Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 79,348 judgments in total from the Lahore High Court.

• Mohammad Arshad Kalim vs Chairman Town Committee Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 205 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Badar UN Nisa And Others vs Tufail Ahmad1990 CLC 1154 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-17Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ali Patwari vs Consolidation Officer Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Revenue Cases 145 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-12Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Abu Bakar Alvi vs Govt. of Punjab Etc.K.L.R 1990 Labour & Sendees Cases 280 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-19Read full judgment →
• Moeen Ud Din And Another vs Sibghat Ullah And 3 Other1990 CLC 1448 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-19Read full judgment →
• Mljiiammad Ameer Oasmi vs Ch. H1lthammad Azhar1990 CLC 1514 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-06Read full judgment →
• Miss Beatrice Ben. vs Government Of PakistanPTCL 1990 CL. 109 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-10Read full judgment →
• Mirza Zafar Ali And 4 Others vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab And 2 Other1990 CLC 1772 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-21
  constitutional petitionsettlement lawsmukhbari applicationinformer allotmentjurisdiction of revenue boardfinality of ordersevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, interfering with an allotment of land made to the petitioners as informers under settlement laws. The core legal questions involved whether the Member (Revenue) possessed the jurisdiction to review, set aside, or interfere with final orders of notified settlement officers after the repeal of evacuee property laws, and whether an informer-claimant entitled to resumed land could be granted alternative land of their choice when the specific resumed land was unavailable. The Lahore High Court held that after the repeal of settlement laws, settlement authorities and revenue boards had no power of review, appeal, or revision, making the orders of notified officers final and immune to executive interference. The court further held that under Section 14(1-A) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, if the resumed land identified by an informant-claimant is unavailable, they are lawfully entitled to alternative land of their choice. The impugned order was struck down as being without lawful authority and jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Member, Board of Revenue has the jurisdiction to review or set aside final orders passed by notified officers under the settlement laws after their repeal?
  • Is an informer who is also a claimant entitled to the allotment of alternative land of their choice if the specific resumed land identified through information is unavailable?
  • Whether the restoration of a dismissed mukhbari application amounts to an incompetent review after the repeal of evacuee property laws?
  • Does a notified settlement officer have the authority to implement an allotment order by examining the availability of land and granting options in accordance with statutory provisions?
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• Mirza Azam Beg vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1149 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-23Read full judgment →
• Mirza Abdullah Anwar Beg vs Mahmood Hamid Bhatti And 4 Other1990 CLC 897 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-12Read full judgment →
• Mian Tajammal Hussain and 7 others vs Province of Punjab through Secretary, Agriculture Department1990 MLD 570 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-05Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Unees alias Pir Badshah vs Ghulam Hassan1990 MLD 219 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-03Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nawab vs Rifat Sharif and anothers1990 PLD Lahore 19 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-08Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Ismail vs Manzoor Ahmad And Other1990 CLC 1112 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-24
  specific performanceagreement to sellbona fide purchaserburden of proofconstructive noticeimmovable propertyexecution of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular Second Appeal arises from a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property. The core legal question was whether the agreement to sell (Ex.P.1) was duly proved and whether the subsequent purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The trial and appellate courts had dismissed the suit, finding the agreement not proved. The High Court, upon re-evaluating the evidence, held that the plaintiff had successfully discharged the initial onus of proof through the testimony of the scribe and an attesting witness, which remained unrebutted. The Court further held that the subsequent purchaser had constructive and actual notice of the prior contract, as evidenced by his role in drafting the receipt for the remaining consideration and the plaintiff's open possession of the property. Consequently, the Court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts and decreed the suit for specific performance. The key principle laid down is that where a plaintiff discharges the initial burden of proof regarding a document's execution, the onus shifts to the defendant, and a subsequent purchaser with notice of a prior contract cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of property by a prior purchaser constitute sufficient notice to a subsequent purchaser?
  • Can a contract for the sale of immovable property be specifically enforced against a subsequent purchaser who had notice of the prior agreement?
  • What is the standard for proving the execution of a document under Section 67 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • When does the burden of proof shift from the plaintiff to the defendant in a civil suit for specific performance?
