Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,813 judgments in total.

• Atiq-ur-Rehman & another vs Returning Officer & 6 others2015 LHC 8344 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-11Read full judgment →
• Atiq-Ur-Re Hman vs Najma Tabassum and others2016 CLC 1905, 2016 PLJ Islamabad 331 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-19
  constitutional petitionwrit petitioninterlocutory orderrent restrictioneviction petitionbar of appealwritten reply
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenging an interlocutory order passed by the Rent Controller closing his right to file a written reply in an eviction proceeding. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against an interim order passed by a Rent Controller when Section 21(2) of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance 2001 expressly bars appeals against interlocutory orders. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that where a statute bars an appeal from an interim order to prevent delays, such a restriction cannot be circumvented by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, unless the impugned order is palpably without jurisdiction, mala fide, void, or coram non judice. The court laid down that interim orders merge into the final verdict and can be challenged in an appeal against the final order under Section 21(1) of the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by a Rent Controller?
  • Does Section 21(2) of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance 2001 bar appeals against interim orders passed by a Rent Controller?
  • Can the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be applied by a Rent Controller in the absence of specific provisions in the rent restriction statute?
  • What are the exceptional circumstances that justify invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court against an interim order passed under rent laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Athar Nadeem vs Zahoor Ahmad and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 729 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-23
  criminal appealacquittalbenefit of doubtlalkaraplea of alibidouble presumption of innocenceappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Narowal, which acquitted the respondent, Zahoor Ahmad, of charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding the murder of Javaid Iqbal. The prosecution alleged that the respondent instigated the murder by raising a 'lalkara' while his co-accused committed the act. The respondent pleaded alibi, which the trial court accepted, finding the prosecution's evidence insufficient and inconsistent. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal was perverse or based on an incorrect appreciation of evidence. The High Court held that the trial court's judgment was fair, well-reasoned, and based on a proper evaluation of the evidence, including the respondent's consistent alibi. The Court affirmed that an acquittal order carries a double presumption of innocence, and appellate interference is limited to cases where the impugned order is fanciful or capricious. Finding no such illegality, the Court dismissed the appeal in limine, upholding the principle that conviction on a capital charge requires high-quality, trustworthy evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of appellate interference against an order of acquittal?
  • Does an acquittal order carry a double presumption of innocence?
  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be sustained on evidence that is not of high quality or standard?
  Read full judgment →
• Athar and Co, Chartered Accountants vs Director (Enforcement) SecuritiesAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Ateeb Ur Rehman @ Atti Mochi vs The State and others2016 SCMR 1424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-17
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsheroin recoveryfurther enquiryweight of drugspackaging materialControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arose from a case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 1014 grams of heroin from the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the weight of the recovered substance, which marginally exceeded the threshold for Section 9(c), justified the denial of bail when the weight included the packaging material. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution could not clarify whether the heroin was weighed with or without the polythene bag. The Court held that if the weight of the packaging were excluded, the quantity might fall below 1000 grams, potentially bringing the offense under Section 9(b) rather than 9(c). Consequently, the Court determined that the case required further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, granting bail to the petitioner subject to a surety bond, establishing that marginal weight discrepancies involving packaging can create a basis for further inquiry in narcotics cases.

