service Tribunal
  service appealimplementation of judgmentmaintainabilitycivil servantproforma promotionFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant filed an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal seeking the implementation of a previous judgment of the Tribunal dated 22.04.2013 passed in Appeal No. 77(K)CS/2011, along with a prayer for proforma promotion to BPS-21 with back benefits. The core legal question was whether an appeal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act is maintainable solely for the purpose of executing or implementing an earlier judgment of the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the appeal in its present format was not maintainable, as the appellant was not aggrieved by any original or appellate departmental order as required by Section 4, and that the proper course for seeking implementation of the Tribunal's judgment lay elsewhere under the law, specifically noting the Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 2014. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, with the observation that the appellant could approach the department in terms of the High Court's earlier directions.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act maintainable solely for the implementation of an earlier judgment of the Tribunal?
  • Can a civil servant challenge the non-implementation of a service tribunal judgment through a service appeal when no original or appellate departmental order is impugned?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad Malkani Chief Executive Officer, JS Global CapitalAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad Malkani (M/s .T.S Global Capital Limited) vs DirectorAppellate Bench of Securities And Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain alias Gullu vs The State and another2016 KLR Criminal Cases 264 · Lahore High Court · 2013-02-13
  post-arrest bailidentification paraderule of consistencyfurther inquirycriminal procedureevidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a second application for post-arrest bail by the petitioner, Ghulam Hussain alias Gullu, in a case registered under Sections 392 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given that he was not named in the F.I.R., the identification parade was arguably compromised, and a co-accused with a similar role had already been granted bail. The Court held that the identification parade lacked evidentiary value because the complainant and witness had seen the accused at the police station prior to the parade. Furthermore, applying the rule of consistency, the Court noted that the co-accused had been granted bail based on the complainant's exonerating affidavit. The Court concluded that the petitioner's case warranted further inquiry and that his continued incarceration served no useful purpose, as the investigation was complete. Consequently, the Court granted the bail application, emphasizing that the recovery of common market items and the lack of a valid identification process supported the petitioner's entitlement to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an identification parade have legal value if the witnesses saw the accused at the police station prior to the parade?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail on the rule of consistency if a co-accused with a similar role has been granted bail?
  • Does the recovery of common, easily available items from an accused constitute strong evidence for denying bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hiader Thind vs Federation of Pakistan etc2016 LHC 917 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-30Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider vs Fazal Ahmad2016 YLR 1875 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-02Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider Thind vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2016 C L R 845 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-30Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider Thind vs Federation of Pakistan and otherss2016 C L R 845, 2016 LHC 917, 2016 MLD 1680 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-30Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider and others vs The State2016 PLJ FSC 40, 2016 YLR 978 · Federal Shariat Court · 2015-10-21
  dying declarationlast seen evidenceinterested witnessesbenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder convictionocular account
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal appeals against convictions for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution’s case, primarily based on an alleged oral dying declaration and 'last seen' evidence provided by interested witnesses, was sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Federal Shariat Court held that the convictions were unsustainable. The court reasoned that the alleged dying declaration was highly doubtful because the police were present at the scene but failed to record it, and the 'last seen' evidence suffered from material contradictions regarding the presence of witnesses and the sequence of events. Furthermore, the court noted the absence of independent corroboration and the failure to recover any weapon of offense. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution evidence relies on oral dying declarations and interested witnesses, such evidence must be consistent and credible; if it is riddled with material discrepancies and lacks independent corroboration, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, leading to acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on an oral dying declaration when police were present at the scene but failed to record it?
  • Does the presence of material contradictions in the testimony of 'last seen' witnesses render their evidence unreliable?
  • Is the testimony of interested witnesses sufficient for conviction without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider & others vs State & others2016 PLJ FSC 40 · Federal Shariat Court
  oral dying declarationmurderbenefit of the doubtinterested witnessesocular accountcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves multiple criminal appeals and a criminal revision arising from a single FIR concerning a murder committed during an alleged dacoity. The trial court convicted the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relying heavily on an oral dying declaration made by the injured victim to private witnesses, along with subsequent apprehensions and recoveries. The core legal questions centered on the reliability of the oral dying declaration, the consistency of the ocular testimony of related and allegedly interested witnesses, and the sufficiency of circumstantial and medical evidence to prove guilt beyond a shadow of doubt. The Federal Shariat Court accepted the appeals, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants, while dismissing the complainant's revision petition for enhancement of sentence. The Court held that material discrepancies rendered the presence of the witnesses doubtful, that an unrecorded oral dying declaration made to private persons in the presence of police officers without proper explanation is highly suspicious and unreliable, and that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can an oral dying declaration made to private persons form the sole basis of a murder conviction when police are already present and fail to record it?
