Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,813 judgments in total.

• The Communication and Works Department, Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Engineer, Eeap, Muzaffarabad vs M_s. Design and Engineer System, Lahore through Chief Executive and 4 others2015 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 135, 2015 P.S.C. 909 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax. vs Mst. Hameeda Begum.2015 LHC 7667 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-29Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax. vs Mst. Asma Jilani and2015 LHC 2797 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-02Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs M/s. Dewan Khalid Textile Mills LimitedSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs M/s Shaista Estate (Pvt) Ltd2015 SHC 59 · Sindh High Court · 2009-10-23Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs M/s Dewan Khalid Textile Mills. Ltd.2015 SHC 69 · Sindh High Court · 2010-02-16Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Multan Division, Multan and Others vs Muhammad2015 NLR Revenue 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-10-29
  proprietary rightsstate landcolonization of government landsrevisional jurisdictionboard of revenueprohibited zoneadditional evidenceleasehold rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the grant of proprietary rights for State land originally leased in 1908. The respondents claimed ownership based on a 1941 letter from the Provincial Government. The High Court ruled in their favor, but the Supreme Court, upon reviewing additional evidence in the form of the Tehsil Kabirwala Register, found that the respondents' lease was not included in the list of those granted proprietary rights in 1941. Consequently, the High Court's finding was based on a misreading of the record. The Supreme Court further held that the Board of Revenue's order dated 15.08.2000, which cancelled the respondents' rights, was passed without jurisdiction because the proviso to Section 7(2) of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957, prohibits one Member of the Board from revising a revisional order passed by another Member. The Court established that agreements to sell state land are not inherently fatal to proprietary rights unless the sale is completed or violates specific conditions. The matter was remanded to the Board of Revenue for a fresh, lawful determination.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Member of the Board of Revenue exercise revisional jurisdiction to set aside a revisional order passed by another Member of the Board of Revenue?
  • Is an agreement to sell state land by an allottee automatically fatal to the conferment of proprietary rights?
  • Under what circumstances is additional evidence admissible before the Supreme Court in a civil petition?
  • Does the mere location of leased land within a municipal limit automatically constitute a 'Prohibited Zone' without factual proof?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Pepco Pakistan PTR111 TAX 169 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-10Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Wali Oil Mills LimitedSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Mr. Zia Naqi C/O Prime ManagementSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner (Legal) Inland Revenue vs M/s E.N.I. Pakistan (M) Ltd.Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• The Commandant, Khyber Pakhtunkhwaconstabulary, Headquarters2015 PLC (C.S.) 1320, 2015 P.S.C. 1038, 2015 SCMR 1040 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-31
  Frontier ConstabularyCivil Servant statusService RulesDe novo inquiryDepartmental inquiryWrit jurisdictionDismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, the Commandant of the Frontier Constabulary, challenged High Court judgments reinstating dismissed personnel. The core legal questions were whether the respondents constituted "Civil Servants," thereby ousting the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution, and whether the dismissal procedure complied with Rule 18 of the North-West Frontier Constabulary Rules, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were not Civil Servants as their service terms were exclusively regulated by the North-West Frontier Constabulary Act, 1915 and the 1958 Rules. Consequently, the High Court possessed jurisdiction. Regarding the merits, the Court found the dismissal orders invalid due to non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry procedure prescribed in Rule 18. The Court set aside the dismissal orders but, rather than ordering permanent reinstatement, remanded the matters to the departmental authority to conduct a de novo inquiry strictly adhering to Rule 18 within four months. The principle established is that employees governed by specific statutory service rules are not Civil Servants, and administrative dismissals failing to follow mandatory statutory inquiry procedures must be remanded for proper compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Frontier Constabulary considered 'Civil Servants' for the purposes of Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters of Frontier Constabulary personnel?
  • What is the appropriate remedy when a departmental dismissal order is passed in violation of the procedure prescribed in Rule 18 of the North West Frontier Constabulary Rules 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commandant, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Constabulary, Headquarters2015 PLC (C.S.) 1320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-31
  Frontier ConstabularyCivil Servant statusde novo inquiryprocedural complianceservice rulesjurisdiction of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, the Commandant of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Constabulary, challenged High Court judgments that reinstated dismissed personnel. The respondents, members of the Frontier Constabulary, had been dismissed for insubordination and cowardice following multiple de novo inquiries. The core legal questions were whether the respondents qualified as 'Civil Servants'—thereby barring High Court jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution—and whether their dismissal complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 18 of the North-West Frontier Constabulary Rules, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were not Civil Servants, as their service terms are governed by the North-West Frontier Constabulary Act, 1915, and the 1958 Rules, meaning the High Court possessed jurisdiction. However, the Court found that the dismissal orders failed to follow the mandatory procedure prescribed in Rule 18. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order of permanent reinstatement, directing instead that the respondents be reinstated solely for the purpose of conducting a fresh, compliant de novo inquiry to be concluded within four months.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Frontier Constabulary considered 'Civil Servants' for the purposes of Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters of Frontier Constabulary personnel?
  • Is a dismissal order valid if it fails to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 18 of the North-West Frontier Constabulary Rules 1958?
  • Can a court order a fresh de novo inquiry when previous inquiries failed to follow statutory procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs vs Water and Power Development AuthoritySindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs vs M/s FMC United (Pvt) Ltd.Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs vs Messrs Asif Ali and another2015 PTD 2651 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-15
  customs referencesmugglingvehicle seizurefinding of factimport documentsCustoms Appellate Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application was filed by the Collector of Customs challenging an order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, which had set aside the seizure of a vehicle by customs authorities. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal erred in law by concluding that the vehicle was not smuggled, despite the customs department's presumption of smuggling based on the absence of import documents at the time of interception. The Court found that the respondent had successfully produced valid registration documents and verification from the Excise and Taxation Department, confirming the vehicle's lawful status. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision was based on a finding of fact, which was supported by the evidence and consistent with established legal precedents regarding the burden of proof in smuggling cases. Consequently, the Court determined that no question of law arose requiring its interference in reference jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that where a tribunal's decision rests on a sound finding of fact regarding the legality of a vehicle's registration, and the department fails to demonstrate perversity or legal error, the High Court will not interfere in its reference jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding of fact by the Customs Appellate Tribunal regarding the lawful registration of a vehicle constitute a question of law for the High Court in reference jurisdiction?
  • Can a vehicle be presumed smuggled solely because the driver failed to produce import documents at the time of interception, despite the existence of valid registration documents?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chairman, National Accountability Bureau vs Fehmida Begum and others2015 CLD 191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-25
  National Accountability Bureau Ordinanceguarantor liabilitycorporate defaultstatutory interpretationaccountability courtcriminal prosecutiondefinition of person
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that quashed National Accountability Bureau (NAB) proceedings against a respondent. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of "person" under Section 5(o) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, specifically whether an individual who is both an employee and a guarantor for a corporate body is subject to prosecution. The High Court had previously held that such an individual was excluded from the definition of "person." The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the definition of "person" under the Ordinance explicitly includes guarantors of a company. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary clause regarding employees applies only to those designated as Directors or Chief Executives and does not extend to guarantors. Consequently, the Court established that a guarantor remains liable for prosecution under the Ordinance regardless of their employment status or lack of dominative influence in the company. The judgment reaffirmed that the Ordinance's provisions apply to private individuals, including guarantors, to ensure the recovery of defaulted loans.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'person' under Section 5(o) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, include a guarantor of a corporate body?
  • Does the exclusionary clause in the definition of 'person' under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, exempt an employee who is also a guarantor from prosecution?