  Read full judgment →
• Astro Plastics (Pvt.) Ltd. through Company Secretary and another vs Ministry of Finance, Government. of Pakistan through Secretary and 3 others2016 PTD 1824 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-20Read full judgment →
• Assadullah Khan Chamkanl J.Yar Muhammad vs StatePLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 480 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-15
  exhumationpostmortem examinationquashment of orderunnatural deathsuicidesanctity of dead body
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed by the petitioner seeking the quashment of orders passed by the lower courts which allowed an application by the local police for the exhumation of the dead body of the petitioner's deceased daughter, Mst. Parkha Bibi, for a postmortem examination. The core legal question was whether exhumation of a dead body can be ordered by a magistrate without any tangible evidence or suspicion of murder, and solely on the basis of a daily diary entry under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where legal heirs state the death was a suicide. The Peshawar High Court held that the lower courts erred in granting the exhumation order as the police had not collected any evidence indicating murder and the legal heirs suspected no one. The court laid down the principle that exhumation without lawful justification, solid evidence, and detailed reasoning violates the sanctity and respect accorded to a dead body, and cannot be ordered mechanically.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a magistrate can order the exhumation of a dead body without tangible evidence or suspicion of murder?
  • Can an exhumation order be maintained solely on the basis of a daily diary report under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the consent or statement of legal heirs regarding suicide relevant for refusing an exhumation application by the police?
  Read full judgment →
• Asral-ul-Majeed Khan C/o Arman & Company (Chartered Accountants)Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Asmat Ali alias Mattay vs The State and another2016 MLD 1072 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-10-19Read full judgment →
• Asmat Ali alias Mattay vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 255 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-10-19
  post-arrest bailabetmentfurther probecriminal conspiracymurdertentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal bail petition filed before the Peshawar High Court by the accused-petitioner, Asmat Ali, seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 302, 324, 34, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the refusal of bail by the Additional Sessions Judge, Shabqadar. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was alleged to have abetted the murder of the complainant's father, was entitled to bail given the evidentiary record. The Court held that the prosecution's case against the petitioner rested solely on allegations in the FIR regarding abetment, with no independent evidence connecting him to the commission of the offence or the alleged conspiracy. Finding that the petitioner's involvement remained a matter requiring further investigation, the Court granted bail. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case against an alleged abettor lacks corroborative evidence and relies only on FIR allegations, the case calls for further inquiry, thereby entitling the accused to the concession of bail under the principle of further probe.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused person entitled to bail when the prosecution's case against them rests solely on uncorroborated allegations of abetment in the FIR?
  • Does the lack of independent evidence connecting an accused to the alleged offence constitute a case for further probe?
  • Can bail be granted to an accused charged with abetment if the investigating agency has failed to establish a clear link between the accused and the principal offenders?
  Read full judgment →
• Aslam vs The State and another2016 YLR 1974 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-11-24Read full judgment →
• Aslam Malik & Co.Chartered Accountants vs Head of Department2016 CLD 1734 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-07-06Read full judgment →
• Aslam Malik & Co. Charted Accountants vs Head of DepartmentAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Askarl Bank Ltd., etc. vs Han Ahmed Masi, etc.2016 P.C.T.L.R. 375 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-08
  Consumer Court jurisdictionBanking Courtcredit card liabilityunauthorized transactionslimitation periodfinancial institutionFederal and Provincial lawslost credit card
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the District and Sessions Judge/Consumer Court, Lahore, which allowed a consumer complaint against the appellant bank regarding disputed credit card transactions amounting to Rs. 40,000/-. The core legal questions involve the jurisdiction of the Consumer Court over disputes between a customer and a financial institution, the liability of a bank for unauthorized credit card transactions occurring before the reporting of a lost card, and the limitation period for filing a complaint under the consumer protection laws. The Lahore High Court held that the Consumer Court lacked jurisdiction because matters between a financial institution and its customer fall exclusively within the domain of the Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which prevails over the provincial Consumer Protection Act pursuant to Article 143 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court held that the complaint was barred by limitation having been filed after a delay of one year against the mandatory thirty-day period, and that the bank cannot be held liable for transactions made prior to receiving notice of a lost card. The appeal was allowed and the consumer complaint dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Consumer Court has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint filed by a bank customer against a financial institution regarding credit card transactions?
  • Can a bank be held liable for unauthorized transactions conducted on a lost credit card before the bank is notified of its loss?
  • Does the mere issuance of subsequent notices extend the mandatory thirty-day period of limitation prescribed for filing a claim under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005?
  • Does a Federal statute relating to banking matters have precedence over a Provincial consumer protection enactment in case of a conflict of jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Askari Hasnain vs Secretary Establishment and others2016 SCMR 871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-23
  pro forma promotionFundamental RulesF.R. 17rounding up markspromotion policysupersessionFederal Service Tribunalretrospective promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a Federal Service Tribunal judgment dismissing the petitioner's appeal regarding his non-promotion to BS-19. The petitioner, a retired Deputy Director (BS-18) in the Meteorological Department, challenged his supersession, contending that the quantification of his Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) was incorrectly calculated and that his score of 59.60% should have been rounded up to meet the 60% minimum eligibility threshold. He further invoked the proviso to Fundamental Rule 17 (F.R. 17) claiming entitlement to pro forma promotion. Despite multiple directions, the departmental respondents failed to appear, file a reply, or contest the assertions. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that rounding up 59.60% marks enabled the petitioner to meet the minimum threshold for promotion. The Court held that under F.R. 17 proviso, the competent authority is empowered to grant pro forma promotion after retirement, which affects no serving officers, and ordered the issuance of the required notification.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant's PER marks of 59.60% be rounded up to meet the 60% minimum eligibility threshold for promotion under the promotion policy?
  • Does the proviso to Fundamental Rule 17 authorize the competent authority to grant pro forma promotion to a civil servant after retirement?
  • Whether an unrefuted claim of incorrect PER quantification warrants the grant of pro forma promotion upon converted appeal by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Askari General Insurance Company Ltd Mr. Abdul Waheed, CEO vs Executive Director (Insurance)Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Askari Bank Ltd. vs A.H. International (Pvt.) Ltd. and others2016 CLD 1028 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-15
  execution proceedingsmortgage decreetransfer of assetsbanking suitconveyance deedvoid transactionobjections
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from objections filed by a commercial bank against execution proceedings concerning a mortgaged property, seeking to halt its auction on the basis of a subsequent conveyance deed and settlement agreement executed with the judgment debtor. The core legal question was whether a registered conveyance deed executed in violation of statutory restrictions during pending banking litigation and after a mortgage decree can override the decree-holder's prior mortgage rights without an independent cancellation suit. The Sindh High Court dismissed the objections, holding that transfers made in contravention of statutory prohibitions under banking laws are void ab initio and of no legal effect, and do not necessitate a separate suit for cancellation under the Specific Relief Act. The court laid down the principle that transactions executed in violation of statutory restrictions regarding encumbered properties during pending proceedings are void, and that a mortgage travels with the property while subsequent transferees step into the shoes of the debtor subject to prior valid decrees.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a registered conveyance deed executed in violation of statutory transfer restrictions during pending banking litigation is void without a separate cancellation suit?
  • Does a mortgage run with the property so that a subsequent transferee steps into the shoes of the debtor?
  • Whether an executing court can go behind a decree in execution proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Askari Bank Ltd. and others vs Irfan Ahmed Niazi and others2016 CLD 383, 2016 P.C.T.L.R. 375, 2016 PLD Lahore 168 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-08
  consumer court jurisdictionbanking courtcredit cardlimitation periodfederal and provincial legislationunauthorized transactionsfinancial institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the District and Sessions Judge/Consumer Court, Lahore, whereby a customer's complaint regarding unauthorized credit card transactions was accepted against Askari Bank Ltd. The core legal questions involved whether the consumer court had jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between a bank customer and a financial institution, and whether the complaint was barred by limitation. The Lahore High Court held that disputes between financial institutions and their customers fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which takes precedence over provincial consumer laws pursuant to Article 143 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Furthermore, the Court held that the complaint was barred by time as it was filed well beyond the thirty-day limitation period prescribed under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, and that mere issuance of subsequent notices did not extend limitation. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the complaint was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a consumer court have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint filed by a bank customer against a financial institution regarding a credit card dispute?
  • Does the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 take precedence over the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 under Article 143 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the issuance of subsequent notices after a specific denial by a bank extend the thirty-day limitation period for filing a claim under Section 28 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005?
  • Is a bank held responsible for unauthorized transactions made on a lost credit card before any intimation of its loss or misplacement has been given to the bank?
  Read full judgment →
• Askari Bank Limited vs DCD Services Limited and 3 others2016 CLD 449 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-15Read full judgment →
• Asim Siddique Butt vs Muhammad Khursheed Mirza, etc.PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 177 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-01
  illegal dispossessionacquittalspecial leave to appealdelay in complaintproperty grabbersdouble presumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for special leave to appeal was filed under Section 417(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, challenging the acquittal of Respondent No. 1 by the trial court in a complaint under Sections 3, 5, 7, and 8 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner successfully established forcible and illegal dispossession by the respondent to invoke the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The Lahore High Court held that the petition was devoid of merits, noting an inordinate and unexplained delay of over four years in filing the complaint, lack of specific details regarding the date and time of the occurrence, and absence of proof regarding forcible dispossession. The court laid down the principle that proof of forcible or illegal dispossession of a lawful owner or occupier by a property grabber is a mandatory prerequisite to set the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 into motion, and that a double presumption of innocence attaches to an accused after acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • What is the prerequisite to set the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 into motion?
  • Does an inordinate and unexplained delay in filing a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 affect the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • What legal presumption prevails after the acquittal of an accused by the trial court?
  • Can a petition against acquittal under Section 417(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 be maintained without establishing forcible dispossession?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif vs Works Manager (Diesel Shed), Pakistan Railway, Karachi Cantt.2016 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 19 · Federal Service Tribunal
  unauthorized absencemajor penaltyproportionality of punishmentservice appealdisciplinary proceedingsregular inquirylimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Helper in Pakistan Railways, challenged his removal from service for unauthorized absence. The department initiated proceedings under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance 2000, alleging absence since June 2001, and subsequently removed him after publishing notices in a newspaper. The appellant argued that the removal was void due to the lack of a regular inquiry and that his appeal was filed within time upon receiving the rejection of his departmental representation. The Federal Service Tribunal addressed whether the major penalty of removal was justified given the circumstances and the procedural history. The Tribunal held that while the appellant's misconduct was established, the imposition of the major penalty of removal from service was disproportionate to the offense. Consequently, the Tribunal converted the major penalty into a minor penalty of stoppage of increment for two years under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973. The principle laid down is that disciplinary penalties must be proportionate to the nature of the misconduct, and major penalties generally require a regular inquiry to be legally sustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Is the imposition of a major penalty of removal from service justified without conducting a regular inquiry?
  • Can a service tribunal convert a major penalty into a minor penalty if the original punishment is found to be disproportionate?
  • Does the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal commence upon the receipt of the appellate authority's rejection order?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Shah and another vs Mst. Attar Bibi and 11 others2016 CLC 1715 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-21
  succession certificaterevocation of succession certificatenominee statussummary proceedingsdisputed titlegiftshari shares
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the appellate judgment of the Additional District Judge setting aside the order of the Senior Civil Judge and excluding a disputed amount from a succession certificate. The core legal question was whether a succession certificate proceeding under the Succession Act, 1925, can be used to determine intricate questions of disputed title such as a gift, and whether a mere nominee becomes the exclusive owner of the funds. The Peshawar High Court held that the grant of a succession certificate is a summary procedure meant to facilitate the collection of debts and securities, not to determine questions of disputed title or ownership. The Court ruled that a nominee merely acts as a facilitator to receive and distribute the amount to legal heirs according to their shari shares, and any claim of a gift must be established through a regular suit before a competent court. The revision was allowed, restoring the succession certificate while requiring legal heirs to furnish surety bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of a succession certificate under the Succession Act, 1925, determine questions of disputed title?
  • Can a nominee claim exclusive ownership of funds solely on the basis of being nominated?
  • What is the appropriate legal recourse when rival claims involving intricate questions of fact arise during succession certificate proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Rafique vs Mst. Quratullain and 3 others2016 MLD 425 · Sindh High Court · 2014-05-30Read full judgment →
• Asif Nawaz Khokhar vs The State2016 KLR Criminal Cases 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-09-23
  post-arrest bailarms ordinancebailable offenceillegal weaponscriminal procedurestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from an order of the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Islamabad (East), dismissing the petitioner's post-arrest bail application in F.I.R. No. 354 dated 05.09.2015 under Sections 13/20/65 of the Arms Ordinance and Sections 420/468/471/188 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, registered at Police Station Koral, Islamabad. The core legal question concerned the bailable or non-bailable nature of offences under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965 and whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail. The Islamabad High Court held that offences under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965 are bailable according to the Second Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as amendments enhancing punishment did not alter its bailable status and temporary ordinances modifying the schedule lacked operational force. Consequently, the court accepted the petition and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner, establishing that Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965 remains bailable.

  Questions settled

  • Is an offence under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965 bailable or non-bailable under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the enhancement of punishment under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965 alter its status from bailable to non-bailable?
  • Whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail when the primary offense invoked is bailable in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Nawaz Khokhar vs StatePLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 42 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-23
  post-arrest bailarms ordinancebailable offencestatutory interpretationcriminal procedurearms dealership
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who was charged under Sections 13, 20, and 65 of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965, and Sections 420, 468, 471, and 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a police raid on his arms dealership. The core legal question was whether the offence under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 is bailable or non-bailable, given conflicting judicial interpretations. The Court held that, based on the Second Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, offences under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 are bailable. The Court reasoned that the legislative intent, despite subsequent amendments to punishment duration, did not alter the bailable status of the offence. Furthermore, the Court noted that other cited provisions were either bailable or non-cognizable. Consequently, the Court allowed the bail petition, emphasizing that the observations made were tentative and should not influence the trial court's proceedings. The petitioner was granted bail subject to furnishing bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Is an offence under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 bailable or non-bailable?
  • Does the enhancement of punishment for an offence under the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 automatically change its status from bailable to non-bailable?
  • What is the effect of the Second Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the classification of offences under the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Nadeem, etc. vs ASJ/Appellate Authority, etc.2016 MLD 1128, 2016 C.L.R. 109 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-03
  local government electiondisqualification of candidatenomination paperslegal advisorstatutory body servicejoint candidatureTMA
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the acceptance of nomination papers for candidates contesting local government elections for Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The core legal question was whether a person serving as a Legal Advisor to a Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA) is disqualified from contesting elections under Section 27(2)(e) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, or if they fall under the exception for part-time officials. The Court held that the Legal Advisor, being subject to government control, appointment, and removal processes, and receiving remuneration, is in the service of a statutory body and does not qualify for the exemption. Consequently, the Court ruled that the candidate was disqualified, and because the candidates were running on a joint ticket, the disqualification of one invalidated the entire panel. The key principle laid down is that the determination of 'service' under the disqualification provisions depends on the substance of the relationship, specifically the power of appointment, removal, and the extent of administrative control, rather than the nomenclature of the position.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Legal Advisor of a Tehsil Municipal Administration disqualified from contesting local government elections under the Punjab Local Government Act 2013?
  • What are the determining factors for establishing whether a person is in the service of a statutory body for the purpose of election disqualification?
  • Does the disqualification of one candidate in a joint panel for local government elections invalidate the candidature of the entire panel?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Nadeem and another vs Additional Sessions Judge/Appellate2016 MLD 1128 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-06
  local government electiondisqualification of candidatelegal advisorstatutory bodynomination papersjoint candidaturePunjab Local Government Act 2013
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the acceptance of nomination papers for the Chairman and Vice Chairman of a Local Government, contending that the candidate for Vice Chairman, serving as a Legal Advisor to the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA), was disqualified under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013. The core legal question was whether a Legal Advisor to a TMA falls within the disqualification criteria of "service of any statutory body" under Section 27(2)(e) of the Act. The Court held that the Legal Advisor is indeed in the service of a statutory body, as the government retains the power of appointment, removal, and supervision, and provides remuneration. Consequently, the Court ruled that the candidate was disqualified, and because the nomination was filed as a joint candidature, the entire panel was disqualified. The key principle laid down is that the determining factors for "service" include the authority to hire and fire, the power of supervision, and the payment of remuneration, rather than just the nomenclature of the position. The impugned orders were set aside, and the nomination papers were rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Legal Advisor to a Tehsil Municipal Administration considered to be in the service of a statutory body for the purposes of election disqualification?
  • What are the determining factors for establishing whether a person is in the service of a statutory body under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Does the disqualification of one candidate in a joint candidature panel for local government elections result in the disqualification of the entire panel?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Kamal vs Government of Pakistan and others2016 YLR 177 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-31
  Exit Control ListFundamental rightsFiduciary dutyPublic fundsConflict of interestPrivatization CommissionEconomic crimesReasonable restrictions
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the inclusion of his name on the Exit Control List (ECL) by the Federal Government, arguing that the action was illegal, non-speaking, and violated his fundamental right to travel. The core legal question was whether the state could restrict the petitioner's movement via the ECL given his involvement in the alleged misappropriation of public funds while serving as a Board Member of the Privatization Commission and Chairman of a private investment bank. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner, as a public functionary, breached his fiduciary duty by facilitating an unauthorized investment of public funds into his own financial institution, leading to significant financial loss. The Court ruled that fundamental rights, including the right to travel, are not absolute and are subject to reasonable restrictions in the public interest. Consequently, the Court upheld the placement of the petitioner’s name on the ECL, emphasizing that the state is empowered to impose such restrictions to prevent the flight of individuals involved in economic crimes and to safeguard public assets.