  • Whether material contradictions and discrepancies in the statements of related prosecution witnesses render their testimony regarding the last-seen status and identification unsafe for sustaining a conviction?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce independent corroborative evidence in a criminal trial entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid vs Naseer Ahmad and others2016 PLD Lahore 478 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-21
  civil revisiondeclaratory suitspecific reliefpower of attorneypre-emptionoral agreementlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from concurrent proceedings challenging judgments of the lower appellate court which dismissed the petitioner's suit for declaration and ownership of property, while accepting the respondents' cross-appeal. The core legal question was whether a suit for declaration of title was competent based on an alleged undisclosed oral agreement without pleading material particulars, and whether a third party could challenge a registered power of attorney. The Lahore High Court held that the suit for declaration was incompetent where the plaintiff claimed rights through an unpleaded oral agreement, noting that a declaratory decree under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 can only declare a pre-existing right rather than create a new one, and that a suit for specific performance would have been the proper remedy. Furthermore, the Court held that a third party lacks standing to challenge a power of attorney executed between defendants. The key principles laid down are that oral agreements must be strictly pleaded with material particulars under Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a declaratory suit cannot create new rights, and concurrent findings of fact free from misreading or non-reading will not be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for declaration competent to claim title based on an alleged oral agreement instead of a suit for specific performance?
  • Can a third party maintain a suit for declaration to cancel a registered power of attorney executed between other parties?
  • Whether a decree in a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 can create a new right rather than declare a pre-existing right?
  • What are the requirements for pleading an agreement under Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid vs Government of Pakistan and others2016 PLC (C.S.) 653 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-11
  pensionary benefitsgratuity allowanceretirement duesconstitutional petitionfundamental rightslegitimate expectancyPakistan Railways
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking the release of his commutation and gratuity allowance due after his retirement from Pakistan Railways. The core legal question concerned whether the department could withhold post-retirement pensionary benefits on the ground of financial constraints. The Lahore High Court held that the non-payment of gratuity violates the fundamental rights of employees and that state functionaries are legally bound to pay pensionary benefits on the day of retirement, as employees have a legitimate expectancy to receive them. Although the petitioner's individual grievance was redressed during the proceedings through the payment of his dues, the Court extended relief to 328 other similarly situated retired employees. The key principle laid down is that financial crises do not justify withholding retirement benefits, and all pensionary dues must be paid to employees on the exact date of their retirement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether financial constraints constitute a valid legal justification for withholding the post-retirement gratuity of an employee?
  • Is it the constitutional and legal obligation of state functionaries to pay pensionary benefits on the very day an employee retires?
  • Can a High Court under Article 199 grant relief to other similarly situated employees whose gratuity has been withheld, even after the individual petitioner's grievance has been redressed?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid and another vs Sher Rehman through LRs.2016 SCMR 862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-27
  mutationParda Nasheenburden of proofrevisional jurisdictionfraudlimitationland revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute over land ownership, specifically challenging the validity of a 1969 mutation entry. The core legal questions concern whether a mutation entry constitutes proof of title, the evidentiary requirements for transactions involving Parda Nasheen ladies, and the limitations of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the appellate court's decree in favor of the appellants. The Court held that the mutation was fraudulent, as the underlying sale transaction was never independently established. It established that mutation entries are not documents of title and require independent proof of sale. Furthermore, transactions involving Parda Nasheen ladies require strict adherence to procedural safeguards, including independent advice and proof of consideration. The Court emphasized that fraud vitiates limitation periods, preventing fraudulent transactions from being protected by time-bar defenses, and reaffirmed that the High Court cannot substitute its own findings of fact in limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in revenue records constitute a document of title?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for proving a sale transaction involving Parda Nasheen ladies?
  • Can a High Court in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 substitute its own findings of fact for those of the appellate court?
  • Does the presumption of truth attached to a 30-year-old document under Article 100 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 apply to a mutation that was not thumb-impressed by the executants?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid and another vs Sher Rehman (Deceased) through his LRs2016 P SC 1102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-27
  revenue mutationdocument of titleparda nasheen ladiesburden of prooffraud vitiates proceedingslimitation periodrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court wherein a suit for declaration, possession, and permanent injunction filed by the appellants regarding land mutation was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The core legal questions involved the evidentiary value of a revenue mutation, particularly concerning transactions involving Parda Nasheen ladies, compliance with mandatory statutory procedures for attestation under the Land Revenue Act, and the effect of fraud on the period of limitation. The Supreme Court held that a mutation entry is not a document of title, the underlying sale transaction must be independently established through cogent evidence, and strict safeguards apply to transactions involving Parda Nasheen ladies. The Court further ruled that fraud vitiates all solemn transactions and extends the period of limitation from the date of knowledge. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the decree of the District Appellate Court in favour of the appellants was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Is a revenue mutation considered a document of title under the law?
