Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 79,348 judgments in total from the Lahore High Court.

• Mst. Safia Bibi and another vs Muhammad Akbar and others2018 PLD Lahore 758 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Ameer vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan2018 CLD 289 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-22
  insurance appealliquidated damagesgroup insuranceinsurance tribunaldelay in payment
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, widow of a deceased government employee, challenged the order of the Insurance Tribunal dismissing her claim for liquidated damages regarding group insurance. The core legal question was whether legal heirs of a deceased employee are entitled to liquidated damages under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, even if the deceased was not a direct contracting party to the group insurance policy, and whether delay beyond ninety days warrants such damages. The Lahore High Court held that under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, it is an implied term of every insurance contract that if payment is not made within ninety days of completing requirements, liquidated damages must be paid unless the delay was due to circumstances beyond the insurer's control. The Court further ruled that the Tribunal erred in holding that the deceased was not a party to the contract, noting that group insurance benefits the family of the deceased employee. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the impugned order set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Are legal heirs entitled to liquidated damages under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, when insurance claim payments are delayed beyond ninety days?
  • Does the requirement of being a party to a group insurance policy bar the legal heirs of a deceased employee from claiming liquidated damages?
  • What constitutes an implied term regarding liquidated damages under every contract of insurance pursuant to the Insurance Ordinance, 2000?
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• Mst. Rasheedan Bibi and others vs Abdul Razzaq2018 MLD 19 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen Akhtar and 4 others vs Judicial Magistrate Section 302018 YLR 985 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-06
  inherent jurisdictionquashing of proceedingssummoning orderprivate complaintabuse of process of lawrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking to set aside a summoning order dated 10.04.2017 passed by a Judicial Magistrate in a private complaint involving offenses under Sections 337-F(i), 427, 447, 506, 147, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. to quash a summoning order when an alternative remedy, such as a revision petition, is available. The Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that inherent powers under Section 561-A are extraordinary, discretionary, and to be exercised sparingly only when no other adequate remedy exists. The Court emphasized that these powers cannot be used as an alternative or additional remedy to bypass the ordinary course of criminal procedure. Furthermore, the Court established that a claim of innocence or the existence of a counter-version does not justify invoking inherent jurisdiction, as such matters must be adjudicated by the trial court during the trial process.

  Questions settled

  • Can the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to challenge a summoning order when a remedy by way of revision is available?
  • Is the inherent power under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 an alternative or additional remedy to the ordinary course of criminal procedure?
  • Does the existence of a counter-version to a criminal complaint justify the quashing of proceedings under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mst. Naik Parveen vs Jewan Khan2018 PLJ Lahore 813 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Lala Rukh Bukhari vs Syed Waqar Ul Hassan Shah Bokhari and others2018 YLR 273 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kousar Kamal vs Chairman, Customs, FBR and othersPTCL 2018 CL. 471, 2018 PTD 93 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kousar Kamal vs Chairman, Customs, FBR & OthersPTCL 2018 CL. 471 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khurshid Bibi, etc vs Nazar Abbas, etc2020 [M] C L R 192, 2018 YLR 2138, 2018 YLR 2138, 2018 LHC 1404 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khurshid Bibi and others vs Syed Fazal Abbas and others2018 YLR 2138 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jameela Begum vs Qadeer Ahmad2018 YLR 66 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-06Read full judgment →
• Mst. Irshad Bibi vs District Police Officer, etc2018 LHC 2775, 2019 P Cr. L J 436 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-12
  habeas corpuscustody of minorsuckling infantinterim custodytender ageGuardian Court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition seeking the recovery of her 13-day-old infant son from the illegal confinement of the child's father. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to grant interim custody of a suckling infant to the mother. The Court held that, in accordance with established Supreme Court precedents, the High Court may intervene in custody matters under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, provided the child is of tender age, has been recently removed from lawful custody, and there is a real urgency. Finding that the 13-day-old infant was a suckling baby recently separated from the mother, the Court ordered the immediate transfer of custody to the mother. The Court clarified that this order was an interim measure, and the father retained the liberty to approach the Guardian Court for a final determination regarding the permanent custody of the minor.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to determine the custody of a minor?
  • Under what specific conditions will the High Court grant interim custody of a minor in a habeas corpus petition?
  • Does an order of interim custody passed by the High Court under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude the father from seeking permanent custody from the Guardian Court?
