Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 233,147 judgments in total.

• Mansoor Ahmed Mughal---Decree Holder vs Noor Qadir Tawaqal and 3 others2015 CLD 1404 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-04Read full judgment →
• Mansoor Ahmed Bajwa vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2015 KLR Labour & Service Cases 78 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-26Read full judgment →
• Manna N Feroz vs Shomaila2015 YLR 1235 · Lahore High Court · 2014-05-27
  NikahnamaActionable claimCivil revisionDowerDivorceContractual obligationShariah lawFamily Courts jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision challenged an appellate court judgment that decreed a wife's suit for recovery of a sum stipulated in the Nikahnama, payable upon divorce. The petitioner argued that such a condition violated Shariah law and public policy, relying on Supreme Court precedents regarding restrictions on divorce rights. The core legal question was whether a contractual stipulation in a Nikahnama requiring payment upon divorce is enforceable as an actionable claim in a civil court. The High Court dismissed the revision, holding that a Muslim wife may lawfully stipulate for financial claims in the event of divorce, and such conditions are neither against public policy nor Shariah law. The Court affirmed that while such claims may not be enforceable within the special jurisdiction of Family Courts, they constitute valid actionable claims enforceable through a civil court of competent jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellate decree in favor of the respondent was upheld, confirming that the contractual obligation regarding the payment upon divorce remained binding and enforceable against the husband.

  Questions settled

  • Is a condition in a Nikahnama requiring payment to the wife upon divorce enforceable as an actionable claim?
  • Does a condition in a Nikahnama regarding payment upon divorce violate Shariah law or public policy?
  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to enforce a claim arising from a Nikahnama condition that is not within the jurisdiction of a Family Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mandi Hassan alias Mehdi Hussain and another vs Muhammad Arif2015 NLR Civil 176, 2015 P.S.C. 676, 2015 PLD Supreme Court 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-17
  civil revisionnon-prosecutionrestoration applicationlimitation periodresiduary articleinherent jurisdictionSection 115 CPCArticle 181 Limitation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether an application for the restoration of a civil revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution is governed by a specific 30-day limitation period or the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The appellants' civil revision was dismissed at the motion stage for non-prosecution, and their restoration application, filed after eight months, was dismissed by the High Court as time-barred. The Supreme Court clarified that revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is a valuable right of an aggrieved party, not a mere privilege. It held that while the CPC lacks specific provisions for the dismissal and restoration of revisions (unlike suits or appeals), courts may exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC to restore such matters. Consequently, as no specific Article in the Limitation Act applies to such applications, the residuary Article 181 applies, prescribing a three-year limitation period. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for a decision on the merits of the restoration application.