  • What are the essential requirements for proving a sale transaction involving Parda Nasheen ladies?
  • Does fraud vitiate limitation periods in civil suits regarding fraudulent transactions?
  • What is the extent of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid and Another vs Sher Rehman (Decd.) through His LRS.2016 NLR Revenue 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-27
  Parda NasheenMutationFraudLimitationRevisional jurisdictionBurden of proofLand revenueDocument of title
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over land ownership involving a contested mutation allegedly attested in 1969. The appellants, including Parda Nasheen ladies, claimed they never sold the land and were absent from the village at the time of the purported transaction. The High Court had dismissed the suit on the grounds of limitation. The Supreme Court held that a mutation entry does not constitute a document of title and requires independent proof of the underlying sale transaction, particularly when challenged. The Court emphasized that transactions involving Parda Nasheen ladies require strict adherence to procedural safeguards, including ensuring the ladies understand the transaction and receive consideration, which were absent here. Furthermore, the Court ruled that fraud vitiates any transaction, thereby overriding limitations on time. It also clarified that the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is limited and does not permit the re-appraisal of evidence unless a miscarriage of justice occurred. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the decree in favor of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in revenue records constitute a document of title?
  • What are the essential conditions for a valid property transaction involving a Parda Nasheen lady?
  • Does the law of limitation protect a transaction proven to be the result of fraud?
  • Can the High Court re-appraise evidence while exercising its limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid and another vs Sher Reh1vian (decd.) through his LRs2016 NLR Revenue 29, 2016 P SC 1102, 2016 SCMR 862, 2016 PLJ Sc 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-27
  mutationparda nasheen ladiesburden of prooffraud vitiates solemn transactionslimitationrevisional jurisdictionsale transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court wherein the appellants' suit for declaration, possession, and permanent injunction regarding agricultural land was dismissed on the ground of limitation after the High Court reversed the appellate court's decree in favor of the appellants. The core legal question involved the validity of a mutation of sale executed over forty years prior, allegedly involving parda nasheen ladies, without their presence, thumb impressions, or independent advice, and attested in a different mouza. The Supreme Court held that a mutation is not a document of title and that the underlying sale transaction must be independently proved through cogent evidence, especially where vulnerable parties like parda nasheen ladies are involved and statutory procedures under land revenue laws are flouted. The Court ruled that fraud vitiates solemn transactions, making limitation periods inapplicable to fraudulent mutations, and that the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the appellate court's decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a mutation entry serves as a document of title conferring ownership rights without independent proof of the underlying sale transaction?
  • What are the mandatory legal requirements and conditions for establishing the validity of a property transaction involving parda nasheen ladies?
  • Does the limitation period bar a suit challenging a property mutation when fraud and misrepresentation are established?
  • Can the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 substitute its own findings of fact for those of the appellate court where no grave miscarriage of justice exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Fareed vs Delimitation Auuthority, D.G.Khan and 4 others2016 CLC 871 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-20
  delimitation of constituenciesspeaking orderlocal government electionsadministrative lawright to fair trialwrit jurisdictionelection disputes
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated writ petitions challenge the orders passed by the Delimitation Authority regarding the delimitation of union councils and wards in District Muzaffargarh. The petitioners contended that the Delimitation Authority failed to adhere to the mandatory legal framework, specifically the Delimitation of Constituencies Act, 1974, and the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, by passing mechanical, non-speaking orders without providing adequate reasoning for the acceptance or rejection of objections. The core legal question was whether the Delimitation Authority is legally obligated to provide a reasoned, speaking order when adjudicating objections to the delimitation process. The Court held that the impugned orders were illegal and unlawful, as they lacked lawful reasoning and failed to address the mandatory requirements of the law. The Court emphasized that under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, administrative authorities must pass speaking orders. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matters for re-adjudication, directing the Authority to provide a fair hearing and issue reasoned decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Delimitation Authority legally required to issue a reasoned, speaking order when deciding objections to the delimitation of constituencies?
  • Does the failure to provide reasons in an administrative order violate the principles of natural justice and the right to a fair trial?
  • Are the provisions of Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act 1897 applicable to the orders passed by a Delimitation Authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Bari vs Haji Basher Ahmad through L.Rs. & others2016 PLJ Lahore 118 · Lahore High Court · 2012-03-30
  civil revisionspecific performancesuit for possessionpower of attorneyagreement to sellconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises out of concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's suit for possession and decreeing a rival suit for specific performance based on an agreement to sell executed by an attorney. The core legal question concerns the validity of the power of attorney, the authority of the agent to enter into an agreement to sell, and the proof of its due execution. The Lahore High Court held that the agent lacked specific authority under the power of attorney to enter into an agreement to sell, and that the execution of the power of attorney was not duly proved since the identifying witness denied identifying the principal before the Sub-Registrar. The Court laid down the principle that an agent authorized merely to sell property does not automatically possess the power to enter into an agreement to sell containing conditional clauses and penalties, and that a beneficiary relying on an agreement executed by an attorney must strictly prove the valid execution and scope of the underlying power of attorney.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agent authorized to sell property possesses the inherent power to enter into an agreement to sell on behalf of the principal?