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• Mst. Irshad Begum vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan2018 CLD 1233 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-06Read full judgment →
• Mst. Iram Shahzadi vs Muhammad Imran-ul-Haq & others2018 LHC 1818 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Iqbal Bano vs Home Department & 2 others2019 P Cr. L J 532, 2019 PLJ Lahore 278, 2018 LHC 2869 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-06
  death penaltydeath row phenomenonpsychosisexecution of death warrantmental incapacitySchizophreniacriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought the suspension of her son's death sentence, arguing that his diagnosed psychosis (Schizophrenia), exacerbated by prolonged incarceration and the 'death row phenomenon,' rendered his execution dehumanizing and a violation of the Pakistan Prisons Rules 1978. The core legal question was whether a convict's mental illness, developed or worsened during long-term incarceration while awaiting execution, constitutes sufficient grounds to stay the execution of a death warrant. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the 'death row phenomenon' and resulting psychological trauma are inherent consequences of the death penalty and do not provide a legal basis for suspending an execution. The Court emphasized that it cannot reopen a case finally decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, nor can it mitigate the sentence based on psychological implications that are concomitant to the penalty itself. Relying on the precedent set in Safia Bano v. Home Department, the Court affirmed that such emotional disorders are insufficient to impede the execution of a lawfully imposed death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the development of psychosis or mental trauma during long-term incarceration on death row constitute a valid ground to suspend the execution of a death warrant?
  • Can a High Court revisit or stay the execution of a death sentence after the conviction has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Is the 'death row phenomenon' a legally recognized basis for mitigating a death sentence in Pakistan?
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• Mst. Hafiza Samina Sultan vs Muhammad Abid and 2 others2018 MLD 923 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Zainab vs Gulastar Hussain through LRs etc2018 PLJ Lahore 129 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fouzia Bibi vs Haji Ahmad2018 PLJ Lahore 377 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bilqees Barkat, etc. vs Member Board of Revenue J-V/CSC, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 130 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bilqees Barkat etc vs Member Board of Revenue J-V/CSC etc2018 PLJ Lahore 257 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bhagan etc vs Ghulam (deceased) through L.Rs and others2018 MLD 1892, 2018 LHC 1560 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bhagan and others vs Ghulam (deceased) through L.Rs, and others2018 MLD 1892 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ayesha Shahid vs Additional District Judge and others2019 PLJ Lahore 484, 2018 MLD 1592 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ashfan Shahid vs Adj and others2018 LHC 1166 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amna Bi and 5 others vs Mst. Naseem Akhtar2018 CLC 748 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Alia Sehar vs Station House Officer Police Station Mureed Wala2018 PLJ Lahore 474 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aila Nawaz vs Judge Family Court Khanewal and 2 others2018 CLC 241 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-09Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Farkhanda Farouq etc vs Defence Housing Authority etc2019 CLC 695, 2018 LHC 2940 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-05Read full judgment →
• Mrs Amna Nawaz vs Additional District Judge and others2018 MLD 1303 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-04Read full judgment →
• Mohsin Ali vs The State and another2018 MLD 934 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryidentification paradeconflicting versionsbenefit of doubtvicarious liabilitycommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the accused in a murder case registered under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail given the inconsistencies between the FIR and the subsequent investigation, specifically regarding his identification and the role assigned to him. The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to bail, determining that the case falls within the ambit of 'further inquiry' under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court reasoned that the prosecution presented two conflicting versions of the incident, the co-accused assigned the primary role was declared innocent, and the identification parade's evidentiary value remained questionable. The key principles laid down are that the benefit of doubt can be extended to an accused at the bail stage, and where the prosecution’s case involves conflicting versions or requires further inquiry into guilt, the grant of bail becomes a right of the accused rather than a mere concession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of two conflicting versions of an incident by the prosecution render a case one of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused at the bail stage?
  • Is the grant of bail a right of the accused when a case falls under the ambit of further inquiry?
  • Does the declaration of innocence of a co-accused assigned the primary role in an FIR provide grounds for bail for other accused?
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• Mohammad Sharif vs Jamshaid Ali and 7 others2018 MLD 1922 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-01Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Shahzaib vs Mishal Fatima and others2018 MLD 1131 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-22Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Raza vs Crescent Industrial Chemical Ltd. and 5 others2018 CLD 898 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-26Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Khalid Naeem vs Habib Bank Limited2018 CLD 1027 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-15
  banking courtex parte decreelimitation periodspecial lawcondonation of delayrecovery of finances
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Banking Court dismissing the Appellant's application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which sought to set aside an ex parte judgment and decree. The core legal questions were whether the Appellant established grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction to warrant setting aside the decree, and whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to appeals filed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001. The Court held that the Appellant failed to prove any fraud, misrepresentation, or jurisdictional defect, as the Banking Court had duly considered the Appellant's leave to defend application before decreeing the suit. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 is a special law prescribing its own limitation period; therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 is inapplicable for condonation of delay in filing appeals under this Ordinance. The appeal was dismissed as both meritless and time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Can Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 be invoked to condone a delay in filing an appeal under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • What are the essential grounds required to successfully challenge a judgment or decree under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 exclude the application of the general provisions of the Limitation Act 1908 regarding the condonation of delay?
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• Mohammad Akram vs Mst. Nooro Mai2019 YLR 1195, 2018 LHC 3043 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-21Read full judgment →
• Model Town Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. vs Secretary to Govt.2018 [M] C.L.R. 642 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mobile Communication Limited vs Province of the Punjab and 7 others2018 PLD Lahore 504 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-08Read full judgment →
• Mirza Naseem-Ul-Hassan and others vs Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Punjab and others2018 PLD Lahore 704 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-29Read full judgment →
• Mirza Muhammad Waqas vs Sana Norani, Etc2018 LHC 1920 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-03Read full judgment →
• Mian Zafar Haider vs Deputy Commissioner, etc.2019 PLC (C.S.) 658, 2018 KLR Civil Cases 256 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-19
  constitutional petitionsuspension from servicecompetent authorityPEEDA Actterms and conditions of serviceService Tribunalbar of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to challenge an order of suspension passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Muzaffargarh against the petitioner, a Junior Clerk, on allegations of wilful absence from duty. The core legal questions involved whether the Deputy Commissioner acted as a competent authority to suspend the petitioner under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, and whether the High Court can interfere with intermediate service proceedings and suspension orders in its constitutional jurisdiction in light of the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that suspension is a temporary measure that does not amount to a punishment, that the Deputy Commissioner acted as the competent authority, and that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to interfere with the intermediate stages of departmental proceedings relating to the terms and conditions of service. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked against interlocutory departmental orders or suspension passed under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, due to the constitutional bar of Article 212.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Deputy Commissioner is a competent authority to suspend a civil servant and initiate proceedings under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006?
  • Does an order of suspension amount to a punishment under service laws?
  • Can the High Court interfere with intermediate stages of departmental proceedings and suspension orders in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 applies to constitutional petitions challenging interlocutory orders regarding terms and conditions of service?
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• Mian Mehmood-Ur-Rasheed vs Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory2018 PLJ Lahore 223 · Lahore High Court · 2016-08-12Read full judgment →
• Mian Khan and 3 others vs The State and another2018 MLD 226 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-24
  criminal appealmurderocular evidencemedical evidencebenefit of doubtfalse implicationenmityacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and life imprisonment sentences awarded by the trial court under Sections 302(b), 324, 440, 109, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a murder and assault case. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the appellants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given the ocular evidence and alleged discrepancies. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, citing significant contradictions between the ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the time of occurrence and the duration between injury and death. Furthermore, the court found the conduct of the eye-witnesses unnatural and noted that the Investigating Officer’s findings cast doubt on the presence of the appellants at the scene. Emphasizing that enmity is a double-edged weapon that can lead to false implication, the court held that the prosecution failed to provide independent corroboration. Consequently, the court acquitted the appellants, setting aside the trial court's judgment and dismissing the complainant's revision petition for sentence enhancement.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant discrepancy between the time of occurrence as stated by eye-witnesses and the time indicated by medical evidence entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the conduct of the eye-witnesses is found to be unnatural and inconsistent with the circumstances of the incident?
  • Is the prosecution's case weakened when the Investigating Officer's findings contradict the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime?
  • Does the existence of previous enmity between the parties necessitate independent corroboration of the prosecution's evidence to secure a conviction?
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• Mian Ghulam Ijaz and others vs The State and others2018 PLD Lahore 151 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-24
  physical remandjudicial remandCode of Criminal Procedureinvestigationmagisterial discretioncriminal revisionpolice custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, which set aside a Magistrate's refusal to grant further physical remand to the petitioners. The core legal question concerns the criteria for granting physical remand under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the extent of a Magistrate's judicial discretion in such matters. The Lahore High Court held that the Additional Sessions Judge erred in reversing the Magistrate's order. The Court ruled that physical remand is a judicial function that cannot be granted mechanically upon the police's request. It emphasized that remand to police custody is an exception, requiring 'real necessity,' such as the recovery of incriminating property, rather than mere general investigation or the hope of obtaining confessions. The Court affirmed that when investigation is incomplete, the appropriate course is to remand the accused to judicial custody and compel the police to submit a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order, restoring the Magistrate's original refusal of further physical remand.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate grant physical remand of an accused person mechanically upon the request of the police?
  • Is the refusal of a Magistrate to grant further physical remand a judicial function subject to revision?
  • Under what circumstances is a remand to police custody justified under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the non-completion of an investigation automatically entitle the police to further physical remand of an accused?
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• Mian Ayaz Anwar etc vs State Bank of Pakistan etc2018 LHC 2873, 2019 CLD 375, 2019 PLD Lahore 310 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-24Read full judgment →
• Mian Asia vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and 22018 PLJ Lahore 155, 2018 PLD Lahore 54 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• Mian Asia vs Federation of Pakistan etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 155 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Zainab DF (Pvt.) Limited through General Manager vs Customs2019 PCRLJ 518, 2018 PTD 1742 · Lahore High Court
  warehouse licensecancellation of licensecustoms appealadjudicating authorityjurisdictionFederal Board of RevenueCustoms Appellate Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arises from an order passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, which rejected the applicant's appeal against the cancellation of a warehouse license on jurisdictional grounds and referred the matter to the Federal Board of Revenue under Section 195 of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether an order for the cancellation of a private warehouse license passed by a Collector of Customs under Section 13(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 falls within the adjudicatory scope of Section 179 and is thus appealable before the Customs Appellate Tribunal under Section 194A. The Lahore High Court held that the powers conferred under Section 13 for licensing and cancellation are distinct from the adjudication powers under Section 179, meaning orders under Section 13(3) are administrative or executive in nature and not appealable to the Tribunal. However, to ensure the aggrieved party is not left remediless, the Court upheld the referral of the matter to the Federal Board of Revenue for review of the legality and propriety of the impugned decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order for the cancellation of a private warehouse license passed under Section 13(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 is appealable before the Customs Appellate Tribunal under Section 194A?
  • Are the powers relating to licensing under Section 13 and adjudication under Section 179 of the Customs Act, 1969 independent and distinct?
  • Does a Collector of Customs passing an order under Section 13(3) act as an Adjudicating Authority or on the executive and administrative side?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Z & J Hyginic Products (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 PTD 419 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-23
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanjurisdictiontax assessmentmaladministrationstatutory remedyouster clauseintra court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenged a Single Judge's order dismissing a writ petition regarding the jurisdiction of the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO). The Appellant contended that the FTO had jurisdiction to address maladministration in tax assessment proceedings, arguing that the FTO Ordinance should be interpreted to allow such intervention. The core legal question was whether the FTO possesses jurisdiction to investigate tax assessment matters when specific statutory remedies, such as appeal and review, are available under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Court held that the FTO lacks jurisdiction in such instances. The ratio is that Section 9(2)(b) of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, acts as an ouster clause, explicitly barring the FTO from inquiring into matters related to tax liability or assessment where alternative legal remedies are provided by the relevant tax legislation. The key principle laid down is that the FTO's investigative powers regarding maladministration are not absolute and are subordinate to the statutory framework governing tax appeals and reviews; thus, a complainant cannot bypass established statutory remedies by invoking the FTO's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Tax Ombudsman have jurisdiction to investigate tax assessment matters when statutory remedies of appeal and review are available?
  • Is the power of the Federal Tax Ombudsman to investigate maladministration absolute under the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does Section 9(2) of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, bar the FTO from inquiring into matters related to the determination of tax liability?
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• Messrs Vintak Pipe Industries through Proprietor vs Customs Appellate2018 PTD 1823 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Tandlianwala Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Province of Punjab through Excise and Taxation and 5 others2018 PTD 75 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Tandlianwala Sugar Mills Ltd vs Province of Punjab through Excise and Taxation and 5 others2018 CLC 733 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Super Asia Muhammad Din Sons through Company Secretary2018 MLD 1933 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sufi Steel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 P.C.T.L.R. 1, 2018 PTD 378, PTCL 2018 CL. 25 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-13
  Customs Act 1969delegated legislationadministrative instructionsrule-making powermanufacturing bondconstitutional petitionultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an FBR letter requiring steel exporters to obtain certificates from a private trade association for exports to Afghanistan. The core legal question was whether the FBR could impose such regulatory conditions through administrative instructions under Section 223 of the Customs Act, 1969, or if such requirements necessitated formal rule-making under Section 219 of the Act. The Court held that the impugned letter was issued without lawful authority and was of no legal effect. The ratio established that administrative instructions cannot override or supplement statutory rules in areas where the legislature has mandated rule-making power. Specifically, matters enumerated in the Third Schedule of the Customs Act, 1969—such as export procedures and warehousing—must be regulated through formal rules notified in the Official Gazette, rather than through administrative orders. The Court affirmed that while administrative directions are valid for internal management, they cannot impose liabilities or restrict rights that are otherwise governed by delegated legislation, and where the law prescribes a specific manner for an act, it must be performed in that manner.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Board of Revenue impose regulatory conditions on exports through administrative instructions under Section 223 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Is there a legal distinction between administrative directions and delegated legislative rule-making power under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can administrative instructions issued by the Federal Board of Revenue override or supplement statutory rules regarding export procedures?
  • Does the requirement for a certificate from a private association for exports fall under the rule-making power of the Board under Section 219 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shaheen Insurance Company Limited through Assistant General2018 CLD 131 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Riaz Textiles Mill (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director vs Pakistan Central2018 PTD 910 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Qadoos Brothers Poultry Farms through Abdul Qadoos vs Judge Banking Court No.1 Gujranwala and others2018 PCTLR 14, 2018 PLJ Lahore 580, 2018 CLD 88 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-17
  banking court jurisdictiondismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of suitfinal orderinterlocutory orderreview of orderFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether a Banking Court, established under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, possesses the jurisdiction to restore a suit dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether such restoration constitutes a "review" of a final order, which is prohibited under Section 27 of the Ordinance, or if it is a procedural power exercisable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court held that an order dismissing a suit for non-prosecution is neither a "final order" under Section 22 of the Ordinance nor a reviewable judgment. Instead, it is an intermediate, procedural order. Consequently, the Banking Court retains the inherent power to recall such dismissal orders and restore the suit upon sufficient cause being shown, pursuant to the provisions of Order IX, Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The principle laid down is that the bar against review in Section 27 does not preclude the Banking Court from exercising procedural powers to restore suits dismissed for non-appearance, as this does not involve re-adjudicating the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Banking Court have the jurisdiction to restore a suit dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Is an order dismissing a suit for non-prosecution considered a 'final order' under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the restoration of a suit dismissed for non-prosecution by a Banking Court amount to a review barred by Section 27 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nirvana House Day Spa and Saloon vs Additional Director, Intelligence and Investigation and others2018 PTD 459 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nice 'N' Easy Fashion (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Standard2018 CLD 1036 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Metro Petroleum Services through Proprietor and 3 others vs Askari Bank Limited through Branch Manager and 4 others2018 CLD 564 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mehr Dastgir Textile Mills Ltd. through Chief Executive vs Public2017 CLD 541 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Imran Ali Lubricants through Managing Partner vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad and 3 others2018 PTD 1042 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hamza Nasir Wire vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 PTD 1071 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Firzonq Tanneries (Pvt.) Limited and others vs United Bank2018 CLD 1279 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Expeditor International Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Messrs Sitara2018 CLC 994 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs DH Travels vs Commissioner Enforcement and others2018 PTD 657 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Butt Flour Mills through Proprietor vs Government of Punjab2018 CLD 242, 2018 PLJ Lahore 801 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Biotech Energy (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 22018 CLD 383 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Azhar & Co. and others vs National Bank of Pakistan2018 CLD 830 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-04
  Execution First Appealwarrants of arrestjudgment debtorshow cause noticeOrder XXI Rule 37 CPCSection 51 CPCauction of mortgaged propertyexecuting court
  Summary & questions settled

  This Execution First Appeal filed under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 challenged an order of the Banking Court issuing arrest warrants against the judgment-debtors. The decree-holder bank had initially attempted execution via auction of mortgaged property, switched to seeking arrest, abandoned that route to re-attempt auction, and subsequently obtained arrest warrants based solely on an oral statement and reliance on previously issued show cause notices. The High Court held that issuing arrest warrants without issuing a fresh mandatory show cause notice under Order XXI, Rule 37 and Section 51 C.P.C. violates fundamental rights. Previous notices cannot be relied upon in subsequent proceedings as circumstances change over time. Furthermore, coercive measures like arrest cannot be ordered straightway without a written application and clear findings that the judgment-debtor is obstructing execution, absconding, or acting in bad faith, particularly where mortgaged property remains available for auction. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and directed the Banking Court to execute the decree via auction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the issuance of a fresh show cause notice under Order XXI, Rule 37 C.P.C. mandatory before issuing arrest warrants in execution proceedings?
  • Can an executing court rely on previously issued show cause notices when a decree-holder revives execution through arrest after having abandoned it?
  • Can warrants of arrest be issued against a judgment-debtor on an oral request without a written application under Order XXI, Rule 37 C.P.C.?
  • Under what circumstances can an executing court order the arrest and detention of a judgment-debtor under Section 51 and Order XXI, Rule 37 C.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Arbab Cotton Industries and Oil Mills through Partner vs Askari2018 CLD 554 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-07Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ammar Textile (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive vs Khurram2018 MLD 338 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs Amjad Ali Brick-Kiln vs Director-General E.P.A. and another2018 CLD 139 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Al-Sheikh International Kino Factory vs National Bank of Pakistan and another2018 CLD 1181 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Active Apparels International (Pvt.) Ltd. through Manager vs Zahida Manzoor and 2 others2018 PLC 28 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-20
  workmandismissal from servicecharge sheetinquiryback benefitsconstitutional petitionlabour disputemisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, filed by an employer, challenged the concurrent judgments of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and Punjab Labour Court which had accepted the respondent employee's grievance petition and ordered her reinstatement with back benefits following her dismissal for alleged misconduct. The core legal questions involved whether a Quality Control Supervisor falls within the definition of a workman, whether a letter of explanation satisfies the statutory requirement of a formal charge sheet and independent inquiry under Section 15 of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and the entitlement to back benefits. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the nature of duties performed—specifically physical inspection of garments—renders the employee a workman irrespective of designation. The Court held that a letter of explanation cannot substitute for a formal charge sheet and independent inquiry, and failure to produce the foundational complaints vitiates the disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, concurrent factual findings cannot be disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction unless perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the nomenclature of a post is determinative of a person being a workman under labour laws?
  • Can a letter of explanation issued to an employee be legally equated with a formal charge sheet under Section 15 of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Is an employer bound to hold an independent inquiry before dismissing a workman on allegations of misconduct?
  • Whether concurrent findings of labour forums can be interfered with under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court when not proven perverse?
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• MEPCO etc vs M/s Asima Qaiser & Co. etc2019 YLR 316, 2021 [M] C L R 1117, 2018 LHC 1799 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-02Read full judgment →
• Member Residual Properties, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore vs Muhammad Arshad Chaudhary etc2019 [M] C.L.R. 170, 2018 KLR Revenue Cases 94, 2018 LHC 985 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-20Read full judgment →
• Mehmood ul Hassan vs Addl. District Judge, etc2019 CLC 71, 2019 CLC 71, 2018 LHC 2655 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-22Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Anwar through Special Attorney vs Abdul Hanan and 3 others2018 YLR 742 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Ahmad & Mood, etc. vs State etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 629 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-03
  pre-arrest bailcross-firingbelated nominationcontradictory statementsprevious enmityweapon recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Sections 302, 324, 148, 149, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, arising from a cross-firing incident between two unknown groups resulting in murder and injuries. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail given their subsequent nomination through a belated application and contradictions in the statements of injured prosecution witnesses regarding indiscriminate firing and specific role attribution, alongside a history of previous enmity. The court held that the petitioners made out a case for pre-arrest bail as false implication could not be ruled out and recovery of weapons did not necessitate custodial interrogation when petitioners cooperated with the investigation. The court confirmed the ad-interim anticipatory bail, laying down the principle that tentative assessment of contradictory witness statements and the possibility of previous enmity warrant pre-arrest bail, and that grant of pre-arrest bail does not obstruct ongoing investigation or recoveries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted when the accused are not nominated in the FIR and are subsequently implicated through a belated application?
  • Does the necessity of recovering weapons of the offence alone justify the refusal of pre-arrest bail when the accused are cooperating with the investigation?
  • Whether contradictory statements of injured prosecution witnesses regarding indiscriminate firing warrant further inquiry into the guilt of the accused for the purpose of bail?
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• Mehboob-ud-Din,etc vs Mst. Zubaida,etc2020 [M] C L R 499, 2019 MLD 732, 2019 PLJ Lahore 239, 2018 LHC 3056 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-20Read full judgment →
• Mehboob vs State, etcPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 877 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-13
  criminal appealrapedelayed FIRmedical evidenceDNA reportadverse inferencewithholding evidencebenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Layyah, convicting the appellant under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for rape and sentencing him to twenty-five years rigorous imprisonment with a fine. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the ocular account, the unexplained four-day delay in lodging the FIR, the withholding of a material independent witness, the lack of corroborative medical evidence, and the inconclusiveness of the DNA report. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to the unexplained delay in reporting, the absence of supporting medical evidence of violence, the withholding of the independent eye-witness attracting an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and the failure of the vaginal DNA swabs to match the appellant. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and sentence, allowing the appeal and acquitting the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained four-day delay in lodging an FIR for rape is fatal to the prosecution case?
  • What is the legal effect of withholding a natural and independent eye-witness under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Can a conviction for rape be sustained when the medical evidence reveals no marks of violence and the vaginal DNA swabs do not match the accused?
  • Does the absence of grouping of semen stains and inconclusive DNA matching constitute sufficient proof to connect an accused with the crime?
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• Mehar Pervaiz Akhtar vs Director General Excise and Taxation Lahore2018 PLJ Lahore 24 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Meezan Bank Limited vs Rahim Industries, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 1482 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-19Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Nawaz vs The State and others2018 YLR 720 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-23
  jail appealmurderrelated witnessesmotiveweapon recoverymitigating circumstancelife imprisonmentocular account
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Lodhran, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his pregnant wife and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life as Ta'zir with compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The prosecution case rested on an ocular account by the complainant and an eyewitness who was an inmate of the house, supported by medical evidence. The core legal questions involved the credibility of closely related eyewitnesses, the corroborative value of motive regarding a disputed property, and the impact of a doubtful weapon recovery on the conviction and quantum of sentence. The Lahore High Court held that close relationship does not discredit natural eyewitnesses in the absence of enmity, and a flawed weapon recovery serves as a mitigating circumstance to spare the appellant the death penalty while maintaining the conviction for life imprisonment. The court established that minor discrepancies in recovery do not outweigh trustworthy ocular and medical evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an eyewitness can be discarded solely on the ground of a close blood relationship with the deceased?
  • Does a contradiction in the recovery of the crime weapon vitiate the entire prosecution case when supported by reliable ocular and medical evidence?
  • Can an unproved recovery of a weapon of offense serve as a mitigating circumstance to withhold the capital sentence in a murder trial?
  • Whether the natural presence of an inmate eyewitness in the house where the crime occurred is sufficient to establish guilt notwithstanding discrepancies regarding other witnesses?
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• Mazhar Jamil Kalyar vs Habib Bank Limited2018 CLD 1228 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-18Read full judgment →
• Maula Dad and 2 others vs The StatePLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 464, 2018 MLD 1718 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-17
  double murderocular accountmedical corroborationquantum of sentencecapital punishmentimprisonment for lifesudden provocationmurder reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected matters arise from a double murder incident where a father and son were shot dead following a dispute over the installation of a water distribution project. The trial court convicted the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, sentencing them to death, while acquitting a co-accused. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the ocular account, the necessity of corroboration after partial acquittal, and the determination of the quantum of sentence in sudden provocation or situational disputes. The Lahore High Court upheld the convictions, finding the ocular testimony consistent, credible, and corroborated by medical evidence and forensic recovery of weapon casings. However, considering the sudden flare-up over the project inauguration without previous serious enmity, the court altered the death sentence to imprisonment for life, answering the murder reference in the negative. The key principle laid down is that while reliable ocular testimony supported by medical and forensic evidence is sufficient to maintain a murder conviction, courts may lean toward the lesser penalty of life imprisonment rather than capital punishment where the crime arises from a sudden situational confrontation without pre-existing deep-seated enmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ocular account corroborated by medical evidence and forensic recovery is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Can the death sentence be commuted to imprisonment for life when a murder arises from a sudden dispute without pre-existing enmity?
  • Does the acquittal of one co-accused necessitate the rejection of eyewitness testimony against remaining co-accused without independent corroboration?
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• Maula Dad and 2 others vs State and othersPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 464 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-17
  double murderocular accountdeath penalty commutationcriminal appealmedical evidenceforensic corroborationquantum of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentences imposed for the double murder of a father and son. The core legal questions concern the credibility of the ocular account, the sufficiency of corroborative evidence, and the appropriateness of the capital punishment awarded. The Court held that the prosecution’s ocular account was consistent, confidence-inspiring, and fully corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, thereby sustaining the conviction. However, regarding the quantum of sentence, the Court exercised discretion to commute the death penalty to life imprisonment. It reasoned that the incident arose from a sudden dispute over a water project without prior deep-seated enmity, and that the appellants acted under the sway of their father. Applying the principle that courts should prioritize the preservation of human life over capital punishment where circumstances permit, the Court altered the sentence to imprisonment for life, while maintaining the compensation order. The appeal against the acquittal of a co-accused was dismissed, finding no grounds for interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment when the crime arises from a sudden dispute without prior enmity?
  • Is consistent ocular testimony, corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to sentences of life imprisonment?
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• Mat. Sameena Ashfaq Syed Amin Al vs Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and 3 others2018 CLD 475, 2018 PLD Lahore 410 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-08Read full judgment →
• Masood-Ur-Rehman and 2 others vs Evacuee Trust Property Board2018 CLC 1716 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-14Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Pervaiz CH vs Mst. Nausheen Chaudhary, Etc2019 PLD Lahore 102, 2018 LHC 2696 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-15Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Hussain Awan vs Zain Malik2019 PLJ Lahore 270, 2019 YLR 123, 2018 LHC 3108 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-28Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Associates, etc. vs Lahore Development Authority, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 898 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-07Read full judgment →
• Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. vs Environmental Protection Agency, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 448 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-24Read full judgment →
• Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. vs Environmental Protection Agency2018 PLD Lahore 255 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-21Read full judgment →
• Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd vs Environmental Protection Agency2018 PLD Lahore 255, 2018 CLD 153 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-21
  deemed approvalenvironmental impact assessmentsustainable developmentprecautionary principlestatutory timelineenvironmental protection agencyIn Dubio Pro Natura
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stopping the construction of a cement plant expansion on the grounds that the petitioner lacked written environmental approval. The core legal question was the scope and effect of the 'deemed approval' provision under Section 12(4) of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997 when the Agency fails to communicate a decision within the statutory four-month period. The Court held that the deeming provision is mandatory; failure by the Agency to meet the statutory timeline results in a deemed approval of the Environmental Impact Assessment. Consequently, the Agency cannot stop a project solely because written approval was not issued. The Court emphasized the principle of sustainable development and the precautionary principle. While the EIA was deemed approved, the Court applied the principle of In Dubio Pro Natura, directing the petitioner to maintain status quo pending a survey report regarding mining concessions in the Salt Range, effectively balancing economic development with environmental protection by ensuring that deemed approval does not override necessary environmental safeguards in uncertain circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the Environmental Protection Agency to communicate a decision on an Environmental Impact Assessment within the statutory four-month period result in a deemed approval of the project?
  • Can the Environmental Protection Agency stop a project solely on the ground that no written environmental approval was granted after the statutory period for review has expired?
  • What is the scope of the 'deemed approval' provision under Section 12(4) of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997?
  • Does the principle of 'In Dubio Pro Natura' allow a court to impose a status quo order on a project that has otherwise received deemed approval under the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997?
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• Malik Zahoor Ul Hassan vs Appellate Tribunal, Multan and 2 others2018 MLD 1618 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-12Read full judgment →
• Malik Zaheer Arshad vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 PLD Lahore 19 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-29Read full judgment →
• Malik Taj Ahmad vs Malik Muhammad Nawaz, Member of Provincial2018 PLD Lahore 723 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-28Read full judgment →
• Malik Taj Ahmad vs Malik Muhammad Nawaz, Member of Provincial2018 PLD Lahore 723, 2018 LHC 1367 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-28Read full judgment →
• Malik Rizwan Shaukat vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 39 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-29
  post-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustprohibitory clausedelay in FIRdocumentary evidencemisappropriation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking post-arrest bail for the petitioner, who was accused of criminal breach of trust under Section 408, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for allegedly misappropriating Rs. 20 Lacs from his employer. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the offence, the significant delay in lodging the First Information Report, and the evidentiary status of the case. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. The Court observed that the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court noted a four-year delay in reporting the incident, which cast doubt on the veracity of the allegations, and emphasized that the prosecution's case relied on documentary evidence already collected by the investigating officer. Consequently, the Court granted post-arrest bail, establishing that where an offence falls outside the prohibitory clause and the prosecution's case is primarily documentary, continued incarceration serves no useful purpose.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail if the alleged offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a significant, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR cast doubt on the veracity of the prosecution's allegations?
  • Should bail be granted when the prosecution's case relies entirely on documentary evidence already in the possession of the investigating officer?
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• Malik Rab Nawaz (deceased) through L.Rs vs Mst. Saban2019 MLD 1, 2019 PLJ Lahore 468, 2018 LHC 3072 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-24Read full judgment →