Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 233,147 judgments in total.
- Feroz Khan vs The State and another2015 YLR 703 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-05-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the offence of rape (zina) against his daughter-in-law. The core legal questions concerned the admissibility of hearsay evidence in the absence of the victim's testimony, the evidentiary value of DNA profiling, and the impact of delayed reporting in sexual assault cases. The Court upheld the conviction, holding that the victim's statement to her brother immediately upon escaping the appellant's house was admissible as part of the res gestae under Article 19 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Court further ruled that the DNA report, which identified the appellant as the biological father of the victim's child, constituted reliable scientific evidence corroborating the prosecution's case. The principle laid down is that in cases of sexual assault, where the victim is unable to testify, statements made spontaneously to family members immediately after the event are admissible as res gestae, and scientific DNA evidence serves as a powerful corroborative tool to establish guilt, particularly when the accused's biological link to the victim's child is scientifically confirmed.
Questions settled- Is a statement made by a victim to a relative immediately after escaping an abusive situation admissible as res gestae?
- Can a conviction for rape be sustained based on DNA evidence and the testimony of a complainant who heard the victim's account, even if the victim herself is not examined?
- Does the advanced age of an accused automatically render him incapable of committing sexual intercourse in the absence of medical proof of impotency?
- Is DNA profiling statutorily recognized as reliable scientific evidence in criminal proceedings?
- Feroz Ali Gaba vs Fishermen's Cooperative Society Limited and 2 others2015 CLC 493 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The plaintiff filed two suits seeking declaration, injunction, and recovery of damages against the defendants, challenging notices issued by the Karachi Fisheries Harbour Authority regarding alleged unauthorized use of a leased plot and non-compliance with lease conditions. The plaintiff sought interim injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. to restrain the defendants from cancelling the lease or disturbing his business. The court evaluated the essential ingredients for granting temporary injunctions: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss. The court observed that the plaintiff was bound by the lease agreement, which restricted the use of the premises to a specific purpose, and that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case or irreparable loss, as the defendants had merely issued show-cause notices for lease violations. Consequently, the court dismissed both injunction applications, holding that equitable relief cannot be granted to protect a prima facie illegality or breach of contract.
Questions settled- Whether an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. can be granted without the co-existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss?
- Does a lessee have a legal right to use a leased property for purposes inconsistent with the objective terms of the lease agreement?
- Does the issuance of a notice of cancellation by a licensing authority constitute an actionable wrong that warrants interference by way of injunction?
- Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary M/O Petroleum &NLR 2015 Tax 29 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Federation of Pakistan appealed against a Peshawar High Court judgment that declared the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess (GIDC) Act, 2011, unconstitutional. The core legal question was whether the GIDC constitutes a 'tax' or a 'fee,' and consequently, whether it could be validly introduced as a 'Money Bill' under Article 73 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision. It held that the GIDC is a 'fee' rather than a 'tax' because it is collected for specific purposes, such as infrastructure development and price equalization, and provides a specific benefit to the payers. The Court emphasized that the nomenclature of a levy is immaterial; its substance determines its nature. Because the GIDC is a 'fee,' it could not be introduced as a Money Bill under Article 73. Furthermore, the Court found the levy did not fall under the relevant taxation entries of the Federal Legislative List, rendering the Act unconstitutional. The Court also noted that the government's own classification of the GIDC as 'Non-Tax Revenue' in budget statements supported this conclusion.
Questions settled- Whether the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess is a tax or a fee?
- Can a levy classified as a 'fee' be introduced as a Money Bill under Article 73 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Does the classification of a levy as 'Non-Tax Revenue' in the Annual Budget Statement preclude it from being treated as a tax for constitutional purposes?
- Are the taxation entries in the Federal Legislative List of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 exhaustive for the purpose of levying taxes via a Money Bill?
- Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary M/o Petroleum & Natural2015 NLR 29, 2015 NLR Tax 29, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 148 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Civil appeals were instituted before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the Federation of Pakistan challenging the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which declared the levy and collection of the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess under the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess Act, 2011 unconstitutional. The primary legal controversy centered on whether the Cess was a 'tax' or a 'fee' and whether the enactment could have been validly introduced and passed as a Money Bill under Article 73 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court held that the Cess is a 'fee' rather than a 'tax' because it was levied for a specific earmarked purpose and rendered a distinct benefit to the payers rather than being a common burden for raising general revenue. Furthermore, even if considered a tax, it was not covered under Entries 49, 51, or 52 of Part I of the Federal Legislative List. Consequently, the Act could not be lawfully passed through a Money Bill under Article 73, rendering the levy ultra vires the Constitution. The appeals were dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a statutory exaction earmarked for a specific development project and providing a direct benefit to payers be classified as a fee rather than a tax?
- Can a levy properly characterized as a fee be validly introduced and passed as a Money Bill under Article 73 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Whether Entry 51 of Part I of the Federal Legislative List allows taxation of mineral oil and natural gas when not used in the generation of nuclear energy?
- Does the non-inclusion of a tax in the National Finance Commission divisible pool under Article 160 of the Constitution render the levy itself unconstitutional?
- Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and anothers vs Durrani Ceramics and others2015 PLJ SC 816, 2015 PLD Supreme Court 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Federation of Pakistan filed review petitions against a Supreme Court judgment that declared the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess (GIDC) unconstitutional. The Court had previously held that the GIDC was a 'fee' rather than a 'tax' and, therefore, could not be validly imposed via a Money Bill. The Federation argued that the levy was a tax and that the Speaker's certification of the Money Bill under Article 73(4) of the Constitution was final and immune from judicial review. The Court rejected these contentions, holding that the Speaker's certificate does not bar the Court's jurisdiction to determine the true nature of a levy. Regarding Entry 51 of the Federal Legislative List, the Court maintained that the word 'and' must be given its ordinary meaning, rejecting the argument that it should be read as 'or' based on legislative history. The Court dismissed the review petitions, affirming that a fee providing quid pro quo benefits to a specific class cannot be enacted as a tax through a Money Bill. The issue of refunds was left to the High Courts to determine on a case-to-case basis regarding whether the burden was passed to consumers.
- Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Petroleum & Natural2015 PLJ SC 816 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Federation of Pakistan filed review petitions against a common judgment of the Supreme Court that had declared the imposition of the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess (GIDC) unconstitutional on the grounds that it was a fee rather than a tax and fell outside the scope of Entry 51 of Part-I of the Federal Legislative List. The core legal questions involved whether the cess constituted a fee or a tax, whether the Speaker of the National Assembly's certification of a Money Bill under Article 73 of the Constitution ousted judicial review, and the proper interpretation of Entry 51 concerning natural gas and minerals. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that the finding regarding the cess being a fee had attained finality and could not be reopened via a second review. The Court further held that the Speaker's certificate does not bar the judiciary from examining the true nature of a levy, and that historical legislative comparisons cannot override unambiguous statutory text. Finally, the question of whether refunded cess amounts could be claimed by companies that had passed the burden to consumers was left for determination by the High Court on a case-to-case basis.
Questions settled- Whether a second review of a concluded finding on the nature of a levy is permissible under the Supreme Court Rules?
- Does the certification of the Speaker of the National Assembly that a Bill is a Money Bill bar the jurisdiction of the Court to examine the true nature of the levy?
- Can historical legislative perspective and previous constitutional entries be used to interpret an unambiguous statutory entry?
- Is a party that has passed on the financial burden of an unconstitutional cess to ultimate consumers entitled to its refund?
- Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and otherss vs Messrs Aalme Engineers (Pvt.) Ltd2015 CLC 1273 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a Regular Second Appeal filed by the Federation of Pakistan challenging concurrent judgments and decrees passed by lower courts regarding construction contract claims. The core legal questions were whether the lower courts misread or ignored material evidence and whether the appellate court correctly denied interest on the decreed claims. The High Court dismissed the Federation's appeals, holding that the concurrent findings of fact were well-reasoned and did not suffer from legal infirmity or perverse appreciation of evidence. The Court affirmed that the Federation, as a litigant, is not entitled to preferential treatment. Regarding the cross-objections, the Court held that the appellate court erred by excluding Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which governs the award of interest on decreed claims. The key principle laid down is that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a second appellate court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact absent clear misreading of evidence, and Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandates the award of interest on decreed claims even if the contract is silent on the matter.
Questions settled- Can a second appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is the Federation of Pakistan entitled to preferential treatment as a litigant in civil proceedings?
- Does the absence of an interest provision in a contract preclude the court from awarding interest under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can documents not exhibited during the trial be considered by the appellate court?
- Federation of Pakistan and others vs M/s. Delta Innovations Ltd.2015 PLJ SC 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by the Federation of Pakistan assails a judgment of the High Court of Sindh allowing a constitutional petition filed by the respondent motorcycle manufacturer. The core controversy concerned whether parts and components of motorcycles imported by the respondent for manufacture and assembly were amenable to customs duty at twenty-five percent ad valorem under Pakistan Customs Tariff heading 87.14, as claimed by the respondent, or at ninety percent under heading 87.11 with partial exemption under SRO No. 436(1)/2001, as contended by the appellants. The Supreme Court held that components imported for the manufacture and assembly of motorcycles fall under PCT heading 87.11 rather than heading 87.14, which is meant for commercial imports, and that partial exemption is available only subject to strict adherence to the conditions of SRO No. 436(1)/2001, including an approved deletion programme and indigenization requirements. The Court set aside the High Court judgment and remanded the matter to the adjudication authorities for decision in accordance with these principles.