  Questions settled

  • Can the state impose reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to travel by placing an individual on the Exit Control List?
  • Does a public functionary have a fiduciary duty to protect public funds from being invested in institutions where they hold a personal interest?
  • Are the grounds for placing a person on the Exit Control List limited to specific categories of economic crimes and corruption?
  • Can a court interfere with the placement of an individual on the Exit Control List when there is a pending investigation involving the misappropriation of public funds?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Bashir vs State, etc.PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 126 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-07
  pre-arrest bailtheftunexplained delayinvestigationcriminal procedurebail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Muhammad Asif Bashir, who was implicated in an FIR registered under Sections 380 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged theft of Rs. 300,000. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the confirmation of pre-arrest bail given the circumstances of the case. The Court noted that the FIR suffered from an unexplained 15-day delay, the occurrence was unseen, and no independent witnesses supported the complainant's version. Furthermore, the Investigating Officer confirmed that the petitioner had joined the investigation, which was complete regarding him, and no recoveries were required from his possession. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition and confirmed the pre-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that where an occurrence is unseen, there is a significant delay in reporting, and the accused has fully cooperated with the investigation with no further recoveries pending, the continued detention of the accused serves no useful purpose, thereby justifying the confirmation of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is pre-arrest bail justified when the FIR is delayed and the occurrence is unseen?
  • Does the completion of investigation and lack of required recoveries support the confirmation of pre-arrest bail?
  • Should pre-arrest bail be confirmed when the accused has fully joined the investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Azeem Shaikh vs The State through Home Secretary, Sindh and 72016 MLD 1067 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-09Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary Government of Sindh Secretariat Karachi and 10 others2016 P Cr. L J 1484 · Sindh High Court · 2016-02-11
  reinvestigationsuccessive investigationchallancognizancedefense pleacriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by an accused seeking the reinvestigation of a murder case registered under various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, on the grounds of false implication due to political rivalry. The core legal question was whether a court can order the reinvestigation or successive investigation of a criminal case after the police have submitted the investigation report (challan) under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the trial court has taken cognizance of the matter. The High Court of Sindh dismissed the petition, holding that ordering a reinvestigation after the submission of the challan and the commencement of trial proceedings is legally unsustainable and complicates the administration of justice. The Court laid down the principle that once a trial court has taken cognizance of a case, any pleas of innocence or false implication raised by an accused constitute defense pleas that must be raised and evaluated before the trial court during the trial, rather than serving as grounds for successive investigations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reinvestigation or successive investigation can be ordered after the police have submitted the challan and the trial court has taken cognizance of the offense?
  • Can an accused seek a fresh investigation on the grounds of false implication and political rivalry after the trial has commenced?
  • What is the legal status of pleas of innocence raised by an accused after a challan has been submitted to the competent trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali Khan and another vs Standard Chartered Bank Limited and another2016 CLC 204 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-29Read full judgment →
• Asian Mutual Insurance Company (Guarantee) Limited vs DirectorAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Asian Consumer Care Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive Officer2016 CLD 804 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-12
  trademark infringementinterim injunctionauthorized usercorporate resolutionpassing offintellectual property rightslicensing agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra High Court Appeal challenged an order granting an interim injunction against the appellant, restraining it from using the trademark "Hajmola" in a suit for infringement and passing off. The core legal question was whether the appellant qualified as an "authorized user" of the trademark under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, based on a letter of authorization from the alleged proprietor, Dabur India Ltd. The Court held that the appellant failed to establish its status as an authorized user, as the corporate resolution relied upon did not expressly authorize the delegation of rights to the appellant. Emphasizing that corporate resolutions must be strictly construed, the Court determined that the letter of authorization was merely descriptive and insufficient to confer licensing rights. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the interim injunction. The judgment establishes the principle that an agent cannot delegate authority not expressly granted by the principal’s corporate resolution and that "authorized user" status requires clear, verifiable evidence of a licensing arrangement under the governing trademark law.