  • Can a private person be prosecuted under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, even if they are not a holder of public office?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chairman, National Accountability Bureau vs Fehmida Begum &2015 NLR Criminal 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  NAB Ordinancedefinition of personguarantor liabilitycorporate defaultaccountability courtstatutory interpretationquashing of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had quashed pending NAB reference proceedings against respondent No. 2, the husband of respondent No. 1, by majority view. The core legal question revolved around the interpretation of the term "person" as defined in sub-section (o) of Section 5 of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, specifically whether an employee of a company who is also a guarantor of a corporate loan falls within the definition of "person" and is liable to prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the majority view of the High Court was contrary to the purpose and preamble of the NAB Ordinance and settled principles of statutory interpretation. The Court ruled that a guarantor of a defaulting corporate body squarely falls within the definition of "person" under the Ordinance, and the exclusionary clause relating to employees applies only to those appointed as Directors or Chief Executives without altering their status as guarantors. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, and clarified that pending proceedings remain subject to any ongoing appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of a corporate body who acts as a guarantor for a company loan falls within the definition of "person" under Section 5(o) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the exclusionary clause in the definition of "person" under Section 5(o) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, protect an employee who is also a guarantor from prosecution?
  • Are the provisions of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 applicable to private persons and guarantors who are not holders of public office?
  Read full judgment →
• The Bank of PUNJABthrough Executive Vice-President vs Flying Cement2015 CLD 1567 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-26Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab vs Sikandar Hayat Khan and 4 others2015 CLD 1167 · Lahore High Court · 2013-10-03Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab vs M/s. Khan Unique, etc.2015 P.C.T.L.R. 117 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-02Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab vs Khan Muhammad & 5 Others2015 NLR Civil 423 · Balochistan High Court · 2013-12-19Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab vs Judge Banking Court and others2015 CLD 1811 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-10Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab vs Dewan Farooque Motors Limited2015 CLD 1756 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-14
  recovery of financesleave to defendfinance facilityrescheduling of loannegotiable instrumenthypothecationmark-upbanking litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff, a financial institution, filed a suit for the recovery of over Rs. 632 million against the defendant, citing default on various finance facilities including Running Finance, Short Term Finance, and Letter of Credit facilities. The defendant sought 'Leave to Defend' under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, alleging that the bank engaged in compounding mark-up, that documents were signed in blank, and that the facilities were not properly disbursed. The Court held that the defendant failed to raise any substantial questions of law or fact warranting a trial. It ruled that rescheduling and restructuring of finance facilities are valid accommodations where the outstanding liability is brought forward, not requiring fresh physical disbursement. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that negotiable instruments carry a statutory presumption of truth under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which the defendant failed to rebut. While the Court disallowed mark-up on the Letter of Credit facility due to a blank rate clause, it decreed the suit for the remaining principal and mark-up, rejecting the defendant's evasive pleas.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rescheduling or restructuring of a finance facility require fresh physical disbursement of funds to be valid?
  • Can a defendant be granted leave to defend a banking suit based on bald and unsubstantiated allegations of signing blank documents?
  • Does a negotiable instrument carry a statutory presumption of truth regarding consideration and execution under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?
  • Can a financial institution recover mark-up on a Letter of Credit facility where the rate of mark-up was left blank in the agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab vs Amtex Limited2015 KLR Civil Cases 338 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-25Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab through Mehboob ul Hassan, Evp Head Sam vs Amtex2015 KLR Civil Cases 338, 2015 CLD 1682 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-25Read full judgment →
• The Auditor General of Pakistan vs Federation of Pakistan, etcK.L.R. 2015 Labour & Service Cases 19, 2015 C.L.R. 395 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-19Read full judgment →
• Tharparkar Sugar Mills Ltd through Chief Executive vs National2015 CLD 1849 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-18
  banking recoveryconsent decreefundamental rightsequality before lawsick industrial unitsexecution of decreestay application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an interlocutory application filed by the plaintiff seeking a restraining order against the auction of its property for the recovery of an outstanding amount under a consent decree passed pursuant to Section 9 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997. The core legal question centered on whether the plaintiff was subjected to unconstitutional discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by being denied the same moratorium and installment terms granted to another entity, Bachani Sugar Mills Limited. The court held that the plaintiff, having opted to settle its liability through a compromise decree under a specific scheme for sick industrial units, cannot claim discriminatory treatment compared to entities governed under different circumstances or schemes, particularly when the enforcement of BPD Circular 29 is primarily the commercial prerogative of the bank. The court dismissed the application, laying down the principle that a compromise decree freely entered into under a beneficial scheme cannot be unilaterally altered, modified, or made subservient to external circulars or subsequent comparative claims of differential treatment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment debtor under a compromise decree can claim parity of treatment regarding moratorium terms granted to another entity under different circumstances?
  • Does the refusal of a bank to grant specific rescheduling terms under BPD Circular 29 violate the constitutional right to equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can a consent decree passed under a beneficial scheme for sick industrial units be modified or deferred through subsequent suits or applications?
  • Is the enforcement of BPD Circular 29 by individual banks a mandatory statutory duty or a matter of internal banking prerogative?
  Read full judgment →
• Telecom Services & Consultants Pvt. Ltd vs Ooredoo Q.S.C. etc2019 CLC 887, 2015-IHC-38 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-01Read full judgment →
• Tehsil. Council Pind Dadan Khan through Nazim Tehsil Council vs Khawaja Muhammad Hanif and another2015 PLJ Lahore 1039 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal Officer, T.M.A., Dera Ghazi Khan. vs Punjab Labour2015 LHC 1209 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-05
  work-charged employeespermanent workmanregularization of servicelabor lawsStanding Orders Ordinanceconcurrent findingsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the concurrent findings of the Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which ordered the regularization of work-charged sanitary workers employed by the Tehsil Municipal Administration. The core legal question was whether work-charged employees engaged for several years in a permanent project attain the status of permanent workmen under labor laws. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that since the employees had been continuously working against posts of a permanent nature for years, they attained the status of permanent workmen by afflux of time pursuant to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The key principles laid down are that the nature of work, rather than the initial appointment nomenclature, determines whether an employee is a permanent workman, that employers cannot use short-term contracts to defeat statutory rights, and that judgments of larger Benches of the Supreme Court prevail over those of smaller Benches.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a work-charged employee engaged for a long period against a job of a permanent nature attains the status of a permanent workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, in the absence of any jurisdictional defect?
  • Does a judgment rendered by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court prevail over a judgment of a smaller Bench when resolving conflicting precedents?
  • Whether government or municipal departments can defeat the statutory rights of employees by repeatedly issuing short-term appointment letters?
  Read full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal Officer, T.M.A. Dera Ghazi Khan vs Punjab Labour2015 PLJ Lahore 543 · Lahore High Court
  work-charge employeesregularization of servicepermanent workmanStanding Orders Ordinancelabour lawconstitutional jurisdictionmala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns writ petitions filed by the Tehsil Municipal Administration challenging the concurrent findings of the Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which ordered the regularization of employees previously appointed on a work-charge basis. The core legal question was whether employees engaged on a work-charge basis, who have served for several years in posts of a permanent nature, are entitled to be declared permanent workmen under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The Court held that the employees were indeed permanent workmen, affirming the lower forums' decisions. The Court reasoned that the nature of the work performed was permanent, and the work-charge designation was a mala fide device used to deprive workers of their statutory rights. The key principle laid down is that under Standing Order 1(b) of the Ordinance, any worker engaged in work of a permanent nature likely to last more than nine months attains the status of a permanent workman, regardless of the nomenclature used in their appointment letters.

  Questions settled

  • Can employees appointed on a work-charge basis attain the status of permanent workmen under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does the definition of a permanent workman apply to employees engaged in projects of a permanent nature regardless of their initial appointment designation?
  • Can an employer use short-term appointment labels to circumvent the statutory rights of employees to regularization?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding the status of a workman by a Labour Appellate Tribunal immune to interference in constitutional jurisdiction absent a jurisdictional defect?