  • Can a power of attorney be deemed validly proved when the identifier before the Sub-Registrar denies identifying the principal at the time of attestation?
  • Whether a beneficiary of an agreement to sell executed through an attorney is bound to prove the valid execution of the underlying power of attorney?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali Asghar vs The State & another2015-SCP-94 · Lahore High Court · -
  blasphemySection 295-A PPCcriminal appealinvestigation guidelinesreligious feelingsprosecution evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 295-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following his acquittal by the trial court on charges under Sections 295-C and 298-A. The core legal question was whether the prosecution provided sufficient, reliable evidence to establish that the appellant’s alleged remarks constituted an offence under Section 295-A, specifically regarding the intent to outrage religious feelings. The Lahore High Court found the prosecution's case fundamentally flawed, noting that the witnesses were unreliable, contradictory, and failed to demonstrate that any class of persons had their religious feelings injured. Furthermore, the Court observed that the investigation was perfunctory, failing to adhere to established judicial guidelines requiring expert consultation in blasphemy cases. The Court held that the conviction was unsustainable due to the lack of corroborative evidence and procedural deficiencies, including the failure to properly confront the appellant with the specific derogatory words in the charge. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that blasphemy laws must not be misused to settle personal scores and require rigorous evidentiary standards.

  Questions settled

  • Does a conviction under Section 295-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 require proof that the religious feelings of a specific class of persons were actually injured?
  • Is a conviction sustainable where the prosecution fails to confront the accused with the specific derogatory words in the charge?
  • What are the procedural requirements for police investigation in blasphemy cases regarding the consultation of religious scholars?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Akbar and 5 others vs Government of Punjab through Secretary2016 PLC (C.S.) 1254 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-20
  police servicespecial law versus general lawage relaxationdepartmental promotion quotareasonable classificationsubordinate legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves several connected writ petitions filed by in-service Head Constables and Assistant Sub-Inspectors challenging the age limits and eligibility criteria advertised by the Punjab Public Service Commission for recruitment to the posts of Sub-Inspectors. The core legal questions involve whether general civil service age relaxation rules override special police service rules, and whether the prescription of specific age limits and qualifications in subordinate rules violates the parent statute or constitutes unlawful discrimination. The Court held that the police force is a disciplined force governed by special laws, specifically the Police Order, 2002 and the Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2013, which exclude the application of general laws such as the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 and the Punjab Civil Servants (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1976. The Court established that special statutory service rules prevail over general rules, that the fixing of reasonable age limits and criteria for departmental quotas does not violate fundamental rights or constitute impermissible discrimination, and that the competent authority is fully empowered under the parent statute to frame special rules regulating recruitment and promotions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Punjab Civil Servants (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1976 apply to members of the police force?
  • Can subordinate rules prescribe age limits and qualifications not explicitly detailed in the parent statute?
  • Does the fixation of different age limits for in-service candidates competing against fresh graduates violate the principle of non-discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the Government is competent to alter promotion criteria and qualifications during the subsistence of service of civil servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ahmed Adam, Chief Executive Syed Rafique Mohammad Shah, Direc_9772bdd1Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas, etc. vs State, etc.PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 9 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-15Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs The State and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 133, 2016 SCMR 2048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-11
  pre-arrest bailcross-versioncounter-FIRcriminal procedurepolice investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in a cross-version case arising from FIR No. 382 of 2015 registered at Police Station Saddar Jhang, involving offences under sections 337-A(ii), 337-F(i), 337-H(ii), 337-L(ii), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the conflicting versions of the incident and police findings during the investigation. The Supreme Court observed that during the investigation, the police found that the petitioner did not cause the specific injuries alleged in the cross-version, but rather had a scuffle involving simple injuries, making it a case of two opposing versions where the possibility of false implication could not be excluded. Holding that the determination of the aggressor must be left to the trial court after elaborate evidence evaluation, the court allowed the appeal and granted pre-arrest bail to the petitioner subject to furnishing requisite surety bonds. The key principle laid down is that in cases of counter-versions where police investigation casts doubt on specific allegations and false implication cannot be ruled out, pre-arrest bail may be granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted in a cross-version case where the police investigation disputes the specific role attributed to the accused?
