Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• State Through The Advocate General, N. W.F.P., Peshawar vs Sohail Sardar1997 SCMR 1180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-22
  narcotics controlconfessional statementpolice custodyvoluntariness of confessionHadd offencescriminal appealretracted confession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the State against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which acquitted the respondent, Sohail Sardar, of charges under Article 3 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The prosecution alleged that one kilogram of heroin was recovered from a scooter occupied by the respondent and a co-accused. The trial court had convicted the respondent primarily based on a confessional statement. The Federal Shariat Court set aside this conviction, noting the lack of evidence regarding ownership or transportation of the contraband and finding the confession unreliable due to retraction and allegations of torture. The Supreme Court examined whether the confession was voluntary and reliable, given that the respondent remained in police custody for several days prior to the recording of the statement. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, holding that it is unsafe to base a conviction on a confessional statement recorded after an accused has been held in continuous police custody for an extended period, as such circumstances cast doubt on the voluntariness and authenticity of the confession.

  Questions settled

  • Is a conviction safe when based solely on a confessional statement recorded after the accused has been in continuous police custody for several days?
  • Does the prosecution bear the burden of proving ownership of contraband recovered from a vehicle occupied by multiple persons?
  • Can a retracted confession recorded after prolonged police custody be relied upon for conviction?
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• State through AdvocateGeneral, Sindh vs Bashir and others1997 PLD Supreme Court 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-18
  acquittal appealpost-arrest bailbail cancellationC.I.A. investigation powersSection 103 Cr.P.C.Mashirnamarecovery witnessescomplainant as investigating officerunlicensed armscognizable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by the State against a Sindh High Court judgment acquitting respondents previously convicted under Sections 399 PPC and 13-D of the Arms Ordinance, 1965. The Supreme Court considered several legal questions, including whether a police officer can act as both complainant and investigating officer, the mandatory nature of Section 103 Cr.P.C. regarding public Mashirs, the reliance on police personnel as recovery witnesses, the validity of joint Mashirnamas, the scope of interference in acquittal appeals, and the authority of C.I.A. personnel to investigate cognizable offenses under Section 156(1) Cr.P.C. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal. It held that while a police officer can be both complainant and investigating officer if no prejudice is caused, the requirement for public Mashirs under Section 103 Cr.P.C. is mandatory. The Court further ruled that C.I.A. personnel lack the power to investigate cognizable offenses and submit challans under Section 156(1) Cr.P.C. without specific authorization, though such an irregularity may not vitiate the trial if no serious prejudice is caused, per Section 156(2) Cr.P.C. The I.G. Police, Sindh, undertook to rectify this practice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a police officer legally assume dual functions as a complainant and an Investigating Officer?
  • Is the requirement of Section 103 Cr.P.C. for two public Mashirs to a recovery mandatory?
  • Can implicit reliance be placed on police personnel as recovery witnesses in a case where the offence charged is the recovery of the article itself?
  • Can a joint Mashirnama of arrest and recovery be relied upon if it is vague and cannot identify specific articles recovered from a particular accused?
  • Do C.I.A. personnel have the power under Section 156(1) Cr.P.C. to investigate any cognizable offence and submit a challan in respect thereof?
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• State Bank of Pakistan vs Messrs Faisal Spinning Mills Limited1997 SCMR 1244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-12
  State Bank of PakistanPay-As-You-Earn SchemeExchange Risk CoverageF.E. CircularsVested rightsRetrospective effectSubordinate legislationForeign currency loan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a High Court judgment allowing a constitutional petition filed by the respondents against the State Bank of Pakistan. The respondents obtained foreign currency loans for importing machinery under the Pay-As-You-Earn (Paye) Scheme and exercised an option for exchange risk coverage under F.E. Circular No.60 of 1986, which incorporated the terms of F.E. Circular No.76 of 1984. A subsequent clarification, F.E. Circular No.7 of 1987, provided the calculation method for multiple disbursement dates, under which the repayment schedule was approved. The State Bank later sought to recalculate liabilities under F.E. Circular No.75 of 1989. The Supreme Court considered whether F.E. Circular No.7 applied to cases covered by F.E. Circular No.60 and whether the subsequent circular could retrospectively alter the respondents' rights. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that F.E. Circular No.7 applied as a valid clarification conferring benefits, and that executive circulars cannot retrospectively impair or extinguish accrued vested rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can a circular clarifying foreign exchange risk coverage terms be read into an earlier circular when the earlier circular incorporates the principal circular's terms and conditions?
  • Can an executive authority issue a subsequent notification or circular to retrospectively impair, abridge, or take away accrued vested rights?
  • Is there a legal bar against an executive notification or circular conferring benefits retrospectively?
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• Sirajuddin vs Afzal Khan and anothers1997 PLD Supreme Court 847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-23
  leave to appealunsoundness of mindschizophreniavitiated trialremand for treatmentfitness to pleadmedical boardmurder convictioninsanity defensecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The complainant sought leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment that vitiated the trial, conviction, and death sentence of respondent No. 1 under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, directing his remand to a mental hospital for examination and subsequent trial upon recovery. The accused was convicted for murder, but during the appeal, a plea of insanity (schizophrenia) was raised, supported by medical reports indicating he was unfit to understand the trial. The Supreme Court considered whether the trial was valid given that the issue of unsoundness of mind was brought to the trial court's notice during bail proceedings, even if not formally raised by the defense counsel during the trial. The Court held that when a question of insanity is brought to the court's notice, it must comply with Section 465, Code of Criminal Procedure, to ascertain the accused's capacity to understand the trial and defend himself. Failure to do so vitiates the trial. The Supreme Court found no infirmity in the High Court's judgment and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial become vitiated if the court fails to ascertain the accused's mental capacity under Section 465, Code of Criminal Procedure, when the issue of unsoundness of mind was brought to its notice?
  • Is a trial court obligated to determine an accused's mental capacity even if the defense counsel does not formally raise the plea of unsoundness of mind during the trial?
  • Can a conviction be set aside and the case remanded for treatment and subsequent trial if the accused is found to be suffering from a major mental illness rendering him incapable of understanding proceedings?
  • What is the significance of medical evidence in determining an accused's capacity to understand trial proceedings and defend himself?
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• Shella B. Charles vs Election Tribunal And Another1997 SCMR 941 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-09
  election petitioninterlocutory orderwrit petitionmaintainabilityrecount of voteselection tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petitions in limine against an interlocutory order passed by the Election Tribunal. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of constitutional writ petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against interlocutory orders of an Election Tribunal, given the availability of an adequate statutory remedy of appeal under the relevant election laws. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that writ petitions against interlocutory orders of the Election Tribunal are not maintainable because such orders can be challenged in an appeal before the Supreme Court under Section 67 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 after the final determination of the election petition. The key principle laid down is that High Courts ought not to interfere through constitutional jurisdiction with interlocutory orders passed by Election Tribunals during ongoing election proceedings, as the statutory framework provides a comprehensive hierarchy and remedy for challenging election disputes upon final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Are constitutional writ petitions maintainable against interlocutory orders passed by an Election Tribunal?
  • Can the proceedings of an election petition before an Election Tribunal be stayed at an interlocutory stage?
  • What is the proper statutory remedy to challenge orders passed by an Election Tribunal under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
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• Sheikh Muhamamd Rafiq And Others vs United Bank Limited And Other1997 SCMR 1149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-08-01
  Banking Tribunals Ordinancemandatory depositmaintainability of appealex parte ordernullity of orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed an application to recall an ex parte order. The petitioners had challenged a Banking Tribunal decree, but their appeals were initially admitted by the High Court. Subsequently, the respondent bank pointed out that the petitioners had failed to comply with the mandatory statutory requirement of depositing the decretal amount as a condition for filing an appeal. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeals ex parte. The petitioners sought to recall this dismissal, arguing that the High Court erred in refusing to apply procedural rules for recalling ex parte orders. The Supreme Court held that since the initial admission of the appeals was a nullity due to the failure to satisfy the mandatory deposit requirement under the relevant statute, the appeals were inherently non-maintainable. The Court reasoned that no useful purpose would be served by recalling the dismissal order, as the statutory bar on the appeals remained absolute. The petitions were dismissed, affirming that procedural rules cannot override mandatory statutory conditions for maintainability.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court recall an ex parte order dismissing an appeal if that appeal was fundamentally non-maintainable due to failure to comply with a statutory deposit requirement?
  • Is an order admitting an appeal a nullity if it is passed in ignorance of a mandatory statutory provision requiring the deposit of the decretal amount?
  • Does the failure to deposit the decretal amount as required by the Banking Tribunals Ordinance 1984 render an appeal against a Banking Tribunal decree non-maintainable?
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• Shaukat Ali and others vs Government of Pakistan through Chairman, Ministry of Railways and others1997 PLD Supreme Court 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-27
  Railway platform licencesrevocation of licencewrit of mandamusconstitutional jurisdictionspecific performancemala fide actionopen auctiontransparent bidding
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arose from thirty petitions for leave to appeal filed by Railway licensees who operated stalls, wheelbarrows, and dining cars on railway platforms, challenging the High Court's refusal to grant relief against Pakistan Railways' decision not to renew their long-standing licences. The primary legal issue centered on whether contractual licensing obligations and renewals can be enforced via constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article 199, and whether courts may intervene in the revocation or non-renewal of a revocable licence. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the established principle that contractual rights and revocable licences generally cannot be enforced via mandamus or specific performance under the Specific Relief Act and Easements Act. However, the Court held that judicial interference is permissible even in licensing matters if the action of a state functionary is tainted with malice, mala fides, or discriminatory political considerations. The Court disposed of the petitions based on an undertaking by Pakistan Railways to issue fresh notices and hold open, transparent public auctions for the licences.

  Questions settled

  • Can contractual obligations arising from a revocable licence be enforced through a writ of mandamus under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can a court interfere in the non-renewal or revocation of a government licence if the state functionary acts with malice or mala fides?
  • Is an injunction maintainable to prevent the revocation of a licence that is revocable at will under Section 60 of the Easements Act?
  • Is compensation in damages the appropriate remedy where a revocable licence is terminated without reasonable notice under Section 63 of the Easements Act?
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• Shan Muhammad vs Maqbool And 2 Other1997 SCMR 1099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-10
  leave to appealevacuee propertyallotment of landlimitationletters patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, which accepted a Letters Patent Appeal and set aside an order regarding the allotment of evacuee agricultural land. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court Division Bench was justified in accepting the appeal and remanding the case for a fresh decision after a lapse of twenty-four years, particularly regarding the consideration of limitation by the revisional authority. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this question, holding that sufficient grounds existed for review, and directed that the petitioner's possession of the disputed land shall not be disturbed pending the final decision of the appeal, subject to the furnishing of security for mesne profits. The key principle laid down relates to the examination of limitation and the temporal propriety of remanding long-standing property allotment matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in accepting the appeal and remanding the case after 24 years?
  • Did the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner properly consider and condone the delay in filing the appeal?
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• Shamsher Ali vs Mst. Qaim Khatoon alias Irshad Bibi and others1997 PLD Supreme Court 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-27
  oathsolemn affirmationwitness testimonyprocedural irregularityOaths Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan raised the sole core legal question of whether the evidence of a witness in a judicial proceeding can be received on solemn affirmation or must necessarily be on oath. The Supreme Court held that while section 6 of the Oaths Act requires Muslim witnesses to take an oath pursuant to its amendment, the omission to administer an oath and recording evidence on solemn affirmation instead is a mere irregularity curable under section 13 of the Oaths Act, 1873, and does not render the evidence inadmissible or invalidate the proceedings unless prejudice is shown. The Court approved the view taken in earlier jurisprudence including Zeb-ul-Haram v. State, maintaining that such evidence cannot be brushed aside simply on the ground of procedural non-compliance. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether evidence of a witness in a judicial proceeding must necessarily be on oath or can be received on solemn affirmation?
  • Does the omission to record evidence on oath invalidate the proceedings or render the evidence inadmissible under the Oaths Act, 1873?
  • Is the failure to follow the prescribed procedure under section 6 of the Oaths Act, 1873 curable under section 13 of the said Act?
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• Shams Textile Mills Ltd. and others vs Province of Punjab and others1997 PLC (C.S.) 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-16
  leave to appealspecial allowancesocial security contributionemployer liabilitystatutory exemptionwage computation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, concerning the computation of employer contributions under the Social Security Ordinance, 1965. The core legal question is whether the special allowance paid to a worker under the Punjab Employees Special Allowance (Payment) Act, 1985, forms part of wages for calculating social security contributions, notwithstanding the specific exemption provided under section 8 of the said Act. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine this statutory interaction and ordered that the interim relief granted earlier on 17-1-1996 shall continue during the pendency of the appeals on identical terms. The key principle established relates to the interpretation of statutory exemptions regarding special allowances vis-a-vis social security contribution liabilities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the special allowance paid under the Punjab Employees Special Allowance (Payment) Act, 1985 is to be treated as part of a worker's wage for computing social security contributions?
  • Does section 8 of the Punjab Employees Special Allowance (Payment) Act, 1985 exempt the special allowance from being included in wage calculations under the Social Security Ordinance, 1965?
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• Shams Textile Mills Ltd. And Others vs Province of Punjab And Other1997 SCMR 1127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-16
  special allowancesocial security contributionemployer liabilitystatutory interpretationwage definitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the interpretation of the Punjab Employees Special Allowance Payment Act, 1988, in relation to the Social Security Ordinance, 1965. The core legal question presented is whether the special allowance paid to a worker under the provisions of the Punjab Employees Special Allowance Payment Act, 1988, constitutes part of the employee's 'wage' for the purpose of calculating the employer's contribution liability under the Social Security Ordinance, 1965. This issue is particularly significant given the specific exemption granted by Section 8 of the Punjab Employees Special Allowance Payment Act, 1988. The Court granted leave to appeal to determine if this statutory exemption precludes the inclusion of such allowances in the wage base for social security contributions. The Court further ordered that the interim order previously issued on 17-1-1996 shall remain in force during the pendency of the appeals on the same terms, thereby maintaining the status quo regarding the disputed contributions while the legal question is adjudicated.