  Read full judgment →
• Managing Director, Motels, PTDC and others vs Presiding Officer and others2015 PLC 166 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-19
  trans-provincial establishmentjurisdiction of labour courtNational Industrial Relations Commissionconstitutional petitionindustrial relationsreinstatementfunctus officio
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged an order passed by the Presiding Officer of the Punjab Labour Court directing the implementation of a reinstatement and wage order in favor of an employee of Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation (PTDC). The core legal question was whether a Provincial Labour Court retained jurisdiction to entertain implementation or other proceedings regarding an employer with trans-provincial status after the promulgation of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Lahore High Court held that once an employer operates establishments or branches in more than one province, the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) possesses exclusive jurisdiction over industrial disputes and related proceedings, rendering the Provincial Labour Court functus officio. The key principle laid down is that jurisdiction in such labor matters is determined by the trans-provincial status of the employer rather than the nature of the specific dispute or the interim/implementation character of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Provincial Labour Court retain jurisdiction to entertain implementation proceedings against an employer with trans-provincial operations after the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Does the nature of the dispute or the status of the employer determine the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission over a provincial labour court?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against an order passed by a forum that has become coram non judice, despite the availability of an alternate remedy?
  • Does Section 57 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 bar Provincial Labour Courts from taking action in matters falling within the exclusive domain of the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  Read full judgment →
• Managing Director, Karachi Fish Harbour Authority vs M/s. Hussain (Pvt) LtdSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Manager ZTBL vs Jind Wadda2015 PLJ Lahore 602 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-11Read full judgment →
• Malik Tilla Muhammad vs Director General Excise & Taxation, Auqaf2015 PLJ Peshawar 442 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Malik Tariq Mehmood. vs Regional Police Officer, Rawalpindi Region, Rawalpindi and anothers2015 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 194 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  service appealmajor penaltyregular inquiryprinciples of natural justiceshow-cause noticeforfeiture of serviceinefficiency
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, challenging the orders of the District Police Officer and the Regional Police Officer, which imposed a penalty of forfeiture of approved service for one year upon the appellant, a Sub-Inspector, for alleged inefficiency. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in a major penalty without a regular inquiry and considered performance metrics outside the scope of the original show-cause notice, were legally sustainable. The Tribunal held that the impugned orders were passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Specifically, the department failed to conduct a regular inquiry, which is a prerequisite for imposing a major penalty, and improperly considered performance data for September 2011 and past service records that were not mentioned in the initial show-cause notice. The Tribunal established that disciplinary actions based on arbitrary assessments without providing the accused a fair opportunity to defend against specific allegations are unsustainable. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside, and the matter was remanded for de novo proceedings in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is a regular inquiry mandatory before imposing a major penalty under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act 2006?
  • Can a disciplinary authority consider performance periods or service records not mentioned in the original show-cause notice when imposing a penalty?
  • Does the absence of specific guidelines for performance evaluation render a disciplinary punishment arbitrary?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Tahir Mehmood vs Not2015 CLC 1247 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-02-25Read full judgment →
• Malik Tahir Ayub through Special Attorney vs Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and 2 others2015 PLD Lahore 57 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-13
  dower recoveryspecial power of attorneyFamily Court jurisdictionstrict construction of power of attorneymatrimonial disputeexclusive jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, which had reversed the trial court's decision and decreed the respondent's suit for the recovery of dower (cash and gold ornaments). The core legal questions concerned whether the Family Court possessed jurisdiction over a dispute involving dower allegedly retrieved by the husband after payment, and whether a special power of attorney, limited to a dissolution of marriage suit, authorized an attorney to contest a separate suit for recovery of dower and maintenance. The High Court held that the Family Court retains exclusive jurisdiction over dower disputes, even if the dower was initially paid but subsequently retrieved by the husband. Furthermore, the Court held that a special power of attorney must be strictly construed; an attorney authorized only for a dissolution of marriage suit lacks the authority to file a written statement or represent the principal in a separate recovery suit. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the appellate court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Family Court have exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute where dower was paid but subsequently retrieved by the husband?
  • Can a special power of attorney executed for a dissolution of marriage suit be used to contest a separate suit for the recovery of dower and maintenance?
  • Should a special power of attorney be construed strictly to include only the specific functions enumerated therein?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Sheraz Zafar vs The State, etc.2015 LHC 5882 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-04Read full judgment →
• Malik Qurban Ali son of Qurban Ali vs StateSindh High Court · -
  post-arrest bailacid throwingfurther inquiryexoneration by complainantanti-terrorismtentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal bail application arising from a case registered under section 324, PPC, later augmented with sections 336-B, 109, 34, PPC read with section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, regarding an acid-throwing incident. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail when his name was absent from the FIR and initial statements, and when the injured complainant herself filed affidavits and made statements before the court exonerating the applicant and expressing no objection to his release. The Sindh High Court held that the case against the applicant called for further inquiry within the meaning of section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the lack of incriminating material, the omission of his name from the initial police report, and the categorical exoneration by the victim. The court laid down the principle that where an injured complainant voluntarily exonerates an accused person through affidavits and statements before the court, and no direct incriminating evidence connects the accused to the crime at the tentative assessment stage, the accused makes out a strong case for further inquiry and is entitled to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when the injured complainant exonerates him through affidavits and statements before the court?
  • Does the absence of an accused person's name from the initial first information report constitute a ground for further inquiry under criminal procedure?
  • Whether bail can be granted when no direct incriminating material connects the accused to the alleged offense during the investigation stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Nasir Mehmood. vs District Transport Officer etc.2015 LHC 5247 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-10Read full judgment →
• Malik Nasir Mehmood vs District Transport Officer, Multan and 32015 LHC 5247, 2015 PLJ Lahore 1086 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-10Read full judgment →
• Malik Muzaffar Ahmed vs Majlis-e-llmi Society through Muhammad Zubair2015-SCP-139, 2016 P.S.C. 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-12-15
  pre-emptionstatutory interpretationlegislative intentcharitable propertyrejection of plaintdrafting omissionWaqf property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that rejected the appellant's plaint in a pre-emption matter. The core legal question was whether the omission of the word 'purchase' in Section 23 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, meant that property purchased for charitable or religious purposes was not exempt from the right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the omission was an inadvertent drafting error that, if read literally, would defeat the legislature's clear intent to protect such properties. Applying established canons of statutory interpretation, the Court held that it has the authority to supply such omissions to render a statute workable and sensible. Consequently, the Court ruled that the word 'purchase' must be read into Section 23 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The principle laid down is that courts may supply necessary words in a statute where a literal construction leads to absurdity or defeats the manifest purpose of the enactment, ensuring the law remains purpose-oriented and consistent with legislative intent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court supply an omitted word in a statute to give effect to the legislative intent?
  • Is property purchased for charitable or religious purposes exempt from the right of pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991?
  • Does the omission of the word 'purchase' in Section 23 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, render such property subject to pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Munir Ahmed vs Sardar Khair Muhammad Tajik and others2015 CLC 560 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-04-30
  Civil RevisionPossession and Permanent InjunctionConcurrent FindingsJoint Family PropertyRevisional JurisdictionPleadings and EvidenceLease DeedTitle Dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the concurrent judgments of the trial and appellate courts, which dismissed the petitioner's suit for possession and permanent injunction regarding specific units within 'Kabir Building.' The core legal question was whether the petitioner established exclusive ownership and entitlement to possession based on a lease deed, despite claims of joint family property and lack of physical partition. The High Court held that the petitioner failed to prove title, noting that the lease deed was merely a paper transaction for tax purposes without physical possession. Furthermore, the court emphasized that evidence contradicting the pleadings is fatal to a case, and the petitioner failed to substantiate the existence of the specific property units claimed. Relying on established precedents, the Court affirmed that mutation or lease entries alone do not confer title without proof of ownership, and concurrent findings of fact by lower courts cannot be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the lower courts' findings that the petitioner failed to establish his claim through either documentary or oral evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a lease deed or mutation entry alone confer title in the absence of physical possession or proof of ownership?
  • Is it permissible for a party to rely on evidence that contradicts their original pleadings?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be reversed under the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Mukhtar Khan vs Federation of Pakistan and othersSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Tariq vs Muhammad Hussain2015 PLJ Lahore 959 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-29
  promissory noterecovery suitrevenue stampscancellation of stampssummary suitevidence admissibilityex-parte proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a suit for recovery of Rs. 40,000 based on a promissory note filed under Order XXXVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial court dismissed the suit, primarily citing technical defects regarding the non-cancellation of revenue stamps on the pronote and their placement on the reverse side. The core legal question was whether the failure to cancel revenue stamps on a promissory note constitutes a fatal defect that invalidates the instrument, particularly when no objection was raised during the tendering of evidence. The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial court erred in its dismissal. The Court established the principle that an objection regarding the non-cancellation of adhesive stamps on a promissory note cannot be raised at a later stage if it was not contested when the document was initially tendered into evidence. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the affixing of revenue stamps on the back of a promissory note does not constitute a legal defect, thereby decreeing the suit in favor of the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection regarding the non-cancellation of adhesive stamps on a promissory note be raised after the document has been tendered in evidence?
  • Does the affixing of revenue stamps on the back side of a promissory note constitute a legal defect?
  • Is a suit for recovery based on a promissory note maintainable if the revenue stamps were not cancelled at the time of execution?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Riaz and another vs Mrs. Farhat Imrana and anotherPIJ 2015 Karachi 376, 2015 MLD 1191 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-09
  interlocutory injunctiontenancy agreementrent proceedingscivil suitejectmentspecific relieflandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff, a tenant in possession of the suit property, filed a civil suit for declaration, injunction, and damages against the landlady, alleging fraud in the execution of the tenancy agreement. Concurrently, the plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to restrain the landlady from claiming rent and to stay pending ejectment proceedings before the Rent Controller. The core legal question was whether a civil court could issue an injunction to stay proceedings before a Rent Controller initiated by a landlord against a tenant who remains in possession. The Court held that a tenant in possession, who admits the existence of the tenancy, cannot use a civil suit to restrain the landlady from pursuing legal remedies for rent recovery or ejectment. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s request was barred by Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act 1877. Consequently, the application for injunction was dismissed, as the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case to interfere with the statutory rent proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court issue an injunction to stay proceedings pending before a Rent Controller?
  • Does a tenant in possession have the right to restrain a landlord from claiming rent through a civil suit?
  • Is a suit for injunction to stay rent proceedings barred by the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Riaz and another vs Mrs. Farhat Imrana & 2 othersPIJ 2015 Karachi 376 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-09
  injunctiontenancy agreementrent proceedingsejectmentcivil suitSpecific Relief Actstay of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, filed by a tenant seeking to restrain the landlady from claiming rent and to stay pending ejectment proceedings before the Rent Controller. The plaintiff, while admitting the tenancy, alleged fraud regarding the tenancy agreement and sought damages, yet remained in possession of the suit property. The core legal question was whether a civil court can issue an injunction to stay ongoing rent proceedings initiated by a landlord against a tenant who remains in possession. The court held that as long as the tenant remains in occupation, they are bound by the tenancy agreement. Consequently, the court dismissed the application, ruling that a tenant in possession cannot use a civil suit to restrain a landlord from pursuing legal remedies for rent recovery or ejectment. The court further affirmed that such requests for staying rent proceedings are barred by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act 1877, as the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for injunctive relief.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court issue an injunction to stay proceedings pending before a Rent Controller?
  • Is a tenant in possession of property entitled to restrain a landlord from claiming rent through a civil suit?
  • Does a tenant who remains in occupation of premises have the right to challenge the validity of the tenancy agreement while simultaneously refusing to pay rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Rafique vs Mst. Tanveer Jahan and another2015 PLD Islamabad 30 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-26
  DNA testpaternity disputesuccession certificatepersonal libertyconsentprima facie casesummary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from concurrent orders of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's application for a DNA test to challenge the paternity of respondent No. 2 in succession certificate proceedings. The core legal question is whether a court can compel a person to undergo a DNA test or blood sample collection without their consent and in the absence of a strong prima facie case. The Islamabad High Court held that a DNA test cannot be ordered in a routine manner or as a fishing expedition to challenge paternity, and no person can be compelled to provide a blood sample without consent, which would otherwise infringe upon personal liberty. The court established that a strong prima facie case must be established supported by sufficient material, and summary succession proceedings are not the appropriate forum to resolve intricate paternity disputes. The petition was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court compel a person to undergo a DNA test without their consent?
  • Whether a DNA test can be ordered in summary succession proceedings to challenge paternity?
  • What is the threshold of proof required for a court to order a DNA test in paternity cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Rafique vs Mst. Tanveer Jahan & another2015 PLJ Islamabad 94 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-26
  succession certificateDNA testpaternity disputepersonal libertycivil revisionsummary proceedingsprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which dismissed the petitioner's application for a DNA test to determine the paternity of the respondent in succession certificate proceedings. The core legal question was whether a court possesses the authority to compel a party to undergo a DNA test to resolve paternity disputes in summary proceedings, and what evidentiary threshold is required to justify such an intrusion. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts correctly refused the request. The Court affirmed that DNA testing cannot be ordered as a matter of course or to facilitate "fishing expeditions" by litigants. It established that before a court considers ordering such a test—which implicates personal liberty—the applicant must demonstrate a strong prima facie case. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that no individual can be compelled to provide a blood sample without consent, and that summary proceedings, such as those for a succession certificate, are inherently unsuitable for resolving complex, disputed questions of paternity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court compel a party to undergo a DNA test in summary proceedings?
  • Is a strong prima facie case required before a court can order a DNA test?
  • Can a person be compelled to provide a blood sample for a DNA test without their consent?
  • Are proceedings under the Succession Act, 1925, appropriate for resolving complex disputes regarding paternity?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri vs The State2015 PLD Islamabad 85 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-09
  blasphemyextra-judicial killinggrave and sudden provocationburden of proofrule of lawqatl-i-amddeath sentenceanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal and capital punishment reference arose from a judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant for the murder of Salman Taseer, the then Governor of Punjab, under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The appellant admitted to shooting the deceased with his official firearm while deployed as a security guard, raising the defense that the deceased had committed blasphemy by criticizing the blasphemy laws, rendering him liable to be killed under Islamic law, and that the act was committed under grave and sudden provocation. The core legal questions involved whether an individual can take the law into their own hands to execute punishment for alleged blasphemy, whether the defense of grave and sudden provocation was available, and whether the offense constituted terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The Islamabad High Court held that no citizen is authorized to take the law into their own hands or act as an executioner, as Pakistan is a constitutional state governed by law. The court upheld the conviction and death sentence under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, ruling that the murder was premeditated and that extra-judicial killings find no justification in Islamic law or the laws of the land. However, the court set aside the conviction under section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, holding that the specific elements of terrorism were not established. The key principle laid down is that the administration of justice and enforcement of penal laws vest exclusively in the state and its courts, and individual vigilantism under the guise of religious enforcement is unlawful and punishable as murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an individual can take the law into their own hands to execute a person accused of blasphemy?
  • Does criticism of the blasphemy laws amount to the offense of blasphemy under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the defense of grave and sudden provocation is available to an accused who deliberately seeks out or provokes the situation resulting in the homicide?
  • Does the murder of an individual by a security guard assigned to protect him constitute an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Kazim and Others Malik Muhammad Azam and Others2015 NLR Civil 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-22
  banking suitleave to appear and defendconditional leavemortgage securityfraudulent depositrecovery of loancivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil appeals filed against an appellate decree of the High Court, which had partially modified a Banking Court's decree in a suit for recovery of Rs. 33 million filed by Al-Baraka Islamic Bank Ltd. The core legal question was whether the defendants, who alleged that their title deeds were fraudulently deposited by their tax consultant, Sh. Asif Salam, were entitled to leave to appear and defend the suit. The Supreme Court observed that the defendants' allegations of fraud and forgery, when weighed against the circumstances of the case—including the significant delay in the defendants seeking the return of their title deeds—warranted a deeper examination of the merits. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's decree and granted the appellants conditional leave to appear and defend the suit, subject to the cash deposit of Rs. 20 million with the respondent Bank within 30 days. The principle laid down is that where a defendant raises a plausible plea of fraud regarding the deposit of security documents, conditional leave to defend may be granted to ensure a fair trial, provided the defendant satisfies the court's conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant be granted conditional leave to appear and defend a banking suit when alleging that security documents were deposited fraudulently?
  • Does the failure to deposit a court-ordered amount within a specified timeframe result in the dismissal of an appeal?
  • Is a delay of several years in seeking the return of title deeds a relevant factor for a Banking Court to consider when evaluating an application for leave to defend?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Asim vs The State & another2015 LHC 7903 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-14
  pre-arrest baildishonoured chequemala fidemultiple FIRssingle liabilityabuse of processSection 489-F PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves a petition for pre-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, concerning a dishonoured cheque issued for a business transaction. The core legal question is whether pre-arrest bail should be granted when multiple FIRs are registered for separate cheques stemming from a single financial liability, indicating potential mala fide on the part of the complainant. The Lahore High Court held that registering successive criminal cases for different cheques issued for a single liability reflects patent mala fide and an attempt to use criminal proceedings as a tool for recovery, entitling the accused to pre-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that splitting a single financial liability into multiple criminal cases by filing successive FIRs for different cheques dishonoured simultaneously is an abuse of process and constitutes mala fide, warranting the grant of pre-arrest bail to prevent harassment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted when a complainant registers multiple FIRs for different cheques issued against a single financial liability?
  • Does the registration of successive criminal cases for cheques dishonoured simultaneously reflect mala fide on the part of the complainant?
  • Can criminal proceedings under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, be used as a tool for the recovery of money?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Asif Raza and anothers vs State and anotherPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Lahore) 253 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-13Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Ashraf vs District Judge, Bahawalpur, Etc.s2015 NLR Revenue 87 · Lahore High Court · 2013-10-09Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Akhtar vs Asj etc.2015 LHC 5094 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-11Read full judgment →
• Malik Mohsin Sajjad vs University of PESHAWARthrough Vice-Chancellor2015 YLR 590 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-01-20Read full judgment →
• Malik Khanzada Khan vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary2015 PLJ Peshawar 273 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Malik Jawed and another vs The State and another2015 P Cr. L J 1315 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-19
  pre-arrest bailtheft of gasplea of alibiprohibitory clausemisidentification in FIRdetection billcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for pre-arrest bail arose from a case registered under Section 462-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning the theft of gas. The petitioners sought bail, contending they were not named in the initial FIR and were falsely implicated. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail despite substantial evidence linking their factory to the unauthorized gas supply. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the initial misidentification in the FIR did not exonerate the petitioners, as subsequent investigation, site plans, and the petitioners' own civil litigation records conclusively linked their premises to the crime. The Court established that a plea of alibi is a matter to be determined during trial upon recording evidence, not at the bail stage. Furthermore, the Court held that where the prosecution presents strong prima facie evidence of massive financial loss to the national exchequer and the accused refuses to address the liability, pre-arrest bail is not warranted. Consequently, the ad-interim bail was recalled.

