Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Abdul Sattar Baig and others vs The State and others2014 P Cr. L J 983 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-01-29
  pre-arrest bailpost-arrest bailcriminal misconductspecial judge jurisdictionscheduled offencespolice investigation powersbail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns consolidated bail petitions, including pre-arrest and post-arrest applications, arising from an FIR involving police officers and private individuals charged with corruption, impersonation, and possession of illicit items. The core legal questions were whether the offenses were bailable, whether the Special Judge possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the scheduled and connected ordinary offenses, and whether the investigation conducted by CIA officials was legally valid. The court held that the petitions must be dismissed. It determined that the offenses, including those under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, were non-bailable and triable exclusively by the Special Judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958. Furthermore, the court established that superior police officers possess the authority to conduct investigations and that a petitioner’s conduct, specifically absconding from court premises, is a material factor weighing against the grant of bail. The court concluded that reasonable grounds existed to believe the petitioners were involved in the alleged offenses, thus denying the relief sought.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Special Judge have exclusive jurisdiction to try ordinary offenses when they are coupled with scheduled offenses under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958?
  • Can a superior police officer exercise the powers of an officer in charge of a police station under Section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the act of a petitioner absconding from court premises disentitle them to the grant of bail?
  • Are offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, considered non-bailable under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958?
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• Zulfiqar Ali Talpur vs Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others2013 PLJ Islamabad 103 · Islamabad High Court
  Intra Court Appealwrit of quo-warrantodeputation appointmentcivil servantlachespublic office
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges an order passed by a learned Single Judge-in-Chambers who accepted a writ petition and issued a writ of quo-warranto declaring the deputation appointments of the appellant and others as illegal and setting them aside. The core legal question revolves around the validity of issuing a writ of quo-warranto against deputation appointments and whether the essential legal requirements for such a writ were met, including the absence of personal interest by the co-relater and the applicability of Article 212 of the Constitution. The court held that deputationists are not civil servants under Section 2(b)(i) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and thus Article 212 of the Constitution is not attracted. Furthermore, the court held that the essential requirements for issuing a writ of quo-warranto—such as the authority exceeding its powers, disqualification of the appointee, and the petition not being preferred by an interested co-relater—were missing in this case. Consequently, the appeal was accepted and the impugned order of the Single Judge was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether deputationists are considered civil servants attracting the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • What are the essential legal requirements that must be satisfied when a writ of quo-warranto is sought?
  • Can a writ petition for quo-warranto be validly preferred by a co-relater having a personal interest in the post?
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• Zhange Guogen vs Mst Jahanzeba Begum and othersK.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases 130, 2013 CLC 963 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-03-16
  ejectment petitionrent defaultwilful defaultpenalty clausefair rentconstitutional petitionIslamabad rent restrictionlease agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was directed against the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, Islamabad, whereby an ejectment petition filed by the respondent-landlady against the petitioner-tenant under section 17 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 on the grounds of default in payment of rent, violation of lease agreement, and personal need was accepted. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was a willful rent defaulter and whether the lease agreement's penalty clause imposing Rs.500 per day was enforceable in light of statutory prohibitions. The Islamabad High Court held that the petitioner made sincere, bona fide attempts to tender the rent through money orders and a courier cheque after the landlady refused receipt, and thus no willful default was established. The Court further held that the penalty clause requiring Rs.500 per day for delayed payment violated sections 11 and 12 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001, which prohibit claims in excess of fair rent or the imposition of penalties, rendering such stipulations void ab initio. Consequently, the constitutional petition was accepted, and the impugned ejectment orders were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere non-payment of rent constitute a default warranting eviction without proving that the default was wilful?
  • Can a penalty clause in a lease agreement stipulating a daily surcharge for delayed rent be enforced in view of statutory prohibitions against claiming amounts in excess of fair rent?
  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts based on misreading or non-reading of evidence are amenable to the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Does a tenant become a defaulter for failing to pay a statutory increase in rent when the landlord has not issued any notice demanding the enhanced rent?
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• Zhange Guegen vs Mst. Jahanzeba Begum, Etc.K.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases 130 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-03-16Read full judgment →
• Zafar Mehmood Khokhar and others vs Dr. Muhammad Afzal2013 PLD Islamabad 121 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-05-22
  Illegal Dispossession Act 2005Section 265-K Cr.P.C.land grabbingrevision petitioncivil disputespecial lawpossession of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing an application under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, in a complaint initiated under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005. The core legal question was whether the existence of pending civil litigation regarding the suit property precluded proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005, thereby warranting the acquittal of the accused. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Trial Court correctly refused to terminate the proceedings at the preliminary stage. The Court affirmed that the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 was enacted specifically to protect owners and lawful occupants from unauthorized land grabbers. It established that the pendency of civil suits between parties does not create an absolute bar to initiating or continuing proceedings under the special law. Furthermore, the Court held that police reports are not conclusive in such matters and that the Trial Court must adjudicate the complaint on its merits based on evidence, without being influenced by parallel civil disputes or preliminary police opinions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of civil litigation between parties bar proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005?
  • Is a police report regarding property ownership conclusive in proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005?
  • Can an application for acquittal under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be granted when the complaint involves disputed questions of fact?
  • Does the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 permit an aggrieved person to pursue remedies under other laws simultaneously?
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• Yawar Abbas and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 987 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-05
  service seniorityregularization of employeesdepartmental committeewrit jurisdictionservice benefitsadministrative fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by contractual employees seeking implementation of a departmental committee's recommendations regarding the fixation of their seniority from their initial date of appointment in 2005, following their subsequent regularization in 2009. The core legal question was whether the respondent organization, having constituted a committee to resolve the seniority dispute in compliance with a Supreme Court directive, could subsequently refuse to implement the committee's recommendations on the grounds that they were non-binding or that the organization's service rules were non-statutory. The Court held that the department could not act in a mala fide manner by ignoring the recommendations of a committee it had itself constituted to act as a referee. The petition was allowed, and the respondents were directed to implement the committee's recommendations within fifteen days. The judgment establishes that where a department constitutes a committee to resolve a service dispute pursuant to a judicial directive, it cannot arbitrarily disregard the committee's findings or adopt a contradictory stance after the fact, as such conduct is inconsistent with fair administrative practice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a department unilaterally ignore the recommendations of a committee it constituted to resolve a service dispute?
  • Does the non-statutory nature of service rules preclude a High Court from directing the implementation of departmental recommendations?
  • Is a department estopped from challenging the validity of a committee's recommendations after having constituted that committee to act as a referee?