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• Mian Muhammad Aslam and 3 others vs The Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhupura and another1990 MLD 1725 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-10Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad and 5 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1331 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-03Read full judgment →
• Mian Abdul Waheed vs Khawaja Muhammad Saeed and another1990 MLD 823 · Lahore High Court · 1987-06-17Read full judgment →
• Mian Abdul Majid vs Govt. of Punjab Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Labour and Service Cases 290 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-14Read full judgment →
• Mian Abdul Majid vs Govt. of Punjab EtcK.L.R.1990 Labour & Services 327 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-14Read full judgment →
• Mian Abdul Majid vs Government of Punjab and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 655 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs.' Basco Enterprisers (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Muhammad Siddique and 21990 MLD 211 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs United Paint House vs The Executive Engineer And 2 Other1990 CLC 1419 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs United Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Iftikhar and Company and 6 others1990 PLD Lahore 111 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-14
  banking recoveryleave to defenddissolution of partnershiplimitation period for mortgageacknowledgment of debtmortgage suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a suit filed under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 by United Bank Limited for the recovery of Rs. 10,13,374.00 against a partnership firm, its partners, and a private limited company. The defendants sought leave to appear and defend the suit, raising contentions that the suit was barred by limitation, that the partnership firm stood dissolved upon the death of a partner under Section 42 of the Partnership Act, 1932, and that the private limited company did not assume the liabilities of the partnership. The Lahore High Court held that the suit was within time due to continuous acknowledgments of debt and because it was governed by the twelve-year limitation period for mortgage suits under Article 132 of the Limitation Act. The Court further held that the dissolution of a partnership upon a partner's death is subject to a contract between the partners or their conduct indicating an intention to continue the business, which was evident here. Finally, the Court found that the private limited company had assumed the liabilities of the firm. Consequently, the petition for leave to defend was dismissed and a preliminary decree was passed in favor of the plaintiff.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death of a partner automatically dissolves a partnership firm under Section 42 of the Partnership Act, 1932?
  • What is the period of limitation for filing a recovery suit based on a mortgage of immovable property?
  • Does a continuous acknowledgment of debt extend the period of limitation in a banking recovery suit?
  • Whether a private limited company formed from a partnership firm inherits the liabilities of the said firm upon conversion?
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• Messrs Sallos (Private) Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1990 PTD 907 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pak Cement Company Limited, Iskandarabad vs Punjab Labour1990 PLC 233 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-03
  probationertermination of serviceindustrial relationsstanding ordersgrievance petitiontermination simpliciterlabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had reinstated a probationer whose services were terminated by the petitioner company. The core legal question was whether a probationer is entitled to the protection of Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and whether the termination order, citing unsuitability for the job, satisfied the requirement of explicitly stating reasons for termination. The Court held that a probationer is a 'workman' under the Ordinance and is entitled to the protections of Standing Order 12(3). However, the Court ruled that the termination order, which stated the employee was assessed and found unsuitable for the job, constituted a valid 'termination simpliciter' and satisfied the requirement of explicitly stating reasons, provided no stigma was attached. The key principle laid down is that while a probationer's services cannot be terminated without a written order explicitly stating reasons, a reference to the probationer's unsuitability for the assigned job constitutes a sufficient reason for termination, absent evidence of mala fides or colorable exercise of power.

  Questions settled

  • Is a probationer considered a 'workman' entitled to the protections of Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Can a probationer file a grievance petition under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
  • Does a termination order citing 'unsuitability for the job' satisfy the requirement of explicitly stating reasons under Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
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• Messrs Nirala & Company vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1990 PTD 24 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nazir Muhammad & Brothers And Others vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan1990 CLC 729 · Lahore High Court
  Regular First Appealrecovery of rentclosure of evidencelease agreementadditional evidenceamendment of written statementcontractual rebatechange of defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal was filed against the judgment and decree of the trial court decreeing the respondent's suit for recovery of outstanding rent arising from a lease agreement for an airport restaurant. The appellants challenged the closure of their evidence under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, argued that the liability was unproven, claimed entitlement to a rent rebate due to business downturn, and moved applications for additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27 and amendment of their written statement under Order VI, Rule 17. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal and applications, holding that closure of evidence was justified as the appellants had neglected multiple opportunities. The court ruled that contractual rent cannot be unilaterally reduced without mutual consent, and the debt was established on admitted lease possession and default. Furthermore, additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill lacunae where documents were intentionally withheld, and an amendment changing the basic nature of the defence with inconsistent pleas is impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court close a party's evidence under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when multiple opportunities have been granted and no sufficient cause is shown for further adjournment?
  • Can a lessee unilaterally claim a reduction or rebate in agreed lease rent without a contractual provision or mutual consent?
  • Can an appellate court allow production of additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to fill gaps where documents were in the party's possession and not produced before the trial court?
  • Whether the principles governing amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply equally to written statements so as to prohibit a complete change in the nature of defence?