  Read full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal Administration through Administrator TMA Ahmedpur2015 PLJ Tr.C. (Labour) 220 · Labour Appellate Tribunal
  Imam Masjidworkman statusgrievance petitionlabor lawhonorariaregular pay scalepermanent employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a grievance petition filed by an Imam Masjid against the Tehsil Municipal Administration, challenging the denial of regular pay scales for his services. The core legal question was whether an Imam Masjid, who performs daily prayers and mosque maintenance, qualifies as a 'workman' under labor laws and is entitled to the regular pay scale for a sanctioned post. The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial court's decision in favor of the respondent. The Tribunal held that the nature of an Imam’s duties—leading prayers five times daily and performing manual maintenance—constitutes a permanent, full-time job, thereby falling within the definition of a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2010 and the Punjab Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 2012. The court emphasized that since a post was sanctioned and the respondent had provided continuous service since 1999, he could not be denied the regular pay scale in favor of a meager honorarium, as this practice amounted to the exploitation of the employee.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Imam Masjid who leads daily prayers and performs maintenance duties qualify as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Act 2010?
  • Is an employee entitled to a regular pay scale when a post has been sanctioned by the government, even if the employer has been paying only honoraria?
  • Does the performance of daily prayers and mosque maintenance constitute a permanent nature of job for the purposes of labor law?
  Read full judgment →
• Tehmina Islam vs Zahid Rafi2015 LHC 2084 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-15
  pecuniary jurisdictionpre-emption suitjurisdictional valueappellate forumvaluation of suitcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal challenged an order by the Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, which returned the appellant's appeal regarding a pre-emption suit for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The appellant had valued the suit at Rs. 5,88,000 for jurisdictional purposes. The Appellate Court erroneously returned the appeal, seemingly influenced by the fact that the appellant had deposited a higher amount (one-third of the sale price) as a pre-condition for the pre-emption suit, mistakenly treating this deposit as the jurisdictional value. The Lahore High Court held that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Appellate Court is determined by the value of the suit as stated in the plaint, not by the amount deposited or the sale price involved in the pre-emption claim. The Court emphasized that if a court disagrees with the jurisdictional value stated in the plaint, it must frame an issue and allow parties to lead evidence before determining a different value. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order and directed the return of the appeal for proper presentation, affirming that jurisdictional value remains fixed as per the Suits Valuation Act, 1887.

  Questions settled

  • Is the pecuniary jurisdiction of an appellate court determined by the value of the suit stated in the plaint or by the amount deposited in a pre-emption suit?
  • Can an appellate court return an appeal for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction without first determining the original jurisdictional value through evidence?
  • Does the deposit of one-third of the sale price in a pre-emption suit alter the jurisdictional value of the suit for the purpose of filing an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority through Chief2015 PLJ Lahore 50 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-20
  up-gradation of postslabor courtlimitationcondonation of delaydiscriminationequality of citizensconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA), impugned the judgments of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Punjab Labour Court whereby grievance petitions of the respondents (cashiers and accountant) seeking up-gradation of their posts from BS-11 to BS-14 were accepted and the petitioner's appeals were dismissed as time-barred. The core legal questions involved whether the respondents were entitled to up-gradation, whether similarly placed employees were discriminated against, and whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal correctly dismissed the appeals on the ground of limitation. The Lahore High Court held that the appeals before the Tribunal were filed with an inordinate delay without plausible explanation, that the respondents were discriminated against in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, and that similarly placed employees must be treated alike. The writ petitions were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal with an inordinate delay and without plausible explanation for condonation is liable to be dismissed as time-barred?
  • Does the principle of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution require that the benefit of up-gradation granted to one employee be extended to similarly placed and qualified employees?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of labor forums when the petitioner failed to produce evidence and cross-examine witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Technical Collector of Customs through Assistant Collector vs Messrs2015 PTD (Trib.) 611 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-11-07Read full judgment →
• Tayyab Hussain Rizvi and otherss vs Fop and others2015 PLD Lahore 353 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-27Read full judgment →
• Taxpayer vs Department111 TAX 369 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-10-16Read full judgment →
• (1)Taxpayer (2) Department vs (1) Department (2) Taxpayer111 TAX 345 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-06-03Read full judgment →
• (1) Taxpayer (2) Department vs (1) Department (2) Taxpayer111 TAX 285 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-06-17
  sales tax on servicescomposite invoicestaxable supplyinput tax adjustmentsales returnspecial excise dutytime-barred invoicestelecommunication towers
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses cross sales tax appeals filed by a registered taxpayer and the Department against an order of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals). The core legal questions involve whether sales tax can be levied on the service component of combined invoices issued for the manufacturing and supply of telecommunication equipment, the legality of adjusting sales returns without debit and credit notes, the admissibility of input tax claims without purchase invoices or beyond statutory time limits, and the validity of Special Excise Duty and input tax claims on shelters. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue held that where services are an integral component of taxable supplies and a composite price is charged, the entire consideration is subject to sales tax, and upheld the disallowance of input tax claims unsupported by valid or timely invoices. The Tribunal established that where invoices combine material and services without independent service registration or where mandatory purchase documents are missing, the taxpayer is liable to pay sales tax on the entire invoiced value and cannot claim unverified input tax.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sales tax is leviable on the service portion of a composite invoice issued by a manufacturer for the supply and installation of goods?
  • Can a registered person claim input tax adjustments without holding valid purchase invoices?
  • Whether sales tax adjustments for sales returns are permissible in the absence of prescribed debit and credit notes?
  • Are time-barred input tax claims condonable under sections 66 and 74 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer vs The State etc.2015 LHC 4797 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-27
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryextra-judicial confessionabscondencemurderevidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the evidence, specifically the reliance on an extra-judicial confession, the testimony of a witness not mentioned in the FIR, and the lack of a medical opinion regarding the cause of death due to the advanced decomposition of the body. The Lahore High Court held that the case against the petitioner required further inquiry. The Court observed that the evidentiary value of the extra-judicial confession and the sole witness was weak, and the absence of a definitive medical cause of death weakened the prosecution's case. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that mere abscondence does not automatically disentitle an accused to bail. Consequently, the Court granted post-arrest bail, holding that the petitioner's continued detention served no useful purpose as the investigation was complete and the case fell under the category of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere abscondence of an accused person automatically disentitle them to the grant of bail?
  • Can bail be granted where the medical report fails to provide a definitive cause of death due to the decomposition of the body?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the prosecution's case relies primarily on weak evidence such as an extra-judicial confession and a witness not named in the FIR?
  Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Sadiq vs The State, etc.2015-IHC-183 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-03-12Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Abid, TCR Gr.I, Pakistan Railways, Multan vs Divisional2015 LHC 3030, 2015 PLJ Lahore 1057 · Lahore High Court
  regularization of servicecontract employeepermanent workmandiscriminatory treatmentfundamental rightslabor lawwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition concerns the regularization of a contract employee, a Ticket Collector, appointed under the Prime Minister Family Assistance Package. The petitioner challenged the refusal of the respondent-department to regularize his services, despite the regularization of similarly situated employees, alleging discriminatory treatment in violation of his fundamental rights. The core legal question was whether a contract employee, having served for a significant period in a post of a permanent nature, attains the status of a permanent workman and is entitled to regularization. The Court held that the petitioner, having served continuously in a post of a permanent nature, had attained the status of a permanent workman by the efflux of time under the relevant labor laws. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, directing the respondents to regularize the petitioner's services along with back benefits. The key principle laid down is that the nature of the work, rather than the mere duration of the contract, determines the status of a workman, and discriminatory denial of regularization to similarly placed employees violates constitutional guarantees of equality.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contract employee attain the status of a permanent workman by the efflux of time if the nature of the work is permanent?
  • Can a department deny regularization to an employee while granting it to others similarly situated without violating the constitutional right to equality?
  • Is the nature of the work the primary factor in determining whether an employee is a permanent workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Does a judgment of a larger bench of the Supreme Court prevail over a judgment of a smaller bench when resolving a legal controversy?
  Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Abid, TCR Cr.I, Pakistan Railways, Multan. vs Divisional2015 LHC 3030 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-23
  regularization of servicecontract employeepermanent workmandiscriminatory treatmentfundamental rightsequal protection of lawStanding Orders Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a contract-based Ticket Collector in Pakistan Railways, sought regularization of his service, alleging discriminatory treatment as other employees under the same 'Prime Minister Family Assistance Package' had been regularized. The respondents opposed the petition, citing the contractual nature of the appointment. The Court examined whether the petitioner, having served for a significant period in a permanent role, attained the status of a permanent workman. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the Court held that the nature of the work, rather than the duration of the contract, is the primary factor in determining permanent status. The Court emphasized that denying regularization to the petitioner while granting it to similarly placed employees violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, directing the respondents to regularize the petitioner's service with back benefits, affirming that the practice of repeatedly renewing short-term contracts to circumvent legal obligations is mala fide and impermissible under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee hired on a contract basis for a permanent nature of work attain the status of a permanent workman by the efflux of time?
  • Can a government department deny regularization to a contract employee if similarly placed employees have already been regularized?
  • Is the nature of work the sole determining factor for classifying an employee as a permanent workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Does the practice of issuing short-term appointment letters to circumvent legal provisions regarding permanent employment constitute mala fide action?
  Read full judgment →
• Tata Textile Mills Ltd. vs Collector of Customs2015 LHC 693 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-09Read full judgment →
• Tata Textile Mills Ltd. through Director vs Collector of Customs Excise2015 P.C.T.L.R. 373, 2015 PTD 1356 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-09Read full judgment →
• Tassadaq Hussain Shah vs Mehr Din and 21 others2015 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 112 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-01-06Read full judgment →
• Tashif Memon vs NotSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Taseer Khan vs . Islamabad Electricity Supply Company2015 LHC 7628 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-19
  rejection of plaintlimitation periodpower distribution companycorporate authoritywrongful detention of propertycivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition, along with connected matters, challenges the trial court's dismissal of applications for the rejection of plaints filed by the Islamabad Electricity Supply Company (IESCO) for the recovery of amounts related to the alleged wrongful taking and detaining of excess material. The core legal questions involve whether IESCO enjoys the status of the Government to claim the benefit of a sixty-year limitation period under Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and whether suits filed by a juristic person require proper authorization. The Lahore High Court held that IESCO is an independent corporate entity, does not perform sovereign functions, is not the Government, and is instead governed by a three-year limitation period under Article 49 of the Limitation Act, 1908, making suits filed nearly two decades after a 1992 audit hopelessly time-barred. Furthermore, the Court established that a suit by a company cannot be initiated or verified without proper authorization via a board resolution or articles of association. Consequently, the revision petitions were allowed and the plaints were rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Islamabad Electricity Supply Company (IESCO) or similar distribution companies can claim the status of Government to invoke the sixty-year limitation period under Article 149 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act 1908 governs suits for compensation regarding wrongfully taken or detained movable property by a corporate entity?
  • Can a suit on behalf of a company or juristic person be initiated and verified without a board resolution or express authority in its articles of association?
  • Whether a plaint that is barred by limitation and filed by an unauthorized person is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasawar Hussain vs Mst. Farzana Kausar and others2015 PLD Lahore 208 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-03
  restitution of conjugal rightsmaintenance allowancerecovery of dowerdeferred dowerpolygamy without permissionMuslim Family Laws Ordinanceconcurrent findings of factconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower family courts, which partially decreed the respondent-wife's suit for recovery of maintenance, dowry, gold jewellery, and dower, while conditionally decreeing the petitioner-husband's counter-claim for restitution of conjugal rights upon payment of past maintenance and dower. The petitioner challenged these findings, arguing misreading of evidence and contending that a decree for dower could not be granted because the dower was deferred rather than prompt, and that the restitution decree should have been unconditional. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that concurrent findings of fact based on admissions and evidence do not warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction absent jurisdictional defects or grave miscarriage of justice. The Court further held that under Section 6(5)(a) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, a husband who contracts a second marriage without the prior written permission of the Arbitration Council is immediately liable to pay the entire amount of dower, whether prompt or deferred, to his existing wife.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a husband who contracts a second marriage without the prior permission of the Arbitration Council is liable to immediately pay the entire amount of dower, including deferred dower, to his existing wife?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact of lower courts in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction in the absence of a jurisdictional defect or grave miscarriage of justice?
  • Whether a decree for restitution of conjugal rights can be made conditional upon the payment of due maintenance and dower to the wife?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasadduq Hussain Shah vs Mehr Din and 20 others2015 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 112, 2015 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 401 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-01-06Read full judgment →
• Tariq Sohail Butt vs Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Petroleum2015 P Cr. L J 1279 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-10
  Constitutional jurisdictionGas Utility CourtAlternative remedyGas supply disconnectionMaintainability of writ petitionExclusive jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a CNG station owner, filed a constitutional petition challenging the disconnection of gas supply and removal of a gas meter by the gas utility company, alleging excessive billing. The respondents contested the petition, arguing that the petitioner was a defaulter and that the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Ordinance, 2014, ousted the High Court's jurisdiction in favor of the specialized Gas Utility Courts. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 despite the availability of an alternative remedy under the Ordinance. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. It reasoned that the Ordinance established Gas Utility Courts with exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes and provided an appellate mechanism to the High Court. Consequently, the High Court declined to interfere, affirming the principle that where a statute creates an exclusive forum and provides an appellate path to the High Court, the constitutional jurisdiction should not be invoked in preference to the statutory remedy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional petition regarding gas utility disputes when a special statute provides an exclusive forum?
  • Is the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Ordinance, 2014, a bar to the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Should the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction when a statute provides an appellate remedy to the High Court itself?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood, Advocate and 4 others vs Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and 2 others2015 PLC (C.S.) 170 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-17
  public service commissionwritten examinationage relaxationrecruitmentservice lawstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the rejection of the petitioners' applications for the post of Assistant District Public Prosecutor (BS-17) by the Punjab Public Service Commission. The petitioners, who had previously exhausted three attempts at the written examination while within the prescribed age limit, sought an additional attempt, arguing that they were entitled to an extra chance upon becoming over-age and receiving age relaxation under Regulation 39 of the Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2000. The core legal question was whether the 'one chance' provision for over-age candidates under Regulation 39 is available to candidates who have already exhausted their three standard attempts while within the age limit. The Court held that Regulation 39 creates two distinct categories: candidates within the age limit (entitled to three chances) and over-age candidates granted relaxation (entitled to one chance). The Court ruled that the one-time concession for over-age candidates is not a continuation of previous attempts and is unavailable to those who have already exhausted their three standard chances. The petition was dismissed as misconceived.

  Questions settled

  • Does the one chance available to an over-age candidate under Regulation 39 of the Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations 2000 apply to a candidate who has already exhausted three chances while within the age limit?
  • Are the three chances for candidates within the age limit and the one chance for over-age candidates under Regulation 39 of the Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations 2000 cumulative?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Atlas Bank Ltd.2015 CLD 959, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 112 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-10
  banking courtlimitation periodcondonation of delayspecial lawrecovery of financestime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a decree passed by the Banking Court, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, for condonation of delay. The appellant had initially filed an application under Section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, to set aside the decree, which was dismissed after four years. The core legal question was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applies to condone the delay in filing an appeal under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The Court held that the application under Section 12 was misconceived as the appellant had not claimed non-service of summons. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the appeal was time-barred. The key principle laid down is that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, constitutes a special law prescribing a specific limitation period for appeals. Consequently, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, are inapplicable to appeals filed under this special statute.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to appeals filed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • Can an application under Section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 be maintained if the defendant was duly served with summons?