  • Is the possibility of false implication in a case of two competing versions a ground for granting pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the determination of the aggressor party in a cross-version incident lie with the trial court after recording evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and 3 others2016 CLC 199 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-22Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs Chief Secretary and 2 others2016 PLC ( C.S.) 87 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-19
  civil servantpromotioneligibility vs fitnessjurisdictionconstitutional petitionterms and conditions of serviceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, challenged his non-consideration for promotion, arguing that the issue concerned his fitness for the post, thereby bypassing the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition, citing the bar on jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. The Court examined whether the grievance pertained to 'eligibility' or 'fitness' for promotion. It held that the petitioner's case involved a determination of eligibility, as he had never been considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee. The Court clarified that eligibility for promotion constitutes a term and condition of service, which falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. Consequently, the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition due to the constitutional bar under Article 212, and dismissed the petition as not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute regarding a civil servant's eligibility for promotion?
  • Is the question of eligibility for promotion considered a term and condition of service under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the bar on jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 apply when a civil servant has not yet been considered for promotion by the relevant departmental committee?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs Additional Sessions Judge (West), Islamabad and 22016 PLJ Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas and others vs Mohammad Shafi through LRs and others2016 SCMR 1403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-04-20
  unconditional withdrawalCode of Civil Procedureinheritance mutationlocus standiestoppellimitationcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the appellants' suit for the annulment of an inheritance mutation. The core legal question was whether a suit for the same relief is maintainable when the predecessor of the plaintiffs had previously withdrawn an identical suit unconditionally without seeking court permission to file a fresh one. The Supreme Court held that the unconditional withdrawal of the earlier suit in 1957, pursuant to Order XXIII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, precluded the institution of the subsequent suit. Furthermore, the Court held that the long-standing inaction and acquiescence of the predecessor for over forty years, despite the existence of the impugned mutation, deprived his heirs of the locus standi to challenge the mutation. The principle laid down is that the unconditional withdrawal of a suit bars any fresh litigation on the same subject matter, and a party’s prolonged failure to challenge a mutation during their lifetime estops their successors from subsequently disputing it. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unconditional withdrawal of a suit without permission to file a fresh one bar a subsequent suit on the same subject matter?
  • Can heirs challenge an inheritance mutation that their predecessor failed to challenge for a significant period during their lifetime?
  • Does the failure to record the terms of an oral compromise at the time of a suit's withdrawal preclude the subsequent enforcement of such terms?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas & Others vs Muhammad Shafi (Decd.) THR. LRS. & Others2016 PSC 1025, 2016 SCMR 1403, 2016 SCP 38, 2016 NLR Civil 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-04-20
  withdrawal of suitabandonment of claiminheritance mutationlocus standiestoppellimitationoral compromise
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court reversing an appellate court's remand order and upholding the trial court's dismissal of the appellants' suit. The predecessors of the parties had been involved in litigation regarding an inheritance mutation, which the appellants' predecessor, Muhammad Nawaz, had unconditionally withdrawn in 1957 without permission to file a fresh suit, claiming an oral compromise. Decades later, the appellants (heirs of Muhammad Nawaz) filed a fresh suit in 2000 for the same relief, which the trial court dismissed as barred under Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court held that the unconditional withdrawal of the earlier suit without the court's permission to institute a fresh suit operates as a complete bar under Order XXIII, Rule 1(3) CPC. Furthermore, the court held that an heir who fails to challenge a wrongfully recorded mutation of inheritance for a considerable length of time until death deprives his own legal heirs of the locus standi to dispute the mutation due to estoppel and abandonment of the cause of action. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unconditional withdrawal of a suit without permission of the court to file a fresh suit bar a subsequent suit on the same subject-matter under Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Does an heir lose the locus standi to challenge an inheritance mutation when their predecessor acquiesced and failed to challenge it for a long period of time until his death?
  • Can a plaintiff lead oral evidence to prove the terms of an unrecorded compromise after unconditionally withdrawing a suit decades earlier?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas & others vs Mohammad Shafi (decd) thr. LRs & others2016 SCP 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-04-20
  withdrawal of suitabandonment of claiminheritance mutationlocus standipreliminary issueoral compromiselimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court reversing an appellate court order and upholding the dismissal of the appellants' suit as barred under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1908. The core legal question concerned whether a fresh suit for cancellation of a mutation is maintainable when the predecessor of the plaintiffs had earlier withdrawn an identical suit unconditionally without the court's permission to file afresh, and whether an oral compromise alleged decades later warrants recording evidence. The Supreme Court held that an unconditional withdrawal of a suit without permission precludes the institution of a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter pursuant to Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC. Furthermore, a predecessor's prolonged acquiescence and failure to challenge a mutation for decades constitutes abandonment of the claim, depriving his heirs of locus standi. The Court laid down that an unconditional withdrawal of a suit bars subsequent litigation on the same cause of action, and prolonged inaction by a predecessor estops heirs from challenging long-standing inheritance mutations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unconditional withdrawal of a suit without permission under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC bar the institution of a fresh suit for the same subject-matter?