  Questions settled

  • Can an agent delegate authority to a third party if the principal's corporate resolution does not expressly grant such power?
  • Does a letter of authorization that lacks specific dates and clear licensing terms establish a party as an 'authorized user' under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001?
  • Are corporate resolutions subject to strict construction regarding the powers granted therein?
  • What constitutes an 'authorized user' of a trademark under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Asia Care Health and Life Insurance Company 15-17 C, 2nd Floor 5thAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Sugar Mills vs Executive Director (Registration) Mrs. Sumara RazaAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Sugar Mills vs Executive Director (Registration) and anothers2016 P.C.T.L.R. 937, 2016 CLD 1544 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-04-07Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Sugar Mills vs Executive Director (Registration) and another2016 P.C.T.L.R. 937 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-04-07Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Hussain vs The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, etc.2016 C.L.R. 410 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-17
  labour lawcompulsory retirementwrongful dismissalindustrial standing ordersback benefitsestoppelservice matterappellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges an order by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal which modified the petitioner's dismissal from service to 'compulsory retirement.' The core legal question is whether the penalty of 'compulsory retirement' is a legally permissible punishment under the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, and whether an appellate tribunal can impose a penalty not prescribed by the governing statute. The High Court held that the penalty of 'compulsory retirement' is alien to the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, which only prescribes removal, retrenchment, discharge, and dismissal. The Court emphasized that any penalty imposed must be strictly authorized by law and proportionate to the offense. Furthermore, the Court ruled that receiving partial retirement benefits does not estop an employee from challenging an illegal penalty. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and remanded the matter for a fresh decision, directing the Tribunal to pass a speaking order in accordance with the law, ensuring that the principles of fairness and due process under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act 1897 are strictly observed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the penalty of 'compulsory retirement' a legally permissible punishment under the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Does the acceptance of partial retirement benefits by an employee create an estoppel preventing them from challenging the legality of the dismissal order?
  • Can an appellate tribunal impose a penalty that is not explicitly prescribed by the governing statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Hussain vs The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others2016 C.L.R. 410, 2016 PLJ Lahore 478, 2016 PLC 97 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-17
  service tribunalcompulsory retirementlabor lawsindustrial and commercial employmentback benefitsestoppelconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition arises from a service dispute where the petitioner, a bank employee with over thirty years of unblemished service, was dismissed following an inquiry. The Labour Court allowed the petitioner's grievance petition and ordered reinstatement with back benefits. On appeal, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal partly accepted the appeal, setting aside the dismissal but converting it into a penalty of compulsory retirement. The core legal question addressed by the Lahore High Court was whether the penalty of 'compulsory retirement' is recognized under the relevant labor laws, and whether the Tribunal's conversion of the penalty was lawful. The Court held that the penalty of compulsory retirement is alien to the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, as the statute only prescribes removal, retrenchment, discharge, and dismissal. The High Court ruled that imposing an unprescribed, harsh penalty violates the statute, affects retirement benefits, and infringes constitutional protections. Consequently, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal was set aside, and the matter was remanded for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the penalty of compulsory retirement can be legally awarded under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does the acceptance of partial retirement dues by an employee operate as an estoppel against challenging an unlawful dismissal order?
  • Whether an adverse administrative action affecting retirement benefits violates fundamental constitutional rights under the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can a Labour Appellate Tribunal convert an illegal order of dismissal into a penalty not prescribed by the governing statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Hussain vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, etc2016 PLJ Lahore 478 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-17
  labour lawcompulsory retirementindustrial standing ordersestoppel against lawproportionate punishmentwrongful dismissalback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged a judgment by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which, while setting aside the petitioner's dismissal from service, converted the penalty into compulsory retirement. The core legal questions were whether the penalty of compulsory retirement is permissible under the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, and whether the acceptance of partial retirement benefits estops an employee from challenging the legality of the penalty. The Court held that the penalty of compulsory retirement is alien to the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, which only prescribes removal, retrenchment, discharge, and dismissal. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that punishment must be proportionate to the offence, especially given the absence of financial loss and the petitioner's clean service record. It was also held that there is no estoppel against law, and an employee is not barred from challenging an illegal penalty simply by accepting partial benefits. Consequently, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is the penalty of compulsory retirement a valid punishment under the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Does the acceptance of partial retirement benefits by an employee create an estoppel against challenging the legality of the dismissal or penalty?
  • Must a disciplinary penalty imposed under labour laws be proportionate to the magnitude of the alleged offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain vs Shah Nawaz and others2016 YLR 1314 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-09-07
  specific performanceagreement to sellcivil revisionremand of caseappellate court judgmentnon-reading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from two civil revision petitions directed against an appellate judgment that partially accepted an appeal in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, cancellation of mutations, and recovery of sale consideration. The core legal question was whether the appellate court committed a grave illegality by failing to frame, discuss, and adjudicate upon crucial points for determination arising from the pleadings and evidence, instead disposing of the appeal in a cursory manner. The Peshawar High Court held that the appellate court's judgment was passed without lawful authority and against the norms of law and justice for omitting to determine essential propositions including the execution of the deed under the Qanun-e-Shahadat, the authority of the attorney, limitation, and admissions in pleadings. The court laid down the principle that an appellate court must independently apply its mind to all material points in controversy and cannot decide a lis containing a plethora of evidence in a cursory manner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is bound to discuss and adjudicate upon all essential points arising from the pleadings and evidence?
  • Can an appellate court dispose of a first appeal containing a plethora of evidence in a cursory manner?
  • Whether a judgment of an appellate court that fails to determine material propositions is tenable in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain Changezi and another vs The State and another2016 P Cr. L J 1357 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-03-24
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtpointation of place of occurrenceconfessional statementmaterial contradictionanti-terrorismexplosive substances
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellant for allegedly throwing a grenade, under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal questions concerned the admissibility of the appellant's pointation of the crime scene, the validity of a confession recorded under Section 21-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the impact of material contradictions regarding the date of the occurrence. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It ruled that the pointation of the crime scene was inadmissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984, as it revealed no fresh facts. Furthermore, the Court found the confession insufficient for conviction without corroboratory evidence and noted significant, unaddressed contradictions in the FIR regarding the date of the incident. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, emphasizing that material contradictions in the prosecution's case must result in the benefit of the doubt being extended to the accused. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Is the pointation of a place of occurrence by an accused in police custody admissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 if no fresh facts are discovered?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on a confession recorded under Section 21-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, in the absence of corroboratory evidence?
  • What is the legal effect of material contradictions regarding the date of occurrence in an FIR on the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 153 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-04
  pre-arrest bailalteration of chargebailable offencesjurisdiction of bail courtcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Sections 452, 354, 337-A(i), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Sessions Judge had dismissed their pre-arrest bail petition by observing that the contents of the FIR attracted additional non-bailable offences such as Section 506(2). The core legal question was whether a Sessions Judge hearing a pre-arrest bail application is competent to alter charges or invoke additional offences based on the FIR contents at the bail stage. The Lahore High Court held that a court hearing a pre-arrest bail application is not competent to alter or add charges, as the power to alter or add to a charge vests in the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 during trial. The court laid down the principle that a bail court must consider the offences as charged in the FIR and cannot arrogate to itself the powers of the trial court to frame or alter charges prematurely.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court hearing a pre-arrest bail application is competent to alter or add charges based on the contents of the FIR?
  • At what stage can a trial court alter or add to any charge under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be refused for offences that are designated as bailable in the FIR on the basis of speculative observations by a bail court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain alias Kala vs The State and anotherK.L.R. 2016 Criminal Cases 106 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-08
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryvicarious liabilitycommon objectbailable offencemala fide implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Ashiq Hussain alias Kala, who was charged under Sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in connection with an F.I.R. registered at Police Station Liaquatpur. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the specific nature of the injury attributed to him and the potential for false implication. The Court observed that the petitioner was not alleged to have caused any injury to the deceased, but rather was accused of causing a single soti blow to an injured witness, which was medically classified as Shajjah Khafifah, an offence under Section 337-A(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which is bailable. Noting the existence of strained relations between the parties and the possibility of exaggerated allegations, the Court held that the petitioner's case warranted further inquiry. Consequently, the Court allowed the bail petition, establishing the principle that where specific allegations against an accused are limited to bailable offences and the overall circumstances suggest potential exaggeration or mala fide, the case for further inquiry is established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the attribution of a bailable offence to an accused in a case involving non-bailable offences entitle the accused to bail on the basis of further inquiry?
  • Can the possibility of false implication due to strained relations between parties constitute grounds for granting post-arrest bail?
  • Is the determination of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 a matter to be decided at the trial stage rather than at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashia Akhtar through Attorney vs Provincial Government G.B. through Chief2016 PLC (C.S.) 972, 2016 KLR Labour & Service Cases 162 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-08-11
  writ petitionpublic appointmentmerit listrecruitment processburden of proofservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by the petitioner seeking a direction to the respondents to issue an appointment order for the post of Est. BPS-14 in Union Council, Shankargrah Astore, alleging that she was qualified and on merit, while contesting the appointment of respondent No. 5. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had established her entitlement to the appointment based on merit and whether the respondents acted illegally or discriminatorily in the recruitment process. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that the petition was devoid of merit and dismissed it. The Court observed that the list relied upon by the petitioner was merely an alphabetical list of shortlisted candidates rather than a final merit list. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that she had qualified the test and interview to a standard entitling her to appointment, nor did she prove that the respondents appointed any candidate with a lower merit position than her. The key principle laid down is that the burden of proof lies upon the petitioner to establish a legal right to public appointment by demonstrating qualification and superior merit over others.

  Questions settled

  • Does an alphabetical list of shortlisted candidates constitute a final merit list for public appointment?
  • Does the burden of proof lie on the petitioner to establish entitlement to a public post in a writ petition?
  • Can a writ petition for appointment be maintained without the petitioner establishing that they qualified the selection process?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashfaque alias Bhola and another vs The State2016 MLD 1941 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-21
  kidnapping for ransomanti-terrorismbenefit of doubtcontradictory testimonydelayed FIRfalse implicationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellants under section 365-A and section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for kidnapping for ransom and sentencing them to life imprisonment. The prosecution's case originated from a private complaint filed after an initial FIR regarding the alleged abduction of the victim, who was later found near the motorway. The core legal questions involve evaluating whether the prosecution proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, considering severe discrepancies in the testimonies of the complainant and the abductee, the unexplained delay in disclosing the names of the abductors to the motorway police upon recovery, and the existence of a prior civil litigation over land property between the families providing a motive for false implication. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution's case was fraught with improbabilities, contradictions, and a lack of credible evidence linking the appellants to the crime. The Court laid down that an unexplained delay by an abductee in disclosing the names of abductors to rescuers at the earliest opportunity, coupled with deep-seated prior enmity over property and a manipulated investigative record, renders the prosecution story untrustworthy, requiring the benefit of doubt to be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an abductee to disclose the names of his abductors to the police officers who rescue him cast serious doubt on a subsequent police statement naming the accused?
  • Can a conviction under section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained when the testimony of the alleged abductee is riddled with glaring discrepancies and improbabilities?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a pre-prepared written statement produced by an abductee before the investigating officer immediately upon recovery?
  • How does a background of persistent civil litigation and property disputes between the parties impact the credibility of a criminal charge of abduction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashfaq Ahmed Khan vs PTCL and others2016 PLD Islamabad 112 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-22
  consumer protectiondue processfair trialunfair trade practicesummary procedureevidence recordingconsumer complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment consolidates several consumer appeals challenging orders passed by the Authority under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995. The core legal questions concern the procedural requirements for awarding punishment and compensation, and the minimum standards for inquiry and evidence in consumer complaints. The Court held that the impugned orders were passed without adhering to the spirit of the law, specifically failing to conduct a proper inquiry. The Court laid down the principle that while the Act provides for summary proceedings, it does not dispense with the requirements of due process. The Authority must frame issues, record evidence, allow cross-examination, and apply the principles of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, mandates a fair trial, requiring the Authority to act judicially. The Court clarified that "fine" and "compensation" are distinct legal concepts requiring separate procedural handling. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, and the cases were remanded for fresh adjudication following the prescribed legal procedure.

  Questions settled

  • What procedure must the Authority follow when awarding punishment and compensation under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995?
  • Does the summary procedure under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995, exclude the requirement to record evidence and allow cross-examination?
  • What are the implications of Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, on the adjudication of consumer complaints?
  • Is there a legal distinction between 'fine' and 'compensation' under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashfaq Ahmed Khan and others vs PTCL and others2016 PLD Islamabad 112, 2016 PLJ Islamabad 437 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-22
  consumer protectiondue processfair trialcompensation vs finesummary procedureinquiry and evidenceremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of several consumer and criminal appeals arising from orders passed by the Additional District Judge acting as the 'Authority' under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995. The core legal questions involved the proper procedure to be followed by the Authority when awarding punishment, imposing fines, granting compensation, conducting inquiries, and evaluating evidence under the Act, particularly in light of the right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Islamabad High Court held that the Authority failed to adopt proper legal procedures, such as recording evidence, exhibiting documents under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, allowing cross-examination, or utilizing expert evidence, and instead disposed of complaints through a cursory perusal of pleadings. The Court laid down that while adjudicating consumer complaints, the Authority must conduct a proper inquiry, frame points of determination or issues, record oral or documentary evidence, apply the principles of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, and differentiate between criminal prosecution (summary trials for fines via Special Magistrates) and civil compensation (measured by actual loss or damage suffered). All impugned orders were set aside and the matters remanded for fresh disposal.