Questions settled- Whether parts and components imported for the manufacture and assembly of motorcycles are amenable to customs duty under PCT heading 87.14 or PCT heading 87.11?
- Does PCT heading 87.14 apply to industrial imports of motorcycle components or commercial imports?
- Are manufacturers claiming partial customs duty exemption under SRO No. 436(1)/2001 required to adhere strictly to an approved deletion programme and indigenization conditions?
- Federation of Pakistan and anothers vs Saeed Ahmed Khan and others2015 CLC 1797 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-13Read full judgment →
- Federation of Pakistan and another vs Saeed Ahmed Khan, etc.2015 CLC 1797, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 374 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a judgment of the learned Single Judge in Chamber which accepted a constitutional petition and declared a notification sending Respondent No. 1, the Chairman of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), on forced leave to be without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government has the inherent or statutory power under the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 or the General Clauses Act, 1897 to send the Chairman of an independent statutory regulatory body on forced leave or appoint an acting replacement outside the prescribed statutory mechanism. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that OGRA is an independent statutory body designed to function without undue governmental interference to ensure regulatory autonomy. The Court ruled that neither the OGRA Ordinance nor Section 16 of the General Clauses Act empowers the Federal Government to unilaterally suspend or send the Chairman on forced leave or make acting charge appointments outside the specific statutory provisions. The ratio decidendi is that any suspension, forced leave, or removal of the OGRA Chairman must follow the explicit statutory procedure requiring an inquiry and recommendation by the Federal Public Service Commission, thereby safeguarding the institutional autonomy and independence of regulatory bodies.
Questions settled- Does the Federal Government have the power under the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 to send the Chairman of OGRA on forced leave?
- Can Section 16 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1897 be invoked by the Federal Government to suspend or place the Chairman of an independent regulatory authority on forced leave without statutory backing?
- Whether the Federal Government can make acting or current charge appointments to fill vacancies in the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority in the absence of an enabling provision in the governing statute?
- What is the mandatory procedure under the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 for removing or suspending the Chairman?
- Federation of Pakistan & Another vs M/s. Naya Daur Motor (Pvt) Ltd, and 3Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This High Court Appeal was filed by the Customs authorities against an order of a learned Single Judge dismissing their application under Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (CPC). The appellants claimed priority over the sale proceeds of a judgment-debtor's mortgaged property auctioned in execution of decrees obtained by secured creditors (respondent banks). The core legal question was whether government customs duties adjudicated after the creation of a mortgage take precedence over the claims of secured creditors upon the execution sale of mortgaged immovables. The High Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that execution proceedings arising out of mortgage decrees under banking laws are governed by Order XXXIV Rules 12 and 13 of the CPC, rather than Section 73 CPC. Consequently, government liabilities created subsequent to an equitable mortgage do not possess preferential rights over the claims of prior secured creditors. Furthermore, statutory recovery procedures under Section 201 and Section 202 of the Customs Act 1969 were held inapplicable to court-conducted auctions of mortgaged properties.
Questions settled- Whether government dues created subsequent to a mortgage take priority over the claims of secured creditors in the distribution of sale proceeds?
- Are execution sales of mortgaged property conducted pursuant to banking decrees governed by Section 73 or Order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does Section 201 of the Customs Act 1969 apply to auctions of immovable property conducted by a court-appointed official assignee?
- Federation of Employee Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs DoctorsK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 38 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision arises from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the petitioner, which was dismissed by the trial court along with an application for temporary injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner challenged the trial court's order and the subsequent appellate court's dismissal of the appeal, alleging misreading and non-reading of the record and asserting that the three essential ingredients for the grant of temporary injunction were satisfied. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in exercising their discretion to refuse the temporary injunction. The High Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting that the respondents were the exclusive owners of the land and no agreement existed between the parties. The Court held that the petitioner failed to establish the co-existence of the three necessary ingredients—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss—and that the lower courts' orders were rational and equitable. Consequently, the civil revision was dismissed in limine for lack of merit.
Questions settled- Are concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the refusal of a temporary injunction subject to interference in civil revision?
- Must all three ingredients—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss—co-exist to justify the grant of a temporary injunction?
- Can a court grant a temporary injunction when the underlying claim of ownership or agreement remains unestablished by evidence?
- Federal Public Service Commission and others vs Altaf Hussain and otherss2015 SCMR 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from appeals directed against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court, which allowed writ petitions and an F.A.O. filed by respondents who were employees of field offices of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). The core legal question involved the legality of the ineligibility criteria introduced by the Federal Public Service Commission in its 2012 advertisement for the Section Officers Promotional Examination, which excluded employees of FBR field offices based on a letter issued by the FBR declaring them subordinate offices. The Supreme Court held that the FBR, being an attached department under the Rules of Business 1973, cannot alter its status or amend entries through an unauthorized letter, and that the Commission lacks the power to determine or modify recruitment eligibility criteria contrary to established rules. The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, dismissing the appeals and confirming that field office employees are eligible to appear in the promotional examination.
Questions settled- Can the Federal Board of Revenue declare its field offices as subordinate offices through an administrative letter to alter eligibility for promotional examinations?
- Does the Federal Public Service Commission possess the power to independently determine or modify recruitment eligibility criteria contrary to applicable rules?
- Are employees working in the field offices of the Federal Board of Revenue eligible to appear in the Section Officers Promotional Examination?
- Federal Public Service Commission and others vs Altaf Hussain and others2015 NLR Service 9, 2015 P.S.C. 708, 2015 SCMR 581, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 1130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding the eligibility of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) field office employees to appear in the Section Officers Promotional Examination (SOPE). The Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) had excluded these employees from the 2012 examination based on an internal FBR letter designating field offices as subordinate, thereby disqualifying them under the established criteria. The core legal questions were whether the FBR could unilaterally alter its status under the Rules of Business, 1973, and whether the FPSC possessed the authority to amend recruitment eligibility criteria based on such departmental communications. The Supreme Court held that the FBR is an attached department under the Rules of Business, 1973, and cannot be redefined by an unauthorized internal letter. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the FPSC lacks the power to modify recruitment rules or determine eligibility criteria beyond its statutory mandate. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision that field office employees are eligible to participate in the SOPE on par with headquarters staff.
Questions settled- Can the Federal Board of Revenue unilaterally declare its field offices as subordinate offices to exclude employees from promotional examinations?
- Does the Federal Public Service Commission have the statutory authority to amend or modify recruitment rules for promotional examinations?
- Is the Federal Board of Revenue considered an attached department under the Rules of Business, 1973?
- Federal Public Service Commission and others vs Altaf Hussain and another2015 P.S.C. 708 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding eligibility criteria for the Section Officers Promotional Examination (SOPE). The core legal question was whether the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) could exclude employees of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) field offices from the SOPE based on an internal FBR letter designating those offices as 'subordinate' rather than 'attached departments.' The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court held that the FBR is explicitly listed as an 'attached department' under the Rules of Business, 1973, and cannot unilaterally redefine its status via an unauthorized internal letter. The key principle laid down is that the FPSC lacks the authority to modify recruitment rules or eligibility criteria based on unauthorized departmental communications; it must strictly adhere to established recruitment rules. Furthermore, a department cannot amend its status as defined in the Rules of Business, 1973, through administrative correspondence. Consequently, the FPSC cannot arbitrarily restrict the eligibility of employees in attached departments based on invalid administrative classifications.
Questions settled- Does the Federal Public Service Commission have the authority to amend or modify recruitment rules for promotional examinations?
- Can a government department unilaterally redefine its status as an 'attached department' through internal administrative correspondence?
- Are employees of field offices of the Federal Board of Revenue eligible for the Section Officers Promotional Examination under the Rules of Business, 1973?
- Federal Public Service Commission & Others Altaf Hussain & Another2015 NLR Service 9 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed writ petitions and a first appeal against order filed by employees of field offices of the Federal Board of Revenue. The core legal question was whether employees working in field offices of the Federal Board of Revenue are eligible to appear in the Section Officers Promotional Examination, and whether the Federal Board of Revenue or the Federal Public Service Commission could lawfully exclude them via administrative instructions contrary to the Rules of Business, 1973. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Board of Revenue, being an attached department under Schedule III of the Rules of Business, 1973, lacks the authority to alter its status or exclude its field office employees through unauthorized letters, and that the Federal Public Service Commission has no power to modify recruitment rules or eligibility criteria. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, dismissing the appeals and upholding the eligibility of the field office employees to take the promotional examination.
Questions settled- Can the Federal Board of Revenue declare its field offices as subordinate offices to exclude employees from the Section Officers Promotional Examination through an administrative letter?
- Does the Federal Public Service Commission have the power to determine or modify the eligibility criteria for recruitment and promotional examinations independently of established recruitment rules?