  • Can heirs maintain a suit challenging an inheritance mutation when their predecessor acquiesced to it and failed to challenge it for decades?
  • Is a party entitled to lead oral evidence regarding an unrecorded compromise alleged to have been the basis of a suit withdrawn decades prior?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghufran Atta Khan vs Messrs Summit Bank Limited through Chief2016 CLD 461 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-24
  banking jurisdictionexclusive jurisdictionspecial lawcustomer definitionfinance recoveryFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit filed by the Plaintiff against a Defendant Bank, wherein the central issue was whether the High Court, exercising its civil jurisdiction, possessed the authority to determine if the Plaintiff qualified as a 'customer' under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The Plaintiff argued that the relationship did not fall within the statutory definition, while the Defendant contended that the matter was barred by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court. The Court held that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is a special law that overrides other legislation. Relying on Section 7(4) of the Ordinance, which grants Banking Courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the existence or otherwise of finance, the Court determined that the question of whether a party is a 'customer' or has availed finance falls squarely within the Banking Court's purview. Consequently, the Court answered the issue in the negative, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, and ordered the related banking suit to be returned to the Banking Court for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to determine if a person is a 'customer' under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, override other laws regarding the jurisdiction of courts?
  • Does the term 'otherwise' in Section 7(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, extend the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court to include the determination of the existence of a finance relationship?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghiyas Ud Din alias Moon vs The State and another2016 P Cr. L J 156 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-10-01
  post-arrest bailmurderdying statementprohibitory clausecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302, 324, 148, 149, and various clauses of section 337 of the Pakistan Penal Code at Police Station Golra Sharif, Islamabad. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given his nomination in the FIR, the dying statement of the deceased implicating him, and discrepancies pointed out in the investigation. The Islamabad High Court held that the petitioner was specifically nominated with an active role in the commission of the offence and that his name and role were further corroborated by the statement of the deceased recorded in the presence of a medical officer. The court emphasized that deeper appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the bail stage and dismissed the petition, establishing that active participation in a heinous crime supported by direct dying statements disentitles an accused to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused nominated in the FIR with an active role in a heinous crime is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Can a statement of the deceased recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 serve as a strong ground to refuse bail?
  • Does a cross-version with a conflicting time of occurrence constitute a valid cross-version warranting bail?
  • Whether deeper appreciation of evidence can be undertaken at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazna Mohammad Rafiq and 7 others vs Province of Sindh through Secretary Education and 5 others2016 YLR 1864 · Sindh High Court · 2015-06-12Read full judgment →
• Ghazi Khan etc vs Aziz-ur-Rehman2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-10-19Read full judgment →
• Ghazanfar AliSufiyan Akram and another vs Appellate Authority/Additional2015-SCP-154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  local bodies electionsnomination papersdisqualificationstatutory bodypublic servantZakat and Ushr Committeeservice of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who had served as a Member and Chairman of a Local Zakat and Ushr Committee constituted under Section 18 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, challenged the rejection of their nomination papers for local bodies elections under Section 27(2)(e) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, which disqualifies persons in the service of a statutory body unless two years have elapsed since retirement or resignation. The core legal questions involved whether such members are in the service of a statutory body and the effect of their statutory status as public servants under Section 23 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them, holding that the petitioners were voluntary workers engaged in the administration of the Ordinance rather than employees in the service of a statutory body, and that their deeming status as public servants under Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 did not attract the disqualification. The Court laid down that disqualifications must be construed strictly, and that the absence of employer-employee characteristics—such as appointment, remuneration, and direct disciplinary control by the State—excludes such committee members from being considered in the service of a statutory body.

  Questions settled

  • Whether members and chairmen of a Local Zakat and Ushr Committee are 'in the service of a statutory body' under Section 27(2)(e) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Does the deeming status of public servants under Section 23 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 read with Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 disqualify a person from contesting local bodies elections?
  • What are the determining tests to ascertain whether a person holds an office in the service of a statutory body or authority?