  Questions settled

  • What procedure must be followed by a consumer authority under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995 when awarding punishment or compensation?
  • Does the summary procedure under consumer legislation exclude the recording of evidence and the framing of issues?
  • How does the concept of 'fine' in criminal prosecution under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995 differ from 'compensation' awarded for unfair trade practices?
  • What are the implications of Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan on proceedings conducted under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashfaq Ahmed Khan and 7 others vs PTCL & another and 7 others2016 IHC · Islamabad High Court · -
  consumer protectionfair trialdue processunfair trade practicecompensationsummary trialburden of proofremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses a batch of consumer and criminal appeals arising from orders passed under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995. The core legal questions involve determining the proper procedure to be followed by the consumer authority or courts when awarding punishment and compensation, the minimum standards for 'inquiry' and evidence in consumer complaints, and the implications of Article 10-A of the Constitution regarding fair trial and due process. The court held that the consumer authority must conduct a proper inquiry involving the framing of issues, recording of oral and documentary evidence, and allowing cross-examination in accordance with the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, distinguishing summary trials for penal offenses from inquiries for compensation. The court laid down key principles regarding due process under Article 10-A, the distinction between fines and compensation, and the procedural stages required for adjudicating consumer complaints, ultimately setting aside the impugned orders and remanding the matters back to the authority for fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • What procedure has to be followed when punishment is awarded under the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995?
  • What procedure has to be followed while awarding compensation under consumer law?
  • What would be the minimum standard to be applied while resolving a controversy under the term inquiry?
  • What would be the minimum standard of evidence required in consumer complaints?
  • What are the implications of Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan upon the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar vs The State2016 YLR 2754 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-11-12Read full judgment →
• Asghar Saeed and another vs Justice of Peace/Sessions Judge2016 P Cr. L J 310 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-31
  quashment of FIRcognizable offenceconstitutional petitionadequate remedyEmigration Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed for the quashment of an FIR registered under sections 18-B and 22-B of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979 read with section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, pursuant to the direction of the Sessions Judge under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The core legal question concerned whether an FIR should be quashed when the inquiry officer initially reported no criminal case was made out. The Peshawar High Court held that once the commission of a cognizable offence is reported, the authorities are under a legal obligation to register an FIR, and subsequent adequate remedies including investigation, submission of a police report, and trial are available to the accused to prove their innocence. The court laid down the principle that a writ petition for the quashment of an FIR is not maintainable when adequate statutory remedies during investigation and trial are available to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition for the quashment of an FIR is maintainable when adequate remedies during investigation and trial are available?
  • Is the SHO under a legal obligation to register an FIR once the commission of a cognizable offence is reported?
  • Can an inquiry officer assume the role of a court while submitting comments on a petition for registration of a case?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs The STATEand others2016 YLR 343 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-05Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs The State and anotherK.L.R. 2016 Criminal Cases 202 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-16
  cross-examinationforfeiture of rightlawyers strikefair trialinherent powerscriminal procedureabuse of process
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the trial court's order forfeiting his right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses in a cheque-bouncing case. The matter arose after repeated adjournments, where the petitioner consistently failed to cross-examine witnesses despite their presence, citing reasons such as the absence of his counsel and lawyers' strikes. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted lawfully in forfeiting the right of cross-examination given the delays and the petitioner's conduct. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that while the right to cross-examination is a fundamental component of a fair trial, it cannot be exercised at the whim of an accused to indefinitely delay proceedings or hold the judicial process hostage. The Court affirmed that lawyers' strikes do not constitute a valid ground for seeking adjournments or excusing a failure to cross-examine witnesses in attendance. The principle laid down is that courts are under a solemn duty to proceed with judicial business regardless of strike calls, and inherent powers under Section 561-A cannot be invoked to validate the abuse of legal process.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person claim a right to cross-examine witnesses indefinitely at their own convenience?
  • Does a lawyers' strike constitute a valid ground for an accused to seek an adjournment for cross-examination?
  • Can the High Court exercise inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to set aside a forfeiture of the right to cross-examine caused by the accused's own persistent defaults?
  • Is a court obligated to adjourn proceedings due to a strike call by the Bar?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs The State and another-2016 YLR 2601 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-29
  Zina-bil-jabracid throwingconversion of convictionmedical corroborationDNA test reportsolitary statement of victimcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant criminal appeal was directed against the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellant was convicted under sections 376, 334, and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution case arose from an incident where the victim, a minor girl, was abducted, subjected to Zina-bil-jabr, and severely injured by having acid thrown on her face and arm. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the victim's solitary ocular account, the sufficiency of medical and chemical corroboration despite a non-matching DNA report, and the correctness of the specific penal sections applied for the injuries sustained. The Lahore High Court held that the victim's testimony, corroborated by medical evidence showing a torn hymen and chemical examiner reports detecting semen, was sufficient to sustain the conviction for Zina-bil-jabr. However, because the medical examination revealed burns and disfigurement rather than dismemberment or amputation of an organ, the court converted the conviction under section 334 to section 336 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with the conviction and sentence modified regarding the specific hurt provision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the solitary statement of a rape victim, when corroborated by medical and chemical examiner reports, is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a non-matching DNA report conclusively negate the prosecution's case when ocular and medical evidence establish the commission of the offense?
  • Can a conviction under Section 334 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be lawfully converted to Section 336 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the medical evidence proves facial disfigurement rather than dismemberment or amputation?
  • Is a defense witness's testimony considered hearsay and inadmissible when the witness was not an eyewitness to the occurrence and did not report the alleged facts during the initial police investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs National Accountability Bureau, etc.2016 P Cr. L J 477, 2016 PLJ Lahore 382 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-01
  Plea bargainNational Accountability OrdinanceIncidental chargesStatutory interpretationWrit jurisdictionAdministrative discretionStandard Operating Procedures
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the legality of a 15% incidental charge levied by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) on a plea bargain amount agreed upon by the petitioner. The core legal question was whether NAB possesses the statutory authority to impose such additional charges on an accused person entering into a plea bargain under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Court held that the imposition of 15% incidental charges is illegal, void ab initio, and without lawful authority. It reasoned that the Ordinance contains no provision authorizing such charges, and internal Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the Chairman NAB cannot substitute for statutory rules. The Court emphasized that under Section 34 of the Ordinance, any rules regarding such charges must be framed with the approval of the President. Consequently, the Court declared the levy illegal, noting that plea bargain negotiations must be transparent and free from duress, and restrained the respondents from collecting the excess amount.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 authorize the National Accountability Bureau to impose 15% incidental charges on plea bargain amounts?
  • Can the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau impose financial liabilities through internal Standard Operating Procedures without framing rules under Section 34 of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  • Is the imposition of 15% incidental charges on a plea bargain agreement legally valid under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs National Accountability Bureau and others2016 P Cr. L J 477 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-01
  plea bargainincidental chargesNational Accountability Bureaustatutory interpretationadministrative discretionaccountability lawsstandard operating procedures
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Patwari, challenged the imposition of 15% 'incidental charges' levied by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) in addition to the total liability amount agreed upon during a plea bargain settlement. The core legal question was whether the NAB has the statutory authority to impose such incidental charges on an accused person opting for a plea bargain under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Court held that the imposition of 15% incidental charges is illegal, void ab initio, and lacks any force of law. The Court reasoned that the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 does not provide for such charges, and the internal Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the Chairman NAB cannot substitute for statutory rules framed under Section 34 of the Ordinance, which require approval by the President. The key principle laid down is that any financial liability imposed during a plea bargain must be strictly grounded in the statute; administrative discretion or internal SOPs cannot create new financial obligations or charges in the absence of validly framed statutory rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 authorize the National Accountability Bureau to impose 15% incidental charges on an accused person during a plea bargain?
  • Can the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau create binding rules for financial liability through internal Standard Operating Procedures without following the procedure under Section 34 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Is the imposition of 15% incidental charges by the National Accountability Bureau in a plea bargain agreement legally enforceable?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs Maqsood Younas etc2019 KLR Revenue Case 35, 2016 LHC 4084 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-06Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali Sheikhin C.A.1611/2014Asadullah Junejoin C.A.1612/2014 vs Liaqat2016 SCMR 690, 2016 SCP 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-05
  election petitioncorrupt practicesrunner-up candidatefresh electionsRepresentation of People ActSection 69void electionvoter disenfranchisement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the validity of an Election Tribunal's order declaring a runner-up candidate as the winner after setting aside the returned candidate's election due to corrupt practices. The core legal question is whether a runner-up can be automatically declared elected under Section 69 of the Representation of People Act, 1976, upon the invalidation of the returned candidate's election. The Supreme Court held that such a declaration is not automatic and requires the petitioner to substantiate their entitlement through objective, positive evidence, which was absent in this case. The Court emphasized that the 'throw away' vote principle does not apply absent proof that voters were aware of the candidate's disqualification. Furthermore, because the returned candidate's votes were tainted by corrupt practices and the runner-up secured only a small percentage of total votes, the Court ruled that the election must be declared void as a whole. The principle laid down is that an election tribunal must objectively assess evidence before declaring a runner-up elected, and where the mandate is significantly compromised, fresh elections are the appropriate remedy to uphold representative democracy.