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• Warm Telecom (Pvt.) Ltd. and 4 others vs Pakistan Telecommunication2013 PLJ Islamabad 190, 2013 CLD 1085, 2013 C.L.R. 641, K.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-08Read full judgment →
• WaridTelecom Pvt. Ltd., etc. vs Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Islamabad, etc2013 C.L.R. 641 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Warid Telecom vs Commissioner Inland Revenue Etc2013 PTD 1598, PTCL 2013 CL. 322 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-28Read full judgment →
• Warid Telecom vs Commissioner Inland Revenue and others2013 PTD 1598 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-28Read full judgment →
• Warid Telecom Pvt. Ltd., Etc. vs Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Islamabad, EtcK.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases 176 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Warid Telecom Pvt. Ltd. vs Commissioner Inlandrevenue And OtherPTCL 2013 CL. 331 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-28Read full judgment →
• Warid Telecom (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Pakistan Telecommunication2013 PLD Islamabad 55 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-08Read full judgment →
• Warid Telecom (Pvt) Ltd and others vs Pakistan Telecommunication2013 CLD 1085 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-08Read full judgment →
• Waqar Alam and others vs Secretary, Establishment Division and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 12 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-03-29
  sacked employees reinstatementone scale higherregularization of serviceseniorityconstitutional petitioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of multiple constitutional petitions filed by employees who were initially inducted as Inspectors (BS-16) in 1996-97 and subsequently terminated from service, seeking implementation of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Ordinance, 2009 and the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010. The core legal question revolves around whether reinstated employees are entitled to be placed one scale higher along with appropriate re-designation and pay protection, or if their placement in BS-16 by the department was lawful. The Islamabad High Court held that under the explicit provisions of Section 3 of the Ordinance of 2009 and Section 4 of the Act of 2010, reinstated sacked employees must be placed one scale higher to their substantive scale and granted corresponding re-designation (from BS-16 Inspectors to BS-17 Assistant Directors), while being placed at the bottom of the seniority list. The court laid down the principle that the statutory command to reinstate sacked employees one scale higher encompasses both the higher grade and the corresponding designation, and departmental misinterpretation or restrictive guidelines cannot override clear statutory mandates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees reinstated under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 are entitled to be placed one scale higher along with corresponding re-designation?
  • Does Section 10 of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Ordinance, 2009 deprive reinstated employees of all monetary and service benefits other than seniority and arrears of pay?
  • How is seniority determined for employees reinstated and placed in a higher scale pursuant to the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010?
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• Wali Shah vs State etcPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 634 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-06
  post-arrest bailextra-judicial confessionfurther inquirymurderuntraced caseinvestigation procedurerecovery of vehicle
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under Sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to connect the petitioner to the alleged offense, particularly given that the case was previously disposed of as untraced and subsequently reopened based on the extra-judicial confession of a co-accused. The Court granted bail, holding that the prosecution's case rested on tenuous evidence—specifically, an extra-judicial confession of a co-accused, which lacks evidentiary value against an accomplice, and the recovery of a vehicle that was not linked to the petitioner through forensic or documentary evidence. The Court established the principle that at the bail stage, the court must evaluate the reasonableness of the material available; where evidence is insufficient or lacks corroboration, the case falls under the ambit of "further inquiry," necessitating the grant of bail. Additionally, the Court emphasized that investigating officers must strictly adhere to legal procedures when reopening cases previously disposed of as untraced.

  Questions settled

  • Can an extra-judicial confession of a co-accused be used as primary evidence against an accomplice at the bail stage?
  • Does the recovery of a vehicle without forensic evidence or proof of ownership constitute sufficient grounds to deny bail?
  • Is a case where the prosecution's evidence is based solely on a co-accused's confession and unlinked recoveries considered a case of further inquiry?
  • What is the legal procedure for an investigating officer to reopen a case previously disposed of as untraced?
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• Waj1d Hussain vs The State and others2013 MLD 698 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-01-23
  post-arrest bailstatutory grounddelay in conclusion of trialco-accusedPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, Wajid Hussain, seeking bail on statutory grounds under proviso III to section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, in case F.I.R. No. 231 registered under section 365-B, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether an accused is entitled to statutory bail when the trial has not concluded within the prescribed period, but the delay is attributable to the co-accused rather than the prosecution. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the bail petition, holding that the statutory ground for bail cannot be invoked unless the accused establishes that the delay in the conclusion of the trial was caused wholly or partly by the prosecution. The key principle laid down is that an accused cannot claim the benefit of the statutory delay proviso for bail when the delay is caused by the intentional absence or default of the co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to statutory bail under proviso III to section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the delay in the trial is caused by the co-accused rather than the prosecution?
  • Can an accused claim the benefit of statutory delay for post-arrest bail when the delay is attributable to the intentional absence of a co-accused?
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• University Staff Welfare Association, International Islamic University, Islamabad vs Rector, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Etc2013 KLR Civil Cases 220 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• University Staff Welfare Association, International Islamic2013 KLR Civil Cases 220, 2013 PLC (C.S.) 1254 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-05-29
  contract appointmentstatutory bodycompetitive processmerit-based recruitmentcolourable exercise of authorityconstitutional jurisdictionuniversity administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the appointment of the Vice-President (Administration, Finance, and Planning) of the International Islamic University, Islamabad, on a contract basis. The petitioner, a recognized staff association, contended that the appointment was made without advertisement, competitive process, or adherence to merit, violating the principles of transparency and the university's governing statutes. The core legal question was whether the university authorities could bypass competitive selection processes for high-level administrative posts. The Court held that the appointment was a result of a colourable exercise of authority, lacking transparency and fairness. Emphasizing that appointments in statutory bodies must be competitive, credible, and merit-based, the Court set aside the impugned appointment orders. The judgment established that discretionary power in public institutions cannot be exercised to circumvent established legal requirements for open, merit-based recruitment. Consequently, the Court directed the university to initiate a competitive selection process for the post and appointed the most senior regular employee as Acting Vice-President in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of a Vice-President in a statutory university requires a competitive and transparent selection process?
  • Can an appointing authority in a statutory body bypass competitive recruitment by claiming discretionary power?
  • Does the bar of jurisdiction under Section 46 of the International Islamic University Ordinance, 1985, protect appointments made without due process?
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• The State vs Asad AliPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 233, 2013 PLD Islamabad 42 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-28
  narcoticsrepresentative samplechemical analysiscriminal appealsentencingburden of proofcharas
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad, under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the recovery of 200 kilograms of charas from a vehicle. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the nature of the recovered substance as a narcotic when samples were not taken from each individual packet or slab found. The Court held that the prosecution failed to collect a representative sample from the entire bulk, rendering the chemical analysis inconclusive regarding the total quantity. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court affirmed that when narcotics are recovered in separate forms, a separate sample must be taken from each to ensure the integrity of the evidence. Failure to do so means only the quantity actually tested can be attributed to the accused. Consequently, while the conviction was maintained, the Court set aside the death sentence, converting it to the period of imprisonment already undergone by the appellant, emphasizing the necessity of representative sampling to prevent miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Is a chemical analysis report valid if the sample tested is not a representative sample of the entire recovered narcotic substance?
  • Must a separate sample be taken from every individual packet, slab, or container of a recovered narcotic substance for the chemical analysis to be conclusive?
  • If samples are not taken from each part of a recovered narcotic, can the accused be convicted for the entire quantity allegedly recovered?
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• The Collector Of Sales Tax And Central Excise vs M_S. Hussain And Company, Islamabad2013 P.C.T.LR. 602 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Tauseef Ahmad vs Fauzia Akram and anothers2013 MLD 679 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-02-07Read full judgment →
• Tauseef Ahmad vs Fauzia Akram And AnotherK.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases 103 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-07Read full judgment →
• Tamraiz Javaid Masih vs The StatePLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 509, 2013 MLD 888 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-04
  re-summoning of witnessre-examinationmedico-legal certificatecriminal revisionjust decision of the casepowers of trial court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges the order of the Sessions Judge dismissing the petitioner-complainant's application under section 540, Cr.P.C. for recalling a prosecution witness to exhibit a medico-legal certificate (MLR). The core legal question is whether a witness can be recalled under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to exhibit a document omitted during initial examination, particularly when the application is made after a delay and at a later stage of the trial. The Islamabad High Court held that the powers under section 540 Cr.P.C. are of the widest amplitude and the court is obliged to summon or recall a witness if their evidence is essential for the just decision of the case, and mere delay or the belated stage of the trial is not a ground to refuse such a request if it prevents a miscarriage of justice, while ensuring the opposing party has the right to cross-examine. The petition was allowed and the impugned order set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a prosecution witness be recalled under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to exhibit an omitted medico-legal certificate?
  • Does delay in filing an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar the court from summoning a material witness essential for a just decision?
  • Whether the recall of a witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to prove an MLR amounts to impermissibly filling a lacuna in the prosecution case?
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• Tamraiz Javaid Masih vs StatePLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 509 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-04
  recalling witnessadditional evidencemedico-legal certificatecriminal revisionjust decision of the case
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order passed by the Sessions Judge dismissing his application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for recalling Prosecution Witness No. 1 (a doctor) to exhibit the Medico-Legal Certificate (MLR). The trial court had refused the request, holding that it was filed after three and a half years and aimed to fill lacunae in the prosecution case. The core legal question was whether a material witness could be recalled under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to prove an essential document like an MLR when an omission occurred during initial examination. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that the powers under Section 540 are of the widest amplitude and the court is obliged to summon evidence essential for the just decision of the case, regardless of delay. The key principle laid down is that the primary guiding consideration under Section 540 is the ends of justice and the necessity of the evidence for a just decision, rather than mere procedural delay or the belated nature of the application.

  Questions settled

  • Can a witness be recalled under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to exhibit a medico-legal certificate omitted during initial testimony?
  • Does delay in filing an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar the court from summoning a material witness essential for a just decision?
  • Whether recalling a prosecution witness to prove an essential medical document amounts to filling a lacuna in the prosecution case?
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• Syed Waqar Hussain Gillani vs Capital Development Authority and others2013 CLC 1095 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-13Read full judgment →
• Syed Naveed Altaf etc vs International Islamic University, Islamabad2013 KLR Civil Cases 267, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 153 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Syed Naveed Altaf And Other vs International Islamic University, Islamabad2013 KLR Civil Cases 267 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Syed Kamran Hussain vs P.T.C.L. and another2013 PLJ Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-30Read full judgment →
• Syed Amir Jalali vs The State and another2013 YLR 626 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-12-10
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clauseproclaimed offenderSection 489-Fbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by an accused charged under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding a dishonoured cheque worth Rs. 4,000,000. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite the offense falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to bail. The ratio of the decision rests on the petitioner's conduct, specifically his status as a proclaimed offender and the significant contradictions in his defense—claiming the cheque was stolen from his office in his bail petition while previously reporting it as lost in Karachi. The court laid down the principle that while an offense may not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the grant of bail is not a rule of universal application. Each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and bail may be refused where the accused's conduct or the prima facie evidence warrants detention.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offense falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle an accused to bail as a matter of right?
  • Can a court refuse bail to an accused even if the offense charged does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a history of absconsion and contradictory statements regarding the alleged theft of a cheque constitute valid grounds for refusing post-arrest bail?
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• Sohail Ahmed Mian and 6 others vs State and 4 others2013 KLR Criminal Cases 125, PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 507 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-01-28
  quashment of FIRinherent jurisdictionobstruction of public servantabuse of processcriminal proceedingsprotestwrongful restraint
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought the quashment of an FIR registered under Sections 341, 353, and 186 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alleging wrongful restraint and obstruction of public servants during a protest regarding the kidnapping of a minor. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings when the allegations lack specific evidence and the FIR fails to establish the essential elements of the charged offences. The Court held that the mere allegation of scuffling without identifying specific police officials or demonstrating a positive act of obstruction is insufficient to constitute an offence under Section 186 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, the Court quashed the challan and acquitted the petitioners. The judgment affirms the principle that the High Court possesses inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to intervene in exceptional cases to prevent the abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice, even where a challan has been submitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings after a challan has been submitted?
  • Does the mere allegation of scuffling with police in an FIR constitute the offence of obstructing a public servant under Section 186 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the High Court barred from quashing proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the trial court has not yet passed orders under Section 249-A or 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Sohail Ahmad Mian And 6 Other vs The State And Another2013 KLR Criminal Cases 125 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-01-28
  quashment of FIRquashment of challaninherent jurisdictionpublic servant obstructionpeaceful protestabuse of process of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought the quashing of an FIR and subsequent challan proceedings registered under Sections 341, 353, and 186 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners were accused of scuffling with police while peacefully protesting the kidnapping of a minor girl. The core legal question was whether the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings when the contents of the FIR and investigation fail to disclose the commission of a cognizable offence or present supporting evidence. The High Court held that physical obstruction or mere vague allegations of scuffling without naming specific police officers or producing evidence of injury/obstruction do not constitute an offence under Section 186 or 353 PPC. Observing that mere allegations without proof cannot form the basis of a conviction and that High Court jurisdiction under Section 561-A CrPC is not barred by the filing of a challan or trial court remedies, the court quashed the challan to prevent abuse of the process of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent power under Section 561-A CrPC to quash criminal proceedings without waiting for the trial court to decide applications under Section 249-A or 265-K CrPC?
  • Does a vague allegation of scuffling during a public protest without specific details or evidence constitute an offence under Section 186 or Section 353 PPC?
  • Is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A CrPC barred merely because a challan has already been submitted to the trial court?
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• Sme Bank Ltd. vs Chairman Appellate Authority and another2013 PTD 1400 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-02-06
  EOBI contributionstatutory body exemptionbanking institutionsEmployees Old-Age Benefits ActFinance Act 2008statutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged orders passed by the Adjudicating and Appellate authorities of the Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI), which rejected the petitioner's claim for exemption from the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. The petitioner, SME Bank Ltd., argued that as a statutory body created under the Regional Development Finance Corporation and Small Business Finance Corporation (Amalgamation and Conversion) Ordinance, 2001, and possessing its own pension and gratuity schemes, it fell under the exemption provided by Section 47(f) of the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, operating as a bank, was exempt from the registration and contribution requirements of the Act. The Court held that the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2008, which omitted clause (e) of Section 47, explicitly brought all banks and financial institutions within the Act's ambit effective from 1 July 2008. The Court determined that the petitioner, functioning as a public limited company, could not claim exemption as a statutory body and was legally obligated to make contributions to the EOBI. The petition was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Are banks and financial institutions exempt from the provisions of the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act 1976?
  • Does the omission of clause (e) of Section 47 of the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act 1976 by the Finance Act 2008 extend the Act's applicability to banking companies?
  • Can a public limited company operating as a bank claim exemption from the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act 1976 on the basis of being a statutory body?
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• Shehbaz Khokhar vs StatePLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 127 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-07-04
  criminal revisionright to counselcross-examinationfair trialnatural justiceremand of caseconviction set aside
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this criminal revision petition, the petitioner challenged concurrent judgments of the lower courts convicting him under Sections 457 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question revolved around whether the trial court gravely erred by proceeding with the trial and convicting the accused without ensuring his right to be defended by a pleader or conducting a proper cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, thereby violating Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and principles of natural justice. The Islamabad High Court held that the right of an accused person to be defended by a pleader and to properly cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental safeguard, and where unrepresented, the trial court must make active efforts to protect those rights. Consequently, the High Court set aside both lower court judgments and remanded the matter back to the trial stage for proper cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. The key principle laid down is that an accused facing criminal charges must be afforded a meaningful opportunity of defense, and failure of the trial court to ensure representation or assist in cross-examination vitiates the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of an accused person to be defended by a pleader under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is mandatory or discretionary?
  • Does a trial court incur a responsibility to assist or cross-examine prosecution witnesses when an accused is unrepresented by counsel?
  • Can a conviction be maintained where the accused was denied a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses?
  • What is the legal effect on a trial when the statutory right to defense and cross-examination is violated?
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• Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, J Oil & Gas Development Company Limited vs Messrs Marathon Construction Company and another2013 CLD 1483 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-05-27
  arbitration awardfrustration of contractrule of the courtjudicial misconductprice escalationappellate jurisdictioncontract breachcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular first appeal arises from the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Islamabad, making an arbitration award dated August 29, 2007, a Rule of the Court under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The appellant, Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), challenged the award and the lower court's dismissal of its objections regarding the frustration of the contract, price escalations, quantity variations, and alleged judicial misconduct by the sole arbitrator. The core legal questions involved whether the contract stood frustrated due to changed site circumstances and whether the arbitrator committed legal or judicial misconduct in rendering a reasoned award granting compensation to the respondent contractor. The Islamabad High Court held that the sole arbitrator had properly evaluated the evidence, framed appropriate issues, and arrived at well-reasoned conclusions regarding the automatic frustration of the contract and breaches committed by the appellant. The court affirmed that an appellate court cannot reappraise evidence or substitute its opinion for that of an arbitrator unless a patent illegality appears on the face of the award. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the rule of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contract stands automatically frustrated under section 56 of the Contract Act 1872 when fundamental site conditions are drastically altered by the employer?
  • Can an appellate court reappraise the evidence recorded by an arbitrator while reviewing an order making an arbitration award a Rule of the Court?
  • Whether an arbitration award can be set aside on the ground of non-speaking conclusions when the arbitrator has discussed each issue in sufficient detail?
  • Does the failure of a civil court to frame separate issues on objections under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act 1940 vitiate the proceedings where the arbitrator has already framed exhaustive issues?
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• Shakeel Hussain Shah vs Bushra Hameed, etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 105 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-21Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Hussain Shah vs Bushra Hameed etc.2013 C.L.R. 354 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-02-21Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Hussain Shah vs Bushra Hameed and others2013 PLJ Islamabad 105, 2013 CLC 1085 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-21Read full judgment →
• Sardar Muhammad Yaqoob Khan Nasar vs Election Commission Of Pakistan, Islamabad Through Its Secretary And Another2013 KLR Civil Cases 240 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Sanya Saud vs Khawaja Saud Masud, etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 9 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-18Read full judgment →
• Sanya Saud vs Khawaja Saud Masud and others2013 PLJ Islamabad 9, 2013 CLC 108 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-18Read full judgment →
• Samba Bank Ltd., Islamabad through Authorized Officers/Attorney vs M/s.2013 PLJ Islamabad 23 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Samba Bank Ltd. through Authorized Officer/Attorney vs Messrs2013 PLJ Islamabad 23, 2013 CLD 801 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-02-22Read full judgment →
• Sajid Mehmood Raja and another vs Federation of Pakistan and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 864 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-25
  trade officersposting abroadinterview weightagepolicy decisionsuspension orderterms and conditions of serviceservice tribunal jurisdictioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two writ petitions challenging the selection process and policy for posting trade officers in foreign missions, as well as a separate writ petition challenging a civil servant's suspension and de novo inquiry. In the primary matter, the Ministry of Commerce advertised trade officer posts, selecting candidates through written examinations conducted by LUMS, performance evaluation reports, and interviews carrying a 70 percent weightage. The petitioners contended that the high weightage given to interviews allowed for arbitrary and subjective selection based on nepotism, and that results were unlawfully withheld. The court held that while qualifying candidates acquire a right to be considered for posting abroad based on merit, they possess no right to a specific posting at a particular location. The court further held that policy decisions by the executive are not subject to judicial substitution unless violative of the Constitution or law, and that subjective assessment in interviews based on defined objective criteria is permissible. In the connected matter concerning a civil servant's suspension, the court held that matters of efficiency, discipline, and suspension form part of the terms and conditions of service, falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 47 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974. Consequently, both petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a candidate who qualifies a test and interview for a posting abroad acquire a legal right to be posted abroad?
  • Can a court substitute a policy decision formulated by the executive government with its own opinion?
  • Is an order of suspension of a civil servant considered a final order for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a Service Tribunal?
  • Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan apply when a writ petition does not seek the implementation of terms and conditions of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajid Mehmood Raja & another vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2013 PLC (C.S.) 864, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 232 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-25
  Trade Officers selectionWrit jurisdictionService mattersEstoppelPolicy formulationArticle 212Constitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenged the selection process for Trade Officers in Pakistani missions abroad, specifically contesting the government's policy of assigning 70% weightage to interviews. The core legal questions were whether the selection policy was arbitrary, mala fide, or violative of constitutional principles, and whether the petitioners, having participated in the process, were estopped from challenging it. The court dismissed the petitions, holding that the government possesses the prerogative to formulate policy, and the judiciary cannot substitute its own opinion unless the policy is unconstitutional. The court found the interview criteria were based on seven objective attributes, negating claims of arbitrary discretion. The court established that while a qualified candidate has a right to be posted abroad, they have no right to a specific station. Furthermore, candidates who participate in a selection process are estopped from challenging the policy after failing to be selected. Finally, the court clarified that challenges to selection policies for foreign postings do not necessarily constitute matters of terms and conditions of service, thus avoiding the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 apply to challenges against selection policies for foreign postings?
  • Can a candidate who has participated in a selection process challenge the policy governing that process after failing to be selected?
  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to be posted at a specific location abroad?
  • To what extent can the High Court interfere with a government policy regarding the selection of officers for foreign postings?
  Read full judgment →
• Saima Ambreen vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2013 PLC (C.S.) 133 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-11-25
  Section Officers Promotional ExaminationFederal Public Service CommissionEligibility CriteriaPromotion to BS-17Provisional CandidatureCivil Service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Section 7(3)(d) of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance 1977 was filed by the appellant challenging orders and memorandums of the Federal Public Service Commission declaring her ineligible for appointment as Section Officer (BS-17) despite qualifying the Section Officers Promotional Examination-2010. The core legal question was whether a civil servant who had completed eight years of service in BS-11 to BS-16, but was already serving in BS-17 (via post upgradation) at the relevant time, was eligible for the promotional examination to BS-17. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that promotion inherently takes place to a higher grade and the promotional examination was strictly meant for civil servants serving in basic pay scales below BS-17. The Court affirmed that admitting candidates is provisional under Rule 5(xviii) of the Examination Rules, permitting FPSC to cancel candidature upon discovering ineligibility at any stage, even after test and interview clearance.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant already serving in BS-17 eligible to appear in a promotional examination meant for promotion of civil servants to BS-17?
  • Can the Federal Public Service Commission cancel the candidature of an ineligible candidate after they have successfully cleared both the written examination and the interview?
  • Does past service of eight years in BS-11 to BS-16 qualify an officer who currently occupies a BS-17 post for a promotional examination designated for BS-11 to BS-16 employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Safeer Hussain and 6 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Secretary of Establishment Division and 5 others2013 PLC (C.S.) 28 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-30
  deputationrepatriationsenioritypolice departmentcivil servantsconstitutional petitionESTACODE
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two writ petitions filed by regular Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors of the Islamabad Capital Territory Police challenging the continuous appointment and posting of officers on deputation from other provinces and departments, which allegedly bypassed rules and adversely affected the seniority and promotion rights of local regular employees. The core legal question was whether the prolonged retention and absorption of deputationists in the police department, contrary to established service rules, was lawful and sustainable. The Islamabad High Court held that deputation is a temporary measure designed for special circumstances where no expert is available within the department, and it should not be allowed for an indefinite period or lead to absorption that harms regular employees' rights. The court ruled that under Rule 20-A of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 and the ESTACODE, the normal deputation period is limited to three years, extendable up to five years, and authorities possess the power to repatriate deputationists even before completion of their term. Consequently, the court allowed the petitions, directing the immediate repatriation of all deputationists except one whose matter was pending before another bench, establishing that unjustified deputations undermine departmental efficiency and good governance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the continuous posting and absorption of officers on deputation in the Islamabad Police Department violates the rights of regular local police officers?
  • What is the maximum permissible duration for a government servant to remain on deputation under the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973?
  • Can government authorities repatriate a deputationist to their parent department before the completion of their specified deputation period?
  • Does a deputationist acquire a vested right to continuous retention or absorption in the borrowing department?
  Read full judgment →
• Saba Altaf vs The State and anothers2013 P Cr. L J 48 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-02-21
  post-arrest bailabetmentfurther inquirydelayed extra-judicial confessionsuspicious recoverysuccessive bailstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a post-arrest bail petition filed by the petitioner, Saba Altaf, facing allegations of abetment under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code in connection with a murder case registered at Islamabad. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner's case falls within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, given the doubtful nature of the evidence regarding abetment, belated extra-judicial confession, and suspicious recovery of a laptop while the petitioner was already incarcerated. The Islamabad High Court held that the evidence collected against the female petitioner, who was in jail with a suckling baby, was not of sufficient weight to establish clear complicity, leaving her guilt open to further inquiry. The Court laid down the principle that where circumstances such as belated statements, doubtful recoveries, and tenuous links regarding abetment create reasonable doubt at the bail stage, the accused is entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail under the provisions of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail when the allegation against her is primarily one of abetment and falls within the scope of further inquiry?
  • Does the dismissal of an earlier bail petition for non-prosecution bar the filing of a successive bail application on the same grounds?
  • Can a recovery of incriminating articles effected from the house of an accused while she is already behind bars constitute a strong ground to deny bail?
  • Whether a belated extra-judicial confession uncorroborated by independent evidence provides sufficient grounds to refuse bail in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Rizwan Khan vs The State and 2 others2013 PLJ Islamabad 26, 2013 P Cr. L J 678 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-29
  quashment of FIRforgerydouble jeopardySection 195 CrPCcivil disputecriminal proceedingsabuse of process
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the quashment of an F.I.R. registered under Sections 420, 468, 471, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and challenging the dismissal of an application under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner argued that because the alleged forged document was produced in pending civil litigation, the procedure under Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, must be followed, and that simultaneous criminal proceedings constituted double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that the offence of forging a document and the offence of using a forged document in court proceedings are distinct. While the latter may require the court's intervention under Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the former constitutes a separate criminal act subject to independent investigation and trial. The Court affirmed that no double jeopardy exists at this stage, as no final verdict on the document's genuineness has been reached, and dismissed the petition in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Does the production of a document in civil proceedings bar the registration of an F.I.R. regarding the forgery of that same document?
  • Are the offences of forging a document and using a forged document in court proceedings distinct offences?
  • Does the initiation of criminal proceedings alongside a pending civil suit regarding the same document constitute double jeopardy?
  • Is a direct petition for quashment under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, appropriate when a remedy via revision exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Rizwan Khan vs State and 2 others2013 PLJ Islamabad 26 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-29Read full judgment →
• Rimsha Masih vs Station House Officer, Police Station Ramna and others2013 PLJ Islamabad 74, 2013 NLR Criminal 170, 2013 PLD Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-11-20
  quashing of FIRblasphemymens reajuvenileabuse of process of courtmalicious prosecutioninherent jurisdictionalternate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, read with Section 561-A of the Cr.P.C., sought the quashing of an FIR registered against a 14-year-old Christian girl under Section 295-B of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) for allegedly burning pages of a prayer book. The petitioner contended that she was falsely implicated due to communal malice, that she was a juvenile with a mental age below her chronological age, and that the investigation revealed a local cleric had planted the Quranic pages to frame her. The High Court accepted the petition and quashed the FIR. The Court held that the essential ingredient of 'mens rea' (willful intention) was entirely absent given the petitioner's age, mental capacity, and lack of religious awareness. It further ruled that the High Court possesses inherent powers to quash an FIR to prevent an abuse of the process of court and a miscarriage of justice, and is not barred by the existence of alternate statutory remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR without requiring the accused to first exhaust alternate remedies under Section 249-A or 265-K Cr.P.C.?
  • Whether an accused can be prosecuted under Section 295-B of the PPC in the absolute absence of mens rea or willful intention to desecrate?
  • Does the planting of fake recovery material by a witness, as established during police investigation, constitute a valid ground for quashing criminal proceedings to prevent an abuse of the process of court?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Ahmed vs Govt. of Pakistan, etc.2013 C.L.R. 1306 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-09-09Read full judgment →
• Rasheed Baig And Others vs Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited2013 P.C.T.LR. 823 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Rana Saeed Ullah vs Inspector General of Police and 6 others2013 YLR 2513 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-03
  quashment of FIRcivil disputemisuse of process of lawagreement to sellSection 489-F PPCwrit petitionparallel proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  Three writ petitions were filed before the Islamabad High Court seeking the quashment of FIRs registered inter se by parties involved in land transaction disputes. The matters arose out of sale agreements and acknowledgement deeds regarding a 93-Kanal property, which subsequently gave rise to multiple pending civil suits for declaration, possession, injunction, and cancellation of cheques. While civil litigation was sub judice, the parties lodged cross FIRs under Sections 420, 468, 471, 506(ii), 406, 467, 447, 419, 34, and 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Islamabad High Court examined the record and noted that the primary dispute related to the execution and performance of civil sale agreements and that the rights and liabilities of the parties were already under adjudication before competent civil courts. The Court held that registering criminal cases to resolve civil disputes constituted a clear misuse of the process of law. Consequently, the High Court allowed all three writ petitions and quashed all three FIRs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criminal proceedings can be quashed if the underlying dispute between the parties is purely of a civil nature and already pending adjudication before civil courts?
  • Does registering an FIR to enforce or settle obligations arising out of a contractual sale agreement constitute a misuse of the process of law?
  • Can an FIR under Section 489-F PPC be quashed when a civil suit regarding the validity and cancellation of the underlying cheques is already sub judice?
  Read full judgment →
• Rakhshinda Habib vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2013 C.L.R. 1015 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-03Read full judgment →
• Raja Shehryar vs Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial2013 PLC (C.S.) 1125 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-09-12
  writ petitionstudy leavelocus poenitentiaevested rightdevelopment projectservice regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed before the Islamabad High Court seeking a declaration that the respondent's memo is illegal and praying for directions to pay salary, scholarship funds for foreign studies, and the conversion of extraordinary leave into study leave with full pay. The core legal questions involved whether a contract employee in a development project is entitled to foreign study funding and the conversion of leave, and whether a vested right was created under the principle of locus poenitentiae based on initial project approvals. The court held that since the petitioner had voluntarily agreed to bear his own study expenses and the development project itself had been completed and closed prior to his formal application for funds and leave conversion, the petitioner's claims were without legal force. Furthermore, the court held that the principle of locus poenitentiae does not apply when initial benefits stem from unauthorized or illegal orders. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can claim funding for foreign studies and conversion of extraordinary leave into study leave after the closure and completion of the development project under which such benefits were initially sanctioned?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae apply to benefit a party when the initial order or No Objection Certificate was issued by an incompetent authority without lawful authority?
  • Can a contract employee in a development project claim statutory entitlements akin to regular civil servants under non-approved service regulations?
  Read full judgment →
• Qadeer alias Teeran vs The State2013 P Cr. L J 822 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-19
  narcotics possessionrepresentative samplerecovery proceedingsprocedural discrepancysentence reductioncrushed poppy headscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the possession of 15 kilograms of crushed poppy heads under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution established the recovery and sampling process beyond reasonable doubt and whether the sample taken was representative of the bulk quantity. The Court found significant discrepancies in the testimonies of the recovery witnesses and the Investigating Officer, specifically regarding the procedural details of the weighing and sampling of the narcotics. The Court held that the failure to establish a transparent recovery process and the failure to collect a representative sample from the bulk quantity created reasonable doubt. Relying on established precedents, the Court emphasized that the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, requires strict adherence to procedural safeguards due to the severity of the punishments involved. Consequently, while the conviction was maintained, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by the appellant, noting his status as a first-time offender.

  Questions settled

  • Is a sample of 10 grams taken from 15 kilograms of narcotics considered a representative sample?
  • Does a failure by prosecution witnesses to detail the specific procedures of weighing and sampling narcotics create reasonable doubt?
  • Must the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 be construed strictly regarding procedural compliance?
  Read full judgment →
• Punjab Beverages Company (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Pakistan Through Ministry Of Finance, Etc2013 P.C.T.LR. 588 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Punjab Beverages Company (Pvt.) Ltd vs Pakistan, through Ministry of Finance, etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 157 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Punjab Beverages Company (Pvt.) Ltd vs Pakistan Through Ministery Of Finance Etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 157, 2013 PTD 1046, PTCL 2013 CL. 348 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-10Read full judgment →
• Punjab Beverages Company (Pvt) Ltd. through Fayyaz I lussam vs Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and 3 others2013 PTD 1046 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-10Read full judgment →
• Peer Saeed Nawaz Cheema vs State, etcPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 332 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-01-30
  post-arrest bailrapezinaprohibitory clausedelay in FIRcriminal intimidationIslamabad High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in case F.I.R. No. 399 dated 14.8.2012 registered under Sections 376 and 5060 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Shahzad Town, Islamabad, on allegations of forcibly committing Zina at pistol point, taking nude pictures and videos, and criminal intimidation. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for post-arrest bail given the heinous nature of the offence, specific nomination in the F.I.R., and recovery of incriminating material. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the bail petition, holding that the offence falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, that the petitioner was specifically nominated with a heinous role, and that the prosecution had collected sufficient incriminating evidence including recoveries. The court laid down the principle that in offences involving the honour and modesty of women, delay in lodging the F.I.R. is often justifiable due to social contemplation, and that medical evidence is merely supportive whereas ocular account holds primary importance at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in lodging an F.I.R. for an offence involving the modesty of a woman can be justified by the need for social contemplation?
  • Does an offence under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Can bail be granted in a heinous offence where the accused is specifically nominated and incriminating recoveries are made?
  • What is the evidentiary value of medical examination versus ocular testimony at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd., Islamabad vs AdditionalPLJ 2013 Tax Cases (Isl.) 110, 2013 PTD 747 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-04-12
  Income Tax Ordinance 2001assessment orderdelegation of powersstatutory interpretationwrit jurisdictionalternate remedyshow cause noticeAdditional Commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple writ petitions challenging show-cause notices issued by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 122(9) read with Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The petitioners contended that the Commissioner could not amend assessment orders deemed passed under Section 120, arguing that such powers constituted "revision" which could not be exercised by the original authority. Furthermore, they challenged the delegation of these powers to the Additional Commissioner under Section 210. The Court held that Section 122(5A) grants the Commissioner specific statutory authority to amend assessment orders, which is distinct from revisional powers. Consequently, the Commissioner may validly delegate this power to an Additional Commissioner under Section 210(1A), and such delegation encompasses the necessary functions to exercise those powers. While the Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction should not bypass statutory remedies, it entertained these petitions solely because they challenged the vires of the law. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the show-cause notices were valid and the petitioners should pursue alternate statutory remedies for factual grievances.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Commissioner of Income Tax amend an assessment order deemed to have been passed under Section 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the power of amendment under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 constitute a revisional power that cannot be exercised by the original authority?
  • Is the delegation of the power of amendment from the Commissioner to an Additional Commissioner under Section 210(1A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 legally valid?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court entertain a constitutional petition despite the availability of an alternate statutory remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. (PTCL) & others vs Mst.2013 PLJ Islamabad 96 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-13Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) and otherss vs Mst Naima Ayub and others2013 CLC 1191 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-13Read full judgment →
• Pak Telecom Mobile Ltd. and others vs Federal Board of Revenue2013 PTD 2151 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• others vs Mst. Naima Ayub and others2013 CLC 1191, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 96, 2013 C.L.R. 819 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-13Read full judgment →
• Omv Pakistan Exploration vs Commissioner of Inland Revenue and othersPTCL 2013 CL. 298, 2013 PTD 1620 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-12
  income tax auditself-assessment schemetax assessmentCommissioner of Inland Revenuestatutory interpretationfiscal statutesconstitutional validity
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated matter involved multiple writ petitions challenging audit notices issued by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The petitioners contended that Section 177 was subservient to Section 214C, arguing that an audit could only be initiated after selection by the Federal Board of Revenue, and that Section 177 was unconstitutional for being discriminatory and lacking objective criteria. The Court held that Section 177 and Section 214C are independent statutory provisions. It determined that the Commissioner possesses the authority under Section 177 to verify self-assessment returns independently of the Board’s selection process under Section 214C. The Court clarified that Section 214C serves as a mechanism to monitor tax authorities, whereas Section 177 facilitates the verification of taxpayer assessments. Consequently, the Court ruled that Section 177 is not unconstitutional, as it is not inherently discriminatory, and dismissed the petitions. The judgment establishes that the Commissioner’s power to audit under Section 177 does not require prior selection by the Board, affirming the State's authority to verify self-assessed tax returns.

  Questions settled

  • Is the power of the Commissioner to conduct an audit under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 subservient to the selection process under Section 214C?
  • Does Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 require prior selection by the Federal Board of Revenue before the Commissioner can initiate an audit?
  • Is Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 unconstitutional for being discriminatory under Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Oil & Gas Development Company Limited vs M/s. Marathon Construction2013 KLR Civil Cases 191 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-26Read full judgment →
• Ocean Pakistan Ltd. vs Federation Of Pakistan, Etc.2013 P.C.T.L.R. 125 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-12-21Read full judgment →
• Ocean Pakistan Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and others2013 PTD 875 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-19Read full judgment →
• Ocean Pakistan Limited Islamabad. vs Federation Of Pakistan Etc.PTCL 2013 CL. 217 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-02-19Read full judgment →
• NoorulHaq N. Qureshi, Tax 2011 Commissioner of Income Taxiwealth Tax, Islamabad vs RamizulhaqNLR 2013 Tax 37 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-12-12Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad Qureshi and others vs Federation of Pakistan2013 PLC (C.S.) 99 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-10-18
  writ jurisdictionpolice selectionpeacekeeping missiondiscriminatory policyjudicial reviewfair competitiongovernment policycivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns writ petitions challenging a government policy letter dated 28th April 2011, which established new criteria for selecting police officers for United Nations Peacekeeping Missions. The petitioners argued that the government’s policy, which imposed age limits and service quotas inconsistent with United Nations guidelines, was discriminatory, lacked legal authority, and was issued without required approval. The core legal question was whether the government could unilaterally impose restrictive and discriminatory selection criteria that contradicted international standards and excluded eligible candidates from fair competition. The Court held that the impugned policy was illegal and void. It established the principle that while policy-making is a government prerogative, such policies are subject to judicial review when they are discriminatory, arbitrary, or lack a foundation in law or established rules. The Court emphasized that the government cannot deny eligible candidates the right to fair competition under the guise of providing opportunities to others, particularly when the policy lacks a rational basis and fails to adhere to the established criteria set by the United Nations.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government impose selection criteria for United Nations Peacekeeping Missions that are discriminatory and contradict the established United Nations guidelines?
  • Is a government policy document subject to judicial review if it is not supported by any law or rule?
  • Does the government have the authority to exclude eligible police officers from competing for United Nations Peacekeeping Missions based on arbitrary age and service quotas?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Aslam vs Federal Government and 6 others2013 PLC (C.S.) 974 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-02-29
  quo warrantostatutory bodydeputationgood governanceappointment on meritwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ of quo warranto challenged the re-appointment of the respondent as Chairperson of the Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (FBISE). The petitioner contended that the respondent, a BS-20 officer, was ineligible for the post which had been upgraded to BS-22, and that the re-appointment was made without the mandatory consent of her parent organization, the Higher Education Commission. The respondent argued that the appointment was made by the competent authority and denied allegations of misconduct. The Court held that the re-appointment was unlawful, emphasizing that statutory bodies must adhere to established rules and that appointments to higher-grade posts must be made on merit to ensure good governance. The Court found that the failure to obtain the parent department's consent and the appointment of an officer to a post two grades higher than their own violated legal requirements. Consequently, the Court declared the re-appointment without lawful authority and directed the Federal Government to fill the vacancy on merit with a qualified officer.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ of quo warranto be issued against an appointment made to a statutory body in violation of rules?
  • Is the re-appointment of an officer to a post two grades higher than their current grade permissible without justification?
  • Does the re-appointment of an officer on deputation require the consent of the parent department?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseemul Ali, Ex. Chief Executive Officer of Trust Management2013 CLD 216 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-10-16
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilityalternate remedystatutory appealpenaltySecurities and Exchange Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Islamabad High Court by the petitioner, Ex. Chief Executive Officer of Trust Management, impugning a judgment dated 18-3-2010 and seeking waiver of a penalty amount. During the proceedings, the respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing that adequate alternate remedies were available under sections 33 and 34 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, specifically that an appeal lay to the High Court under section 34 against the order of the Appellate Bench. The Court examined the relevant statutory provisions and the case law cited by the respondents, which established that constitutional jurisdiction should not be exercised when an alternate efficacious remedy is available. The Court observed that the petitioner had failed to avail the further appeal provided under section 34 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997. Consequently, the Islamabad High Court held that the constitutional petition was non-maintainable due to the availability of an adequate statutory remedy, and dismissed the petition accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when an adequate alternate statutory remedy of appeal is available under the law?
  • Does an appeal lie to the High Court against an order of the Appellate Bench of the Commission under the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997?
  • Can constitutional jurisdiction be exercised when the aggrieved party fails to avail the further appeal provided by the relevant statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseem alias Fahim vs The State and anothers2013 MLD 1524 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-05-15
  post-arrest bailmurdervicarious liabilityprohibitory clausecross versiondelay in F.I.R.
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Islamabad High Court through a criminal bail petition filed by Naseem alias Fahim, seeking post-arrest bail in case F.I.R. No. 22 dated 13-1-2013, registered under sections 302, 324, and 148/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code at Police Station Shahzad Town, Islamabad, concerning a fatal land dispute altercation resulting in murder and injuries. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail given his specific nomination in a promptly lodged F.I.R., active participation in a heinous crime falling within the prohibitory clause, and the doubtful nature of a delayed counter-version. The court held that the petitioner is not entitled to bail, as a cursory perusal of the record prima facie establishes his active participation and vicarious liability in a pre-planned heinous offense, while the counter-version was lodged with inordinate delay. The key principle laid down is that at the bail stage, deep appreciation of evidence is impermissible, and where sufficient incriminating material prima facie connects the accused to a heinous offense within the prohibitory clause, and a cross-version suffers from unexplained delay, post-arrest bail must be refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused specifically nominated with an active role in a promptly lodged F.I.R. for a heinous offense falling within the prohibitory clause is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does a delayed counter-version lodged after a considerable period create sufficient doubt at the bail stage to warrant the grant of bail?
  • Can the question of vicarious liability be applied to an accused who participates in a pre-planned scheme resulting in murder?
  • To what extent can a court examine the merits and prosecution evidence during the consideration of a bail petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Nagina Bibi & others vs Federal Directorate of Education, etc.2013 PLJ Islamabad 33 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Sajid Traders, Lahore and 4 others vs M/O. Commerce, Govt. of2013 PLJ Islamabad 201 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Premier Kadanwari Development Company Ltd. vs The Customs,PLJ 2013 Tax Cases (Isl.) 4, 2013 PTD 1037, 2013 P.C.T.L.R. 430 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-04Read full judgment →
• M/s. Premier Kadanwari Development Company Ltd. vs Customs,PLJ 2013 Tax Cases (Isl.) 4 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Omv Pakistan Exploration vs Commissioner of Inland Revenue etcPTCL 2013 CL. 298 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-12Read full judgment →
• M/s. M.N. Construction Company vs Federation Of Pakistan, Etc.2013 PLD Islamabad 85, 2013 P.C.T.LR. 475 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-28Read full judgment →
• M/s. Kingcrete Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Central Board of RevenueNLR 2013 Tax 44 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Kingcrete Builders (Pvt.) Ltd vs Central Board of Revenue throughNLR 2013 Tax 44, PLJ 2013 Tax Cases (Isl.) 89, 2013 PTD 111, 2013 C.L.R. 95 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-21Read full judgment →
• M/s. Glauser International vs Capital Development Authority And Other2013 KLR Criminal Cases 289 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-14
  contempt petitionnon-prosecutionrestoration of petitionwithdrawal of petitioncapital development authorityintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This contempt petition arose from the alleged non-compliance with an Islamabad High Court order dated 17.6.2008 passed in an Intra-Court Appeal, which directed the Capital Development Authority (CDA) to examine and decide the petitioner's claim within two weeks, subject to the condition that it had not already been decided. The petitioner filed a contempt petition alleging non-implementation, which was twice dismissed for non-prosecution due to the petitioner's lack of diligence and failure to appear. The petitioner subsequently sought restoration of the petition and, concurrently, permission to withdraw it with liberty to file a fresh one. The core legal question was whether a case for contempt of court was made out and whether repeated petitions on the same subject matter could be entertained. The Court held that the contempt petition lacked merit as there was no proof of non-compliance or pending formal applications on record, the restoration application lacked sufficient grounds, and a litigant cannot be permitted to file successive petitions for the same relief. The petition and accompanying civil miscellaneous applications were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contempt petition can be entertained when the petitioner fails to establish any deliberate non-compliance with the court order?
  • Can a litigant be permitted to withdraw a contempt petition with permission to file a fresh one on the same subject matter?
  • Whether an application for restoration of a dismissed petition can be allowed without sufficient cause or supporting medical evidence?
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• M/s, Glauser International vs Capital Development Authority etc.PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 504 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-14
  contempt of courtnon-prosecutionrestoration of petitionwithdrawal of petitioncompliance with court orderrepetitive petitions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a contempt petition filed by the petitioner against the Capital Development Authority (CDA) for alleged non-compliance with a court order dated 17.06.2008, which directed the CDA to decide the petitioner's claim within two weeks. The contempt petition had a history of being dismissed twice for non-prosecution due to the petitioner's lack of diligence. The petitioner sought restoration of the petition and subsequently requested permission to withdraw the contempt petition to file a fresh one. Upon review, the Court found no reasonable grounds to initiate contempt proceedings, noting the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the CDA had not already decided the claim or that the petitioner had actively pursued compliance. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioner's restoration application lacked merit due to insufficient evidence regarding the counsel's alleged illness. Relying on the principle that a litigant cannot file repetitive petitions for the same relief, the Court dismissed the contempt petition and the associated miscellaneous applications, holding that contempt proceedings are a matter between the Court and the alleged contemnor.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner be permitted to withdraw a contempt petition to file a fresh one on the same subject matter?
  • Is a contempt petition maintainable where the petitioner fails to demonstrate active pursuit of compliance with the court order?
  • Does a court have the discretion to drop contempt proceedings if it finds no merit in the allegations?
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• M/s, Askari Commercial Bank Limited vs Commissioner of Inland2013 PLJ Islamabad 122 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s Pak Gul Construction (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation Of Pakistan AndPTCL 2013 CL. 420 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muneer Ahmad vs The Central Selection Board, Etc.K.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases 118 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-11Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Ahmad Siddiqui vs Tahir Aslam Mufti and 11 others2013 PLJ Islamabad 278 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman, etc. vs Abdul Rehman, etc.2013 C.L.R. 69 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman and others vs Abdul Rehman and others2013 C.L.R. 69, 2013 CLC 288 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zafar Iqbal and 5 others vs Oil and Gas Development2013 PLC (C.S.) 43 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-03-19
  antedated promotionpay protectionsalary recoverylocus poenitentiaeservice matterconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, employees of the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), filed a constitutional petition seeking the antedating of their promotion to Executive Group-III (EG-III) from 1-12-2002 to 1-12-1997, and challenging the recovery of salary amounts deducted following the re-fixing of their pay. The core legal questions concerned whether the recovery of salary adjustments following an antedated promotion was illegal and whether the petitioners were entitled to the requested promotion date. The Court held that the recovery was a necessary, consequential adjustment arising from the beneficial antedated promotion and could not be viewed in isolation or termed unjust; therefore, the principle of locus poenitentiae was inapplicable. The Court directed the respondents to consider the petitioners' cases for promotion to EG-III effective 1-12-1997 in accordance with prescribed criteria. If the promotion is granted, the respondents must reconsider the recovery issue. The key principle laid down is that financial adjustments resulting from a beneficial promotion order are consequential and do not constitute illegal recovery subject to the doctrine of locus poenitentiae.

  Questions settled

  • Can salary recoveries resulting from a beneficial antedated promotion be challenged as illegal?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae apply to financial adjustments consequential to a promotion order?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable for the determination of promotion eligibility based on internal criteria?
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• Muhammad Yaseen and 2 others vs SSP Islamabad and 5 others2013 P Cr. L J 137 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-09
  quashment of FIRdouble jeopardyscheduled offencesFederal Investigation Agencypublic servantcriminal procedureabuse of process
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought the quashment of F.I.R. No. 398 of 2011, contending that it involved the same subject matter as a subsequent F.I.R. No. 524 of 2011, thereby violating the constitutional protection against double jeopardy and constituting an abuse of process. They further argued that the pendency of a civil suit necessitated the stay of criminal proceedings. The core legal question was whether the two F.I.Rs. concerned the same offence, thereby warranting quashment, and whether the involvement of a public servant required the transfer of the investigation to the Federal Investigation Agency. The Court held that the two F.I.Rs. were distinct, as the second involved scheduled offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and the involvement of a public servant. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the case did not constitute double jeopardy. The Court established that where a public servant is implicated in scheduled offences, the investigation must be transferred to the Federal Investigation Agency, and ordinary police lack jurisdiction to submit a final report in such matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of two separate F.I.Rs. regarding different aspects of a transaction constitute double jeopardy?
  • Is it mandatory to transfer an investigation to the Federal Investigation Agency when a public servant is implicated in a scheduled offence?
  • Can an ordinary police officer submit a final report in a case involving scheduled offences triable by a Special Judge?
  • Does the pendency of a civil suit automatically require the stay of criminal proceedings regarding the same subject matter?
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• Muhammad Yaseen And 2 Other vs S.S.P., Islamabad And 5 Other2013 KLR Criminal Cases 159 · Islamabad High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob and another vs Managing Director/Chief2013 PLC (C.S.) 303 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-16
  constitutional petitionante-dated promotionres judicatasuccessive petitionsservice matterabuse of process
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by employees seeking ante-dated promotion to the posts of Private Secretary (EG-III) and Executive Secretary (EG-IV) with consequential back benefits. The petitioners contended they were unfairly bypassed for promotion in 2001 while juniors were promoted, and that their subsequent promotion in 2008 was delayed. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could re-agitate the issue of ante-dated promotion through a fresh constitutional petition after the matter had already been settled in previous litigation. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. It observed that the controversy regarding the petitioners' promotion had been previously adjudicated and resolved by the Court in earlier labour appeals. Applying the principles of res judicata and the prohibition against successive petitions on the same cause of action, the Court ruled that the petitioners were barred from re-litigating the same grievance. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that parties cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction to re-open matters already finalized by a court of competent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when it concerns the same cause of action previously adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to prevent the re-agitation of service-related promotion claims that were previously settled through court-ordered compromises?
  • Can a party file successive petitions regarding the same grievance after the initial matter has been finally decided?
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• Muhammad Sarwar and 9 otherss vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and anothers2013 MLD 45 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-10-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Chairman, Capital Development Authority, etc.2013 C.L.R. 971 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Chairman, Capital Development Authority and others2013 C.L.R. 971, 2013 CLC 1841 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-05Read full judgment →