  • Does a voluntary position without remuneration or formal state-controlled appointment constitute 'service' for election disqualification purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazanfar Ali vs The State and another2016 P.S.C. 368, 2016 P.S.C. Crl. 368 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-04-13
  qatl-i-amdqisastazirchance witnesscapital punishmenttazkiyat-ul-shuhoodappeal against acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir addresses cross-appeals arising from a judgment of the Shariat Court, which had dismissed appeals and confirmed the death sentence of the convict-appellant, Ghazanfar Ali, for qatl-i-amd under Section 302(a) of the Azad Penal Code (APC), while maintaining the acquittal of co-accused Ghazan Khan. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution had established its case beyond reasonable doubt through ocular testimony, whether chance witnesses could form the basis of a capital conviction, and whether the legal standards for awarding qisas under Section 304 of the APC were fulfilled. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the convict-appellant through consistent and trustworthy eye-witness testimony whose presence at the scene was established, and that the statutory requirements for qisas including tazkiyat-ul-shuhood were properly met by the Trial Court. The Court further declined to interfere with the acquittal of the co-accused in the absence of perversity. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of chance witnesses can be relied upon for awarding the death penalty as qisas?
  • What are the pre-requisites for proof of qatl-i-amd liable to qisas under Section 304 of the Azad Penal Code?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Does a mere relationship between eye-witnesses and the deceased render their testimony untrustworthy?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazanfar Ali vs Appellate Authority/Additional District Judge,2016 PLD Supreme Court 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-11-04
  local bodies electionsnomination papersstatutory bodypublic servantdisqualification of candidatesZakat and Ushr Committeeelection appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who had served as a Member and Chairman of a Local Zakat and Ushr Committee constituted under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, challenged the rejection of their nomination papers for local bodies elections. Their nominations were initially rejected under Section 27(2)(e) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, on the premise that they were in the service of a statutory body and had not completed the mandatory two-year post-resignation period. The core legal questions revolved around whether holding such positions constitutes 'service of a statutory body' and the effect of deeming them 'public servants' under Section 23 of the Ordinance read with Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them, holding that the petitioners were merely 'engaged in' rather than 'employed for' the administration of the Ordinance, received no salary or remuneration, and were not subject to the direct appointment and removal control characteristic of master-servant relationships with the State. The Court laid down that disqualifications for contesting elections must be construed strictly, and that holding honorary, voluntary positions in statutory committees does not bring an individual 'in the service of a statutory body' under the electoral laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Member or Chairman of a Local Zakat and Ushr Committee is in the service of a statutory body under Section 27(2)(e) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Does the deeming provision of Section 23 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, classifying committee members as public servants under Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, disqualify them from contesting local bodies elections?
  • What are the determining tests to ascertain if a person is in the service of a body or authority for the purpose of electoral disqualifications?
  • Does the statutory bar on persons in the service of a statutory body contesting local elections apply to individuals holding honorary and voluntary positions without receiving salary or remuneration?
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• (1) Ghazanfar Ali Appellate Authority/Additional District Judge, Sahiwal and2016 P.S.C. 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  local government electionsnomination papersdisqualificationstatutory bodypublic servantZakat and Ushr Ordinanceelection law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, former Member and Chairman of a Local Zakat and Ushr Committee, challenged the rejection of their nomination papers for local government elections. The core legal question was whether holding such positions constitutes being "in the service of a statutory body" under Section 27(2)(e) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, thereby disqualifying them from contesting elections. The Supreme Court held that these positions do not constitute "service" under the Act. The Court reasoned that members are "engaged in" rather than "employed for" the administration of the Ordinance, receive no salary or benefits, and are selected rather than appointed by the state. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the status of "public servant" under Section 23 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, read with Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, is a legal fiction for specific administrative purposes and does not equate to being in the service of a statutory body for election disqualification purposes. Consequently, the Court ruled that disqualification provisions must be construed strictly, and the petitioners were not disqualified.

  Questions settled

  • Does holding a position as a Member or Chairman of a Local Zakat and Ushr Committee constitute being in the service of a statutory body under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Does the deeming provision of Section 23 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, classifying committee members as public servants under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, create a disqualification for contesting local government elections?
  • Should disqualification provisions for candidates contesting elections be construed strictly?
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• Ghayas and 3 others vs The State2016 MLD 1316 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-05-06Read full judgment →
• Gharibwal Cement Limited vs Director (Enforcement) Securities and Exchange Commission of PakistanAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Ghansham Das vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2016 PLJ Islamabad 226 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-20
  deputationrepatriationcivil servantterms and conditions of serviceconstitutional jurisdictionvested rightabsorption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a single-judge order dismissing a writ petition filed by a civil servant against his repatriation from a deputation post to his parent department. The core legal questions concerned whether a deputationist possesses a vested right to continue on deputation or to be permanently absorbed into the borrowing department, and whether such repatriation orders are justiciable under the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The Court held that deputation is an administrative arrangement between borrowing and lending authorities, terminable at any time without assigning reasons. The Court affirmed that a deputationist holds no vested right to remain on deputation or to demand absorption, as these matters pertain to the terms and conditions of service. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Civil Servants (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013, does not confer a right of absorption. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, with the Court reiterating that constitutional jurisdiction is barred in matters relating to the terms and conditions of service, which fall under the purview of the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant on deputation have a vested right to continue on deputation for the full stipulated period?