  Questions settled

  • Can a runner-up candidate be automatically declared elected under Section 69 of the Representation of People Act, 1976, simply because the returned candidate's election was declared void?
  • What is the standard of proof required for an election petitioner to be declared as the winner under Section 69 of the Representation of People Act, 1976?
  • Does the principle of 'throw away votes' apply to invalidate votes cast for a candidate whose election is set aside due to corrupt practices?
  • When should an election be declared void as a whole rather than declaring the runner-up as the winner?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali Sheikh and another vs Liaqat Ali Jatoi and others2016 SCMR 690 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-06
  election petitioncorrupt practicesreturned candidaterunner-upfresh electionsdisenfranchisementburden of proofRepresentation of the People Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an Election Tribunal judgment that declared the election of a returned candidate void due to corrupt practices and subsequently declared the runner-up as the duly elected candidate. The core legal question was whether the runner-up could be automatically declared the winner under Section 69 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, and whether the evidence presented sufficiently established his entitlement to the seat. The Supreme Court held that the declaration of the runner-up as the winner was erroneous. The Court ruled that a runner-up cannot be automatically declared elected simply because the returned candidate is disqualified, as this risks disenfranchising voters. The petitioner must objectively prove their entitlement through independent, positive evidence, which was absent in this case. The Court established that where an election is materially affected by corrupt practices, the election must be declared void as a whole, necessitating fresh elections to ensure the true representative of the people is elected and to uphold the mandate of representative democracy.

  Questions settled

  • Can a runner-up in an election be automatically declared the winner under Section 69 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, after the returned candidate's election is set aside?
  • What is the standard of proof required for an election petitioner to be declared the winner under Section 69 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • Does the disqualification of a returned candidate due to corrupt practices automatically entitle the runner-up to be declared elected?
  • When should an election be declared void as a whole rather than declaring the runner-up as the winner?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali Ramay & 3 others vs Asghar Ali Ramay & 3 othersPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Karachi) 789 · Sindh High Court · 2015-06-22
  post-arrest bailabetmentmurdertentative assessmentabsconsioncriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant sought post-arrest bail after her previous bail application was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge-VII, Larkana, in a case concerning offences under Sections 302, 324, 109, 120-B, 34, and 504 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that the applicant and a co-accused met the principal accused at the court premises and handed him a pistol, which he subsequently used inside the prisoner's hall to murder one person and injure others. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail given the nature of the allegations and lack of direct eyewitnesses to the handing over of the weapon. The court held that no overt act of firing was assigned to the applicant, the allegation of providing the pistol was unverified and lacking in specification between the two accused, and absconsion alone does not bar bail if a case is otherwise made out. Consequently, the bail application was allowed subject to furnishing surety.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted when the allegation of supplying the murder weapon is unverified and lacks specification between co-accused?
  • Does absconsion alone disentitle an accused from the grant of bail if a meritorious case for bail is otherwise made out?
  • What is the evidentiary value of tentative observations made during a bail hearing regarding the merits of the trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali Mubarak vs Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No.1, Rawalpindi and 5 others2016 P Cr. LJ 1108 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-02
  anti-terrorism courtsectarian violencedefinition of terrorismjurisdictionprosecution branch opinioncriminal procedureconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the complainant seeking the annulment of an opinion issued by the Prosecution Branch which directed that the challan in a murder case be submitted before a court of ordinary criminal jurisdiction rather than an Anti-Terrorism Court. The core legal question was whether the offense, arising from an assault on members of the Shia faith returning from a religious gathering due to their professional representation of accused persons in a prior sectarian incident, fell within the definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Lahore High Court held that the attack constituted an action aimed at advancing a religious and sectarian cause under Section 6(c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and thus fell exclusively within the domain of the Anti-Terrorism Court. The court established the key principle that where an assault is perpetrated to advance a religious or sectarian cause, the pre-requisites of creating a sense of fear or insecurity under clause (b) of Section 6 are not required to attract the definition of terrorism under clause (c).

  Questions settled

  • Whether an attack on persons for advancing a religious or sectarian cause falls within the definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Are the conditions mentioned in clause (b) of Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 required to be attracted when applying clause (c) of the said section?
  • Does the phrase 'intimidating and terrorizing the public' in Section 6(c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 have to be read together with the expression 'for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause'?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali and others vs The State and others2016 MLD 709 · Board of Revenue · 2015-01-28Read full judgment →
• Asghar Abbas vs The State and another2016 MLD 1002 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-24
  narcotic substanceschemical examiner reportchain of custodyreasonable doubtcomplainant as investigating officercriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of narcotics. The core legal question concerns whether a conviction can be sustained when the prosecution fails to establish the integrity of a second sample sent for chemical analysis after the first sample proved inconclusive, and where the complainant also acted as the investigating officer. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the origin and preparation of the second sample parcel, as neither the police officer nor the Magistrate involved in its preparation were produced as witnesses. Furthermore, the Court noted significant procedural irregularities, including the complainant acting as the investigating officer. Consequently, the Court found that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The judgment reinforces the principle that the prosecution must strictly establish the chain of custody and the integrity of evidence, particularly when multiple samples are involved, to secure a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on a second chemical analysis report when the prosecution fails to prove the preparation and origin of the second sample?
  • Does the failure to produce the officer or Magistrate involved in the preparation of a second sample parcel invalidate the Chemical Examiner's report?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the complainant and the investigating officer are the same person, leading to procedural irregularities?
  Read full judgment →
• Asfandyar and another vs Kamran and another2016 PSC CRI 783, 2016 SCP 91, 2016 SCMR 2084 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-29
  local commissionsite inspectionCCTV footagedelegation of powerinherent jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionadmissibility of evidencemodern devices
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment that set aside a trial court's order appointing a local commission to inspect a crime scene and allowing the placement of CCTV footage on record. The Supreme Court addressed whether a trial judge could delegate the power of site inspection under Section 539-B Cr.P.C. to a subordinate magistrate. The Court held that Section 539-B Cr.P.C. grants an exclusive, non-delegable power to the trial judge or magistrate to personally visit and inspect a location for the purpose of appreciating evidence. Delegating this to a commission constitutes an illegality not curable under Section 537 Cr.P.C. Regarding CCTV footage, the Court clarified that while admissible under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, such evidence must be strictly proved by examining the person who prepared the footage to ensure genuineness. Finally, the Court noted that while Section 561-A Cr.P.C. should not substitute revisional remedies, the High Court's well-reasoned judgment would be deemed as passed in revisional jurisdiction to avoid unnecessary remand.

  Read full judgment →
• Asfandyar & another vs Kamran & another2016 SCP 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-29
  inspection of place of occurrencelocal commissionCCTV footage admissibilityQanun-e-Shahadat Orderinherent powersrevisional jurisdictionsite plan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which set aside a trial court order appointing a local commission under Section 539-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to visit a crime scene and verify a site plan. The core legal questions concern whether a trial judge can delegate inspection powers under Section 539-B to a commission, the admissibility and proof requirements for CCTV footage under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and the maintainability of a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a revisional remedy is available. The Supreme Court held that the power to inspect a place of occurrence under Section 539-B is exclusive to the trial judge, cannot be delegated to a subordinate officer or commission, and does not substitute for investigation or evidence collection. The Court further held that CCTV footage must be strictly proved through the examination of the person who prepared it under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and that Section 561-A cannot be used as an alternate remedy where express revisional provisions exist. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial judge delegate the power to inspect a place of occurrence under Section 539-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to a local commission?
  • How must CCTV footage be proved as evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Is a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 maintainable when an express revisional remedy is available under the law?
  • Does the illegal appointment of a local commission under Section 539-B amount to a curable irregularity under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Asdullah Rafique vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 21 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-07
  pre-arrest baildishonoured chequefurther inquiryprohibitory clausecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner Asdullah Rafique sought pre-arrest bail in case FIR No. 74 dated 03.03.2015 registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station City Kabirwala, District Khanewal. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail where the investigation revealed that the amount was not received as a loan and the cheque belonged to another person, rendering the FIR version incorrect. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner's guilt called for further inquiry within the meaning of the criminal law, especially as the disputed cheque was already in the possession of the investigating agency and the alleged offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, establishing the principle that where investigation casts doubt on the veracity of the FIR allegations and the offence falls outside the prohibitory clause, bail should be granted for further probe.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be confirmed when the investigation reveals that the allegations in the FIR are incorrect?
  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause?
  • Is bail granted when the guilt of the petitioner requires further probe after joining the investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Asal Khan through Attorney and another vs Taluka Nazim Qasimabad2016 YLR 139 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-19Read full judgment →
• Asal Janan and others vs Zareef Khan and others2016 YLR 561 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-22
  revision petitioninheritance mutationlaw of limitationrevenue recordconcurrent findingspedigree tablestale claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts dismissing the petitioners' suit for declaration regarding certain historical revenue mutations and inheritance claims dating back to the early 20th century. The core legal questions involved whether the plaintiffs had established a valid cause of action and pedigree linkage, and whether a suit challenging ancient inheritance and sale mutations is barred by the law of limitation. The Peshawar High Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove their pedigree linkage or challenge the fundamental mutations depriving their predecessor of inheritance, and that suits involving inheritance claims are nonetheless subject to the law of limitation when challenged after an unreasonable and inordinate delay of nearly a century. The court laid down the principle that the law of limitation applies to inheritance matters where stale claims are brought after long efflux of time, and that plaintiffs must prove their case through cogent and reliable evidence rather than relying on the weakness of the defense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the law of limitation apply to suits involving claims of inheritance when challenged after a prolonged delay?
  • Can a plaintiff succeed in a civil suit on the basis of the weakness of the defendant's evidence without discharging the initial burden of proof?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by subordinate courts can be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction without establishing misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Asad Khan vs Deputy Commissioner Mansehra and others2016 P Cr. L J 1502 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-09-09
  preventive detentionmaintenance of public orderdouble condemnationapplication of mindwrit petitioncriminal cases
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged their preventive detention orders issued by the Deputy Commissioner Mansehra under section 3(1) of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, on the basis of their involvement in various criminal cases. The core legal question was whether preventive detention could be legally sustained merely on the ground of pending criminal cases and without proper application of mind by the detaining authority. The Peshawar High Court held that the impugned detention orders, having been issued mechanically upon police reports without independent satisfaction or application of mind, were illegal and amounted to double condemnation. The Court set aside the detention orders and directed the immediate release of the petitioners. The key principles laid down are that preventive detention cannot be ordered mechanically on the basis of pending criminal cases and that the District Magistrate must independently apply his mind and be satisfied that the detention is necessary for public safety and maintenance of public order.