- Are employees working in the field offices of the Federal Board of Revenue eligible to appear in the Section Officers Promotional Examination at par with headquarters staff?
- Gazanfar Ali vs Department Prisons2015 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 337 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 2015-07-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a service appeal filed by the appellant, a former jail warder, challenging his penalty of withholding of three increments for a period of three years arising from misconduct proceedings under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006. The core legal question concerns whether the time spent pursuing a non-statutory revision petition before a departmental authority extends the statutory limitation period for filing an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal. The Tribunal held that filing a revision petition before an incorrect or non-statutory forum does not toll the limitation period prescribed by law, and an indolent litigant cannot be shown leniency when failing to approach the proper forum within time. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as time-barred, establishing that the pursuit of remedies not provided by statute does not excuse delay in filing a service appeal.
Questions settled- Does the pursuit of a non-statutory revision petition extend the limitation period for filing a service appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal?
- Is a service appeal maintainable when filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974?
- Can time spent pursuing a remedy at a wrong forum condone delay for an indolent appellant?
- Gamoon and others vs The StateSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellants challenged their conviction for murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the alleged contradictions in ocular testimony, the failure to prove the stated motive, and significant discrepancies between the ocular account and medical evidence. The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and acquitting the appellants. The court held that when a motive is alleged but not proven, ocular evidence requires strict scrutiny. It further established that where ocular testimony is inconsistent with medical evidence, it cannot be relied upon to sustain a conviction. The court emphasized that the presence of witnesses who fail to intervene during an attack on a close relative is unnatural, casting doubt on their presence at the scene. Reaffirming that the accused is the "favorite child of law," the court ruled that any single infirmity creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal, as the prosecution must prove its case without relying on the weaknesses of the defense.
Questions settled- Does the failure of the prosecution to prove an alleged motive necessitate the scrutiny of ocular evidence with greater caution?
- Can a conviction be sustained when the ocular testimony is inconsistent with the medical evidence regarding the nature of injuries?
- Is the presence of alleged eyewitnesses considered doubtful if they fail to intervene or attempt to save a relative during an assault?
- Does a single infirmity in the prosecution's case that creates reasonable doubt entitle the accused to acquittal?
- Federal Government of Pakistan vs General (R) Pervez Musharraf2015 NLR Criminal 226, 2015 P Cr. L J 1 · Special Court · 2014-11-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a criminal complaint filed by the Federal Government against former President and Chief of Army Staff General (R) Pervez Musharraf under Article 6 of the Constitution of Pakistan for high treason, following the proclamation of emergency, the issuance of the Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 2007, and the Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2007. During the trial, the accused filed an application seeking dismissal of the complaint on grounds of selective prosecution or, alternatively, the joinder of numerous state functionaries, including the then Prime Minister, Federal Law Minister, and various civil and military officials, as co-accused. The core legal questions revolved around whether the prosecution was vitiated due to selective targeting and whether sufficient material existed on record to implicate other individuals as aiders and abettors under Article 6(2) of the Constitution and Section 107 of the Pakistan Penal Code. By a majority decision, the Special Court held that while an accused cannot dictate who is prosecuted, the court must interfere when an investigation is selective or inconclusive. Based on material showing active participation in the removal and replacement of superior court judges, the court partly allowed the application, directing the Federal Government to array the then Prime Minister, the then Federal Law Minister, and Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar as co-accused for a joint trial. The key principle laid down is that individuals whose acts facilitate the principal offender in executing an unconstitutional dispensation—such as processing the removal and appointment of judges during an emergency—qualify as aiders and abettors and must be tried jointly to secure the ends of justice.
Questions settled- Whether an accused facing trial for high treason under Article 6 of the Constitution of Pakistan can demand the joinder of other state functionaries as co-accused as a matter of right?
- Does the statutory definition of abetment under Section 107 of the Pakistan Penal Code require active complicity or participation in the commission of the crime to make a person an accessory?
- Can a Special Court interfere with an inconclusive or selective investigation and direct the Federal Government to array additional persons as co-accused based on material available on the record?
- Whether the actions of a Prime Minister and Federal Law Minister in swiftly processing the removal and appointment of superior court judges during an emergency constitute abetment of high treason?
- Federal Board of Revenue vs Kh. Saleem. and anotherPTCL 2015 CL. 313 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-04-21Read full judgment →
- Fazul Muhammad vs Senior Superintendent of Police and others2015 YLR 1686 · Sindh High Court · 2013-01-01Read full judgment →
- Fazlur Rehman vs Mst. Shazia Bibi and 2 others2015 CLC 116 · Sindh High Court · 2013-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged concurrent judgments of the lower courts regarding the custody of minor children. The petitioner, the father, sought to retain custody of all children, alleging the mother lacked financial means and possessed an immoral character. The core legal question concerned whether the custody of minor daughters should be transferred to the mother, given the paramount consideration of the minors' welfare and the father's subsequent remarriages. The Court held that the mother's alleged financial inability is not a valid ground to deprive her of custody, and the father failed to substantiate allegations of immorality. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that a step-mother cannot substitute for a real mother in rearing children, and the father's remarriage rendered him less suitable for custody of the daughters. Upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the High Court ruled that the welfare of the minors necessitated granting custody of the daughters to the mother, while the sons remained with the father. The Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction should not be invoked to interfere with concurrent findings of fact absent misreading or non-reading of evidence.
Questions settled- Does a mother's alleged inability to maintain children financially constitute a valid ground for depriving her of their custody?
- Can a father's remarriage and the introduction of a step-mother affect his suitability for the custody of minor children?
- Is the High Court empowered to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in its constitutional jurisdiction absent misreading of evidence?
- Does the concept of 'Hizanat' prioritize the mother's custody for minor children?
- Fazli Hakeem and anothers vs Secretary State and Frontier Regions2015 NLR Service 101, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 1270, 2015 SCMR 795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions for leave to appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that dismissed appeals concerning the promotion of a temporary employee over eligible regularized employees. The core legal question was whether a temporary employee could be promoted to a higher scale, and if such an order, being potentially void, was correctly assessed by the Service Tribunal, particularly regarding the distinction between illegal and void orders. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the case to the Service Tribunal for a fresh decision. The Court held that the Service Tribunal failed to consider the controversy in its correct perspective. It emphasized that any repository of power must act in accordance with law, and if it errs in law, it acts outside its jurisdiction, rendering its order non-est. The Court affirmed that a tribunal has jurisdiction to decide rightly, not wrongly, and an error of law makes its decision in excess of jurisdiction, which should not be perpetuated by courts.
- Fazli Hakeem and another vs Secretary State and Frontier Regions2015 PLC (C.S.) 1270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions for leave to appeal arose from the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals concerning the promotion and seniority of a temporary employee over regularized employees. The core legal question was whether the promotion of a temporary employee in disregard of regular employees constituted a void, non-est order, and whether the Service Tribunal correctly examined the issues of limitation and the legality of the promotion. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal adopted a myopic view in distinguishing between illegal and void orders, emphasizing that an authority going wrong in law acts outside its jurisdiction, rendering its order non-est. The Court converted the petitions into appeals, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the matter back to the Service Tribunal for a fresh decision. The key principle laid down is that tribunals and executive authorities must act strictly in accordance with law, and an error of law takes them outside their jurisdiction, making any resulting order void and unprotectable by technicalities like limitation.
Questions settled- Whether the promotion of a temporary employee over regularized employees can be held to be free from the traits of a void order?
- Does an error of law by a tribunal or authority take it outside its jurisdiction making its decision non-est?
- Can the question of limitation be allowed to perpetuate an unjust and unfair act which is prima facie against the law?
- Fazil Hussain and another vs Maqsood Hussain and others2015 PLJ AJ&K 198, 2015 MLD 1505 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-06-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal arises from an order passed by the Additional District Judge, Dadyal, upholding the execution of a final civil court decree for declaration and possession. The core legal question was whether a final decree can be rendered unexecutable due to the pendency of separate writ proceedings concerning revenue record entries and Arakdari rights. The High Court held that once a decree attains finality, it must be executed in its true letter and spirit, and collateral proceedings concerning revenue entries do not obstruct execution. The court established that technical objections and delays in the execution of final decrees frustrate the administration of justice and must be rejected.
Questions settled- Whether a final decree can be rendered unexecutable due to the pendency of separate proceedings concerning revenue record entries?
- Does the pendency of litigation regarding Arakdari rights operate as a bar to the execution of a final civil court decree for possession?
- Can the execution of a decree be frustrated through technical objections and prolonged applications?
- Fazil Hussain and another vs Maqsood Hussain and 17 others2015 PLJ AJ&K 198 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-06-04Read full judgment →
- Fazal-ur-Rehman vs State2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-10-08Read full judgment →
- Fazal-Ur-Rehman and others vs The State2015 CLC 1426 · Board of Revenue · 2015-02-09Read full judgment →
- Fazal-Ur-Rehman and another vs State through Additional Advocate2015 PLJ Sh.C. (AJ&K) 12 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
- Fazal-e-Qadir and 5 others vs Muhammad AzamK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 150 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-04Read full judgment →
- Fazal-E-Haq vs The State and another2015 P Cr. L J 189 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, a police officer, challenged his conviction under Article 155-C of the Police Order, 2002, for continuing an investigation after his suspension. The appellant argued that the Regional Police Officer (RPO) lacked the authority to suspend him and that his conviction under the Police Order was legally flawed because the original charge was framed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the RPO, as a superior officer, possessed the requisite authority to suspend the appellant. The Court further affirmed that a Special Judge is empowered to convict an accused for any offence established by the facts, provided the accused is aware of the nature of the accusation, as supported by the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court concluded that the appellant was fully aware of the allegations regarding his unauthorized continuation of the investigation, rendering the conviction legally sound and free from procedural irregularity.