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• Messrs Nabi Bakhsh And Another vs Allah Ditta1990 CLC 1443 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-22
  pre-emptionco-sharerkhasra girdawarimutation of inheritancerebuttable presumptiontenancy rightsdeath register
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a suit for pre-emption filed by the respondent against the appellants, who purchased land in District D.G. Khan. The respondent claimed a superior right of pre-emption based on co-ownership and relationship. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the lower appellate court reversed this decision. The core legal questions were whether the appellants, as vendees, could defend the suit based on their status as tenants, and whether the respondent had successfully proven his status as a co-sharer in the khata. Upon review, the High Court held that the respondent could not challenge the appellants' status as tenants, as he himself relied on the revenue records (khasra girdawari) confirming such tenancy. Furthermore, the Court found that the respondent's evidence regarding his status as a co-sharer was fabricated, as the death certificate relied upon was contradicted by the mutation of inheritance and the testimony of the deceased's widow. Consequently, the Court set aside the appellate decree, restored the trial court's judgment, and dismissed the pre-emption suit, reaffirming that rebuttable presumptions of truth in official records can be displaced by contradictory evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who relies on revenue records to establish a claim subsequently challenge the veracity of those same records?
  • Is a presumption of truth attached to an entry in a Death Register absolute or rebuttable?
  • Does the status of a vendee as a tenant provide a valid defense against a suit for pre-emption?
  • Can a court dismiss a pre-emption suit where the plaintiff's evidence regarding his status as a co-sharer is found to be fabricated and contradictory?
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• Messrs Munkoc Corporation vs Province of Punjab And 6Thers S1990 CLC 1791 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-10
  cancellation of allotmentautomatic cancellationnatural justiceaudi alteram partemre-allotmentindustrial plotwrit petition maintainabilityrestoration of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional petition was filed by the petitioner challenging an order dated 10-12-1985, which re-allotted Plot No. 130/3 in Township Scheme, Lahore to respondent No. 4, executed an agreement, and transferred possession, seeking a declaration of illegality and restoration of possession. The core legal questions were whether an allotment of an industrial plot could be cancelled automatically due to alleged default in payment and construction, whether cancellation without a specific order and without affording a hearing was valid, and whether the writ petition was maintainable despite a pending civil suit regarding encroachment. The Lahore High Court held that the allotment agreement and terms of allotment did not permit automatic cancellation; a formal order by the competent authority after giving the allottee a fair hearing was mandatory. Because the petitioner's allotment was never legally cancelled, the plot was not available for re-allotment. The petition was allowed with costs, declaring all actions in favour of respondent No. 4 void and directing restoration of possession to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allotment of an industrial plot be automatically cancelled under the terms and conditions of allotment without a formal order passed by the competent authority?
  • Whether the cancellation of an allotment and subsequent re-allotment of a plot without providing an opportunity of hearing to the original allottee violates the principles of natural justice?
  • Is a constitutional writ petition maintainable to challenge the validity of an allotment's cancellation where a civil suit between the parties regarding an encroachment issue is also pending?
  • Can a statutory authority review an earlier order in the absence of an express statutory provision conferring powers of review?
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• Messrs Lahore Art Press through its Proprietor, Muhammad Mohsin.and another vs National Bank of Pakistan, Anarkali Branch, Lahore1990 PLD Lahore 300 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-03
  ex parte decreesufficient causelimitation periodcivil revisionservice of summonsgross negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a suit filed by the respondent bank against the petitioners, which resulted in an ex parte decree after the petitioners failed to file a written statement or appear in court. The petitioners' subsequent application to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed by the trial court and the appellate court on grounds of insufficient cause and limitation. The core legal questions were whether the petitioners demonstrated sufficient cause for their absence and whether their application to set aside the ex parte decree was time-barred. The High Court held that the petitioners failed to prove sufficient cause, noting that the claim regarding their counsel's clerk failing to inform them was unsupported by evidence. Furthermore, the Court held that the application was time-barred under Article 164 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as the limitation period of 30 days commenced from the date of the decree, given that the petitioners were duly served with summonses. The Court affirmed that the decree resulted from the petitioners' own contumacy and gross negligence, dismissing the revision petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for setting aside an ex parte decree run from the date of the decree or the date of knowledge when the defendant was duly served with summons?
  • Is a bald statement by a party regarding the negligence of their counsel's clerk sufficient to establish 'sufficient cause' for setting aside an ex parte decree?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding 'sufficient cause' in a civil revision?
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• Messrs Kwong Fah Chinese Restaurant vs Punjab Employees' Social1990 MLD 235 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Badarunnisa and 4 others vs Tufail Ahmad1990 MLD 228 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Aziz Flour Mills And 2 Others vs The Industrial Development1990 CLC 1473 · Lahore High Court
  banking recoveryinterlocutory appealdismissal in defaultrestoration of suitdate of hearinginherent powerssummary procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the defendant-appellant challenges the order of the learned Single Judge in Chamber restoring a recovery suit that had been dismissed in default by the Special Judge Banking. The core legal questions involve the maintainability of an intra-court appeal against an interlocutory order under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to such proceedings, whether a dismissal for default on a date adjourned for 'further proceedings' constitutes a valid date of hearing, and the competence of a restoration application. The Lahore High Court held that no appeal lies from an interlocutory order that does not dispose of the entire case under Section 12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The Court further held that an order dismissing a suit on a date not fixed for actual hearing or formal proceedings is void ab initio, and the court possesses inherent powers to undo wrongs resulting from its own illegal procedural orders. The appeal was dismissed both as incompetent and on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal is maintainable against an interlocutory order under Section 12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 that does not dispose of the entire case?
  • Does a date adjourned indefinitely or for 'further proceedings' without fixing specific business constitute a valid 'date of hearing' for the purpose of dismissing a suit in default?
  • Can a court invoke its inherent powers or Section 21 of the General Clauses Act 1897 to restore a suit that was illegally or prematurely dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Whether an application for restoration of a suit under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 must be signed and filed by the party personally or can be competently filed by a duly appointed pleader?
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• Messrs Alipur Jute Mills vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others1990 PLC 745 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Alfa Sewing Machine Co. vs The Registrar of Trade Marks And Another1990 CLC 1401 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Afzal Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Chairman, Central Board1990 PTD 903 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-23
  agreed assessmentincome tax assessmentquasi-judicial tribunalspeaking orderauthorized representativepowers of income tax officerconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a private limited company, challenged an assessment order passed by the Income-tax Officer based on an agreed net income figure settled between the department and the company's authorized representatives. The revision before the Commissioner of Income-tax having failed, the petitioner approached the Lahore High Court through a constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether an agreed assessment is permissible under the Income-tax Ordinance. The Court held that the Income-tax Ordinance does not provide for or countenance an agreed assessment, and the Assessing Officer is statutorily bound to compute total income based on the material on record and evidence rather than a compromise. The key principle laid down is that while an assessee's admission may constitute evidence when no material exists, an Assessing Officer acts as a quasi-judicial tribunal and must pass a speaking order reflecting application of mind, and cannot bypass statutory assessment procedures through mere consensual agreements. Consequently, the impugned assessment and revisional orders were declared without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Income-tax Ordinance permit an Assessing Officer to pass an assessment order on a compromise or agreed basis?
  • Can an assessee's admission or agreement to a particular income figure substitute statutory assessment procedures when books of account and material exist?
  • Is an Income-tax Officer required to write a speaking order demonstrating the application of mind and reasons for an assessment?
  • Does the doctrine of estoppel apply to bar an assessee from challenging assessment proceedings that are violative of law?
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• Mehmuda Sultana vs Naseem Mumtaz and another1990 MLD 1028 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-12
  specific performancebona fide purchasersubsequent vendeemode of serviceburden of proofrevisional jurisdictionagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  These two civil revision petitions arise out of a judgment and decree by the District Judge, Lahore, which dismissed an appeal by a subsequent vendee and cross-objections by the original property owner, upholding the trial court's decree for specific performance in favor of the first vendee. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner-owner was bound by the written statement and power of attorney filed by her counsel, whether defects in the mode of service vitiated the proceedings despite appearance through counsel, and whether the subsequent vendee was a bona fide purchaser without notice entitled to protection under the Specific Relief Act. The court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the valid engagement of counsel by the petitioner were unassailable in revision, that procedural defects in service do not vitiate proceedings when the defendant effectively appears and defends through counsel, and that a subsequent transferee claiming bona fide status must prove lack of notice and reasonable inquiry, which the subsequent vendee failed to do. The key principles laid down are that appearance and representation by counsel cure formal defects in service, and the heavy burden of proof lies on a subsequent transferee to establish good faith and lack of notice under section 27 of the Specific Relief Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appearance and defense filed by a duly engaged advocate cure any prior defects or irregularities in the mode of service of summons?
  • What is the burden of proof required for a subsequent transferee to claim protection as a bona fide purchaser without notice under section 27 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the authorization of counsel be disturbed by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does possession of the property by the first vendee or their relatives constitute notice to a subsequent vendee requiring reasonable inquiry?
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• Mehmood vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1533 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-19Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Alam vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1303 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-04Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Hussain vs The State1990 MLD 195 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-09Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Hussain vs Ishtiaq Hussain and another1990 PLD Lahore 249 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-14
  bail cancellationpost-arrest baildistrict prosecution agencypolice reportsection 173 CrPCmens reainvestigation powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed by the complainant seeking the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to the sole respondent-accused by the Additional Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi, in a case registered under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerned whether bail was rightly granted when the police and the District Prosecution Agency were at loggerheads over the nature of the offence committed—specifically whether the act constituted murder under section 302 or unintentional homicide under section 304—and the respective scope of authority between the police and the District Prosecution Agency regarding the final scrutiny of police reports under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Lahore High Court held that the Additional Sessions Judge erred by delving deep into the merits of the case at the bail stage and improperly granting bail. The Court laid down the key principle that the police's role is confined to investigation, and while they may form opinions, the final scrutiny of charge-sheets and reports under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure rests exclusively with the District Prosecution Agency under the Punjab Law Department Manual and Punjab Police Rules, and police officers cannot impose their views regarding the nature of offences on the prosecution agency.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the opinion of the police regarding the nature of an offence during investigation is binding on the District Prosecution Agency?