  Questions settled

  • Can preventive detention be ordered solely on the basis of a detenu's involvement in criminal cases?
  • Does the issuance of a detention order mechanically upon a police report vitiate the order?
  • Whether preventive detention based on pending criminal charges amounts to double condemnation?
  Read full judgment →
• Asad Amin vs Noor Hussain2016 PLJ Islamabad 254 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-29Read full judgment →
• Arslan and 4 others vs Administrator Metropolitan Corporation2016 PLC 213 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2015-06-05
  labour disputefake appointment lettersdispatch registergrievance petitionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Labour Court Quetta, which dismissed the appellants' grievance application concerning unpaid salaries. The core legal question revolves around the authenticity of the appellants' appointment letters as sweepers and whether they were legitimate employees of the respondent corporation. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the Trial Court failed to properly exercise its jurisdiction in determining the genuineness of the appointment letters and official dispatch entries, noting that such entries were supported by official records and testimony. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned judgment, partially allowed the appeal, and remanded the matter to the Metropolitan Corporation to conduct a thorough inquiry and decide the grievance notice in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Labour Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not verifying the authenticity of disputed appointment letters and official dispatch entries?
  • Is an employer's FIR for forgery lodged against employees during the pendency of a labour petition considered an afterthought when official dispatch records support the employment?
  • Whether an appellate tribunal can remand a labour case for a thorough departmental inquiry and proper decision on a pending grievance notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Arshad Wadud Khan Khalid Wadud Khan Zamir-ud-din Sabri Dr. Safdar AliAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Arshad vs The State2016 YLR 2719 · Sindh High Court · 2016-06-15
  post-arrest bailabsconsionacquittal of co-accusedrule of consistencycriminal trialbail on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the accused, Arshad, in a criminal case involving charges under Sections 302, 324, 337H(2), 147, 148, 149, and 504 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given that co-accused persons facing similar allegations had already been acquitted by the trial court and the complainant had expressed no objection to the grant of bail. The Court held that since the complainant and injured witnesses did not implicate the applicant in their evidence and co-accused with similar allegations were acquitted, the applicant was entitled to bail. The Court further affirmed the principle that while absconsion is a factor, bail may still be granted if the accused has a strong case on merits, as mere absconsion does not automatically preclude the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused persons facing similar allegations entitle an applicant to the grant of bail?
  • Can bail be granted to an accused person who was an absconder if the case has merit?
  • Does the lack of objection by the complainant influence the court's decision in a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Arshad Hussain Khan s/o Khan Ata Hussain Khan, Multan. vs The CollectorPTCL 2016 CL. 807 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-02-19Read full judgment →
• Arshad Ali Khan vs Messrs Dalda Foods (Pvt.) Ltd. and another2016 PLC 300 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2015-11-05
  workmantermination of servicewaiver and estoppelcompensation in lieu of reinstatementindependent contractorlabour appellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a machine operator whose services were terminated by a contractor, challenged the dismissal of his reinstatement application by the Sindh Labour Court. The core legal questions involved whether withdrawal of deposited legal dues after termination amounts to a waiver of the right to challenge termination, and whether compensation in lieu of reinstatement can be awarded due to a long lapse of time. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that gradual withdrawal of termination dues to sustain life during unemployment does not estop an employee from challenging unlawful termination, and that long litigation, estranged relations, and loss of trust make reinstatement unviable. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the dismissal and awarded a lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The key principle laid down is that withdrawal of terminal dues out of financial necessity during unemployment does not constitute a waiver or estoppel, and courts possess the equitable power to award compensation instead of reinstatement when trust has broken down over prolonged litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of legal dues deposited in a bank account after termination amount to a waiver preventing an employee from challenging their termination?
  • Can a Labour Court or Tribunal award compensation in lieu of reinstatement in appropriate circumstances?
  • Does the absence of a specific statutory restriction regarding compensation amounts under the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013 remove the power of the Labour Court to grant compensation?
  • Are long lapse of time and estrangement of relations relevant factors for awarding compensation instead of reinstatement?
  Read full judgment →
• Army Welfare Trust (Nizampur Cement Project), Rawalpindi and another vs Collector of Sales Tax (Now Commissioner Inland Revenue), Peshawar2016 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Leave to appealDirect civil appealAppellate TribunalSales TaxJurisdiction of High CourtQuestion of lawQuestion of factSales tax exemptionCollection of sales taxConstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court addressed whether a petition for leave to appeal or a direct civil appeal was the correct remedy against a Peshawar High Court judgment that set aside an order of the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the Appellate Tribunal constitutes a "court immediately below" in terms of Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution, which would mandate a direct appeal. The Court held that the Appellate Tribunal, not being established under the Constitution or by law as a court, is not a "court" for the purposes of Article 185(2)(d). Therefore, a petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) was the appropriate remedy. Additionally, the Court clarified that the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, is limited to questions of law, and it cannot overturn factual findings of the Appellate Tribunal without evidence. The Court found the High Court erred in deciding a question of fact without evidence and restored the Appellate Tribunal's finding that no sales tax was collected.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal a "court immediately below" for the purpose of Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction when hearing an appeal or reference under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can a High Court set aside a factual finding of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal without evidence under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does an internal pricing mechanism of a manufacturer, which includes a notional amount for sales tax, constitute proof of actual collection of sales tax under Section 3B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Is the object of a sales tax exemption notification, issued under Section 13 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, to benefit consumers by requiring manufacturers to sell goods at a lower price?
  Read full judgment →
• Arif-Ur-Rehman vs The State2016 YLR 305 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-11-12Read full judgment →
• Arif Hussain, Chief Executive Nabila Arif, Director Rubi Tufail, Director AliAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Arbab Munir Ahmad and 2 others vs Pakistan Electric Power Company2016 PLC (C.S.) 502 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-30
  master and servantseniority disputecivil court jurisdictionnon-statutory rulesFederal Service TribunalPESCOWAPDA employeesubi jus ibi remedium
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition addresses the maintainability of a civil suit filed by employees of the Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO), a corporate company originating from WAPDA, challenging seniority lists and promotion orders. The core legal question revolves around whether employees of non-statutory bodies governed by the master and servant principle—who cannot approach the High Court under Article 199 or the Federal Service Tribunal after the deletion of Section 2-A of the Federal Service Tribunal Act, 1973—are remedy-less, or if civil courts possess jurisdiction to entertain suits regarding service grievances and enforcement of adopted rules. The Peshawar High Court held that since such employees are excluded from the jurisdiction of the High Court and Service Tribunals, they cannot be left without a remedy. Invoking the maxim 'ubi jus ibi remedium' and Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court ruled that civil courts retain ultimate and general jurisdiction to try suits of a civil nature concerning the enforcement of civil rights and non-statutory service rules unless expressly or impliedly barred. Consequently, the revision petitions were allowed, setting aside the lower courts' orders returning the plaints, and remanding the suits to the trial court for adjudication on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of corporate entities with non-statutory service rules can approach the Federal Service Tribunal for service grievances after the deletion of Section 2-A of the Federal Service Tribunal Act, 1973?
  • Do civil courts have jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to entertain civil suits filed by corporate employees for the enforcement of non-statutory service rules and seniority disputes?
  • Can an employee governed by the principle of master and servant maintain a civil suit challenging promotions and seniority when no statutory violation is involved?
  • Whether the return of a plaint by a civil court under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is justified in cases where alternative forums like the High Court and Service Tribunal lack jurisdiction.
  Read full judgment →
• Arbab Ali and another vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 1 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-29
  terrorismrobberymurderidentification paradeocular testimonypersonal gaincriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment dated 27th April 2005 convicting the appellants under section 393 and section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with sections 6 and 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Amendment Ordinance, 2001. The core legal questions involved the applicability of anti-terrorism laws to offences committed during robbery for personal gain, and the evidentiary value of identification parades and related ocular testimony. The Sindh High Court held that although the ultimate object of the robbery was personal gain, the manner of commission—creating fear and disruption on a public road—brought the offence within the definition of terrorism under section 6(2)(i) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Court further held that minor procedural irregularities in an identification parade do not discredit the ocular testimony of credible and consistent witnesses. Consequently, the conviction and sentences were maintained, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offence committed for personal gain during a robbery can fall within the ambit of terrorism under section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Does a joint identification parade or minor procedural irregularities vitiate the credibility of an eyewitness identification?
  • What is the distinction between a related witness and an interested witness in criminal jurisprudence?
  • How does the impact and manner of a criminal act determine whether it is designed to create a sense of fear or insecurity among the public?
  Read full judgment →
• Aqleem Khan and others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others2016 YLR 1667 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-08-13
  limitationcondonation of delaywinter vacationscertified copiessufficient causecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant civil revision petitions arise from a common judgment and decree passed by the District Appellate Court, which dismissed the petitioners' appeal as being barred by limitation by eight days and refused an application for impleadment by other parties. The core legal question concerns the correct computation of the period of limitation for filing an appeal, specifically regarding the exclusion of court vacations, the time required for obtaining certified copies, and the condonation of a minor delay caused by a half-working day. The Peshawar High Court held that the lower appellate court committed a gross misconception of law and facts by including winter vacation periods and the day of judgment announcement in the limitation period, contrary to statutory provisions and fundamental rights. The court ruled that the days during which the courts and copying departments remain closed must be excluded, that an administrative notification cannot override the statutory right under the Limitation Act, and that a minor, bona fide delay of one day due to a half-working day constitutes 'sufficient cause' for condonation under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The impugned judgment was set aside and the matters were remanded for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period during which civil courts remain closed for winter vacations can be included in computing the period of limitation for filing an appeal?
  • Can an administrative notification regarding the functioning of a court office override the statutory right of exclusion provided under the Limitation Act?
  • Whether a delay of one day caused by a half-working day on the last day of limitation constitutes sufficient cause for condonation under section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • How should the time requisite for obtaining certified copies of a judgment and decree be excluded under the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Aqeel Tariq vs Irfan Sultan and 4 otherss2016 PLJ Sh.C. (AJ&K) 39 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-12-04
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationcriminal revisionexercise of discretionAzad Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition arises from an order passed by the District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction Bhimber confirming the pre-arrest bail of the accused respondents in a criminal case registered under Sections 448, 337-Al to 6, 337-F1 to 6, and 34 of the Azad Penal Code. The core legal question addressed by the court concerns the principles governing the recall or cancellation of bail once granted by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir dismissed the revision petition, holding that bail once extended to an accused cannot be recalled in a routine manner and will only be interfered with if the order granting bail is perverse, arbitrary, without reason, or in violation of law. The court laid down the principle that the grounds for the cancellation of bail are distinct from those for its initial grant, and appellate interference is unwarranted where the trial court's discretion has been exercised within legal bounds and challan has already been submitted.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can pre-arrest bail once granted to an accused be recalled?
  • Are the grounds for the cancellation of bail the same as the grounds for the initial grant of bail?
  • Does the submission of challan and the commencement of the evidentiary stage impact the routine interference in bail matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Aqeel Tariq vs Irfan Sultan and 3 others2016 MLD 665 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-12-04
  pre-arrest bailcancellation of bailcriminal revisionjudicial discretionAzad Penal Codebail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges an order passed by the District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Bhimber, which confirmed the pre-arrest bail of the accused-respondents in a case involving charges under sections 448, 337-A1 to 6, 337-F1 to 6, and 34 of the Azad Penal Code. The petitioner argued that the accused were not entitled to bail due to specific roles attributed to them in the assault and injury of the complainant. Conversely, the respondents contended that the dispute arose from a family matter involving a divorce and that the investigation was complete, with the challan submitted to the trial court. The Court held that the bail, once granted by a competent court, cannot be recalled in a routine manner. It emphasized that interference is only warranted if the initial order is perverse, arbitrary, or violative of the law. Finding no such grounds for interference, the Court dismissed the revision petition, noting that the case was already at the stage of recording evidence and that the trial court's discretion should not be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can a court recall or cancel a bail order once it has been granted?
  • Does the mere possibility of taking a different view on the merits of a case justify the cancellation of bail?
  • Is the discretion exercised by a lower court in granting bail subject to interference if it is not shown to be perverse or violative of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Aqeel Husnain, etc. vs State, etc.PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 16 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-07Read full judgment →
• Aqal Zaman and others vs Balqiat Khan and others2016 MLD 245 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-10-27Read full judgment →
• Application for Registration of National Commodity Exchange Limited (Ncel) vs NotSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Appellate Bench Ans Capital (Pvt.) Limited Mr. Aizaz Mansoor Sheikh Mr.Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Appellant vs Malik Muhammad Nawaz2016 PLJ Lahore 724, 2016 MLD 1553 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-02
  summary suitleave to defendnegotiable instrumenttriable issueconditional leaverecovery suitaffidavit evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a trial court's judgment and decree in a summary suit for recovery of Rs. 500,000 based on a dishonored cheque. The trial court had dismissed the defendant's application for leave to appear and defend the suit and decreed the claim. The defendant contended that the cheque was stolen by the plaintiff, a junior colleague, and that the plaintiff had a history of criminal fraud. The High Court observed that the defendant's plea raised a substantial, plausible, and triable issue requiring evidence, particularly regarding the financial capacity of a junior clerk to lend such a significant sum. The Court held that when a defendant discloses a plausible defence, leave to defend should generally be granted, either unconditionally or conditionally. Given the defendant admitted the signature on the cheque, the Court set aside the trial court's decree and granted leave to defend, subject to the condition of depositing half the claimed amount in cash and furnishing a surety bond for the remainder, emphasizing that trial courts must exercise discretion judiciously rather than hastily.