Questions settled- Can a Special Judge convict an accused for an offence other than the one originally charged if the facts support it?
- Does a Regional Police Officer have the authority to suspend a police officer if the DPO or CPO is the designated appointing authority?
- Does the suspension of a police officer automatically render their continued investigation of a case illegal?
- (1) Fazal Wadood and 8 others (2) Saif Malook Shah and others vs TheSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The applicants sought post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the rejection of their bail application by the Anti-Terrorism Court. The prosecution alleged that the applicants obstructed police officials from removing encroachments, blocked a highway, and caused injuries to police personnel. The core legal question was whether, given the surrounding circumstances and the existence of a prior constitutional petition regarding the disputed land, the applicants were entitled to bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the prosecution's case was not free from doubt, noting the absence of private witnesses, the lack of evidence regarding specific injuries or recoveries, and the undisputed existence of a prior restraining order against the administration regarding the subject land. Concluding that the matter required further inquiry, the Court granted bail to the applicants. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's narrative is unsupported by independent evidence and the case involves disputed civil rights, the matter warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.
Questions settled- Does the absence of private witnesses and lack of recovery evidence in a police-registered FIR constitute grounds for further inquiry in bail proceedings?
- Can a court grant bail when the accused's actions are linked to a disputed property matter subject to a prior restraining order?
- Is a case eligible for further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the prosecution fails to substantiate allegations of injury or damage?
- Fazal Sons etc. vs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited2015 LHC 447 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-04Read full judgment →
- Fazal Raziq vs Haji Sher Zaman and 2 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 121 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-03Read full judgment →
- Fazal Rahim Khan and otherss vs Lac and others2015 CLC 1392 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-19Read full judgment →
- Fazal Qadir vs Jamshed Ellahi Butt and 2 others2015 P Cr. L J 865 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal under Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 was filed by the complainant against the judgment of the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-II, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, which acquitted the respondents of the charge under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by extending them the benefit of doubt. The core issue before the High Court was whether the trial court had misread or overlooked material evidence, justifying interference with the acquittal. The High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, affirming the acquittal. The Court noted an unexplained one-year delay in lodging the FIR, material contradictions in the prosecution witnesses' statements, lack of evidence regarding the place of confinement or payment of ransom, and an admission by the investigating officer that the FIR was concocted. The Court reiterated that an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence into a double presumption, which cannot be overturned unless the trial court judgment is perverse, illegal, or grossly erroneous.
Questions settled- Can an order of acquittal be overturned merely because another view is possible upon re-appraisal of the evidence?
- Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case?
- Can uncorroborated recovery evidence sustain a conviction when the prosecution fails to establish the primary charge of abduction for ransom?
- What is the evidentiary effect of an unexplained one-year delay in registering an FIR alleging abduction for ransom?
- Fazal Majeed vs State2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-15Read full judgment →
- Fazal Khaliq vs The State and 3 others2015 YLR 624 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-03-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment and order of the trial court whereby the appellant was convicted under sections 302(b) and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to imprisonment for life and ten years rigorous imprisonment respectively. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular evidence, the reliability of a dying declaration, identification from a disputed distance, and the evidentiary value of abscondance. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt due to doubtful identification from a long aerial distance, withholding of best evidence, and infirmities in the dying declaration and medical testimony. The court established the key principles that the unverified distance in site plans and doubtful identification must benefit the accused, that abscondance alone cannot sustain a conviction in the absence of reliable primary evidence, and that a dying declaration must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny and inspire full confidence.
Questions settled- Whether the unverified aerial distance between the accused and the eyewitnesses in a site plan can render the identification of the accused doubtful?
- Can abscondance alone form the basis of a conviction when the primary ocular account and dying declaration have been disbelieved?
- What degree of scrutiny is required for a dying declaration when the medical officer has not been examined to verify the victim's fitness?
- Does the withholding of best available evidence by the prosecution warrant an adverse inference against its case?
- Fazal Kareem (deceased) through legal heirs. vs Muhammad Ilyas2015 LHC 2995 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-15Read full judgment →
- Fazal Haque, etc. vs The State, etc.2015 LHC 6622 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for pre-arrest bail arises from FIR No. 12/2015, registered at Police Station FIA, Lahore, under Sections 420, 467, 471, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning allegations of submitting a fake bank guarantee to the Bank of Punjab to settle outstanding loan liabilities. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail given the ongoing civil litigation between the parties and the alleged mala fides of the complainant bank. The Court held that the dispute was essentially civil in nature, stemming from a settlement agreement and pending execution proceedings. It observed that the criminal case appeared to be a tool for recovery rather than a genuine criminal matter, noting the lack of investigation into the bank's own role and the failure to verify the alleged forgery forensically. Consequently, the Court confirmed the pre-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy intended to protect individuals from victimization and the abuse of criminal process for ulterior motives, particularly when the underlying dispute is civil.
Questions settled- Can a criminal case be registered to exert pressure for the recovery of a debt that is the subject of pending civil execution proceedings?
- Is pre-arrest bail appropriate when the underlying dispute between the parties is primarily of a civil nature?
- Does the failure of the prosecution to conduct a forensic investigation into alleged forged documents create sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of bail?
- Fazal Din vs Mir Muhammad Jan, etc2015 C.L.R. 121 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-05Read full judgment →
- Fazal Din through Legal Heirs and others vs Mir Muhammad Jan and another2015 CLC 536 · Lahore High Court · 2013-11-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby the petitioners' plaint in a suit for separate possession through partition and permanent injunction was rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether a plaint can be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 based on averments in the written statement or revenue record entries without recording evidence, and whether a vendee whose name appears in the cultivation column of the revenue record is a co-sharer. The Lahore High Court held that the power to reject a plaint must be confined strictly to the contents of the plaint, assuming them to be true, and cannot be invoked on disputed factual controversies requiring a full trial. The Court further held that a vendee of a specific plot from a co-owner in an undivided khata acquires the status of a co-sharer. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned judgments, allowed the civil revision, and remanded the suit to the trial court for proceedings on merits, laying down that pure and serious questions of fact cannot be bypassed by prematurely rejecting a plaint.
Questions settled- Can a trial court reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by considering the averments raised in the written statement or revenue records?
- Whether a vendee of a specific plot in an undivided khata whose name appears in the column of cultivation acquires the status of a co-sharer entitled to seek partition?
- Does the rejection of a plaint become permissible after issues of fact and law have already been framed by the trial court?
- To what extent can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts in a civil revision when jurisdiction has been exercised with material irregularity?
- Fazal Amin alias Toray vs Shahid Zaman and another2015 YLR 1952 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-09-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302/109/34, P.P.C. at Police Station Shehbaz Garh, District Mardan, relating to the murder of the complainant's brother. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds of delay in recording the statement under section 164, Cr.P.C., lack of ocular account, unverified joint pointation, and the rule of consistency vis-a-vis co-accused already granted bail. The Peshawar High Court held that since the petitioner was not charged in the FIR, the delayed statement lacked a stated source of information, the evidentiary value of the joint pointation was subject to trial, and a co-accused with an identical role had already been released, the case fell within the scope of further inquiry. The court laid down that commencement of trial does not debar an accused from bail if a case of further inquiry is made out, and accordingly allowed the bail petition.
Questions settled- Whether an accused not named in the FIR and charged belatedly under section 164 Cr.P.C. without disclosing the source of information is entitled to post-arrest bail?
- Does the commencement of a trial debar an accused from seeking bail when a case for further inquiry is made out?
- Is an accused entitled to bail on the rule of consistency when a co-accused with an identical role has already been released on bail?
- Fazal Ahmad Ranjha etc. vs Govt. of the Punjab etc.2015 LHC 1564 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-25Read full judgment →
- Fayyaz vs Sher Bahadar2015 NLR Criminal 545 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-05-27Read full judgment →
- Fayyaz Rasool alias Pappu vs The State2015 YLR 985 · Federal Shariat Court · 2015-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a conviction for murder and sodomy. The appellant was charged with the murder of a minor, Muhammad Tariq, and committing sodomy, following an incident where the deceased was seen leaving with the appellant and subsequently found being attacked. The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302(b) and Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to death and imprisonment, while acquitting him under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance VII of 1979. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the charges and whether the death sentence was appropriate given the circumstances. The Federal Shariat Court upheld the convictions, finding the ocular and medical evidence, including the chemical examiner's report confirming semen on anal swabs, sufficient to establish guilt. However, the Court held that because the motive for the murder remained shrouded in mystery and the circumstances suggested a sudden, unexplained incident following the act of sodomy, the death sentence was excessive. Consequently, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, maintaining the other sentences and granting the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for sodomy be sustained based on medical evidence and chemical examiner reports alone?