  Questions settled

  • Does the initial omission of an accused's name in an FIR entitle them to pre-arrest bail when subsequent investigation links them to the crime?
  • Can a plea of alibi be conclusively determined during pre-arrest bail proceedings?
  • Does the refusal to pay a detection bill for gas theft constitute a relevant factor in denying pre-arrest bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail when documentary evidence and civil suit admissions link their premises to the site of the alleged offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Javed Akhtar vs The State, Etc.s2015 NLR Criminal 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-06
  pre-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustentrustmentpublic servantinvestigationbona fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Islamabad High Court, which had refused pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the ingredients of the offence under Section 409, specifically the element of 'entrustment' as contemplated by Section 405, were prima facie satisfied, given that the petitioner was neither a public servant nor a broker. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the applicability of Section 409 appeared suspect due to the lack of evidence regarding entrustment. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner had already joined the investigation, rendering the police's insistence on arrest potentially lacking in bona fides. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted pre-arrest bail to the petitioner. The judgment reinforces the principle that pre-arrest bail may be granted where the applicability of the charged penal provision is prima facie doubtful and the accused has cooperated with the investigation process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of the status of a public servant or broker make the application of Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 prima facie suspect?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted when the accused has already joined the investigation and the necessity for arrest is questionable?
  • Is the element of 'entrustment' under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 a necessary prerequisite for invoking Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Javaid Iqbal vs The State and others2015 PLD Supreme Court 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-18
  post-arrest bailChallan caseprivate complaintstatutory interpretationcriminal procedurebail cancellationremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that granted post-arrest bail to an accused in a Challan case solely because a private complaint regarding the same incident was pending. The core legal question was whether the pendency of a private complaint constitutes a valid statutory ground for bail in a connected Challan case. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s reasoning lacked statutory sanction. The Court clarified that bail in non-bailable offences must strictly adhere to the parameters defined in Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court emphasized that courts cannot invent grounds for bail outside the statute, and the pendency of a private complaint does not justify detention being deemed "without trial" in the Challan case. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision on the merits of the case. The principle laid down is that bail must be granted strictly within the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is the pendency of a private complaint a valid ground for granting post-arrest bail in a connected Challan case?
  • Can a court grant bail on grounds not provided for in Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What are the statutory grounds for granting post-arrest bail in non-bailable offences under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Hashim Amir Khan vs Mst. Saadia Tabassum and another2015 MLD 89 · Lahore High Court · 2013-01-21
  bridal giftsrecovery of gold ornamentswithdrawal of suitres judicatafamily courtwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition under constitutional jurisdiction arose from a dispute regarding the recovery of gold ornaments weighing 21 tolas claimed as bridal gifts by the respondent wife against the petitioner husband. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, noting a prior suit had been withdrawn and a subsequent suit for dowry and gifts had been adjudicated. The Additional District Judge reversed this decision and decreed the suit. The Lahore High Court addressed the core question of whether a subsequent suit for recovery of bridal gifts is maintainable after the unconditional withdrawal of a previous similar suit and the adjudication of another suit for dowry articles where such ornaments were not claimed. The Court held that principles underlying Order XXIII Rule 1 and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to family court proceedings when not inconsistent, and that unconditional withdrawal of the first suit and omission to claim the ornaments in the subsequent suit bar the claim. The writ petition was accepted, setting aside the appellate judgment and restoring the trial court's dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for recovery of bridal gifts is maintainable after the unconditional withdrawal of a previous similar suit?
  • Do the principles underlying Order II Rule 2 and Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings before Family Courts?
  • Can a party claim additional bridal gifts in a subsequent suit after a prior suit for dowry articles and gifts has been decided on merits without claiming those ornaments?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Habib Ullah vs Lahore Development Authority through Director2015 LHC 4878, 2015 YLR 1542 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-06Read full judgment →
• Malik Habib Ullah vs Lahore Development Authority & others2015 LHC 4878 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-06Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Elahi vs Muhammad Akram2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-10-07Read full judgment →
• Malik Aziz ul Haq & 14 others vs M/s Crystal Line Chemical Industries (Pvt.)2015 LHC 7610 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-23Read full judgment →
• Malik Ashiq Hussain vs Collector of Customs, MCC, Islamabad and others2015 PTD (Trib.) 1214 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-07-17Read full judgment →
• Malik Allah Yar vs Mst. Nazran Khatoon, etc2018 MLD 2070, 2015 LHC 619 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-09Read full judgment →
• Malik Abrahim vs The State2015 YLR 2114 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-01
  pre-arrest bailnarcoticsidentification of accusedsecret informercriminal procedurebail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition seeks the confirmation of pre-arrest bail in a case registered under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and The Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner was identified fleeing the scene of a police raid after discarding a bag containing 515 grams of Charas Garda and six bottles of liquor. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the evidentiary basis for his identification. The Court held that the prosecution's case rested solely on the identification provided by a secret informer who was not cited as a witness, and there was no other material on record to prima facie establish the petitioner's identity as the person who fled the scene. Consequently, the Court confirmed the interim pre-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case regarding the identity of an accused relies entirely on an uncorroborated secret informer, and the accused was not apprehended at the spot, the accused is entitled to the concession of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail when the prosecution's identification of the accused relies solely on an uncorroborated secret informer?
  • Does the absence of the accused at the scene of the crime during a police raid constitute a ground for granting pre-arrest bail?
  • Can interim bail be confirmed when there is a lack of prima facie material connecting the accused to the recovered contraband?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Abdul Rehman vs Tehsil Municipal Administration Khanewal2015 PLJ Lahore 445 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Malak Zahoor-Ul-Haq through Special Attorney vs Iind Additional2015 CLC 468 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-26
  typographical errorcorrection of judgmentrent appealejectmentaccidental slipconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arose from the correction of a typographical error by the first appellate court under section 152, C.P.C., in a rent matter. The core legal question was whether the appellate court could lawfully correct an accidental slip where the time granted to a tenant to vacate the premises was typed as 'three years' instead of 'three months'. The Sindh High Court held that the error was an obvious accidental slip and typographical mistake made by the stenographer, and the appellate court rightly corrected it under section 152, C.P.C., as no vested right had accrued to the petitioner based on a clerical error, nor could an unreasonably long period of three years be lawfully granted upon dismissal of a tenant's appeal. The court laid down the principle that clerical mistakes and accidental slips in judgments may be rectified under section 152, C.P.C., provided the correction does not substitute a conscious judicial adjudication, and that courts cannot grant unreasonably lengthy periods to tenants for vacating premises without the landlord's consent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accidental slip or typographical error in a judgment regarding the time allowed to vacate premises can be corrected under Section 152, C.P.C.?
  • Does Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 authorize a court to supplement its judgment with directions that require a fresh application of mind?
  • Can an appellate authority specify an unreasonably long period of time for a tenant to vacate a premises upon the dismissal of an appeal?
  • Does a typographical error granting an excessive period to vacate create an accrued right for a petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Malak Khanzada vs not2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-11Read full judgment →
• Makhna and Two Others vs Ghulam Shabir and Others2015 NLR Revenue 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-10-04
  concurrent findings of factreappraisal of evidencepermanent injunctionpossession suitcivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' civil revision against concurrent findings of the lower courts. The dispute originated from a suit for permanent injunction and possession regarding 23 kanals and 10 marlas of land, which the trial court decreed in favor of the respondent based on evidence, including the testimony of a Patwari and a report from a Local Commission. The appellate court affirmed this decree, and the High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioners' civil revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts warranted interference in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any illegality in the impugned judgment. Emphasizing that the reappraisal of evidence is generally impermissible at the stage of a petition for leave to appeal where concurrent findings of fact exist, the Court dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the lower courts' decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Is the reappraisal of evidence permissible in a petition for leave to appeal where there are concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the absence of any demonstrated illegality in the impugned judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Major (Retd.) Kunwar Nasim KHANPetitioner vs The State and others2015 YLR 2486 · Lahore High Court · 2014-08-06
  pre-arrest bailfraudulent transferland disputemala fide FIRbailable offencesdemarcation proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by Major (Retd.) Kunwar Nasim Khan in respect of FIR No. 290 dated 18-4-2014 registered under Sections 420, 464, and 471, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Sambrial, District Sialkot, concerning allegations of fraud and the illegal transfer of land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to confirmation of pre-arrest bail given the circumstances and the nature of the allegations. The Lahore High Court held that the allegations in the FIR were not borne out by demarcation proceedings, that a prior civil litigation was pending between the parties suggesting a motivated FIR, that certain offences were bailable or non-cognizable without proper magisterial permission, and that the 75-year-old petitioner's case called for confirmation of bail. The court laid down the principle that pre-arrest bail will be confirmed where the criminal proceedings appear to be motivated, lacking supporting evidence from revenue records or demarcation, and where incarceration would be unjust.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be confirmed when allegations in the FIR are not supported by revenue demarcation proceedings?
  • Does the pendency of a prior civil suit between the parties affect the mala fides of a criminal case for the purpose of bail?
  • Whether pre-arrest bail should be granted to an elderly petitioner where offences are bailable or non-cognizable and lack direct connecting evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Major (Retd.) Ahmed Nadeem Sadal, etc vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Sports2015 C.L.R. 171 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Major (Retd.) Ahmed Nadeem Sadal and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Sports, Islamabad and 3 others2015 C.L.R. 171, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 1, 2015 CLC 34 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-05
  constitutional petitionsuppression of factsabuse of processclean handsfrivolous litigationspecial costsPakistan Cricket Board
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution was filed by petitioners challenging amendments made to the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) constitution via a notification dated 10-7-2014. During ex parte arguments, the Court was informed by the Additional Attorney General that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had already settled the matter through a short order and detailed judgment, approving the new PCB constitution and issuing execution directions. The petitioners suppressed these Supreme Court proceedings, short order, and judgment in their petition and subsequent affidavits, despite having received certified copies. The core legal questions were whether deliberate suppression of material facts and abuse of court process warrant outright dismissal and whether the High Court can impose heavy special costs beyond statutory limits under Section 35-A C.P.C. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that equitable constitutional jurisdiction requires clean hands and full disclosure. Finding the petitioners' conduct reprehensible and fraudulent, the Court imposed special costs of Rs. 1,000,000 on each petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does deliberate concealment or suppression of material facts disentitle a petitioner from seeking equitable relief under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution impose heavy costs exceeding the limit specified in Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to deter frivolous litigation?
  • Whether filing a writ petition that suppresses a binding prior Supreme Court judgment on the same subject matter constitutes an abuse of the court process?
  Read full judgment →
• Major (R.) Waqar Ali Shah and 4 others vs Nawab Ali and 5 others2015 C.L.R. 1232 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-09
  regularization of servicescontingent employeesadministrative policydue processintra-court appealstatutory bodiesCabinet Division notification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves multiple Intra-Court Appeals challenging a judgment that declared the regularization of services for various government, semi-government, and statutory employees void ab initio. The core legal question concerned the validity of the regularization process and the appropriate mechanism for reviewing the status of contingent and temporary employees. The court held that the impugned judgment was unsustainable. Relying on a notification issued by the Cabinet Division, the court directed that a newly constituted Committee be responsible for examining regularization cases on their individual merits, strictly adhering to the guidelines set forth in the 2008 policy. The court established that while the regularization policy provides a framework for employment, it does not legitimize illegal appointments. Consequently, departments retain the liberty to initiate proceedings against employees regularized through irregularities, provided that such actions strictly observe the mandatory requirements of due process as guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Committee is mandated to pass speaking orders after affording all parties an opportunity of hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the regularization of government employees under a specific policy preclude departments from taking disciplinary action against those appointed through illegal means?
  • What procedural requirements must a committee follow when reviewing the regularization of government employees to satisfy the constitutional guarantee of due process?
  • Can a court declare the regularization of employees void ab initio when a government-constituted committee exists to evaluate such cases on their individual merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Major (R) Waqar Ali Shah and 4 others vs Nawab Ali and 5 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 220 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-09
  regularization of servicescontract employeescontingent employeesdue processintra court appealadministrative policyservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple Intra Court Appeals challenging a judgment that declared the regularization of services of various contract and contingent employees by a Cabinet Sub-Committee as void ab initio. The core legal question involved the validity of the regularization process and the appropriate mechanism for determining the eligibility of such employees. The Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment, directing that the regularization process be conducted by a newly constituted Committee established by the Federal Government. This Committee is tasked with examining each case on its own merits, adhering to the guidelines set forth in the 2008 regularization policy, and providing an opportunity for a hearing to all affected parties. The Court established that while regularization policies exist, they cannot be implemented to legitimize illegal appointments. Furthermore, departments maintain the authority to investigate and take action against illegal regularizations on a case-by-case basis, provided that any adverse order strictly adheres to the mandatory requirements of due process as guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Can a regularization policy be used to legitimize illegal appointments?
  • Does a department have the authority to initiate proceedings against employees regularized through illegal means?
  • Must an order having an adverse effect on an employee's rights comply with the requirements of due process?
  • Is the regularization of employees by a Cabinet Sub-Committee subject to review by a specifically constituted Committee under the 2008 policy guidelines?
  Read full judgment →
• Majid Khan vs The State2015 P Cr. L J 166 · Lahore High Court · 2013-02-27
  juvenile justicedetermination of ageossification testbirth entryschool leaving certificatecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges the trial court's order dismissing the petitioner's application under section 7 of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, seeking a declaration that he was a juvenile at the time of the offense. The core legal question revolves around the determination of age for juvenile justice purposes, specifically evaluating the evidentiary weight of documentary evidence like a school leaving certificate and union council birth entry versus a unanimous medical board ossification test report. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that documentary evidence such as birth entries and school certificates, which can be created upon self-serving information, are not conclusive proof of age, especially when hospital records fail to corroborate the birth entry and the petitioner himself requested the ossification test whose findings remained unchallenged. The key principle laid down is that where documentary age evidence is dubious or uncorroborated, and an unchallenged medical ossification test conducted pursuant to the accused's own request determines an age well above the statutory juvenile threshold, such medical findings carry determinative weight in age-determination inquiries under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000.

  Questions settled

  • Are birth entries and school leaving certificates conclusive proof of age in juvenile determination inquiries?
  • Can an accused challenge the evidentiary value of an ossification test report that was conducted upon his own request and left unchallenged?
  • What is the evidentiary significance of medical board ossification test findings when hospital records fail to corroborate a union council birth entry?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Shah vs Syed Khalid Hussain Shah, etc.2015 PLJ SC 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-19
  succession mutationlimitation periodco-ownershiprevenue recordFederal Shariat Courtinheritance rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had maintained the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts in favor of the respondents. The core legal questions examined were whether a civil suit challenging a succession mutation was barred by time due to entries in the revenue record, and whether the suspension of a Federal Shariat Court judgment declaring a statutory provision un-Islamic operates indefinitely. The Supreme Court held that where co-heirs become co-owners upon the demise of their propositus, the preparation of every new record of rights confers a fresh cause of action, meaning no length of time extinguishes their rights, and that declarations by the Federal Shariat Court cannot affect previous operations of law or successions taking place before the effective date. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether entries in the revenue record confer a fresh cause of action in suits involving co-heirs and co-owners?
  • Does the suspension of a Federal Shariat Court judgment upon appeal operate indefinitely to allow cases to be decided under laws declared un-Islamic?
  • Can a declaration by the Federal Shariat Court affecting a statutory provision invalidate successions taking place before the effective date of the declaration?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Shah vs Syed Khalid Hussain Shah, Etc.s2015 NLR Civil 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-19
  inheritancesuccessionlimitationco-ownersrevenue recordMuslim Family Laws OrdinanceFederal Shariat Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which maintained lower court decrees in a suit concerning inheritance and succession. The core legal questions were whether a suit challenging a mutation is time-barred when revenue records exclude certain heirs, and whether the declaration of Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 as un-Islamic by the Federal Shariat Court invalidates successions occurring prior to that declaration. The Supreme Court held that co-heirs are co-owners of the property of their propositus upon death, meaning their rights do not extinguish with time, and new entries in revenue records confer a fresh cause of action. Furthermore, the Court held that even if a provision is declared un-Islamic, such a declaration cannot affect the previous operation of law or successions that occurred before the effective date of that declaration. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the rights of co-heirs remain protected regardless of revenue mutations, and that the impugned judgments were in conformity with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exclusion of an heir from a mutation record bar a subsequent suit for inheritance due to the law of limitation?
  • Does a declaration by the Federal Shariat Court that a law is un-Islamic invalidate successions that occurred prior to that declaration?
  • Do co-heirs become co-owners of property immediately upon the death of the propositus regardless of revenue record entries?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Shah vs Syed Khalid Hussain Shah, etc. Civil Appeal No. 734 of 2010,2015 PSC 1531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  inheritanceco-ownershiplimitationmutationMuslim Family Laws OrdinanceFederal Shariat Courtsuccession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that upheld lower court decrees regarding inheritance rights. The core legal questions concerned whether a suit challenging a mutation of succession sanctioned decades prior was time-barred, and whether Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, having been declared un-Islamic by the Federal Shariat Court, could be applied to pending cases. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was not time-barred because co-heirs are deemed co-owners upon the death of the propositus. Consequently, the preparation of new revenue records confers a fresh cause of action, and no length of time extinguishes such proprietary rights. Regarding the second issue, the Court ruled that even if a provision is declared un-Islamic, such a declaration does not affect the previous operation of law or successions occurring before the effective date of the declaration under Article 203D of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that the rights of co-heirs remain protected regardless of revenue mutations, and the impugned judgments were in conformity with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the preparation of new revenue records confer a fresh cause of action for co-heirs challenging a mutation of succession?
  • Can a suit for inheritance by a co-heir be dismissed as time-barred based on the date of the original mutation?
  • Does a declaration by the Federal Shariat Court that a provision is un-Islamic affect successions that took place prior to that declaration?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Shah vs Syed Khalid Hussain Shah and others2015 PLJ SC 616, 2015 SCMR 869, 2015 NLR Civil 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-19
  successionproperty rightslimitationtime-barred suitco-ownersco-heirsmutationFederal Shariat CourtMuslim Family Law Ordinanceconstitutional law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, with leave of the Supreme Court, challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that upheld lower court decrees concerning property succession. The primary legal questions were whether a civil suit filed in 1998, challenging a 1978 mutation, was time-barred, and the effect of the Federal Shariat Court's declaration that Section 4 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance was un-Islamic on past transactions. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the suit was not time-barred because co-heirs become co-owners immediately upon the propositus's demise, and their possession is deemed on behalf of all. Each new record of rights confers a fresh cause of action, preventing the extinguishment of proprietary or possessory rights by time. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Federal Shariat Court's declaration against Section 4 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, even if affirmed, would take effect from March 31, 2000, under Article 203D of the Constitution, and thus could not affect previous operations of law or successions occurring before that date.

  Read full judgment →
• Mahdi Hassan alias Ghulam Abbas and 3 others vs The State and another2015 YLR 782 · Lahore High Court · 2013-11-06
  fair trialcross-examinationprevious statementQanun-e-Shahadat Ordercriminal revisionadmissibility of evidenceRapat Roznamcha
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal revision petitions challenging several interlocutory orders passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Khanewal, during a murder trial. The core legal questions involved whether the trial court correctly disallowed cross-examination questions regarding a specific police record (Rapat Roznamcha No. 16) and whether it properly refused to admit certified copies of said record and denied the summoning of a government official. The High Court held that the trial court erred in restricting the defence's cross-examination, as the Rapat constituted a "previous statement" under Article 140 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which the defence is entitled to use for contradiction. Furthermore, the court ruled that certified copies of official records are admissible and that the accused’s right to summon relevant witnesses is essential to a fair trial. The court emphasized that under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the accused is guaranteed a fair trial and due process. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside, and the trial court was directed to allow the requested cross-examination and admit the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court restrict a defence counsel from cross-examining a witness on a previous statement recorded in a police Rapat?
  • Is a certified copy of a Rapat Roznamcha admissible in evidence during a criminal trial?
  • Does the denial of the right to summon a witness for relevant record constitute a violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a trial court refuse to summon a witness on the ground that the application is intended to delay the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahak Bibi (Rukhsana Iqbal) vs Addl. Sessions Judge, Multan and 32015 PLJ Lahore 138 · Lahore High Court · 2014-05-14Read full judgment →
• Magna Processing Industry (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad vs Commissioner Inland2015 P.C.T.L.R. 183 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-01-08
  zero-rating facilitysales tax on electricitydoctrine of equalitydiscriminationmanufacturer-cum-exportertextile industry
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant matter involves a miscellaneous application for stay against sales tax on electricity bills and an appeal against the Commissioner Inland Revenue's denial of a zero-rating facility to a registered manufacturer-cum-exporter of textiles. The core legal question is whether denying the zero-rating facility on electricity bills to the appellant while granting it to similarly situated manufacturer-cum-exporters constitutes unlawful discrimination violative of constitutional equality principles. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue held that denying the facility while extending it to others in identical circumstances violates Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution. The Tribunal set aside and remanded the impugned order with directions to provide a hearing and pass a speaking order without unlawful discrimination, while dismissing the stay application as infructuous.

  Questions settled

  • Whether denying a zero-rating sales tax facility to a manufacturer-cum-exporter while granting the same to similarly situated units constitutes unlawful discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Is a registered manufacturer-cum-exporter engaged in zero-rated supplies entitled to zero-rating of sales tax on electricity bills under Section 4 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Whether persons placed at the same pedestal can be treated differently in the matter of tax privileges and liabilities?
  Read full judgment →
• Madad Khan & 6 others vs Naseer Ahmad & others2015 PLJ Peshawar 104 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-15
  dismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of suitprocedural technicalitieslimitation periodcivil revisionadjudication on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent orders of the lower courts, which dismissed an application for the restoration of a suit previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether the dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution was legally sustainable given the procedural history, and consequently, whether the application for restoration was time-barred under the Limitation Act. The High Court held that the dismissal of the suit was improper because the petitioners were not at fault, as they had been diligently pursuing the litigation since 1992 and were not properly served or notified of the proceedings leading to the dismissal. The Court emphasized that procedural law is designed to foster justice rather than defeat it through technicalities. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the lower courts, accepted the restoration application, and remanded the matter to the trial court for a decision on the merits, directing an expeditious conclusion of the long-pending case. The principle laid down is that courts should avoid deciding cases on technicalities when doing so denies a party the opportunity for adjudication on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit dismissal for non-prosecution legally sustainable if the plaintiff was not properly served or notified of the hearing date?
  • Does the law favor the adjudication of disputes on merits over the dismissal of cases based on procedural technicalities?
  • Can a court dismiss a suit for non-prosecution when the record indicates the plaintiff has been diligently pursuing the litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Madad Ali Madan & Another vs Faysal Bank Limited & OthersSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mada Meer Jan and another---Appellants vs The State and 2 others2015 YLR 1661 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-04-02
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtocular accountmedical evidencedelay in FIRabscondenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to life imprisonment, alongside a connected revision petition for enhancement of sentence. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the ocular testimony, the unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report, contradictions between ocular and medical evidence regarding the time and nature of injuries, and the evidentiary value of recoveries and abscondence. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, as the eyewitness's presence was doubtful, the medical evidence directly contradicted the ocular account, and corroborative pieces like recovery and absconsion could not sustain a conviction in the absence of reliable substantive evidence. The court laid down the principles that benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right when prosecution evidence is pregnant with contradictions, and that corroborative evidence such as abscondence or weapon recovery cannot replace substantive proof.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report creates serious doubts regarding the prosecution case?
  • Can medical evidence contradicting the ocular account regarding the time and nature of injuries discredit the testimony of an alleged eyewitness?
  • Does the recovery of crime empties serve as sufficient corroboration when the direct substantive evidence has been disbelieved?
  • Can mere abscondence of an accused form the basis for conviction in the absence of reliable substantive evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Machia through L.Rs. and others vs Altaf Hussain Shah through L.Rs. and others2015 C.L.R. 656, 2015 CLC 657 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-08Read full judgment →
• Machia (Deceased) through L.Rs., etc vs Altaf Hussain Shah through L.Rs., etc2015 C.L.R. 656 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MaAHMED Nadeem Sadal and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Sports, Islamabad and 3 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M.R. Industries vs SESSI & Others2015 NLR Labour 40 · Sindh High Court · 2014-05-14
  social security courtcontribution demandinterim relieffurnishing securityrecovery of arrearsland revenueappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Sindh Social Security Court requiring the petitioner to furnish security for a contribution demand during the pendency of an appeal under Section 59 of the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965. The core legal questions centered on whether the Social Security Court could suo motu mandate security as a prerequisite for maintaining an appeal, and whether the mere filing of an appeal automatically stays recovery proceedings under the Land Revenue Act. The Sindh High Court held that the Social Security Court lacks the power to demand security on its own motion or as an automatic precondition for filing an appeal, because filing an appeal does not operate as an automatic stay. However, the Court clarified that interim relief or stay of the impugned demand may be granted by the Social Security Court upon a formal application by the appellant, subject to furnishing solvent security or a bank guarantee. Furthermore, the institution remains free to recover dues as arrears of land revenue unless an explicit stay is granted.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Social Security Court suo motu direct an appellant to furnish security or a bank guarantee as a precondition for maintaining an appeal under Section 59 of the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965?
  • Does the mere filing of an appeal before the Social Security Court automatically operate as a stay against the recovery of contribution demands?
  • Can the Social Security Institution resort to the recovery of unpaid contributions as arrears of land revenue during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Under what circumstances can the Social Security Court grant interim relief to stay an impugned demand of contribution?
  Read full judgment →
• M.R. Industries through Managing Partner vs Sindh Employees' Social2015 PLC 72 · Sindh High Court · 2014-05-16
  social security courtprovincial employees social security ordinancerecovery of contributionarrears of land revenueinterim relieffurnishing securityappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the First Sindh Social Security Court requiring the petitioner to furnish security during the pendency of an appeal filed under Section 59 of the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, against a contribution demand. The core legal question was whether the Social Security Court could suo motu or as a mandatory prerequisite compel an appellant to furnish security or bank guarantee upon the mere filing of an appeal, and whether mere filing of an appeal operates as a stay of recovery. The Sindh High Court held that the Social Security Court lacks the power to order security on its own motion as a prerequisite for filing an appeal, and that mere filing of an appeal does not stay the recovery of contributions. However, interim relief or stay of demand can be granted by the appellate court upon an application, subject to furnishing solvent security or bank guarantee, failing which the institution remains free to recover dues as arrears of land revenue. The petition was disposed of accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Social Security Court possess the power to order an appellant to furnish security or a bank guarantee on its own motion as a prerequisite for filing an appeal under Section 59 of the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965?
  • Does the mere filing of an appeal before the Social Security Court automatically operate as a stay against the recovery of contribution demands?
  • Can the Social Security Institution resort to the recovery of unpaid contributions as arrears of land revenue during the pendency of an appeal if no stay order has been granted?
  • Under what circumstances can the Social Security Court condition the grant of a stay of demand upon the furnishing of solvent security or a bank guarantee?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Waqas vs The State etc.2015 LHC 2510 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-15
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirydelay in FIRArsh or Damanprevious non-convict
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a petition filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, whereby the petitioner sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No.459/2014 registered under Sections 337A(iii), 354, 379, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail considering the delayed FIR, the nature of the role attributed, the applicability of penal sections, and the completion of the investigation. The Court held that the petitioner has made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, noting an unexplained eighteen-day delay in the FIR, contradiction in the weapon's use during investigation, potential applicability of Section 337N(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the fact that the petitioner is a previous non-convict whose further incarceration would serve no useful purpose. The key principle laid down is that while deciding bail, the likely punishment under the circumstances of the case is to be considered rather than the maximum punishment, and statutory provisions regarding previous convictions and alternative punishments such as Arsh or Daman are relevant for further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained delay in the registration of an FIR is a relevant ground for granting post-arrest bail?
  • Does the applicability of Section 337N(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 make a case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is maximum punishment or the punishment likely to be awarded to be considered while deciding a bail petition?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Tabassum Aftab AlVi, JJSyed Ghulam Hassan Shah vs Muslim2015 PLJ AJ&K 202, 2015 CLD 1705 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-04-14
  banking courtex parte decreerecovery of financemandatory noticecompetency of appealfinancial institutions ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an ex parte decree passed by the Banking Court in favour of the respondent-plaintiff for the recovery of a loan under a running finance facility. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of the appeal and the mandatory requirement of serving a pre-institution notice of appeal to the respondent under section 22(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, read with Order XLIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The High Court held that giving notice of the filing of the appeal to the respondent before presentation is a mandatory condition precedent for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed as incompetent and not maintainable due to the appellant's failure to serve the required notice, establishing that statutory prerequisites for filing an appeal against a Banking Court decree must be strictly fulfilled.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service of a pre-institution notice of appeal under section 22(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read with Order XLIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is mandatory?
  • Does the failure to give notice of the filing of an appeal against a Banking Court decree render the appeal incompetent?
  • Can an appeal be preferred against a decree passed ex parte by a Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Shafiq Khan vs State2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-09Read full judgment →
• M. Rehman Zeb etc vs Sardar Khan etc2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-10Read full judgment →
• M. Iqbal vs The State2015 P Cr. L J 535 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-08
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaytrial adjournmentexpeditious trialcriminal procedurebail application
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, facing trial for an offence under section 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought post-arrest bail from the Sindh High Court on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of his trial, invoking the proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The applicant had been in custody for approximately 25 months. The prosecution opposed the bail, arguing that the applicant was responsible for the delay through frequent adjournments sought by the defence, despite the presence of prosecution witnesses. The Court examined the trial diary sheets and determined that the delay was primarily attributable to the applicant's side, as numerous adjournments were requested while witnesses were present. Consequently, the Court held that the statutory benefit of delay could not be extended to an accused who actively contributes to that delay. The bail application was dismissed, and the trial court was directed to expedite the proceedings and conclude the trial within thirty days, with the Sessions Judge instructed to personally oversee the matter to ensure compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused claim the benefit of statutory delay for bail if the delay in trial is attributable to the defence?
  • Does the frequent seeking of adjournments by the defence preclude an accused from claiming statutory delay under section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the legal requirement for a trial court when granting adjournments under section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Lucky Cement Ltd., having its offices at Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan vs Commissioner Income Tax, Zone Companies, Circle-52015 P.C.T.L.R. 1147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income from other sourcesbusiness incomeMemorandum of Associationtaxation of surplus fundsinterpretation of statutesprohibitory clauseIncome Tax Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned whether interest income earned by a company from investing surplus funds during the construction phase of its primary cement manufacturing plant constituted "income from business" or "income from other sources" under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that such income is taxable as "income from other sources." The Court reasoned that the company’s Memorandum of Association must be interpreted as a whole. Specifically, a "notwithstanding" clause (Clause 37) that expressly prohibited the company from engaging in the business of investment overrode other permissive clauses (Clause 6) that authorized the company to invest its money. The Court established the principle that where a company’s constitutional documents contain a clear prohibitory clause against engaging in investment as a business, income generated from such investments cannot be classified as business income, regardless of the company's commercial prudence in utilizing idle funds. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, affirming that the income fell under the residuary head of "income from other sources."

  Questions settled

  • Whether income earned from the investment of surplus funds by a company during the construction of its primary plant constitutes business income or income from other sources?
  • Does a prohibitory clause in a Memorandum of Association override permissive clauses regarding investment activities?
  • Can a company claim that investment income is business income if its Memorandum of Association expressly prohibits the business of investment?
  Read full judgment →
• Lucky Cement Ltd. vs Commissioner Income Tax, Zone Companies, Circle-5, Peshawar2015 PTD 2210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-10
  income taxincome from other sourcesbusiness incomememorandum of associationtax assessmentsurplus fundsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax appeal concerned whether income generated from the investment of surplus funds by a company during the construction phase of its cement plant should be classified as "income from business" or "income from other sources" under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The appellant argued that its Memorandum of Association (MOA) permitted such investments as a business activity. The Court, by a majority, held that the income must be classified as "income from other sources." The ratio established that the MOA must be construed as a whole. Specifically, a prohibitory clause in the MOA, which explicitly restricts the company from engaging in the business of investment, finance, or leasing, overrides permissive clauses that might otherwise authorize such activities. Consequently, even if a company possesses the power to invest surplus funds, if the MOA expressly prohibits the company from indulging in the business of investment, the resulting income cannot be characterized as business income for tax purposes. The principle laid down is that the specific prohibitory language in a corporate charter dictates the tax characterization of income derived from non-core activities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether income earned from the investment of surplus funds by a company during the construction phase of its primary project constitutes business income or income from other sources?
  • Does a prohibitory clause in a company's Memorandum of Association override permissive clauses regarding the nature of business activities for tax purposes?
  • Can interest income earned on surplus funds be treated as business income if the company's Memorandum of Association expressly prohibits the business of investment?
  Read full judgment →
• Lucky Cement Ltd vs Commissioner Income Tax, Zone Companies, Circle-5, Peshawar2015 P.C.T.L.R. 1147, 2015 PTD 2210, 2015 SCMR 1494, 2015 CLD 1482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-10
  income taxincome from businessincome from other sourcesMemorandum of Associationcompany lawstatutory interpretationsurplus fundsinvestment incometaxation of companiestax appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether income derived by a cement manufacturing company from investing its surplus funds during the plant's construction phase constituted "income from business" or "income from other sources" for tax purposes. The appellant company argued that its Memorandum of Association (MOA) permitted such investments as an independent business activity (Clause 6 read with Clause 36). The revenue department contended that a prohibitory clause (Clause 37) in the MOA, precluding the company from undertaking "investment business," meant such income fell under "other sources." By a majority of 2:1, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court and Income Tax Tribunal's decision. The majority held that despite general authorization for investment, Clause 37, prefixed with "Notwithstanding," explicitly barred the company from indulging in the "business of investment." Therefore, the income generated from these surplus funds, prior to the commencement of the primary cement business, was correctly assessed as "income from other sources" under Section 30(2)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The ruling emphasized that the classification depends on whether the activity is part of the company's normal business, not merely an authorized power.

  Read full judgment →
• Lucky Cement Limited vs HMS Bergbau Ag & othersSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Lt.-Col. (Rtd.) Ghazanfar Abbas Shah vs Mehr Khalid Mehmood Sargana2015 SCMR 1585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-27
  election petitionverification of pleadingsoath commissionersummary dismissalrepresentation of the people actpresumption of official actsmandatory complianceaffidavit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the Election Tribunal's dismissal of an election petition due to defective verification under the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The core legal question concerns whether an election petition lacking proper verification—specifically missing the date, place, and explicit certification of oath administration—is liable for summary dismissal, and whether an accompanying affidavit can cure such defects. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the verification requirements for election petitions are mandatory and stringent. The Court affirmed that non-compliance with Section 55(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, necessitates summary dismissal under Section 63. While the Court applied the presumption of official acts under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, to save the current petition from dismissal based solely on the Oath Commissioner's omission, it established a prospective rule: future petitions must explicitly endorse the administration of oath, or they will be liable for dismissal. Additionally, the Court clarified that a flawed affidavit cannot cure a fundamentally defective verification in election proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is the verification of an election petition a mandatory requirement under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • Can a defective verification of an election petition be cured by an accompanying affidavit?
  • Does the failure of an Oath Commissioner to explicitly certify the administration of an oath invalidate an election petition?
  • What are the consequences of non-compliance with the verification requirements of an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  Read full judgment →
• Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Jamshaid Gulzar and another vs Federation of Pakistan2015 PLC (C.S) 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-06-25
  retrospective legislationvested rightstenure of officecolourable legislationlegislative competenceFederal Public Service Commissionservice protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of the Federal Public Service Commission (Amendment) Act, 2006, which curtailed the tenure of the Chairman and Members of the Federal Public Service Commission from five years to three years. The appellants, former Chairman and Members, challenged the retrospective application of this amendment, arguing it violated their vested rights, was a colourable exercise of legislative power, and was mala fide. The core legal question was whether the legislature, through the Act, could validly curtail the tenure of sitting members with retrospective effect, notwithstanding their initial appointment terms. The Supreme Court held that the legislature possesses plenary power to enact laws with retrospective effect by clear intendment. The Court found that the language of the Act, including the non-obstante clause and the deeming provision, explicitly mandated retrospective application. Consequently, the Court ruled that the appellants' vested rights were effectively superseded by the valid legislative enactment. The key principle laid down is that while the legislature's motives are generally irrelevant if it acts within its competence, it may validly take away vested rights through legislation if it does so with clear, express, or implied retrospective intent.

  Questions settled

  • Can the legislature validly curtail the tenure of a statutory office holder with retrospective effect?
  • Does the doctrine of colourable legislation apply when the legislature acts within its constitutional competence?
  • Can vested rights be taken away by a legislative enactment that explicitly provides for retrospective operation?
  • Does the General Clauses Act 1897 protect rights against a subsequent legislative amendment that explicitly intends to operate retrospectively?
  Read full judgment →
• Lt. Col. (Rtd.) Sultan Zeb Khan, Principal vs Board of Governor Fazal-E-2015 PLJ Peshawar 72 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Lt. Col. (Retired) Ghazanfar Abbas Shah vs Mehr Khalid Mehmood2015 SCMR 1585, 2015 PLJ SC 893, 2015 P.S.C. 1214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-27
  election petitionverification of pleadingsOath Commissioneraffidavit attestationRepresentation of the Peoples Actsummary dismissalmandatory provisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976 challenged the judgment of the Election Tribunal dismissing the appellant's election petition for defective verification under Section 55(3) and Section 63 of the Act. The core legal questions involved whether the election petition and its supporting affidavit complied with mandatory verification and attestation requirements, and whether omissions by the Oath Commissioner regarding the administration of oath rendered the petition fatally defective. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the election petition and affidavit indeed suffered from substantial flaws, lacking proper identification, dates, and explicit attestation of oath administration, which under election laws cannot be treated as a mere curable irregularity after the limitation period. However, invoking the presumption of official acts under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 for past cases, the Court ruled that future election petitions must explicitly ensure the Oath Commissioner endorses the physical administration of oath. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the dismissal of the election petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an election petition lacking proper verification in terms of Section 55(3) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976 is liable to be summarily dismissed?
  • Can a defective verification in an election petition be cured by a supporting affidavit when both documents lack mandatory attestation details?
  • Whether the omission of an Oath Commissioner to expressly mention the administration of oath invalidates an election petition filed under the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976?
  • Does the presumption of correctness of official acts under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 apply to cure omissions in the attestation of election petitions by Oath Commissioners?
  Read full judgment →
• Lt. Col. (Retd.) Sultan Zeb Khan vs Board of Governors, Fazle Haq2015 PLJ Peshawar 72, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 1385 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-11-06
  contractual employmenttermination simplicitermaster and servantnon-statutory rulesconstitutional petitionreinstatement in serviceofficial Gazette publicationstigma
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution challenged the termination of the petitioner's contractual employment as Principal of Fazal-e-Haq College, Mardan. The core legal questions were whether a writ petition is maintainable against the termination of a contract employee in an institution governed by non-statutory regulations under the master-and-servant rule, and whether termination simpliciter without stigma requires prior notice or a formal disciplinary inquiry. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Fazal-e-Haq College (Terms and Conditions of Service) Regulation, 2011, having not been published in the official Gazette pursuant to Section 2(41) of the General Clauses Act, lacked statutory force. Consequently, the relationship was purely governed by the principle of master and servant. The Court ruled that termination simpliciter executed strictly under contractual terms—allowing termination with one month's notice or salary in lieu without casting any stigma—violates no statutory rights, and a contract employee cannot seek reinstatement via constitutional jurisdiction, being limited at best to claiming damages before a court of plenary jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a service regulation framed by a statutory body attain statutory status if it has not been published in the official Gazette?
  • Can a contractual employee maintain a constitutional petition under Article 199 seeking reinstatement when the governing service rules lack statutory status?
  • Is an employer legally obligated to hold a formal inquiry or issue a show-cause notice when effecting a termination simpliciter without stigma under an express contractual term?
  • What remedy is available to a contract employee governed by the master-and-servant principle whose services are prematurely terminated without statutory violation?
  Read full judgment →
• Lt. Col. (R) Muhammad Younus vs Pakistan Defence Officers' Housing2015 CLC 1190 · Sindh High Court · 2013-04-19
  civil revisionconcurrent findingsbona fide purchaserpermanent injunctionjurisdictionhousing authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts, which decreed a suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff regarding a residential plot allotted by the Defence Housing Authority (DHA). The core legal questions involved the maintainability of the revision application against concurrent findings of fact, the finality of judgments when a party fails to appeal, and the protection of a bona fide purchaser against alleged fraud by the original allottee. The Sindh High Court held that the revision application was incompetent as the applicant had failed to appeal the trial court's decree and the DHA had allowed the appellate judgment to attain finality against it, and further that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appraisal of evidence cannot be interfered with under revisional jurisdiction in the absence of jurisdictional error or perversity. The key principles laid down are that a party failing to challenge a judgment at the intermediate stage cannot maintain a revision, and that a bona fide purchaser for value cannot be penalized for the administrative negligence or mistakes of a housing authority in allotment and transfer procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who failed to file an appeal against the trial court's judgment maintain a civil revision against the appellate court's order?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact recorded by two courts below can be interfered with under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the absence of a jurisdictional error or misreading of evidence?
  • Can a bona fide purchaser for value be penalized for fraud allegedly committed in the original allotment by a housing authority's negligence?
  • Does the non-joinder of a necessary party defeat civil proceedings in a court of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Lt. Cdr. (R) Abdul Aziz Narejo vs Karachi Port Trust through Chairman2015 PLC (C.S.) 699 · Sindh High Court · 2014-08-29
  wrongful terminationdouble jeopardydisciplinary inquiryad hoc employeeservice lawshow-cause noticereinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an ad hoc employee of the Karachi Port Trust, challenged his termination order, which was based on allegations of misconduct regarding diesel theft. Following an initial inquiry that implicated the petitioner, the employer initiated a second inquiry, which exonerated him of the theft charges but recommended a warning. Despite this, the employer terminated the petitioner’s services relying on the initial, superseded inquiry report and show-cause notice. The core legal question was whether an employer could validly terminate an employee based on a defunct show-cause notice after a subsequent inquiry had effectively dropped the charges. The Court held that the impugned termination order was without lawful authority and jurisdiction. It established the principle that once a second inquiry is conducted, the previous show-cause notice based on an earlier, superseded report abates and becomes non-existent in the eyes of the law. Proceeding on such defunct grounds constitutes double jeopardy and violates due process. Consequently, the Court set aside the termination, declaring it void, and ordered the petitioner's reinstatement with full back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer terminate an employee based on a show-cause notice that has been superseded by a subsequent inquiry?
  • Does conducting a second disciplinary inquiry on the same set of allegations constitute double jeopardy?
  • Is a termination order valid if it relies on an inquiry report that has been effectively abandoned by the employer?
  Read full judgment →
• Loo Khan vs The State2015 P Cr. L J 75 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2014-06-26
  quashment of proceedingssummoning of accusedhostile witnesscorroborative evidencedischarge of accusedSection 265-K Cr.P.C.criminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by the Additional District Judge, Diamer Chilas, which directed the summoning of the petitioner to face trial for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, despite the petitioner having been previously discharged by the investigating authorities under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in summoning the petitioner based solely on the statements of eye-witnesses named in the F.I.R., when the complainant himself had turned hostile and disowned the F.I.R. contents. The Court held that the impugned order was unsustainable. It reasoned that since the complainant, who initially named the witnesses, had declared he was not present at the scene and disowned the F.I.R., relying on those witnesses without any corroborative evidence was unsafe. The Court set aside the summoning order, establishing the principle that summoning an accused to face trial is unwarranted when the foundational evidence is demonstrably unreliable and lacks independent corroboration, thereby serving no useful purpose in the administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court summon an accused to face trial based solely on the statements of witnesses named in an F.I.R. when the complainant has disowned the F.I.R. and turned hostile?
  • Is it legally sustainable to proceed against an accused when the prosecution's evidence lacks any corroborative material?
  • Does the discharge of an accused under Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude a trial court from summoning them if the evidence is found to be unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Light Metal & Rubber Industries Pvt., Ltd., & Ors. vs Sarfraz Quadri2015 SHC 65 · Sindh High Court · 2011-06-01Read full judgment →
• Liberty Papers Ltd., Etc. vs Human Rights Commission of Pakistan2015 NLR Civil 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-17
  defamationdamagesterritorial jurisdictioncause of actionsocieties registrationfreedom of expressiondignity of mannewspaper circulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan which reduced a defamation damages decree against the appellants from five million rupees to one million rupees. The core legal questions involved the competence of the plaintiff organization to sue under the Societies Registration Act, the territorial jurisdiction of courts in defamation suits where a newspaper is circulated, the establishment of cause of action, and the principles governing the assessment of general and aggravated damages for defamation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the plaintiff had established jurisdiction and cause of action in Quetta through unchallenged evidence of newspaper circulation and readership, and that the reduced damages were justified given the gravity of the unverified and defamatory publication against the organization and its office bearers. The Court laid down that jurisdiction in defamation actions lies both where the newspaper is published and where it circulates, that failure to cross-examine witnesses on circulation establishes the cause of action, and that constitutional protections of human dignity and reputation prohibit unbridled freedom of expression that violates professional journalistic ethics.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 can sue in the absence of rules and regulations authorizing specific office bearers?
  • Does the territorial jurisdiction for filing a defamation suit arise where a defamatory newspaper is circulated and read, in addition to the place of publication?
  • Can un-cross-examined testimony regarding newspaper distribution and readership in a specific locality successfully establish a cause of action for territorial jurisdiction?
  • What categories of damages are recoverable under the Defamation Ordinance 2002 for injury to reputation and feelings?
  • Does the constitutional right to freedom of expression override the constitutional protection afforded to human dignity and reputation under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Liberty Papers Ltd. etc vs Human Rights Commission of Pakistan2015 PLJ SC 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-17
  defamationjurisdictioncause of actiondamagesfreedom of expressiondignity of manmedia ethics
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that reduced a defamation damages award from five million to one million rupees against a newspaper publisher. The core legal questions concerned the jurisdiction of the trial court in defamation suits involving inter-provincial publication, the locus standi of the respondent organization to sue, and the principles governing the assessment of defamation damages. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that a defamation suit may be instituted where the defamatory material is published or circulated, as this constitutes a part of the cause of action under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court held that the publisher bears the burden of proving diligent fact-checking and adherence to professional ethics to rebut claims of malice. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that constitutional rights to freedom of expression are not absolute and are subject to the inviolable right to dignity and reputation. It concluded that the appellants failed to justify their conduct or produce evidence, and reaffirmed that media entities must operate within the bounds of professional ethics and the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defamation suit be filed in a jurisdiction where the newspaper is circulated even if the publisher resides elsewhere?
  • Does the publication of defamatory material in a specific jurisdiction constitute a 'cause of action' for the purpose of territorial jurisdiction?
  • What is the burden of proof on a publisher to rebut claims of malice in a defamation suit?
  • Are the constitutional rights to freedom of expression and access to information absolute in the context of defamation?
  Read full judgment →
• Liberty Papers Ltd. and others vs Human Rights Commission of Pakistan2015 PLD Supreme Court 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-17
  defamationdamagesterritorial jurisdictioncause of actionfreedom of expressiondignity of mannewspaper publicationaggravated damages
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan which reduced a defamation damages decree against the appellants from five million to one million rupees. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for defamation can be instituted at the place where the defamatory material is circulated and cause of action arises, the competence of the plaintiff to file the suit, and the principles governing the award of general and aggravated damages for defamation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that territorial jurisdiction in defamation cases lies both where the newspaper is published and where it is circulated, and that the unproven defamatory publication coupled with lack of diligence establishes malice justifying damages. The key principles laid down include the interpretation of territorial jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in defamation suits, the constitutional protection afforded to human dignity and reputation under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and the standards of professional ethics required of the media.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court where a defamatory newspaper is circulated have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages for defamation?
  • What constitutes a cause of action in a defamation suit involving widely circulated print media?
  • Under what heads of damages can compensation be awarded in a defamation action under the Defamation Ordinance 2002?
  • Can unverified and unethical reporting by a media publisher establish malice by implication in a defamation suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaquat National Hospital through Medical Director vs Province of Sindh through Secretary Excise and Taxation and 2 others2015 PLD Sindh 123 · Sindh High Court · 2014-07-15
  property tax exemptioncharitable institutionfiscal statute interpretationexclusive use testSindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Acttax liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the dismissal of a revision application by the Excise and Taxation authorities, which denied the petitioner hospital an exemption from property tax. The core legal question is whether the petitioner, a hospital registered as a society, qualifies for exemption under Section 4(f) of the Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, which requires the property to be used 'exclusively' for public charity. The court held that the petitioner failed to meet the 'exclusively' test because, while it provides some charitable services, it also operates on a commercial basis, and the income is not derived solely from charitable activities. Furthermore, the court noted that the legislative history of Section 4(f), particularly the amendments in 2000 and 2001, indicates a restrictive intent regarding exemptions for hospitals. The court affirmed the principle that exemption clauses in fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly, with the burden of proof on the claimant, and that properties must be used exclusively for the specified charitable purpose to qualify for tax relief.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'exclusively' in Section 4(f) of the Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, preclude tax exemption for a hospital that provides both charitable and paid services?
  • Is a hospital entitled to property tax exemption under Section 4(f) of the Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, if it is not used exclusively for public charity?
  • Does the burden of proof lie with the taxpayer to demonstrate entitlement to a statutory tax exemption?
  • How should an exemption clause in a fiscal statute be interpreted when two reasonable interpretations exist?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Hussain vs The State through Advocate-General of Azad Jammu2015 P.S.C. Crl. 841, 2015 P Cr. L J 1812 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-10-31
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirydelay in FIRcriminal revisionright to bailtentative assessmentprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges the dismissal of a post-arrest bail application by the Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The core legal question is whether the accused is entitled to bail when the prosecution's case involves a significant, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and questionable evidence regarding the complainant's presence at the scene, rendering the case one of 'further inquiry'. The Court held that where the two essential conditions of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are satisfied—namely, that there are no reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed a non-bailable offence, and there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry—the accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right. The Court emphasized that bail cannot be withheld based on judicial practice when a statutory right under Section 497(2) is established. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that keeping an accused in custody indefinitely without trial progress, when investigation is complete, constitutes punishment without trial, which is impermissible. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and bail was granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR constitute sufficient grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be withheld on the ground of judicial practice when an accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is it permissible to keep an accused in custody indefinitely when the investigation is complete and the trial has not commenced?
  • Does the court have the power to grant bail in cases falling under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if tentative assessment reveals doubts regarding the accused's guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Hussain vs The State through Advocate-General of Azad Jammu2015 P.S.C. Crl. 841 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Liaqatullah Khan vs The State and 6 others2015 PLD Peshawar 115 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-03-21
  quashment of FIRSection 561-A Cr.P.CSection 489-F PPCdishonour of chequeinherent jurisdictionabuse of process of courtprofessional misconductlegal ethics
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. seeking the quashment of FIR No. 4/2014 registered under Section 489-F PPC at Police Station Cantt, D.I. Khan. The complainant alleged that the petitioner, engaged as a defense advocate in a murder case, demanded Rs. 2,50,000/- under the pretext of paying a judge as gratification for bail, promising to return the money if bail was rejected. Following rejection, the petitioner executed an agreement and issued a cheque for Rs. 1,50,000/-, which was subsequently dishonored due to insufficient funds and signature discrepancy. The court dismissed the quashment petition, holding that inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. cannot be used to interrupt or deflect the ordinary course of criminal proceedings when a prima facie case exists. The High Court emphasized that such extraordinary powers must be exercised sparingly, only where there is a clear abuse of process, no offence is disclosed, or to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice. It further reminded that remedies like Sections 249-A or 265-K Cr.P.C. remain available during trial.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can the High Court invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR?
  • Can the High Court exercise powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to deflect or interrupt the ordinary course of trial when a prima facie criminal case is disclosed?
  • Does the availability of remedies under Section 249-A or Section 265-K Cr.P.C. before the trial court preclude the quashment of an FIR under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. at an early stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Zaman Khan and others vs Mst. Tazeem Akhtar and others2015 PLJ Peshawar 277 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-23Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali vs The State.2015 LHC 8113 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-15
  narcoticssafe custody of case propertyrepresentative samplechemical examiner reportcriminal appealacquittalControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of narcotics. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution established the safe custody of the recovered contraband and whether the sampling procedure adopted by the police met the legal requirements for a representative sample. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the safe custody of the case property, noting discrepancies in the handling of samples and the unexplained involvement of the Excise and Taxation Office in the dispatch process. Furthermore, the Court found that the sampling procedure was defective because representative samples were not taken from each individual packet or slab, contrary to established precedents. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The key principle laid down is that the prosecution must strictly prove the safe custody of case property, and failure to take representative samples from each separate packet or slab of narcotics renders the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction for the total quantity recovered.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to prove the safe custody of narcotics samples in the Malkhana vitiate a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Is a conviction sustainable if the prosecution fails to take representative samples from each individual packet or slab of recovered narcotics?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the chain of custody for narcotic samples involves an unexplained transfer to an agency not mentioned in the initial recovery report?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali vs The State2015 KLR Criminal Cases 156 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-15
  murdercapital punishmentsolitary eye-witnessmitigating circumstancessentence reductionsudden quarrelcriminal appealmurder reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant, Liaqat Ali, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his wife and sentencing him to death, along with compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the solitary, uncorroborated ocular testimony of the complainant was sufficient to sustain a capital conviction, and whether mitigating circumstances warranted altering the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Lahore High Court held that a conviction can indeed be based on the testimony of a single reliable witness if it inspires confidence, and found that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through credible ocular and medical evidence. However, noting extenuating circumstances—specifically that the offense was committed on the spur of the moment during a sudden domestic quarrel without premeditation—the court altered the sentence from death to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be maintained on the solitary statement of an eye-witness?
  • Whether the absence of recovery of the crime weapon affects the prosecution's case when supported by direct ocular and medical evidence?
  • Does a murder committed on the spur of the moment during a sudden domestic quarrel constitute a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali vs Aitzaz Ahmad and another2015 YLR 709 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-24Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali Sheikh and 3 others vs Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad2015 P.C.T.L.R. 647 · Lahore High Court · 2001-07-24Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali Chalgari vs Senior Member, Board of Revenue, Government2015 PLC (C.S.) 1035 · Balochistan Service Tribunal · 2014-02-13
  transfer and postingcivil servantOfficer on Special Dutytenure of postingservice appealcompetent authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under section 4 of the Balochistan Service Tribunals Act 1974 against a notification transferring the appellant from his post as Tehsildar and directing him to report to the Board of Revenue before completing his normal tenure. The core legal question was whether an immature transfer and turning a civil servant into an OSD without compelling recorded reasons is sustainable in law, and whether a direct appeal to the Service Tribunal is competent in transfer matters. The Balochistan Service Tribunal held that while transfer and posting is a prerogative of the administration, normal tenure must be respected unless exigencies require otherwise, and posting officers as OSD without compelling reasons violates settled apex court principles. The appeal was accepted and the impugned notification was set aside. The key principles laid down are that transfer orders made mala fide or in violation of tenure rules are judicially reviewable by the Service Tribunal, direct appeals in transfer matters are competent to avoid undue delays, and civil servants should not be made OSD except for compelling recorded reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a direct appeal before the Service Tribunal is competent in matters of posting and transfer?
  • Is the transfer and posting of a civil servant considered part and parcel of the conditions of his service?
  • Can a civil servant be posted as an Officer on Special Duty without compelling reasons recorded in writing?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali & 4 others Javed Iqbal alias Dollar Rana Naeem The State. vs The State & another The State & another The State & 16 others Javed Iqbal alias Dollor & 5 others2015 LHC 7218 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-10
  murderbenefit of the doubtocular accountmedical evidenceFIR promptitudecriminal appealcapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the trial court convicting six appellants under sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and attempt to murder, while acquitting several co-accused. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution's ocular account, supported by medical evidence, recoveries, and motive, establishes the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt, notwithstanding discrepancies regarding the precise attribution of firearm injuries and doubts surrounding the timing and preparation of the First Information Report. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution case suffered from exaggeration, suspicious promptitude in a computer-generated report before the victim's death, and humanly impossible precision in assigning specific firearm roles during a chaotic incident. The court laid down the principle that meticulous precision in ocular accounts must be tested against the natural course of probability, and where doubts exist regarding the manner of occurrence and the possibility of a widened net due to political influence, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, resulting in their acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether meticulous precision in an ocular account can be relied upon when it defies the natural course of probability?
  • Does the presence of an injured witness serve as an absolute certification of truth of the prosecution case?
  • Can a conviction carrying capital punishment be sustained on evidence that suffers from exaggeration and a widened net of accused persons?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali & 2 others Mst. Shakila Nargas The State. vs The State The State &2015 LHC 76679 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-17
  murder trialbenefit of the doubtsubstitution of accusedeyewitness credibilitydeath sentencecriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 302(b) read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased and sentencing them to death, alongside connected appeals seeking the confirmation of death sentences and the reversal of co-accused acquittals. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eyewitness testimonies, the possibility of substitution of culprits due to deep-rooted previous enmity, and the reliance on circumstantial and medical evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of the alleged eyewitnesses beyond a reasonable doubt, noting that the medical condition of the deceased rendered an exhaustive dying declaration improbable and that the circumstances suggested a non-deliberate substitution of accused persons based on suspicion. Consequently, the court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellants, set aside their convictions and death sentences, dismissed the appeal against the acquittals, and acquitted the appellants. The key principle laid down is that where deep-rooted enmity exists and the presence of eyewitnesses is doubtful, substitution of real offenders through guesswork or suspicion is a real possibility, warranting the extension of the benefit of the doubt to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of related eyewitnesses is sufficient to sustain a capital conviction when their presence at the scene is rendered doubtful?
  • Can the principle of substitution of real culprits by innocent persons on the basis of suspicion apply in cases involving previous deep-rooted enmity?
  • Whether a dying declaration allegedly made while the deceased was in a critical, gasping condition with zero blood pressure can form a reliable basis for prosecution?
  • Does the failure of the deceased to use a lethal weapon carried at the time of the attack cast doubt on the prosecution's version of the incident?
  Read full judgment →