Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Ashraf vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government1997 PLC (C.S.) 744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-02
  seniority disputead hoc servicedepartmental examinationservice lawlimitation periodregularization of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter concerns a seniority dispute between the appellant and respondents within the Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having served on an ad hoc basis prior to his regularization, was entitled to seniority over respondents who had passed the mandatory departmental examination and were regularized earlier. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Federal Service Tribunal's decision. The Court held that seniority is determined by the date of regularization and the successful completion of departmental examinations, rather than total length of service including ad hoc periods. Since the respondents achieved these milestones before the appellant, their seniority was correctly fixed. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the appellant's challenge was time-barred, noting that an order acted upon by a competent authority cannot be circumvented by claiming it is void to avoid limitation. The principle established is that seniority rights in government service are contingent upon the specific criteria of regularization and examination success, and procedural limitation periods remain binding.

  Questions settled

  • Does ad hoc service count towards seniority in the presence of regularized service?
  • Is seniority determined by the date of passing the departmental examination?
  • Can an appeal against a seniority list be entertained if it is time-barred?
  • Does an order acted upon by a competent authority remain open to challenge as a void order?
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• Muhammad Ashraf vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government1997 SCMR 843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-02
  service senioritydepartmental examinationregularization of servicelimitationfederal service tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a service dispute concerning the fixation of seniority between Lower Division Clerks in the Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department. The appellant, initially appointed on an ad hoc basis and later regularized, challenged a revised seniority list that placed him junior to the contesting respondents, and his subsequent departmental appeals and appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal were dismissed. The core legal questions relate to the determination of seniority based on the passing of departmental examinations and regularization, as well as the question of limitation regarding service appeals. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contesting respondents, having passed the departmental examination earlier and having been regularized prior to the appellant, were rightly placed senior, and further noted that the appellant's service appeal was barred by limitation. The Court laid down that an employee cannot claim seniority over colleagues who passed required departmental examinations and attained regular status prior in time, and that a departmental order acted upon cannot be bypassed on the ground of being void when challenged belatedly without sufficient cause.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee appointed on an ad hoc basis can claim seniority over colleagues who cleared departmental examinations and were regularized earlier?
  • Does an appeal before the Service Tribunal become time-barred if the impugned departmental order is challenged after the prescribed period without valid explanation?
  • Can a belated challenge to a departmental seniority order be entertained on the ground that the order is void when it has already been acted upon?
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• Muhammad Ashraf And Another vs The State And Another1997 SCMR 1387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-01
  surety bondforfeiture of surety bondsabsconding accusedpenalty reductioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of forfeiture of surety bonds and imposition of penalty against the petitioners, who stood surety for an accused person who subsequently absconded and was declared a proclaimed offender. The Special Court forfeited the surety bonds and imposed a penalty of Rs.40,000 on each petitioner, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court in revision. The core legal question concerns the quantum of penalty to be imposed upon the forfeiture of surety bonds when the sureties did not profit from the absconsion and the accused was later apprehended. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that while the petitioners indeed forfeited their bonds due to the absconsion of the accused, the penalty of Rs.40,000 was excessively harsh in the circumstances. The Court laid down the principle that in forfeiture of surety bonds, courts must strike a proper balance between undue leniency and undue severity, leading to the reduction of the penalty imposed on each petitioner to Rs.10,000.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the forfeiture of surety bonds is justified when an accused absconds after being granted bail?
  • What principles govern the quantum of penalty to be imposed upon sureties when a bond is forfeited?
  • Can the Supreme Court reduce the penalty imposed by trial and revisional courts in surety forfeiture matters?
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• Muhammad Ashraf And 4 Others vs Khan Muhammad1997 SCMR 1373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-08
  limitationcourt fee deficiencyregular first appealrevision applicationleave to appealdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' Regular First Appeal as time-barred. The petitioners had originally filed a revision application against a trial court decree, which was later converted into a Regular First Appeal. A dispute arose regarding the limitation period, specifically concerning the delay in making up a deficiency in court fees. The petitioners argued that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to extend the time for payment of the deficient court fee. They contended that once such discretion is exercised and the time is extended, the appeal should be deemed filed on the date of the initial presentation of the revision petition, thereby bringing it within the limitation period. The Supreme Court found that the petitioners' contentions regarding the proper application of Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 required further examination and granted leave to appeal to consider whether the dismissal of the appeal was based on a misappreciation of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court exercise its discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to extend the time for payment of deficient court fees?
  • If time is extended for the payment of deficient court fees under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, does the appeal relate back to the date of its initial filing for limitation purposes?
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• Muhammad Ashad Akhtar vs Muhammad Ali And Other1997 SCMR 1476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-08-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asghar vs Federal Service Tribunal And Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 1065 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-11
  advance incrementsservice laweducational qualificationsdepartmental promotionFederal Service TribunalPakistan Railwaysservice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Stenographer in Pakistan Railways, challenged the withdrawal of four advance increments granted to him for acquiring higher educational qualifications (F.A. and B.A.). The Federal Service Tribunal had dismissed his appeal, ruling that the appellant, as a Stenographer, already possessed the requisite B.A./B.Sc. qualification prescribed by the Pakistan Railways Personnel Manual, thus disentitling him to the increments. The core legal question was whether the appellant's educational qualification for the post of Stenographer was governed by the outdated Railways Manual or by the Federal Government's Office Memorandum dated 23-9-1969, which set lower qualification requirements for departmental promotees. The Supreme Court held that since Pakistan Railways is a division of the Federal Secretariat, the Federal Government's O.M. applied. Under this O.M., departmental promotees were not required to possess the higher educational qualifications mandated for direct recruits. Consequently, the appellant was entitled to the advance increments for his higher qualifications. The key principle established is that where a departmental entity is part of the Federal Secretariat, the qualification standards for its employees are governed by the Federal Government's directives rather than superseded or outdated departmental manuals.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government's qualification policy for Stenographers supersede the Pakistan Railways Personnel Manual?
  • Are departmental promotees to the post of Stenographer required to possess the same educational qualifications as direct recruits?
  • Is a Stenographer who was promoted from the post of Stenotypist entitled to advance increments for acquiring higher educational qualifications?
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• Muhammad Asghar vs Federal Service Tribunal And Other1997 SCMR 1755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  advance incrementshigher educational qualificationsPakistan RailwaysFederal Service Tribunalservice appealrecruitment rulesStenographer qualification
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, initially appointed as a Stenotypist in Pakistan Railways and later promoted as a Stenographer, improved his academic qualifications by passing his F.A. and B.A. exams. He was granted four advance increments pursuant to a Finance Division Office Memorandum, which were subsequently withdrawn by the department on the ground that B.A. was the basic qualification for a Stenographer and thus he was not entitled to advance increments. His departmental appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal was dismissed. Upon grant of leave to appeal, the core legal question was whether the prescribed basic educational qualification for the post of Stenographer in Pakistan Railways was Intermediate or B.A. for a departmental promotee, and consequently whether he was entitled to advance increments for acquiring a higher qualification. The Supreme Court held that Pakistan Railways being a Division of the Federal Secretariat, the qualification prescribed under the Federal Government O.M. applied, under which departmental promotees from Stenotypist required only a Matriculation qualification. Consequently, the appellant possessed a higher qualification than prescribed and was entitled to the four advance increments. The impugned order of the Tribunal was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the educational qualifications prescribed for the Federal Secretariat apply to Pakistan Railways as a Division of the Federal Secretariat?
  • Is a departmental promotee from the post of Stenotypist to Stenographer required to possess an Intermediate or B.A. qualification where the rules prescribe Matriculation for promotees?
  • Whether an employee who improves their academic qualification beyond the prescribed requirement for their post is entitled to advance increments under the Finance Division Office Memorandum?
  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal erred in holding that a departmental promotee holding a B.A. degree was not entitled to advance increments for acquiring higher qualifications?
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• Muhammad Arshad vs The State1997 SCMR 949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-10
  transfer applicationjudicial biasreasonable apprehensioncriminal trialjudicial impartialitytransfer of criminal case
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his transfer application by the High Court. The petitioner, facing trial for charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, requested the transfer of his case from the Sessions Judge, Peshawar, alleging judicial bias, prejudice, and external pressure due to the deceased being the brother of a Senior Judge of the High Court. The petitioner further alleged that the trial judge's questioning of a witness and comments regarding defense counsel's conduct indicated partiality. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial judge's clarification questions were permissible and did not demonstrate prejudice. The Court affirmed that transfer requests must be based on clear, cogent facts creating a reasonable apprehension of unfairness, rather than mere presumptions or unsubstantiated fears. It held that the relationship between the deceased and a High Court judge does not automatically imply judicial bias. Furthermore, the Court determined that judicial comments regarding trial delays by defense counsel do not constitute valid grounds for transfer, emphasizing that transfer applications must be substantiated by concrete evidence of improper conduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that a deceased victim is related to a High Court judge automatically create a presumption of bias for a trial judge?
  • Can a trial judge ask clarifying questions to a witness during cross-examination without demonstrating prejudice?
  • What is the standard of proof required to substantiate an application for the transfer of a criminal case?
  • Are comments by a trial judge regarding the conduct of defense counsel sufficient grounds to justify the transfer of a case?
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• Muhammad Arshad vs The State And Another1997 SCMR 1275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-10
  bail on medical groundsbail cancellationmurdersuppression of terrorist activitiessickness as ground for baildiscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against an order passed by the Lahore High Court whereby bail granted to the petitioner by the trial court in a case under Section 302/34, P.P.C. was cancelled. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an accused is entitled to bail merely on the ground of suffering from ailments, or if compelling circumstances disclosing the seriousness of the disease and a threat to life in detention must exist. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that every ailment does not attract the discretion contained in the proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C., and that the petitioner's conditions—moderate hypertension, high blood pressure, and sinus tachycardia—were common diseases manageable within the jail hospital and not life-threatening. The Court laid down the principle that for bail on medical grounds, there must be strong reasons to show that treatment is not possible in detention, and the trial court's discretion must be exercised judiciously based on the true gravity of the sickness.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail merely because he suffers from certain common ailments?
  • Does moderate hypertension and high blood pressure constitute a sufficient ground for granting bail under the proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C.?
  • What level of seriousness must a disease reach before discretionary medical bail can be granted to an accused in detention?
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• Muhammad Arshad Sultan, Section Officer, Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others vs Prime Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad and 31 others1997 PLC (C.S.) 451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-27
  senioritydeputationistOffice Management Groupcivil servantabsorptiontransferFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave concerns the determination of inter se seniority between direct recruits and deputationists absorbed into the Office Management Group (O.M.G.) as Section Officers (BPS-17). The core legal question is whether civil servants initially appointed as Section Officers on deputation and subsequently absorbed by transfer are entitled to claim seniority from the date of their initial joining on deputation or from the date of their regular absorption. The Supreme Court held that a deputationist generally continues to belong to their parent cadre and cannot claim seniority in the borrowing cadre prior to the date of transfer or absorption, unless governed by specific instructions relating to the right of refusal or voluntary acceptance of the transfer. The Court set aside the impugned orders of the Federal Service Tribunal and the departmental authority, remanding the matter for re-determination of seniority in light of the instructions contained in ESTACODE.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civil servants initially appointed on deputation and subsequently absorbed into the Office Management Group are entitled to claim seniority from the date of their joining on deputation?
  • Does a deputationist remain a member of their parent service or cadre until permanently absorbed in the borrowing department?
  • How is the seniority of a civil servant determined upon transfer from one office to another under the Civil Servants Act 1973 and applicable instructions?
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• Muhammad Arshad Sultan, Section Officer, Cabinet Division, Islamabad And Other vs Prime Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad And 31 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-27
  senioritydeputationistOffice Management Groupcivil servanttransferFederal Service Tribunalparent cadre
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated civil appeal addresses whether civil servants initially appointed as Section Officers in the Office Management Group on deputation from other departments and subsequently absorbed by transfer are entitled to claim seniority from the date of their joining on deputation or from the date of their regular absorption. The Supreme Court examined the provisions of the Civil Servants Act 1973 and the instructions governing transfers and deputation found in ESTACODE. The Court held that a deputationist generally counts seniority in a new office from the date of transfer only if they had the option to accept or refuse the offer of appointment, as a deputationist remains a member of their parent cadre until permanently absorbed. Because the record lacked findings on whether the private respondents had the right to refuse the offer of transfer to the Office Management Group, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the Federal Service Tribunal and departmental authorities, remanding the cases for re-determination of seniority in accordance with the applicable instructions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civil servants appointed as Section Officers on deputation and subsequently absorbed by transfer are entitled to claim seniority from the date of joining on deputation or from the date of regular absorption?
  • Does a deputationist continue to remain a member of their parent service or cadre unless absorbed permanently in the borrowing department?
  • How is the seniority of a civil servant determined upon transfer from one office to another under the Civil Servants Act 1973 and applicable ESTACODE instructions?
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• Muhammad Arshad Akhtar vs Muhammad Ali And Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-07-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif Shah And 4 Others vs The State And Another1997 SCMR 447 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-03
  pre-arrest bailjudicial discretionprohibitory clausebail cancellationdemarcation disputecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that set aside a pre-arrest bail previously granted to the petitioners by a Sessions Judge. The petitioners were charged under sections 147, 148, 447, 186, and 440 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 following a dispute during demarcation proceedings. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the Sessions Judge's discretionary order granting pre-arrest bail, particularly when the alleged offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interference. It found that, prima facie, the allegations did not constitute an offence under section 440 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed the principle that an appellate court should not interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion by a lower court in granting bail, especially when the offence charged does not fall within the prohibitory clause of the relevant bail statute.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with a Sessions Court's discretionary order granting pre-arrest bail when the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a dispute during demarcation proceedings, involving hot words, necessarily constitute an offence under section 440, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Muhammad Arif And Others vs Nawab And Other1997 SCMR 1792 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-05
  civil court jurisdictionpartition of landagricultural landrevenue officerland revenue actouster of jurisdictionbuilt-up property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment regarding a suit for possession by partition of a plot of land. The petitioners argued that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit, contending that the land was agricultural and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue Officers pursuant to the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967. The core legal question was whether the Civil Court retains jurisdiction to partition land that has been built upon and has lost its agricultural character. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Civil Court possessed the requisite jurisdiction. The Court affirmed the principle that the term "land" under the Land Revenue Act does not encompass property that has ceased to be agricultural and has assumed the character of commercial or built-up property. Consequently, where land has lost its agricultural identity, the ouster of Civil Court jurisdiction provided by the Land Revenue Act does not apply, and the Civil Court maintains plenary jurisdiction to adjudicate partition disputes regarding such immovable property.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to partition land that has lost its agricultural character and been built upon?
  • Does the ouster of jurisdiction under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967 apply to land that has ceased to be agricultural?
  • Is the determination of whether land has lost its agricultural character a question of fact to be decided by the Civil Court?
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• Muhammad Anwar Rahi and another vs Muhmammad Afzal Khan and 41997 PLC (C.S.) 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  pro forma promotionservice lawDepartmental Promotion Committeecompetent authoritycivil servantadministrative lawremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding the promotion of a civil servant. The core legal question was whether the SGA&I Department possessed the authority to approve or disapprove recommendations made by the Departmental Promotion Committee (D.P.C.) for pro forma promotion, or if such authority rested solely with the Secretary of the Agriculture Department. The Supreme Court held that, following the amendment to Rule 6 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, the SGA&I Department lacked the legal competence to interfere with the D.P.C.'s recommendations. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision to set aside the SGA&I Department's refusal and upheld the remand of the case to the Secretary of the Agriculture Department for appropriate action. The key principle established is that under the amended Rule 6, the Secretary of the relevant department holds the exclusive authority to make appointments to specific posts, rendering external approval from the SGA&I Department legally ineffective and ultra vires.

  Questions settled

  • Does the SGA&I Department have the legal authority to approve or disapprove recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee?
  • Who is the competent authority to make appointments to posts in BPS-16 and 17 under the amended Rule 6 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974?
  • Can a civil servant claim a vested right to promotion solely on the ground of eligibility when the promotion rule is based on selection?
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• Muhammad Anwar Rahi And Another vs Muhammad Afzal Khan And 41997 PLC (C. S.) 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-18
  pro forma promotionDepartmental Promotion Committeecompetent authorityservice lawadministrative powerremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which remanded a service matter to the Secretary of the Agriculture Department for a decision regarding the pro forma promotion of the respondent. The core legal question was whether the SGA&I Department possessed the legal authority to approve or disapprove the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) regarding the respondent's promotion, or if that authority rested solely with the Secretary of the Agriculture Department under the applicable rules. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the SGA&I Department lacked the power to interfere with the DPC's recommendations. The Court affirmed that, pursuant to the amended Rule 6 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, the Secretary of the Department is the sole competent authority to make appointments and act upon DPC recommendations for the relevant posts. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, confirming that the matter was correctly remitted to the Secretary for final determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the SGA&I Department have the legal authority to approve or disapprove recommendations made by a Departmental Promotion Committee?
  • Who is the competent authority to act upon the recommendations of a Departmental Promotion Committee for posts in BPS-16 and 17 under the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974?
  • Can a service tribunal remand a matter to the departmental secretary for a decision on promotion recommendations?
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• Muhammad Anwar Rahi And Another vs Muhammad Afzal Khan And 41997 SCMR 1213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-18
  service appealpro forma promotionDepartmental Promotion Committeeleave to appealcompetent authoritycivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which allowed the service appeal of respondent No. 1 and remanded the case to the Secretary, Agriculture Department, Government of Punjab, for passing appropriate orders on the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee (D.P.C.). The core legal question revolved around the competence of the SGA & I Department to approve or disapprove recommendations of the D.P.C. for pro forma promotion under the relevant rules. The Supreme Court held that under the amended Rule 6 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, the SGA & I Department lacked the power to approve or disapprove the D.P.C.'s recommendations, and that the Secretary of the Department alone was competent to make appointments and consider such recommendations. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the SGA & I Department has the power to approve or disapprove recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee under the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974?
  • Does an eligible candidate possess a vested right to be selected for promotion on the mere ground of eligibility when promotion is based on selection?
  • Who is the competent authority to make appointments and consider recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee for posts in BPS-16 and 17 under the amended Rule 6 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974?
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• Muhammad Amin vs The State1997 SCMR 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-18
  Zina-bil-JabarHudood Ordinancecriminal appealcorroboration of evidencerape convictionmedical evidencechemical examiner report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, wherein the appellant challenged his conviction and sentence for abduction and Zina-bil-Jabar. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven the charges against the appellant, particularly given contentions regarding the lack of independent corroboration of the victim's testimony and the impossibility of identifying the specific perpetrator of sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution had successfully proven its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found that the victim's testimony, which detailed being subjected to rape while in the detention of the accused, was credible and sufficiently corroborated by both medical evidence and the positive report of the Chemical Examiner. Furthermore, the appellant was apprehended alongside the abductee, providing strong circumstantial evidence. The judgment affirms the principle that where ocular testimony is consistent and supported by independent medical and forensic evidence, it is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Hudood laws, even in the absence of additional corroborative witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a victim in a Zina case acceptable without independent corroboration when supported by medical and forensic evidence?
  • Does the apprehension of an accused in the company of an abductee constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for abduction and Zina?
  • Can a conviction under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 be maintained when there are no visible marks of violence on the victim?
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• Muhammad Ali Wain vs Mst. Naseem Akhtar1997 SCMR 1441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-07-22
  rent ejectmentdefault in rentbona fide needreconstruction of premisesleave to appealpleadings in rent cases
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal against an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller and upheld by the First Appellate Court. The ejectment was ordered based on the petitioner's alleged default in rent payment and the respondent's bona fide need for the premises for reconstruction and subsequent use by her husband. The petitioner contends that the default finding, based on a failure to pay a 25% rent increase under Section 5-A of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, was improper as it was neither pleaded nor framed as an issue. Furthermore, the petitioner argues that the rent increase was already implemented in 1989 and that the respondent's claim of needing 18 shops for her husband's business lacks bona fide credibility. The Supreme Court, finding that these contentions require detailed consideration, granted leave to appeal. The Court held that the legal questions regarding the necessity of pleading specific grounds for default and the bona fide nature of reconstruction plans warrant further examination, continuing the interim stay order pending final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant be evicted for default on a rent increase that was neither pleaded in the eviction petition nor framed as an issue?
  • Does a landlord's plan to construct 18 shops for a single husband's business satisfy the requirement of bona fide personal need?
  • Is a tenant entitled to accommodation after reconstruction under Section 13(5-B) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
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• Muhammad Ali vs Secretary, Ministy of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad And Another1997 PLC (C. S.) 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-02-27
  service appealmaintainabilitypremature appealfinal orderdisciplinary proceedingscivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal as premature due to the absence of a final order. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of a service appeal before the Tribunal when departmental disciplinary proceedings under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 remain pending and no final adverse order has been passed. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's view was unexceptionable, ruling that an appeal filed against ongoing or inconclusive departmental proceedings without a final order is not maintainable. The key principle laid down is that the Service Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal under the Service Tribunals Act where departmental proceedings are still pending and no final order has been issued against the civil servant.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal maintainable against pending disciplinary proceedings where no final order has been passed?
  • Can a civil servant challenge ongoing departmental proceedings under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 before the Service Tribunal prematurely?
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• Muhammad Ali Alias Mamali vs The State1997 SCMR 1498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-17
  prohibition ordernarcotics recoveryconfessional statementpublic witnessesretroactive sentencereduction of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had maintained the petitioner's conviction under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, while reducing his sentence to two years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question concerned the legality of the raid conducted without associating public witnesses under section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the propriety of imposing an enhanced sentence for an offense committed prior to the statutory amendment providing for such enhancement. The Supreme Court held that the absence of public witnesses did not vitiate the proceedings given the supervision of the raid by a Magistrate and the subsequent confession, but found the enhanced sentence legally flawed as it was based on an amendment enacted after the occurrence. The Court consequently converted the petition into an appeal, maintained the conviction, and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone. The key principle laid down is that penal enhancements cannot be applied retrospectively to occurrences preceding the amending statute, and that magisterial supervision of a narcotics raid can cure non-compliance with public witness requirements under section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of public witnesses from the locality render a narcotics raid illegal when the raid is supervised by a Magistrate?
  • Can an enhanced sentence introduced by an amendment be applied to an offense committed prior to the enactment of that amendment?
  • Whether a conviction under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 can be sustained on the basis of a confessional statement and corroborating official testimony?
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• Muhammad Akhtar vs Mst. Razia Begum And 7 Other1997 SCMR 1623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-27
  suit for redemptionmortgagedismissal in defaultOrder IX Rule 9bar to fresh suitrestoration applicationcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of a civil suit for possession by redemption of a mortgaged house. The respondents' earlier suit for redemption had been dismissed in default under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Upon filing a fresh suit for redemption, the petitioner argued that the subsequent suit was barred under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, particularly since an application for restoration of the previous suit had been dismissed. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court reversed the decision and remanded the suit for disposal on merits, which was affirmed by the Peshawar High Court in civil revision. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order, holding that the statutory proviso to Order IX Rule 9 specifically permits a plaintiff to bring a fresh suit for redemption of a mortgage despite the dismissal of a former suit for default. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of an earlier suit for redemption of a mortgage in default under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a plaintiff from bringing a fresh suit for redemption?
  • Does the dismissal of an application for restoration of a default-dismissed suit preclude a mortgagor from filing a fresh suit for redemption under the proviso to Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Muhammad Ahmad And Another vs The State And Other1997 SCMR 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-04
  ocular testimonychance witnessinterested witnesscorroborationmedical evidencemotivebenefit of doubtdeath sentence conversion
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of criminal appeals arising from a murder case where the appellant was convicted under Section 302/34, P.P.C. for the fatal shooting of the deceased in a bazaar. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency and credibility of the ocular testimony given by a related complainant and an alleged chance witness, the necessity of independent corroboration for interested witnesses, and the impact of the co-accused's acquittal on the appellant's conviction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings regarding the presence and reliability of the eye-witnesses were based on sound appraisal of evidence, and that the rule requiring corroboration for interested witnesses is a rule of prudence not rigidly applicable when testimony inspires confidence. The Court further held that the acquittal of the co-accused on grounds of age and ailment did not shake the credibility of the evidence against the appellant, and that medical evidence and established motive sufficiently corroborated the prosecution's case. Consequently, the conviction was upheld, and both appeals were dismissed, while clarifying that the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. does not extend to cases where a death sentence is commuted by executive amnesty rather than judicial discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of an interested or related witness can be relied upon for a murder conviction?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused automatically vitiate the credibility of eye-witnesses against the remaining convict?
  • Whether medical evidence regarding the direction and distance of a firearm shot can override positive ocular testimony?
  • Can the benefit of Section 382-B of the Criminal Procedure Code be extended where a death sentence is converted to life imprisonment by presidential amnesty rather than by judicial order?
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• Muhammad Afzal Bhatti and 17 others vs Province of Punjab through Collector, Rawalpindi and 4 others1997 PLC (C.S.) 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-23
  land acquisitionmala fidedefence purposesconstitutional petitionburden of proofjudicial reviewurgency clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging a land acquisition notification. The petitioners alleged that land acquired by the government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ostensibly for 'defence purposes,' was mala fide and intended for the private benefit of a housing society. The core legal questions were whether the acquisition was mala fide and whether the joint issuance of notifications under sections 6 and 17 of the Act was legally permissible. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations of mala fide with evidence. The Court affirmed that the burden of proving mala fide lies heavily on the petitioner. Furthermore, the Court held that the determination of urgency under section 17 is a matter for the government and generally not subject to judicial review. Additionally, the Court ruled that legal arguments not raised before the High Court cannot be agitated for the first time in the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Is the determination of urgency under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 subject to judicial review?
  • Can a party raise new legal contentions in the Supreme Court that were not agitated before the High Court?
  • Does the joint issuance of notifications under sections 6 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 render the acquisition process legally unsustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Bhatti And 17 Others vs Province of Punjab Through Collector, Rawalpindi And 4 Other1997 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-23
  land acquisitiondefence purposemala fidejoint notificationconstitutional petitionleave to appealburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition that challenged a land acquisition notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on the grounds of mala fides. The petitioners contended that the land was acquired not for defence purposes, but for the benefit of a private housing society. The core legal questions involved whether the acquisition notification was vitiated by mala fides and whether joint notifications under sections 6 and 17 of the Act were legally permissible without prior notice. The Supreme Court held that allegations of mala fide remained unsubstantiated by any material and that the burden of proof, which rests heavily on the petitioners, was not discharged. The Court further held that the Land Acquisition Act does not bar the joint issuance of notifications under sections 6 and 17, that the existence of urgency under section 17 is a matter for the Government and generally not subject to judicial review, and that new points not raised before the High Court cannot be agitated for the first time before the Supreme Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquisition of land under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for defence purposes can be invalidated on unproven allegations of mala fides?
  • Can notifications under sections 6 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 be issued jointly?
  • Is the existence of urgency under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 subject to judicial review?
  • Can a new contention not raised before the High Court be agitated for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Bhatti And 17 Other vs Province of Punjab Through Collector, Rawalpindi And 4 Others1997 PLC (C. S.) 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-23
  land acquisitiondefence purposemala fidejoint notificationconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition challenging a land acquisition notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for defence purposes. The petitioners contended that the acquisition was mala fide and intended to benefit a private housing society rather than the military. The core legal questions involved whether the land acquisition notification was vitiated by mala fides and whether joint notifications under sections 6 and 17 of the Act were permissible. The Supreme Court held that allegations of mala fide remained unsubstantiated, that the burden to prove mala fide rests heavily on the petitioner, and that the issuance of joint notifications under sections 6 and 17 is not prohibited by the Act. The key principles laid down are that factual findings of subordinate courts regarding bona fides will not be disturbed unless perverse, that the existence of urgency under section 17 is a matter for government determination, and that grounds not raised before the High Court cannot be agitated for the first time before the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a land acquisition notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 can be challenged on the ground of mala fides without substantiating material?
  • Is the joint issuance of notifications under sections 6 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 legally permissible?
  • Can a contention not raised before the High Court be agitated for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal And Another vs The State1997 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-18
  bail cancellationoffence of zinaprohibitory clausediscretionary reliefconduct of accusedabduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court whereby bail granted to the petitioners by the Additional Sessions Judge was cancelled in a case under Section 10/16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The petitioners were accused of abducting two married women and developing illicit relations with them. The High Court cancelled their bail on the ground that their conduct had destroyed the complainant's family, noting that the alleged abductees had subsequently been murdered, and held that bail is a discretionary relief where the accused's conduct is a vital consideration. The Supreme Court heard the petition and held that the mere fact that an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not entitle an accused to bail as a matter of course, and that courts must consider all attending facts and circumstances. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the cancellation of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle an accused to bail as a matter of course?
  • Is the conduct of an accused person seeking bail an important circumstance to be taken into consideration by the court?
  • Can the High Court cancel bail granted by a lower court if the discretion was exercised in disregard of established legal principles?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah vs University College of Engineers, Texila And Others1997 PLC (C. S.) 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-08
  service lawpromotion quotatemporary appointmentservice grievanceleave to appealsuperannuation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Lecturer Assistant, challenged the denial of his promotion to the post of Laboratory Supervisor (Grade-16), claiming entitlement under a sixty-seven percent promotion quota. The petitioner had served for over ten years in Grade-11 and subsequently over five years in Selection Grade-17. His grievance arose because respondent No. 3, an employee from another department, was appointed to the Laboratory Supervisor position as a temporary arrangement. The petitioner contended that this temporary arrangement had persisted for six years, effectively blocking his promotion, and that he had only six years of service remaining before superannuation. The petitioner sought redress against the denial of his promotion rights and the prolonged nature of the temporary appointment of the respondent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the validity of the petitioner's contentions regarding his promotion entitlement and the impact of the long-standing temporary arrangement on his career progression, specifically examining whether such an arrangement could indefinitely preclude a qualified candidate from promotion within the prescribed quota.

  Questions settled

  • Can a temporary appointment to a promotional post be maintained for an extended period if it effectively blocks the promotion of a qualified candidate within the prescribed quota?
  • Does a long-standing temporary arrangement in a promotional post create a valid grievance for an employee entitled to promotion under a specific quota?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarak Hussain And Others vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Rehabilitation And Works Division, Islamabad And Other1997 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-12
  settlement lawsrevisional jurisdictionres judicatafraudulent allotmentremand orderrepeal of statutespending proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order remitting a land allotment dispute to the Board of Revenue/Chief Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision. The dispute originated from allegations that a respondent fraudulently increased claim units and obtained allotments. The petitioners argued that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to remand the case following the repeal of settlement laws under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, and that the matter was barred by res judicata due to a previous High Court order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's revisional jurisdiction remained valid post-repeal by virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which saves pending legal proceedings. Furthermore, the Court rejected the res judicata argument, noting that the current allegations of fraud were not previously adjudicated. The Court affirmed that remand orders to investigate fraud are appropriate and do not warrant interference under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. The principle established is that pending settlement proceedings are saved by the General Clauses Act, and allegations of fraud justify remand for inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeal of settlement laws under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, extinguish pending revisional proceedings in the High Court?
  • Can a High Court remand a case for fresh inquiry into allegations of fraud despite the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Does the doctrine of res judicata apply to subsequent proceedings involving allegations of fraud that were not the subject-matter of previous litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarak Ali And Another vs Government of Punjab Through Secretary, Industries And Mineral Development Department1997 PLC (C.S.) 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-15
  regularisation of servicecontract appointmentad hoc employeesvested rightdiscriminationsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition seeking regularisation of their services as Assistant Engineers. The core legal question involved whether contract employees appointed after the cut-off date for ad hoc regularisation possess a vested right to regularisation and equal treatment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the petitioners were appointed on a contract basis after the specified cut-off date of 17-1-1989, and not on an ad hoc basis, they had no vested right to regularisation upon the expiry of their contract period. Furthermore, the claim of discriminatory treatment failed as the petitioners could not furnish particulars of any similarly situated persons. The Court laid down the principle that contract employees cannot claim the benefit of regularisation policies specifically meant for ad hoc employees appointed prior to a designated cut-off date, and upheld the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition.

  Questions settled

  • Do contract employees appointed after a specified cut-off date have a vested right to regularisation?
  • Can employees appointed on contract basis claim the benefit of regularisation policies meant for ad hoc employees?
  • Whether the termination of contract employment upon the expiry of the contract period violates any legal right?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst., Ajaib Sultana And Another vs Gohar Ur Rehman And 5 Other1997 SCMR 1412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-22
  leave to appealcolonization of government landsproprietary rightslimited estatealienation of landreversionary rightsshariat application act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent decrees in favor of the respondents, who challenged a gift of State land made by the female holder to her son. The original land was allotted as an army grant in 1905, and proprietary rights were later acquired. The lower courts and the High Court held that section 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 placed a clog on the alienation of the property, creating a life estate that reverted to the heirs of the original allottee, and that the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act did not apply. The Supreme Court observed that the question of whether the respondents' suit was hit by section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, and whether the resulting decree was void, required deeper examination. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a female holder who acquires proprietary rights of land allotted under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 holds a limited estate subject to a clog on alienation under section 30-A?
  • Do the provisions of section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 nullify reversionary rights to challenge alienations made in respect of estates held under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  • Does section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 apply to cases where female heirs succeeded to a tenancy under section 20 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 rather than male heirs under custom?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saleh Bibi vs Muhammad Younis And Another1997 SCMR 1222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-15
  leave to appealocular evidencedelay in FIRnatural witnessesacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the High Court's acquittal of the respondent, who was initially convicted by the trial court for the murder of the deceased and house trespass. The prosecution's case rested on ocular testimony from the deceased's mother and brother, who witnessed the respondent entering their home and firing at the deceased. While the trial court accepted this testimony, the High Court acquitted the respondent, primarily citing a delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR). The petitioners argue that the eye-witnesses were natural witnesses present at the scene, had sufficient opportunity to identify the assailant, and were preoccupied with transporting the injured victim to the hospital, which explains the delay in reporting. The core legal question is whether the High Court erred in rejecting the testimony of natural eye-witnesses solely on the basis of a delay in the FIR registration. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the contentions regarding the credibility of the eye-witnesses and the explanation for the delay in the FIR required further examination.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of natural eye-witnesses be rejected solely on the ground of delay in lodging the First Information Report?
  • Does the act of rushing an injured victim to the hospital provide a valid explanation for a delay in reporting a crime to the police?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saghiri Begum And Others vs Ch: Ali Muhammad And Other1997 SCMR 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-18
  evacuee propertysettlement proceedingsallotment of landwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order dated 18-4-1993 passed by the Lahore High Court in a writ petition arising from evacuee property settlement proceedings. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court, after affirming the finding that an informer was not entitled to excess land allotment, could validly restore an administrative order that favored the said informer without clarification. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention raised by the petitioners had force and required examination as to whether the High Court's judgment contained a contradiction regarding the restoration of the allotment order in favor of the informer. The principle laid down is that appellate or constitutional review of administrative orders must be internally consistent, particularly regarding specific allotments and competing claims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can restore an allotment order in favor of an informer after affirming a finding that the informer is not entitled to excess land?
  • Can an appellate or constitutional court issue an internally contradictory judgment regarding property allotments?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Reshman Bibi vs Sheerin Khan And Other1997 SCMR 1416 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-25
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidencemurder convictionstandard of proofcriminal appealacquittalreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The prosecution alleged that the deceased was murdered by his in-laws due to strained marital relations, relying primarily on 'last seen' evidence provided by a witness who claimed to have seen the deceased with the accused in a taxi hours before the incident. The core legal question was whether the circumstantial evidence, specifically the 'last seen' testimony and alleged motive, was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's acquittal, finding the prosecution's case inconsistent. The Court held that the significant time gap between the witness sighting the accused and the time of the murder rendered the 'last seen' evidence inconclusive. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that circumstantial evidence must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused to warrant conviction. The presence of two conflicting theories of motive—one involving the wife's paramour and the other involving the in-laws—indicated that the charges were based on suspicion rather than concrete proof, failing to meet the required standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Is 'last seen' evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction when there is a significant time gap between the sighting and the occurrence of the crime?
  • Does the existence of multiple, conflicting theories of motive regarding the same crime undermine the prosecution's case?
  • What is the required standard for circumstantial evidence to support a criminal conviction in the absence of direct evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehmat Bi And 4 Others vs Muhammad Rashid And Other1997 SCMR 1775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-24
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentsub-lettingrelationship of landlord and tenantrent appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by a landlord against a High Court judgment setting aside an order of ejectment of the respondents on the ground of default in payment of rent and unauthorized sub-letting. The core legal questions involved whether the dismissal of a civil suit for declaration of title filed by a tenant or sub-tenant affects the finality of earlier rent proceedings, and whether the transfer of a business concern without notice to the landlord constitutes unauthorized sub-letting under the relevant rent laws. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court misread the evidence and that the dismissal of the tenant's title suit negated the earlier finding of no relationship of landlord and tenant, establishing that the sub-tenant was indeed an unauthorized occupant. The appeal was accepted, the High Court judgment was set aside, and the Rent Controller's ejectment order was restored, laying down the principle that the mere pendency or dismissal of a tenant's title suit is significant for determining landlord-tenant status and that unauthorized transfers of business premises constitute unlawful sub-letting.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the dismissal of a title suit filed by a tenant or sub-tenant affects the finality of earlier rent proceedings concerning the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Does the transfer of a business concern by a tenant to a third party without notice to the landlord constitute unauthorized sub-letting?
  • Can a Rent Controller pass an order under section 16(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 against an unauthorized sub-lettee?
  • Whether a High Court can interfere with a Rent Controller's order of ejectment based on a misreading and non-reading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor Jehan vs Federation of Pakistan And Other1997 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-10-27
  constitutional petitionfinality of judgmentappellate jurisdictionField General Court Marshalre-litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by the mother of a convict sentenced to death by a Field General Court Marshal. The petitioner sought to challenge the conviction, arguing that the law under which the convict was tried (Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860) was invalid due to the repeated promulgation of Ordinances. The core legal question was whether a petition under Article 184(3) is competent to challenge a conviction after the Supreme Court has already adjudicated the matter under its regular appellate jurisdiction (Article 185(3)) and review jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the jurisdiction under Article 184(3) cannot be invoked to reopen a matter that has already been finally adjudicated upon by the Court in its regular jurisdiction. The Court established the principle that the finality of its judgments must be maintained, and the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 184(3) cannot be utilized as a mechanism to re-litigate issues that were or could have been raised during the appellate or review stages.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution competent to challenge a conviction after the Supreme Court has already adjudicated the matter under its regular appellate jurisdiction?