- Does the presence of a mysterious motive for murder justify the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
- Is the appellate court empowered to modify a death sentence to life imprisonment when the motive for the crime is not clearly established?
- Fayyaz Muhammad vs Kidaytullah2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-09-18Read full judgment →
- Fayyaz Mehmood Khan and others vs Fayyaz Mahmood Khan and others2015 CLC 1636 · Board of Revenue · 2015-03-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition challenges the order of the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) dismissing the petitioners' revision against the District Officer (Revenue)'s order granting permission to review certain revenue mutations. The core legal question was whether the District Collector is competent under section 163 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 to grant permission to review an order or mutation sanctioned by a Revenue Officer. The Board of Revenue accepted the petition, holding that the District Collector's power of review under section 163 is limited to reviewing an order passed by himself or his predecessor, and does not extend to granting permission to review a mutation sanctioned by a Revenue Officer when such an order is appealable before the Collector or Assistant Commissioner. The key principle laid down is that a District Collector cannot utilize section 163 to review or permit the review of a mutation sanctioned by a Revenue Officer.
Questions settled- Is a District Collector competent under section 163 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 to review a mutation sanctioned by a Revenue Officer?
- Whether the power of review under section 163 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 extends to orders passed by a Revenue Officer rather than the Collector himself?
- What is the appropriate legal remedy when a party seeks to challenge the erroneous implementation of sale-deeds in the revenue record instead of seeking a review from the District Collector?
- Fayyaz Mahmood Khan and 2 others vs Haji Abdul Rehman through L.Rs, and others2015 YLR 411 · Lahore High Court · 2013-10-01Read full judgment →
- Fayyaz Hussain vs The State and 4 others2015 YLR 194 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-24Read full judgment →
- Fayaz Shah vs The State2015 PLJ Cr.C. (Peshawar) 231, 2015 YLR 2189 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-10-15Read full judgment →
- Fayaz Shah vs StatePLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 231 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-10-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under an FIR relating to the recovery of a large quantity of narcotics from a vehicle. The core legal questions involve whether an inordinate and unexplained delay in sending samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory and the failure to produce the vehicle in court create fatal doubts in the prosecution case. The Peshawar High Court held that the unexplained delay of thirty-five days in transmitting samples—during which tampering could not be ruled out—along with the non-production of the vehicle used in the offense, rendered the prosecution evidence unconvincing and unreliable. The court laid down the principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and missing links such as unverified custody of samples and physical non-production of the case property entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt and subsequent acquittal.
Questions settled- Does an unexplained delay in sending recovered narcotic samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory vitiate the conviction?
- Is the non-production of the vehicle allegedly used for transporting contraband fatal to the prosecution case?
- Whether the prosecution is bound to establish safe custody of narcotics samples during the entire period prior to laboratory testing?
- Fayaz Ali vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others2015 PLC (C.S.) 1014 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the rejection of the petitioner's candidature for the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector (BS-9) in the Sindh Police Department. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was over the prescribed age limit by five months and twenty-five days on the closing date of the advertisement, was entitled to age relaxation under a general government notification dated 19-7-2011. The Sindh High Court held that the petitioner was ineligible for the post. The court reasoned that the specific advertisement for the recruitment explicitly barred any relaxation in age, education, or physical standards. Consequently, the general notification granting age relaxation to government departments did not override the specific terms and conditions stipulated in the recruitment advertisement for the Police Department, particularly where the recruitment process required strict adherence to age limits as of the closing date. The court affirmed that recruitment policies explicitly excluding age relaxation for specific posts prevail over general administrative notifications, thereby upholding the rejection of the petitioner's application.
Questions settled- Does a general government notification granting age relaxation apply to recruitment processes where the specific advertisement explicitly bars such relaxation?
- Is a candidate who exceeds the prescribed age limit on the closing date of an advertisement eligible for appointment to a government post?
- Can a candidate challenge the rejection of their application based on age limits when the recruitment advertisement clearly states that no age relaxation will be allowed?
- Fawwad Butt vs Messrs Mary (Pvt) Limited and 5 others2015 CLD 1309 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an application under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 filed to record a compromise and decree a suit for declaration, specific performance, and injunction based on a sale agreement of shares in a private limited company. The core legal questions involve whether a compromise agreement between a plaintiff and certain defendants regarding the transfer of shares in a private limited company can override the pre-emptive rights of existing members enshrined in the company's Articles of Association and the Companies Ordinance 1984, and whether such a compromise constitutes a lawful agreement under Order XXIII, Rule 3. The Sindh High Court held that the compromise application was unlawful and contrary to the mandatory restrictions and pre-emptive rights contained in the Memorandum and Articles of Association and the relevant provisions of the Companies Ordinance 1984, which prohibit the unapproved transfer of private company shares to outsiders. The court accordingly dismissed the compromise application, affirming that shares in a private company are subject to strict internal transfer restrictions.
Questions settled- Can a compromise application under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be recorded when it violates the pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders under a private company's Articles of Association?
- Whether shares in a private limited company can be transferred to an outsider without complying with the transfer restrictions and pre-emptive provisions of the Companies Ordinance 1984?
- Is a compromise agreement for the sale of company shares considered a lawful agreement under Order XXIII Rule 3 if it bypasses mandatory internal company procedures?
- Fauji Kabirwala Power Company Ltd. and 8 others vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-Hi, Ltu, Islamabad2015 PTD (Trib.) 63 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2013-12-13Read full judgment →
- Fatima Sugar Mills Limited through Company Secretary and others_ In the matter of vs Not2015 PLD Lahore 632 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns whether an order passed by the High Court sanctioning a scheme of arrangement or amalgamation under section 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, constitutes an 'instrument' or 'conveyance' liable to stamp duty under the Stamp Act, 1899. The petitioner companies argued that such orders are not instruments, that the transfer is not 'inter vivos', and that they are exempt under Notification No. 1 dated 16-1-1937. The Court held that an order sanctioning a scheme of arrangement is based on the consent of the shareholders and functions as an instrument under section 2(14) of the Stamp Act, 1899. Furthermore, the Court determined that such an order falls within the purview of Article 27-A of the First Schedule to the Stamp Act, 1899, as it involves the transfer of immovable property based on consent. The Court rejected the argument that the transfer is not 'inter vivos', affirming that juristic persons can engage in such transfers. Consequently, the Court ruled that these orders are liable to stamp duty, and parties must provide requisite stamp papers before such orders are finalized.
Questions settled- Does a court order sanctioning a scheme of arrangement or amalgamation under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, constitute an instrument liable to stamp duty?
- Is an order sanctioning a scheme of arrangement or amalgamation considered a conveyance under the Stamp Act, 1899?
- Does the term 'inter vivos' in the context of the Stamp Act, 1899, include transfers between juristic persons?
- Is a court order sanctioning a scheme of arrangement based on shareholder consent subject to Article 27-A of the First Schedule to the Stamp Act, 1899?
- Fatima Bibi and others vs Muhammad Hanif and others2015 YLR 1789 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-22Read full judgment →
- Fateh-Ul-Mulk, Etc.s vs KPK Govt., Etc.s2015 NLR Revenue 135 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-17Read full judgment →
- Fateh-ul-Mulk and others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-17Read full judgment →
- Fateh-Ul-Mulk Ali Nasir and 4 others vs Government of Khyber2015 NLR Revenue 135, 2015 CLC 1762 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by the legal heirs of the former Mehtar of Chitral, seeking cancellation of notices issued by government respondents regarding ownership and mining rights over a river bed known as 'Shotar' in village Balach. The petitioners claimed full ownership of the river bed based on historical administrative notifications, commissions' orders, and civil court decrees, challenging the government's interference with a private lease executed for a hydropower project. The respondents maintained that all mines, minerals, and river beds belong to the Provincial Government under Section 49 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 and relevant notifications. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that under Section 49 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, all mines and minerals are deemed to be government property notwithstanding any contrary court decree, contract, or instrument. Additionally, under the notification dated 31st July 1975, all rivers and river beds were explicitly declared to be state property.
Questions settled- Does Section 49 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 vest ownership of all mines and minerals in the Provincial Government notwithstanding any decree of a civil court or contract?
- Can private land owners execute valid lease agreements for the extraction of minerals from a river bed declared to be state property?
- Does a notification declaring rivers and river beds as state property override private ownership claims based on historic inheritance or civil decrees?
- Fateh Textile Mills & Others vs Allied Bank Ltd.Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Fateh Sher and others vs The State and others2015 P Cr. L J 1540 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves criminal appeals against convictions and sentences for murder and abduction, alongside an acquittal appeal, revision for compensation, and a murder reference arising from a judgment by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chiniot. The core legal questions concern the credibility of ocular and circumstantial evidence, the evidentiary value of extra-judicial confessions, and the standard of proof required in criminal trials. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, noting that the sole eyewitness kept a suspicious and unexplained silence for several days, the last-seen evidence and extra-judicial confessions suffered from glaring improvements and contradictions, and corroborative recoveries and medical evidence were insufficient in isolation. Consequently, the court laid down the principle that multiple infirmities, unexplained delays, and material contradictions in prosecution evidence entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right.
Questions settled- Whether unexplained and mysterious silence of an eyewitness for several days renders their ocular account untrustworthy?
- Can a conviction be sustained solely on an extra-judicial confession marked by major improvements and contradictions when co-accused have already been acquitted on the same evidence?
- Is a belated recovery of crime weapons at the instance of an accused in police custody sufficient to connect them to the crime in the absence of reliable direct evidence?
- Does medical evidence alone suffice to identify the culprits in a criminal trial?
- Fateh Muhammad, etc vs Allah Wasaya, etc2015 LHC 7040 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-07Read full judgment →
- Fateh Muhammad vs Ghulam Hassan and another2015 MLD 105 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision challenges the concurrent dismissal of a suit for possession through pre-emption. The core legal questions concern whether the failure to file an application for revival under Section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, is fatal to the suit, whether the failure to plead Zaroorat and Zarrar in a plaint filed before 1993 violates Section 6(2) of the Act, and whether the petitioner properly performed Talb-i-Ishhad. The Court dismissed the revision, holding that the failure to file an application for revival within the statutory 60-day period under Section 35(1) is fatal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that for pre-emption suits filed between 1986 and 1990, the mandatory pleading of Zaroorat and Zarrar under Section 6(2) was required, as the Supreme Court's declaration of repugnancy to Islamic injunctions lacks retrospective effect. Finally, the Court found the evidence regarding Talb-i-Ishhad contradictory and insufficient. The judgment establishes that statutory requirements for revival of pre-emption suits and mandatory pleadings of Zaroorat and Zarrar for suits filed during the interregnum period must be strictly adhered to, and judicial declarations of repugnancy do not operate retrospectively.
Questions settled- Is the failure to file an application for revival under Section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, fatal to a pre-emption suit filed between 1986 and 1990?
- Does the Supreme Court's declaration that Section 6(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam have retrospective effect on plaints filed before 1993?
- Is the failure to plead Zaroorat and avoidance of Zarrar in a pre-emption suit filed prior to 1993 a fatal defect?
- Can a pre-emption suit succeed where the plaintiff fails to perform Talb-i-Ishhad against the actual vendees?
- Fateh Muhammad Kobhar vs Sabzal and othersSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Fateh Muhammad etc. vs Din Muhammad etc.2015 LHC 7005 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-13Read full judgment →
- Fateh Muahmmad and 2 others vs Din Muhammad and 2 others2015 LHC 7005, 2015 PLJ Lahore 1103 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision arises from a dispute over the validity of property transfers executed by an agent under a power of attorney. The petitioners challenged an appellate court judgment that reversed the trial court's dismissal of the respondents' suit for declaration. The core legal question was whether an agent, holding a general power of attorney, possesses the authority to transfer the principal's property to his own sons via 'Tamleek' (gift/transfer) without specific authorization. The Lahore High Court upheld the appellate court's decision, dismissing the revision. The court held that even if a power of attorney grants general powers, an agent cannot unilaterally transfer the principal's property to himself or his relatives through 'Tamleek'. The court established the principle that an agent's authority to execute 'Tamleek' is strictly limited to completing ministerial formalities—such as attestation or registration—for a transfer already initiated or intended by the principal. An agent cannot use a general power of attorney to effectuate a self-serving transfer of the principal's assets, as such actions exceed the scope of fiduciary agency and lack the requisite specific authorization from the principal.
Questions settled- Can an agent holding a general power of attorney transfer the principal's property to his own relatives through 'Tamleek' without specific authorization?
- Is an agent's authority to execute 'Tamleek' limited to ministerial acts of registration and attestation?
- Does a general power of attorney grant an agent the power to alienate the principal's property for the agent's personal benefit?
- Fateh All Khan vs Federation of Pakistan, etcK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 148 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-19Read full judgment →
- Farzand All etc. vs Bashir Ahmad2015 LHC 3216 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition challenges the appellate court judgment that dismissed the petitioners' suit for declaration regarding a disputed property. The core legal questions involve the proper court fee for a suit challenging a registered sale deed, the burden of proof required from a beneficiary to establish a valid sale transaction, and the effect of limitation in cases alleging fraud. The Lahore High Court held that a suit seeking to avoid a registered sale deed in reality constitutes a suit for cancellation requiring ad valorem court fee under the Court Fees Act 1870, and that the beneficiary of a disputed sale deed must affirmatively prove its valid execution and the payment of sale consideration through best evidence. The Court laid down that no presumption of truth attaches to a disputed registered document, and the failure of the beneficiary to produce essential witnesses such as the scribe and sub-registrar permits an adverse inference under the Qanoon-e-Sahadat Order 1984, while limitation does not run against a fraudulent transaction.
Questions settled- Whether a suit framed as a declaration seeking to avoid a registered sale deed requires the affixation of ad valorem court fee?
- Does a presumption of truth attach to a registered sale deed when its execution is disputed by the alleged executant?
- What is the burden of proof on the beneficiary of a disputed sale deed to establish its valid execution and the payment of sale consideration?
- Does limitation run against a suit challenging a sale deed on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation?
- Farzand Ali and another vs Khuda Bakhsh and others2015 PLD Supreme Court 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal, filed under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution, concerned a dispute between rival vendees seeking specific performance of agreements to sell immovable property. The core legal questions involved the validity of a revision petition filed against a deceased person, the applicability of the rule of lis pendens, the requirement of proving an agreement to sell through attesting witnesses, the enforceability of an agreement not signed by the vendee, and the discretionary nature of specific performance. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court held that the appellants' agreement to sell was invalid and unenforceable due to lack of their signatures, signifying an absence of "consensus ad idem." Furthermore, the appellants failed to prove their agreement by examining two attesting witnesses as mandated by the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, particularly since the respondent denied its execution. The rule of lis pendens was deemed inapplicable because the appellants' suit for specific performance was dismissed. The Court reiterated that specific performance is a discretionary relief under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and the appellants' conduct and failure to demonstrate readiness and willingness justified its refusal. An admission by one co-defendant was held not binding on another, and a revision petition against a deceased person (through LRs) was a curable defect, not a nullity, especially when LRs were subsequently heard.
- Farzana Roohi vs Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways and 42015 PLC 101 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the Railway Department's refusal to grant compensation for the death of the petitioner's father, a train driver who died while performing official duties in India. The core legal question was whether a death resulting from a heart attack during the course of employment qualifies as an "accident" under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The Court held that the impugned order denying compensation was unlawful and set it aside. It established that the term "accident" in the Act must be interpreted in its popular sense as an unexpected, untoward, and unlooked-for mishap. The Court reasoned that a heart attack suffered during the performance of strenuous official duties, especially when the employee is isolated from family and home, possesses a sufficient causal connection to employment. Therefore, such an event constitutes an "accident" arising out of and in the course of employment, entitling the legal heirs to compensation. The Court further directed the respondents to process the compensation claim within 45 days, rejecting the necessity of exhuming the body after eight years to ascertain the cause of death.
Questions settled- Does a heart attack suffered by an employee during the performance of official duties constitute an "accident" under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923?
- Is a causal connection between the work performed and the injury required to claim compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923?
- Can an employer deny compensation for a death occurring during employment based solely on the medical cause of death being a heart attack?
- Faryal Noureen vs Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, Sargodha etc2015 LHC 6795 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-19Read full judgment →
- Farooq Ahmed & another vs Additional District Judge, Samundari, District Faisalabad and 6 others2015 PLJ Lahore 774 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Through this constitutional petition, the petitioners sought the setting aside of orders passed by the Executing Court and the Additional District Judge whereby Petitioner No. 1, the general attorney and brother of the judgment debtor, was sent to civil prison and Petitioner No. 2's surety bond was enforced in execution of a maintenance decree. The core legal question was whether an attorney and a surety who voluntarily undertook liability during execution proceedings can frustrate the execution of a maintenance decree passed under family laws. The Lahore High Court held that the judgment debtor, his attorney, and his surety cannot frustrate the execution of a decree, and the Executing Court possesses ample powers under the law, including arrest and detention, to ensure the realization of decretal amounts. The key principle laid down is that Family Court proceedings are special in nature, and executing courts must utilize all prescribed legal modes—including those borrowed from land revenue recovery and civil procedure—to effectively enforce and execute maintenance decrees.
Questions settled- Can an attorney and a surety frustrate the execution of a maintenance decree passed against a judgment debtor?
- What modes of recovery can an Executing Court adopt for the execution of a money decree under the Family Courts Act, 1964?
- Whether the liability of an attorney and surety is coextensive with that of the judgment debtor in family court execution proceedings?
- Farooq Ahmad Chaudhry vs Government of the Punjab and others2015 LHC 324, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 402 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The instant constitutional petition was filed by a former senior cashier of the Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd. (P.P.C.B.L.) challenging an order passed by the Administrator of the Bank directing the recovery of a pecuniary loss from him, notwithstanding a prior Award rendered by the Registrar of Societies under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, which had absolved him of liability for the cash shortage. The core legal question was whether the Bank, having initiated proceedings before the Registrar and obtained an Award, could subsequently upend that decision through internal departmental proceedings to impose financial liability on the petitioner. The Lahore High Court held that the Bank could not turn around and revisit the findings of the Registrar after submitting to his jurisdiction, as doing so would amount to impermissible double jeopardy. The Court laid down the principle that once a statutory functionary determines liability and renders a final Award regarding an alleged embezzlement upon the application of a party, that party is bound by it and cannot circumvent it through internal administrative or disciplinary actions.
Questions settled- Whether the Administrator of a bank can upend an Award rendered by the Registrar under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925?
- Does it amount to double jeopardy for a bank to initiate internal recovery proceedings after a statutory Registrar has already absolved an employee of liability in an Award?
- Can a party that approaches a statutory forum and submits to its jurisdiction subsequently turn around and take a different stance?
- Farmanullah and 6 others vs Ghulam Habib2015 PLJ Peshawar 407 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves three consolidated revision petitions arising from disputes over land ownership, exchange mutations, and sale mutations between the parties. The core legal questions concern whether the lower courts erred in their concurrent findings regarding the validity of these mutations and whether the petitioners' claims were barred by limitation or the principle of res judicata. The Peshawar High Court dismissed all three revision petitions, holding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any misreading or non-reading of evidence by the lower courts. The Court affirmed the validity of the exchange and sale mutations, noting that the predecessor of the petitioners had not challenged the sale during his lifetime. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioners' suit challenging a 1973 mutation filed in 2011 was clearly time-barred. The key principle established is that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts will not be disturbed in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 absent a showing of illegality, and that long-standing revenue entries cannot be challenged after inordinate delay.
Questions settled- Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be disturbed in a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without demonstrating misreading or non-reading of evidence?
- Does every successive entry in the periodical record of rights accrue a fresh cause of action for a party challenging revenue entries?
- Is a suit challenging a sale mutation filed decades after its attestation maintainable?
- Farman Karim and 3 others vs The State2015 P Cr. L J 1305 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-03-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition sought the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners under Section 295-A, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Sections 6/7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, following the registration of an FIR regarding a religious ceremony. The petitioners contended that the proceedings violated Article 20 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and that the mandatory sanction under Section 196, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was absent. The Court addressed whether the inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, could be invoked to quash the proceedings. The Court held that because the case involved charges under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, which is a special law with overriding effect, the procedural requirements of Section 196, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, were not applicable to the proceedings before the Special Court. Furthermore, the Court established that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, should not be invoked when an alternative remedy, such as an application for acquittal under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is available to the accused before the trial court.
Questions settled- Does the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 have an overriding effect over the procedural requirements of Section 196, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Can the inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, be invoked when an alternative remedy under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is available?
- Is the sanction of the government required under Section 196, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, for cases triable by a Special Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
- Farman Ali vs Fazal Rabi and another2015 YLR 1777 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-07-21Read full judgment →
- Farman Ali vs Dr. Musa Karim and 2 others2015 P Cr. L J 1335 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-03-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Criminal Revision Petition challenged an order by the Sessions Judge, Gilgit, acting as an ex-officio Justice of the Peace, which rejected an application under Section 22-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the registration of a criminal case against doctors for alleged medical negligence. The core legal question was whether an order passed by a Justice of the Peace is amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 435, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the petition was neither maintainable nor meritorious. It determined that a Sessions Judge acting as a Justice of the Peace functions in an administrative or supervisory capacity, not as a "court" under Section 6, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and thus, such orders are not subject to revision. Furthermore, on merits, the Court found the application lacked a prima facie case and appeared motivated by malice. The Court emphasized that aggrieved parties have alternative, efficacious remedies, such as filing a private complaint under Section 200, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, or approaching a Magistrate under Section 156(3), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
Questions settled- Is an order passed by a Sessions Judge acting as an ex-officio Justice of the Peace under Section 22-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, subject to revisional jurisdiction?
- Does a Justice of the Peace function as a 'court' within the meaning of Section 6, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- What are the alternative remedies available to an aggrieved party when police refuse to register a cognizable offence?
- Farman Ali alias Gulla The State vs The State Farman Ali alias Gulla2015 LHC 2125 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Farman Ali alias Gulla, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a connected murder reference. The prosecution alleged that the appellant inflicted fatal knife blows on the deceased during an altercation in a graveyard. The core legal questions involved the credibility of related eyewitnesses, the legal effect of a delayed FIR and a discarded weapon recovery, and the presence of mitigating circumstances warranting the reduction of the death penalty to imprisonment for life. The Lahore High Court held that the eyewitness testimony was consistent, trustworthy, and corroborated by medical evidence despite the relatedness of the witnesses and the acquittal of co-accused. However, the court ruled that the delayed recovery of the blood-stained weapon without matching blood grouping reports, alongside the acquittal of co-accused, constituted mitigating circumstances. The court upheld the conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but altered the sentence from death to imprisonment for life, answering the murder reference in the negative.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of related eyewitnesses can be relied upon without independent corroboration in a murder trial?
- Does the acquittal of co-accused persons automatically require the acquittal of the main appellant based on the same evidence?
- Can the recovery of a weapon after a considerable delay without matching serological reports be used as incriminating evidence?
- What constitutes sufficient mitigating circumstances to commute a sentence of death to imprisonment for life under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Faridullah Shah & others vs Syed Inamullah Shah Bacha & others2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-24Read full judgment →
- Faridoon Khan and others vs State and others2015 PLJ Peshawar 364 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-16Read full judgment →
- Farid Virani & another vs Feroz ViraniSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Farid Ullah and others vs The State and others2015 MLD 927 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-06-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal and connected revision petition arise from a judgment of the Sessions Judge Bannu, convicting the appellants under Section 302(b) read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased and sentencing them to life imprisonment, along with compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony by a solitary related eyewitness, the effect of minor discrepancies and delayed examination due to the appellants' prolonged absconsion, the corroborative value of medical and circumstantial evidence, and whether uncertainty regarding whose specific shot proved fatal warrants a lesser sentence than death. The Peshawar High Court held that the testimony of the solitary eyewitness was straightforward, natural, and confidence-inspiring, and was duly corroborated by prompt registration of the FIR, medical evidence, and recovery of blood-stained articles, notwithstanding the long delay in trial caused by the appellants being fugitives from law. The Court established that minor discrepancies are natural under such circumstances, that the site plan and medical evidence were not in fatal conflict, and that the inability to attribute the fatal blow among multiple co-accused acts as a mitigating circumstance justifying life imprisonment instead of capital punishment. Both the appeal and the enhancement revision were dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of a solitary related eyewitness?
- Does the prolonged absconsion of the accused explain minor discrepancies in the testimony of a witness examined years after the incident?
- Is uncertainty regarding whose specific firearm shot proved fatal considered a mitigating circumstance justifying imprisonment for life instead of the death penalty?
- Does the absence of recovered crime empties or minor omissions in the site plan vitiate an otherwise credible ocular account?
- Farid Bakhsh vs Jind Wadda and others2015 SCMR 1044 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that allowed a revision petition, setting aside an Additional District Judge's decree and restoring a Civil Judge's decree in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The core legal question concerned the mandatory requirements for proving an attested document, specifically an agreement to sell, under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, and the High Court's revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an agreement to sell, involving a financial obligation, must be proved strictly in accordance with Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order. This Article mandates calling at least two attesting witnesses if alive and capable, a requirement deemed substantive, not procedural. The Court clarified that a scribe's testimony cannot substitute for an attesting witness, serving only for corroboration. Failure to call the second attesting witness, without plausible explanation, gives rise to an adverse presumption under Article 129(g) of the Order. The High Court's revisional jurisdiction was correctly exercised where the first appellate court's findings were based on an incomplete appreciation of evidence and relevant law.
- Fareedullah vs Muzaffar Ali2015 YLR 730 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-12-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal petition seeks the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to the private respondent by the trial court under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case registered under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether a subsequent bail application can be entertained and bail granted on grounds that were already available when earlier bail applications were withdrawn or dismissed. The Balochistan High Court held that successive bail applications to the same or subordinate courts are incompetent unless based on fresh grounds that did not exist at the time of previous applications. The Court found that the grounds relied upon by the trial court were previously available and that the trial court exercised its discretion in violation of settled judicial principles. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order and cancelled the bail granted to the private respondent, laying down the principle that grounds available earlier cannot be resurrected as fresh grounds for subsequent bail applications.
Questions settled- Can a subsequent bail application be entertained on grounds that were already available when an earlier bail application was withdrawn or dismissed?
- Does a trial court possess the discretion to grant post-arrest bail on grounds previously existing without the emergence of a fresh ground?
- What constitutes a fresh ground for the purpose of filing a subsequent bail application after the withdrawal of a prior one?
- Faqir Muhammad Shah vs S.S.P. Thatta, District Thatta and 2 others2015 YLR 2418 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Criminal Miscellaneous Application was filed under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking to set aside an order by the Additional District Judge, Thatta, and to compel the police to register an FIR against the proposed accused regarding a land dispute. The applicant alleged that the accused attempted to occupy his agricultural land and issued threats. The core legal question was whether the High Court, exercising its inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, should intervene to direct the registration of an FIR in a matter involving a disputed land claim. The Court held that the application was not maintainable. It reasoned that the dispute between the parties concerning land shares was essentially civil in nature and required adjudication by a competent civil forum. The Court emphasized that the extraordinary powers under Section 561-A are intended to prevent the abuse of the process of law and to meet the ends of justice, not to bypass express legal provisions or serve as a substitute for available civil remedies. Consequently, the application was dismissed, leaving the parties to seek redressal through appropriate civil proceedings.
Questions settled- Can the High Court exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to direct the registration of an FIR in a matter involving a civil dispute?
- Are the powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 intended to be used as a substitute for available civil remedies?
- Should the High Court intervene in a land dispute where the parties' rights are not yet adjudicated?
- Faqir Masih vs The Joint Secretary (Admn.) and anotherK.L.R. 2015 Labour & Service Cases 1, 2015 C.L.R. 346 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenges orders passed under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, whereby the petitioner, a sweeper, was removed from service on allegations of absence from duty, and his departmental appeal was subsequently dismissed. The core legal questions involved the requirement of a speaking order by an appellate authority and the necessity of a regular inquiry before imposing a major penalty. The Lahore High Court held that an appellate authority must independently analyze the case and render a reasoned, speaking order rather than merely endorsing the lower authority's decision, and that major penalties generally require a regular inquiry unless lawfully dispensed with by giving reasons. The court set aside the appellate order and remanded the matter back to the appellate authority to decide the appeal afresh through a reasoned order.
Questions settled- Whether an appellate authority is required to render an independent and speaking order when deciding an appeal against a major penalty?
- Can a major penalty of removal from service be imposed without holding a regular inquiry?
- What are the essential ingredients of a proper speaking order by an appellate authority in service matters?
- Faqir Bakhsh vs The State and others2015 PLD Lahore 93 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Rojhan, which directed the petitioners to hand over possession of disputed land to the complainant as interim relief under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question was whether a trial court possesses the authority to grant interim relief for the restoration of possession under Section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, prior to the formal commencement of the trial. The High Court held that the impugned order was legally unsustainable because the statutory condition of granting such relief 'during the trial' had not been met. The Court clarified that the mere taking of cognizance does not constitute the commencement of a trial; rather, a trial commences only upon the framing of a charge. Since no charge had been framed against the accused, the trial had not yet begun, rendering the interim order premature. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter, directing the trial court to expedite the proceedings and decide the case within two months.
Questions settled- Does the mere taking of cognizance by a court constitute the commencement of a trial?
- At what stage of criminal proceedings does a trial formally commence?
- Can a trial court grant interim relief for the restoration of possession under Section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, before the framing of a charge?
- Fap Employees Union (Cba), Zafar-Ur-Haq Road, Rawalpindi--Applicant2015 PLJ Tr.C. (NIRC) 320 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 2014-11-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an application filed by the FAP Employees Union (CBA) under Section 62 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, seeking a declaration that the various offices and terminals of M/s. Fauji Akbar Portia Marine Terminals Ltd (located in Karachi and Lahore) constitute a single Collective Bargaining Unit (CBU). The core legal question was whether the disparate establishments of the company, which share common administration, finance, and economic activities, should be consolidated into one CBU to facilitate effective collective bargaining. The National Industrial Relations Commission held that consolidating the establishments into a single CBU is in the interest of both the workers and the management, as it promotes unity, prevents industrial discontentment arising from fragmented negotiations, and ensures a unified charter of demands. The Commission affirmed that the principle of 'Unity and Strength' is paramount for the advancement of workers' causes. Consequently, the Commission declared the entire establishment of Fauji Akbar Portia Marine Terminals Ltd as one CBU for a period of five years, effective from the date of the order.
Questions settled- Can the National Industrial Relations Commission declare multiple geographically dispersed establishments of a single company as one Collective Bargaining Unit?
- Does the consolidation of establishments into a single Collective Bargaining Unit promote industrial peace and effective negotiation?
- For what duration can a Collective Bargaining Unit be declared by the National Industrial Relations Commission?
- Fandoon Khan and Others vs State and Others2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-16Read full judgment →
- Falak Niaz vs The State2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-25Read full judgment →
- Fakir Mohammad and others vs The StateSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This jail appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under sections 324, 353, and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the charges of firing at police, deterring public servants, and possessing a snatched motorcycle based on the uncorroborated testimony of police officials. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution story was unnatural and unbelievable, noting the lack of firearm injuries or vehicle damage despite a prolonged exchange of gunfire, the failure to join independent witnesses, the absence of ballistic reports, and material contradictions in evidence. The court laid down the principle that uncorroborated testimony of police officials is insufficient for conviction where the prosecution story is fraught with doubt, contradictions, and non-compliance with basic investigative safeguards, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt.
Questions settled- Whether the uncorroborated testimony of police officials is sufficient to sustain a conviction under section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in the absence of corroborative physical evidence?
- Does the failure to associate independent witnesses from a populated locality during an alleged arrest and recovery vitiate the prosecution's case?
- Whether an accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt when no firearm injuries or bullet marks are sustained by either party despite an alleged extended cross-firing incident?
- Fakhir Ullah vs The State and another2015 P Cr. L J 1409 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-09-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This bail application arises from a criminal case involving charges under sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the petitioner sought post-arrest bail for the alleged murder of two individuals. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given his plea of alibi and the existence of a cross-version FIR. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the application, holding that the prosecution established a prima facie case through a promptly lodged FIR, direct charges, recovery of blood-stained earth, forensic reports, and medical evidence. Regarding the plea of alibi, the court determined it was a matter for trial rather than tentative assessment. Crucially, the court laid down the principle that the existence of a cross-version FIR does not automatically grant an accused a right to bail. Instead, each cross-case must be tentatively scrutinized and assessed on its own merits to determine if the accused is entitled to relief, rather than treating cross-FIRs as a license for bail.
Questions settled- Does the existence of a cross-version FIR automatically entitle an accused to bail?
- Can a plea of alibi be conclusively determined during the bail stage?
- What is the standard for assessing the merits of a cross-case for bail purposes?
- Fakhar-ud-Din vs Member (Judicial-v), Board of Revenue, etc2015 C.L.R. 523 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-12Read full judgment →
- Fakhar-ud-Din vs Member (Judicial-v), Board of Revenue etc.2015 LHC 596 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-12Read full judgment →
- Fakhar-Ud-Din through L.Rs,s vs Muhammad Iqbal and others2015 CLC 994 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Regular First Appeal was directed against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, whereby the appellant's suit for declaration and cancellation of a registered sale-deed was dismissed. The core legal questions involved whether the impugned sale-deed was executed through fraud and undue influence without consideration, and whether the vendor was estopped from denying the receipt of consideration recited in the registered document. The Lahore High Court held that a registered sale-deed can be challenged and declared void if the payment of consideration and delivery of possession are not proved, and that an acknowledgment of receipt of consideration in a deed is rebuttable. The court laid down the key principle that the rule excluding oral evidence does not prevent a party from proving want of consideration, fraud, or undue influence to invalidate a transaction, and that the burden shifts to the beneficiary to prove the validity of the document when an old person without independent advice is involved.
Questions settled- Whether a vendor is estopped from proving that consideration was not actually received despite an acknowledgment in a registered sale-deed?
- Does Article 103 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 bar oral or extrinsic evidence to prove want of consideration, fraud, or undue influence?
- What are the essential elements required to constitute a valid sale under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
- Does a presumption of correctness attached to a registered document by the Sub-Registrar extend to the actual payment of consideration?
- Fakhar-Ud-Din (deceased) through LRs vs Muhammad Iqbal, etc.2015 PLJ Lahore 395 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-04Read full judgment →
- Fakhar Abbas vs Additional District Judge Tandlianwala, District2015 LHC 554 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-27Read full judgment →
- Faizullah Khan and others vs Mst. Mirzago Begum and others2015 YLR 1489 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves consolidated civil suits for declaration, partition, and administration of the estate of the deceased, Z.A. Khan, brought by his legal heirs. The core legal questions concerned the entitlement of the plaintiffs to their inheritance shares under Sharia and the validity of alleged relinquishment deeds relied upon by the defendants to deny these claims. The court held that the plaintiffs in Suit No. 1445/2008 had already received their shares and effectively relinquished their rights. Conversely, the court found in favor of the plaintiff in Suit No. 92/2010, ruling that she had not received her inheritance and that the relinquishment deed presented against her was fraudulent and invalid, as it was an unregistered document executed by an illiterate person without proper explanation. The key principles established are that an unregistered relinquishment deed is ineffective against an illiterate party absent proof of informed consent, and the burden of proof rests on defendants to demonstrate that disputed properties were not part of the deceased's estate. A preliminary decree for administration was issued accordingly.
Questions settled- Is an unregistered relinquishment deed executed by an illiterate person binding without proof that the contents were explained?
- Does the burden of proof lie on defendants to establish that properties are not part of the deceased's estate when they claim individual ownership?
- Are legal heirs entitled to a preliminary decree for administration when their share in the estate has not been distributed?
- Faizan Ahmed Siddiqui vs NABSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →