Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 233,147 judgments in total.

• Waheed Ahmed vs Chief Engineer Electricity, Government of Azad2014 PLC (C.S.) 866 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2012-12-26
  transfer and postingcivil servantcompetent authorityservice tribunaltenure of stayelectricity department
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal which dismissed in limine the appellant's service appeal challenging his transfer order from the Construction Division to the Operation Division of the Electricity Department. The core legal questions involve whether the Chief Engineer was competent to issue the transfer order given the administrative division into zones, and the applicability of the Rules of Business, 1985. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the establishment of zones within the Electricity Department is purely for administrative purposes and does not create independent departments, rendering the Chief Engineer fully competent under the service rules to issue transfers. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the normal tenure of stay at one station is a guideline and transfers can be made in exigencies of service, and civil servants have no vested right to claim posting of choice. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the Service Tribunal's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Engineer of the Electricity Department is competent to transfer an employee across administrative zones?
  • Can a civil servant claim posting and transfer to a station of their own choice?
  • What is the applicability of the Rules of Business, 1985 regarding the transfer of civil servants between departments?
  • Does the division of an administrative department into zones create independent departments for transfer purposes?
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• Waheed Ahmed Siddiqui vs Additional Sessions Judge and others2014 MLD 1513 · Lahore High Court · 2014-05-21Read full judgment →
• Wahab Gul vs Sikandar Ali and Others2014 NLR Revenue 59 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-10-28Read full judgment →
• Wahab Gul vs Sikandar Ali and 7 otherss2014 NLR Revenue 59, 2014 YLR 2130 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-10-28
  civil revisionjurisdiction of civil courtland revenue actrecord of rightsdeclaratory suitrejection of plaintkhasra girdawari
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a dispute over land ownership and the jurisdiction of Civil Courts versus Revenue authorities. The petitioner challenged the dismissal of an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which sought to reject a declaratory suit on the grounds that the matter fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue hierarchy. The core legal question was whether the Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate a suit involving ownership rights when the underlying dispute involved entries in the record-of-rights. The Court held that while the correction of simple entries in the record-of-rights falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue authorities under Section 172 of the Land Revenue Act 1967, disputes involving complex questions of ownership and rights in land are cognizable by Civil Courts under Section 53 of the same Act. Furthermore, the Court ruled the revision petition non-maintainable, noting that the petitioner had already exhausted a revisionary remedy before the lower appellate court, rendering the current petition a second revision, which is barred by law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Civil Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a suit involving ownership rights when the dispute also concerns entries in the record-of-rights?
  • Is an order dismissing an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 appealable?
  • Can a party file a second revision petition before the High Court after having already availed a revisionary remedy before the lower appellate court?
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• Vestergaard Frandsen'a_S and others vs Bestnet Europe Limited and others2014 SCMR 381, 2014 CLD 473 · Supreme Court of United Kingdom
  breach of confidencetrade secretscommon designconfidential informationintellectual propertyemployment contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom arose from a commercial dispute concerning the alleged misuse of confidential information and trade secrets relating to the manufacture of long-lasting insecticidal nets. Vestergaard Frandsen appealed against a Court of Appeal decision that had reversed an initial finding holding Mrs. Trine Sig, a former employee, liable for breach of confidence. The core legal question was whether an individual who was a former employee and co-founder of a competing company could be held liable for damages for breach of confidence or under a common design, despite having neither acquired the relevant trade secrets nor known at the material time that the competing product was developed using the claimant's confidential information. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that liability for breach of confidence and common design requires the defendant to have shared the relevant knowledge or state of mind rendering the acts wrongful. The Court laid down the principle that an individual cannot be held liable in damages for the misuse of trade secrets without knowledge or notice that the information is confidential and being misused, thereby maintaining a fair balance between protecting intellectual property and permitting honest market competition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant be held liable in damages for breach of confidence without knowledge or notice that trade secrets were being misused?
  • Does participation in a common design to manufacture a product create liability for misuse of confidential information if the defendant does not share the wrongful state of mind?
  • Is a former employee subject to strict liability for the misuse of trade secrets by a third party when the employee never acquired the confidential information during their employment?
  • What mental element or state of knowledge is required to establish secondary liability for the misuse of confidential information?
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• Vestergaard Frandsen a_S (now called MVF 3 ApS) and others—Appellants vs Bestnet Europe Limited and others2014 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of United KingdomRead full judgment →
• Venus Distributors (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Abdullah Hanif and others2014 CLC 1275 · Sindh High Court · 2014-02-14Read full judgment →
• Vejay Kumar and another vs The State2014 P Cr. L J 1783 · Sindh High Court · 2013-11-19
  anti-terrorism courtjurisdictionkidnapping for ransomtransfer of casecriminal revisionterrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application called in question an order passed by the Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court dismissing the applicants' application for the transfer of their case from the anti-terrorism court to a court of ordinary jurisdiction. The applicants faced charges including kidnapping for ransom and murder. The core legal question was whether an offence involving kidnapping a minor for ransom, resulting in death, falls within the parameters of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, thereby warranting trial by an Anti-Terrorism Court rather than an ordinary court. The court held that the barbaric nature of the act—kidnapping a young child, taping his mouth to silence him, causing his death, and throwing his body into a channel—creates fear, panic, and a sense of insecurity among the public, which squarely brings the act within the ambit of terrorism. The key principle laid down is that while determining the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court, the court must consider the gravity of the offence, its societal repercussion, surrounding circumstances, and whether the act results in striking terror or creating a sense of insecurity among the people.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court can be determined on the basis of contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses?
  • Does kidnapping a minor child for ransom resulting in death fall within the ambit of terrorism under section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • What are the essential ingredients and parameters a court must consider while deciding the criminal jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • When can the revisional jurisdiction under section 435 or inherent powers under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked?
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• Uzma Rani vs Registrar, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan and 22014 YLR 2000 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-11Read full judgment →
• Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan (Ltd.) Through Managing2014 CLC 238 · Lahore High Court · 2013-03-27Read full judgment →
• Usman vs Mushtaq Ahmad and another2014 PLD Peshawar 108 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-03-14
  post-arrest bailcross-casesfurther inquiryparity of treatmenttentative assessmentcriminal proceduremurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought post-arrest bail for offences under Sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question concerned the entitlement to bail in a "cross-case" scenario where both parties lodged FIRs regarding the same incident. The Court held that the matter constituted a cross-case as the parties, time, and place of occurrence were identical, and the presence of firearm injuries on both sides precluded the argument that the counter-version was fabricated. The Court affirmed the principle that in cross-cases, bail is generally granted to allow for further inquiry, as determining the initial aggressor requires evidence during trial. Although the petitioner was attributed a specific effective role, the Court observed that the accused in the counter-case had already been granted bail. Consequently, to ensure parity of treatment, the Court granted bail to the petitioner. The judgment reiterates that bail observations are based on tentative assessments and should not influence the trial court’s independent appraisal of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What criteria must be met for a criminal case to be classified as a 'cross-case' for the purpose of bail?
  • Is bail generally granted in cross-cases to allow for further inquiry?
  • Does the granting of bail to an accused in a counter-case entitle the accused in the primary case to similar treatment?
  • Can observations made by the High Court during a bail hearing influence the trial court's appraisal of evidence?
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• Usman Ltd. vs Lasbella Industrial Estate Development Authority Hub2014 YLR 1893 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-04-30
  possession of immovable propertyspecific relieflimitation periodremand of casecivil appealindustrial plot allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges the judgment and decree passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Hub District Lasbela, which dismissed the appellant's suit for possession of immovable property. The core legal question revolves around whether the trial court erred in treating a regular suit for possession based on title filed under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, as a summary suit under Section 9 of the Act, and consequently dismissing it as time-barred. The Balochistan High Court held that the trial court committed a material irregularity by mischaracterizing the nature of the suit, as the title, contents, and prayer clause—which sought a declaration of title, cancellation of allotment, restoration of possession, damages, and permanent injunction—clearly brought it within the purview of Section 8. Furthermore, the High Court noted that suits under Section 9 bar appeals, whereas the matter had previously been subjected to an appeal, confirming Section 9 was inapplicable. The court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter back to the trial court for fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit explicitly filed under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 can be treated by the trial court as a summary suit under Section 9 of the said Act?
  • Does a decree passed under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 bar an appeal against it?
  • What is the core distinction between a regular suit for possession based on title under Section 8 and a summary suit for possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
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• Usman Ali through L.Rs, and others vs Commissioner Sukkur Division at2014 CLC 1586 · Sindh High Court · 2013-12-16Read full judgment →
• University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar through Registrar UET, Peshawar vs Qazi Raza-Ur-Rehman and 2 otherss2014 YLR 2085 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-12-13Read full judgment →
• Universal Welfare Organization through General Secretary vs Muhammad Sabir and another2014 MLD 882 · Sindh High Court · 2013-10-22Read full judgment →
• Universal Insurance Company Limited: In the matter of vs Not2014 CLD 510 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2013-12-26Read full judgment →
• United Liner Agencies of Pakistan Private Limited through Company2014 PLC 284 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2013-11-21
  industrial disputelabour court awardclosure of establishmentprofit bonuswage increasestanding orderscommercial establishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was preferred by the appellant establishment against the Award dated 23-8-2001 passed by the Sindh Labour Court V, Karachi, under section 32(1-A) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which allowed four demands relating to wage increase, house rent, conveyance, and profit bonus. The core legal question was whether the Labour Court's award was sustainable and whether the subsequent closure of the appellant's commercial establishment absolved it from complying with the award for the relevant period (1998-1999). The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the appellant establishment remained bound to comply with the award up to the date of its closure in 2009, as the closure did not extinguish liabilities accrued under the award for the period of active operation. The Tribunal laid down the principle that a commercial establishment must comply with statutory and adjudicated industrial awards despite subsequent closure, and that exemptions regarding employee thresholds under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, are strictly construed and do not dispense with mandatory closure requirements where applicable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer is absolved from complying with an industrial award upon the subsequent closure of its establishment?
  • Does the exemption under the second proviso to clause (c) of subsection (4) of section 1 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, apply to commercial establishments seeking closure under Standing Order 11-A?
  • Is an employer bound to pay statutory profit bonus under Standing Order 10-C regardless of whether an active collective bargaining agreement exists?
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• United Bank Limited vs Gulistan Textile Mills Limited2014 CLD 1482 · Sindh High Court · 2013-12-20
  winding-up petitioncommercial insolvencyinability to pay debtsofficial liquidatorgoing concernstatutory noticecorporate liquidation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for the winding-up of a public limited company, Gulistan Textile Mills Limited, filed by a financial institution, United Bank Limited, under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, on the grounds of the company's inability to pay its debts. The core legal question was whether the company had become commercially insolvent, thereby necessitating a winding-up order. The Court held that the company was indeed commercially insolvent, noting that it had failed to respond to a statutory notice of demand, creating a presumption of insolvency. Furthermore, the company's own audited annual reports revealed massive losses, negative equity, and current liabilities significantly exceeding current assets, confirming it was no longer a going concern. The Court affirmed that when a company is unable to pay its current demands and there is no reasonable hope of profitable trading, winding-up is inevitable. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, ordered the company to be wound up, and appointed an official liquidator to take control of its affairs and assets to protect the interests of creditors and shareholders.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to respond to a statutory notice of demand under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 create a presumption of commercial insolvency?
  • What criteria must a court consider when determining whether a company is commercially insolvent for the purposes of a winding-up petition?
  • Is a winding-up order inevitable when a company's current liabilities significantly exceed its assets and it is no longer a viable going concern?
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• United Bank Limited vs District Judge with the Power of Labour Court and 2 others2014 PLC 418 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-03-05
  labour lawlimitation periodsufficient causecomputation of timewrit jurisdictionlabour appellate tribunalcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenges the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal as time-barred. The core legal question is whether the appeal, filed on 12-2-2013 against a judgment dated 12-1-2013, was within the period of limitation, considering intervening holidays and the delay in the availability of the judgment. The Court held that the appeal was within time, setting aside the Tribunal's order. The ratio is that where a statute does not explicitly exclude provisions like Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908 or the principles of the General Clauses Act, they may be invoked to exclude public holidays from the computation of limitation periods. Furthermore, the Court established that the failure of a Labour Court to dictate and sign a judgment in open court as required by law constitutes a valid 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 for condoning delay, and that the time spent awaiting the availability of a judgment must be accounted for to ensure substantial justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can the principles of the General Clauses Act be invoked to exclude public holidays from the computation of a limitation period in proceedings under the Industrial Relations Ordinance?
  • Does the failure of a Labour Court to dictate and sign a judgment in open court constitute 'sufficient cause' for the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can the theory of implied exclusion be applied to exclude provisions of the Limitation Act 1908 in proceedings under the Industrial Relations Ordinance where they are not explicitly excluded?
  • Is a party entitled to the exclusion of time spent awaiting the availability of a judgment when computing the period of limitation for filing an appeal?
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• Union of India vs V. Sriharan @ Murugan and others2014 PSC (Crl.) 702 · Supreme Court of India
  remission of sentencelife imprisonmentappropriate governmentcommutation of death sentenceconsultation versus concurrenceconstitutional bench reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns writ petitions filed by the Union of India challenging a proposal by the Government of Tamil Nadu to remit the life sentences and release seven convicts in the Rajiv Gandhi Assassination Case, following the commutation of their death sentences by the Supreme Court. The core legal questions involve whether life imprisonment upon commutation means natural life precluding remission, whether the appropriate Government can exercise remission after constitutional or judicial commutation, and the interpretation of 'appropriate Government' and 'consultation' under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court did not finally decide the merits but held that the complex and critical issues regarding the scope of remission, co-extensive executive powers, and statutory interpretation necessitated an authoritative pronouncement. Consequently, the Court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench for resolution, framing several specific questions of law, and directed that interim orders should continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the rest of the prisoner's natural life, or if a convict undergoing life imprisonment has a right to claim remission?
  • Whether the appropriate Government is permitted to exercise the power of remission under the Code of Criminal Procedure after parallel power has been exercised by the President, Governor, or the Supreme Court?
  • Whether Section 432(7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives primacy to the executive power of the Union and excludes the executive power of the State where the power of the Union is co-extensive?
  • Whether there can be two appropriate Governments in a given case under Section 432(7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether the term 'consultation' stipulated in Section 435(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure implies 'concurrence'?
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• Union National Bank vs M/s. Silver Reed International (Pvt.) Limited2014 P.C.T.L.R. 208 · Sindh High Court · 2013-12-27
  banking jurisdictionfinancial institutionreturn of plaintrecovery of financeoriginal civil jurisdictionjurisdiction of banking court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil suit was instituted in the original civil jurisdiction of the Sindh High Court for the recovery of money advanced by the plaintiff bank to the principal borrower and guarantors abroad. The core legal question was whether the High Court retained jurisdiction to try the suit in its original civil jurisdiction or whether jurisdiction exclusively vested in a Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The court held that since the plaintiff-bank operated a branch in Pakistan, it qualified as a 'financial institution', making the defendants 'customers' and the transaction 'finance' under the Ordinance of 2001; consequently, by virtue of Section 7(4) of the Ordinance, the High Court lacked jurisdiction, and the plaint was ordered to be returned for presentation before the proper Banking Court. The key principle laid down is that where a banking dispute falls within the statutory definition of finance and involves a financial institution and customer, exclusive jurisdiction vests in the Banking Court, ousting the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a foreign bank operating a branch in Pakistan fall within the definition of a financial institution under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court is barred in respect of matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a Banking Court under the Ordinance of 2001?
  • What is the proper course of action for a court that finds it lacks pecuniary, territorial, or special jurisdiction to try a suit?
  • Are the provisions of Rule 10 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 regarding the return of a plaint mandatory in nature?
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• Union Local Loop (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federal Board of Revenue and othersPTCL 2014 CL. 515 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-30Read full judgment →
• Umer Farooque and 2 others vs Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Mirpurkhas and another2014 P Cr. L J 1052 · Sindh High Court · 2013-06-06
  Anti-Terrorism Acttransfer of casejurisdictionterrorismpublic terrorcriminal revisionbail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal revision applications challenging orders of an Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) that refused to transfer two cases to a court of ordinary jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the alleged incidents, involving a political dispute, firing, and death, satisfied the statutory definition of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, thereby warranting trial in an ATC. The High Court held that the ATC erred in retaining jurisdiction. It established that the element of striking terror or creating a sense of fear and insecurity in the public at large is a sine qua non for invoking the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The court emphasized that the provisions of the Act must be construed strictly, and in the absence of evidence demonstrating that the crime created public terror, the Act is inapplicable. Additionally, the court ruled that the issue of jurisdiction goes to the root of the proceedings and can be raised at any stage; filing a bail application before an ATC does not bar an accused from subsequently challenging that court's jurisdiction to try the case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the creation of public terror a necessary ingredient for an offence to be triable under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Does the filing of a bail application before an Anti-Terrorism Court preclude an accused from subsequently challenging the court's jurisdiction?
  • Can an objection regarding the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court be raised at any stage of the proceedings?
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• Umer Farooq vs Attock Petroleum Limited through Chief Executive2014 CLD 1672 · Sindh High Court · 2014-07-16Read full judgment →
• Umed Ali vs The State2014 YLR 1028 · Sindh High Court · 2014-01-22
  illicit armspolice witnessinimical witnessmisreading of evidencesurmises and conjecturescriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of conviction passed against the appellant under section 13(d) of the Arms Ordinance for the alleged recovery of an unlicensed Kalashnikov. The core legal question was whether a conviction based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of police officials, particularly where the complainant-cum-investigating officer admitted to a severe prior enmity regarding a murder charge involving the appellant's brother, could be sustained in the absence of independent corroboration and proper appreciation of evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court's judgment was based on surmises, conjectures, and non-reading of evidence, and that the uncorroborated testimony of inimical police officials cannot inspire confidence for a safe administration of criminal justice. The court laid down the principle that where admitted enmity exists between the accused and the police complainant-investigator, and independent witnesses from the locality are not associated despite availability, police evidence cannot be treated as reliable without independent corroboration, and judgments cannot be founded on subjective assumptions or extraneous price evaluations of contraband weapons.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for possessing an illicit weapon under the Arms Ordinance can be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of police officials who are on terms of admitted enmity with the accused?
  • Can a trial court rely on personal assumptions and extra-record evaluations regarding the market price of a weapon to discard the possibility of a false implication by police?
  • Whether the non-association of independent private witnesses from the locality during a recovery vitiates the prosecution case when personal animosity between the accused and the police complainant-investigator is established?
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• Umar Hayat vs Muhammad Akbar and otherss2014 YLR 2493 · Lahore High Court · 2013-12-18Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat Khawaja through President and 2 others vs National Bank2014 PLC (C.S.) 871 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-14
  privilege leaveencashment of leaveretirement benefitsNational Bank of Pakistanlacheswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves multiple writ petitions filed by retired officers of the National Bank of Pakistan seeking directions for the payment of unutilized Privilege Leave (PL) exceeding 180 days, based on Instruction Circular No.37/99. The core legal question is whether the petitioners are entitled to encashment of frozen Privilege Leave beyond the maximum limit of 180 days stipulated in subsequent Circular No.57/99. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioners have already been paid for 180 days of PL in accordance with Circular 57/99 and are not entitled to any further amount. Furthermore, the court held that the claims were hit by laches, having been filed years after the respective retirements without raising any objections at the time of receiving retirement benefits. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are retired bank employees entitled to encashment of unutilized privilege leave beyond the limit of 180 days under the bank's instructions circulars?
  • Does a belated claim for unutilized privilege leave filed years after retirement suffer from laches?
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• Umar Farooque vs The State2014 PLD Sindh 203 · Sindh High Court · 2013-10-31
  Anti-Terrorism Actpersonal enmityterrorismjurisdictioncriminal revisionmurdervendetta
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged orders returning a case from an Anti-Terrorism Court to an ordinary court. The core legal question was whether a triple murder incident, allegedly motivated by prior murderous enmity, constitutes an act of "terrorism" under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, thereby mandating trial by an Anti-Terrorism Court. The Court held that the incident, being a result of personal vendetta and previous enmity, lacked the requisite design to coerce, intimidate, or create a sense of fear or insecurity in the public, which are essential ingredients of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Consequently, the Court upheld the impugned orders, ruling that the case was not triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court. The key principle laid down is that for an act to qualify as terrorism, the motivation, object, and purpose behind the act must be examined; where the act is merely the result of personal enmity or private vendetta, it does not attract the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, regardless of the number of casualties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a murder incident motivated by personal enmity constitute an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • What criteria must be applied to determine if an offence falls within the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Is the number of casualties in an incident sufficient to classify an act as terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
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• Umar Daraz and anothers vs The State and 5 otherss2014 YLR 1231 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-02-02
  quashment of FIRinherent jurisdictionabduction for ransomSection 164 statementabuse of processcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the quashment of an FIR registered under Section 365-A, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding the alleged abduction of the complainant's brother for ransom. The petitioners contended they were innocent, falsely implicated due to personal grudges, and that the delay in naming them cast doubt on the prosecution's case. The Court examined the record, noting that the abductee and the complainant had both provided statements under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, explicitly naming the petitioners. The Court held that a tentative assessment of the record established a prima facie connection between the petitioners and the alleged offence. Consequently, the Court declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to quash the FIR, ruling that the petitioners' contentions regarding innocence and delay were matters for the trial court. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that it lacks the competence to quash an FIR under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash an FIR in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should a petition for quashment of an FIR be entertained when the accused are prima facie connected to the offence through statements recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a plea of innocence and mala fide sufficient grounds for the High Court to quash an FIR at the initial stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Umair Nasir Khan, Overseer, Local Government and Rural DevelopmentK.L.R. 2014 Labour & Service Cases 112 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  civil service appointmentregularization of contract employeesbackdoor appointmentequality before lawfundamental rightsrecruitment ruleswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the illegal regularization and appointment of private respondents as Sub-Engineers (BPS-16) in the Local Government and Rural Development Department without advertisement or a transparent selection process. The core legal question was whether the government could regularize contract project employees into permanent civil posts without adhering to statutory recruitment rules and constitutional requirements of merit. The High Court held that the impugned appointments and the subsequent designation of BPS-16 as a 'personal scale' for the respondents were illegal and void. The court quashed the appointment orders and directed that the posts be filled through a fresh, open, and merit-based selection process. The court reaffirmed that civil service appointments must strictly comply with statutory recruitment rules, including the mandatory advertisement of vacancies. It established that ad-hoc or contract service confers no vested right to regularization, and 'backdoor' appointments violate the fundamental right to equality before the law, as guaranteed by the constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can contract employees be regularized into permanent civil posts without advertisement and a transparent selection process?
  • Does an ad-hoc or contract appointment confer a vested right to regularization in civil service?
  • Is the designation of a higher grade as a 'personal scale' valid when the underlying appointment to the post is illegal?
  • Does the regularization of project employees without open competition violate the fundamental right to equality before the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Umair Nasir Khan, Overseep Local Govt. & Rural DevelopmentK.L.R. 2014 Labour & Service Cases 112, 2014 PLJ AJ&K 380 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  civil service appointmentregularization of contract employeesad-hoc appointmentmerit-based selectionequality before lawwrit jurisdictionpublic service commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the illegal regularization and appointment of private respondents as Sub-Engineers (BPS-16) in the Local Government and Rural Development Department. The core legal question was whether the appointment and subsequent regularization of contract employees, without advertisement or a competitive selection process, violated the constitutional guarantee of equality and established civil service laws. The Court held that the appointments were unlawful, as they bypassed mandatory recruitment rules and the Public Service Commission. Relying on established precedents, the Court emphasized that ad-hoc or contract appointments cannot confer a right to permanent regularization without adherence to merit-based selection. The judgment reaffirmed that public posts must be filled through transparent, advertised processes to satisfy the constitutional requirement of equality before the law. Consequently, the Court quashed the impugned appointment orders, declared the posts vacant, and directed the authorities to fill them through a proper, merit-based selection process, while allowing the private respondents to compete for the positions, with age relaxation if applicable.

  Questions settled

  • Can contract employees be regularized in government service without advertising the posts or following a competitive selection process?
  • Does an ad-hoc or contract appointment confer a legal right to permanent regularization?
  • Is the regularization of government employees without reference to the Public Service Commission for posts in BPS-16 and above legally valid?
  • Does the constitutional guarantee of equality before the law apply to entry into government service?
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• Umair Aslam vs Station House Officer and 7 others2014 P Cr. L J 1305 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-28
  quashing of F.I.R.criminal breach of trustabuse of process of lawcivil disputeconstitutional petitioninherent powers of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, read with Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the quashing of an F.I.R. registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner argued that the allegations were false, the dispute was essentially civil in nature regarding a property deal, and that the F.I.R. did not disclose the commission of a criminal offence. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings should be quashed when the allegations do not constitute a criminal offence and the matter is civil in nature, even after the submission of a challan. The Court held that since the F.I.R. lacked specific allegations of entrustment required for criminal breach of trust and the underlying dispute concerned a property transaction, the proceedings constituted an abuse of the process of law. Consequently, the Court quashed the F.I.R., establishing that the submission of a challan does not bar the High Court from quashing proceedings if they are groundless or constitute an abuse of process.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed by the High Court after the submission of a challan?
  • Does a dispute arising from a property transaction necessarily constitute a criminal offence under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the High Court empowered to quash an F.I.R. if the contents do not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence?
  • Does the mere submission of a challan by the police bar the High Court from exercising its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Um-Air Ahmed Khan vs Yousuf Ali Khan Ghouri and another2014 MLD 953 · Sindh High Court · 2013-06-28
  appeal against acquittaldouble presumption of innocenceinterested witnessesocular testimonydelay in F.I.R.benefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondent by the trial court for offences under sections 324 and 506(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of ineffective firing and criminal intimidation. The core legal question revolves around whether the trial court's evaluation of ocular testimony, delayed F.I.R., and material contradictions among interested witnesses warranted setting aside the acquittal. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court's judgment was based on a proper appreciation of evidence. The court reaffirmed the principle that an accused against whom an order of acquittal has been passed enjoys a double presumption of innocence, and appellate courts should not interfere unless the trial court's findings suffer from material illegality, perversity, or misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with an order of acquittal when the trial court's judgment is based on a proper appreciation of evidence and suffers from no legal or factual infirmity?
  • Does the testimony of closely related and interested witnesses require independent corroboration in the face of admitted enmity?
  • Can the prosecution succeed based on improvements made by the complainant in court testimony regarding his presence at the scene of the incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Udha Ram vs Muhammad Mehtab and another2014 CLC 98 · Sindh High Court · 2013-09-06
  civil revisionpre-emptionTalb-e-MuwasibatTalb-e-IshhadMuhammadan Lawrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 arises out of concurrent findings of the lower courts dismissing the applicant's suit for possession through pre-emption and permanent injunction regarding the suit property. The core legal questions involved were whether the suit property was available for and subject to a valid sale giving rise to the right of pre-emption under Muhammadan Law, whether the mandatory demands of Talb-e-Muwasibat and Talb-e-Ishhad were duly and strictly fulfilled, and whether the revisional court could interfere with concurrent findings of fact. The Sindh High Court held that the right of pre-emption arises only out of a valid and complete sale, that the alleged date of knowledge and demands did not correspond with the actual registered sale-deeds executed months prior, and that the second demand of Talb-e-Ishhad was not made in accordance with Muhammadan Law either in the presence of the buyer/seller or on the premises subject to sale. The Court affirmed that pre-emption is a piratical right requiring strict proof and compliance, and declined to interfere with the concurrent factual findings in revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of pre-emption arise out of transactions other than a valid, complete, and bona fide sale under Muhammadan Law?
  • What are the strict legal requirements for making Talb-e-Muwasibat and Talb-e-Ishhad to successfully claim pre-emption?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Is a pre-emption suit maintainable when the statutory demands are not performed at the premises subject to sale or in the presence of the contracting parties as mandated by Muhammadan Law?
  Read full judgment →
• UBL Insurers Limited vs Ashiq Hussain and another2014 CLD 1155 · Lahore High Court · 2013-12-10
  constitutional petitioninterim ordermaintainabilityinsurance tribunalright of appealwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by the petitioner challenging an interim order dated 2-2-2013 passed by the Insurance Tribunal, Lahore, whereby an application for summoning witnesses was partially allowed. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against an interim order passed by the Insurance Tribunal where the governing statute excludes an appeal against interim orders. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that a statute excluding a right of appeal from an interim order cannot be bypassed by invoking constitutional jurisdiction against such interim orders, and the aggrieved party must wait for the final order before challenging it in the proper forum. The key principle laid down is that interim orders of tribunals whose statutes bar appeals against interlocutory orders are not amenable to constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against an interim order passed by an Insurance Tribunal?
  • Can a party bypass the statutory exclusion of an appeal against an interim order by invoking constitutional jurisdiction?
  • At what stage can an aggrieved party challenge an interlocutory order passed by a tribunal where appeal against interim orders is barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Ubaidullah and anothers vs The State and anothers2014 YLR 753 · Balochistan High Court · 2013-10-31
  quashment of FIRdishonoured chequeSection 489-F PPCinherent jurisdictionfugitive from lawcivil and criminal proceedingsSection 561-A CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought the quashment of an FIR registered under sections 419, 420, 471, 489-F, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning the dishonour of a cheque issued for a coal mining commission. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings under Section 489-F can be quashed on the grounds that the underlying dispute is purely civil and that payment was subsequently made. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the dishonour of a cheque issued for the fulfilment of an obligation constitutes a distinct criminal offence under Section 489-F, regardless of the civil nature of the underlying transaction. The Court emphasized that criminal and civil proceedings can proceed simultaneously and that inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 should not be invoked to bypass the trial court when an alternative remedy, such as Section 249-A, exists. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioners, having failed to surrender to the trial court, were fugitives from law and thus disentitled to discretionary relief.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be quashed on the ground that the underlying dispute is purely civil?
  • Does the existence of a civil obligation preclude the initiation of criminal proceedings for the dishonour of a cheque?
  • Can the High Court exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when an alternative remedy exists under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Are petitioners who fail to surrender to the trial court entitled to seek the quashment of an FIR?
  Read full judgment →
• ubaid-ur-Rahman and others vs Qazi Saeed-ur-rahman and others2014-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2014-02-17
  temporary injunctionprima facie caseland acquisitionunutilized landfunctus officiocivil revisionlease validity
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision matter concerns the legality of a lease granted by government functionaries over unutilized land previously acquired for public road construction. The original landowners challenged the lease, alleging procedural irregularities and seeking a temporary injunction to maintain the status quo. The trial court initially refused the injunction, but the appellate court granted it. Subsequently, the appellate court refused to extend the injunction, citing it had become functus officio. The Peshawar High Court examined whether the plaintiffs established a prima facie case and whether the appellate court erred in declining to extend the injunction. The Court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated a prima facie case, given the serious allegations regarding the lease's validity and potential loss to the public exchequer. It further ruled that the appellate court was not functus officio and was obligated to decide the extension application on its merits. The Court dismissed the revision petitions challenging the injunction grant and allowed the petition seeking the extension of the injunction, emphasizing that a prima facie case requires only an arguable case, not proof of success.

  Questions settled

  • What are the three essential ingredients a court must consider when deciding whether to grant a temporary injunction?
  • Does the requirement of a prima facie case for a temporary injunction necessitate that the plaintiff establish a certainty of success?
  • Can an appellate court decline to decide an application for the extension of a temporary injunction on the ground that it has become functus officio?
  Read full judgment →
• Ubaid Ahmad vs The State2014 YLR 707 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-10-25Read full judgment →
• Trustees of the Port of Karachi (K.P.T.) through Manager Legal Affairs vs Messrs Sahaf Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director2014 YLR 199 · Sindh High Court · 2013-09-10Read full judgment →
• Treet Corporation Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan etcPTCL 2014 CL. 308 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-07Read full judgment →
• Tipu Salman Makhdoom vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2014 C.L.R. 1141 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-20Read full judgment →
• Tipu Salman Makhdoom vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2014 PLD Lahore 486 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-14Read full judgment →
• Tipu M. Sultan vs Registrar , .2014 PLC (C.S.) 893 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-03-20
  constitutional petitionage relaxationjudicial service rulesreasonable classificationequality before lawfundamental rightscivil judges recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Peshawar High Court challenging Rule 6 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Service Rules, 2001 and the advertisement for posts of Civil Judges/Judicial Magistrates/Illaqa Qazis, contending that the upper age limit and the differential age relaxation granted to government servants and persons from backward areas compared to practicing lawyers was discriminatory and violative of Articles 4, 25, and 127 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The core legal question was whether the differential age relaxation provided under the service rules constitutes an unconstitutional and arbitrary classification under the principle of equality before the law. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the classification made in the rules is founded on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the objects sought to be achieved, distinguishing government servants and backward area residents from a private profession like practicing advocates. The key principle laid down is that Article 25 permits reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and rational nexus, and the State is not prohibited from treating different categories of citizens differently where they are not similarly situated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the differential upper age relaxation for government servants and practicing lawyers under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Service Rules, 2001 violates Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the guarantee of equality before law under Article 25 prohibit reasonable classification of citizens by the State?
  • What are the established principles for determining whether a legislative classification is based on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus?
  Read full judgment →
• through Authorized Manager and Security vs Director of Labour, Government of Sindh and 3 others2014 PLC 382 · Sindh High Court · 2014-05-02
  trade union registrationlocus standiconstitutional petitioncollective bargaining agentindustrial relationsemployer's right to hearingmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the registration of a trade union by the Registrar of Trade Unions, with the petitioner-employer alleging that the union consisted of outsiders and was registered without affording the employer an opportunity to be heard. The core legal questions were whether an employer has locus standi to challenge a trade union's registration and whether the Registrar is legally obligated to hear the employer prior to such registration. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the registration of a trade union is a matter strictly between the Registrar and the applicant union. Relying on established precedents, the court ruled that the Registrar is not required to hear the employer during the registration process, as the right to form a union is a constitutional guarantee under Article 17 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the court found the petition incompetently filed due to the absence of a board resolution authorizing the signatory. The court affirmed that an employer's grievances regarding the status of workers are properly agitated only during the subsequent determination of a Collective Bargaining Agent.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer have a legal right to be heard by the Registrar of Trade Unions before the registration of a trade union?
  • Can an employer challenge the registration of a trade union in a constitutional petition on the grounds that the union members are not employees?
  • Is a constitutional petition filed by a company representative maintainable without a specific board resolution authorizing the filing?
  • At what stage can an employer challenge the employment status of union members regarding the determination of a Collective Bargaining Agent?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Zafar Iqbal2014 P Cr. L J 934 · Federal Shariat Court · 2014-02-18
  appeal against acquittalrobberyidentification of accusedmuffled facebenefit of doubtrecovery witnesspresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the State through the Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, challenging the trial court judgment dated 27-5-2004 that acquitted the respondent/accused under Section 17(3) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, read with Sections 324, 411, and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the accused snatched Rs. 7,000 at pistol point and fired at the police before being apprehended with the weapon and money. The key legal question before the Federal Shariat Court was whether the prosecution had established its case beyond reasonable doubt to justify overturning the order of acquittal. The Court observed that the complainant admitted the culprit had a muffled face and could not identify the accused in court, while the arresting police constable gave contradictory evidence, admitting the accused had already been apprehended before his arrival and not acting as a recovery witness. Holding that acquittal carries double presumption of innocence and that trial findings will not be interfered with unless there is misreading, non-reading, or illegal reception of evidence, the Federal Shariat Court dismissed the State's appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by a trial court?
  • Whether an accused can be convicted based on identification when the complainant admits the offender's face was muffled at the time of the occurrence?
  • What evidentiary value does the testimony of an arresting police official hold when it directly contradicts the narrative set out in the First Information Report?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Syed Ali Baqar Naqvi and others2014 PSC (Crl.) 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-11-12
  acquittal appeallimitation periodProvincial Governmentstatutory interpretationcriminal procedurestate appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the limitation period for filing an appeal against an acquittal by the Provincial Government under Section 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court had dismissed the State's appeal as time-barred, erroneously applying a shorter limitation period. The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework of Section 417, Cr.P.C., noting that it creates three distinct categories for acquittal appeals: those by the Provincial Government (Section 417(1)), those by a complainant (Section 417(2) and (3)), and those by an aggrieved person (Section 417(2A)). The Court held that while specific limitation periods are prescribed for complainants (60 days) and aggrieved persons (30 days), no such specific period is provided for the Provincial Government under Section 417(1). Consequently, the Court ruled that the limitation period for appeals filed by the Provincial Government remains governed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act 1908, which prescribes a period of six months. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was remanded to the High Court for disposal on merits.

  Questions settled

  • What is the limitation period for an appeal against acquittal filed by the Provincial Government under Section 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the amendment adding Section 417(2A) to the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 alter the limitation period for appeals filed by the Provincial Government?
  • Is the limitation period for an acquittal appeal filed by the Provincial Government governed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Boota2014 YLR 306 · Lahore High Court · 2012-01-19
  murder referencechild witnesscapital punishmentmitigating circumstancesqatl-e-amdtazirocular evidencecompetency of witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Murder Reference submitted to the Lahore High Court for confirmation of the death sentence awarded to the convict, Muhammad Boota, for the murder of his wife, Mst. Abida Parveen. The core legal questions were whether the conviction was sustainable based on the testimony of a child witness and circumstantial evidence, and whether the failure to prove the alleged motive warranted a reduction in the sentence. The Court held that the conviction was sound, relying on the consistent and confidence-inspiring testimony of the deceased's daughter (a child witness) and supporting circumstantial and medical evidence. The Court affirmed that there is no legal requirement to record the intellect assessment of a child witness in writing, provided the trial judge is satisfied with the witness's capacity. However, the Court ruled that because the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive and the co-accused was acquitted, the death sentence was harsh. The principle laid down is that while a conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 may be sustained on ocular evidence alone, the non-proof of a specific motive constitutes a mitigating circumstance justifying the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a child witness admissible if the trial court does not record the intellect assessment in writing?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive in a murder case constitute a mitigating circumstance for sentencing?
  • Can a conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained solely on ocular and circumstantial evidence when the motive is unproven?
  • Is there a prescribed age limit for a witness to be considered competent to testify under the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Khalil and 2 others2014 P Cr. L J 770 · Federal Shariat Court · 2014-02-18
  appeal against acquittalbank dacoityrecovery of stolen propertysection 103 CrPCdouble presumption of innocencesearch procedurecircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The State appealed against the acquittal of respondents Khalil, Jehanzeb, and Yaseen by the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Nowshera, for offences under Section 17(3) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, Section 412 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 202 of the Drug Act. The prosecution case rested primarily on the recovery of stolen currency notes and tools used in a bank robbery. Upon reviewing the record, the Federal Shariat Court found that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court observed that the sole eye-witness could not identify any accused. Furthermore, the alleged recoveries of money were doubtful and legally unsupportable due to failure to comply with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as no independent local witnesses were associated and proper search procedures were bypassed when searching premises outside local territorial limits. Applying the established principles governing appeals against acquittal, the Court held that the trial court's order was not perverse or unreasonable and the respondents enjoyed a double presumption of innocence. Consequently, the State's appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an acquittal order be set aside when the prosecution relies on recoveries that failed to comply with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What are the established principles that a appellate court must follow before interfering with an order of acquittal?
  • Does failure to join independent public witnesses during search and recovery render the recovery evidence legally doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through Regional Director ANF through Deputy Attorney General2014 YLR 879 · Peshawar High Court · 2012-10-05
  cancellation of bailmedical groundsnarcotics controljudicial discretionbail principlesmisuse of bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed by the State seeking the cancellation of bail previously granted to an accused on medical grounds in a case involving the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the bail granted by the Special Court should be revoked due to the alleged lack of merit or misuse of the concession. The High Court held that the petition for cancellation of bail must be dismissed. The Court reasoned that the accused had substantiated his serious cardiac condition with medical evidence, including angiography reports, and there was no proof of misuse of bail or tampering with evidence. The Court emphasized that the considerations for cancelling bail are distinct from those for granting it. The key principles laid down are that once bail is granted by a competent court, it cannot be recalled unless the order is patently illegal, perverse, or the accused has abused the concession, such as by tampering with evidence, repeating the offence, or fleeing, which were not established in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Are the considerations for the cancellation of bail distinct from the considerations for the grant of bail?
  • Under what circumstances can a court cancel bail that has already been granted?
  • Does the fact that an offence is punishable with death or life imprisonment automatically mandate the cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through Prosecutor-General Balochistan, Quetta vs Abdul Aleem2014 P Cr. L J 432 · Balochistan High Court · 2013-10-25
  superdariinterim custodymotor vehicle taxcriminal revisionfake number platesinherent powers of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged the orders of a Judicial Magistrate and an Additional Sessions Judge, which granted superdari (custody) of a vehicle to the respondent. The vehicle had been seized by police due to allegations of using fake number plates, unauthorized police sirens, lights, and a government monogram. The core legal question concerned the criteria for granting interim custody of a vehicle involved in criminal proceedings. The High Court held that the lower courts acted in a cursory manner by failing to verify the vehicle's registration, tax status, or the legitimacy of its modifications before granting custody. The Court emphasized that mere possession at the time of seizure does not automatically entitle a person to superdari. It laid down the principle that a Magistrate has a duty to ensure a vehicle is compliant with applicable laws—including payment of motor vehicle tax and verification of registration—before releasing it. Although the lower courts erred, the High Court allowed the respondent to retain the vehicle, noting that the tax arrears were subsequently paid and the original registration documents were produced.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere possession of a vehicle at the time of seizure automatically entitle the possessor to interim custody (superdari)?
  • Is a Magistrate required to verify the legal compliance of a vehicle, such as payment of motor vehicle tax and registration status, before granting interim custody?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to correct a cursory order passed by a lower court regarding the custody of case property?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through DPP and another vs Riaz and 2 others2014 P Cr. L J 721 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2013-08-21
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtinterested witnessespost-arrest bailfurther inquiryrule of consistencyfalsely implicatedmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This document contains two distinct criminal judgments. The first judgment, from the Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court, addresses an appeal against a conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the appellate court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellants due to material contradictions, improvements by interested witnesses, lack of medical autopsy, and failure to send weapon empties for forensic analysis, extending the benefit of the doubt to the accused. The second judgment, from the Lahore High Court, involves a post-arrest bail petition under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 read with the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The court held that where an accused was found innocent during investigation and placed in column No.2 of the challan, and a co-accused with an identical role had already been granted bail on the rule of consistency alongside a probability of false implication, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry, warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether material contradictions and improvements in the statements of interested witnesses without medical autopsy justify setting aside a murder conviction?
  • Can post-arrest bail be granted on the rule of consistency when a co-accused with the same role has already been released on bail?
  • Does finding an accused innocent during investigation and placing their name in column No.2 of the challan make the case one of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through Chairman, National Accountability Bureau vs Fazal2014 P Cr. L J 758 · Sindh High Court · 2013-01-07
  National Accountability BureauProsecutor-General AccountabilityMaintainability of appealActing appointmentLimitation periodCertified copiesCriminal Accountability Acquittal Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of several Criminal Accountability Acquittal Appeals filed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The core legal question was whether the Chairman NAB could authorize an 'Acting' Prosecutor-General Accountability to file appeals under Section 8(d) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, during periods when the office of the Prosecutor-General was vacant. The Court held that the power to authorize an acting incumbent under Section 8(d) is a stopgap arrangement intended only for the temporary absence of a regular appointee, not for filling a permanent vacancy. Consequently, appeals filed by an unauthorized 'Acting' Prosecutor-General during such vacancies were deemed incompetent and dismissed. The Court further established that the power to appoint a regular Prosecutor-General vests with the President of Pakistan, and allowing an acting appointment during a vacancy constitutes an usurpation of that mandate. Additionally, the Court issued mandatory administrative directions for Accountability Courts regarding the endorsement of certified copies to ensure accurate calculation of limitation periods in future proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau authorize an acting Prosecutor-General Accountability to file appeals when the office of the Prosecutor-General is vacant?
  • Does the power to authorize an acting incumbent under Section 8(d) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, extend to filling permanent vacancies?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for endorsements on certified copies issued by Accountability Courts to determine limitation periods?
  Read full judgment →
• The Punjab Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority2014 NLR Service 13 · Lahore High Court · 2013-12-17Read full judgment →
• The National College of Business Administration and Economics, Lahore vs The Higher Education Commission of Pakistan and 2 others2014 C.L.R. 994 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-31Read full judgment →
• The National Bank of Pakistan vs Saf Textile Mills Ltd. through Shazia Said2014 P.C.T.L.R. 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  financial institutions recoverymortgage salenon-judicial foreclosureconstitutional viresdue processfair trialbanking courtfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from judgments evaluating the constitutionality of Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which empowered financial institutions to sell mortgaged property without the intervention of a court. The core legal questions involved whether Section 15 violated fundamental constitutional rights, including access to justice, property rights, equality, and the newly incorporated right to a fair trial and due process. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and held that Section 15 of the Ordinance of 2001 is unconstitutional and ultra vires the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Court reasoned that the statutory provisions effectively deprived mortgagors of essential safeguards, remedies, and the right to object to sham sales or the absence of a reserve price, thereby offending Articles 3, 8, 10A, 24, and 175 of the Constitution. The key principle laid down is that any statutory mechanism permitting non-judicial foreclosure and sale of mortgaged property must incorporate adequate, meaningful judicial remedies and adhere strictly to the standards of due process and fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 violates the constitutional right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the power of financial institutions to sell mortgaged property without court intervention amount to an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power?
  • Can a statutory provision authorizing non-judicial sale of property stand when it excludes post-sale remedies and the requirement of a reserve price?
  • Whether Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is severable or if the entire section must be struck down as ultra vires?
  Read full judgment →
• The National Bank of Pakistan vs Saf Textile Mills Ltd. THR. Shazia Said2014 NLR Civil 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  mortgage foreclosureconstitutional validitydue processfair trialfinancial institutions recoveryproperty rightsnon-judicial salebanking law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the constitutionality of Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which empowered financial institutions to sell mortgaged property without judicial intervention. The core legal question was whether this provision violated fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, specifically regarding due process, fair trial, and property rights. The Supreme Court held that Section 15 was ultra vires the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the provision created a parallel, exploitative recovery system that deprived mortgagors of the right to object to the sale process, lacked essential safeguards like a reserve price, and excluded judicial oversight. By allowing financial institutions to act as seller, buyer, and auctioneer without a fair trial or due process, the provision offended Articles 3, 9, 10A, 24, and 25 of the Constitution. The Court established that the denial of a remedy constitutes the destruction of a right, and that statutory provisions enabling such non-judicial foreclosure without adequate procedural safeguards are unconstitutional.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, unconstitutional for violating fundamental rights?
  • Does the power of a financial institution to sell mortgaged property without judicial intervention violate the right to a fair trial and due process?
  • Can a statutory provision that excludes judicial oversight in the sale of mortgaged property be sustained under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• The Managing Director, Utility Store Corporation, Islamabad and 5 othersK.L.R. 2014 Labour & Service Cases 15 · Labour Appellate Tribunal
  industrial disputelabour court jurisdictionNIRC jurisdictiontrans-provincial establishmentregularization of serviceretrospective applicationpower of attorneylabour laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns an interim order of the Labour Court regarding its jurisdiction to adjudicate a service regularization dispute involving employees of the Utility Store Corporation, an entity with establishments in multiple provinces. The appellant challenged the Labour Court's jurisdiction, citing the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, which mandates National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) jurisdiction for trans-provincial establishments. The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Labour Court's jurisdiction. The Tribunal held that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, does not apply retrospectively to cases filed prior to its enactment. Furthermore, the Tribunal clarified that the NIRC's jurisdiction under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, is limited to industrial disputes raised by federations of trade unions or Collective Bargaining Agents affecting multiple provinces, and does not extend to individual service claims of a local nature. Additionally, the Tribunal ruled that power-of-attorney documents in labour proceedings do not require stamp paper, and no court fee is payable for such filings under the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 apply retrospectively to industrial disputes filed before its enactment?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over individual service regularization claims involving trans-provincial employers?
  • Is a power-of-attorney in labour proceedings required to be executed on stamp paper?
  • Are court fees payable for filing documents in proceedings before a Labour Court under the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010?
  Read full judgment →
• The Federation Of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Finance vs Sultan Ahmad Shams and others2014 PSC 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pension calculationemolumentscivil servantsretrospective applicationservice tribunalclassification of pensionerspay scales
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals by the Federation of Pakistan against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that directed the recalculation of pensions for retired civil servants by including various allowances such as Special Additional Allowance, Special Relief Allowance, Adhoc Relief, and Dearness Allowance. The core legal question was whether these allowances constitute 'emoluments' under Civil Service Regulations 486 and whether the subsequent merger of these allowances into basic pay scales via a 2011 Office Memorandum entitles already-retired civil servants to pension recalculation. The Supreme Court held that the allowances were not part of pensionable emoluments at the time of retirement and that the 2011 Memorandum could not be applied retrospectively. The Court reaffirmed the principle established in I.A. Sherwani that pensioners and serving civil servants constitute distinct classes; therefore, revisions to pay scales for serving employees do not automatically confer rights upon those who have already retired. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, ruling that the respondents were not entitled to the claimed pension recalculation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'emoluments' in CSR 486 include ad-hoc allowances for the purpose of pension calculation?
  • Can subordinate legislation, such as an Office Memorandum, be applied retrospectively to grant pension benefits to already retired civil servants?
  • Does the revision of pay scales for serving civil servants entitle retired civil servants to a notional recalculation of their pension?
  • Are pensioners and serving civil servants considered the same class for the purposes of Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• The Federal Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary Interior Division vs General (R) Pervez Musharraf2014 P Cr. L J 684 · Special Court · 2014-03-07
  high treasonspecial courtbias and recusalrules of businessdying declarationbenefit of doubtmurder convictionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The first matter involves a criminal miscellaneous application filed by the accused seeking a declaration that the action taken against him for high treason was illegal, void ab initio, and tainted with malice, while also seeking the recusal of the Special Court judges on grounds of bias. The Special Court held that the Prime Minister's exercise of executive authority through the Rules of Business 1973 was valid, the authorization of the complaint through the Ministry of Interior was lawful, the constitution of the Special Court in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and High Court Chief Justices was proper, and the allegations of bias against the judges were unfounded and barred by waiver and the doctrine of necessity. Consequently, the application was dismissed. The second matter involves a criminal appeal against conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the Peshawar High Court evaluated the evidentiary value of a dying declaration and the withholding of a material eye-witness. The Court held that a dying declaration must be free from infirmities and supported by a proper medical fitness certificate, and the withholding of the primary witness creates serious doubt. Extending the benefit of the doubt, the conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the decision of the Prime Minister to initiate a complaint for high treason without the collective approval of federal ministers violates Article 90(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a judge be disqualified from hearing a case on the ground of apprehension of bias merely due to previous judicial decisions or administrative actions involving the accused?
  • What are the mandatory legal requirements for treating a statement of an injured person as a dying declaration under Article 46 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 to sustain a capital conviction?
  • Does the withholding of a natural and material eye-witness by the prosecution entitle the accused to an adverse inference and the benefit of the doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs M/s. Bashir BrothersPTCL 2014 CL. 638 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-25Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax & Wealth Tax, Rawalpindi vs M/s. ZulfiqarPTCL 2014 CL. 614 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-15Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad vs M/s. Chenab2014 PTD (Trib.) 558, PTCL 2014 CL. 194 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2013-08-29
  sales taxinput tax adjustmenttax fraudsuspended registrationblacklisted suppliersfake invoicesdouble taxationappellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the revenue department under Section 46 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, against the order of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), which had accepted the taxpayer's appeal against a tax demand order. The core legal questions involved whether tax liabilities could be raised on fabricated and missing records, whether input tax adjustments could be denied due to the suspension of a supplier's registration prior to final blacklisting, whether a buyer could be held jointly liable under Section 8A or Section 8(1)(ca) without proof of knowledge or where such provisions are unconstitutional, and whether the Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation had jurisdiction over periods prior to 2007. The Appellate Tribunal held that demands based on missing or fabricated documents are void, that suspension of registration does not bar input tax credit until final blacklisting under Section 21(3), that Section 8(1)(ca) is unconstitutional, and that tax cannot be levied twice. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, ruling that the tax authorities failed to establish any tax fraud, collusion, or lawful basis for the impugned tax demands.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sales tax demand be raised on the basis of documents not found or listed in the official resumption memo?
  • Whether input tax credit can be denied solely on the ground that a supplier's registration has been suspended, prior to final blacklisting under Section 21(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Is a buyer jointly and severally liable for unpaid tax by a supplier under Section 8A without proof that the buyer had knowledge or reasonable grounds to suspect non-payment?
  • Does the Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation have retrospective jurisdiction to conduct sales tax audits for periods prior to July 2007?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Tariq Mehmood, etc.2014 P.C.T.L.R. 741 · Lahore High Court · 2014-08-19Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s. Macca CNG Gas Enterprises,2014 P.C.T.L.R. 753 · Lahore High Court · 2014-05-06Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Maj. Gen. (R) Dr. C.M.Anwar etcPTCL 2014 CL. 608 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-25Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Maj. Gen. (R) Dr. C.M. Anwar, etc.2014 P.C.T.L.R. 514 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-25Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs vs Water and Power Development Authority2014 NLR Civil 74, 2014 P.C.T.L.R. 338, 2014 PTD 535, 2014 P.C.T.L.R. 263 · Sindh High Court · 2013-12-19Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs vs M/s. Faisal Enterprises2014 P.C.T.L.R. 161 · Sindh High Court · 2014-01-03Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab through Regional Chief, General Manager, Quetta vs Khan Muhammad and 5 others through Attorneys2014 YLR 1002 · Balochistan High Court · 2013-12-19
  tenancy agreementrent enhancementlease extensionarrears of rentcivil revisionholdover tenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a dispute over rental arrears between a landlord and a tenant. The petitioner, a bank, rented premises for a nine-year term, which expired in July 2009. Following the expiry, the tenancy was extended by mutual consent until September 2010. The core legal question was whether the terms of the original rent agreement, specifically the clause mandating a 15% rent enhancement every three years, remained applicable during the extended period of tenancy. The petitioner argued that the extension constituted a fresh agreement without the rent escalation clause. The Court held that the extended period remained governed by the original agreement's terms, as the extension was a continuation of the existing relationship. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that even without express consent, a tenant remaining in possession after a lease expires is bound by the original agreement's terms. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the tenant was liable for the increased rent arrears as stipulated in the original contract.

  Questions settled

  • Does a rent escalation clause in a lease agreement remain binding during a period of tenancy extended by mutual consent?
  • Are the terms and conditions of an expired lease agreement applicable to a tenant who remains in possession of the property?
  • Does the extension of a lease period by mutual consent constitute a new agreement or a continuation of the original contract?
  Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab through General Attorney vs Malik Umer Farooq2014 CLD 198 · Lahore High Court · 2013-11-05
  financial institutionrecovery of financeslease finance facilityleave to defendbanking court procedurerepossession of vehicle
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal filed under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 against an order of the Banking Court which disposed of a suit for declaration and permanent injunction by directing the appellant Bank to return a repossessed vehicle to the respondent-customer upon payment of defaulted lease instalments. The core legal question is whether a Banking Court can summarily dispose of a suit and grant final relief without following the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, particularly regarding issuance of proper summons and granting the defendant an opportunity to file an application for leave to defend. The Lahore High Court held that the Banking Court erred in law by bypassing mandatory statutory procedures, denying the Bank its right to file a leave to defend application under Section 10, and granting the plaintiff final relief at the outset. The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the suit was remanded to be proceeded with afresh in accordance with the law. The key principle laid down is that Banking Courts must strictly adhere to the mandatory procedures for service of summons and the determination of leave to defend under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and cannot dispose of suits or grant final relief summarily without affording defendants their statutory right of defense.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Banking Court can dispose of a suit and grant final relief without following the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is a defendant financial institution entitled to an opportunity to file an application for leave to defend under section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 before a suit is disposed of?
  • What are the mandatory modes of service of summons required upon the presentation of a plaint under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab through Attorney vs Messrs Zephyr Textile Limited2014 MLD 233 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-11Read full judgment →
• The Army Welfare Trust Trading as Nizampur Cement Plant through Director of Awt and Acting Managing Director vs Soneri Bank Limited and 2 others2014 CLD 440 · Lahore High Court · 2013-10-23
  banking suitletter of creditmaintainabilitydefinition of financeobligation of financial institutionState Bank of Pakistan circularsjurisdiction of banking courtdamages
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved a banking suit filed by the plaintiff customer against Soneri Bank Limited and others under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, seeking recovery of money and damages following the retirement of shipping documents under a letter of credit. The core legal questions were whether a banking suit remains maintainable by a customer who has already repaid the underlying finance facility, whether the scope of 'obligation' under the Ordinance covers the violation of State Bank of Pakistan circulars and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and whether claims for tortious damages or consequential losses can be adjudicated by a Banking Court. The Lahore High Court held that the repayment of a finance facility does not disentitle a customer from agitating a default in obligations that occurred during the subsistence of the facility, that obligations under State Bank circulars fall within the statutory definition of 'obligation', and that while claims arising from breach of contract or finance are triable by the Banking Court, claims based on tortious liability or remote damages are beyond its jurisdiction. The court ordered the deletion of non-maintainable claims and allowed the suit to proceed for the remaining competent claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repayment of a finance facility by a customer disentitle them to file a suit against a financial institution for defaults committed during the subsistence of the facility?
  • Do instructions and circulars issued by the State Bank of Pakistan constitute obligations under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can claims for tortious liability and consequential damages be adjudicated in a suit before the Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • What constitutes a 'customer', 'finance', and 'obligation' in terms of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• The Additional Director, Directorate of Intelligence Investigation, FBR vs Abdul Majeed and another2014 P.C.T.L.R. 246 · Sindh High Court · 2014-01-15Read full judgment →
• Terrorist Incident of District Courts, Islamabad --- (Suo Motu case)2014 PSC (Crl.) 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-03-10
  Suo MotuTerrorismJoint Investigation TeamJudicial securityCriminal investigationVictim compensationPrejudicial statements
  Summary & questions settled

  This Suo Motu case arose following a terrorist attack on the District Courts in Islamabad, which resulted in the deaths of several individuals, including a judicial officer, and numerous injuries. The core legal questions concerned the adequacy of existing security protocols, the integrity of the police investigation, and the sufficiency of government compensation for the victims' families. The Court held that to ensure a transparent and impartial inquiry, the Secretary Interior must constitute a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) comprising independent and competent officers, headed by a Deputy Inspector General. Furthermore, the Court directed the government to review the quantum of compensation and consider employment opportunities for the families of the deceased. A key principle laid down is that public figures and government officials are strictly prohibited from making statements regarding an ongoing investigation that could prejudice its merits or influence witnesses. The Court also affirmed that parallel inquiries, such as those initiated by the High Court, may continue alongside the JIT investigation to ensure comprehensive fact-finding.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court direct the government to constitute a Joint Investigation Team in a criminal matter?
  • Does the Court have the authority to restrict public officials from making statements regarding ongoing criminal investigations?
  • Is the government obligated to review compensation and employment for victims of terrorist incidents occurring within court premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Telecard Limited Through Its Authorized Representative Ghufran Shaheer2014 PSC 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-13
  company appealjuristic personboard resolutionauthorizationlocus standicorporate litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal filed by Telecard Limited against the dismissal of its statutory appeal by the High Court. The core legal question addressed by the court is whether an appeal on behalf of a corporate juristic person can be initiated and filed without proper authorization through the articles of association or a board resolution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a legal proceeding on behalf of a company cannot be maintained without due authority derived from the articles of association or a board resolution, which was conspicuously missing in this case as the appellant failed to establish the CEO's authority. The key principle laid down is that a company, being a juristic person, must demonstrate proper authorization through corporate governance documents or board resolutions to competently institute legal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a company initiate legal proceedings without authorization through its articles of association or a board resolution?
  • Is a legal appeal maintainable when signed by a chief executive officer without documented proof of corporate authority?
  • What is required to establish the locus standi of a listed company filing an appeal before the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Telecard Limited through Authorized representative vs Pakistan2014 PSC 765, 2014 CLD 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-13
  juristic personboard resolutionarticles of associationauthorized representativecorporate litigationlocus standimemo of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996, by a limited company challenging a decision of the High Court. The primary legal question concerned the locus standi and the validity of the appeal's institution, specifically whether the individual who signed the memorandum of appeal possessed the requisite legal authority to represent the juristic person. The High Court had dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it was not filed by an authorized person. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that a company, being a juristic person, cannot initiate litigation without express authority derived from its articles of association or a specific board resolution. The Court noted that the appellant failed to produce any documentation, such as a board resolution, to establish that the Chief Executive Officer was authorized to sign the memo of appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the appeal lacked merit due to the absence of proper authorization, reinforcing the principle that corporate litigation must be backed by documented institutional consent.

  Read full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal Administration, Sadiqabad through Tehsil Municipal2014 PLC 34 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2013-01-15
  regularization of servicepermanent workmandaily wage employeeslabour lawsanitary workersnature of employmentStanding Orders Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals filed by the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA), Sadiqabad, against a judgment of the Labour Court, which ordered the regularization of several sanitary workers. The core legal question was whether employees engaged on a daily wage basis for several years, performing duties of a permanent nature, attained the status of permanent workmen under the relevant labour laws. The Labour Appellate Tribunal upheld the Labour Court's decision, dismissing the appeals. The Tribunal held that the respondents had indeed attained the status of permanent workmen, as their employment exceeded the nine-month threshold and the nature of their work—sanitary services for a municipal body—was inherently permanent. The key principle laid down is that if a workman is employed on a project or work of a permanent nature that lasts beyond nine months, they are entitled to the status of a permanent workman, regardless of their initial designation as daily wage or temporary employees. The Tribunal emphasized that artificial breaks in service do not negate this status when the underlying employment is continuous and permanent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a daily wage employee performing duties of a permanent nature for more than nine months attain the status of a permanent workman?
  • Can an employer defeat a claim for permanent status by creating artificial breaks in the service of a daily wage employee?
  • Is the nature of work performed by sanitary workers in a municipal administration considered permanent in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Techno Time Construction Company through Partner vs Punjab2014 MLD 874 · Lahore High Court · 2013-11-04
  tender evaluationlowest bidderbid scheduleperformance securityearnest money forfeitureconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the evaluation of its bid for various construction works and sought either to be declared the successful bidder or the return of its deposited earnest money (CDRs). Tenders were invited by the respondents, and the petitioner filled only the last page of the bid schedule while leaving preceding pages blank. Pursuant to Clauses 9(i) to (v) of the Tender/Contract Documents, the respondents calculated the rates, rendering the petitioner the lowest bidder. Consequently, the petitioner was directed to deposit additional performance security, which it failed to do, subsequently filing a constitutional petition. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner, having become the lowest bidder under the explicit terms of the tender documents, was bound by the prescribed procedure and terms of acceptance, and could not assail the contract conditions or claim a refund of earnest money upon default. The court refused to interfere with the terms of the tender documents in the absence of any public interest violation, and dismissed the petition as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contractor who leaves initial pages of a bid schedule blank can dispute the calculation method prescribed under the tender documents?
  • Can a court interfere with the terms and conditions of tender or contract documents without establishing that they are contrary to public interest?
  • Whether the earnest money of a bidder who becomes the lowest bidder under the tender terms is liable to be forfeited upon failure to furnish performance security?
  Read full judgment →
• Tayyaba Komal vs District Coordination Officer, Sialkot and 4 others2014 PLC (C.S.) 378 · Lahore High Court · 2013-03-19
  recruitment policymerit listappointmentwrit jurisdictionpublic authorityvested righteducational recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a candidate for the post of Secondary School Educator, challenged the rejection of her appointment by the District Coordination Officer. Despite being next in merit after selectees failed to join or left their posts, the authorities denied her appointment, citing the expiration of the 190-day validity period of the merit list and the completion of the recruitment phase. The Court held that under the Recruitment Policy, 2011, the appointing authority was obligated to offer the appointment to the next candidate on the merit list when a selectee failed to join or left within the specified period. The Court rejected the respondents' reliance on technicalities and administrative delays, emphasizing that public authorities cannot use their own lethargy to deprive a deserving candidate of a vested right. The Court set aside the impugned order, directed the issuance of the appointment letter, and ordered an inquiry into the conduct of the responsible official for failing to process the petitioner's case in accordance with the policy.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appointing authority required to offer a post to the next candidate on the merit list if a selectee fails to join or leaves within the stipulated period under the Recruitment Policy, 2011?
  • Can public authorities deny a candidate's appointment based on the expiration of a merit list when the delay was caused by the authority's own lethargy?
  • Does the completion of a recruitment phase preclude the court from granting relief to a deserving candidate who was denied appointment due to administrative failure?
  Read full judgment →
• Taxation Officer/Deputy Commissioner Income Tax Kotli A.K. vs Said2014 PTD 793 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2013-12-20
  civil court jurisdictionbar of suitsincome tax recoveryrecovery certificateremand orderalternate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the District Judge, Kotli, which had set aside the dismissal of a civil suit by the Senior Civil Judge and remanded the matter for fresh decision. The core legal question was whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging a recovery certificate issued under income tax laws, notwithstanding the statutory bar of jurisdiction. The High Court held that under Section 227 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, civil courts are barred from entertaining suits against orders made under the Ordinance, and the plaintiff had an adequate alternate remedy before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The court established that matters concerning income tax assessments and recovery certificates fall exclusively within the ambit of the tax authorities and specialized tribunals, and civil courts lack general jurisdiction to review such tax recovery actions where the taxpayer has already availed remedies under the tax framework.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to hear matters concerning income tax recovery falling within the ambit of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether a suit can be brought in a civil court against an order made under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in the presence of a statutory bar?
  • What is the effect of a taxpayer conceding the jurisdiction of tax assessing and appellate authorities by filing returns and appeals?
  Read full judgment →
• Taxation Officer/Deputy Commissioner Income Tax Kotli A.K vs Said AkbarPTCL 2014 CL. 450 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2013-12-20
  civil court jurisdictionincome tax recoverybar of suitsrecovery certificatetax default
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the District Judge, Kotli, which had accepted the respondent's appeal and remanded the case to the Senior Civil Judge for a fresh decision. The core legal question concerned whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit regarding the recovery of income tax and challenge a recovery certificate issued under tax laws. The High Court held that civil courts are barred from entertaining suits against orders made under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and that taxpayers must pursue remedies within the statutory framework rather than approaching a civil court. The ratio decidendi is that the jurisdiction of civil courts is ousted in tax matters falling within the ambit of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, particularly where the aggrieved party has already invoked departmental appellate remedies and conceded the assessing authority's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to hear matters concerning income tax recovery under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether a suit can be brought in a civil court against an order made under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does a taxpayer who invokes departmental appellate remedies concede the jurisdiction of tax authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Tauseef Idrees And Another vs Hamayun Khalid And Other2014 CLC 698 · Lahore High Court · 2013-12-18Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Sadiq vs The State, Etc.2014 NLR Criminal 468 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-03-12Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Sadiq vs The State and othersK.L.R. 2014 Criminal Cases 69, 2014 NLR Criminal 468, 2014 P Cr. L J 1019 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-03-12
  post-arrest bailrule of consistencyabscondanceconstitutional petitionNAB referenceOGRA corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by Tauqeer Sadiq, former Chairman of OGRA, seeking post-arrest bail in a corruption reference filed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds of statutory delay, rule of consistency with co-accused who were already granted bail, and whether allegations of illegal increase in Unaccounted for Natural Gas (UFG) benchmarks and alleged abscondance warranted continued incarceration. The Islamabad High Court held that since the documentary evidence had already been seized by the prosecution, trial conclusion was not in sight, co-accused facing similar or graver allegations had been released, and further incarceration would serve no useful purpose, the petitioner was entitled to bail. The court laid down the principle that principles of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to bail petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, that abscondance must be proven through evidence during trial, and that differential treatment in arresting co-accused amounts to discriminatory practice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted to an accused on the rule of consistency when co-accused facing similar allegations have already been released on bail?
  • Does the mere allegation of abscondance disentitle an accused to post-arrest bail when the abscondance itself is yet to be proved through evidence?
  • Are the principles of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable while considering bail under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether continued incarceration is justified when the prosecution's case rests on documentary evidence already seized and the conclusion of trial is not in the foreseeable future?
  Read full judgment →
• Tata Textile Mills Ltd. through Authorized Attorney_Representative, Karachi and 57 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division_FBR, Islamabad and anotherPLJ 2014 Tax Cases (Kar.) 149 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Tassaduq Hussain vs Mst. Muneer Fatima2014 SCMR 1744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-08-20
  relationship of landlord and tenantejectment petitioncantonments rent restrictionsale agreementspecific performanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent against the petitioner under section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restrictions Act, 1963, on the grounds of default in payment of rent, personal need, and subletting. The Rent Controller and subsequently the Lahore High Court ordered the eviction of the petitioner, rejecting his plea that he occupied the property as an owner by virtue of a sale agreement rather than as a tenant. The core legal question was whether a valid relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and whether the petitioner successfully established possession as an owner. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to prove that he was put in possession pursuant to the alleged sale agreement, which in any case does not confer title, and that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the landlord-tenant relationship were based on proper appreciation of evidence. The court laid down that an unexecuted or unperfected sale agreement does not create ownership or negate an established tenancy, and that leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution will not be granted against concurrent factual findings free from misreading or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell confer ownership title on the purported vendee so as to extinguish the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and the High Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Whether failure to file a suit for specific performance to perfect title affects the plea of ownership in rent proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasleem Kausar vs Kh. Muhammad Ashraf2014 YLR 34 · Federal Shariat Court · 2013-06-28
  recovery of dowerprompt dowerfamily lawIslamic lawadmission by witnessburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the Family Court, which dismissed the appellant's suit for the recovery of dower while decreeing her suit for maintenance. The core legal question was whether the appellant had sufficiently proven her claim that her prompt dower, consisting of gold ornaments valued at Rs. 50,000, was snatched by the respondent upon her desertion. The appellate court reviewed the evidence, noting that the appellant's witnesses supported her claim. Crucially, the court found that the respondent's own witness admitted during cross-examination that the gold ornaments had been snatched by the respondent. Furthermore, the respondent failed to deny this allegation in his own testimony, effectively amounting to an admission. Consequently, the court held that the trial court erred in ignoring this evidence. The appellate court set aside the trial court's dismissal of the dower claim and decreed the suit in favor of the appellant. The judgment reaffirms the established principle of Islamic law that dower is the absolute right of the wife, which the husband is legally bound to pay or return if wrongfully taken.

  Questions settled

  • Does the admission of a fact by a party's own witness, who has not been declared hostile, constitute binding evidence against that party?
  • Is a husband legally obligated to return dower in the form of gold ornaments if he has forcibly taken them from his wife?
  • Can a trial court's judgment be set aside if it fails to consider a material admission made by a witness during trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasawar Hayat and another vs The State and others2014 P Cr. L J 1591 · Lahore High Court · 2014-05-26
  Qatl-e-amdmitigating circumstancesdeath penalty commutationocular evidenceunproven motivenon-repetition of firecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the ocular evidence and whether the death penalty was appropriate given the circumstances. The Lahore High Court held that while the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt through consistent ocular testimony and medical evidence, the death sentence was not warranted. The Court affirmed the conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but converted the death sentence to life imprisonment. The key principles laid down are that the legal maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus does not apply in criminal trials, requiring courts to sift truth from falsehood. Furthermore, the Court established that when the prosecution fails to prove an alleged motive, and where there is non-repetition of fire by the assailant, these factors constitute significant mitigating circumstances justifying the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment, as the law confers discretion upon the court to withhold the capital penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Does the legal maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus apply to criminal trials in Pakistan?
  • Can the failure of the prosecution to prove an alleged motive serve as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing?
  • Is the non-repetition of fire by an assailant considered an extenuating circumstance for the purpose of sentencing in a murder case?
  • Does the court have the discretion to convert a death sentence to life imprisonment in a case of Qatl-e-amd?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasam Ali Bukhari vs Ghulam Mustafa and 4 others2014 CLC 244 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-09-30Read full judgment →
• Tasam Ali Bukhari vs Ghulam Mustafa And 4 Other2014 CLC 244 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-09-30
  negotiable instrumentdishonoured chequepresumption of lawburden of proofrecovery suitsummary procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge-I, D.I. Khan, which dismissed the appellant's suit for the recovery of Rs. 3,75,000 based on a dishonoured cheque. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in dismissing a suit based on a negotiable instrument by framing extraneous issues and ignoring the statutory presumption attached to such instruments. The Peshawar High Court held that the trial court misdirected itself by delving into unnecessary factual controversies regarding the underlying contract rather than focusing on the negotiable instrument itself. The Court found that the plaintiff successfully proved the issuance of the cheque and its subsequent dishonour due to insufficient funds. The Court emphasized that under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a legal presumption exists in favour of the holder of a negotiable instrument, placing the burden of proof squarely on the defendant to rebut this presumption. Since the defendant failed to provide evidence to rebut this, the Court set aside the trial court's judgment and decreed the suit in favour of the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on the defendant to rebut the presumption attached to a negotiable instrument under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881?
  • Is a trial court justified in dismissing a suit based on a negotiable instrument by focusing on extraneous issues regarding the underlying contract?
  • Does the mere denial of the issuance of a cheque by a defendant suffice to overcome the statutory presumption of a negotiable instrument?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Saeed vs The State and another2014 MLD 1561 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-05
  acquittalillicit armsSection 249-A Cr.P.C.recovery of weaponmurder trialcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under Section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging an acquittal order passed by a Judicial Magistrate. The appellant sought to overturn the acquittal of the respondent, who had been charged under Section 13 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965, following his earlier acquittal in a related murder case. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in acquitting the respondent under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 based on his prior acquittal in the murder case, rather than adjourning the trial sine die under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the acquittal was proper because the recovery of the weapon was inseparably linked to the murder case, and the evidence regarding the recovery had already been disbelieved in the murder trial. The key principle laid down is that where the recovery of an illicit weapon is not independent but inextricably embedded in the facts of a murder case, a prior acquittal in the murder case renders the recovery evidence unreliable, justifying acquittal in the arms case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court acquit an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the evidence against him has already been disbelieved in a related murder case?
  • Does the acquittal of an accused in a murder case necessarily impact the outcome of a trial for the recovery of an illicit weapon used in that same murder?
  • Is it mandatory to adjourn a trial sine die under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when prosecution witnesses are unavailable, or can the court proceed to acquittal under Section 249-A?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Nazir Bukhari vs Province of Sindh through Home Secretary and 42014 MLD 524 · Sindh High Court · 2013-11-27Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood Murtaza vs Returing Officer PP 2, Rawalpindi And Another2014 CLC 94 · Election Tribunal · 2013-04-13
  nomination papersrejection of nomination papersconcealment of assetsfalse declarationdisqualificationProvincial Assembly electionhonest and Ameen
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the order of the Returning Officer rejecting the nomination papers of the appellant to contest elections for PP-2, Rawalpindi. The core legal question concerns whether the appellant concealed assets and made false declarations in his nomination papers, thereby attracting disqualification under the Constitution. The Election Tribunal held that while certain explanations regarding a vehicle, bank account, and credit card were satisfactory, the appellant failed to satisfactorily explain the non-disclosure of his ownership in an active company registered with the SECP and the misdeclaration of land purchased by his father as inherited property. The Tribunal ruled that the appellant concealed assets and made a false statement on oath, making him dishonest and disqualified from being elected. The key principle laid down is that failure to disclose company ownership and misdeclaring purchased property as inherited property in nomination papers constitutes concealment of assets, warranting disqualification from contesting elections.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to disclose shares in a company that is no longer carrying on business constitute concealment of assets in nomination papers?
  • Can a candidate misdeclare land purchased in their name as inherited property without attracting disqualification?
  • Whether summary proceedings by an Election Tribunal can resolve factual disputes regarding the valuation of assets?
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• Tariq Masood Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2014 CLD 924 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-02-18
  quo warrantopublic sector companycorporate governanceindependent directorconflict of interestconstitutional jurisdictionterritorial jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the appointment of respondent No. 4 as a Director of IESCO, contending it violated Rule 2(d)(vi) of the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013 regarding term limits and involved a conflict of interest. The Islamabad High Court addressed the questions of territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, the maintainability of a quo warranto petition against a public sector company, the interpretation of term limits for independent directors, and the scope of conflict of interest. The Court held that the Islamabad High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction as the distribution company operates within its territory and the appointment was made within the Islamabad Capital Territory. It further held that public sector companies performing essential public services are amenable to constitutional writ jurisdiction. On the merits, the Court found that while the respondent exceeded two terms and could not serve as an independent director, he could still serve as a non-independent, non-executive director during the transition period. The petition was ultimately dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Islamabad High Court has territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 to issue a writ of quo warranto against the appointment of a director of a distribution company operating within its territory?
  • Whether a public sector company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 is amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Whether Rule 2(d)(vi) of the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013 operates as a disqualification regarding the maximum number of terms an independent director can serve?
  • Whether running a business that consumes electricity from the distribution company constitutes a conflict of interest precluding a person from holding directorship?
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• Tariq Mahmood vs Ghulam Mustafa Shah and another2014 PSC 660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-03-18
  General Power of Attorneydeclaration suitbona fide purchaserrevocation of power of attorneycivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent decrees passed against him in a suit for declaration. The respondent No. 1 had filed a suit challenging the validity of a General Power-of-Attorney and a subsequent sale-deed executed by respondent No. 2 in favor of the petitioner, contending that the power-of-attorney was fraudulent and stood revoked upon the death of one of the executants. The Trial Court, appellate court, and High Court ruled in favor of respondent No. 1. The Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner had established his status as a bona fide purchaser without notice and whether he was entitled to interfere with the concurrent findings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to prove the payment of sale consideration, was never delivered possession of the property, and omitted to file an independent suit for possession. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and declined leave to appeal, affirming that the lower forums properly appreciated the material on record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death of one of the executants revokes a General Power-of-Attorney?
  • Can a defendant in a declaration suit seek a substantive decree for possession without filing a separate suit?
  • Whether a purchaser of property without delivery of possession can claim the status of a bona fide purchaser without establishing payment of sale consideration?
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• Tariq Javed and another vs Chairman, Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority, Islamabad and anotherK.L.R. 2014 Civil Cases 117 · Lahore High Court · 2013-12-10Read full judgment →
• Tariq Hussain Magsi and anothers vs Speaker Balochistan Provincial2014 CLC 1778 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-03-19Read full judgment →
• Tariq Amjad vs The State and another2014 MLD 489 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-09
  murderdaylight occurrenceeye-witness testimonyweapon recoveryossification testplea of minoritycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed under Section 410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenged the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Chiniot, convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a young boy and sentencing him to life imprisonment with compensation. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the eyewitness accounts, the reliability of the medical evidence and weapon recovery, and the plea of minority raised by the appellant. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent eyewitness testimony, corroborative medical evidence matching a single fatal stab wound to the chest, and the recovery of the blood-stained weapon upon the appellant's pointation, while the defense failed to establish minority against the medical board's ossification report. The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and ruling that minor discrepancies in testimonies do not undermine a trustworthy daylight occurrence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies in the statements of eyewitnesses are sufficient to discard their otherwise reliable testimony in a murder case?
  • Does a medical board report regarding the age of an accused override school leaving and birth certificates?
  • Whether the recovery of a crime weapon at the pointation of the accused can be relied upon despite the absence of independent public witnesses?
  • Is a delayed post-mortem examination by itself sufficient to conclude that eyewitnesses were planted?
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• Tariq Ali vs The State & another2014-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-01
  dishonoured chequefraudcheatingburden of proofrevision petitioncriminal breach
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition arose from concurrent judgments of the lower courts convicting the petitioner under sections 419, 420, and 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for personation, cheating, and dishonestly issuing a cheque, following an FIR lodged by the complainant. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the charges and whether the petitioner discharged the statutory burden under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding the dishonoured cheque. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution established its case through unchallenged evidence, that the petitioner failed to dispute his signature or account number, and that he failed to discharge the burden of proof required under section 489-F. Consequently, the court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the concurrent findings and sentences of the lower courts. The key principle laid down is that under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the burden of proof rests squarely on the accused to establish that arrangements were made with the bank to honour the cheque and that the bank was at fault.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 shift to the accused to prove that bank arrangements were made to honour a dishonoured cheque?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts under sections 419, 420, and 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 warrant interference in criminal revision?
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• Tariq Ali vs Mst. Rubina Bano and another2014 MLD 693 · Sindh High Court · 2013-12-12Read full judgment →