Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,813 judgments in total.

• Punjab Technical Board vs Arif Irshad etc.2015 LHC 1975 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-20Read full judgment →
• Punjab Seed Corporation. vs Labour Court No.9, Multan and others.2015 LHC 970 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-27
  regularization of servicework-charged employeespermanent workmanStanding Orders Ordinanceconcurrent findingsconstitutional petitionmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a batch of writ petitions filed by the Punjab Seed Corporation challenging concurrent findings and orders of the Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which directed the regularization of the services of various work-charged employees. The core legal question was whether employees engaged on a work-charge basis for prolonged periods ranging from 4 to 28 years attained the status of permanent workmen under labour laws. The Lahore High Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that since the employees had continuously worked against permanent jobs for years without interruption, they attained the status of permanent workmen under Standing Order 1(b) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The Court deprecated the practice of issuing 89-day appointment letters as a mala fide device to defeat legal rights and deprive workers of regularization. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact by the lower labour forums cannot be interfered with under constitutional jurisdiction unless shown to be without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees appointed on a work-charge basis for several years attain the status of permanent workmen under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can departmental service rules framed prospectively take away the statutory status of permanent workmen acquired under the Standing Orders Ordinance?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the practice of issuing 89-day appointment letters prevent work-charged employees from attaining permanent status when the nature of their work is permanent?
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• Punjab Seed Corporation vs Labour Court No. 9, Multan and others2015 PLJ Lahore 895 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-27
  regularization of servicework charge basispermanent workmanlabour lawindustrial relationswrit jurisdictionStanding Orders Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from concurrent findings by the Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal, which directed the Punjab Seed Corporation to regularize numerous employees engaged on a 'work charge' basis. The core legal question was whether these employees, having served for periods ranging from four to twenty-eight years against permanent posts, attained the status of permanent workmen. The High Court affirmed the lower forums' decisions, holding that the respondents, by virtue of their long-term employment on tasks of a permanent nature, qualified as permanent workmen by afflux of time under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The court established that the nature of the work is the primary determinant for such status, rather than the contractual label of 'work charge.' It further deprecated the employer's practice of issuing successive 89-day appointment letters to circumvent statutory protections, characterizing such devices as mala fide. The court concluded that internal service rules cannot be applied retrospectively to defeat the statutory rights of workmen to regularization once they have satisfied the requirements of the Standing Orders Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee engaged on a 'work charge' basis for an extended period against a permanent post attain the status of a permanent workman?
  • Can an employer use successive short-term appointment letters to circumvent the statutory rights of a workman to regularization?
  • Is the nature of the work performed the primary factor in determining whether an employee is a permanent workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can internal service rules be applied retrospectively to deny the regularization of employees who have already attained permanent status by afflux of time?
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• Punjab Seed Corporation through Managing Director and another vs Labour Court No.9, Multan through Presiding Officer and 2 others2015 LHC 970, 2015 PLJ Lahore 895, 2015 PLC 232 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-27
  regularization of servicespermanent workmanwork-charge basismaster and servantlabour lawsconcurrent findingsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from concurrent judgments of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal directing the Punjab Seed Corporation to regularize the services of various work-charge employees who had served continuously for periods ranging from 4 to 28 years. The core legal question was whether employees engaged on a work-charge basis for prolonged periods against permanent posts attain the status of permanent workmen by afflux of time under labour laws. Dismissing the petitions, the Lahore High Court held that since the nature of the jobs was permanent and the employees had served uninterruptedly for years exceeding the statutory threshold, they attained the status of permanent workmen under Standing Order 1(b) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The court deprecated the practice of issuing 89-day appointment letters to defeat statutory rights and affirmed that concurrent factual findings of lower forums cannot be interfered with under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 in the absence of any jurisdictional defect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees engaged on a work-charge basis for a prolonged period against posts of a permanent nature attain the status of permanent workmen under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can an employer circumvent statutory protections by repeatedly issuing 89-day appointment letters to work-charge employees?
  • Whether departmental service rules framed subsequent to the employment can be applied retrospectively to determine the status of temporary workers?
  • To what extent can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by labour courts while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Punjab Seed Corporation through Director Admn and another vs Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal No.2, Multan and 2 others2015 LHC 1195, 2015 PLC 295, 2015 KLR Labour & Services Cases 58 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-05
  regularizationwork-charge employeepermanent workmanStanding Orders Ordinanceconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the concurrent findings and orders of the Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had ordered the regularization of work-charge employees of the Punjab Seed Corporation as permanent workmen. The core legal questions involved whether work-charge employees serving for a long duration against permanent nature posts attain the status of permanent workmen under the law, and whether the Labour forums possessed the jurisdiction to grant such relief. The Lahore High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that employees engaged continuously for years against permanent jobs satisfy the criteria for permanent workmen under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The court laid down the principle that the nature of the work, rather than the initial work-charge designation, is the decisive factor in determining a worker's status, and deprecated the practice of employing workers on short-term contracts to defeat statutory rights. Furthermore, judgments of larger benches of the Supreme Court prevail, and similarly situated employees are entitled to equal treatment under Article 25 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a work-charge employee can attain the status of a permanent workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does the nature of the work or the initial appointment label serve as the primary determining factor for a worker's permanent status?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Whether the judgment of a larger bench of the Supreme Court takes precedence over that of a smaller bench in labour disputes?
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• Punjab Seed Corporation through Director Admin Office, etc. vs Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal No.2, Multan, etc2015 LHC 1195 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-05
  work-charge employeespermanent workmanregularization of serviceStanding Orders Ordinancewrit jurisdictionconcurrent findingslabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the concurrent findings of the Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which directed the petitioner-corporation to regularize the services of several employees initially appointed on a work-charge basis. The core legal question was whether these employees, having served continuously for many years on projects of a permanent nature, attained the status of permanent workmen under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the nature of the work, rather than the nomenclature of the appointment, determines a worker's status. The Court affirmed that employees engaged in permanent work for extended periods are entitled to regularization, and the practice of issuing short-term appointments to circumvent legal protections is mala fide. Furthermore, the Court ruled that concurrent findings of fact by lower forums are not subject to interference under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, absent jurisdictional error. The judgment reinforces that all similarly situated employees are entitled to equal protection of the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee appointed on a work-charge basis attain the status of a permanent workman if the nature of the work is permanent and continues beyond nine months?
  • Can a department use short-term appointment letters to defeat the legal provisions regarding the regularization of permanent workmen?
  • Is a High Court empowered to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by a Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does the principle of equal protection of law under Article 25 of the Constitution require that the benefit of a court judgment be extended to similarly situated employees not party to the litigation?
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• Punjab Public Health Engineering Department Employees Cooperative2015 KLR Civil Cases 403 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-08Read full judgment →
• Punjab Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income2015 LHC 1485 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-10Read full judgment →
• Punjab Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income Tax2015 LHC 1485, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 525, 2015 PTD 2522 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-10
  income taxinterest incomeincome from other sourcesbusiness incomemineral extractionstatutory corporationreference applicationrepealed Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns reference applications filed under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, challenging an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the tax assessment of interest income earned by the Punjab Mineral Development Corporation. The core legal question was whether interest income derived from financial institutions by a corporation engaged in the exploration and extraction of mineral deposits constitutes 'income from business' assessable under Part-II of the 5th Schedule read with Section 26(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, or 'income from other sources' assessable under Section 30 of the same Ordinance. The Court held that interest income is distinct from the profits and gains of the specific business of mineral extraction. It affirmed that Section 30 is a residuary provision covering income not falling under other heads, and that statutory authorization to invest surplus funds does not transform interest income into business income. Consequently, the Court ruled that such interest must be assessed as 'income from other sources' under Section 30, and further held that issues not adjudicated by the Tribunal cannot be raised in reference proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interest income earned by a corporation engaged in mineral extraction is assessable as business income under the 5th Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, or as income from other sources under Section 30?
  • Does the statutory authority to invest surplus funds convert interest income into business income for tax purposes?
  • Can a question of law be raised in a reference application if it was neither agitated before nor adjudicated by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal?
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• Punjab Employees' Social Security Institution, Lahore through Commissioner and another vs Messrs M. H. Challenge Industries, Sialkot and others2015 SCMR 790, 2015 PLC 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-24
  Social SecurityEstablishmentCharitable Educational InstitutionSocial Security ContributionBeneficial LegislationStatutory RemediesEjusdem Generis
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging High Court judgments arising from proceedings under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965. In the first matter, a respondent firm filed a civil suit disputing social security contribution demand notices after having previously made payments. In the second matter, a charitable educational trust challenged its notification as an 'establishment' under the Ordinance via a writ petition. The core legal questions pertained to whether an entity that voluntarily contributed over a long period could challenge liability on grounds of misrepresentation or lack of notification, and whether charitable educational institutions fall within the statutory definition of an 'establishment'. The Supreme Court allowed both appeals, setting aside the impugned judgments. The Court held that respondents who had paid contributions over a considerable time were debarred from denying liability or asserting non-notification. Furthermore, following established precedent, the open-ended phrase 'or otherwise' in Section 2(11) encompasses charitable educational institutions under the beneficial regime of the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer who has willfully paid social security contributions over a considerable period subsequently deny liability on the ground of misrepresentation or lack of notification?
  • Does the definition of 'establishment' under Section 2(11) of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 include educational institutions run on a charitable basis?
  • Does the phrase 'or otherwise' in Section 2(11) of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 render the definition of 'establishment' open-ended so as to cover non-industrial and non-commercial entities?
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• Punjab Employees Social Security Institution, Lahore through Commissioner and another vs Messrs M. H. Challenge Industries, Sialkot and others2015 SCMR 790 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-24
  social security contributionestablishment definitioncivil court jurisdictioncharitable institutionstatutory remedybeneficial legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two consolidated appeals regarding the applicability of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, to various entities. The core legal questions were whether civil courts possess jurisdiction to challenge social security contribution notices given the statutory remedies provided in the Ordinance, and whether charitable educational institutions qualify as an "establishment" under Section 2(11) of the Ordinance, thereby requiring contribution payments. The Supreme Court held that the Ordinance provides a comprehensive, independent remedial mechanism under Sections 57 to 64, which effectively bars the jurisdiction of civil courts. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the definition of "establishment" in Section 2(11) is broad and inclusive due to the phrase "or otherwise," encompassing entities regardless of their charitable or commercial nature. The Court established that the beneficial nature of the Ordinance mandates a liberal interpretation to protect employees, and charitable status does not exempt an institution from its obligations to contribute. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned High Court judgments, ruling that the institutions were subject to the Ordinance's regime.

  Questions settled

  • Does the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, bar the jurisdiction of civil courts regarding contribution disputes?
  • Does the definition of 'establishment' under Section 2(11) of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, include charitable educational institutions?
  • Can an entity challenge social security contribution notices in a civil court when the Ordinance provides specific appellate remedies?
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• Punjab Employees Social Security Institution, Lahore THR.2015 NLR Labour 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  social security contributionestablishmentcharitable educational institutionjurisdiction of civil courtconstitutional petitionejusdem generis
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Punjab Employees Social Security Institution challenges judgments from the Lahore High Court and lower forums regarding the applicability of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 to certain entities. The core legal questions involved whether civil court and writ jurisdictions are barred given the Ordinance's internal remedies under sections 57 to 64, and whether charitable educational institutions and entities paying contributions historically fall within the definition of "establishment" under section 2(11) of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgments, holding that the definition of "establishment" under section 2(11) is open-ended due to the phrase "or otherwise" and covers charitable educational institutions. The Court established that entities continuously paying social security contributions cannot later challenge liability on coercion grounds, and that charitable educational institutions are not exempt from the social security regime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the term "establishment" under section 2(11) of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 includes charitable educational institutions?
  • Can a party that has voluntarily paid social security contributions for a prolonged period subsequently challenge its liability on the ground of misrepresentation or coercion?
  • Does the inclusion of the words "or otherwise" in section 2(11) of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 render the definition of establishment open-ended?
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• Punjab Cooperative Board of Liquidation through its Chairman vs Muhammad Ilyas2015 PLJ SC 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  cooperative societiesauctionstatutory interpretationejusdem generisjudicial reviewappellate jurisdictionmarkup
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns the scope of the Cooperatives Judge's jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act, 1993, specifically regarding the authority to order a re-auction of property. The core legal question was whether the Cooperatives Judge, upon an aggrieved person's appeal, could annul an auction that the Board itself had not cancelled, and whether the statutory power to pass 'just' orders is open-ended. The Supreme Court held that the Cooperatives Judge's jurisdiction is limited to confirming, reversing, or modifying the Board's decision. The Court ruled that the phrase 'make such order as he may think just' must be interpreted ejusdem generis with the specific powers provided, precluding the Judge from passing arbitrary orders like re-auctioning property. The Court established that a judicial forum cannot exercise its powers to place an aggrieved party in a worse position than they were in before seeking redress. Consequently, the Court upheld the original auction while maintaining the Board's valid condition requiring the respondent to pay markup on the balance amount.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power of a Cooperatives Judge under Section 11 of the Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act, 1993 to make 'just' orders grant an open-ended jurisdiction to annul a valid auction?
  • Can a court, while exercising appellate jurisdiction, pass an order that places an aggrieved party in a worse position than they were in before filing the appeal?
  • Is the principle of ejusdem generis applicable to the interpretation of the powers of the Cooperatives Judge under Section 11 of the Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act, 1993?
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• Punjab Beverages Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue2015 LHC 2788 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-22Read full judgment →
• Punjab Beverages Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs Additional Commissioner Inland112 TAX 200 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Punjab Beverages Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. through Senior Finance Manager and others vs Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue and others2015 LHC 2788, 2015 PTD 2296 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-22
  Income Tax Ordinance 2001Constitutional jurisdictionAlternative remedyTax assessmentStatutory appealMinimum taxWrit petition maintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves several writ petitions challenging show-cause notices and orders-in-original issued by tax authorities regarding the denial of tax benefits under Section 113(2)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question is whether the High Court should exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to interpret tax laws and grant relief when statutory remedies are available, specifically when petitioners argue that such remedies are illusory due to existing case law. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that they were premature and that the petitioners must exhaust the specialized statutory remedies provided under the tax Ordinance. The Court affirmed that where a taxing statute provides a comprehensive mechanism for adjudication, including appeals and references, constitutional petitions cannot be used to bypass this process. A party cannot preemptively claim that statutory remedies are inadequate or illusory based on speculation that authorities will apply unfavorable precedents, as each case must be adjudicated on its own facts through the prescribed hierarchy before a question of law can properly arise for judicial determination.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable when a petitioner has not exhausted the statutory remedies provided under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a taxpayer bypass the statutory appeal process on the ground that the available remedy is illusory due to existing judicial precedents?
  • At what stage does a question of law ripen for interpretation by the High Court under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the existence of a show-cause notice without an adverse order provide sufficient grounds for invoking the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Provincial Government through District Coordination Officer, Swabi and 3 others vs Fazal Rahim and 3 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 108 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Provincial Government through Chief Secretary Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2015 MLD 1595 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-11
  civil revisionrevenue recordlimitationland acquisitionconcurrent findingsdeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition is directed against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby the respondents-plaintiffs' suit for declaration and correction of revenue record regarding the suit property was decreed. The core legal questions involve the correct classification of the land in the revenue record as irrigated versus Barai, the failure of the appellate court to frame a definite finding on limitation under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the suit was barred by limitation or based on mala fides following a notification under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The Peshawar High Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on proper appreciation of evidence, including revenue records and a prior compromise decision, and that limitation accrued when the notification was issued and the status of the land was incorrectly recorded. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed as meritless, affirming that concurrent factual findings free of misreading or non-reading of evidence will not be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the nature and ownership of land can be interfered with in civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a suit challenging revenue entries accrue upon the issuance of a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Whether the failure of an appellate court to record a distinct finding on limitation renders the judgment deficient under Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Province of the Punjab through Collectbr and 2 others vs Mst. Nabeela2015 YLR 1635 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-17Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh, Secretary Board of Revenue, Government of Sindh2015 YLR 209 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-15
  land acquisitiondismissal for non-prosecutionlimitation periodcondonation of delaypublic functionariesfirst appealcompetency of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, the Province of Sindh, challenged an order of the Additional District Judge dismissing its restoration application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which had originally been dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of the first appeal against an order rejecting a restoration application rather than an award, the correct limitation period applicable under the Limitation Act, 1908, and whether public functionaries are entitled to preferential treatment or condonation of delay without a formal application. The Sindh High Court held that an appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, only lies against an award or part thereof, and an appeal against an order rejecting a restoration application must be filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(c) read with Article 153 of the Limitation Act, 1908, prescribing a 30-day limitation period. The Court laid down the principle that government and public functionaries are not entitled to preferential treatment regarding limitation, and delay cannot be condoned without a formal application explaining the delay of each day.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the High Court under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 against an order dismissing a restoration application rather than against an award?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act, 1908 governs an appeal filed against an order rejecting an application to set aside the dismissal of a land acquisition reference for non-prosecution?
  • Are public functionaries and government departments entitled to preferential treatment in the matter of condonation of delay?
  • Can delay in filing an appeal be condoned in the absence of a formal application for condonation explaining the delay of each and every day?
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• Province of Sindh through Secretary Ministry of Transport vs Muhammad2015 YLR 1051 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-30Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh through Collector and another vs Jan Muhammad2015 MLD 1525 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-17Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh and others vs Ghulam Fareed and others2015 PLC (C.S.) 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-07
  service lawown pay and scalevoid orderlimitationcompetent authoritytermination of serviceacting chargequo warranto
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a challenge to the Sindh Service Tribunal's judgments which reinstated respondents whose services were terminated by an Executive District Officer (EDO) holding charge on an 'Own Pay and Scale' (OPS) basis. The core legal questions involved the validity of OPS appointments, the competency of an officer so appointed to exercise statutory powers of a higher grade, and the applicability of limitation periods to void orders. The Court held that the Sindh Civil Servants Act and relevant rules do not permit appointments on an OPS basis, as such practices bypass statutory mechanisms like acting or current charge under Rule 8-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974. Consequently, the termination orders issued by an incompetent officer were void ab initio. The Court further ruled that the bar of limitation does not apply to void orders. The appeals were dismissed, affirming that administrative exigencies do not authorize the government to bypass statutory appointment procedures or confer higher-grade powers upon junior officers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appointment made on an 'Own Pay and Scale' (OPS) basis has any legal sanction under the Sindh Civil Servants Act and Rules?
  • Can an officer appointed to a higher post on an OPS basis validly exercise the statutory powers and functions of that higher grade?
  • Does the bar of limitation apply to an appeal filed against an order that is found to be void and passed without jurisdiction?
  • What are the statutory requirements and time limits for making acting charge or current charge appointments under Rule 8-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974?
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• Province of Punjab, Etc.s vs Anwar Ali2015 NLR Revenue 25 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-01
  Temporary Cultivation Schemeproprietary rightscivil revisionrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factCode of Civil Procedureagricultural lease
  Summary & questions settled

  The Province of Punjab filed a civil revision petition challenging the concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which had decreed the respondent's suit for the grant of proprietary rights over agricultural land leased under the Temporary Cultivation Scheme. The core legal question was whether the respondent, a civil servant, was ineligible for proprietary rights under the 1979 policy and whether the lower courts erred in their findings. The High Court dismissed the revision, holding that the respondent was eligible at the time of the lease, had fulfilled all requisite conditions, and that the governing policy contained no prohibition against civil servants. The Court affirmed that the respondent’s possession and compliance were established by the evidence. The key principle laid down is that revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is strictly supervisory rather than appellate. It is intended solely for the correction of jurisdictional errors or material irregularities and does not authorize the High Court to interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless there is a demonstrable misreading or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a civil revision petition?
  • Does the Temporary Cultivation Scheme policy of 1979 prohibit the grant of proprietary rights to civil servants?
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• Province of Punjab, etc vs Tariq Masood Chaudhary, etc2015 LHC 3433 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-22Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab, etc vs Anwar Ali2015 NLR Revenue 25, 2015 C.L.R. 384 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-01Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab vs Tariq Masood Chaudhary2015 C.L.R. 1500 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-17Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Secretary Works and Communication2015 PLJ Lahore 1128 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through District Revenue, Rawalpindi & Others vs Muhammad Sarwar2015 NLR Civil 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil revisionlimitation periodsuo motu jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionstatutory interpretationCivil Procedure Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a civil revision petition as time-barred. The core legal question was whether a revision petition filed by an aggrieved party beyond the statutory 90-day limitation period under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 must be entertained by the High Court under its suo motu supervisory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court clarified that Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 creates two distinct modes of exercising revisional jurisdiction: one invoked by an aggrieved party, and the other exercised by the court on its own motion. The Court held that when a party initiates a revision petition, it is strictly bound by the 90-day limitation period prescribed in the second proviso to Section 115(1). An aggrieved party cannot circumvent this statutory limitation by invoking the court's discretionary suo motu powers. Consequently, the second proviso must be applied with full vigor to all party-initiated revision petitions, rendering time-barred applications liable for dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 90-day limitation period prescribed in the second proviso to Section 115(1) of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 apply to revision petitions filed by aggrieved parties?
  • Can an aggrieved party circumvent the statutory limitation period for filing a revision petition by invoking the court's suo motu revisional jurisdiction?
  • Are the provisions of Sections 4, 9, 18, and 22 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to revision petitions filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908?
  • Is Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to revision petitions filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908?
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• Province of Punjab through Dfo, Forest Department, Attock vs Member, Federal Land Commission, Islamabad and others2015 SCMR 1000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-10
  resumed landLand Reforms Act 1977Federal Land Commissionsuo motu jurisdictionpast and closed transactionForest Departmentghair mumkin pahaar
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a High Court judgment upholding an order of the Member, Federal Land Commission, which had cancelled a 1990 mutation transferring 1737 acres 3 kanals and 3 marlas of resumed uncultivable land (ghair mumkin pahaar) to the Forest Department of the Punjab Government. The core legal questions pertained to whether the Federal Land Commission validly exercised its suo motu jurisdiction to reopen and cancel a past and closed transaction, and whether uncultivable land reserved for forestry could be cancelled on the premise of satisfying tenant claims. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, setting aside the Federal Land Commission's cancellation order. The Court held that there was no valid justification or reasonable cause for exercising suo motu jurisdiction to disturb a transaction completed long before, particularly when the land was non-arable and the claims of cultivating tenants in the relevant mouzas had already been satisfied. The Court directed that the land be used exclusively as forest land.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Land Commission can exercise suo motu jurisdiction to reopen and cancel a past and closed land allotment transaction without valid reasons?
  • Can uncultivable land (ghair mumkin pahaar) mutated in favour of a provincial Forest Department be validly cancelled for allocation to tenants when no cultivating tenancy existed on such land?
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• Province of Punjab through Collector Gujrat, Etc. vs Muhammad2015 NLR Civil 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  limitationsummer vacationvested rightcomputation of limitationcivil appealcondonation of delayduty judge
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court addressed whether a civil appeal filed in the District Court after the expiration of the limitation period during the court's summer vacation is barred by time, or whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The trial court decreed the suit against the appellants, and the limitation period expired while the District Courts were closed for summer vacation. The appeal was filed on the day the courts reopened, but both the lower appellate court and the High Court dismissed it as time-barred due to the lack of a formal condonation application. The Supreme Court held that Section 4 confers a substantive, vested statutory right upon a litigant to institute a suit, appeal, or application on the day the court reopens if the limitation period expires during court closure. The Court clarified that the mere presence of a duty judge for urgent matters does not mean the court is legally open for routine filings. The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the first appellate court, ruling the appeal was within time, and remanded the matter for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed on the reopening of a court after summer vacation is barred by time when the prescribed period of limitation expires during the court closure?
  • Does the availability of a duty judge for urgent matters during court vacations mean the court is open for the ordinary institution of cases so as to exclude the application of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Is the right conferred under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 a mere grace or a vested statutory right that must be enforced?
  • Does the filing of an urgent matter during court vacation to seek interim relief deprive a litigant of the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for the main appeal?
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• Province of Punjab through Collector Gujrat, etc vs Muhammad Saleem2015 P.S.C. 561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  limitation periodcourt vacationvested rightcomputation of limitationcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether an appeal filed in the District Court beyond the prescribed period of limitation, but during the period when the court was closed for summer vacation, is barred by time, or whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court examined whether the statutory right to institute a matter upon the re-opening of the court when the limitation period expires during court closure can be claimed if the appeal is filed during the vacation due to compelling circumstances. The Court held that Section 4 confers a vested right upon a litigant to wait until the re-opening of the court, and that this right is not obliterated or lost merely because a litigant is compelled to file the matter during the vacation to seek urgent interim relief to prevent irreparable loss. The appeal was decided accordingly, affirming the availability of the statutory protection under Section 4.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed when the court is closed for summer vacation is barred by time if the limitation period expired during the vacation?
  • Does Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908 confer a vested right upon a litigant to institute proceedings upon the re-opening of the court?
  • Does a litigant lose the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908 by filing a matter during court vacation under compelling circumstances to seek urgent interim relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Collector Bahawalpur, Etc. vs 1. Mst.2015 NLR Revenue 47, 2015 NLR Revenue 4 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-10-28
  limitationcondonation of delayvoid judgmentsland acquisitioncompensation without protestmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from a judgment concerning land acquisition compensation. The core legal questions involve the condonation of delay for time-barred appeals, whether an allegedly erroneous judgment can be termed void to escape limitation, the bar on filing a reference under the Land Acquisition Act upon receiving compensation without protest, and whether the lower courts misread the evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appeals were barred by time as erroneous judgments are not automatically void, and a party cannot enjoy an unlimited period to challenge orders. Furthermore, the contention regarding receiving compensation without protest under the Land Acquisition Act was not raised before the lower courts and cannot be urged for the first time, while the plea of misreading of evidence was unsubstantiated. The court laid down the principles that an erroneous judgment does not constitute a void order for limitation purposes, limitation commences from the date of knowledge, and factual or statutory objections not raised before lower forums cannot be agitated before the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Can an erroneous judgment be treated as void to claim an exception to the period of limitation?
  • Does the receipt of compensation without protest bar a party from filing a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 if not pleaded before the lower courts?
  • Can a plea regarding misreading and non-reading of evidence be sustained when the lower courts have duly considered admissions and material on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab etc. vs Syed Ghzanfar Ali Shah etc.2015 LHC 3304 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-20
  evacuee propertyallotment of landForest Departmentcivil revisionpossession suitestoppelRehabilitation Settlement Scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a dispute over the possession of evacuee land between the plaintiffs, who were allottees, and the Forest Department, which claimed ownership through foreclosure and subsequent purchase. The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs’ title, derived from a valid allotment, was superior to the Forest Department’s possession, particularly in light of a memorandum restricting allotments. The Lahore High Court held that the plaintiffs were the lawful owners, as the land was duly proposed and confirmed to them by the competent settlement authorities. The Court ruled that the Forest Department’s foreclosure was a temporary arrangement for forestation that expired, and the Department’s failure to challenge the allotment, combined with their prior de-notification of a portion of the land, estopped them from denying the plaintiffs' title. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a proposal for allotment made prior to a restrictive memorandum remains a subsisting right. Consequently, the Court dismissed the revisions, upholding the appellate court's decree for possession, as the defendants failed to demonstrate any legal title or right to retain the property after the lease expired.

  Questions settled

  • Does a proposal for the allotment of evacuee land create a subsisting right that survives a subsequent administrative memorandum banning allotments?
  • Can the Forest Department claim ownership of evacuee land based on a temporary foreclosure notification after the expiry of the lease period?
  • Does the de-notification of a portion of land by the Forest Department operate as an estoppel against its claim of ownership over the remaining portion of the same property?
  • Is a suit for possession maintainable by allottees of evacuee property against a government department holding the land under an expired lease?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab etc. vs Muhammad Farooq etc.2015 LHC 5907 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-09Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab and otherss vs Zafar Ullah and others2015 PLD Lahore 220 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-28Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab and others vs Abdul Rashid2015 CLC 987 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-14Read full judgment →
• Prop: M/s Gull Jewellers, New Sarafa Bazar, Sargodha vs Secretary112 TAX 1 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2015-03-17Read full judgment →
• Project Director, Swabi Development Authority (Sda), Etc.s vs Noorul Amin. Etc.s2015 NLR Civil 321 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Project Director Swab Development Authority and 2 others vs Noorul2015 NLR Civil 321, 2015 YLR 688 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-02-10Read full judgment →
• Progress Report of NAB in OGRA Case; In re vs N/A2015 SCMR 1813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-21
  National Accountability Bureaucorruption watchdogmega scamsjudicial commissionfundamental rightsaccountabilityOGRA case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the performance and accountability of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) in investigating high-profile corruption cases, specifically the OGRA case involving the escape of Tauqir Sadiq. The Supreme Court observed a marked lack of diligent effort by NAB, noting instances of deliberate concealment of facts and failure to provide satisfactory answers regarding the status of mega scams. The core legal question addressed was whether the Court could intervene to ensure accountability and transparency in the functioning of a statutory watchdog body when it fails to perform its mandated duties. The Court held that NAB's inefficiency adversely affects fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Consequently, in exercise of its powers under Articles 187 and 190 of the Constitution, the Court appointed a Local Commission to examine NAB's internal reports, investigate the alleged facilitation of Tauqir Sadiq's escape by various state agencies, and evaluate NAB's performance in pursuing long-pending mega scams. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court possesses the authority to appoint a commission to oversee and audit the functioning of a statutory body when its failure to act threatens the rule of law and fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to appoint a Local Commission to investigate the functioning of the National Accountability Bureau?
  • Can the Supreme Court intervene in the operations of a statutory body when its failure to perform its duties impacts fundamental rights?
  • Is the National Accountability Bureau required to disclose full particulars of mega scams and pending investigations when ordered by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Professor Malik Arshad Aziz (Economics), Government Post Graduate2015-SC AJK-86 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  time-scale policy4-tier formulapromotioncivil servantremandaccrued rightsFinance Department
  Summary & questions settled

  The captioned appeals by leave of the Court were directed against the judgment of the High Court, whereby writ petitions filed by the appellants—Lecturers, Assistant Professors, and Associate Professors challenging the proposal of the Finance Department to amend the time-scale promotion structure—were dismissed. The core legal questions involved whether the Finance Department, having concurred with the replacement of the 4-tier formula with a time-scale policy, could subsequently propose omitting the word "promotion" from it, leaving college teachers with no alternative mode of promotion, and whether accrued rights could be revoked. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to attend to and resolve these crucial points and relied on inapplicable or outdated provisions without considering the abolished 4-tier formula or the method of time-scale promotions. Consequently, the appeals were accepted, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the cases were remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision after considering all raised points.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Finance Department can alter or omit the term promotion from a time-scale policy formulated and adopted with its full concurrence after the prior 4-tier promotion formula has been abolished?
  • Can a right once accrued to a civil servant under a notified promotion policy be subsequently taken away by a departmental proposal?
  • Whether regular promotion can only be made against an available higher post under section 8 of the Civil Servants Act 1976 when a time-scale promotion structure is in operation?
  Read full judgment →
• Professor Dr. Munir Khan Khattak vs The Chancellor, University of Agriculture Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Peshawar2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-08Read full judgment →
• Professor DR. Muhammad Aslam Baloch vs Govt. of Balochistan2015 NLR Service 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  alteration of date of birthservice recordcivil servantlimitation periodsuperannuationrecovery of salaryfabricated documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's service appeal and ordered his retirement and recovery of salaries. The petitioner, a Professor, sought to alter his date of birth in his service record from 16.11.1951 to 16.11.1954, which was initially approved by the Chief Secretary based on an Inquiry Committee's recommendation. The core legal question was whether a civil servant's date of birth can be altered after the expiry of the statutory two-year limitation period from the date of entry in the service record. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Rule 11 of the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Transfer and Promotion) Rules 2009, a civil servant's date of birth is final once recorded at the time of joining and cannot be altered after two years, except for clerical errors. Finding that the petitioner used fabricated documents to alter his age on the verge of retirement, the Court dismissed the petition, upheld the Tribunal's judgment, and ordered the recovery of salaries.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant seek the alteration of their date of birth in their service record after the expiry of the statutory two-year limitation period?
  • Whether a duplicate matriculation certificate and national identity card obtained through foul play constitute conclusive proof for the determination of a civil servant's date of birth?
  • Can the competent authority entertain a representation for altering a civil servant's date of birth beyond the period prescribed under the relevant service rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Prof.Dr.Masood Hameed Khan Dr.Shershah Syed Prof.Surgeon Dr.Ata-urSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Principal Sardar Kaurey Khan, Public Higher Secondary School, Muzaffargarh and another vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal No. II, Multan and 2 others2015 PLJ Lahore 193 · Lahore High Court · 2014-05-13Read full judgment →
• Present: Tariq Pervez and Gulzar Hussain Syed Jawaid Haider Kazmi vs2015 KLR Supreme Court Cases 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2012-07-06
  fire hazardinflammable articlescivil defence clearanceapprehension of offencepublic safetybusiness regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed in-person concerning the operation of a business involving inflammable articles in a residential building, which the petitioner alleged posed a severe fire hazard and risk to the lives of the inhabitants. The core legal question addressed by the court was whether the apprehension of a future fire hazard resulting from a lawful business operating under statutory clearances constitutes an actionable offence or warrants judicial intervention to halt the trade. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a mere future apprehension of fire does not constitute an offence, noting that the respondents' business was lawful and possessed necessary clearances from the Civil Defence Authority, which had taken adequate preventive measures. The court ultimately dismissed the petition while issuing binding directives requiring the respondents to strictly adhere to safety measures and obtain a renewed clearance certificate from the Civil Defence Authority every six months, to be prominently displayed on each shop.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere apprehension of a future fire hazard resulting from a business constitute an offence?
  • Can a lawful business possessing necessary licences and safety clearances from the Civil Defence Authority be restrained based on general apprehensions?
  • What mandatory safety directives can the court issue to mitigate risks associated with businesses dealing in inflammable materials?
  Read full judgment →
• Postal Life Insurance through General Manager vs Muhammad Ishaq2015 CLD 1254 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-09Read full judgment →
• Pordil Khan vs State through Advocate-General, K.P.K. & 11 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 113 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-01-22Read full judgment →
• Plaintiff, M/s. United Paper Board & Cone Industries vs The StateSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Piran Ditta and others vs Dur Muhammad and 3 others2015 PLJ Lahore 333 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-11Read full judgment →
• Pir Muhammad Shah Khagga vs District Returning Officer Na-164, Pakpattan and 3 others2015 CLC 329 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-20
  recount of voteselection disputenarrow marginrejected votessatisfaction of returning officerconstitutional jurisdictionelection tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged orders passed by the Returning Officer and the Election Commission of Pakistan, which dismissed the petitioner's application for a vote recount in constituency NA-164 Pakpattan-I. The core legal question was whether a narrow margin of victory and a large number of rejected votes, by themselves, furnish sufficient justification under the law to order a recount, and whether High Court writ jurisdiction under Article 199 can be invoked to resolve disputed factual inquiries involving election disputes. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that a narrow margin of votes does not automatically warrant a recount without sufficient material satisfying the Returning Officer of a reasonable request, and that factual disputes requiring evidence recording are best agitated before an Election Tribunal rather than through constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that 'satisfaction' for ordering a recount requires mental persuasion based on substantial evidence and specific allegations of irregularity, rather than vague assertions or mere narrow vote margins, and constitutional courts will not undertake detailed factual inquiries in election matters where alternative forums like Election Tribunals exist.

  Questions settled

  • Does a narrow margin of votes between contesting candidates by itself furnish sufficient justification for ordering a recount?
  • Can a ground regarding non-compliance with section 39 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, be raised for the first time before the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether the High Court can undertake a factual inquiry and record evidence to resolve disputed questions of fact in an election petition under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Muhammad Azam vs National Accountability Bureau through Chairman and 2 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 417 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pir Inman Sajid and others vs Managing Director/General Manager2015 PLC (C.S.) 1487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-18
  regularization of contract employeeswrit jurisdictionright to livelihoodpublic function testservice mattersconstitutional petitionmala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the regularization of contract employees who served the Telephone Industries of Pakistan (TIP) for over a decade. The core legal questions were whether TIP, a government-owned entity, is amenable to writ jurisdiction despite lacking statutory service rules, and whether the appellants acquired a vested right to regularization given the permanent nature of their duties and government directives. The Supreme Court held that TIP, being wholly owned and controlled by the federal government, performs functions in furtherance of the federation's affairs and thus falls within the definition of a "person" under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that the appellants' long-term service and the permanent nature of their roles entitled them to regularization, noting that the refusal to implement the cabinet subcommittee's directive was mala fide and arbitrary. The Court affirmed that the right to livelihood is an integral component of the right to life. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the appellants' services were ordered to be regularized from the date of the cabinet subcommittee's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a government-owned company performing public functions is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the long-term renewal of contract employment for permanent-nature duties create a vested right for regularization?
  • Can a public entity arbitrarily refuse to implement a government directive for the regularization of its employees?
  • Is the right to livelihood protected under the right to life as envisaged by the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Imran Sajid and others vs Managing Director/General Manager2015 P.S.C. 1291 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-05-18
  regularization of contract employeesright to livelihoodconstitutional jurisdictionmaster and servantgood governancefederal government owned companylegitimate expectation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether contract employees who have served continuously for over a decade in an entity wholly owned and controlled by the Federal Government acquire a right to regularization pursuant to governmental directives and established legal principles. The appellants, appointed through a transparent process in the Telephone Industries of Pakistan (TIP), sought regularization in compliance with a decision of the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Regularization. The Peshawar High Court dismissed their writ petitions on the grounds that TIP lacks statutory service rules and the appellants were contract employees. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that although TIP's service rules are non-statutory, the company falls within the definition of a "person" under Article 199 of the Constitution due to federal ownership and control, and the continuous renewal of contracts for over twelve years indicates the permanent nature of the jobs. The Court laid down that long-term contract employment for permanent duties creates a legitimate expectation and entitlement to regularization, and arbitrary refusal to regularize violates fundamental constitutional guarantees of livelihood, equality, and fair treatment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees serving on a contract basis for a prolonged period can claim regularization when the nature of their duties is permanent?
  • Does a company wholly owned and controlled by the Federal Government fall within the definition of a 'person' under Article 199 of the Constitution despite having non-statutory service rules?
  • Can the non-compliance by a state-owned enterprise with a directive of the Federal Government or Cabinet Sub-Committee regarding regularization be declared illegal and mala fide?
  • Does the right to life guaranteed under Article 9 of the Constitution encompass the right to livelihood, thereby protecting employees from arbitrary termination or denial of permanent status?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Imran Sajid and others vs Managing Director/General Manager2015 NLR Service 130, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 1487, 2015 PLJ SC 933, 2015 P.S.C. 1291, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-18
  regularization of contract employeesright to livelihoodconstitutional petitionmaster and servantgood governancefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals by contract employees of the Telephone Industries of Pakistan (TIP) seeking regularization of their services following a decision by a cabinet sub-committee and directives from the federal government. The core legal question examined is whether contract employees continuously serving an entity owned and controlled by the federal government for over a decade acquire a vested right to regularization, and whether constitutional petitions are maintainable against such an entity despite the absence of statutory service rules. The Supreme Court held that since TIP is wholly owned, controlled, and financed by the federal government, it falls within the definition of a "person" under Article 199, and the appellants are entitled to implementation of the government's regularization directives. The Court established that long-term contract employment for permanent nature jobs, combined with arbitrary refusal to regularize, violates fundamental rights to livelihood and equality, establishing that the right to livelihood forms part of the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee working on a contract basis for a prolonged period in a company owned and controlled by the federal government is entitled to regularization pursuant to governmental directives?
  • Does the absence of statutory service rules bar an employee from invoking constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 against a company wholly owned and financed by the state?
  • Whether the right to livelihood forms an integral part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the continuous renewal of a contract over many years create a presumption regarding the permanent nature of the job?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Imran Sajid & others vs Managing Director/General Manager2015 PLJ SC 933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-18
  regularization of contract employeesright to livelihoodconstitutional jurisdictionfunction testgood governanceArticle 199state-owned entity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the regularization of contract employees at the Telephone Industries of Pakistan (TIP), a company wholly owned and controlled by the Federal Government. The core legal question was whether these employees, having served for a decade, possessed a vested right to regularization, and whether the High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution despite the absence of statutory service rules. The Supreme Court held that TIP, being a state-controlled entity, satisfies the 'Function Test' and falls within the definition of a 'person' under Article 199. The Court ruled that the arbitrary refusal to regularize the employees, despite a directive from the Cabinet Sub-Committee, violated the principles of good governance and the right to livelihood. The appeals were allowed, and the Court ordered the regularization of the appellants' services from the date of the Cabinet Sub-Committee's decision. The judgment reaffirms that public functionaries must act in good faith, ensuring socio-economic justice and adherence to the constitutional guarantees of equality and fairness in employment practices.

  Questions settled

  • Does a company wholly owned and controlled by the federal government fall within the definition of a 'person' under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can contract employees of a state-owned entity claim a right to regularization based on a directive from a government cabinet sub-committee?
  • Does the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 encompass the right to livelihood?
  • Does the absence of statutory service rules in a state-owned entity preclude the High Court from exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Haider Zaman Qureshi vs Pir Muhammad Aslam Bodla and 3 others2015 YLR 1793 · Lahore High Court · 2012-05-25Read full judgment →
• Pir 1Mran Sajid Muhammad Saeedmuhammad'sajid Fariq Khaliq-Ur-2015 NLR Service 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-18
  regularization of servicecontract employeesright to livelihoodconstitutional jurisdictionmala fideadministrative discretionpublic functionary
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the regularization of contract employees at the Telephone Industries of Pakistan (TIP), a company wholly owned and controlled by the Federal Government. The core legal question was whether long-term contract employees, whose positions were permanent in nature and who were subject to a government-directed regularization policy, possessed a vested right to regularization despite the absence of statutory service rules. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were entitled to regularization. The Court reasoned that the company's status as a state-controlled entity brought it within the scope of constitutional jurisdiction, and the nature of the appellants' long-term service, combined with the government's explicit directive for regularization, rendered the refusal to regularize them mala fide and arbitrary. The Court emphasized that the right to livelihood is an integral component of the right to life under the Constitution. It established that administrative authorities cannot exercise discretionary powers to deny regularization when the underlying employment is permanent and the refusal violates principles of fairness, equality, and good governance as mandated by the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of statutory service rules in a government-controlled company preclude employees from seeking constitutional remedies for regularization?
  • Can long-term contract employment, repeatedly renewed, be considered permanent in nature for the purpose of regularization?
  • Does the right to life under the Constitution of Pakistan include the right to livelihood?
  • Is a government-controlled entity bound to implement a directive from a cabinet sub-committee regarding the regularization of its employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh and others (in all cases) vs Mujeeb Ahmed and others2015 P.S.C. 976 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-09
  promotion quotaexecutive engineerreasonable classificationfundamental rightsequality of citizensgood governancepolicy decision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which set aside a government notification dated 4th June 2008 altering the promotion quota for Executive Engineers (BPS-18) in the Works and Services Department. The core legal question was whether the government's policy decision regarding inter se promotion quotas among Assistant Engineers holding different qualifications was discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court held that while the government possesses the prerogative to formulate policies and make rules, such executive discretion must be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the doctrine of reasonable classification under the Constitution. The Court found that the impugned notification created an irrational and discriminatory ratio disproportionate to the actual number of qualified personnel, aimed at accommodating specific individuals. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the government has the sole prerogative to determine policy decisions regarding the appointment and promotion quota of government servants?
  • Can a government notification fixing promotion quotas be struck down by a judicial forum if found to be discriminatory and violative of the Constitution?
  • What are the well-defined parameters of the doctrine of reasonable classification in the context of government promotion policies?
  • Does an executive policy or notification affecting promotions require adherence to the principles of justness, fairness, and openness?
  Read full judgment →
• Pioneer Cricket Club etc. vs Election Commissioner, PCB, etc2015 PLJ Lahore 314 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-18Read full judgment →
• PIA Corporation vs Syed Suleman Alam Rizvi and others2015 SCMR 1545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-01
  Constitutional PetitionMaintainabilityMaster and ServantEmployment BenefitsStatutory RulesService LawEncashment of LeaveIncrementsCivil Servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that directed Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) to pay employment benefits, including encashment of accumulative leave and leftover increments, to its retired employees. The central legal questions concerned the maintainability of a Constitutional Petition for employees of a corporation whose terms of service are not governed by statutory rules, and the applicability of the principle from Hameed Akhtar Niazi's case regarding the extension of judgment benefits to similarly placed non-litigant employees. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that a Constitutional Petition is not maintainable in matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of service for employees of a corporation where such terms are not governed by statutory rules, as their relationship is that of "master and servant." The principle from Hameed Akhtar Niazi's case was deemed inapplicable as it pertains exclusively to civil servants whose service is governed by the Civil Servants Act, not to employees under a "master and servant" relationship. The private respondents were advised to file a civil suit for redressal.

  Read full judgment →
• Pfizer Products Inc. through Authorized Signatory and 2 otherss vs Hilton Pharma (Private) Limited through Chief Executive_Director_Secretary_Principal Officer2015 CLD 1384 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-27
  patents ordinanceinterim injunctionsealing of patentcomplete specificationinfringement proceedingsrejection of plaintjurisdictional objectionproviso interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit arises under the Patents Ordinance, 2000, wherein the plaintiffs sought interim injunctive relief and enforcement of rights regarding pharmaceutical patents prior to the sealing of the patents under section 22 of the Ordinance. The core legal question was whether an applicant for a patent can institute proceedings and obtain injunctive relief for infringement occurring after the advertisement of the complete specification but before the patent is actually sealed. The court held that the proviso to section 22 of the Patents Ordinance, 2000 operates as a true proviso that defers remedies rather than destroys substantive rights, meaning an applicant cannot institute proceedings or obtain injunctive relief for pre-sealing infringement until the patent is officially sealed. The key principle laid down is that while section 22 confers inchoate rights and privileges akin to a patentee upon the advertisement of a complete specification, the accompanying proviso bars the institution of any infringement proceedings or the grant of injunctions until the patent has been successfully sealed, rendering premature suits filed during the pre-sealing period subject to rejection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an applicant for a patent can institute proceedings for patent infringement before the patent has been sealed under section 22 of the Patents Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does the proviso to section 22 of the Patents Ordinance, 2000 extinguish the substantive rights of an applicant or merely defer the available remedies until the sealing of the patent?
  • Can a suit for patent infringement seeking interim injunctive relief be maintained during the pre-sealing period of a patent application?
  • Whether a plaint can be rejected as an abuse of the process of the court when the institution of infringement proceedings is barred by statute prior to the sealing of a patent?
  Read full judgment →
• Petro Oil (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 P.C.T.L.R. 747 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-05Read full judgment →
• Petro Oil (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive vs Federation of Islamic2015 LHC 1, 2015 CLC 1030 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-06Read full judgment →
• Petro Oil (Put) Limited vs The Federation of Pakistan & others2015 LHC 1 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-06Read full judgment →
• Petitioner No.1 present in person vs notSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Petitioner No.1 present in person Mr. Rizwan Dodani, advocate filedSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Petitioner Muhammad Shamim Farooqui vs Faisal HadiSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• petitioner Mst. Yasmeen Shaikh vs StateSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Petitioner Abdullah Khan alias Amanat, vs State2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-11-20Read full judgment →
• Peshawar University Teacher's Association (Puta) through General2015 CLC 265 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-06-09
  Constitutional jurisdictionLocus standiNatural justicePublic fiduciary dutyWrit of certiorariAdministrative lawUniversity property
  Summary & questions settled

  The Peshawar University Teachers' Association and other stakeholders filed a constitutional petition challenging the Chief Minister's unilateral decision to withdraw and reallocate a portion of land previously leased to the University of Peshawar for a botanical garden. The core legal questions concerned the locus standi of the petitioners to challenge executive action and the legality of the unilateral withdrawal of leased property. The Court held that the petitioners possessed the necessary locus standi as aggrieved persons, noting that the traditional, restrictive view of standing has evolved to recognize the role of stakeholders and socially aware citizens in ensuring transparent governance. The Court declared the Chief Minister's decision illegal and without lawful authority, holding that it violated the cardinal principle of natural justice by failing to provide the University a hearing. It directed the University Syndicate to deliberate on the proposal, emphasizing that public functionaries must exercise authority over public property in a fair, transparent, and reasonable manner, consistent with their fiduciary obligations to the public.

  Questions settled

  • Does the traditional, restrictive view of locus standi apply to constitutional petitions challenging executive actions affecting public property?
  • Can an executive authority unilaterally withdraw land leased to a public university without providing a hearing?
  • Is the decision of a public functionary regarding public property subject to judicial review if it lacks transparency and reasonableness?
  • Does the failure of a Vice-Chancellor to protect university property empower other stakeholders to invoke constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd vs not2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-04
  Wafaqi MohtasibjurisdictionagencyPESCOmaladministrationalternate remedywrit petition maintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. (PESCO) challenging the jurisdiction of the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) to entertain complaints against it, arguing that PESCO is not an "agency" under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983. The core legal questions involved whether PESCO falls within the definition of an agency subject to the Ombudsman's jurisdiction and whether a writ petition is maintainable when an alternate and efficacious remedy by way of a representation to the President is available under the law. The Peshawar High Court held that PESCO falls within the definition of "Agency" in light of notifications and its distribution license issued by NEPRA, indicating overall control by the Federal Government. The Court further held that the petition was not maintainable due to the petitioner's failure to avail the alternate remedy of representation under Section 14 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, alongside procedural defects in the institution of the petition. The key principle laid down is that public limited companies licensed and controlled through statutory frameworks like NEPRA under Federal oversight fall within the definition of an agency subject to the Wafaqi Mohtasib's jurisdiction, and writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked directly without exhausting statutory remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Does Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. (PESCO) fall within the definition of 'Agency' under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 and the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against an order of the Wafaqi Mohtasib without availing the alternate and efficacious remedy of representation before the President under the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013?
  • What constitutes 'maladministration' under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 in relation to employment and service matters in public distribution companies?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz vs The State, Etc.s2015 NLR Criminal 280 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-03
  Control of Narcotic Substances ActChemical Examinerre-examination of case propertyGovernment Analyst reportpurity of narcoticsheroin recoverynarcotic drug sample
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was directed against an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Chiniot, which dismissed the appellant's application seeking to send the entire recovered contraband (3,575 grams of heroin) to the Chemical Examiner to determine its purity during trial under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The primary legal issue was whether an accused has a statutory right to demand the transmission of the whole recovered narcotic substance for chemical examination and percentage determination. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 36 of the Act and Rule 4 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 only require a reasonable sample rather than the whole substance. Furthermore, percentage calculations under Section 3 of the Act are confined strictly to liquid preparations. The Court established that permitting re-examination or sending the entire case property without extraordinary reasons risks tampering and abuse of process, and when the law prescribes an act to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused facing trial under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 has a right to demand that the entire recovered substance be sent to the Chemical Examiner for determining its purity?
  • Whether Section 3 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 permits percentage calculation for solid narcotic substances such as heroin?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court direct the re-examination or fresh chemical analysis of a narcotic substance that has already been tested?
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• Pervaiz vs The State, etc2015 LHC 1408 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-03
  narcotic substanceschemical analysiscase propertysample testingControl of Narcotic Substances Actevidence tamperingcriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chiniot, which dismissed the appellant's application to send the entire quantity of recovered narcotic substance for chemical analysis. The core legal question was whether an accused has a statutory right to demand the chemical examination of the entire recovered bulk rather than a representative sample. The Lahore High Court held that the application was neither competent nor maintainable. The Court reasoned that Section 36 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and Rule 4 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, only require the analysis of a reasonable sample drawn on the spot. The Court emphasized that there is no legal provision mandating the analysis of the entire case property. Furthermore, the Court relied on Supreme Court precedents to caution against re-examination requests, noting the risk of evidence tampering. The principle laid down is that where a statute prescribes a specific procedure for testing, it must be followed strictly, and courts should not permit the re-examination of evidence without extraordinary justification.

  Questions settled

  • Does the law require the entire quantity of recovered narcotic substances to be sent for chemical analysis?
  • Is a sample of a recovered narcotic substance sufficient for chemical analysis under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Under what circumstances can a court permit the re-examination of narcotic substances already tested?
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• Pervaiz vs The State and another2015 MLD 263 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-24
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymurdercommon intentionfirearm injurycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station City District Chiniot, involving allegations of entering the complainant's house and participating in a murder. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail when the fatal firearm injury was attributed to a co-accused and no incriminating recovery was made from the petitioner. The Lahore High Court held that the case against the petitioner fell within the purview of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as there was no allegation of causing firearm injury against him and he had been incarcerated for a significant period without any recovery. Consequently, the court allowed the petition and admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail subject to surety bonds, laying down the principle that tentative assessment favoring further inquiry warrants bail where active participation in the fatal assault is absent and no recovery is effected from the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when the fatal firearm injury is attributed to a co-accused rather than the petitioner?
  • Does the absence of recovery of any weapon at the instance of the accused during investigation make the case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether prolonged incarceration without the requirement of further investigation justifies the grant of bail in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Akhtar vs Govt. of Punjab etc.2015 LHC 7644 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-23Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Akhtar and others vs Muhammad Mansha and others2015 YLR 2340 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-09
  specific performanceagreement to sellburden of proofmarginal witnessesunilateral agreementcivil revisionQanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision challenges the concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which decreed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The core legal questions concerned whether the plaintiff successfully proved the execution of the agreement to sell and whether a unilateral agreement, lacking the signatures of both parties, is enforceable. The High Court held that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof, noting the failure to produce marginal witnesses and the inability of the plaintiff to identify the defendant in court. The Court emphasized that a scribe is not an attesting witness and that a party cannot avoid producing witnesses due to the fear of them turning hostile. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an agreement to sell which is unilateral and lacks the signatures of both parties is unenforceable under the law. Consequently, the Court accepted the revision, set aside the lower courts' decisions, and dismissed the suit, establishing that the failure to produce essential witnesses and the lack of mutuality in an agreement render it legally ineffective.

  Questions settled

  • Is a scribe of a document considered an attesting witness for the purpose of proving its execution?
  • Can a party be absolved of the duty to produce a witness merely due to the apprehension that the witness might turn hostile?
  • Is an agreement to sell that is signed by only one party enforceable in law?
  • What is the effect of failing to produce marginal witnesses in a suit for specific performance?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Ahmed Siddiqui & another vs Aijaz Ahmed Siddiqui & othersSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Pepsi-Cola International (Private) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2015 LHC 61, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 393 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-05Read full judgment →
• Pepsi Foods Pvt. Ltd. & others vs Astt. Commissioner of Income Tax &112 TAX 100 · Delhi High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pepsi Cola International (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan etc.111 TAX 233 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-05Read full judgment →
• Peoples Unity of PIA Employees through President vs Member National2015 PLC 307 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-19
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilityalternate remedyNational Industrial Relations Commissioncollective bargaining agentIndustrial Relations Actwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging an order passed by a Single Member of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) remanding an appeal concerning a collective bargaining agent dispute. The core legal question addressed is whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against an order of a Single Bench of the Commission when an alternate remedy of appeal or review exists under the statute. The Lahore High Court held that the petition is not maintainable because the aggrieved party has an adequate alternate remedy by way of an appeal before the Full Bench of the Commission under Section 58(1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, as well as the right to invoke revisional or supervisory powers. The key principle laid down is that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked when an efficacious alternate statutory remedy is available within the hierarchy of the tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable against an order passed by a Single Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission when an alternate remedy is available?
  • Does an aggrieved person have a right of appeal before the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission under Section 58 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 against an order of a Single Bench?
  • Can suo motu revisional powers of an appellate tribunal be invoked on the basis of information or an application provided by an aggrieved party?
  Read full judgment →
• People Unity of PIA Employees Cba, Karachi vs The Registrar of Trade2015 PLC 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-05-12
  Collective Bargaining AgentTrade UnionIndustrial RelationsReferendumStatutory InterpretationTenure Extension
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an Islamabad High Court order dismissing a writ petition filed by a trade union. The petitioner, a Collective Bargaining Agent (C.B.A.), sought to extend its tenure from two years to three years, relying on the proviso to subsection (11) of section 19 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, which grants an extended term to unions with over 5,000 members and multi-province presence. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to an automatic three-year term despite failing to assert this right or verify its membership status at the time of the referendum. The Supreme Court held that the proviso does not mandate an automatic extension. Instead, a union must establish its eligibility and request the extended certification from the Registrar at the time of the referendum. The Court ruled that the petitioner’s failure to agitate this claim for nearly twenty months, coupled with the Registrar’s subsequent announcement of a new referendum, precluded the petitioner from seeking the benefit of the proviso. The petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the proviso to subsection (11) of section 19 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, grant an automatic three-year term to a trade union meeting the membership and geographic criteria?
  • At what stage must a trade union assert its eligibility for a three-year term under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Can a trade union claim an extended term of office after the expiry of its initial two-year certification period?
  Read full judgment →
• Peer Mukarram-Ul-Haq vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 PLC (C.S.) 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-04-07
  civil servicereinstatementjudicial finalityexecutive authoritySupreme Court judgmentconstitutional obligationservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Islamabad High Court's dismissal of the appellant's writ petition regarding his termination from service. The appellant, previously dismissed from the Printing Corporation of Pakistan, had his dismissal upheld by the Supreme Court in 2003. Subsequently, the appellant invoked Section 23 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and was reinstated by the President on the Prime Minister's advice. The core legal question was whether the executive authority could reinstate a civil servant whose dismissal had attained finality through a Supreme Court judgment. The Supreme Court held that the executive cannot override a final judicial decision. It ruled that Section 23 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, does not permit a second appeal after judicial finality, and that executive authorities are constitutionally obligated under Article 190 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to act in aid of the Supreme Court. Consequently, the reinstatement order was declared violative of the Constitution, and the appeal was dismissed, affirming that executive powers cannot be used to nullify Supreme Court judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Can the executive authority reinstate a civil servant whose dismissal has been upheld by a final judgment of the Supreme Court?
  • Does Section 23 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, empower the President to entertain a second appeal after the matter has attained finality in the Supreme Court?
  • Are executive authorities constitutionally obligated to act in aid of the Supreme Court under Article 190 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Peer Muhammad vs Muhammad Yasin, etc2015 LHC 3287, 2015 C.L.R. 1552 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-25Read full judgment →
• Peer Mohammad vs Mohammad Yasin, etc2015 LHC 3287 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-25
  pre-emption suitpresentation of plaintlimitationcivil revisioncourt fee deficiencyministerial establishmentprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arose from a pre-emption suit where the central dispute concerned the validity of the plaint's presentation and the resulting limitation period. The petitioners contended that the suit was time-barred because the plaint was presented to an Ahlmad rather than the Presiding Officer, who was absent on the material date. The Lahore High Court examined whether such presentation to a court official, followed by submission to a Tehsildar, satisfied the procedural requirements for instituting a suit. The Court held that under Order IV, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a plaint may be validly presented to an officer appointed in that behalf when the Presiding Officer is unavailable. The Court affirmed that such ministerial acts, when authorized, constitute valid institution of a suit. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a court must provide an opportunity to rectify court fee deficiencies before rejecting a plaint. Consequently, the Court dismissed the revision, upholding the lower courts' findings that the suit was filed within the limitation period and the procedural requirements were satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presentation of a plaint to an Ahlmad in the absence of the Presiding Officer constitute a valid institution of a suit?
  • Is a court required to provide an opportunity to a plaintiff to make up a deficiency in court fee before rejecting the plaint?
  • Does the Limitation Act apply when a court is closed or the Presiding Officer is on leave on the last day of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Peer Bakhsh vs SHO, etc2015 KLR Criminal Cases 211 · Lahore High Court · 2010-02-25Read full judgment →
• Peer Ally Imran etc. vs Nawaz Sharif etc.2015 LHC 3714 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-22Read full judgment →
• Peer Ally Imran and otherss vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others2015 LHC 3714, 2015 PLD Lahore 671 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-22Read full judgment →
• Pathan vs The State2015 NLR Criminal 186, 2015 SCMR 315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-27
  MurderOcular accountEyewitness testimonyUnnatural conduct of witnessesMotiveBenefit of doubtAppealAcquittalQanun-e-Shahadat Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns an appeal against a murder conviction where the death penalty, initially awarded by the trial court, was converted to life imprisonment by the High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to assess the legal worth and probative value of the ocular account, particularly considering the unnatural conduct of the eye-witnesses. The core legal questions revolved around the credibility of eyewitness testimony when close relatives remained silent spectators during a prolonged attack, and the reliability of the prosecution's stated motive. The Court observed that the three alleged eyewitnesses, including the deceased's son, failed to intervene despite the deceased receiving 19 stab wounds from scissors, which would have taken considerable time. This unnatural conduct rendered their presence at the crime scene highly doubtful, leading the Court to disbelieve their testimony. Furthermore, the prosecution's motive, based on a teacher's transfer by the head teacher, was found to be artificial, unproven, and legally unsound, further weakening the case. The Supreme Court held that once the ocular account is discarded, other corroborative evidence, like the recovery of scissors, is insufficient for conviction on a capital charge. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, extending the benefit of doubt to the appellant, and his conviction and sentences were set aside, leading to his acquittal.

  Read full judgment →
• Paspida vs Federation of Pakistan and others2010 SHC 1 · Sindh High Court · 2010-02-18Read full judgment →
• Parvez Akhtar vs Dr. Saeed-Ur-Rehman and others2015 MLD 405 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-01-20
  specific performancepecuniary jurisdictionreturn of appeallimitation actcondonation of delaypublic documentcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by the lower appellate court as time-barred. The petitioner originally filed an appeal against a trial court judgment dismissing his specific performance suit in the High Court, which was subsequently withdrawn for presentation before the proper forum due to pecuniary jurisdiction. Instead of re-submitting the exact returned memo of appeal, the petitioner filed a newly drafted and amended appeal before the District Court after a delay. The core legal question was whether filing a freshly drafted appeal rather than the original returned memorandum, coupled with delayed presentation, entitles the appellant to the exclusion of time under the Limitation Act. The Peshawar High Court held that when a plaint or memorandum of appeal is returned for presentation to the proper court, it must be presented as-is without alteration, as it forms part of the public record; filing a fresh or amended appeal constitutes a new institution, and wrong advice or negligence of counsel does not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does filing a newly drafted appeal instead of re-submitting the original returned memorandum of appeal deprive the appellant of the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act?
  • Whether wrong or ill advice of counsel can be considered a 'sufficient cause' for the condonation of delay under the Limitation Act?
  • Is litigating before a wrong forum considered a bona fide act in law for the purpose of condoning delay?
  • Can an appellant amend or file a fresh memorandum of appeal after it has been returned for presentation before the proper forum?
  Read full judgment →
• Parveen Akhtar and 3 others vs Additional District and Session Judge, Muzaffarabad and others2015 PLD High Court (AJ&K) 7 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-10-30Read full judgment →
• Pakistan WAPDA Employees Pegham Union vs Member, National2015 PLC 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-03-14
  Leave to appealWrit jurisdictionTrade union registrationIndustrial Relations ActCollective Bargaining AgentFactual controversyReferendumConstitutional petitionNational Industrial Relations Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution, sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition challenging the registration of an industry-wise workers' union by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). The core legal question concerned whether the union's registration violated Sections 7 and 8 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, due to alleged irregularities in the approval of its constitution and claims of corruption in the Registrar's office, and if such factual controversies could be resolved in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court held that allegations of factual controversies, including corruption or irregularities in union registration documents, cannot be resolved in writ jurisdiction, especially when no illegality or voidness in the Registrar's order was demonstrated. The Registrar had found all documents in order and registered the union in accordance with law. The Court reiterated that the law does not envisage a full-fledged inquiry by the Registrar at the registration stage; such issues can be agitated during a referendum for electing a Collective Bargaining Agent.

  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2015-IHC-177 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-28
  Income Tax Ordinance 2001Excessive delegationFiscal statutesJurisdiction of tax authoritiesShow cause noticeConstitutional petitionMachinery provisionsAggrieved person
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment addresses multiple writ petitions challenging notices issued under Section 122(5-A) read with Section 122(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 and the constitutionality of Sections 122(5-A) and 210 of the Ordinance. The petitioners contended that the impugned notices were issued by officers lacking the requisite grade (BPS-19/20) and that the statutory provisions constituted excessive delegation of legislative power. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the notices were issued by competent authorities. It ruled that the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 does not prescribe specific Basic Pay Scale (BPS) grades for the exercise of powers by Income Tax authorities, and courts cannot read such requirements into fiscal statutes. Furthermore, the Court held that Sections 122 and 210 do not constitute excessive delegation of legislative power but are valid machinery provisions. The key principle established is that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly according to their express language, while machinery provisions are construed liberally to ensure effective tax administration, and legislative discretion granted within a clear statutory framework does not violate constitutional guarantees.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 require an officer to hold a specific Basic Pay Scale (BPS) grade to exercise the powers of a Commissioner or Additional Commissioner?
  • Do Sections 122 and 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?
  • Can a show cause notice issued under Section 122(5-A) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 be challenged as an adverse order under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Are machinery provisions in a fiscal statute subject to the same strict construction as charging sections?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust (Ptet) through M.D., Islamabad and others vs Muhammad Arif and others2015 SCMR 1472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-12
  pension increasetransferred employeesstatutory protectioncivil servantsvested rightstelecommunication sectorterms and conditions of servicepension trust
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions arose from judgments of the Islamabad and Peshawar High Courts regarding the entitlement of former Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department (T&T) employees to pension increases. The respondents, who were transferred first to the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation and subsequently to the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), alleged that the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust (PTET) abruptly stopped applying pension increases announced by the Federal Government in 2010. The petitioners argued that PTCL is a private entity and the Trust has discretionary policy-making powers regarding pension rates. The Supreme Court held that under Section 9 of the Act of 1991 and Sections 35, 36, and 46 of the Act of 1996, the terms and conditions of service for transferred employees were statutorily guaranteed and could not be varied to their disadvantage. The Court ruled that since these employees were originally civil servants, they remained entitled to pensionary benefits, including increases, at the rates announced by the Federal Government. The Trust is legally bound to fulfill these obligations as part of the protected terms of service.

  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust (Ptet) through its M.D., Islamabad vs Muhammad Arif and others2015 P.S.C. 1317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pension increasetransferred employeesvested rightsstatutory protectioncivil servantswrit jurisdictionpension fund
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions challenging judgments of the Islamabad and Peshawar High Courts, which had allowed writ petitions filed by former employees of the Pakistan Telegraph & Telephone (T&T) Department. The respondents, who were transferred first to the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation and subsequently to the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), challenged the abrupt stoppage of pension increases that matched those announced by the Federal Government. The core legal question was whether these transferred employees were entitled to pension increases announced by the Federal Government, or if their pensions were subject to the sole discretion of the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust (PTET). The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the terms and conditions of service, including pensionary benefits, of the transferred T&T employees were statutorily protected under the relevant re-organization acts. The Court laid down the principle that pension is a vested right and not a bounty, and that statutory protections prevent the alteration of service terms to the employees' disadvantage, thereby binding the Trust to pay pension increases in line with government announcements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees transferred from a government department to a statutory corporation and then to a public limited company retain their civil servant status and statutory terms of service?
  • Can a statutory trust alter or reduce the pensionary benefits of transferred employees to their disadvantage where such benefits are protected by legislative guarantees?
  • Are former employees of the T&T Department transferred to PTCL entitled to the pension increases announced by the Federal Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. vs Pakistan2015-IHC-68 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-13Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. vs Pakistan2015 PLD Islamabad 184 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-05
  subordinate legislationultra virespenaltytelecommunication chargesdelegated legislationstatutory interpretationregulatory powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 7(1) of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (Re-organization) Act 1996 challenged an enforcement order imposing a penalty for non-payment of annual charges for allocated numbers. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority possesses the statutory power to impose penalties or create financial liabilities through subordinate legislation (Regulations) without complying with the parent statute's prescribed mechanisms. The Islamabad High Court held that delegated legislation cannot go beyond the scope of the parent statute and that the imposition of a penalty or charge through regulations without fulfilling the mandatory prerequisites of Section 5(2)(p) of the Act is ultra vires, void, and inoperative. The key principle laid down is that punitive actions and financial charges must be explicitly authorized by the parent statute, and subordinate legislation cannot bypass statutory limitations or render specific statutory provisions redundant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority can impose a penalty or financial charge through Regulations without complying with Section 5(2)(p) of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (Re-organization) Act 1996?
  • Can subordinate legislation create punitive liabilities or charges that exceed the scope of the parent statute?
  • Does Section 5(1) of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (Re-organization) Act 1996 grant general powers to the Authority to levy charges or impose penalties independent of specific statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →