Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 79,348 judgments in total from the Lahore High Court.

• Mst. Zubaida. Bibi vs Incharge Dar-Ul-AmanK.L.R. 1996 Criminal Cases 602 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubaida Bibi vs Incharge, Darulamaan, Lahore1996 PLD Lahore 339 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zarina vs The State1996 MLD 1055 · Lahore High Court · 1995-03-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zarina Bibi and others vs S.H.O., Police Station Nawan Shehar, Tehsil1996 MLD 1028 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zarina Bibi And Others vs S.H.O., Police Station Nawan Shehar, Tehsil Kabfrwala, District Khanewal And Other1996 MLD 1028 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zareena Bibi and 5 others vs The State and anothers1996 MLD 1300 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zareena Bibi And 5 Others vs The State And Another1996 MLD 1300 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zahooran Bibi vs S.H.O., Police Station City Vehari1996 MLD 1035 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Waziran alias Faiq Elahi vs Abdul Sattar and others1996 CLC 682 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tahira Parveen vs District Education Officer (Women), .1996 PLC (C.S.) 939 · Lahore High Court · 1996-02-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sosan vs The State1996 P Cr. L J 291 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sharifan Bibi and others vs Member, Board of Revenue, Lahore and others1996 CLC 644 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-23
  revisional jurisdictionBoard of Revenuemutation proceedingsconstitutional petitionland revenuejurisdiction of Commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the revisional order of the Member, Board of Revenue, which set aside a mutation sanctioned in favor of the petitioner's predecessor. The core legal questions involved the competence of the Board of Revenue to exercise revisional jurisdiction after the Commissioner had already exercised similar powers under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, and whether a constitutional petition is maintainable in mutation proceedings. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the Board of Revenue possesses vast and wide revisional powers under section 164 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 and sections 4 and 5 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957, which are not restricted by any statutory bar preventing revision of an order passed by the Commissioner. The key principle laid down is that the Board of Revenue's revisional jurisdiction under the Punjab land revenue framework is not barred even if the Commissioner has exercised revisional powers, and ordinarily, constitutional petitions are not maintainable in matters arising out of mutation proceedings where parties can establish their title before a civil court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Board of Revenue can exercise revisional jurisdiction under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 after the Commissioner has already exercised revisional powers?
  • Does section 164 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 contain any bar preventing the Board of Revenue from revising an order passed in revision by the Commissioner?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained in matters arising out of proceedings for mutation?
  • Whether questions of title and the fabrication of documents like Fard Taqseem can be decided within constitutional jurisdiction arising from mutation proceedings?
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• Mst. Shahnaz Akhtar vs Tahir Islam1996 P Cr. L J 1278 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina vs The State1996 P Cr. L J 1621 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina vs S.H.O. Police Station Basti Malook and others1996 P Cr. L J 1809 · Lahore High Court · 1996-07-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakhia Kausar vs The State1996 P Cr. L J 286 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rubia Jilani vs Raja Zahoor Akhtar and 2 others1996 CLC 1603 · Lahore High Court · 1996-04-08
  child custodywelfare of the minorguardianshipconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factGuardians and Wards Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the concurrent orders of the Guardian Judge and the Additional District Judge, which denied the petitioner-mother’s application for the custody of her three minor sons. The core legal question concerned whether the welfare of the minors necessitated transferring their custody from the respondent-father to the mother. The High Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, holding that the welfare of the minors was paramount and was best served by maintaining their current educational stability at a reputable institution where they resided together. The Court emphasized that in guardianship matters, the welfare of the minor, as defined under Section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890, is the primary consideration. Furthermore, the Court established that it would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in constitutional jurisdiction unless the lower courts acted without jurisdiction or in violation of law. Additionally, the Court noted that the petitioner could not resile from a previous court-recorded agreement regarding custody, and that keeping siblings together in a stable environment is generally desirable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding child custody in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is the welfare of the minor the paramount consideration in determining custody disputes under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  • Can a parent resile from a court-recorded agreement regarding the custody of minors?
  • Is it a valid ground to deny custody transfer if the minors are currently receiving stable education and living together in a reputable institution?
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• Mst. Razia Ali vs Riaz. Etc.K.L.R. 1996 Criminal Cases 641 · Lahore High Court · 1994-07-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rafique Begum and anothers vs Muhammad Rafique and 5 others1996 CLC 667 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen Akhtar vs Director, F.I.A., Lahore and 5 others1996 PLD Lahore 328 · Lahore High Court · 1995-12-04
  constitutional petitionjurisdictioncause of actionPrincipal SeatHigh Court Benchesillegal detentionlaw reforms appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 arises from an order of a learned Single Judge returning a constitutional petition for presentation before the Rawalpindi Bench. The appellant had challenged her husband's arrest in Lahore by federal investigating authorities acting on warrants from Islamabad, alongside extradition proceedings to the United States. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition challenging detention and arrest can be maintained at the Principal Seat of the Lahore High Court when the arrest occurred within its territorial jurisdiction, notwithstanding that warrants originated from Islamabad. The Lahore High Court held that the distribution of cases between the Principal Seat and benches is a matter of administrative convenience rather than jurisdiction, and since part of the cause of action arose where the arrest took place, the petition at the Principal Seat was competent. The Court laid down the principle that the place of arrest gives rise to a part of the cause of action, enabling a detainee to challenge custody at that location regardless of subsequent removal or the place where warrants were issued.

  Questions settled

  • Does a part of the cause of action arise at the place where a person is taken into custody?
  • Whether a constitutional petition challenging detention can be filed at the Principal Seat of the High Court if the arrest occurred within its territorial limits, notwithstanding that the arrest warrants were issued elsewhere?
  • Is the allocation of cases between the Principal Seat and Benches of the High Court a matter of jurisdiction or administrative convenience?
  • Does a judge of the High Court exercise jurisdiction over the entire province regardless of the establishment of benches?
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• Mst. Naziran Bibi vs The State1996 P Cr. L J 1903 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nauras Bibi alias Mst. Fatima Bibi vs The State1996 P Cr. L J 1749 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasim Akhtar vs The State and others1996 P Cr. L J 560 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-12
  Section 145 proceedingsrestoration of possessionbreach of peacecriminal revisionjurisdiction of magistratetwo-month limitationcivil suit pendency
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged an order by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur, which set aside a Magistrate's order restoring possession of a property to the petitioner under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions were whether a Magistrate can order restoration of possession when dispossession occurred more than two months prior to the application, and whether the pendency of a civil suit regarding the same property bars Section 145 proceedings. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Magistrate failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of establishing a likelihood of a breach of peace. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the proviso to Section 145(4) restricts the Magistrate's power to restore possession to instances where dispossession occurred within two months of the initial order. The Court clarified that while the pendency of a civil suit does not automatically oust a Magistrate's jurisdiction, Section 145 proceedings are intended only to maintain the status quo until a civil court of competent jurisdiction adjudicates the title.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a civil suit regarding the same subject matter automatically oust the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to initiate proceedings under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a Magistrate required to record a speaking order regarding the likelihood of a breach of peace as a condition precedent for exercising jurisdiction under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a Magistrate order the restoration of possession under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the dispossession occurred more than two months prior to the initial order?
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• Mst. Naseem Akhtar And Another vs The State1996 MLD 616 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nargis Khatoon vs Director General, Pakistan Broadcasting Etc.(K.L.R. 1996 Labour & Service 167) · Lahore High Court · 1993-06-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mukhtiar Bibi and another vs S.H.O., Police Station Nawan Shehr, Tehsil Kabirwala, District Khanewal and 3 others1996 MLD 874 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mukhtar Bibi vs S.H.O., Police Station Nawan Shehr, Tehsil1996 MLD 1309 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-06Read full judgment →
• Mst. Maryam vs District Magistrate/Controlling Authority,1996 PLD Lahore 336 · Lahore High Court · 1996-02-04
  constitutional petitionrevisional jurisdictioneffective talaqarbitration councilmuslim family lawsdivorce certificatejurisdiction of district magistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed under the Constitution of Pakistan challenges an order passed by the District Magistrate in exercise of revisional jurisdiction setting aside a certificate of effectiveness of Talaq issued by the Chairman of the Arbitration Council. The core legal question was whether the District Magistrate possessed revisional jurisdiction under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 to entertain a revision against the certification of a divorce becoming effective. The Lahore High Court held that revision is a creature of statute and since the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 does not explicitly provide for a revisional remedy against an order or certificate declaring a Talaq effective under Section 7, the District Magistrate acted without lawful authority in entertaining the revision. The Court established the principle that revisional jurisdiction cannot be presumed or inferred unless expressly provided by statute, and since Section 7 orders are not amenable to revision, any such interference is illegal and void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the District Magistrate has revisional jurisdiction to set aside a certificate of effectiveness of Talaq issued by the Chairman of the Arbitration Council under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • Is revision against an order or certificate under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 provided under the law?
  • Can revisional jurisdiction be presumed or inferred in the absence of explicit statutory provision?
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• Mst. Manzoor Elahi vs Ch. Muhammad Anwar, S.H.O., Police Station1996 P Cr. L J 975 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Litafat Nisreen vs Imtiaz Ali Shah1996 CLC 512 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khurshid Begum vs Dr. Khalid Masood and another1996 CLC 646 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kausar Bibi vs The Deputy Inspectorgeneral of Police, Crimes1996 P Cr. L J 124 · Lahore High Court · 1995-08-21
  criminal procedurecognizance of offencedischarge of accusedpolice investigationwrit jurisdictionjudicial independenceOffence of Zina
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police directing the discharge of an accused in a criminal case after the Additional Sessions Judge had already taken cognizance and framed charges under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the police retain the authority to conduct further investigation and seek the discharge of an accused under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, after the trial court has formally taken cognizance and framed charges. The Court held that such an administrative order is illegal and inoperative. The ratio established is that once a trial court has taken cognizance and framed charges, the police are divested of the power to seek the discharge of an accused through further investigation. The Court emphasized that allowing such executive interference would create judicial anarchy. Consequently, the impugned order was quashed, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the trial on its merits, as the judicial process cannot be preempted by subsequent police opinions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the police conduct further investigation and seek the discharge of an accused after a court has taken cognizance and framed charges?
  • Does an administrative order by a police officer to discharge an accused supersede the judicial process once the trial court has taken cognizance?
  • Is it legally permissible for the police to submit a fresh report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after the trial court has already framed charges against the accused?
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• Mst. Kariz Bibi vs The StateK.L.R. 1996 Criminal Cases 647 · Lahore High Court · 1994-09-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Janno N Mai vs Station House Officer, Police Station Saddar1996 P Cr. L J 1608 · Lahore High Court · 1996-06-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jamila Akhtar and others vs Custodian, Evacuee Property and others1996 PLD Lahore 149 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-22
  court auctionsale certificateevacuee propertyadverse possessiondelivery of possessionlimitation actintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two intra-court appeals arising from a single judgment of a learned Single Judge regarding the evacuee status of certain properties purchased at a court auction prior to partition by a person who subsequently embraced Islam and did not migrate. The core legal question was whether an auction-purchaser's title is perfected upon the issuance of a sale certificate regardless of taking formal delivery of possession through the executing court, and whether the judgment-debtors' continued possession ripened into ownership by adverse possession, thereby rendering the property evacuee. The Lahore High Court held that title passes to the auction-purchaser upon the issuance of the sale certificate under Order XXI Rule 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and that delivery of possession is not a condition precedent to perfecting title. The Court further held that mere length of possession by a judgment-debtor without proof of a hostile and adverse assertion of title does not extinguish the owner's title under the Limitation Act 1908, nor does it classify the property as evacuee property under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957. Consequently, the appellants' appeal was allowed and the respondents' appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a sale certificate under Order XXI Rule 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 complete the title of an auction-purchaser independently of taking formal delivery of possession?
  • Does the mere continued possession of a judgment-debtor for a long duration amount to adverse possession sufficient to extinguish the owner's title under the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Whether property purchased at a court auction prior to independence by a local resident who later embraced Islam becomes evacuee property due to a failure to secure formal possession through the executing court?
  • Which Article of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to a suit or claim concerning immovable property where the plaintiff has not been dispossessed or discontinued possession?
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• Mst. Ismat Mahmood and others vs Senior Superintendent of Police, Khushab and others1996 PLD Lahore 275 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ishrat Bibi vs S.H .0.1996 P Cr. L J 1019 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Iqbal Begum and 10 others vs Assistant1996 CLC 772 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghazala Begum and others vs The District Magistrate, Khanewal1996 P Cr. L J 389 · Lahore High Court · 1995-12-06
  exhumationpost-mortem examinationjudicial inquirycriminal procedurewrit petitioncause of death
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the order of the District Magistrate, Khanewal, directing the exhumation of the dead body of Abdul Latif for a post-mortem examination following allegations of murder by the respondent. The petitioners contended that the exhumation order was unlawful, arguing that they were not properly associated with the initial inquiry, that the inquiry lacked a judicial character, that a second inquiry was redundant under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that the significant time lapse rendered the exhumation futile. The Lahore High Court held that the initial inquiry was indeed judicial and that the petitioners were sufficiently associated with the proceedings. Regarding the time limit, the Court affirmed that there is no statutory time limit for the disinterment of a body to ascertain the cause of death, citing medical jurisprudence and precedent. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and directed the Magistrate to proceed with the exhumation and post-mortem examination within a fortnight, ensuring the presence of both the petitioners and the complainant to ensure procedural fairness.

  Questions settled

  • Is there a fixed time limit under the law for the disinterment of a dead body to ascertain the cause of death?
  • Does the failure to associate all accused persons with an inquiry prior to exhumation render the exhumation order unlawful?
  • Is a judicial inquiry a condition precedent for the exhumation of a dead body?
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• Mst. Farhat Iqbal and others vs Muhammad Shafique and others1996 PLD Lahore 383 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dilshad Akhtar and another vs The State and another1996 PLD Lahore 145 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-18
  quashment of FIRconstitutional jurisdictionsui jurismedical age assessmentmala fide investigationfundamental rightsOffence of Zina
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for the quashment of an F.I.R. registered under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 concerns allegations of abduction for the purpose of Zina. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings where the alleged abductee, a sui juris adult, asserts a lawful marriage and denies the abduction, and where the investigation indicates no offence is made out. The Court held that the F.I.R. should be quashed, finding that the petitioner was an adult based on medical evidence, which it preferred over a school certificate. The Court determined that the petitioners' marriage was valid and that continuing the investigation would constitute harassment and a mala fide exercise of power. The key principle laid down is that the High Court has the authority under its constitutional jurisdiction to quash criminal investigations that infringe upon fundamental rights, violate the law, or are motivated by mala fide intentions, particularly when the continuation of such proceedings serves no purpose and constitutes harassment.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash a criminal investigation under its constitutional jurisdiction if it is found to be mala fide or harassing?
  • Should a medical radiological report regarding age be preferred over a School Leaving Certificate in criminal proceedings?
  • Does the High Court have the power to intervene in a criminal investigation if it infringes upon the fundamental rights of the citizens?
  • Is a criminal investigation liable to be quashed if the alleged victim is a sui juris adult who denies the abduction and asserts a lawful marriage?
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• Mst. Daulat Bibi and others vs Province of Punjab through District1996 PLD Lahore 171 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bhirawan vs Ladha And Other(KLR 1996 Revenue Cases 162) · Lahore High Court · 1996-04-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Basri Through L.Rs. And Others vs Abdul Hamid Through L.Rs. And Other1996 MLD 1123 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Basri through L.Rs, and others vs Abdul Hamid through L.Rs, and others1996 MLD 1123 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Asia vs The State1996 PLD Lahore 45 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Akbar Jan and 6 others vs Imtiaz Qayyum Khan and 8 others1996 MLD 242 · Lahore High Court · 1995-08-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Akbar Jan And 6 Others vs Imt1az Qayyum Khan And 8 Other1996 MLD 242 · Lahore High Court · 1995-08-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aisha Bibi vs Mst. Safia Begum and anothers1996 MLD 1169 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aisha Bibi vs Mst. Safia Begum And Another1996 MLD 1169 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-01Read full judgment →
• Mst Bushra vs The StateK.L.R. 1996 Criminal Cases 639 · Lahore High Court · 1994-07-10Read full judgment →
• Ms. Shema Farooq vs Chairman, Union Committee, Ward No.4, Lahore1996 CLC 673 · Lahore High Court · 1995-03-07
  constitutional petitiondissolution of marriagetalaqdelegated right of divorcearbitration counciljurisdictionmuslim family laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the order of the Chairman, Arbitration Council, holding that the notice of Talaq served by the petitioner was ineffective and invalid. The petitioner, having been delegated the right of Talaq with a condition in the Nikahnama requiring permission of family elders, dissolved the marriage and issued notice under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The core legal question was whether the Chairman of an Arbitration Council possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity or effectiveness of a Talaq pronounced by a spouse. The Lahore High Court held that the Arbitration Council is constituted solely to effect reconciliation, and the Chairman lacks jurisdiction to determine the validity of a Talaq, which becomes effective by operation of law upon the expiry of ninety days from the notice. The Court ruled that the impugned order was without lawful authority and set it aside, reaffirming that the Chairman cannot assume the role of a Family Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chairman of an Arbitration Council have the jurisdiction in law to adjudicate upon the validity of a Talaq pronounced by a spouse?
  • When does a notice of Talaq served under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 become effective if reconciliation fails?
  • Can the Chairman of an Arbitration Council assume the role of a Family Court to determine whether conditions attached to a delegated right of divorce were fulfilled?
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• Mrs. Zia Farhat And Others vs Presiding Officer, Special Court1996 MLD 680 · Lahore High Court · 1995-03-22Read full judgment →
• Mohkam Din through Legal Heirs and 4 others vs Ghulam Baqir and another1996 CLC 316 · Lahore High Court · 1994-07-21Read full judgment →
• Mitchells. Fruit Farm (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Zila Council, Okara1996 MLD 1617 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-25Read full judgment →
• Mitchell's. Fruit Farm (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Zila Council, Okara1996 MLD 1617 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-25Read full judgment →
• MITCHELL's Fruit Farm vs Zilla Council Okara1996 P.C.T.L.R. 253 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-25Read full judgment →
• Miss Khalida Zafar vs Controller, Nursing Examination and others1996 CLC 1750 · Lahore High Court · 1996-05-16Read full judgment →
• Miss Afshan Amjad vs Vicechancellor, University of the Punjab, Lahore and another1996 CLC 877 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-10Read full judgment →
• Misal Din vs The State1996 PLD Lahore 192 · Lahore High Court · 1995-12-10Read full judgment →
• Mirza Nazeer Ahmad Baig vs Additional District Judge, Kasur and 21996 CLC 1616 · Lahore High Court · 1996-05-15
  writ jurisdictiontentative rentstriking off defencesuppression of material factsclean hands doctrinerent restrictionejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Court, which had directed the petitioner's ejectment for failing to comply with a tentative rent order. The Rent Controller had fixed the monthly rent at Rs. 1,000, and upon the petitioner's failure to deposit the arrears and future rent, his defence was struck off under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The petitioner contended that the rent order was void ab initio due to misreading of the written statement and that he had been ill. The High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable because the petitioner had suppressed the material fact that a previous writ petition challenging the same tentative rent order had been dismissed in limine, thus failing to approach the court with clean hands. Furthermore, on merits, the court held that the petitioner's failure to clearly state the actual rate of rent and his non-compliance with the Rent Controller's order justified the striking off of his defence. The court reaffirmed that illness does not absolve a tenant from the liability to deposit rent, as it can be deposited by others on their behalf.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of a previously dismissed writ petition regarding the same subject matter render a subsequent writ petition non-maintainable?
  • Can a tenant's defence be struck off for non-compliance with a tentative rent order if the tenant claims illness prevented the deposit?
  • Is a tenant required to deposit rent as ordered by a Rent Controller even if they dispute the rate of rent?
  • Can a tenant's illness absolve them from the liability to deposit rent within the time specified by the Rent Controller?
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• Mirza Ghias Beg vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry1996 P Cr. L J 1022 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-05Read full judgment →
• Mirza Fayyaz Baig vs The StateK.L.R. 1996 Criminal Cases 389 · Lahore High Court · 1994-01-24Read full judgment →
• Mirza Farooq Baig vs Abid Rafeeq and others1996 MLD 1339 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-30Read full judgment →
• Mirza Farooq Baig vs Abid Rafeeq And Other1996 MLD 1339 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-30Read full judgment →
• Mirza Book Agency vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Zone-B, Lahore1996 PTD 1123 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-13Read full judgment →
• Mian Tariq Azmat Sheikh vs S.H.O., Police Station F.I.A. (Banking Circle), Ahmed Park, Khanewal Road, Multan and 2 others1996 MLD 1362 · Lahore High Court · 1995-07-24Read full judgment →
• Mian Tariq Azmat Sheikh vs S.H.O., Police Station F.I.A. (Banking Circle), Ahmed Park, Khanewal Road, Multan And 2 Other1996 MLD 1362 · Lahore High Court · 1995-07-24Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Rafiq Saigol vs Bcci and others1996 CLC 1390 · Lahore High Court · 1996-02-19Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Legari, President of Pakistan1996 CLC 1714 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-16
  revisional jurisdictionbanking tribunalfinance leasejurisdiction by consentconstitutional petitionterritorial jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment from the Lahore High Court addresses revision petitions arising from a civil suit for damages, focusing on jurisdictional competence and the propriety of transferring cases between benches. The core legal question centered on whether a single judge of the High Court could entertain and treat revision petitions pending before a Division Bench as applications for review or reconsideration based on statements of counsel and consent. The court held that revision petitions pending before a Division Bench cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn or treated by another single bench without proper assignment, and jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon any court or tribunal by the mere consent of parties. The key principle laid down is that procedural jurisdiction is a matter of law and strict adherence to institutional distribution of work, and consent of parties cannot override statutory bench jurisdictions or estop a party from raising legal objections regarding competence.

  Questions settled

  • Can jurisdiction be conferred upon a court or tribunal by the consent of the parties?
  • Whether a case assigned to a Division Bench can be withdrawn and entrusted to a single bench without proper legal assignment?
  • Does a lease agreement involving motor vehicles constitute 'finance' under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984?
  • Does a Banking Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the existence or otherwise of finance under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984?
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• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs Sardar Far00() Ahmad Khan Leghari1996 PLD Lahore 92 · Lahore High Court · 1995-12-13
  territorial jurisdictionHigh Court Benchesadministrative disciplinejudicial biastransfer applicationcivil revisionLahore High Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a request to entertain revision petitions and a transfer application at the Principal Seat of the Lahore High Court, bypassing the Rawalpindi Bench which has territorial jurisdiction over Islamabad. The core legal question was whether the High Court at its Principal Seat could directly entertain revision petitions against interlocutory orders passed by a subordinate court within the jurisdiction of a Bench, and whether the transfer application was maintainable. The Court held that while the transfer application was maintainable at the Principal Seat under the Lahore High Court (Establishment of Benches) Rules, 1981 and the 1982 Notification, the revision petitions were not. The Court affirmed that matters arising within an area assigned to a Bench must be filed before that Bench, absent exceptional circumstances like those involving personal liberty. Furthermore, allegations of judicial bias must be addressed to the concerned judges directly, as they are the keepers of their own conscience. The principle established is that administrative discipline requires adherence to territorial Bench jurisdiction unless specific exceptions apply.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party bypass the assigned High Court Bench to file revision petitions directly at the Principal Seat?
  • Is a transfer application maintainable at the Principal Seat of the High Court if the subject matter arises within the jurisdiction of a Bench?
  • What is the proper forum for raising allegations of bias against judges of a High Court Bench?
  • Do the Lahore High Court (Establishment of Benches) Rules 1981 require all matters to be filed at the assigned Bench?
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• Mian Miraj Din And Others vs Brothers Steel Mills And Others1996 P.C.T.L.R. 803 · Lahore High Court · 1994-10-06Read full judgment →
• Mian Miraj Din And Other vs Brother Steel Mills And Other(PTCL 1996 CL. 262) · Lahore High Court · 1994-10-06Read full judgment →
• Mian Iftikhar Ahmad Sukhera vs Munawar Hussain Shah, M.I.C. Illaqa1996 P Cr. L J 444 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-31Read full judgment →
• Mian Atta Ullah vs Lahore Development Authority Tribunal and 51996 CLC 1943 · Lahore High Court · 1995-12-06
  land acquisitionreference to courtlimitation periodlocus poenitentiaecompensationLDA Tribunalconsent decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Lahore High Court addresses intra-court appeals concerning the acquisition of property located at Upper Mall, Lahore. The core legal questions involved the legality of fresh acquisition proceedings, the limitation period for making a reference under the Land Acquisition Act, the jurisdiction of the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) Tribunal, and the validity of a consent-based order regarding compensation apportionment. The Court held that the initial acquisition proceedings were abandoned and converted into an acquisition by agreement following a solemn undertaking given to the appellant by the Governor of Punjab, rendering the subsequent unilateral withdrawal via notification unlawful under the doctrine of locus poenitentiae. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act must be brought within the strict maximum limitation period of six months from the date of the award, and the LDA Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain a belated reference filed years later. The key principle laid down is that statutory limitation periods for land acquisition references are mandatory, orders based on collusive admissions lack legal efficacy, and the State is bound under law and equity to honour solemn agreements regarding compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the State or acquiring authorities can unilaterally withdraw fresh acquisition proceedings initiated pursuant to an agreement with a property owner?
  • What is the maximum period of limitation for making a reference to the court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 where the applicant was not present at the time of the award?
  • Does section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 confer a substantive right on a private party to demand a reference as a matter of right?
  • Whether a tribunal or court order passed mechanically on the basis of a collusive admission or concession has independent legal efficacy?
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• Mian Abbas Ahmad vs The State1996 P Cr. L J 1731 · Lahore High Court · 1995-07-25Read full judgment →
• Mews Sunrise Textiles Limited and others vs Mashreq Bank PSC and others1996 PLD Lahore 1 · Lahore High Court · 1995-06-28
  Intra-Court AppealCompany JudgeCompanies OrdinanceOriginal Civil JurisdictionAppellate ForumWinding-up proceedingsLaw Reforms Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of Intra-Court Appeals (ICAs) against orders passed by a Company Judge under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, specifically in instances where no winding-up order has been issued. The core legal question is whether such appeals lie before a Division Bench of the High Court or the Supreme Court. The Court held that the jurisdiction exercised by a Company Judge under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, possesses the attributes of original civil jurisdiction. Consequently, orders passed by the Company Judge, where the company has not been wound up, are appealable before a Division Bench of the High Court under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The Court established the principle that the phrases 'same manner' and 'same conditions' in Section 10(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, refer to procedural requirements such as limitation and court fees, rather than the appellate forum. The legislative intent of Section 10(1) was to designate the Supreme Court as the appellate forum only for winding-up orders, leaving the High Court's appellate jurisdiction intact for other interlocutory orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Intra-Court Appeal lie against an order passed by a Company Judge under Section 10(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, where no winding-up order has been passed?
  • Does the jurisdiction of a Company Judge under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, constitute original civil jurisdiction?
  • Do the phrases 'same manner' and 'same conditions' in Section 10(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, determine the appellate forum for orders passed by a Company Judge?
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• Metropolitan Corporation, Lahore vs Imtiaz Hussain Kazmi1996 PLD Lahore 499 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-29
  withholding of salaryfundamental rightsright to lifedignity of manlocal council servantservice without salaryintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves Intra-Court Appeals arising from a consolidated judgment directing the Metropolitan Corporation, Lahore, to pay salaries to school teachers who had been performing duties for several years despite a recruitment ban. The core legal question was whether an employer can withhold salaries of employees who have been continuously performing their duties, and whether such withholding violates fundamental rights. The Court held that salary is not a bounty of the State but a rightful due for services rendered. It ruled that where employees have performed duties without hindrance, the employer cannot withhold remuneration. The Court further held that non-payment of salary to employees who are actively working constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights to life and dignity under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, as it deprives individuals of the means to sustain a qualitative life and maintain human dignity. The Court established that in such circumstances, regularization of appointment may be presumed if the government fails to take a positive decision within a reasonable time.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer withhold the salary of an employee who is continuously performing their duties?
  • Does the non-payment of salary to an employee violate the fundamental rights to life and dignity under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the regularization of an appointment be presumed if the government fails to take a decision within a reasonable period?
  • Is salary considered a bounty of the State or a rightful due for services rendered?
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• Messrs United Bank Limited vs Flora Textiles Limited and 6 others1996 PLD Lahore 333 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs United Bank Limited vs Bashir Engineering Industries And Other1996 MLD 729 · Lahore High Court · 1995-06-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sameer Electronics vs Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Circle-10, Zone 'A' Lahore1996 PTD 36 · Lahore High Court · 1995-05-24
  Income tax assessmentReopening of assessmentConstitutional jurisdictionAlternative adequate remedyIncome Tax OrdinanceFactual controversyWrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  Through Writ Petitions Nos.6453/95, 6454/95 and 6455/95, the petitioner challenged the issuance of notices under Section 65, 61, and 58(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 for the assessment years 1991-92, 1992-93, and 1993-94, contending that the reopening of assessment based on previously used information amounted to a change of opinion and was illegal. The core legal questions involved whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against a notice issued under the Income Tax Ordinance when alternative statutory remedies exist, and whether factual controversies regarding concealed lines of business can be resolved in constitutional jurisdiction. The Lahore High Court held that the Income Tax Ordinance is a complete code providing adequate remedies of appeal and revision, that each assessment year is separate, and that disputed questions of fact cannot be adjudicated under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The key principles laid down are that writ petitions cannot be used to circumvent the provisions of a fiscal statute, and that constitutional jurisdiction will not be exercised where alternative statutory remedies are available and factual controversies are involved.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained against a notice issued under the Income Tax Ordinance when adequate statutory remedies of appeal and revision are available?
  • Whether factual controversies regarding concealed business income and the release of films can be resolved in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Does the issuance of a notice for a subsequent assessment year based on new information constitute a change of opinion if similar information was considered in past years?
  • Whether a writ petition can be filed to circumvent the provisions of a complete code such as the Income Tax Ordinance?
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• Messrs Rijaz (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive Riaz A. Gul, Lahore vs The Wealth Tax Officer, Circle III, Lahore and another1996 PTD (Trib.) 489 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-27
  wealth taxassetsclarificatory amendmentretrospective operationstatutory interpretationdeclaratory actimmovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of three writ petitions involving a common question regarding the levy of wealth tax on buildings owned by companies incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The petitioners sought refunds of wealth tax paid on buildings after the Supreme Court interpreted section 2(e)(ii) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963, in B.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd. v. Wealth Tax Officer, holding that only immovable properties held for the business of construction and sale or letting out were taxable assets. Subsequently, the Legislature amended the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 through the Finance Act, 1991 by adding an explanation to section 2 to clarify the definition of 'assets' to include immovable properties held for letting out or business of letting out. The Lahore High Court held that the explanation was clarificatory and declaratory in nature, intended to remove doubts and legislative ambiguity, and therefore operated retrospectively. The Court concluded that the legislature possesses the power to legislate retrospectively, and clarificatory amendments apply retroactively to set aside judicial interpretations, thereby dismissing the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an explanation added to a statute through an amendment can be applied retrospectively?
  • Does a clarificatory or declaratory legislative amendment have retrospective effect to resolve judicial interpretations?
  • Whether immovable properties held by a company constitute assets under the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 for the levy of wealth tax?
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• Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif vs The StateK.L.R. 1996 Criminal Cases 300 · Lahore High Court · 1996-04-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Electric Company (Pvt.) Ltd., Gujranwala vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujranwala Zone, Gujranwala1996 PTD 901 · Lahore High Court · 1996-03-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Muhammad Safdar & Company through Muhammad Safdar Sole1996 PLD Lahore 22 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-10
  auction leasecontract executionlocal governmentcross-casescounter-versionpreliminary inquiryconstitutional petitionprivate complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two consolidated writ petitions arising from a public auction for leasing out goods exit tax collection rights of Zila Council, Okara, and a criminal constitutional petition involving cross-cases of murder and private complaints. In the first matter, the Lahore High Court examined the validity of an auction confirmation and the necessity of executing a formal contract under local government laws. The Court held that the Minister for Local Government properly intervened upon discovering contractor pooling, and that under Section 39 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 and relevant lease rules, no lease becomes operative or binding without a formal written contract executed between the parties. Consequently, the Court set aside the unauthorized bid confirmation and ordered a fresh auction based on a higher financial baseline. In the second incorporated matter, the Court reiterated the fundamental criminal jurisprudence principle that cross-cases containing counter-versions of the same incident between the same parties must be tried together by the same court simultaneously. The Court held that lower forums committed legal errors in dismissing a private complaint during a preliminary inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and interfered under constitutional jurisdiction to restore the complaint for a joint trial.

  Questions settled

  • Is a formal written contract mandatory under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 before a lease or tax collection right becomes operative?
  • Can a government minister or authority direct a fresh auction upon discovering contractor pooling that causes financial loss to a local council?
  • Must cross-cases containing counter-versions of the same incident between the same parties be tried together by a single court?
  • What is the distinction in the burden of proof and judicial approach between a preliminary inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and a full regular trial?
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• Messrs Millat Tractors Limited through General Manager, Lahore vs Punjab Labour Court No, 3, Lahore and 2 others1996 PLC 79 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. vs Central Board of Revenue1996 PTD 238 · Lahore High Court · 1995-01-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Karim Aziz Industries Limited, Hasanabad vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi1996 PTD 1192 · Lahore High Court · 1995-02-28Read full judgment →
• Moqueem Hassan vs Member Judicial-III/ Notified Officer, Board of2025 LHC 5722 · Lahore High Court · 2025-09-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Gulzar & Companys vs The Town Committee And Other1996 MLD 370 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Flying Board Paper Products Ltd. vs Messrs Lab. Aids1996 MLD 1238 · Lahore High Court · 1995-11-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Flying Board and Paper Products vs Central Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others1996 PLD Lahore 718 · Lahore High Court · 1996-08-28
  regulatory dutysales tax exemptioncustoms dutyvested rightsretrospective taxationpromissory estoppelimport contractsletter of credit
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Lahore High Court addresses a batch of constitutional petitions challenging the imposition of regulatory duty on imported goods via Notification No. 1050(I)/95 dated 29-10-1995, and the withdrawal of sales tax exemptions through notifications dated 4-4-1996. The core legal questions involve the validity of imposing regulatory duty during the currency of earlier exemption-granting notifications, the applicability of such duties to goods contracted or imported prior to the notifications, and the retrospective withdrawal of sales tax exemptions. The Court held that regulatory duty is essentially an additional customs charge and cannot be claimed if an exemption-granting notification is still holding the field, until expressly rescinded. Furthermore, the regulatory duty notification cannot apply to goods that had already entered the territorial waters of Pakistan before its issuance, though mere conclusion of contracts or opening of letters of credit does not exempt importers due to section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969. Regarding sales tax, the Court held that in the absence of a provision parallel to section 31-A in the Sales Tax Act, accrued vested rights on concluded contracts or imports cannot be retrospectively destroyed by executive withdrawal of exemptions. The key principles established relate to the nature of regulatory duty as customs duty, the impact of section 31-A on vested rights for customs, and the protection of vested rights against retrospective executive withdrawal of sales tax concessions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether regulatory duty levied under section 18(2) of the Customs Act, 1969 constitutes a customs duty subject to exemptions granted under section 19 of the said Act?
  • Does the mere conclusion of a contract or opening of a letter of credit exempt an importer from the payment of regulatory duty in view of section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can the Federal Government retrospectively withdraw sales tax exemptions to affect concluded contracts and goods already imported in the absence of a provision equivalent to section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • At what point does an imported good become chargeable to customs and regulatory duty under the Customs Act, 1969?
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• Messrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Banking1996 PLD Lahore 672 · Lahore High Court · 1996-07-01
  constitutional petitionbanking tribunalultra viresjudicial independenceright to appealstatutory interpretationbanking lawrecovery of loansjurisdictionfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This Full Bench judgment addresses 607 constitutional petitions challenging the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984. The core questions concerned the maintainability of constitutional petitions during pending Banking Tribunal proceedings, the appealability of Tribunal judgments, and the constitutionality of sections 6 and 9 of the Ordinance. The Court held that petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution are maintainable where a Tribunal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the law is ultra vires. It was decided that Section 4, Section 6(6) as amended by Act VII of 1990, and the first proviso to Section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, are unconstitutional, as they erode judicial independence and violate Articles 2A, 4, 8, 25, and 175 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Banking Tribunals constituted thereunder were declared illegal, and pending cases were ordered to be transferred to Banking Courts established under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, maintainable during the pendency of proceedings before a Banking Tribunal constituted under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984?
  • Can the judgment and decree of a Banking Tribunal be assailed by filing a Constitutional petition notwithstanding that it is appealable before the High Court under section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984?
  • Are sections 6 and 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, discriminatory and ultra vires the Constitution?
  • Is Section 4 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, providing for the establishment of Banking Tribunals, ultra vires the Constitution?
  • Is the condition of depositing the decretal amount under Section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, an unreasonable restriction on the right of appeal?
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• Messrs Capital Farms, Islamabad vs National Development Finance1996 PLD Lahore 99 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-12
  regular first appealthird-party objectoragreement to sellmortgage by deposit of title deedsacquiescencebona fide purchaserexecution proceedingslocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular first appeal before the Lahore High Court arose from execution proceedings where a third-party objector, claiming under an agreement to sell, challenged a banking court decree and subsequent auction of mortgaged property. The core legal questions involved whether a stranger to a suit can challenge a decree by way of appeal, the effect of an agreement to sell against a prior registered mortgage, and whether a party who acquiesces in auction proceedings can subsequently challenge the underlying decree. The Court held that a stranger may file an appeal with leave of the court if adversely affected, but leave will be refused where the appellant lacks a present interest, has acquiesced in the proceedings by participating in the auction, and where an innocent third-party auction-purchaser's rights have intervened. The key principles laid down include that an agreement to sell creates no ownership interest until a sale deed or decree for specific performance is executed, a mortgage certified under section 127 of the Companies Ordinance creates a valid first charge, and a litigant cannot approbate and reprobate by participating in an auction and later challenging the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who is not a party to a suit file an appeal against an adverse judgment and decree?
  • Does an agreement to sell create an actionable right or interest in immovable property prior to the execution of a sale-deed or specific performance decree?
  • Whether a prior registered mortgage or charge takes precedence over a subsequent agreement to sell?
  • Can a party that participates in execution auction proceedings subsequently challenge the validity of the underlying decree?
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• Meraj Din, Etc vs Chief Engineer, EtcK.L.R. 1996 Criminal Cases 64 · Lahore High Court · 1995-04-02Read full judgment →
• Mehraj Din vs Ward Ali1996 MLD 747 · Lahore High Court · 1995-09-24Read full judgment →
• Mehjabeen vs Government of the Punjab And Other(K.L.R. 1996 Labour & Service 136) · Lahore High Court · 1996-06-26Read full judgment →
• Mehinwal Khan vs Khuda Bakhsh Etc.K.L.R. 1996 Civil Cases 322 · Lahore High Court · 1995-09-17Read full judgment →
• Mehinwal Khan vs Khuda Bakhsh EtcK.L.R. 1996 Civil Cases 268 · Lahore High Court · 1995-09-27Read full judgment →
• Mehinwal Khan vs Khuda Bakhsh and others1996 MLD 252 · Lahore High Court · 1995-09-17Read full judgment →