  Questions settled

  • Is the special allowance paid under the Punjab Employees Special Allowance Payment Act, 1988, considered part of a worker's wage for calculating employer contributions under the Social Security Ordinance, 1965?
  • Does the exemption provided in Section 8 of the Punjab Employees Special Allowance Payment Act, 1988, exclude special allowances from the definition of wages for social security contribution purposes?
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• Shams Textile Mills Ltd. And Other vs Province of Punjab And Others1997 PLC (C. S.) 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-16
  leave to appealspecial allowancewages computationsocial security contributionstatutory exemptioninterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan on a petition for leave to appeal against an order regarding the computation of social security contributions. The core legal question raised is whether the special allowance paid to a worker pursuant to the Punjab Employees Special Allowance (Payment) Act 1985 must be included as part of his wage for calculating the employer's contribution under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965, notwithstanding the explicit statutory exemption provided under Section 8 of the 1985 Act. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider and resolve this question of statutory interpretation concerning the interaction between the exemption clause in the 1985 Act and the definition of wages for social security contributions. The Court further ordered that the interim relief granted to the appellants on 17-01-1996 shall continue to remain in operation on the same terms during the pendency of the main appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether special allowance paid under the Punjab Employees Special Allowance (Payment) Act 1985 forms part of wages for social security contribution?
  • Does Section 8 of the Punjab Employees Special Allowance (Payment) Act 1985 exempt special allowance from social security contribution calculations under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965?
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• Shahmand And 5 Others vs Allah Bakhsh1997 SCMR 424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-11
  pre-emptionwaiver of rightagricultural landpreferential rightcollateralleave to appealquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that affirmed lower court decisions in a pre-emption suit. The respondent, Allah Bakhsh, had successfully sued for pre-emption of agricultural land, asserting a preferential right as a collateral of the vendors. The petitioners, who were the original purchasers, contested the suit primarily by alleging that the respondent had waived his preferential right by refusing an offer to purchase the land before the sale occurred. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had sufficiently established the plea of waiver regarding the pre-emption right. The Supreme Court observed that the issue of whether an offer was made to the pre-emptor was a question of fact. Crucially, the respondent was not confronted with specific details regarding the alleged offer, such as the identity of the offerors, the location, or the timing of the offer, during cross-examination. Consequently, the Court held that the plea of waiver was unsubstantiated and essentially fabricated. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' findings and refused to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to confront a pre-emptor with specific details of an alleged waiver offer during cross-examination render the plea of waiver unsubstantiated?
  • Is the question of whether an offer to purchase was made to a pre-emptor considered a question of fact?
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• Shahid Ul Qayyum And Others vs Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Economic Affairs And StatisticsDivision, Government Of Pakistan, Islamabad And Other1997 SCMR 1198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-12
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsright to cross-examinevitiated inquiryleave to appealFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had modified disciplinary penalties imposed on a civil servant, Shahid ul Qayyum. The petitioner challenged the imposition of any penalty, arguing that the Tribunal's findings—that the air-conditioner in question was indeed installed in the office and that the petitioner's only fault was a procedural failure to obtain written approval—negated the justification for punishment. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the inquiry proceedings were vitiated because he was denied the right to cross-examine witnesses. The Federation of Pakistan also filed a petition challenging the same judgment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal in both petitions, determining that the contentions regarding the lack of justification for the penalty and the procedural irregularity of the inquiry process, specifically the denial of the right to cross-examine, raised substantial questions of law requiring further consideration by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses during a departmental inquiry vitiate the entire proceedings?
  • Can a disciplinary penalty be sustained when the findings of the Service Tribunal indicate that the alleged misconduct was merely a procedural lapse?
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• Shahid Nabi Malik and another vs Chief Election Commissioner, Islamabad and 7 others1997 PLD Supreme Court 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-26
  election petitiondisqualification of candidateservice of Pakistanoffice of profitharmonious constructionNational Assembly electionstatus of Minister of StateRepresentation of the People Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two direct civil appeals filed under Section 67(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, against the judgment of the Election Tribunal, Punjab, which declared the election of Muhammad Ishaq Dar to National Assembly Seat No. NA-95 Lahore void under Article 63(1)(k) of the Constitution on the ground that two years had not elapsed since he ceased to hold the post of Vice-Chairman, Pakistan Investment Board (PIB). The core legal questions were whether the two-year disqualification under Article 63(1)(k) applies simpliciter to anyone who was in the service of Pakistan, or only to holders of an 'office of profit', and whether the appellant's unremunerated post with the status of Minister of State constituted an office of profit. The Supreme Court (majority view) allowed Dar's appeal and set aside the Tribunal's order, holding that Article 63(1)(k) must be harmoniously construed with Article 63(1)(d) to apply only to former holders of an office of profit. The Court established that an office of profit requires actual pecuniary gain beyond reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses, and mere conferment of ministerial status without statutory appointment under Article 92 does not render an office lucrative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the two-year disqualification period under Article 63(1)(k) of the Constitution applies to any person who was in the service of Pakistan, or only to those who held an office of profit in such service?
  • Does mere reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses render a post in the service of Pakistan an 'office of profit'?
  • Does the conferment of the status of a Minister of State on an individual automatically entitle them to the salary and pecuniary benefits attached to the constitutional office of a Minister of State under Article 92 of the Constitution?
  • Can a newly created, unbudgeted government post with no attached salary or determined emoluments be categorized as an office of profit under Article 63(1) of the Constitution?
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• Shahid Maqbool vs The State1997 SCMR 1138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-22
  leave to appealright of audiencecondemned unheardcriminal appealprocedural lapse
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question concerns whether a miscarriage of justice occurred when the High Court failed to process an appeal filed by the petitioner against his conviction and sentence by the trial court, and subsequently observed in the impugned judgment that the petitioner had failed to prefer an appeal, thereby condemning him unheard. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider this grievance, directing that the appeal along with connected Criminal Petitions Nos. 10 and 11 of 1994 be considered together. The holding establishes that leave is warranted to examine procedural failures and violations of the right of audience in criminal appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal left unprocessed by the court office constitutes a denial of the right to be heard?
  • Does an incorrect observation by the High Court that no appeal was filed result in a miscarriage of justice?
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• Shafiq Ur Rehman And 5 Others vs The State1997 SCMR 632 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-01
  private complaintpolice excessesunlawful assemblyhouse trespassgrievous hurtinterested witnessesdelay in lodging complaintmitigation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellants' appeals against their convictions and sentences under sections 148, 452, and 325/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellants, who were police officials, were tried on a private complaint alleging that they formed an unlawful assembly, trespassed into the complainant's house, and caused grievous injuries to his wife while stripping her. The core legal questions involved the credibility of partisan and related witnesses, the explanation and impact of delay in lodging a private complaint, and the validity of the police's counter-version regarding a raid on proclaimed offenders. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through natural ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence and independent witnesses, and that the defence plea was fabricated. While upholding the convictions, the Supreme Court took a lenient view regarding the sentence considering the appellants' dismissal from service and the period already undergone, reducing the sentence of imprisonment to the period already served.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related and partisan witnesses can be relied upon without independent corroboration?
  • Does a delay in filing a private complaint vitiate the prosecution case when the delay is duly explained and involves police officials?
  • Can a fabricated counter-version set up by police officials through daily diary entries sustain a plea of private defense?
  • Whether the appellate court can reduce a sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone in view of mitigating circumstances?
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• Sh. Nazir Ahmad vs Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore Through Chairman1997 PLC (C. S.) 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-10
  leave to appealservice appealservice tribunalappeal maintainabilitydepartmental appealremandcivil servanttermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which, on remand from the Supreme Court, had dismissed his service appeal concerning the termination of his services as a J.V. Teacher. The Tribunal's majority view held the appeal non-maintainable, despite the Chairman's finding that the Supreme Court had previously settled the maintainability issue. The core legal questions revolve around the interpretation of Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, and Section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, specifically whether an appeal filed prematurely before the Tribunal becomes competent if the departmental appeal remains undecided after 90 days. A further question was whether the issue of appeal maintainability could be re-agitated before the Tribunal after a Supreme Court remand. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these provisions and contentions.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal filed prematurely before the Service Tribunal become competent if the departmental appeal remains undecided after 90 days?
  • Can the question of appeal maintainability be re-agitated before the Service Tribunal after a case has been remanded by the Supreme Court for a fresh decision?
  • What is the correct interpretation of Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, regarding the maintainability of appeals?
  • What is the correct interpretation of Section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, regarding the maintainability of appeals?
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• Sezai Turkes Feyzi Akkaya Construction Company, Lahore Through Project Director vs Messrs Crescent Services, Lahore And Another1997 SCMR 1928 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-25
  arbitration agreementarbitration clausenovation of contracttermination agreementsub-contractreference to arbitration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking to invoke an arbitration clause in a sub-contract agreement for the Lahore By-Pass project. The petitioner resisted the application, contending that a subsequent termination agreement novated and superseded the original sub-contract, thereby extinguishing the arbitration clause. Both the Civil Judge and the High Court rejected the petitioner's plea, holding that the sub-contract and the termination agreement had a clear nexus, must be read together, and that the original arbitration clause survived. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, holding that where a subsequent agreement is to be implemented with reference to the rights and obligations secured under an original contract, the arbitration clause remains binding and enforceable. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent termination agreement automatically extinguish an arbitration clause contained in an original contract?
  • Whether an arbitration clause survives the novation or modification of a contract when the subsequent agreement relies upon the original contract for its implementation?
  • Is an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 maintainable when a dispute arises out of an agreement containing an arbitration clause?
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• Semual And Others vs Piara Masih And Other1997 SCMR 1172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-05
  succession lawgovernment landleave to appealstatutory interpretationinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the inheritance and succession of government land. The core legal question presented is whether succession in the instant case is governed by Section 21(b) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, or by Section 37 of the Pakistan Succession Act, 1925, specifically in light of the saving provision contained in Section 29(2) of the Pakistan Succession Act, 1925. The petitioner contends that the High Court relied on a precedent (PLD 1992 SC 385) that did not address this specific statutory argument. The Supreme Court, finding merit in the contention that the legal issue requires further examination, granted leave to appeal. Given that the relied-upon precedent was decided by a Full Bench, the Court directed that the appeal be placed before a larger Bench of three or more judges. The existing stay order was ordered to continue until the final disposal of the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 29(2) of the Pakistan Succession Act 1925 operate as a saving provision that excludes the application of Section 37 of the same Act in favor of Section 21(b) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912?
  • Is the succession of government land governed by the Pakistan Succession Act 1925 or the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912?
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• Secretary, Narcotics Control Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad And Another vs Muhammad Sajjad And 4 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-10
  service appealpromotionseniority-cum-fitnessjurisdiction of service tribunaldepartmental promotion committeeunfitness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, whereby service appeals filed by respondents, who were promoted Upper Division Clerks, were allowed. The respondents had grievances that they were bypassed for promotion to Assistants (BPS-11) in favour of their juniors, in violation of the rule of seniority-cum-fitness under the Recruitment Rules in Establishment Division's S.R.O. 248(1)88. The core legal question concerned the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal to examine the question of fitness and the validity of supersession based on findings of unfitness without supporting material such as Annual Confidential Reports. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Departmental Promotion Committee failed to provide proper and cogent reasons or refer to supporting material regarding the unfitness of senior civil servants, and declined to interfere with the Tribunal's order remanding the cases to the appellate authority for fresh orders. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to examine the question of fitness in promotion matters?
  • Can senior civil servants be superseded for promotion without cogent reasons and supporting material regarding their unfitness?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a Tribunal's order remanding a service matter for fresh consideration when no proper reasons were given by the Departmental Promotion Committee?
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• Secretary, Education Department, Lahore and others vs Mst. Nasim1997 PLC (C.S.) 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-30
  civil servanttransferpostingService Tribunalvested rightpublic interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Education Department challenging the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had set aside the transfer order of the respondent, a Senior Headmistress and District Education Officer, and ordered her reposting as District Education Officer at Sargodha. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in setting aside the transfer and reposting order of the civil servant where the initial transfer order lacked reasons and deviated from the normal tenure procedure. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal acted justly and properly as the initial transfer order smudged of arbitrariness by failing to assign reasons and disrupting the respondent's normal tenure near the end of her career. The key principle laid down is that while civil servants have no vested right to a particular post, arbitrary transfers that lack reasons and deviate from normal tenure rules are open to judicial scrutiny and correction by service tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to claim posting at a particular post?
  • Whether an unreasoned transfer order of a civil servant passed without assigning reasons can be set aside by the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the interference by the Service Tribunal in the transfer of a civil servant amount to unwarranted interference in the internal management of a department?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Education Department, Lahore And Other vs Mst. Nasim1997 PLC (C.S.) 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-30
  transfer and postingcivil servantvested rightservice tribunalarbitrary orderpublic interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Education Department against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had set aside the transfer of the respondent from the post of District Education Officer. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in interfering with the transfer and posting order of a civil servant passed by the Competent Authority. The Supreme Court held that while a civil servant has no vested right to claim a particular post, the unreasoned uprooting of the respondent from her post prematurely, without assigning any reasons, smacked of arbitrariness. The Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Tribunal's decision. The key principle laid down is that although transfer and posting are prerogative of the administration in the public interest, an arbitrary transfer order lacking reasons and disrupting normal tenure is susceptible to judicial scrutiny and interference by the service tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to claim posting to a particular post?
  • Can an unreasoned transfer order of a civil servant be interfered with by a Service Tribunal?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal's interference in the transfer of a civil servant amounts to unwarranted interference in departmental management?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Education Department, Lahore vs Mrs. Kishwar Aslam And Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 978 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-11
  service lawpromotionrecruitment rulesfunctional unitdepartmental promotion committeecivil servicetransfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Punjab Service Tribunal judgment regarding the promotion of a civil servant to the post of Director (BS-20). The core legal question was whether the government could bypass the promotion of an eligible candidate by filling the post through transfer, and whether the recruitment methods 'by promotion' or 'by transfer' were interchangeable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The Court held that promotion is the primary method of recruitment, while transfer is an alternative method to be utilized only when no eligible candidate is available for promotion. A key principle laid down is that the order of priority in recruitment rules must be respected, and 'or' does not imply interchangeability. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that any appointment to such a post, whether by promotion or transfer, necessitates the recommendation of the appropriate Departmental Promotion Committee or Selection Board. Additionally, the Court clarified that where an impugned order is passed by the Governor, the requirement for exhausting departmental appeals is dispensed with.

  Questions settled

  • Does the word 'or' between 'by promotion' and 'by transfer' in recruitment rules imply that the methods are interchangeable?
  • Is the recommendation of an appropriate committee or board a mandatory prerequisite for appointments made by transfer?
  • Must an aggrieved civil servant file a departmental appeal when the impugned order is passed by the Governor?
  • Is promotion considered the primary method of recruitment when rules specify 'by promotion or by transfer'?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of Punjab, Housing Physical &1997 SCMR 1606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-05
  allotment of plotsvested rightpolicy changelawyers quotaconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court and the subsequent dismissal of an Intra-Court Appeal concerning the allotment of a residential plot under a lawyers quota in the Area Development Scheme No.II, Tehsil Samundri. The respondent was initially allotted a plot which was later found to be reserved for government servants. Before an alternate plot could be allotted, the government abolished all quotas through a policy change. The core legal question was whether a subsequent change in government policy could take away a vested right of allotment once eligibility was determined and a plot was allotted, and whether the District Housing Committee's allotment powers were final. The Supreme Court held that the respondent had acquired a vested right upon the acceptance of his application and allotment by the competent committee, which could not be divested by a subsequent retrospective policy change, particularly when allotments under similar exemptions continued. The Court affirmed the findings of the High Court, dismissed the petition, and refused leave to appeal, ruling that a government cannot resile from a commitment made when the applicant was duly found eligible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent change in government policy can take away a vested right of allotment once eligibility has been determined and a plot has been allotted?
  • Whether the recommendation and allotment by a District Housing Committee create a binding right for the allottee?
  • Whether a government can apply a new policy retrospectively to deny a plot to an eligible applicant who was previously granted an allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of N.W.F.P, And 2 Others vs Saifur Rehman1997 SCMR 1073 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-04
  departmental inquirydismissal from serviceright of cross-examinationnatural justicepolice rulesservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Government of N.W.F.P. against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar, which had accepted the respondent's appeal and set aside his dismissal from service. The respondent, a police constable, was dismissed following fresh departmental proceedings where an Inquiry Officer found him guilty of misconduct. The Service Tribunal set aside the dismissal on the ground that the respondent was not associated with the inquiry proceedings, which violated mandatory procedural requirements. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, upon perusing the record, confirmed that the respondent was neither associated with the inquiry nor given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The Court held that a person facing a departmental inquiry has an absolute right to participate in the proceedings and cross-examine witnesses. Finding no legal error in the Service Tribunal's decision, which also allowed the department the option to conduct fresh proceedings, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a departmental inquiry conducted without associating the accused civil servant or allowing him to cross-examine witnesses is legally sustainable?
  • Does the failure to intimate the appointment of an Inquiry Officer to the accused civil servant invalidate the subsequent inquiry report and dismissal order?
  • Can a Service Tribunal, while setting aside a dismissal order due to procedural defects in an inquiry, grant the department the option to initiate fresh inquiry proceedings on the same charges?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of N.-W.F.P. And Another vs Muhammad1997 PLC (C.S.) 422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-05-20
  departmental examinationpromotionwork munshiessub-engineerleave to appealnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court setting aside the reversion of the respondents. The respondents, employed as Work Munshies and having completed ten years of service, appeared in a second departmental examination for promotion to Sub-Engineer after the department failed to inform them of the initial examination held in violation of rules. Upon passing the second examination, they were promoted, but their promotion was subsequently withdrawn due to the cancellation of that examination on the ground that it violated the rule setting the examination once a year in November/December. The core legal question was whether the department could cancel a duly held second examination and withdraw promotions when employees were deprived of participating in the first examination through no fault of their own. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in setting aside the reversion, ruling that the department had a duty to inform eligible candidates, and the holding of a second examination to remedy the initial omission was just, proper, and based on principles of natural justice. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the department can cancel a departmental examination held to accommodate employees who were not informed about the initial examination?
  • Does the failure of the department to inform eligible employees about a promotion examination justify the holding of a subsequent examination?
  • Can promotions granted on the basis of a lawfully conducted remedial departmental examination be arbitrarily withdrawn?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of N. W.F.P. Educationdepartment, Peshawar And 2 Others vs Samuel Poul, S.E.T. (Technical)1997 SCMR 1816 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-27
  service lawrunning pay scalegraded paypresumptive payservice tribunaleducational qualificationsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of N.W.F.P. against a Service Tribunal judgment that granted the respondent, a S.E.T. (Technical) employee, a running basic pay scale in BS-16 from the date he qualified for the In-Service Teacher Training Course in Industrial Arts. The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to the graded/running pay scale of his post despite the government's contention that he lacked the requisite qualifications. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Service Tribunal correctly applied the law. The Court found that the government failed to demonstrate any misinterpretation of evidence by the Tribunal and that the respondent's qualifications, specifically the In-Service Teacher Training Course, entitled him to the graded pay scale. The key principle laid down is that an employee who fulfills the necessary training and qualification requirements for a post is entitled to the corresponding graded pay scale, and the ratio of Federation of Pakistan v. Shahzada Shahpur Jan (1986 SCMR 991) supports the entitlement to presumptive pay where the employee is qualified for the post.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to a graded or running pay scale upon completing the required in-service training for their post?
  • Does the ratio in Federation of Pakistan v. Shahzada Shahpur Jan support the entitlement to presumptive pay for qualified employees?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a Service Tribunal's findings of fact under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 if no misinterpretation of evidence is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Sarfraz Hussain vs Sardar Bibi1997 SCMR 917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-15
  transfer of civil suitleave to appealmatrimonial disputesrestitution of conjugal rightsdissolution of marriagerecovery of dowerconvenience of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the transfer of a suit for recovery of dower from Lahore to Chakwal. The parties had previously consented to the transfer of earlier matrimonial suits between them to Lahore, which suits were disposed of in 1991. The petitioner contended that his consent in those previous, concluded proceedings could not serve as a valid ground for rejecting the transfer of a subsequently filed suit where both parties permanently reside in Chakwal and no cause of action arose in Lahore. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the matter and granted leave to appeal, while also ordering a stay of proceedings in both suits.

  Questions settled

  • Can consent given for the transfer of previous matrimonial suits preclude a party from seeking the transfer of a subsequently filed suit?
  • Is previous consent in disposed of litigation a valid ground for rejecting a transfer application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Rafique Haider Khan Leghari vs Election Tribunal and others1997 PLD Supreme Court 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-22
  nomination paperselection tribunalsubstantial defectsagacious and righteousmisreading of evidenceasset declarationconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the rejection of the petitioner's nomination papers for two constituencies by the Election Tribunal, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court. The Tribunal had disqualified the petitioner on grounds that he lacked the 'sagacious' and 'righteous' character required under Article 62 of the Constitution, citing alleged misstatements regarding his educational qualifications and the valuation of his assets. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that the Tribunal misread the evidence, that the alleged defects were not of a 'substantial nature' under Section 14 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, and that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of his character. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the petitioner's contentions regarding the misreading of evidence and the nature of the defects appeared to have prima facie merit. The Court held that the petitioner should be allowed to contest the election pending the final outcome of the appeals, emphasizing the need to examine whether the High Court was justified in failing to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to rectify the Tribunal's potential errors.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Returning Officer reject a nomination paper for a defect that is not of a substantial nature?
  • Does a misstatement regarding educational qualifications or asset valuation automatically render a candidate not 'sagacious' or 'righteous' under Article 62 of the Constitution?
  • Is the High Court justified in refusing to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction when an Election Tribunal's order is based on a misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar And 3 Others vs Bahadur And 18 Other1997 SCMR 1448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-07
  res judicatacivil court jurisdictionredemption of mortgagestatutory tribunalultra viresfinality of decreerestitution of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that reversed concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the validity of a civil decree. The dispute arose from a 1972 application by petitioners for restitution of mortgaged land under the Punjab Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1964. A Collector ordered restitution, but the mortgagees successfully challenged this in a civil suit, obtaining a decree in 1977 declaring them owners due to the expiration of the sixty-year limitation period. The petitioners did not appeal this decree but later filed a separate suit to declare it a nullity, which lower courts initially granted. The High Court reversed this, holding that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to determine if the mortgage was subsisting and that its decision, even if legally incorrect, was not a nullity and operated as res judicata. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that Civil Courts retain jurisdiction to determine if statutory tribunals have acted ultra vires. Because the petitioners failed to appeal the 1977 decree, it attained finality and operated as res judicata.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to determine if a statutory tribunal acted within the scope of its authority despite a provision ousting civil court jurisdiction?
  • Can a decree passed by a court of general jurisdiction be treated as a nullity in a subsequent suit simply because the court may have made an error of law?
  • Does a failure to appeal a civil court decree render that decree final and binding as res judicata in subsequent litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Central Board of Revenue and others1997 PLD Supreme Court 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-26
  territorial jurisdictionwrit petitionArticle 199dominant object testcustoms assessmentregulatory dutycause of action
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which ordered the return of a writ petition due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner had imported goods arriving at the Port of Karachi, where Customs Authorities assessed regulatory duty under a Federal Government notification. The petitioner filed a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court challenging both the notification and the assessment order, on the grounds that the notification emanated from Islamabad and the petitioner's office and factory were in Lahore. The Supreme Court considered whether the Lahore High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Refusing leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the dominant object of the writ petition was to challenge the assessment order passed by a Customs official located at Karachi Sea Port. The Court laid down that challenging a notification's vires does not confer jurisdiction on a High Court where the primary cause of action and the performing authority are situated within the territorial jurisdiction of another High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain a writ petition primarily challenging a customs assessment order passed by an authority located in another province?
  • Can a petitioner establish territorial jurisdiction in a High Court by challenging the vires of a Federal Government notification when the main cause of action and assessment order arose within the jurisdiction of another High Court?
  • How does the 'dominant object' of a constitutional petition determine which High Court has territorial jurisdiction under Article 199(1)(a) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Sameena Arif And Others vs Muhammad Arif Barry And Another1997 SCMR 1861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-01
  temporary injunctionbenamidarprima facie casediscretionary reliefco-ownershipleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which affirmed a Single Judge's order declining an ad interim injunction in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The petitioner, a wife, sought a declaration that her husband (respondent No. 1) held a property in trust as a benamidar for her and their children, or alternatively, that she was a co-owner of the property, claiming she had contributed over one-third of the construction costs. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had established a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had properly exercised their discretion in refusing the injunction. The Court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the funds withdrawn from her bank accounts were utilized for the house construction, noting a significant chronological discrepancy between the dates of withdrawal and the construction period. The principle laid down is that appellate courts will not interfere with the concurrent exercise of discretion by lower courts regarding temporary injunctions where no prima facie case has been established.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with the concurrent exercise of discretion by lower courts regarding the grant of a temporary injunction?
  • Is a party entitled to a temporary injunction if they fail to establish a prima facie case regarding their financial contribution to a property?
  • Does a chronological discrepancy between the withdrawal of funds and the construction period of a property defeat a claim of financial contribution for the purpose of an injunction?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleem Jahangir vs Mst. Khatm UN Nisa1997 SCMR 1601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-22
  Khuladissolution of marriagematrimonial liferestitution of conjugal rightsfamily lawreconciliation proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dissolved a marriage between the parties on the basis of Khula. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction in granting Khula where the wife demonstrated extreme hatred and an inability to maintain a happy matrimonial life, despite the husband's opposition. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly appreciated the evidence and applied established legal principles regarding Khula. The Court affirmed that where a wife has developed an intense dislike for her husband and it is impossible for the spouses to live together within the limits prescribed by God Almighty, the marriage should be dissolved. The Court emphasized that prolonged litigation and failed reconciliation efforts are significant factors supporting the conclusion that a harmonious matrimonial life is unattainable. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing to interfere with the High Court’s findings, and upheld the dissolution of the marriage subject to the return of benefits received by the wife.

  Questions settled

  • Can a marriage be dissolved by way of Khula when the wife expresses extreme hatred for the husband?
  • Does the failure of reconciliation efforts support a finding that a happy matrimonial life is impossible?
  • Is a court justified in granting Khula after prolonged litigation demonstrates the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleem Chaudhry Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan And Other1997 SCMR 1415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-21
  leave to appealtax recoveryincome taxsuspension of recoveryconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the levy of taxes under the Income Tax Ordinance. The core legal question involves the validity and applicability of tax provisions under sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D of the Ordinance. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the questions of law raised, ordering that all related appeals be heard together after notice to the Attorney-General. As for the holding, the Court decided that during the pendency of the appeals, the recovery of the contested tax shall remain suspended on the condition that the appellants provide an undertaking to pay the tax as levied or leviable under sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, along with interest at the rate of two percent over the Bank rate, should the appeals ultimately be dismissed. The key principle laid down relates to the conditional suspension of tax recovery pending final adjudication of tax appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Under what conditions can the recovery of tax levied under sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance be suspended during the pendency of an appeal?
  • What rate of interest is applicable on the payable tax if the appeals regarding tax levy under the Income Tax Ordinance are dismissed?
  Read full judgment →
• Salamat Ali Baig And Others vs Muhammad Asghar Chaudhry, S.O. And Other1997 SCMR 1760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-20
  Office Management Groupseniorityacting chargequota systemretrospective regularizationcivil serviceFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the seniority and regularization of Section Officers in the Office Management Group (OMG) of the Federal Secretariat, involving a dispute between direct recruits and departmental promotees. The core legal question was whether the government could regularize "acting charge" promotees with retrospective effect, thereby impacting the seniority and quota rights of direct recruits. The Supreme Court held that while the government is empowered to regularize officers performing duties on an acting charge basis, such regularization must strictly adhere to the prescribed 2/3 (direct) and 1/3 (promotee) quota system. The Court affirmed the Federal Service Tribunal’s decision that retrospective regularization is impermissible where it lacks a factual basis regarding vacancy availability at the relevant time. The key principle laid down is that administrative regularization of civil servants cannot be applied retrospectively to the detriment of other cadres if it violates the statutory or rule-based quota allocations or if vacancies were not actually available on the effective date of such regularization.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government regularize civil servants on acting charge basis with retrospective effect if it violates established quota allocations?
  • Is the fixation of seniority a vested right under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the regularization of acting charge officers require the existence of actual vacancies within the prescribed departmental quota?
  Read full judgment →
• Salamat Ali Baig And Other vs Muhammad Asghar Chaudhry, S.O. And Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 1071 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-20
  Office Management Groupacting charge appointmentcivil service seniorityrecruitment quotaretrospective regularizationFederal Service TribunalSection Officers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals regarding the seniority and regularization of Section Officers within the Office Management Group of the Federal Secretariat. The core legal question was whether the government could regularize "acting charge" promotees with retrospective effect, and whether such regularization violated the statutory quota system (two-thirds direct recruitment, one-third promotion) and the seniority rights of direct recruits. The Supreme Court held that while the authorities possess the power to regularize officers performing duties on an acting charge basis, such regularization cannot be granted retrospective effect to a date where the existence of vacancies within the specific promotion quota is not established. The Court affirmed the Federal Service Tribunal's decision to delete the retrospective effect of the regularization notifications, emphasizing that adherence to the prescribed recruitment quotas is mandatory. The judgment establishes that administrative convenience cannot override statutory quota requirements, and retrospective regularization is unlawful if it encroaches upon the rights of other civil servants by filling posts that were not vacant within the relevant quota at the material time.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government regularize civil servants on an acting charge basis with retrospective effect without establishing the availability of vacancies within the prescribed quota?
  • Does the regularization of promotees in violation of the prescribed recruitment quota infringe upon the seniority rights of direct recruits?
  • Is the adherence to recruitment quotas for Section Officers in the Federal Secretariat mandatory for the regularization of acting charge appointees?
  Read full judgment →
• Salahud Din vs Syed Mansoor Ali Shah And Other1997 SCMR 414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-24
  procedural compliancemandatory noticeFirst Appeal from Ordertechnical groundsappearance of respondentappellate procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's First Appeal from Order (F.A.O.) due to the failure to serve a mandatory notice under Order 43, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the dismissal of an appeal for non-compliance with the notice requirement is justified when the respondents have already entered an appearance and were represented before the High Court prior to the admission of the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the primary purpose of the notice requirement under Order 43, Rule 3 is to ensure the respondent is aware of the proceedings. Since the respondents were represented by counsel and appeared before the Division Bench before the appeal was admitted to regular hearing, the object of the statutory notice was satisfied. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that an appellant cannot be non-suited on technical grounds when the underlying purpose of the procedural requirement has been effectively achieved through the respondent's actual participation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to serve notice under Order 43, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 necessitate the dismissal of an appeal if the respondent has already appeared in the proceedings?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed on technical grounds when the underlying purpose of a mandatory procedural notice has been satisfied?
  • Does the appearance of a respondent's counsel before the admission of an appeal satisfy the requirement of notice under Order 43, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Hussain vs The State1997 SCMR 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-17
  visual identificationsource of lightcapital punishmentpartial acquittalbenefit of doubtreassessing evidencecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Sajjad Hussain, for the murders of three women under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the visual identification of the petitioner in the dead of night, absent the seizure of the electric bulb used as a source of light, and the partial acquittal of a co-accused, rendered the conviction unsafe. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that observations in precedent regarding the non-production of a light source are confined to their specific facts and do not establish an inflexible rule of law requiring production of the light source to sustain a conviction. The Court affirmed that ocular testimony of related witnesses, corroborated by natural presence and immediate reporting, was reliable, and that partial acquittal of a co-accused does not vitiate the conviction of another where distinguishable roles are established. The key principle laid down is that the evidentiary value of visual identification in darkness depends on the quality of light and opportunity to view, and failure to produce the physical source of light does not ipso facto invalidate credible eyewitness testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to seize and produce in evidence the electric bulb used as a source of light vitiates an eyewitness identification in a dark night?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused based on distinguishing factors preclude the conviction of the main accused on the same evidence?
  • Whether observations made by the Supreme Court regarding the absence of a light source in a prior case constitute an enunciation of a binding legal principle or are confined to the merits of that case?
  • Is the testimony of related eyewitnesses inherently untrustworthy when their presence at the scene of the crime is natural and fully explained?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Ahmed vs Muhammad Aamar And Another1997 SCMR 1134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-22
  post-arrest bailbail granted on minoritymurderleave to appealjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, whereby the respondent was admitted to post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 solely on the ground of minority. The core legal question concerns whether minority alone constitutes a sufficient ground for the grant of bail in a capital case, notwithstanding the gravity of the allegations and the specific role attributed to the accused. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention raised regarding the improper exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail requires detailed examination, particularly where the accused is alleged to have played a principal role in opening fire on the deceased. The principle laid down is that while courts possess the discretion to grant bail to minors in cases punishable with death or transportation for life, such discretion must be exercised by duly considering the attendant circumstances and gravity of the crime rather than relying solely on the age of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minority alone is a sufficient ground for the grant of post-arrest bail in a case punishable with death?
  • Can the attendant circumstances of a crime be ignored while exercising discretion to grant bail to a minor accused of murder?
  • Does the specific role of opening fire on the deceased outweigh the ground of minority when considering a bail petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Saifullah Khan And Another vs Javed Iqbal And Another1997 SCMR 1210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-02
  general power of attorneysale of propertyconcurrent findingsburden of proofattestation of documentsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, Saifullah Khan and Mst. Nizakat Afza, filed a civil suit seeking to declare a registered sale deed executed by their brother, respondent Nisar Ahmad, in favor of Javed Iqbal regarding a residential property as illegal, ineffective, and without consideration, alleging that they had not authorized the sale and that the general powers of attorney relied upon were fictitious and fraudulent. The trial court, the District Judge, and the Peshawar High Court concurrently dismissed the suit and the subsequent revision petition. Upon seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the petitioners contended that the powers of attorney were fraudulent, attesting witnesses were not produced in violation of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, and handwriting expert examination was improperly denied. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to produce direct evidence to substantiate their claims of fraud, relying instead on hearsay through their attorney, while the written statement and evidence supported the validity of the execution. The Court consequently refused leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the validity of general powers of attorney warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the failure of plaintiffs to appear as witnesses and rely solely on hearsay evidence through an attorney invalidate their challenge to a registered sale deed?
  • Whether Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order applies to general powers of attorney without proof that they compulsorily require attestation by witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Sahib Khan vs Agricultural Development Bank of PAKISTANAnd Other1997 SCMR 953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-16
  Banking Tribunals Ordinanceex parte decreeexecution proceedingsbank guaranteestay of executionintra-court appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's Intra-Court Appeal against the refusal to stay execution proceedings initiated by the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984. The petitioner, having suffered an ex parte money decree due to failure to apply for leave to defend, sought to stay execution proceedings. The Banking Tribunal had granted a conditional stay requiring a bank guarantee, which the petitioner failed to provide, leading to the recall of the stay. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to stay the execution proceedings despite the petitioner's challenge to the constitutionality of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the Banking Tribunal acted within its authority in recalling the stay upon the petitioner's failure to comply with the condition of furnishing a bank guarantee. The Court affirmed that the mere pendency of a challenge to the validity of the Ordinance before a larger bench does not automatically warrant a stay of execution of a decree.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Banking Tribunal justified in recalling a stay order if the judgment debtor fails to furnish the required bank guarantee?
  • Does the mere pendency of a constitutional challenge against the Banking Tribunals Ordinance 1984 before a larger bench constitute sufficient grounds to stay the execution of a decree passed by such a tribunal?
  • Can a writ petition be used to nullify the effect of a default in complying with conditional stay orders granted by a Banking Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Sahab Khan And 4 Others vs The State And Other1997 SCMR 871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-04
  appellate judgmentreasoned judgmentSection 367 CrPCremandcriminal appealevaluation of evidencemiscarriage of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal appeals against a High Court judgment that upheld convictions for murder and attempted murder while altering the conviction of two appellants from Section 304(I) PPC to Section 302 PPC. The core legal question was whether the High Court's appellate judgment satisfied the mandatory requirements of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which necessitates that a judgment contain points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for the decision. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to analytically discuss the evidence or address the specific legal and factual contentions raised by the appellants, rendering the judgment legally insufficient. The Court established the principle that an appellate court must provide a reasoned, analytical evaluation of the evidence on record to satisfy the requirements of Section 367 Cr.P.C. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for a fresh hearing and decision on the merits, emphasizing that appellate courts cannot decide cases summarily without proper discussion of the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court judgment in a criminal appeal satisfy the requirements of Section 367 Cr.P.C. if it fails to analytically discuss the evidence on record?
  • Is an appellate court required to address specific legal and factual contentions raised by the parties in its judgment?
  • Can the Supreme Court substitute its own decision on the merits of a case when the lower appellate court has failed to provide a reasoned judgment?
  • What are the mandatory components of a criminal judgment under Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Safiullah Siddiqui vs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Limited1997 SCMR 926 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-25
  ex parte decreesetting aside ex parte decreeservice of summonsregistered officetransfer of suitcourt motion noticeadvocate negligencecorporate service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a High Court order setting aside an ex parte judgment and decree passed against the respondent corporation in a suit for recovery of employment dues. The primary legal issue was whether service of court motion notice on the dealing clerk of a branch office after transfer of the suit constituted valid legal service under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether an ex parte decree can be maintained under Section 24A(2) or Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. The Supreme Court held that service of court motion notice must strictly comply with the designated address for service under Order III Rule 5 and Order XXIX Rule 2 C.P.C., or at the registered office of a corporation under company law, rather than an unapproved branch location. The Court further laid down that while Section 24A(2) C.P.C. obligates parties to appear before transferee courts upon direction, failure of the court to issue proper directions and subsequent reliance on invalid service invalidates ex parte proceedings. Additionally, negligence of an advocate generally binds the client, but non-service of notice at the statutory address entitles the defendant to set aside the ex parte decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does service of a court motion notice on a corporation at a branch office constitute valid service under Order XXIX Rule 2 C.P.C. when a registered office address is specified in the suit?
  • Can an ex parte decree be sustained under Section 24A(2) C.P.C. where the transferor court fails to direct the parties to appear before the transferee court on a specified date?
  • Does the negligence of an advocate in failing to appear after proper service bind the client in proceedings under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C.?
  • Can the proviso to Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. validate an ex parte decree where there is no evidence that the defendant had actual knowledge of the hearing date?
  Read full judgment →
• Saffar Khan vs The State1997 SCMR 1983 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-10
  forfeiture of bondsurety bondreduction of penaltyabscondence of accusedmisuse of bailremission of penaltySection 514 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court order that reduced the forfeited bail bond penalty from Rs.50,000 to Rs.40,000 under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, who stood surety for an accused charged under various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code including Section 302, sought further reduction of the penalty on humanitarian grounds, contending that he acted purely out of benevolence without monetary gain. The core question was whether the petitioner was entitled to further leniency and remission of the forfeited surety amount upon the abscondence of the accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing leave to appeal. The Court held that excessive leniency by courts in imposing penalties under Section 514 encourages the misuse of bail and promotes abscondence. The High Court had already appropriately exercised its discretion by remitting Rs.10,000, and no justification existed for any further reduction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a surety claim further reduction of a forfeited bail bond penalty solely on the ground of having acted out of benevolence without monetary consideration?
  • Whether unwarranted leniency by courts in imposing penalties under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 promotes abscondence and misuse of bail concessions?
  • Under what circumstances is an appellate or revisional court justified in refusing further remission of a forfeited surety bond?
  Read full judgment →
• Safdar Ali Malik vs The Estate Officer, Estate Office, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad And Other1997 SCMR 605 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-08
  allotment of government quartercivil servantinfructuous appealterms and conditions of serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal with leave of the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the appellant civil servant's writ petition challenging the cancellation of the allotment of a government quarter on the ground that the matter pertained to terms and conditions of service and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether such allotment constituted a term of service, in light of a prior precedent holding otherwise. During the proceedings, it was brought to the Court's attention that the appellant had subsequently been allotted and accepted another quarter, as acknowledged by an occupation report and a subsequent letter to the Estate Officer, although the appellant contended he was forced to sign those documents and had not yet physically occupied the premises. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent allotment and acknowledgment rendered the present appeal infructuous. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as having become infructuous, allowing the appellant to occupy the newly allotted quarter if he had not already done so.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the allotment of quarters by the Government to civil servants constitutes a term of service?
  • What is the effect on an appeal when the grievance regarding the subject matter has been redressed through a subsequent allotment during the pendency of the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabz Ali Khan vs Bismillah Khan And Another1997 SCMR 1781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-30
  cantonment rent restrictionlandlord and tenantdefault in payment of rentdenial of titlenotice of transferejectmentregistered sale-deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court confirming the ejectment of the petitioner from a rented shop under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, on grounds of default in payment of rent and denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant. The core legal questions involved whether a registered sale-deed of the premises operates as notice of transfer to the tenant, whether a statutory notice of transfer is a mandatory prerequisite under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, in the absence of a provision akin to Section 13-A of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and whether a tenant can withhold rent merely by setting up a title dispute through a civil suit. The Supreme Court held that the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, contains no requirement for a written notice of transfer to the tenant, that a registered sale-deed serves as public notice, and that a tenant cannot deny the landlord's title or withhold rent on a vexatious or unsubstantiated claim of ownership. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether service of a written notice of transfer of premises to a tenant is a mandatory prerequisite under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Does the registration of a sale-deed operate as a public notice of transfer of property to the tenant?
  • Can a tenant deny the relationship of landlord and tenant and withhold rent merely by filing a civil suit claiming title based on an agreement to sell?
  • How should a Rent Controller distinguish between a genuine dispute of title and a frivolous or vexatious denial raised by a tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• S.T. Rehman vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary1997 PLC (C.S.) 1207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-22
  supersessionpromotionAnnual Confidential ReportsFederal Service Tribunalleave to appeallimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Grade-20 officer in Pakistan Audit and Accounts, challenged his supersession to Grade-21 before the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal as time-barred and beyond jurisdiction due to failure to challenge adverse or average Annual Confidential Reports (A.C.Rs) within the prescribed period. The petitioner then sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arguing that the uncommunicated average A.C.Rs could not bar his appeal and that his representation against supersession validly raised all related grievances. The core legal questions concerned whether a representation against supersession encompasses challenges to ACR quantification, whether unconveyed ACRs affecting promotion can be challenged before the Tribunal, whether a writ petition can substitute for a departmental representation, and how limitation periods for challenging ACRs should be computed. The Supreme Court held that the legal aspects raised questions of public importance and granted leave to appeal to thoroughly examine these matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether or not representation of an aggrieved person against supersession includes challenge to quantification, propriety of A.C.Rs, and criteria for selection?
  • Whether or not A.C.Rs, which are obviously concealed from incumbent, though may not be adverse, yet directly affect the future career and his right of further promotion can be challenged by way of appeal before Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Whether writ petition challenging propriety of undisclosed A.C.Rs, can constitute notice to competent authority and be substituted for representation to approach Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Whether or not question of limitation for challenging A.C.Rs, would be relatable to period when aggrieved person becomes aware about it?
  Read full judgment →
• S.T. Rehman vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad And 3 Others1997 PLC (C. S.) 1207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-22
  promotionsupersessionAnnual Confidential ReportsFederal Service Tribunalservice lawlimitation periodcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Grade-20 officer in the Pakistan Audit and Accounts service, challenged his supersession for promotion to Grade-21. Despite being eligible, the Selection Board recommended junior officers over him, citing 'Average' Annual Confidential Reports (A.C.Rs.) as the basis for his exclusion. The petitioner's appeal to the Federal Service Tribunal was dismissed on grounds of limitation and failure to challenge the A.C.Rs. earlier. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, arguing that the 'Average' A.C.Rs. were never communicated to him, thereby preventing him from challenging them earlier, and that the reporting and countersigning authorities were the same, suggesting mala fides. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying significant legal questions regarding whether a representation against supersession inherently includes a challenge to the quantification and propriety of A.C.Rs., whether undisclosed A.C.Rs. affecting career progression can be challenged before the Tribunal, and whether the limitation period for challenging such reports commences only upon the aggrieved person's awareness of them.

  Questions settled

  • Does a representation against supersession include a challenge to the quantification, propriety of A.C.Rs., and the criteria for selection?
  • Can A.C.Rs. that were concealed from an incumbent, even if not explicitly adverse, be challenged by way of appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal if they affect future promotion?
  • Can a writ petition challenging the propriety of undisclosed A.C.Rs. be substituted for a formal representation to the competent authority for the purpose of approaching the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Does the limitation period for challenging A.C.Rs. commence from the date the aggrieved person becomes aware of them?
  Read full judgment →
• S.M. Rizwan Abidi vs Shamsul Mulk, Chairman, Water and, Power1997 SCMR 1109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-25
  contempt of courtservice lawannual confidential reportmove-overpromotion criteriaadministrative discretionWAPDA
  Summary & questions settled

  This contempt petition arose from the petitioner's allegation that the respondent, Chairman WAPDA, defied a Supreme Court order regarding his entitlement to a move-over to BPS-20. The core legal question was whether the respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's previous judgment, which had mandated the expunction of adverse Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) used to deny the petitioner's promotion. The Court held that while there was no deliberate or contumacious disregard of its prior order, the respondent’s assessment of the petitioner’s eligibility was flawed. Specifically, the Court ruled that the evaluation of performance by immediate supervisors, who possess better opportunities to adjudge an employee's work and conduct, should prevail over the assessment of higher authorities when no reasons for disagreement are provided. Consequently, the Court treated the petitioner’s 1986 ACR as 'Good,' thereby satisfying the criteria for the move-over. The contempt petition was dismissed, but the Court directed the respondent to grant the petitioner the move-over to BPS-20 effective from March 1987.

  Questions settled

  • Does the evaluation of an employee by immediate supervisors prevail over higher authorities when no reasons for disagreement are provided?
  • Can a contempt petition be dismissed if the respondent's non-compliance is found to be a result of flawed assessment rather than deliberate defiance?
  • Are Annual Confidential Reports without the countersignature of the designated authority valid for denying a promotion or move-over?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Masood Ali and 4 others vs Director-General, Bureau of Emigration1997 PLC (C.S.) 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-27
  service tribunalpromotionseniorityres judicataleave to appealjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises petitions for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the promotion and seniority of civil servants. The core legal questions involve whether a second round of litigation before the Service Tribunal was barred by the principles of res judicata, limitation, and the jurisdictional restriction under Section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, particularly where matters regarding promotion and seniority had already been subjected to prior adjudication by the Supreme Court. The Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised questions of public importance concerning the competency of successive service appeals, the finality of prior determinations, and the jurisdictional limits of the Service Tribunal regarding departmental seniority and promotion matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal is barred by res judicata when the matters in issue have already been decided up to the Supreme Court?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal exceed its jurisdiction under Section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, when determining and declaring seniority of civil servants?
  • Whether a civil servant can challenge a promotion notification when their own departmental representation regarding a provisional seniority list is still pending?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Masood Ali And 4 Others vs Director General, Bureau of Emigration1997 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-27
  Service Tribunals Act 1973Res judicataSeniority disputePromotion eligibilityLeave to appealJurisdiction of Service TribunalCivil service law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the promotion and seniority of civil servants. The core legal questions involve whether the Tribunal erred in entertaining a subsequent appeal on the same subject matter after a prior Supreme Court decision, and whether it exceeded its jurisdiction under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The petitioners argued that the Tribunal's decision was barred by the principle of res judicata, that the appeal was time-barred, and that the Tribunal lacked the authority to re-adjudicate seniority and promotion eligibility already settled by this Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these propositions of public importance. The Court aims to determine if the Tribunal acted beyond the jurisdictional restrictions contained in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and whether the principles of finality of litigation were upheld. The judgment highlights the necessity of strictly adhering to statutory limitations and the doctrine of res judicata in service matters to prevent endless litigation over seniority and promotion disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal is barred by the principle of res judicata if the underlying seniority dispute was previously adjudicated by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to determine seniority and promotion eligibility in contravention of the restrictions contained in Section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Can a departmental representation and subsequent appeal be entertained by the Service Tribunal if they are filed after the dismissal of a related petition by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Masood Ali And 4 Other vs Director-General, Bureau of Emigration1997 PLC (C.S.) 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-27
  civil servicepromotionseniorityres judicatajurisdiction of service tribunalservice mattersleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal concerning the promotion and seniority of civil servants. The respondent challenged the promotion of the petitioners to Assistant Director (B-17), claiming he was senior and that the petitioners were ineligible for promotion. In a previous round of litigation, the Supreme Court had dismissed the respondent's appeal, noting that his seniority claim was pending departmental review and that he could not claim promotion over the petitioners until his seniority was established. Subsequently, the respondent filed a new appeal before the Tribunal, which ruled in his favor, declaring the petitioners ineligible and the respondent entitled to the promotion. The petitioners challenged this, arguing the matter was res judicata, the appeal was time-barred, and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction under section 4(1)(b) of the Act and whether the principles of res judicata and limitation barred the respondent's subsequent challenge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate promotion disputes where the fitness of a civil servant is involved under section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Can a matter previously decided by the Supreme Court be re-litigated before the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Is a service appeal maintainable if the underlying departmental representation is time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Roazi Khan And Others vs Nasir And Other1997 SCMR 1849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-07-07
  revisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factremand of caseadverse possessionrevenue entriesarbitration awardframing of issues
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan, which set aside concurrent findings of the lower courts and remanded the case for fresh evidence and trial. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court rightly interfered with concurrent findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C., and whether the remand of the case was justified. The Supreme Court held that the High Court overstepped its revisional jurisdiction by disturbing concurrent findings of fact without establishing any jurisdictional error, perversity, or material misreading of evidence by the lower courts. Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that remanding the case was unwarranted since sufficient evidence was already available on record for a final adjudication. The key principles laid down are that revisional powers under section 115 C.P.C. are strictly curative for jurisdictional defects and cannot be used to overturn concurrent findings of fact based on a reappraisal of evidence, and that remand should not be ordered as a matter of routine when the existing record is sufficient to decide the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C.?
  • Under what circumstances is an appellate or revisional court justified in remanding a case to the trial court for recording fresh evidence?
  • Does an arbitration award that has not been made a rule of the court affect the rights of persons who were not parties to the arbitration agreement?
  • What is the proper scope of the revisional powers of the High Court under section 115 C.P.C. regarding evaluation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Rizwan Ahmed And 2 Others vs The State1997 SCMR 1097 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-11
  statutory bailpre-trial detentionleave to appealOffences Against Propertyprolonged incarcerationbail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's order rejecting the petitioners' bail application in a criminal case. The petitioners were charged under Section 17(3) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, read with Sections 436, 336, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident involving arson and robbery at an office. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners were entitled to statutory bail given that they had been incarcerated for more than two years without the charge being framed. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were entitled to relief based on the duration of their pre-trial detention. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and admitted the petitioners to bail, subject to the furnishing of surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court. The key principle affirmed is that prolonged pre-trial incarceration, specifically exceeding the statutory threshold for bail, constitutes a valid ground for the grant of bail, even in serious offenses, provided the statutory requirements are met.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to frame a charge within two years of arrest entitle an accused to statutory bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant bail to petitioners if the High Court failed to consider the statutory period of detention?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Ullah vs The State1997 SCMR 1009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-12
  leave to appealidentification paradebank robberycriminal evidenceHudood lawsappreciation of evidencedelayed identification
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which affirmed the petitioner's conviction under Section 17(3) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for his alleged involvement in a bank robbery. The core legal questions concern the sufficiency of evidence leading to the petitioner's arrest, the evidentiary value of recovering items of a general nature, and the reliability of an identification parade conducted fifteen days after the petitioner's arrest. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the identification parade occurred after the petitioner had been in custody for a significant period, providing ample opportunity for the witnesses to have seen him. The Court held that it must examine whether the conviction, based on such identification and general recoveries, aligns with established principles of criminal justice administration. The key principle laid down is that the timing and circumstances of an identification parade are critical to the reliability of identification evidence, and convictions based on delayed parades following potential exposure to witnesses require rigorous judicial scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Does an identification parade conducted fifteen days after an accused's arrest, where witnesses had prior opportunity to view the accused, satisfy the requirements for reliable identification evidence?
  • Can the recovery of items of a general nature, such as a turban or handkerchief, serve as sufficient corroborative evidence to sustain a conviction for bank robbery?
  • What is the standard for evaluating the nexus between recovered general articles and the commission of a specific criminal offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Ul Haq vs Selection Committee Constituted for Admission to Bolan Medical COLLEGEThrough Secretary, Principal Bolan Medical College, Quetta And 6Other1997 SCMR 1845 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-07-23
  medical college admissiondomicile certificatereserved seatsprovisional admissionregularization of admissionequity and fair playex parte proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a decision of the Balochistan High Court dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition against the Selection Committee, Bolan Medical College, Quetta, which had rejected his application for admission to the first-year M.B.B.S. class on a seat reserved for District Mastung. The core legal questions were whether an applicant possessing a valid domicile certificate issued by the competent authority could be denied admission based on an informal verbal statement that his family did not physically reside in the district, and whether provisional admission granted by court order should be regularized when the student has completed most of the medical course. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was a bona fide resident of District Mastung entitled to admission based on his valid domicile certificate, particularly when his sisters had previously been admitted on the same basis. Relying on principles of justice, equity, and fair play, as well as precedents, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and regularized his admission since he was in his final year of studies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an admission candidate's valid domicile certificate issued by a competent authority can be rejected based on informal verbal statements regarding physical residence?
  • Whether provisional admission granted under an interim order of the Court should be regularized where the student has completed a significant portion of the academic course?
  • Can a Selection Committee deny admission to a candidate on domicile grounds when family members were previously granted admission under the same domicile status?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Ali vs The State1997 SCMR 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-09-03
  leave to appealArms Ordinanceevidentiary contradictionspossession of unlicensed weaponcriminal appealbail pending appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the conviction of the petitioner for an offence under Section 13-D of the Arms Ordinance. The Trial Court had initially sentenced the petitioner to seven years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine, which the High Court subsequently modified to three years of rigorous imprisonment and a reduced fine. The petitioner challenges the conviction on the grounds that the evidence presented by the prosecution contained material contradictions that were not properly appreciated by the lower courts. Furthermore, the petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the absence of a license for the recovered weapon, specifically a Kalashnikov, relying on established precedents regarding the necessity of such proof. The Supreme Court, finding merit in the contentions raised regarding the evidentiary appraisal and the legal requirement to prove the lack of a license, granted leave to appeal. Consequently, the Court admitted the petitioner to bail pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to ask whether a petitioner possessed a license for a recovered weapon constitute a ground for leave to appeal?
  • Can a conviction under the Arms Ordinance be challenged on the basis of unappreciated contradictions in witness testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Shah vs Shamroz1997 SCMR 1800 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-06
  pre-emptionTalab-i-MuwasibatTalb-i-Ishhadwaiverleave to appealconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed his civil revision and maintained the concurrent judgments of the lower courts non-suiting him in a pre-emption suit. The suit was dismissed on the grounds that the petitioner failed to make the requisite 'Talabs' under section 13 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987, and that he had waived his right of pre-emption prior to the sale. The petitioner contended before the Supreme Court that the lower findings suffered from misreading of evidence and that his response to the respondent's offer to buy the land did not constitute waiver under the law. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the petitioner fulfilled the requirements of Talab-i-Muwasibat and Talb-i-Ishhad on the evidence, and whether his reply to the offer constituted waiver within the contemplation of section 15 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioner on the evidence on record fulfilled the requirements of Talab-i-Muwasibat and Talb-i-Ishhad so as to entitle him to successfully pre-empt the sale?
  • Whether the petitioner's reply to the offer made by the respondent for purchasing the disputed land constitutes waiver within the contemplation of section 15 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987?
  Read full judgment →
• Registrar, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad vs Qazi Wali1997 PLC (C.S.) 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-08
  Service of PakistanCivil ServantService Tribunal jurisdictionJudicial independenceSupreme Court employeesTerms and conditions of serviceArticle 208
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed by the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenges a Federal Service Tribunal order that reinstated a Research and Reference Officer of the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether Supreme Court employees, whose service terms are governed by rules framed under Article 208 of the Constitution, qualify as "civil servants" subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that such employees are not "civil servants" under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and thus the Service Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over their service disputes. The Court clarified that while these employees may be in the "service of Pakistan" under Article 260 of the Constitution, the definition of "civil servant" is narrower and excludes those governed by rules framed under Article 208. The ratio establishes that the independence of the judiciary necessitates that the legislature not interfere with the terms and conditions of court staff, rendering them outside the purview of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Consequently, the Tribunal's order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered 'civil servants' under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate service disputes involving employees of the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Is the definition of 'Service of Pakistan' under Article 260 of the Constitution synonymous with the definition of 'civil servant' under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Are rules framed under Article 208 of the Constitution for Supreme Court employees subject to the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashid Mehmood And Others vs Muhammad Riaz Akhtar And 8 Other1997 SCMR 1406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-08
  transfer of immovable property taxboard of revenue memorandumconstitutional jurisdictiontax collectionregistration of deedsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which exercised constitutional jurisdiction to declare a memorandum issued by the Board of Revenue on 29-10-1991 as illegal and without lawful authority. The core legal question concerns whether the Board of Revenue could legally issue instructions requiring the production of receipts showing payment of the immovable property transfer tax before the registration of transfer documents, given that Rule 4(1) of the Punjab Local Councils (Tax on Transfer of Immovable Properties) Rules, 1981 stipulates that the tax becomes due as soon as the sale deed is registered. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the prevention of tax evasion and safeguarding municipal revenue needed examination and consequently granted leave to appeal, while suspending the operation of the impugned judgment during the pendency of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Board of Revenue compel the production of tax payment receipts prior to the registration of an immovable property deed under the Punjab Local Councils (Tax on Transfer of Immovable Properties) Rules, 1981?
  • At what point does the tax on the transfer of immovable property become due under Rule 4(1) of the Punjab Local Councils (Tax on Transfer of Immovable Properties) Rules, 1981?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashid Ahmad vs Mst. Jiwan And 5 Other1997 SCMR 171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-20
  lis pendenstransferee pendente liteimpleadment of partyassignment of interestcivil proceduretransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from an order of the Lahore High Court declining to implead a transferee pendente lite as a respondent in a pending regular second appeal on the ground that the doctrine of lis pendens applied. The core legal question was whether the rule of lis pendens operates as a bar to prevent a pendente lite transferee from being joined as a party to ongoing judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of lis pendens, as embodied in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, only protects the rights of parties from being defeated by a transfer during litigation and does not legally bar the transferee from being impleaded as a party. The Court ruled that under Order XXII, Rule 10, and section 146 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, a person who acquires an interest in the subject-matter during the pendency of proceedings is entitled to be joined as a party. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rule of lis pendens can be set up as a bar to an application by a transferee pendente lite from being impleaded as a party to pending proceedings?
  • Does section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 preclude a transferee during litigation from being made a party?
  • Are the provisions of section 146 and Order 22, Rule 10 of the C.P.C. applicable to appeals involving the devolution of interest?
  Read full judgment →
• Ramzan Alias Jani vs The State1997 SCMR 590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-21
  criminal appealmurdersubstitution of accusedocular evidencemedical evidence contradictionbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the appellant's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while altering his death sentence to life imprisonment for the murder of Amanat. The core legal question involves the sustainability of a conviction based on delayed substitution of the accused in the First Information Report, discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence, and an unproven motive. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond a reasonable doubt due to unexplained omission of the appellant's name in the initial report, material contradictions between the testimony of interested witnesses and medical evidence showing multiple injuries and independent shots, and the substitution of the accused long after the incident. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of the murder charge, laying down the principle that substitution of accused persons after delay, coupled with medical inconsistencies and lack of corroboration from independent witnesses, renders a capital conviction unsafe.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained when the accused was not named in the initial First Information Report and was substituted later?
  • Does a material conflict between ocular testimony regarding the number of shots fired and medical evidence showing multiple independent wounds weaken the prosecution case?
  • What is the legal effect of withholding the maker of the First Information Report and material eye-witnesses during trial?
  • Can a capital sentence be maintained on the basis of an extra-judicial confession and testimony from interested witnesses lacking independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Rustam Ali Khan vs Muhammad Hanif And 6 Other1997 SCMR 2008 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-07-04
  constitutional jurisdictionmala fidepolice investigationjudicial reviewanti-corruptionwrit petitionroving inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an interim order passed by the Lahore High Court in a constitutional petition. The respondents had filed a writ petition alleging that the registration of an FIR and subsequent investigation by the Anti-Corruption Establishment were mala fide and motivated by political rivalry. The High Court, in its interim order, had summoned official investigation files and records from the Anti-Corruption Department to determine the veracity of these mala fide allegations. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court possesses constitutional jurisdiction to examine allegations of mala fide, it cannot engage in a roving inquiry or assume the role of an investigator. Citing established precedents, the Court reaffirmed that the judiciary should not interfere with the police's statutory duty to investigate. Furthermore, the Court held that allegations of mala fide must be pleaded with particularity and proven by the party asserting them; they cannot be used as a basis to launch a fishing expedition into government files. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order summoning the investigation records and directed the High Court to decide the writ petition on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court summon investigation files to conduct a roving inquiry into allegations of mala fide?
  • Is the judiciary permitted to interfere with the police's statutory power to register and investigate criminal cases?
  • What is the standard of proof required when alleging mala fide against official acts?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to assume the role of an investigator under its constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Rafique Ahmad Chaudhry vs Ahmad Nawaz Malik and others1997 PLC (C.S.) 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-10-21
  petition for leave to appealtransfer orderinterim suspensionwrit petitionservice matterjurisdiction of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court suspending the transfer order of the petitioner while admitting a writ petition. The core legal question raised is whether the High Court was justified in suspending the transfer order in a writ petition, particularly in light of the jurisdictional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 relating to matters concerning terms and conditions of civil servants. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petition raised substantial questions meriting consideration and accordingly granted leave to appeal, while also suspending the operation of the impugned interim order of the High Court pending the final disposal of the appeal. The key principle laid down is that interim suspension of administrative transfer orders by the High Court in service matters warrants close scrutiny by the apex court, especially regarding constitutional competency and the propriety of interim relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in suspending an administrative transfer order in a writ petition?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 bar the maintainability of a writ petition against a transfer order of a civil servant?
  • Is it a fit case to grant leave to appeal against an interim order suspending a transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Rafique Ahmad Chaudhry vs Ahmad Nawaz Malik And Other1997 SCMR 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  leave to appealwrit jurisdictionservice mattertransfer orderinterim reliefconstitutional barArticle 212
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which suspended a transfer order of the petitioner while admitting a writ petition filed by respondent No. 1. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerns the competency of the High Court to entertain a writ petition regarding a transfer order in light of the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and whether the High Court was justified in suspending the transfer order pending the adjudication of the writ petition. The Supreme Court, finding merit in the petitioner's arguments regarding the potential lack of jurisdiction and the impropriety of the interim relief granted, granted leave to appeal. Consequently, the Court held that the impugned order of the High Court suspending the transfer was suspended until the final disposal of the appeal. The case establishes that the propriety of granting interim relief, such as the suspension of a transfer order, in matters potentially barred by Article 212, requires rigorous judicial scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition challenging a transfer order competent before the High Court in view of Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Is the High Court justified in suspending a transfer order while admitting a writ petition in a service matter?
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• Qalb E Abbas Alias Nahola vs The State1997 SCMR 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-16
  murderunlawful assemblyconstructive liabilityinterested witnessescorroborationmotiveacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 302/149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of the deceased, which the High Court maintained despite acquitting his four co-accused. The core legal question was whether motive could corroborate the testimony of interested eye-witnesses and whether constructive liability under Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, could be sustained following the acquittal of all other alleged members of the unlawful assembly. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was unsustainable. It reaffirmed that motive is neither substantive nor corroborative evidence, but merely a circumstance that can be a double-edged weapon. Consequently, it cannot bridge the evidentiary gap left by interested witnesses. Furthermore, the Court ruled that once all co-accused are acquitted, the charge of unlawful assembly under Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, necessarily fails. As the prosecution failed to provide independent corroboration for the interested eye-witnesses and the constructive liability charge was legally untenable, the appellant's conviction was set aside, and he was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can motive serve as sufficient corroboration for the testimony of interested witnesses in a criminal case?
  • Is a conviction under Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sustainable when all other co-accused have been acquitted?
  • Does the existence of motive or enmity constitute substantive or direct evidence for a criminal conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Qadeer Ahmad vs Ghulam Murtaza And Another1997 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-13
  murderacquittalocular evidencedelay in FIRSupreme Court appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, was filed by the complainant Qadeer Ahmed against the acquittal of respondent Ghulam Murtaza, who had been initially convicted by the trial court under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Naseer Ahmed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction and acquitting the respondent based on the unreliability of ocular evidence, unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R., and inconsistencies regarding the presence of eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the acquittal by the High Court was based on cogent and valid grounds, noting that the presence of the alleged eye-witnesses at the scene was highly doubtful and that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the principle that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal order unless the grounds are arbitrary or perverse, which was not the case here.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court's judgment of acquittal warrants interference by the Supreme Court when based on cogent and valid grounds?
  • Does the unexplained absence of alleged eye-witnesses taking the injured to the hospital cast serious doubt on their presence at the scene?
  • Whether a delay in lodging the first information report without plausible explanation undermines the prosecution's case in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of the Punjab through Secretary, Health Department vs Dr. S. Muhammad Zafar Bukhari1997 PLD Supreme Court 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-27
  contempt proceedingsjudgment per incuriamterms and conditions of servicejurisdiction of High Courtservice tribunalnullitypromotionvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from orders passed by the Lahore High Court in contempt proceedings initiated for the non-implementation of a judgment dated 29th April, 1989, delivered in a writ petition. The respondent civil servant had challenged service rules regarding promotion qualifications for medical college professors, and the High Court had ruled that Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC) regulations prevailed over provincial service rules. The Supreme Court examined the validity of implementing such a judgment and whether a judgment rendered contrary to binding Supreme Court precedents and in a matter barred by Article 212 of the Constitution could be enforced through contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment was rendered per incuriam and was without jurisdiction as the matter pertained to terms and conditions of civil servants falling exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, and that a judgment which is a nullity cannot be enforced via contempt proceedings. The appeal was accepted and the impugned orders were quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment passed by a High Court in disregard of binding Supreme Court precedents is a judgment per incuriam?
  • Can a judgment or order that is a nullity in law be enforced through contempt of court proceedings?
  • Does the jurisdiction to determine terms and conditions of service of civil servants lie exclusively with the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Whether a civil servant has a vested right in the terms and conditions of a higher post before promotion to it?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Through Secretary, Health Department, Lahore vs Dr.1997 PLC (C.S.) 157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-15
  leave to appealservice rulespromotioncontempt of courtPakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Province of Punjab, sought leave to appeal against orders passed by the Lahore High Court in contempt proceedings arising from the non-implementation of a judgment dated 29-4-1989. The respondent had originally challenged service rules regarding qualifications for the post of Professor, and the High Court had previously declared the respondent eligible for promotion in accordance with Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulations. During contempt proceedings, the High Court recorded undertakings by the Secretary SGA&I to consider the respondent's promotion under those regulations and disposed of the matter. The petitioner contended before the Supreme Court that this direction conflicted with a prior precedent of the Supreme Court establishing that the terms and conditions of civil servants are governed by civil servant acts and rules rather than independent medical council regulations. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and stayed the operation of the impugned orders, holding that arguable questions regarding the binding effect of prior Supreme Court precedents on service matters required consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant are governed by Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulations or by the applicable civil servants act and rules?
  • Can a High Court issue directions in contempt proceedings contrary to settled principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether service rules framed by the provincial government prevail over external professional council regulations in matters of civil servant promotions?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Through Collector Bahawalpur, District, Bahawalpur And Others vs Col. Abdul Majeed And Other1997 SCMR 1692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-25
  land acquisitionmarket valuepotential valuecompulsory acquisition chargesappellate powersnon-appealing respondents
  Summary & questions settled

  This batch of civil appeals arises from separate proceedings for the compulsory acquisition of land situated in village Hansra, Bahawalpur, under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal questions involved whether a subsequent notification under section 4 was a mere corrigendum, whether the High Court was justified in granting relief to non-appealing respondents under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the proper determination of market value considering the potential value of the land rather than solely relying on one-year average sale prices. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the subsequent notification was an independent superseding notification rather than a corrigendum, confirmed that appellate courts possess wide amplitude under Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C. and inherent powers to grant relief to non-appealing respondents to prevent contradictory orders and injustice, and held that one-year average sales cannot be the sole yardstick while assessing market value where land possesses high potential value due to its proximity to developed areas. The Court modified the compensation rate to a flat rate of Rs. 3,500 per Marla for the entire land while maintaining statutory charges and interest.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 operates as a corrigendum or as an independent superseding notification?
  • Can an appellate court grant relief to respondents who have neither filed an appeal nor cross-objections under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Is one year's average sale price of land preceding the notification under section 4 the sole permissible criterion for assessing market value under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Should the potential value and future use of acquired land be factored into the determination of its market value for compensation?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab and others vs Shah Muhammad Chaudhry1997 PLC (C.S.) 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-14
  service lawdeputationpromotionnotional promotionconfidential reportsservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had directed the provincial government to consider the respondent's promotion from the date his juniors were promoted. The respondent, while on deputation to Pakistan Steel Mills, was bypassed for promotion due to adverse remarks in his Confidential Reports, which were later expunged, and missing records. The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to consideration for promotion while on deputation, in accordance with the provincial government's policy regarding officers on deputation. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, noting that the government failed to follow its own policy of informing the officer of his promotion eligibility and offering him the option to revert to his parent department. The Court held that the government had sufficient time to reconsider the respondent's case after the expunction of adverse remarks and the availability of missing records. Furthermore, the Court observed that granting the respondent notional promotion would not adversely affect his juniors, as he had since been absorbed into the service of Pakistan Steel Mills.

  Questions settled

  • Is a government servant on deputation entitled to be considered for promotion by their parent department?
  • Does the failure to expunge adverse remarks and consider a complete service record invalidate a promotion decision?
  • Can a government servant be granted notional promotion after they have been absorbed into the service of another organization?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab And Other vs Shah Muhammad Chaudhry1997 PLC (C. S.) 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-14
  deputationnotional promotionexpunction of adverse remarkssenioritycivil serviceService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Province of Punjab against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had directed the petitioners to consider the respondent's promotion from the date his juniors were promoted. The respondent, while on deputation to the Pakistan Steel Mills, was bypassed for promotion on multiple occasions. He was initially superseded due to adverse remarks in his Confidential Report, which were subsequently expunged, and later deferred because of missing Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). The Service Tribunal accepted the respondent's appeal, noting that under the S&GAD Policy Letter dated 20-11-1982, an officer on deputation must be considered for promotion in turn and given an option to revert to the parent department. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that because the adverse remarks were expunged and the missing ACRs became available before the respondent's absorption into the Steel Mills, his case should have been reconsidered. Since the respondent had already been absorbed into another service, the promotion was purely notional and did not affect his juniors' seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant on deputation is entitled to be considered for promotion in turn and given an option to revert to their parent department upon clearance?
  • What is the effect of the expunction of adverse remarks and the subsequent availability of missing ACRs on a civil servant's deferred promotion case?
  • Is the non-joinder of junior officers fatal to a service appeal when the promotion sought from a back date is purely notional and does not affect their seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Principal, Quaid E Azam Medical College, Bahawalpur And Another vs Nasim Ahmad And Another1997 SCMR 583 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-19
  medical educationexamination eligibilityacademic regulationsstudent rightsinterpretation of statutesFirst Professional M.B.,B.S. Examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which allowed an Intra-Court Appeal filed by a medical student against his expulsion from Quaid-i-Azam Medical College, Bahawalpur. The student had been debarred from studies after failing to clear the First Professional M.B.,B.S. examination within four attempts. The core legal question was whether examinations for which a student was ineligible due to a shortage of required lectures counted towards the four-chance limit prescribed by the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council regulations. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the four-chance limit only commences once a student becomes eligible to sit for the examination, which requires the completion of the requisite number of lectures and practicals. Since the respondent had not met the attendance criteria for the first three examinations, those attempts could not be counted against him. Consequently, the Court held that the student was entitled to avail of the remaining three chances, dismissing the college's appeal and confirming the student's right to continue his medical education.

  Questions settled

  • Does an examination for which a student is ineligible due to a shortage of lectures count as a 'chance' under the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council regulations?
  • When does the four-chance limit for clearing the First Professional M.B.,B.S. examination commence for a medical student?
  • Is a student entitled to continue medical education if they have not exhausted four eligible attempts at the First Professional M.B.,B.S. examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Muhammad Qureshi vs Chairman, Pof Board, Wah Cantt. And 51997 SCMR 1452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-07
  leave to appealservice matteradverse remarksAnnual Confidential ReportsupersessionpromotionFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an officer in the Pakistan Ordnance Factory, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed his appeal regarding his supersession for promotion. The petitioner had previously challenged adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Reports (A.C.R.) for 1986 and 1987, which were initially expunged by the Tribunal. Despite this, the petitioner was superseded for promotion to BPS-20 by his juniors. Although the Tribunal initially directed his promotion, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to implead the promoted incumbents. Upon remand, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that authorities failed to consider his corrected A.C.Rs. and that a promoted junior lacked the requisite N.I.P.A. course qualification. The Supreme Court found substance in these contentions, noting that the petitioner's promotion consideration was based on outdated, adverse remarks rather than his corrected records. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the authorities erred in ignoring the corrected A.C.Rs. and the qualification requirements for the promoted juniors.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of authorities to consider corrected Annual Confidential Reports when determining promotion eligibility constitute a valid ground for judicial review?
  • Can an officer be superseded for promotion based on adverse remarks that have been subsequently expunged?
  • Whether the lack of mandatory training qualifications, such as the N.I.P.A. course, renders a promotion of a junior officer legally challengeable?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Zafar Butt vs Muhammad Hanif1997 SCMR 1185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-07-04
  ejectment applicationlandlord-tenant relationshiprent controller jurisdictiondisputed titlecivil court jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an Additional Rent Controller's order directing the petitioner to approach a civil court to determine property title in an ejectment matter. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller and the High Court erred in refusing to adjudicate an ejectment application when the respondent disputed the petitioner's title to the property. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit because the petitioner failed to produce material before the Rent Controller establishing a landlord-tenant relationship between the original owner and the respondent. Consequently, the petitioner, having stepped into the shoes of the original owner, could not substantiate his status as landlord. The Court affirmed that while the High Court's specific direction for the petitioner to seek a title determination in civil court was uncalled for, the Rent Controller was justified in declining jurisdiction over the ejectment application. The principle laid down is that in the absence of established evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship, a Rent Controller cannot entertain an ejectment application, and the claimant must instead pursue remedies for possession in a civil court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller entertain an ejectment application when the landlord-tenant relationship is not established?
  • Is a Rent Controller competent to adjudicate a dispute regarding the title of a property?
  • What is the appropriate forum for a claimant to seek possession when the landlord-tenant relationship is denied by the occupant?
  Read full judgment →
• Panel 20 Companies And Another vs Pakistan Herald Ltd. Through Director, Finance And Corporate Affairs1997 SCMR 1256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-08
  income taxreopening of assessmentdefinite informationchange of opinionset-off of lossessubsidiary companyconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that allowed Constitution petitions filed by the respondent, invalidating a notice issued under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance. The respondent company had entered into an agreement with another company, Matri Publications, to manage an Urdu newspaper, bearing all losses and sharing profits, and had fully disclosed these facts in its returns. Over multiple assessment years, Matri's losses claimed by the respondent were subjected to various proceedings and ultimately allowed. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer issued a notice under section 65 to reopen past assessments based solely on the non-application of section 34-A of the Ordinance, introduced by the Finance Act of 1980. The core legal question is whether the discovery that a provision of law was ignored or not applied constitutes 'definite information' under section 65 to warrant reopening a completed assessment. The Supreme Court held that since the respondent was not a listed company owning the entire share capital of a subsidiary, section 34-A was entirely inapplicable, and its mere non-application did not constitute definite information. Reopening an assessment based on a realization that a provision was ignored, without any concealment of facts, amounts merely to a change of opinion, which cannot sustain proceedings under section 65. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the discovery that a provision of law was ignored or not applied during a previous assessment amount to 'definite information' under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance?
  • Can an assessment be reopened under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance based solely on a change of opinion or different interpretation of law?
  • Does the non-application of an irrelevant statutory provision constitute valid grounds for reopening a completed tax assessment?
  • Does a mere change of opinion by the assessing authorities regarding the validity of an agreement constitute definite information for the purposes of section 65?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways Through General Manger vs Ghulam Rasul1997 SCMR 1581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-28
  service appealdepartmental inquiryappellate powers of Service Tribunalcompulsory retirementback benefitsunauthorized absencereinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment concerning the removal of a Pakistan Railways employee. The respondent remained absent from duty without leave from 1979 to 1983. Following a medical assessment, he reported for duty in 1984 but was subsequently removed from service. Although the removal order was later withdrawn, he was not reinstated and faced a second inquiry, leading to a final removal in 1990. The Tribunal set aside the removal, converting it to compulsory retirement, and ordered back benefits. The core legal questions were whether the Tribunal had the authority to modify departmental penalties and whether the respondent was entitled to salary for periods of unauthorized absence. The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, the Tribunal possesses wide appellate powers to confirm, vary, or modify departmental orders, provided the decision is reasonable and not arbitrary. The Court upheld the conversion of the penalty but modified the salary award, ruling that the respondent was entitled to pay only for the period he was prevented from working, not for the period of his initial unauthorized absence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the power to modify or vary a penalty imposed by a departmental authority?
  • Can a civil servant claim salary for a period during which they were absent from duty without leave?
  • Are the appellate powers of the Service Tribunal under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, limited to questions of law only?
  • Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court interfere with an order passed by the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways Through General Manager, Pakistan Railways vs Ghulam Rasul1997 PLC (C.S.) 837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-28
  service appealquantum of punishmentpowers of service tribunalunauthorized absenceback benefitscompulsory retirementmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by Pakistan Railways challenges a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal that partially accepted a respondent-employee's service appeal, converted his punishment of removal from service to compulsory retirement, and directed payment of salary for certain periods. The respondent had remained absent from duty without leave for a prolonged period, following which he was subjected to disciplinary proceedings, removed from service, and later had that removal order withdrawn before being subjected to a de novo inquiry and a second removal order. The core legal questions involved the scope of the Service Tribunal's appellate powers under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 to alter departmental punishments, and the legality of awarding salary for periods of unauthorized absence versus periods where the employee was prevented from working. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal possesses wide appellate powers on both questions of law and fact, including the power to modify penalties provided its reasons satisfy standards of reasonableness. However, the Court held that the Tribunal erred in awarding salary for the period of unauthorized absence without leave. The appeal was partly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal has the power to alter or modify a penalty imposed by a departmental authority after a disciplinary inquiry?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal award salary to a civil servant for a period of unauthorized absence from duty without leave?
  • What is the scope of appellate powers of the Service Tribunal under section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • What are the limitations on the Supreme Court when reviewing a judgment of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways Through G.M., Lahore And Another vs Zafarullah, Assistant Electrical Engineer And Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-29Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways Through G.M., Lahore And Another vs Zafarullah, Assistant Electrical Engineer And Other1997 SCMR 1730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil servicemove-overacting chargecurrent chargeregular appointmentservice tribunalbasic pay scale
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves thirteen civil appeals concerning the entitlement of civil servants working on 'acting charge' or 'current charge' basis to 'move-over' to the next higher Basic Pay Scale (BPS). The core legal question is whether a civil servant holding a post on an acting or current charge basis qualifies as a 'regular member' of the service, cadre, or post, which is a mandatory prerequisite for move-over under the Finance Division's Office Memorandum dated 1-1-1986. The Supreme Court held that appointments on acting or current charge basis are merely temporary, stop-gap arrangements intended for short durations and do not constitute regular appointments. Consequently, such appointees do not meet the essential criteria of being a 'regular member' of the service required for move-over. The Court further ruled that the failure of the department to challenge previous tribunal orders granting move-over in other cases does not constitute discriminatory treatment. The principle laid down is that acting or current charge appointments, by definition and under Rule 8-B of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, confer no right to regular promotion or seniority, thereby precluding eligibility for move-over.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant working on an acting or current charge basis considered a regular member of the service for the purpose of move-over?
  • Does an appointment on an acting or current charge basis confer a vested right for regular promotion?
  • Can a failure by the department to challenge previous tribunal orders in isolated cases be cited as discriminatory treatment by other employees?
  • Does an acting charge appointment amount to an appointment by promotion on a regular basis for the purpose of seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation Through D.G. H.Q., Islamabad AndAnother vs Nasiruddin1997 SCMR 1303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-07
  move-overannual confidential reportsgenerally goodservice lawcivil servantPBC rulesadverse remarks
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which allowed the respondent’s move-over from Scale-7 to Scale-8 within the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC). The core legal question was whether the respondent, who possessed a mix of 'Good' and 'Average' Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs), satisfied the 'generally good' criteria required for a move-over under PBC rules. The petitioners argued that 'generally good' necessitated consistently 'Good' reports. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal correctly applied the law. The Court affirmed that the expression 'generally good' does not mandate strictly 'Good' reports. Relying on established precedents, the Court laid down the principle that in the absence of adverse remarks, 'Average' reports are sufficient to satisfy the 'generally good' requirement for move-over purposes. An 'Average' report cannot be treated as adverse unless specifically communicated as such to the civil servant. Consequently, the respondent was entitled to the move-over, and the Tribunal's decision was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does the requirement of 'generally good' Annual Confidential Reports for a move-over mandate that an employee must possess only 'Good' reports?
  • Can 'Average' Annual Confidential Reports be treated as adverse remarks in the absence of specific communication to the civil servant?
  • Is a mix of 'Good' and 'Average' Annual Confidential Reports sufficient to satisfy the 'generally good' criteria for a move-over?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation Through D.-G., H.Q., Islamabad AndAnother vs Nasiruddin1997 PLC (C.S.) 931 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-07
  move-overAnnual Confidential Reportsservice lawgenerally goodPakistan Broadcasting Corporationservice tribunalcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment regarding the denial of 'move-over' from Scale-7 to Scale-8 for a Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation employee. The core legal question was whether an employee possessing a mix of 'Average' and 'Good' Annual Confidential Reports satisfies the 'generally Good' requirement for move-over eligibility under the relevant service rules. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Tribunal's decision to grant the move-over. The Court held that the expression 'generally Good' does not necessitate strictly 'Good' technical ratings. In the absence of adverse reports, 'Average' reports are not inherently adverse and, when combined with 'Good' reports, satisfy the 'generally Good' criteria. This interpretation aligns with established precedents, specifically Muhammad Anwar v. Secretary, Establishment Division, which clarifies that 'Average' reports are acceptable for move-over purposes provided they have not been formally communicated as adverse. The decision emphasizes that 'generally Good' permits a flexible assessment of an employee's service record rather than a rigid adherence to a specific grading.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'generally Good' in service move-over criteria require strictly 'Good' Annual Confidential Reports?
  • Can 'Average' Annual Confidential Reports be treated as 'generally Good' for the purpose of move-over eligibility?
  • Is an 'Average' Annual Confidential Report considered an adverse report if it has not been formally communicated as such?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation through D.-G., H.Q., Islamabad and another vs Nasiruddin1997 PLC (C.S.) 931 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-07
  move-overannual confidential reportsgenerally goodservice tribunalpakistan broadcasting corporationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which accepted the respondent employee's appeal and granted him move-over from Scale-7 to Scale-8 under the rules of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an employee with mixed 'Average' and 'Good' Annual Confidential Reports satisfies the requirement of being 'generally Good' for the purpose of entitlement to move-over to Scale-8. Upholding the Tribunal's decision, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any specific adverse remarks communicated to the employee, mixed reports containing both 'Average' and 'Good' ratings must be construed as 'generally Good' for move-over eligibility. The Court reaffirmed the established principle that an 'Average' report cannot be treated as adverse unless specifically so designated and conveyed, thereby dismissing the petition and refusing leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee with mixed average and good annual confidential reports is entitled to move-over to a higher scale under the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation rules?
  • Can an average annual confidential report be treated as an adverse report without being specifically so treated and conveyed to the employee?
  • What is the legal connotation of the expression 'generally good' in relation to the criteria for grant of move-over?
  Read full judgment →
• Obedullah And 2 Others vs Inspector General, Frontier Corps., Quetta1997 SCMR 1833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-24
  smugglingbanaspati gheecustoms auctionredemption fineconstitutional petitionimpracticable relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan dismissing the petitioners' constitutional petition. The petitioners were intercepted while transporting Banaspati Ghee with the intention of smuggling it out of Pakistan, leading to the seizure of the goods by Kharan Rifles and subsequent confiscation by the Deputy Collector Customs. Upon appeal, the Collector Appeals granted the petitioners an option of redeeming the goods upon payment of a redemption fine, which the petitioners deposited. However, prior to the appellate decision, the perishable goods had already been auctioned by the department and the proceeds deposited in the Government Treasury. The core legal question was whether the original goods could be restored to the petitioners or whether the constitutional petition was rightly dismissed when physical restoration became impracticable. The Supreme Court held that since the goods had already been lawfully disposed of by auction before the remedy was sought, physical restoration was impossible and no implementation directions could be issued in a vacuum. The Court refused leave to appeal while noting the necessity for transparency and fair market value in departmental auctions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court issue directions for the physical restoration of goods that have already been lawfully auctioned as perishable items during the pendency of proceedings?
  • Whether a constitutional petition seeking the return of seized goods becomes infructuous when the goods are no longer available with the respondents?
  • What is the obligation of customs authorities regarding transparency and obtaining fair market value during the auction of seized perishable commodities?
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• Obaidullah and anothers vs Habibullah and others1997 PLD Supreme Court 835 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-25
  specific performancecontract of personal serviceSpecific Relief Actpublic appointmentfundamental rightsfreedom of professioninjunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which had set aside concurrent judgments decreeing the petitioners' suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The petitioners claimed employment in the Public Health Engineering Department based on an agreement wherein their father transferred land to the department in exchange for such jobs. The core legal question was whether a contract of employment or personal service in consideration of land transfer could be specifically enforced and protected by injunction, and whether making appointments without public advertisement violates constitutional rights. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and permanent injunctions cannot be granted to interfere with public duties or prevent the breach of such non-enforceable contracts under Section 56. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that making public appointments without advertising vacancies through the press violates Article 18 of the Constitution regarding freedom of profession and equal opportunity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contract of personal service or employment be specifically enforced under section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • Whether a permanent injunction can be granted to prevent the breach of a contract of employment that is not specifically enforceable?
  • Does the making of initial or regular appointments to public posts without publicly advertising vacancies violate Article 18 of the Constitution?
  • Is an agreement to provide government employment in exchange for land legally enforceable by the courts?
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• Nusrat Ali vs The State1997 SCMR 876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-26
  post-arrest bailleave to appealillegal detentionrecoveries without independent witnessespolice encounter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of bail applications by the High Court of Sind in criminal cases involving charges related to police encounters, terrorism, and illicit arms possession. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner, an advocate alleged to have been arrested in an armed encounter involving police and rangers, is entitled to post-arrest bail given contentions of prior illegal detention and lack of independent witnesses for recoveries. The Supreme Court held that leave to appeal should be granted and interim bail awarded to the petitioner, noting prima facie grounds that the petitioner may have been detained prior to the formal arrest time and that no independent witnesses were associated with the recoveries despite being in a populated area. The key principle laid down is that where serious questions arise regarding the timing of arrest and the absence of independent corroboration for recoveries in populated areas, a case for further inquiry is made out warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted when there are serious doubts regarding the timing of the petitioner's arrest and prior detention?
  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses with recoveries in a populated area justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Whether a case of ineffective firing and doubtful recoveries constitutes grounds for further inquiry under criminal jurisprudence?
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• Noor Nabi Javaid vs Pakistan International Airlines CORPORATIONAnd1997 SCMR 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-22
  back benefitsservice tribunaldismissal from servicefresh inquirypetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal seeking non-payment of salary for the period from his dismissal until his resumption of duty following an earlier judgment of this Court that had set aside his dismissal and ordered a fresh inquiry. The core legal question concerns the entitlement and determination of back-benefits and salary during the period of suspension or dismissal when a fresh inquiry is ordered. The Supreme Court held that the question of payment of salary for the said period must be determined by the competent authority under the relevant rules, and declined to grant leave to appeal while observing that the respondent organization should finalize the matter in accordance with the law. The key principle laid down is that the determination of back-wages and salary following the setting aside of a dismissal order and the holding of a fresh inquiry rests with the competent authority under the applicable service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Who is authorized to determine the payment of salary for the period between dismissal and resumption of duty when a fresh inquiry is ordered?
  • Is an employee automatically entitled to back salary for the period following the setting aside of a dismissal order and pending a fresh inquiry?
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• Noor Muhammad vs The Superintending Engineer And Another1997 PLC (C.S.) 1219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-18
  compulsory retirementback benefitsreinstatementdepartmental appealservice tribunalWAPDAemoluments
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Lineman-I in WAPDA, was compulsorily retired from service on 22-5-1993. Following a departmental appeal, he was reinstated on 2-11-1995, but the appellate authority treated the intervening period as extraordinary leave without pay and denied back benefits. The petitioner challenged this denial before the Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal. Subsequently, the petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerns whether an employee, upon reinstatement following a successful departmental appeal, is entitled to back benefits for the period during which the appeal remained pending, particularly when the delay in disposal was attributable to the departmental authority's failure to act despite judicial intervention. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the contention regarding the entitlement to back benefits requires consideration. The Court directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record within three months, emphasizing the significance of the emoluments issue. The matter remains pending for final adjudication on the merits of the entitlement to back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to back benefits for the period of unemployment if the delay in deciding their departmental appeal was caused by the departmental authority?
  • Does the reinstatement of an employee after a successful departmental appeal automatically entitle them to back benefits for the intervening period?
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• Noor Muhammad vs Muhammad Gulzar And Another1997 S CM R 1194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-31
  leave to appealagricultural landlease schemeproprietary rightsBoard of Revenuereview jurisdictionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition concerning agricultural land in Tehsil and District Khanewal. The core legal questions involve the competency of a minor to obtain land on lease under a temporary scheme, the finality of an unchallenged order refusing proprietary rights, and whether the Member, Board of Revenue exceeded jurisdiction by reviewing a prior order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions, holding that arguable questions of law were raised regarding the legality of the lease extension, the finality of the earlier revenue hierarchy orders, and the review powers exercised by the Member, Board of Revenue. The key principle laid down is that debatable questions concerning jurisdiction and the finality of administrative revenue orders warrant a full examination through a grant of leave to appeal, pending which status quo is maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a minor is competent to obtain agricultural land on lease under the temporary allotment scheme?
  • What is the legal effect of an order refusing proprietary rights that attains finality due to lack of further challenge in the revenue hierarchy?
  • Did the Member, Board of Revenue act in excess of jurisdiction by reviewing his own prior order?
  • Whether the High Court correctly appreciated the contentions regarding the legality of the lease extension?
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• Noor Muhammad vs Ahmad through Legal Heirs and anothers1997 PLD Supreme Court 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-26
  pre-emption suitlimitation periodmutationphysical possessionrevenue officerattestation of mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the appellant-vendee challenged the dismissal of his plea regarding the limitation period. The core legal question was whether the limitation period for a pre-emption suit under Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 commences from the date of the entry of the mutation or the date of its final attestation or sanction, particularly when the vendee claims prior physical possession. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the trial, appellate, and High Court, which determined that the appellant failed to substantiate the claim of taking physical possession of the land before the mutation was sanctioned. The Court held that the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commences from the date of the attestation of the mutation by the Revenue Officer, not the date of its entry or the recording of statements. The judgment reinforces the principle that mere entry of a mutation or recording of statements does not constitute the attestation required to trigger the limitation period under the Act, and that factual claims of prior physical possession must be proven by cogent evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 commence from the date of entry of a mutation or its final attestation?
  • Is the recording of a vendor's statement on a mutation equivalent to the attestation of the mutation for the purpose of calculating the limitation period?
  • Can a vendee successfully plead a limitation bar in a pre-emption suit based on prior physical possession without proving such possession through evidence?
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• Noor Hussain And Others vs Gul Abbas Through Legal Heirs1997 SCMR 1377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-05
  Waqf propertymosqueoccupancy tenantMutwallirevenue recordconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the concurrent findings of three lower courts which held that the disputed land was Waqf property dedicated to the village mosque and that the petitioners' ancestor held it merely as a Mutwalli rather than as an occupancy tenant. The core legal question was whether the land alienated for the maintenance of the mosque and services of the Imam constituted Waqf property or created occupancy rights under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the revenue records clearly established the mosque as the owner of the property and that the concurrent findings of fact were supported by the record and free from misreading or non-reading. The key principle laid down is that where revenue records consistently show a mosque as the owner of dedicated land rather than individual occupancy tenants, the property retains its character as Waqf, and concurrent findings of fact on such status will not be interfered with in the absence of legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land alienated for the maintenance of a mosque and the services of an Imam constitutes Waqf property or creates occupancy rights under section 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the ownership and status of land as Waqf property be interfered with when supported by the revenue record?
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• Noor Elahi vs Federation of Pakistan And Others1997 PLC (C. S.) 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-11
  annual confidential reportexpungement of acrdelay in communicationpaf civiliansservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Noor Elahi, a Head Clerk in the Pakistan Air Force at Sargodha, seeking the expungement of an adverse Annual Confidential Report (A.C.R.) for the year 1991. The core legal question concerns whether an adverse A.C.R. communicated with a significant delay of nearly four years and allegedly issued in violation of departmental instructions is liable to be expunged. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions raised regarding the delayed communication and the alleged malice or procedural impropriety of the reporting officer. The court held that the petition raised arguable questions regarding the violation of paragraphs 15, 16-C, and 19 of Confidential Reports, PAF Civilians, laying down the principle that unexplained and inordinate delays in communicating adverse reports along with procedural breaches warrant a detailed examination by the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an adverse A.C.R. communicated after an inordinate delay is liable to be expunged?
  • Does the communication of an adverse report in violation of departmental instructions vitiate the report?
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• Noor Elahi vs Federation of Pakistan And Other1997 SCMR 1364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-11
  Annual Confidential ReportService LawAdverse ACRExpunction of ACRProcedural irregularityP.A.F. Civilians
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Head Clerk in the Pakistan Air Force with thirty-one years of service, challenged an adverse Annual Confidential Report (A.C.R.) recorded in 1991. The petitioner contended that the report was biased, having been authored by a Reporting Officer under whom he served for only one year and with whom he had a grievance. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the communication of this adverse report occurred with a significant delay of nearly four years, specifically on 15-8-1994, which constituted a procedural violation of paragraphs 15, 16-C, and 19 of the Confidential Reports for P.A.F. Civilians. The petitioner sought the expunction of the adverse A.C.R. on these grounds. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the adverse A.C.R. should be expunged due to the alleged procedural irregularities in its communication and the circumstances surrounding its issuance.

  Questions settled

  • Can an adverse Annual Confidential Report be expunged if it was communicated to the employee with a significant delay in violation of departmental regulations?
  • Does a Reporting Officer's alleged bias or short duration of supervision invalidate an Annual Confidential Report?
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• Noor Elahi vs Director of Civilian Personnel, Rear Air Headquarters, Peshawar And 2 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-13
  Annual Confidential Reportadverse remarksexpunctionservice lawreporting officeradministrative efficiencyprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the expunction of adverse remarks recorded in the Annual Confidential Report (A.C.R.) of a Head Clerk in the Pakistan Air Force. The appellant challenged the remarks, arguing they were biased, unsubstantiated, and communicated with significant delay, violating established departmental instructions. The core legal question was whether the adverse remarks, which were vague and communicated years late, could be sustained against an employee with a long, otherwise spotless service record. The Supreme Court held that the reporting officer failed to adhere to the mandatory procedure for timely communication of adverse remarks and that the remarks themselves were vague and lacked specific supporting material. The Court emphasized that a reporting officer must be impartial, forthright, and unambiguous, and that the primary purpose of such reports is to provide an opportunity for the employee to correct deficiencies. Finding that the delay and the vague nature of the remarks caused grave prejudice to the appellant, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and ordered the expunction of the adverse remarks.

  Questions settled

  • Is a reporting officer required to provide specific details when recording adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report?
  • Does the failure to communicate adverse remarks within the stipulated timeframe render them liable to be expunged?
  • Can adverse remarks that are vague and lack supporting evidence be maintained against a government employee?
  • What is the legal consequence of a reporting officer failing to inform a subordinate of alleged defects to allow for correction?
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• Nnjuman Data Ganj Bakhsh Ali Hajveri and Darbar Baba Qasim Sain1997 SCMR 1462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-09
  leave to appealremand orderevacuee propertyfactual findingsconstitutional petitionforged documentsscope of remand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the ownership of land, originally claimed by the respondents based on an alleged 1956 transfer order from the Deputy Rehabilitation/Settlement Commissioner. Following an initial High Court remand, a notified officer conducted inquiries and concluded that the respondents' documents were forged and the land was State land rather than evacuee property. A learned Single Judge of the High Court subsequently set aside this finding, declaring it illegal and directing the authorities to record the respondents as owners. The petitioners challenged this decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that the notified officer acted within his competence under the remand order to examine the genuineness of the documents and that the High Court improperly interfered with findings of fact. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the contentions raised regarding the scope of the remand order and the propriety of the High Court's interference with the notified officer's factual findings required detailed consideration. The operation of the High Court judgment was suspended pending the final outcome.

  Questions settled

  • Is a notified officer competent to examine the genuineness of an alleged transfer order when a High Court remand order permits the parties to raise questions of fact and law?
  • Can a High Court interfere with the factual findings of a notified officer in a constitutional petition absent a showing of misreading of evidence or failure to consider material evidence?
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• Nizamuddin And 2 Others vs Chairman, Evacuee Trust Properties Board1997 SCMR 1152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-06
  leave to appealevacuee trust propertypermanent transfer deedlachesconstitutional petitioncivil suit pendencyland settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing their constitutional petition regarding the cancellation of the transfer of agricultural land. The land, originally belonging to the Karachi Pinjrapore Association, was auctioned to the petitioners under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, with a Permanent Transfer Deed issued in 1962. Subsequently, the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, acting under M.L.R. 57, declared the transfer void, alleging the land was evacuee trust property. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' challenge on grounds of laches and the pendency of a parallel civil suit. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the delay was justified, the civil suit involved different issues, and the transfer was protected under the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions regarding the maintainability of the constitutional petition, the scope of the civil suit, and the statutory protection of the transfer deed required detailed examination by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a transfer of land confirmed by a Permanent Transfer Deed be cancelled on the ground that the land was evacuee trust property?
  • Does the pendency of a civil suit regarding the legality of a transfer order render a subsequent constitutional petition challenging the same order non-maintainable?
  • Is a delay in filing a constitutional petition sufficient grounds for dismissal if the petitioner provides detailed reasons for the delay?
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• Nisar Muhammad and anothers vs Sultan Zari1997 PLD Supreme Court 852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-30
  habeas corpusminor custodySection 491 Cr.P.C.hizanatinterim custodyGuardians and Wards Act 1890extraordinary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court granting custody of five minor children to their mother under a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C. The core legal question was whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. to grant interim custody of minor children to a mother when alternative remedies under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 are available. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's order. The Court held that the availability of an alternative remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 does not oust the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. to restore provisional custody of minors to a person legally entitled to hizanat where their detention by another is improper or illegal. However, the Court cautioned that this extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. should be exercised sparingly and primarily in cases of real urgency, leaving ultimate custody determinations to the Guardian Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. to grant provisional custody of minor children to a mother?
  • Does the availability of a remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 bar a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C. for minor custody?
  • Under what circumstances should the High Court exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. regarding the custody of minors?
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• Nazir Ahmed Rana vs Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary1997 PLC (C.S.) 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-28
  deputationpermanent absorptioncontrolling authorityappointment authorityanticipation of approvalcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute where a civil servant on deputation to the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad, sought permanent absorption. The Secretary Education, Government of Punjab, permitted the petitioner's permanent absorption, and the Chairman of the Board issued an office order allowing the same in anticipation of the Board's approval. However, the Board subsequently resolved not to absorb the petitioner. The petitioner's writ petition and subsequent Intra-Court Appeal were dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the Secretary's permission constituted an appointment under Section 12(8)(ii) of the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976, and whether the Chairman had the authority to permanently absorb the petitioner without the Board's approval. The Court held that the Secretary's order was merely a permission to seek absorption, not an appointment. Furthermore, under Section 10(2)(xviii) of the Act, the Board, not the Chairman, is the competent authority to make permanent appointments. Consequently, the petitioner had no vested legal right to permanent absorption, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a permission granted by the Secretary Education to a deputationist to get absorbed in a Board constitutes an order of appointment by the Controlling Authority under the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976?
  • Does the Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education have the power to permanently absorb an employee in the Board's service without the approval of the Board?
  • Can a deputationist claim a vested legal right to be permanently absorbed in the borrowing organization when the competent authority has declined to confirm the absorption?
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• Nazir Ahmad And Others vs Abdullah And Other1997 SCMR 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-30
  res judicatainheritancelimited ownerlife estateMuslim Family Laws Ordinancecomplete justicesuccession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the inheritance of agricultural land following the death of a limited owner, Mst. Fazlan Bibi, in 1984. The core legal questions concerned whether a previous 1929 judgment regarding the legitimacy of an heir constituted res judicata, and whether the heirs of a pre-deceased daughter were entitled to inherit upon the termination of a life estate, despite the original owner dying before the enactment of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Supreme Court held that the 1929 judgment was binding under Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, as it involved the same parties and subject matter, thereby barring the claim of appellants claiming through the disputed heir. However, regarding the inheritance of the pre-deceased daughter, the Court held that upon the termination of a life estate, succession re-opens, and the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, apply. The Court emphasized its power under Article 187 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice, ruling that legal heirs should not be denied their shares on technical grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code distinguish between judgments in rem and judgments in personam for the purposes of res judicata?
  • Does the termination of a life estate trigger the re-opening of succession for the purpose of applying the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant relief to legal heirs on issues not specifically mentioned in the leave to appeal under its power to do complete justice?
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