  • Does Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 exclude the application of Section 5 when a special law prescribes a different limitation period?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Atlas Bank Ltd. through Authorised Agent2015 CLD 959 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-10
  banking courtlimitation periodcondonation of delayspecial lawrecovery of financestime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a decree passed by a Banking Court, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The appellant had previously filed an application under Section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to set aside the decree, which was dismissed after four years. The core legal question was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to appeals filed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, given that the latter prescribes a specific limitation period. The Court held that the application under Section 12 was misconceived because the appellant had already appeared before the Banking Court and filed for leave to defend, rendering the remedy inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court determined that because the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is a special law prescribing a specific limitation period of 30 days, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 excludes the application of Section 5. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed as incompetent, and the time-barred appeal was rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applicable to appeals filed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can an application under Section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 be maintained if the defendant had already appeared and filed for leave to defend?
  • Does the provision of a specific limitation period in a special law exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood and others vs Collector Land Acquisition Mangla2015 YLR 237 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-03-13
  land acquisitioncompensation enhancementbrick-kilnmarket valueoral evidencecompulsory acquisition charges
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses counter-appeals filed against the judgment and decree of the Reference Judge, Mangla Dam Raising Project, Mirpur, regarding the enhancement of compensation for an acquired brick-kiln. The core legal question concerns whether the compensation and associated charges determined by the Collector Land Acquisition and modified by the Reference Judge were in accordance with the evidence and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The High Court held that neither the brick-kiln owner nor WAPDA could demonstrate that the Reference Judge's findings were contrary to law or evidence, noting that the owner failed to produce expert testimony, income tax statements, or reliable documentary proof to substantiate a higher market value or additional claims. Consequently, the court dismissed both appeals, affirming that oral statements by lay witnesses alone are insufficient to establish higher compensation in land acquisition matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether oral statements of lay witnesses alone are sufficient to establish a higher market value for acquired property in land acquisition cases?
  • Whether the compensation and incidental expenses assessed by the Collector Land Acquisition were determined in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act?
  • Whether the owner of an acquired brick-kiln is entitled to higher escalation and compulsory acquisition charges without producing reliable documentary proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Jamil Bangash and another vs Attaullah Khan Khattak2015 MLD 343 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-01-22
  summary suitex parte decreeleave to defendlimitation periodinherent jurisdictionCode of Civil Procedurenegotiable instruments
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against an ex parte decree passed in a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal questions were whether a court may pass an ex parte decree under Rule 2 of Order XXXVII for a single instance of default after leave to defend has been granted, and whether an application to set aside such a decree is governed by Rule 13 of Order IX or Rule 4 of Order XXXVII. The Court held that a single default on a miscellaneous application does not justify an ex parte decree under Rule 2 of Order XXXVII. It further clarified that such decrees cannot be set aside under Rule 13 of Order IX, but rather under Rule 4 of Order XXXVII, provided special circumstances exist. The Court established that the limitation period for such applications is governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908, allowing three years. Exercising inherent powers under Section 151, the Court converted the appeal into a revision, set aside the impugned judgments, and remanded the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court pass an ex parte decree under Rule 2 of Order XXXVII for a single instance of default after leave to defend has been granted?
  • Does Rule 13 of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to setting aside an ex parte decree passed under Rule 2 of Order XXXVII?
  • What is the limitation period for an application to set aside an ex parte decree under Rule 4 of Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an appeal against an order rejecting an application under Rule 4 of Order XXXVII be converted into a revision under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Tariq Irshad S/o. H. Irshad Illahi (late) (2) Mehmood S/o. Abdullah vs TheSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Tariq Hussain vs Sarfaraz Ahmed & 4 others2015 PLJ Quetta 20 · Balochistan High Court · 2013-06-10Read full judgment →
• Tariq Fareed vs Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary, Ministry of Inter Provincial Co-ordination, Lahore and 2 others2015 PLJ Lahore 283 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-28Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Ahmed Choudhary vs Azad Government of the State of Jammu2015 YLR 1728 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-06-12Read full judgment →
• Tanveer vs DildarSindh High Court · -
  last seen evidencecircumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder convictionreappraisal of evidencedeath sentence confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellants for the murder of a minor, Sajjad Ali, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence, primarily based on "last seen" testimony and alleged recoveries, was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The court found the "last seen" witness unreliable due to unexplained delays, contradictions in testimony, and his status as a chance witness. Furthermore, the recovery of incriminating items was deemed doubtful due to the lack of independent witnesses and procedural lapses. The court emphasized that "last seen" evidence is a weak form of proof requiring independent corroboration to form a complete, unbroken chain of circumstances. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellants, and answered the reference for confirmation of the death sentence in the negative, reiterating that the benefit of doubt must always be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on 'last seen' evidence without independent corroboration?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove a complete, unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence entitle the accused to an acquittal?
  • When two interpretations of evidence are possible, which interpretation must the court adopt in a criminal case?
  • Is the evidence of a chance witness sufficient to establish guilt in a capital case?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Iqbal vs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited2015 P.C.T.L.R. 462 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-15Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Ahmad. vs The State, etc.2015 LHC 1294 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-04
  criminal appealrapeabductionacquittalbenefit of doubtcorroborationappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Sections 365-B and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the alleged abduction and rape of the complainant. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, given that the trial court acquitted all other co-accused despite their roles being intertwined with the appellant's, and considering the lack of independent corroboration. The Court held that the prosecution's narrative was inherently improbable within the context of local social ethos and norms, noting that the acquittal of co-accused rendered the prosecution's version of events unreliable. Furthermore, the Court highlighted an unexplained five-day delay in reporting the incident and the absence of forensic evidence (serological or DNA) to support the allegations. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's evidence is disbelieved regarding the majority of co-accused whose roles were inextricably linked to the appellant, such evidence cannot sustain a conviction against the appellant without strong, independent corroboration. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained against an accused when the prosecution evidence regarding co-accused, whose roles were inextricably linked, has been disbelieved and resulted in their acquittal?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR, in the absence of corroborative evidence, entitle an accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Is the testimony of a complainant sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape when the prosecution's narrative is found to be inherently improbable according to social norms and lacks forensic support?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Ahmad vs The State and another2015 LHC 8603 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-20
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirytwo versionsmedical evidence contradictionpolice investigation opinionnon-recovery of empties
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 302, 324, 109, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The primary legal issue was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail where the specific firearm injury attributed to him in the FIR was not corroborated by the postmortem examination and police investigation found him empty-handed. The Lahore High Court observed that deeper appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the bail stage. The medical evidence did not support the alleged calf injury, no .30 bore empties were recovered from the spot, and police investigation contradicted the complainant's version, thereby creating two conflicting versions. The Court held that the case fell squarely within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. Given that the petitioner was a non-convict, investigation was complete, and trial had not progressed, the post-arrest bail petition was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conflict between the FIR version and the police investigation findings renders a murder case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.?
  • Whether the absence of an attributed firearm injury in the postmortem report entitles an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • Can police findings regarding an accused being empty-handed at the crime scene be considered alongside circumstantial evidence at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Tallat alias Arshad vs The State2015 P Cr. L J 511 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-10
  murderanti-terrorismpolice encounterabscondencebenefit of doubtcapital sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and capital sentence reference arise from a judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant, Tallat alias Arshad, for the murder of three police officials and related offenses following a violent attack on a prisoners' van by under-trial prisoners. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's active participation, common intention, and culpability in the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, given that he was merely a passenger in the van who fled during the ensuing chaos. The Lahore High Court held that the ocular testimony, medical evidence, alleged abscondence proceedings, and weapon and handcuff recoveries failed to connect the appellant to the specific acts of violence, noting that his flight was a natural psychological reaction to preserve his life during a horrendous shootout. The court laid down the principle that conviction in a capital case cannot rest on conjectures, surmises, or fabricated evidence, and that the mere presence and subsequent escape of an accused in a chaotic shootout do not establish criminal liability without direct proof of active participation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mere presence of an accused in a prisoners' van during an attack and subsequent escape makes him criminally liable for the acts of his co-accused without proof of active participation?
  • Can a conviction for murder and terrorism be sustained on the basis of conjectures and surmises when the ocular and circumstantial evidence fails to connect the appellant to the crime?
  • What is the evidentiary value of recovery proceedings of a metal item that shows no signs of rusting despite long exposure to changing weather conditions?
  • Does the flight of an accused from a chaotic shootout scene of mass violence constitute conclusive proof of guilt, or can it be attributed to self-preservation?
  Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain, etc. vs State, etc.PLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Lahore) 553 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-16
  circumstantial evidencetest identification paradebenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder referenceFirst Information Reportacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the convictions and sentences for murder and robbery under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence. The Lahore High Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, answering the question in the negative. The Court held that in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a continuous, unbroken chain of circumstances linking the accused to the crime; a break in this chain is fatal to the prosecution's case. The Court further laid down that supplementary statements recorded during investigation do not equate to, nor form part of, the First Information Report. Additionally, test identification parades are rendered legally immaterial and useless if the accused have already been shown to witnesses or named prior to the parade. Emphasizing that any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case, necessitating acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a supplementary statement recorded during investigation be treated as part of the First Information Report?
  • Does the prior identification or showing of an accused to witnesses render a subsequent test identification parade legally immaterial?
  • What is the required standard for establishing a chain of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal if the prosecution fails to establish a continuous chain of circumstantial evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Talat Shahzad vs Muhammad Siddique and 2 others2015 C.L.R 1202 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-18Read full judgment →
• Talal Haleem and 3 others vs Principal Bolan Medical College, Quetta2015 PLD Balochistan 97 · Balochistan High Court · 2015-03-17Read full judgment →
• Talaat Inayatullah Khan and another vs Dr. Anis Ahmad Sheikh2015 PLJ Karachi 408, 2015 PLD Sindh 134 · Sindh High Court · 2014-06-11
  attachment before judgmentunconditional withdrawalprivity of contractspecific performancedamagesinterim ordersreview application
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment resolves two High Court Appeals (H.C.A. Nos. 46 and 47 of 2012) arising from a single judge's order in a property dispute. The respondent had filed a suit for specific performance and deposited a sum with the Nazir of the Court, but later sought unconditional withdrawal of the suit and the deposited amount. The appellant subsequently filed a separate suit for damages in her personal capacity and sought attachment of the deposited amount under Order XXXVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court of Sindh observed that before exercising powers under Order XXXVIII, the court must be satisfied that the plaintiff has an unimpeachable prima facie case and that there is a real danger of the defendant removing themselves or their property from the court's jurisdiction. Finding that the appellant had no privity of contract in her personal capacity, the court held her suit for damages highly contentious. It further held that upon unconditional withdrawal of a suit, all interim orders become ineffective, and the depositor is entitled to the return of their funds. Consequently, both appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What conditions must be satisfied before a court can order attachment of property before judgment under Order XXXVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party sue for damages in their personal capacity under a contract where they only acted as an attorney or agent for another party?
  • What is the legal status of interim orders and deposited funds once a suit is unconditionally withdrawn under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Tajammul Khan, DSP vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the Chief Secretary and 3 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 81 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-10Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad through Attorney vs Messrs Symphony (Pvt.) Ltd. and another2015 YLR 2333 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-13Read full judgment →
• Taimoor Alam Satti vs Mst. Aalia Bibi, etc.2015 LHC 3149 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-11Read full judgment →
• Tahira Zaib vs Ghaffar Ahmed and 2 others2015 MLD 1853 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-08-26Read full judgment →
• Tahir Munir Malik vs Province of Punjab etc.2015 LHC 341 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-08Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mehmood vs The State and another2015 P Cr. L J 153 · Lahore High Court · 2013-07-09
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaydacoity-cum-murderhardened criminaltrial adjournmentcriminal procedurebail refusalstatutory right to bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail was filed on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial, following previous unsuccessful bail applications. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail under the statutory provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 despite the trial's duration exceeding two years. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the statutory right to bail is inapplicable where the delay is occasioned by the accused's own conduct, specifically noting that the petitioner had sought numerous adjournments when prosecution witnesses were present. The court further held that the nature of the offense—dacoity-cum-murder—categorized the petitioner as a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal,' invoking the exceptional clause of Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which precludes bail. The court established the principle that trial delay calculations are not a mere mathematical exercise of counting adjournments but must account for the conduct of the parties, and that the accused cannot benefit from delays they themselves caused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory right to bail due to trial delay apply when the delay is caused by the accused?
  • Can an accused charged with dacoity-cum-murder be classified as a hardened or desperate criminal under Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should trial adjournments sought by the defense be compared mathematically against those of the prosecution to determine statutory delay?
  • Is the court required to re-examine the merits of a case in a subsequent bail application after previous bail petitions have been dismissed on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mehmood alias Acchu and another vs The State and another2015 P Cr. L J 1524 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-21
  murder referencepolice witnessesforensic evidencecapital sentencered-handed arrestanti-terrorismocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal and a murder reference arising from the conviction of the appellant for the murder of a police constable and related offenses. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, the credibility of police witnesses in the absence of independent public witnesses, and the validity of forensic evidence dispatched on the same day as the arrest. The Court held that the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt through consistent ocular testimony of police officials, which the Court deemed as credible as any other, and corroborated by forensic reports and medical evidence. The Court affirmed that the appellant's arrest red-handed with the weapon negated the need for independent witnesses or specific motive. Consequently, the Court confirmed the death sentence for the murder charge but acquitted the appellant on the charge of murderous assault against a witness who failed to implicate him. The key principle laid down is that police officials are competent witnesses whose testimony is evaluated based on its intrinsic value rather than their status, and that even-dated dispatch of forensic evidence does not diminish its value when the accused is arrested red-handed with the weapon.

  Questions settled

  • Are police officials competent witnesses in a criminal trial in the absence of independent public witnesses?
  • Does the even-dated dispatch of forensic evidence to a laboratory invalidate the report when the accused is arrested red-handed with the weapon?
  • Does a failure to specifically mention a section of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 in the charge sheet vitiate the trial if the accused was aware of the nature of the proceedings?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when a prosecution witness turns hostile or fails to implicate the accused in court?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mahmood vs Abdul Salam and 6 others2015 YLR 1768 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-01-27
  civil revisiondismissal for non-prosecutiondate of hearingspecific performancerestoration of suitwritten statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from an order passed by the Additional District Judge, Kotli, dismissing an application for the restoration of a suit for specific performance of a contract that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether a suit could be lawfully dismissed for non-prosecution under Order IX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure on a date fixed merely for filing a written statement rather than a date of hearing. The High Court held that a date fixed for filing a written statement does not constitute a date of hearing, and therefore the trial court could not legally record an order of dismissal for non-prosecution on such a date. Consequently, the revision petition was accepted, the impugned order was set aside, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the case in accordance with law. The key principle laid down is that a date fixed for filing a written statement is not a date of hearing for the purposes of dismissing a suit for non-prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a date fixed for filing a written statement constitutes a date of hearing under Order IX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court lawfully dismiss a suit for non-prosecution when neither party appears on a date not fixed for hearing?
  • What remedies are available to a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed for non-prosecution when neither party appeared?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Khan vs The State2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-11-05Read full judgment →
• Tahir Khan alias Hafeez vs The State and another2015 YLR 2229 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-12Read full judgment →
• Tahir Aziz vs Lal Habib and another2015 P Cr. L J 1556 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-09
  bail cancellationArsh paymentdefault in instalmentsinherent jurisdictioncriminal miscellaneous
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. was filed by the petitioner seeking cancellation of bail granted to the respondent and his commitment to jail until full payment of the specified Arsh amount pursuant to an earlier judgment of the court. The core legal question was whether the respondent's failure to pay consecutive monthly instalments of Arsh constituted a violation of the conditional bail order, warranting the recall of bail and recommitment to prison. The Peshawar High Court held that since the respondent defaulted on the payment of monthly instalments as directed by the final judgment and exhibited reluctance to pay the remaining balance, he violated the conditional terms of the bail. Consequently, the court accepted the petition, recalled the concession of bail, and ordered the respondent to be committed to jail until the full payment of the remaining Arsh amount. The key principle laid down is that failure to comply with the strict conditional terms of a bail order granted for the payment of financial compensation in criminal cases entails the immediate revocation of bail and recommitment of the convict to custody.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted on the condition of paying Arsh in instalments can be cancelled upon default?
  • Does failure to pay monthly instalments of Arsh constitute a violation of a final court order?
  • Can a convict who defaults on payment of compensation be committed to jail until full payment is made?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Ayub Khan vs Ms. Alya Anwar and anotherSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Tahir Ali vs The State2015 P Cr. L J 869 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-06
  fair trialright to counselde novo trialcross-examinationprejudiceadministration of justiceSindh Arms Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a conviction under the Sindh Arms Act, where the appellant, unrepresented by counsel, was sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the trial court's failure to ensure the appellant had legal representation, particularly in an 'off-shoot' case related to a capital offense, violated the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Court held that while there is no absolute statutory requirement to provide counsel for non-capital offenses, the administration of justice requires that an accused be able to properly test the veracity of prosecution witnesses through cross-examination. Given the appellant's youth, the lack of cross-examination, and the potential prejudice to the main capital case, the Court set aside the conviction. The key principle laid down is that while speedy trial is desirable, it must not come at the cost of procedural fairness; where an unrepresented accused is clearly prejudiced in their ability to defend themselves, a de novo trial may be ordered in the interest of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court legally required to provide counsel to an accused in a non-capital case?
  • Can a conviction be set aside solely on the ground that the accused was unrepresented by counsel during the trial?
  • Does the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan mandate the appointment of counsel for an unrepresented accused in all criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Abbas vs The State and another2015 LHC 8617 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-28
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryvicarious liabilityconflicting versionscriminal procedurebail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking post-arrest bail for the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 302, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was nominated in the FIR but alleged to have played no specific role and caused no injury, was entitled to bail pending trial. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, determining that his case fell within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court observed that the investigation presented a version of events conflicting with the FIR, specifically regarding the petitioner's role and presence, and noted that the petitioner had been incarcerated for a significant period without trial progress. The key principle laid down is that when the prosecution's own investigation presents conflicting versions of an accused's involvement, and the accused is not alleged to have caused specific injuries, the case warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of conflicting versions between the FIR and the police investigation justify granting bail on the basis of further inquiry?
  • Can an accused be granted bail when no specific role or injury is attributed to them in a murder case?
  • Is the opinion of the police during an investigation binding on the court when deciding a bail petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Tabrez lqbal vs Sughra Begum and 2 others2015 P.S.C. Crl. 850 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-02-09
  post-arrest bailcancellation of baildeeper appreciation of evidencecircumstantial evidencecommon intentiontentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Shariat Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondents in a murder case registered under Sections 302, 34, and 109 of the Azad Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the Shariat Court exercised its discretion judiciously in granting bail, particularly given allegations of common intention and destruction of evidence. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir dismissed the appeal, holding that the Shariat Court’s decision was based on a tentative assessment of the facts and did not warrant interference. The Court affirmed that bail matters require only a tentative assessment of evidence rather than a deeper appreciation of the merits, which is reserved for trial. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle that the criteria for granting bail and cancelling bail are distinct; once bail is granted, it should not be cancelled unless the order is patently illegal, erroneous, or results in a miscarriage of justice. As the investigation was complete and the accused were no longer required for further inquiry, the bail order was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Is a deeper appreciation of evidence permissible while deciding a bail application?
  • What is the standard for cancelling bail once it has been granted by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Does the court need to probe deep into the merits of the prosecution case during the bail stage?
  • Can an accused person be denied bail solely on the basis of allegations of destroying evidence if the case requires further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Tabrez Iqbal vs Sughra Begum and 2 others2015 P Cr. L J 1790 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-02-09
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationcircumstantial evidencetentative assessmentcommon intentiondestruction of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order of the Shariat Court granting bail to the accused-respondents in a case concerning the murder of Jamrez Iqbal registered under sections 302, 34, and 109 of the Azad Penal Code. The core legal question revolves around whether the Shariat Court exercised its discretion judiciously in granting post-arrest bail to the respondents based on circumstantial evidence and tentative assessment. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the Shariat Court's order was based on convincing reasons and tentative assessment, noting that deeper appreciation of evidence is unwarranted at the bail stage and that bail once granted should not be interfered with lightly absent patent illegality or miscarriage of justice. The key principles laid down include that a tentative assessment of evidence is sufficient for bail, that the case of further inquiry is made out when evidence requires deeper probe, and that different and stricter criteria apply to the cancellation of bail compared to its initial grant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether deeper appreciation of evidence is permissible while deciding a bail application?
  • Under what circumstances can bail once granted by a competent court be cancelled?
  • Is tentative assessment of facts and circumstances sufficient for extending the concession of bail in cases based on circumstantial evidence?
  • Does an allegation of destroying prosecution evidence warrant the denial of bail when the case requires further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• T&T Employees Ideal Cooperative Housing Society Ltd vs Province of Punjab, etc2015 LHC 6578 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-16Read full judgment →
• T Abdul Haq and another vs The State2015 PSC (Crl.) 509, 2015 SCMR 1326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-08
  sectarianismterrorismocular testimonyforensic evidenceprompt FIRspot arrestcapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from four separate judgments of the trial courts and the High Court whereby the appellants were convicted and sentenced to death for multiple counts of murder, terrorism, and related offenses arising from a chain of interlinked sectarian terrorist attacks in Sheikhupura, where twelve persons—including members of a Shia Majlis, businessmen, and police officials—were killed. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, the corroborative value of prompt FIRs, medical evidence, and forensic reports regarding weapon recovery in heinous sectarian crimes. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, holding that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a shadow of doubt through consistent natural eyewitnesses, positive forensic matching of weapon empties, and spot arrest with weapons. The Court laid down that sectarian violence severely destabilizes security and emphasized strategic counter-measures including purging educational syllabi of hate material, responsible media reporting, and banning violent sectarian organizations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence and positive forensic reports is sufficient to sustain convictions in multiple murder cases?
  • Does a promptly lodged FIR exclude the possibility of deliberation and false implication of accused persons?
  • Does an accused's offer to take an oath on the Holy Quran carry legal sanctity to rebut overwhelming prosecution evidence?
  • What legal significance is attached to the spot arrest of accused persons along with weapons of offense and matching spent empties?
  Read full judgment →
• Syeda Sarah Batool Gardezi vs Chief Executive Educational Services2015 PLC 173 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2014-04-29
  workman statuslabour lawgrievance petitionmanual vs intellectual workindustrial and commercial employmentservice bondtermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Labour Court's order returning the appellant's grievance petition for lack of jurisdiction, based on the finding that she was not a "workman." The appellant, formerly a School Evaluation Associate, argued her duties were manual and clerical, thus falling under the protection of labour laws. The core legal question was whether her employment, which involved evaluating school environments and reporting, constituted "manual or clerical work" under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the appellant was not a workman. The ratio decidendi established that the primary test for "workman" status is the nature of the duties performed, not the designation or salary. The Tribunal held that duties requiring intellectual faculties, analytical skills, and professional judgment—even if involving incidental writing or reporting—do not constitute "manual or clerical" work. Furthermore, the absence of supervisory or hiring/firing power is not conclusive evidence of "workman" status if the job itself is primarily intellectual in nature.

  Questions settled

  • Does the performance of incidental manual tasks, such as writing reports, convert an intellectual or professional role into that of a workman?
  • Is the absence of supervisory or hiring/firing power sufficient to classify an employee as a workman under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • What is the primary test for determining whether an employee qualifies as a workman under labour laws?
  • Can an employee be classified as a workman based on the definition of employee in the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, if they do not meet the criteria under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  Read full judgment →
• Syeda Abida Hussain Imam and others vs The Province of Punjab2015 YLR 1522 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-22Read full judgment →
• Syed Zulqarnain, etc vs Managing Director, WASA, etc2015 KLR Civil Cases 197 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-15Read full judgment →
• Syed Zawar Hussain vs Syed Riazul Abbas Sherazi2015 MLD 890 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-10
  recovery suitnegotiable instrumentcheque dishonouroral agreement to sellburden of proofrebuttable presumptionpassing of consideration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Sargodha, which decreed a recovery suit filed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on a dishonoured cheque. The core legal questions involved whether the plaintiff successfully proved the oral agreement to sell and the passing of consideration money, and whether the statutory presumption attached to a negotiable instrument under the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 was effectively rebutted. The Lahore High Court held that the plaintiff miserably failed to plead and prove the oral agreement to sell, the payment of the huge consideration amount, and the actual issuance of the cheque for repayment, and that the defendant successfully rebutted the rebuttable presumption attached to negotiable instruments through extensive evidence of ongoing litigation and strained relations. The court laid down the principle that admitting a signature on a cheque is not equivalent to admitting the issuance of the cheque, that oral transactions of sale must be strictly pleaded and proved with precise details, and that presumptions under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 can be effectively rebutted by surrounding circumstances and continuous litigation between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether admission of a signature on a cheque constitutes an admission of the issuance of the cheque itself?
  • Can the statutory presumptions attached to a negotiable instrument under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 be rebutted by circumstantial evidence and ongoing litigation between the parties?
  • What is the standard of proof required to establish an oral agreement to sell and the passing of a substantial consideration amount?
  • Whether a plaintiff suing for recovery on the basis of a cheque given for the return of alleged sale consideration must prove the underlying transaction when the defendant denies the issuance of the cheque?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Zainuddin vs Shah and 4 others2015 CLC 746 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-17Read full judgment →
• Syed Zahir Shah vs National Accountability Bureau through Chairman2015 YLR 371 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-03-12
  benami transactionsdisproportionate assetsburden of proofillegal gratificationforfeiture of propertydouble jeopardypublic servant corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected writ petitions arose from the judgment of the Accountability Court convicting the appellant, a former public servant, under Section 10 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for acquiring assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, and ordering the forfeiture of properties held in the names of benamidars. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proof under the special provisions of the Ordinance, whether the properties in question were benami assets held for the benefit of the appellant, and whether the imposition of fine and sentence upon retrial constituted double jeopardy. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the accumulation of massive assets beyond known sources, shifting the burden onto the appellant and the petitioners to establish independent, lawful sources of income, which they failed to do. The Court affirmed the conviction and the forfeiture of properties, ruling that the petitioners qualified as benamidars under the Ordinance, but directed that the appellant need not be recommitted to prison since he had already served his substantive sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the burden of proof shifts to the accused in corruption trials under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case of assets disproportionate to known sources of income?
  • What constitutes a benamidar under the provisions of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 with respect to assets held in the name of family members or associates?
  • Does the imposition of a fine and its realization mechanism under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 violate the constitutional protection against double jeopardy or retrospective punishment?
  • How are the special recovery procedures under Section 33-E of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 applied to the realization of fines compared to general criminal procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Zaheer Haider, etc. vs Shaukat Ali, etc.2015 PLJ Lahore 720 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-23Read full judgment →
• Syed Zafar Ali Shah vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and 34 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 299, 2015 PLD Islamabad 156 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-13
  resignation of membersArticle 64Speaker of National Assemblyseparation of powerspolitical question doctrinejudicial reviewvacation of seats
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the status of Members of the National Assembly who had allegedly tendered resignations but subsequently retracted them. The petitioner sought a declaration that the respondents' seats were vacant and requested the Court to direct the Speaker and the Election Commission to proceed accordingly. The core legal question was whether the Speaker is under a mandatory, mechanical duty to accept resignations, and whether the Court could interfere under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Speaker has a constitutional duty to conduct an inquiry to satisfy himself that a resignation is voluntary, genuine, and intended to relinquish the seat. The Court established that a resignation is ineffective if retracted before the Speaker concludes this inquiry. Furthermore, the Court held that the matter falls within the Speaker's exclusive domain, and under the doctrine of separation of powers and the political question doctrine, judicial interference is unwarranted. The Court emphasized that the will of the people is sacrosanct, and seats cannot be vacated without strict adherence to constitutional requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Speaker have a mechanical duty to accept a resignation, or is an inquiry required to determine if it is voluntary and genuine?
  • Can a Member of the National Assembly effectively retract a resignation before the Speaker concludes the inquiry into its validity?
  • Is the Speaker's satisfaction regarding the genuineness of a resignation subject to judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does the doctrine of separation of powers preclude the Court from interfering in the Speaker's handling of parliamentary resignations?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Zafar Ali Shah vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Pakistan and 34 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 299 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Syed Zafar Abbas Jafri vs Syeda Abida Sultana and others2015 MLD 1598 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-30Read full judgment →
• Syed Waqar Haider Zaidi vs Mst.Alam Ara BegumSindh High Court · -
  specific performancejudgment on admissionOrder 12 Rule 6 CPCconsolidation of suitspleadingscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for specific performance, cancellation, and injunction regarding a property sale agreement. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff could obtain a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on alleged admissions made by the defendant in the written statement of a separate, albeit consolidated, suit. The court dismissed the application, holding that the plaintiff could not rely on pleadings from a distinct suit to seek a judgment on admission. The court affirmed the principle that an admission in a pleading is binding only for the purposes of the specific proceedings in which it is made. Furthermore, the court clarified that the consolidation of two suits does not merge the pleadings into a single document; they remain distinct and separate. Consequently, an admission made in one suit cannot be utilized to secure a decree in another suit under Order 12 Rule 6, as such admissions are not binding outside the original proceedings. The application was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court pass a decree on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on statements made in a different suit?
  • Does the consolidation of two suits merge the pleadings such that an admission in one suit becomes binding in the other?
  • Is an admission in a pleading binding in subsequent or separate legal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Waqar Haider Zaidi vs Mst. Alam Ara Begum through Legal Heirs2015 PLD Sindh 472 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-19
  specific performancejudgment on admissionOrder XII Rule 6 CPCbinding precedentconsolidated suitspleadingsQanun-e-Shahadat
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of an application under Order XII, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which sought a decree for specific performance based on an admission made by the original respondent in a separate, consolidated suit. The appellant argued that the respondent’s admission regarding the sale agreement and receipt of consideration in the connected suit was binding and sufficient to warrant a decree. The core legal question was whether an admission made in the pleadings of one suit can be utilized to obtain a judgment on admissions in a separate, albeit consolidated, suit. The Sindh High Court held that while Order XII, Rule 6 permits judgments on admissions made in pleadings or otherwise, binding precedent from the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Naseer Ahmed v. Asghar Ali establishes that admissions in pleadings are binding only in the proceedings where they are made and may be contested in subsequent actions. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that such admissions do not automatically entitle a party to a decree in a different suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court pass a decree for specific performance based on an admission made by a party in a separate, consolidated suit?
  • Are admissions made in the pleadings of one suit binding in a subsequent or different suit?
  • Does the phrase 'or otherwise' in Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow for the use of admissions from external proceedings to obtain a summary judgment?
  Read full judgment →