  Questions settled

  • When should a court grant leave to appear and defend in a summary suit?
  • Does an application for leave to defend supported by an affidavit require a counter-affidavit to be controverted?
  • Can a court impose conditions on granting leave to defend a summary suit?
  • Is a defendant's admission of a signature on a cheque sufficient to deny leave to defend when a plausible defence is raised?
  Read full judgment →
• Appeal No. 72 of 2009 Sulaiman Ahmed Saeed Al Hogani vs ExecutiveAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Appeal No. 28 of 2006 vs Mr. Imtiaz Haider, Director (SMD),SECP GhulamAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Appeal No. 19 of 2001 Mian Nisar Elahi Appeal No. 27 of 2001 Tanveer MalikAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Apex International and another vs Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation FBR and another2016 PTD (Trib.) 2891 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-12-16Read full judgment →
• Apex Consulting Pakistan through Mudabbir Haneef andanother vs Tanveer Hussain2016 CLC 1316, 2016 PLJ Islamabad 499, K.L.R. 2016 Civil Cases 198 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-24Read full judgment →
• Apex Consulting Pakistan through Mudabbir Haneef and another vs Tanveer Hussain2016 CLC 1316 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-24
  Civil RevisionRejection of PlaintOrder VII Rule 11Procedural LawAmendment of PlaintCause of ActionHandmaids of Justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged an order dismissing the petitioners' application under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which sought the rejection of a suit for recovery and damages. The core legal question was whether a plaint must be rejected for failing to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Order VII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, or whether the court retains discretion to allow an amendment to cure such defects. The High Court upheld the trial court's decision, dismissing the petition. The court held that the provisions of Order VII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are directory rather than mandatory. Procedural rules are intended to be "handmaids of justice" and should not be construed to obstruct the resolution of disputes. Consequently, minor procedural omissions in a plaint do not necessitate immediate rejection; instead, the court should grant the plaintiff an opportunity to rectify the defects. Rejection of a plaint is an extreme measure appropriate only when no triable issue exists or when a party fails to cure identified deficiencies after being granted an opportunity to do so.

  Questions settled

  • Are the requirements of Order VII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Can a plaint be rejected solely for failing to include a specific 'cause of action' clause if the facts constituting the cause of action are otherwise disclosed?
  • Is a court required to provide an opportunity to amend a plaint before rejecting it for procedural deficiencies under Order VII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the inherent power of the court under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow for the correction of procedural errors to ensure the ends of justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Apex Consulting Pakistan through Mudabbir Haneef & another vs Tanveer HUSSAINs2016 PLJ Islamabad 499 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-24
  rejection of plaintcivil revisionprocedural lawamendment of plaintcause of actionhandmaids of justicedirectory provisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition impugned the order of the trial court dismissing the petitioners' application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which sought the rejection of a suit for recovery and damages due to non-compliance with the procedural requirements of Order VII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The core legal question was whether the omission of specific particulars or formal clauses required under Order VII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, warrants the outright rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, or if an opportunity for amendment should be provided. The Islamabad High Court held that the provisions of Order VII, Rule 1 are directory and procedural in nature, serving as handmaids of justice, and procedural defects do not render a suit non-est without first granting the plaintiff an opportunity to cure the omissions by submitting an amended plaint. The court affirmed that procedural rules should not be construed to obstruct justice when a triable issue is disclosed. Consequently, the revision petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Order VII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are directory or mandatory in nature?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 solely for procedural omissions without affording an opportunity to amend?
  • Does the mere failure to incorporate a separate clause titled 'cause of action' warrant the rejection of a plaint?
  • Are procedural rules subservient to the cause of justice to prevent the striking out of a bona fide suit involving mixed questions of law and fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwer Ali and anothers vs FEDERAtION of Pakistan thrpugh Secretary2016 MLD 1617 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-12Read full judgment →
• Anwar Hussain vs Rafiquddin and 7 others2016 YLR 1108 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-10Read full judgment →
• Anwar Alam Siddiqui vs The State and another2016 YLR 417 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-15Read full judgment →
• Anwar Ahmed Khan Yousufzai through Legal heirs vs Muhammad Ali2016 YLR 1008 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-16Read full judgment →