  • Can bail be granted by delving deep into the merits of the case at an early stage?
  • What are the respective statutory duties and scopes of authority of the police versus the District Prosecution Agency regarding the scrutiny of police reports under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the District Magistrate have the legal authority to intervene and issue instructions regarding the nature of offences and trial courts in pending criminal cases?
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• Oasim vs Province of Punjab1990 CLC 1495 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-21Read full judgment →
• Maulvi Asad Ahmad alias Asad and 17 others vs The State and anothers1990 PLD Lahore 1 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-28Read full judgment →
• Maulana Abdus Sattar and others vs Maulana Wali Muhammad1990 MLD 2115 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-15Read full judgment →
• Matwalli alias Mutalli vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 731 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-10
  confiscation of propertylicensed weaponacquittalrestoration of propertycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a trial where the appellant, Matwalli alias Mutalli, was acquitted of charges under sections 302, 392, 397, 109, and 412 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Special Court for Speedy Trials No. VI, Bahawalpur. Despite the acquittal, the trial court ordered the confiscation of the appellant's licensed gun, which was not involved in the alleged incident. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the trial court possessed the legal authority to confiscate a licensed weapon that was unrelated to the commission of the offense for which the accused was acquitted. The High Court held that in the absence of any nexus between the licensed weapon and the alleged crime, the confiscation order was unsustainable. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and directed the restoration of the licensed gun to the appellant. The judgment affirms the principle that property not connected to the commission of an offense cannot be confiscated by the State upon the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court confiscate a licensed weapon belonging to an accused person who has been acquitted of the charges?
  • Is a licensed weapon that was not used in the commission of an alleged offense subject to confiscation by the State?
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• Masud Ul Hassan Qureshi vs The Secretary to Government and Chief1990 PLC (C.S.) 745 · Lahore High Court
  Auqaf Departmentcivil servantmaster and servantstatutory rulescompulsory retirementconstitutional petitionback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges a notification issued under section 12(ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, whereby the petitioner, an Administrator of Auqaf, was retired from service by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf. The core legal question was whether an employee of the Auqaf Department is a civil servant amenable to the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, and whether the master and servant rule or statutory rules applied. The Lahore High Court held that the Auqaf Department is a statutory body corporate and its employees are not civil servants under the said Act, rendering the notification illegal ab initio. The Court further held that where statutory rules govern the terms and conditions of service, the master's power is limited by those rules, and an order cannot be validated under an alternative provision of law when mandatory procedural requirements, such as an inquiry, have not been fulfilled. The petition was accepted, the notification declared void, and the petitioner was awarded back-benefits and salary.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of the Auqaf Department is a civil servant within the meaning of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Does the ordinary law of master and servant apply to statutory corporation employees whose terms are governed by statutory rules?
  • Can an illegal order passed under a wrong provision of law be validated under another provision when mandatory procedural requirements like an inquiry are not met?
  • Whether an employee wrongfully kept out of service is entitled to salary and emoluments for the period until superannuation?
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• Massu and 27 others vs United Bank Limited and another1990 MLD 2304 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-30
  constitutional petitionObjectives Resolutionself-executing provisionRibainterest-bearing loansFederal Shariat Courtjurisdiction barharmonious construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves twelve constitutional petitions filed by borrowers challenging the recovery of interest on loans by financial institutions. The petitioners contended that Article 2-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which made the Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the Constitution, is a self-executing provision that renders all statutory provisions allowing the recovery of interest (Riba) ultra vires and void. The Lahore High Court examined the constitutional scheme of Islamisation, specifically comparing Article 2-A with Chapter 3-A (Articles 203-A to 203-H) and Part IX (Articles 227 to 230). The Court held that Article 2-A is not a self-executing provision and cannot be used by a High Court to strike down existing statutes. The Constitution provides a specific, evolutionary mechanism for Islamisation through the Council of Islamic Ideology and the Federal Shariat Court, whose exclusive jurisdiction under Article 203-G bars other courts from declaring laws repugnant to Islam. The petitions were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 2-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is a self-executing provision that empowers High Courts to strike down existing laws as repugnant to Islam?
  • Whether a High Court has the jurisdiction to declare statutory provisions relating to interest or Riba ultra vires in light of the Objectives Resolution?
  • Does the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203-G of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 bar other courts from determining the Islamic conformity of existing statutes?
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• Maskeen Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 936 · Lahore High Court · 1989-08-23Read full judgment →
• Mardana vs Mst. Pullan Jan and 3 others1990 MLD 370 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-01Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmad and 3 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1541 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-21Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Muhammad Ali and another1990 MLD 1227 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-13Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Allah Ditta1990 MLD 743 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-29Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain Khan vs Mst. Asia Begum And 21 Other1990 CLC 1014 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-06
  specific performanceagreement to sellburden of proofbest evidence rulecivil revisionadverse inferenceexecution of document
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 18-11-1975, which was dismissed by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff had sufficiently proved the execution of the disputed agreement to sell (Ext. P1) to entitle him to relief. The High Court held that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof, noting that the marginal witnesses to the agreement were not produced, and the plaintiff’s reliance on the deed writer’s testimony was insufficient. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, emphasizing that a document does not prove itself and, when denied, must be proved in accordance with the law of evidence. The key principle laid down is that the "best evidence" rule applies in civil litigation; where a party withholds available witnesses, such as marginal witnesses to a deed, the court may draw adverse inferences. Furthermore, a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of their own case rather than the weakness of the defense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce marginal witnesses to a disputed agreement to sell justify an adverse inference against the party relying on the document?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to specific performance if they fail to prove the execution of the underlying agreement to sell?
  • Does the rule of best evidence require a party to produce available witnesses to prove the execution of a document?
  • Can a plaintiff succeed in a suit for specific performance based on the weakness of the defendant's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1990 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-10Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs Syed Mushtaq Ahmad and another1990 PLD Lahore 390 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-15
  rejection of plaintcertified copy of decreeappellate procedurecivil revisionremand of suitdispensation of certified copy
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arose from a suit for permanent injunction where the trial court rejected the plaintiff's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The plaintiff appealed this rejection to the Additional District Judge, who accepted the appeal and remanded the case. The defendant challenged this remand in revision, arguing the appeal was not properly constituted because it lacked certified copies of the trial court's judgment and decree. The core legal questions were whether an appeal against the rejection of a plaint requires a certified copy of the decree, and whether an appellate court can impliedly dispense with the requirement of filing a certified copy of the judgment. The High Court held that in cases involving the rejection of a plaint, filing a certified copy of the decree is not mandatory. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an appellate court may impliedly dispense with the requirement of filing a certified copy of the judgment by admitting the appeal to a regular hearing and granting interim relief.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to file a certified copy of the decree when filing an appeal against the rejection of a plaint?
  • Can an appellate court impliedly dispense with the requirement of filing a certified copy of the trial court's judgment?
  • Does the admission of an appeal to a regular hearing and the granting of interim relief constitute an implied dispensation of filing a certified copy of the judgment?
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• Manzoor Ahmad vs S.S.P. EtcK.L.R 1990 Labour & Service Cases 201 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-19Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs S.S.P. and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 362 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-19Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad and another vs Sardar and 6 others1990 MLD 1744 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-20Read full judgment →
• Mansoor Azhar Farooqi vs Province of Punjab Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 34 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-29Read full judgment →
• Mansoor Azhar Farooqi vs Province of Punjab and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 350 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-29Read full judgment →
• Mansab Khan and another vs The State1990 MLD 632 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-17Read full judgment →
• Managing Director, Lyallpur Cotton Mills, Faisalabad vs Labour1990 PLC 514 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-04
  grievance petitioncondonation of delaylimitation actwithdrawal of petitionmemorandum of appealindustrial relations ordinanceretrenchmentclosure of business
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged orders passed by the Punjab Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal which had allowed a retrenched employee's grievance petition and dismissed the employer's appeal. The core legal questions involved whether the delay in filing the second grievance petition after the voluntary withdrawal of the first could be condoned under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908, whether a memorandum of appeal filed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1968 is incompetent if not signed personally by the appellant, and whether an employer has the exclusive right to close a business section. The Lahore High Court held that section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 does not apply to voluntarily withdrawn suits or petitions under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, that a memorandum of appeal under section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1968 does not strictly require the appellant's personal signature if signed by a duly authorized pleader, and that an employer has the absolute discretion to run or close a business section. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside and the employee's grievance petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to a case where a petition is voluntarily withdrawn under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is an appeal under section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 incompetent if the memorandum of appeal is signed only by the counsel and not personally by the appellant?
  • Can an employer be compelled to keep a business section running when the employer decides to close it down?
  • Whether the period during which a voluntarily withdrawn petition remained pending can be excluded for the purpose of limitation under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• Manager, Hameed Masood (Private Ltd.) vs Punjab Labour Appellate1990 PLC 559 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-03Read full judgment →
• Mamora vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 695 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-07Read full judgment →
• Maman and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1323 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-19Read full judgment →
• Malik Raheem Bakhsh Awan vs Ejaz Mahmood and anothers1990 PLD Lahore 37 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-01
  specific performanceremand of suitappellate court powersburden of proofadditional evidenceframing of issuescivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order by the Additional District Judge remanding a specific performance suit to the trial court. The appellate court had remanded the matter, citing the trial court's failure to frame an issue regarding whether the defendants were bona fide purchasers, the incorrect placement of the burden of proof, and a pending application for additional evidence. The High Court held that the remand was unjustified. It established that when parties are fully aware of the controversy and have led evidence, the failure to frame a specific issue or the incorrect placement of the onus of proof does not warrant a remand, provided no prejudice is caused. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an appellate court should not remand a case for additional evidence but must instead decide the application for additional evidence itself. If an issue is missing, the appellate court should exercise its powers to frame it rather than setting aside the entire decree. Consequently, the High Court set aside the remand order and directed the appellate court to decide the appeal on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court remand a case solely because the trial court failed to frame a specific issue, even if the parties were aware of the controversy and led evidence?
  • Does the incorrect placement of the burden of proof by a trial court justify a remand if the parties have already led evidence on the issue?
  • Is an appellate court permitted to set aside a trial court's decree and remand the case merely to allow the production of additional evidence?
  • What is the correct procedure for an appellate court to follow when it determines that a necessary issue was omitted by the trial court?
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• Malik Muhammad Shaft vs Malik Farzand Ali And Another1990 CLC 693 · Lahore High Court · 1984-12-08Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Aslam vs Mian Aftab Ahmed And 5 Other1990 CLC 1830 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-02Read full judgment →
• Malik Mitha vs Jamal Din and 2 others1990 PLD Lahore 186 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-25Read full judgment →
• Malik Jahangir Khan vs Syed Sibtul Hassan And Other1990 CLC 1659 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-13
  landlord and tenant relationshipeviction petitionsub-dealershiprent controller jurisdictionres judicatalis pendensnon-residential buildingpetrol pump
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenge concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, which ordered the eviction of the petitioner from a petrol pump premises. The core legal questions concerned the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner (sub-dealer) and the respondent (dealer), and whether the Rent Controller possessed jurisdiction under the relevant rent legislation. The Court held that the petitioner, having entered into a valid sub-dealership agreement with the respondent, could not deny the landlord-tenant relationship by asserting a direct dealership with the oil company, particularly when the supporting documents were fabricated during the pendency of the litigation. The Court affirmed that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction, as the premises constituted a non-residential building under the rent laws. The key principle laid down is that a sub-lessee cannot deny the landlord's title after executing a tenancy agreement, and findings of fact affirmed by superior courts in earlier stages of the same litigation operate as res judicata, precluding re-agitation of those issues in subsequent proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the sub-letting of a petrol pump business create a relationship of landlord and tenant under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a tenant deny the landlord's title by asserting a direct relationship with the head-lessor based on documents fabricated during the pendency of litigation?
  • Do findings of fact affirmed by a High Court in a previous writ petition operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings regarding the same parties?
  • Does the installation of machinery for pumping petroleum products exclude premises from the definition of a non-residential building under the rent laws?
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• Malik Imtiaz Ahmad And 2 Others vs Deputy Commissioner_Collector, Khushab And 4 Other1990 CLC 915 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-01Read full judgment →
• Malik Ghulam Yaseen and another vs The Deputy Director, F.I.A., Lahore1990 P Cr. L J 1834 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-06Read full judgment →
• Malik Ghulam Murtaza vs Superintendent, District Jail, Multan1990 P Cr. L J 565 · Lahore High Court · 1978-04-02Read full judgment →
• Malik Allah Ditta vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1861 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-29Read full judgment →
• Makhdoom Ali Shah and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J.1324 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-04Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Hayat vs Sh. Munir Ahmad and anothers1990 PLD Lahore 151 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-17Read full judgment →
• Mahboob alias Booba and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 887 · Lahore High Court · 1987-09-09Read full judgment →
• M. Saleem Anjum vs Majid Nizami and 4 others1990 MLD 206 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-04
  private complaintacquittallimitation periodcondonation of delaydefamationSection 249-A CrPCjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a private complaint case regarding defamation. The core legal questions were whether the appeal was barred by limitation, whether the time spent pursuing a remedy in a wrong forum could be excluded, and whether a Magistrate could acquit all accused persons under Section 249-A when only some had filed the application, and without fresh material after process had already been issued. The Court held that the appeal was within time, as the period spent in the wrong forum was excludable under Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908. Furthermore, the Court set aside the acquittal, ruling that a Magistrate cannot review their own order of summoning accused persons without fresh material on record. Additionally, the Court held that it was a patent illegality to acquit accused persons who had neither appeared nor filed an application under Section 249-A, as this demonstrated a lack of judicial application of mind.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate acquit all accused persons under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when only some of the accused have filed an application for acquittal?
  • Is the time spent pursuing a case in a wrong forum excludable when computing the limitation period for filing an appeal?
  • Can a Magistrate review their own order of summoning an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without the introduction of fresh material?
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• Liaquat vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 2068 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-17Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali vs The State1990 MLD 1548 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-04Read full judgment →
• Latif vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1304 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-06Read full judgment →
• Land Acquisition Collector, WAPDA Scarpvi, Rahimyar Khan and another vs Quresh Muhammad and 17 others1990 MLD 2133 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Lal vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1371 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-16Read full judgment →
• Lal Hussain and others vs Pakistan and 6 others1990 MLD 223 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-23Read full judgment →
• Lal (Deceased) Through L.R.S vs Muhammad Bibi And 3 Other1990 CLC 919 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-17Read full judgment →
• Lahore Municipal Corporation vs Muhammad Sarwar1990 CLC 379 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-13Read full judgment →
• Lahore High Court] Ghulam Rasool and others vs Member, Board of Revenue and others1990 PLD Lahore 497 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khushi Muhammad vs Zonal Manager (Punjab), Civil Aviation1990 PLC (C.S.) 304 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-23Read full judgment →
• Khushi Muhammad And 4 Others vs Khairat Hussain And. 6 Other1990 CLC 813 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Begum vs Munawar Bibi And 6 Other1990 CLC 1306 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-09Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Begum vs Muhammad Sharif and 3 others1990 P Cr. L J 772 · Lahore High Court · 1978-12-02Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Ali and others vs Abdur Rauf and others1990 PLD Lahore 211 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-23
  Specific performanceAgreement to sellMaterial alterationEquitable remedyClean hands doctrineContract enforcement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, which reversed the trial court's dismissal of a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell a shop. The appellants contested the suit, arguing that the respondents lacked locus standi and that the agreement had been materially altered. The High Court found that the agreement was indeed interpolated after execution, specifically regarding the area of the property, without the appellants' consent. This alteration was deemed material as it encroached upon land the appellants intended to retain for a staircase. The Court held that specific performance is an equitable remedy requiring the plaintiff to approach the court with clean hands. Relying on established jurisprudence, the Court affirmed that any unilateral material alteration to a deed renders it void and incapable of enforcement. Consequently, the High Court set aside the appellate decree and restored the trial court's judgment dismissing the suit, concluding that the respondents' conduct precluded them from seeking the equitable relief of specific performance.

  Questions settled

  • Does a unilateral material alteration of an agreement to sell render the contract unenforceable?
  • Is a plaintiff who has interpolated a document entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance?
  • What is the effect of a material alteration in a contract on a suit for specific performance?
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• Khurshid Alam vs Senior Superintendent of Police, Guiranwala and others1990 P Cr. L J 2059 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-26Read full judgment →
• Khuda Yar and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1601 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-11Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bakhsh vs The State1990 MLD 152 · Lahore High Court · 1988-12-05Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim vs Federation of Pakistan and others1990 PLD Lahore 505 · Lahore High Court · 1990-10-14Read full judgment →
• Khan Gul vs District Judge, Attock and 2 others1990 PLD Lahore 263 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-19
  ex parte decreemaintenance suitreasonable timelachesconstitutional jurisdictionservice of summonsdilatory tactics
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a judgment by the District Judge, Attock, which reversed a trial court's order recalling an ex parte decree in a maintenance suit. The petitioner argued that the limitation rule applied by the appellate court was ultra vires and that courts should favor adjudication on merits over technicalities. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's application to set aside the ex parte decree was filed within a reasonable time, given the evidence of his prior knowledge of the proceedings and deliberate avoidance of service. The High Court held that the petitioner had consistently avoided service and possessed knowledge of the proceedings, rendering his belated application for recall of the decree unjustified. The Court affirmed that while adjudication on merits is preferred, this principle cannot be exploited by litigants using dilatory tactics. It held that the application was barred by laches and failed to meet the 'reasonable time' requirement under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of adjudication on merits apply to a litigant who has employed dilatory tactics to avoid court proceedings?
  • Can an application to set aside an ex parte decree be dismissed if it is not filed within a reasonable time?
  • Is a finding by a lower appellate court regarding the reasonableness of time for filing an application subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Khalil Ahmed and another vs District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi1990 P Cr. L J 1744 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-10Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ahmad vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner And Other1990 CLC 388 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-19Read full judgment →
• Khalid vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 459 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-16Read full judgment →