  • Can a deputationist claim a legal right to be permanently absorbed into the borrowing department?
  • Is the repatriation of a civil servant from a deputation post a matter relating to the terms and conditions of service?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to interfere in matters of deputation and repatriation?
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• Ghansham Das vs Federation of Pakistah through Secretary2016 PLJ Islamabad 226, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 191 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-20
  deputationrepatriationcivil servantterms and conditions of servicewrit jurisdictionvested rightabsorptionadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of a writ petition filed by a civil servant against his repatriation from a deputation post to his parent department. The core legal question was whether a deputationist possesses a vested right to continue on deputation indefinitely or to be absorbed into the borrowing department, and whether such repatriation is justiciable under the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction. The Court held that deputation is an administrative arrangement between borrowing and lending authorities, terminable at any time at the discretion of the competent authority. A deputationist holds no vested right to complete a tenure or to be absorbed into the borrowing department. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that matters concerning deputation and repatriation relate to the terms and conditions of service, which generally precludes the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the repatriation order was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed, as the appellant failed to demonstrate any legal entitlement to remain in the borrowing department or to challenge the administrative decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant on deputation have a vested right to continue on deputation for the full stipulated period?
  • Is a deputationist entitled to be absorbed into the borrowing department as a matter of right?
  • Can a High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to challenge the repatriation of a civil servant?
  • Does the repatriation of a deputationist require the borrowing authority to assign specific reasons?
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• Ghania Hassan vs Shahid Hussain Shahid and another2016 SCMR 2170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-22
  dower enhancementexecution proceedingsobjection petitionsummary procedurecivil petition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner-wife's appeal against the dismissal of her objection petition in execution proceedings. Respondent No. 1 secured a money decree under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 against Respondent No. 2, who is a fugitive from law. During execution, the petitioner objected that the attached properties constituted her dower under her Nikahnama and a subsequent agreement. The core legal questions involved whether dower can be increased after marriage and whether the subsequent agreement regarding dower enhancement could be summarily determined in execution proceedings where bona fides were questionable. The Supreme Court held that dower can indeed be fixed or increased after marriage by mutual consent or by the husband, but declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the suspicious nature of the subsequent agreement, noting the petitioner had already filed a separate family suit. The petition was dismissed, subject to the decree holder's statement not to execute against the property mentioned in the original Nikahnama. The key principle laid down is that while dower is amenable to post-marriage enhancement, disputed subsequent transfers intended to frustrate execution of decrees may be left for adjudication by a competent family court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amount of dower agreed upon between spouses can be increased after marriage?
  • Can a subsequent agreement enhancing dower be summarily adjudicated in execution proceedings when its bona fides are challenged?
  • Whether property validly settled as dower in a Nikahnama is liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree against the husband?
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• Ghani Builders and Developers (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs Commissioner2016 PTD (Trib.) 1238 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-01-20
  accrual basis accountingdisposal of business assetsjoint venturedeemed assessmenttaxability of land saledefinite informationincome tax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  The taxpayer, a private limited company engaged in the business of building and development, challenged an order amending its deemed assessment for the tax year 2009. The tax authorities had treated the entire consideration for a land transaction as income, alleging a disposal of business assets under Section 75 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and rejecting the taxpayer's cash-basis accounting in favor of accrual-basis accounting. The taxpayer argued that the land was part of a joint venture project, title remained with the taxpayer, and the project was subject to ongoing litigation, rendering the full addition premature. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue held that while the taxpayer, as a company, is generally required to maintain accounts on an accrual basis, the specific nature of the joint venture and the ongoing litigation meant that the land had not been fully disposed of. The Tribunal ruled that the addition of the entire sale consideration was premature and unjustified, holding that only the partial amount actually received by the taxpayer as cost of land could be taxed on a receipt basis, pending final settlement or completion of the project.

  Questions settled

  • Is a private limited company required to maintain accounts on an accrual basis for income tax purposes?
  • Does the transfer of land to a joint venture project constitute a complete disposal of a business asset under Section 75 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Can tax authorities treat the entire agreed sale consideration of land as income if the project is incomplete and the title remains with the taxpayer?
  • Does the receipt of partial payment for land in a joint venture project justify taxing the entire consideration as income in the year of the agreement?
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• Ghafoor Khan vs The State2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Ghaffar Ali vs Jalil Said2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-17Read full judgment →
• Getz Pharma (Pvt) Limited through Authorized Signatory vs Servier2016 CLD 2229 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-15Read full judgment →