  • Can the jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution be invoked to reopen a matter that has reached finality through the Supreme Court's appellate or review jurisdiction?
  • Does the Supreme Court's duty to do complete justice allow it to entertain a constitutional petition to re-litigate issues that were available but not argued during previous appellate proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naheed Akram vs Province of the Punjab Through Secretary, Education, Government Of The Punjab, Lahore And 2 Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 1217 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-25
  service lawtransfer and postingleave to appealservice tribunaladministrative order cancellationextraneous considerations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had set aside the transfer and posting orders of two competing candidates for the position of Senior Headmistress at Government Girls High School 122/JB, District Faisalabad. The dispute arose when the respondent, Mst. Khalida Syed, was initially posted to the school on 3-6-1996, but this order was subsequently cancelled on 9-7-1996, while the petitioner, Mst. Naheed Akram, had been posted to the same position on 15-5-1996. The Punjab Service Tribunal accepted the respondent's appeal, setting aside the orders of 15-5-1996 and 9-7-1996, thereby allowing the respondent to continue in the post. Upon hearing the petitioner, the Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the withdrawal of the respondent's posting order, whether the cancellation was motivated by extraneous considerations, and whether the specific post in question requires an officer of BPS-18 or above. The Court suspended the operation of the impugned judgment pending the final hearing of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Was there legal justification for the withdrawal of the transfer order posting the respondent to the school?
  • Was the cancellation of the transfer order motivated by extraneous considerations?
  • Does the post of Senior Headmistress in Government Girls High School 122/JB require an officer of BPS-18 or above?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mumtaz Begum And Another vs Mst. Yaqoot Begum And Another1997 SCMR 1173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-09
  civil court jurisdictionejectment suitrent restriction lawsleave to appealarrears of rent
  Summary & questions settled

  Mst. Mumtaz Begum and another filed a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Peshawar High Court dated 30-4-1995, which dismissed their revision petition and upheld the appellate judgment of the District Judge, Kohat, decreeing the ejectment suit and recovery of arrears of rent filed by respondent Mst. Yaqoot Begum. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the civil court had jurisdiction to adjudicate an ejectment suit regarding a shop situated within Kohat city, which the petitioners contended was governed by rent restriction laws rather than the civil court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention raised regarding the bar of jurisdiction of the civil court and the applicability of rent restriction laws required detailed consideration by the Court. The key principle laid down is that where property is situated within an area governed by specific rent restriction laws, the jurisdictional competency of civil courts to entertain ejectment proceedings requires substantive judicial scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to adjudicate an ejectment suit regarding a shop governed by rent restriction laws?
  • Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the revision petition against the judgment of the District Judge?
  • Are commercial properties situated within Kohat city exclusively subject to rent restriction legislation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mahmudi Begum Alias Muhammadi Begum vs Malik Muhammad1997 SCMR 1608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-03
  consent decreefraud and misrepresentationspecific performancecompromise decreecivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a civil revision by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner had sought to set aside a consent decree passed in a specific performance suit on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, and lack of authorized representation, contending she was an illiterate purdah-observing lady who was misled into a compromise. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a strong and clear case of fraud or misrepresentation to warrant setting aside the consent decree under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the High Court and trial court rightly dismissed the application, as the petitioner's subsequent conduct—specifically moving an application for extension of time to deposit the decretal amount—demonstrated reliance on the decree, thereby negating her belated plea of fraud. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that provisions of Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 must be construed and applied strictly, placing a heavy onus on the applicant to establish fraud or misrepresentation through clear and strong evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside a consent decree requires strict proof of fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Does the subsequent conduct of a party in seeking an extension of time to satisfy a consent decree preclude them from later challenging it as fraudulent under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a consent decree be set aside on the ground of unauthorized representation without establishing a clear and strong case within the scope of Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Zohra And Another vs Malik Muhammad Sadiq And Another1997 SCMR 449 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-26
  dying declarationmurderacquittalmedical fitnesscriminal appealreasonable doubtcapital charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent of murder charges. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting a dying declaration and acquitting the accused despite the trial court's conviction. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding the High Court's assessment of the evidence correct. The Court held that when a victim suffers extensive burns (75-80%) and is admitted to the hospital in an unconscious state, the prosecution must establish the declarant's mental and physical fitness to make a statement. The failure of the investigating officer to obtain a medical certificate confirming the victim's fitness before recording the dying declaration, coupled with significant contradictions in witness testimony and the absence of a Magistrate during the recording, created reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed the principle that a dying declaration is only reliable when the declarant's fitness is beyond doubt, and in the absence of such verification, it is unsafe to sustain a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration reliable when the victim is suffering from extensive burns and was admitted to the hospital in an unconscious state without a medical certificate of fitness?
  • Does the failure of a police officer to obtain a medical certificate regarding the fitness of a declarant before recording a dying declaration create reasonable doubt?
  • Is it safe to base a conviction on a capital charge solely on a dying declaration when there are material contradictions in the prosecution's evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fahmida vs The State1997 SCMR 947 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-10-20
  narcotics bailpersonal searchrecovery proceedingsSection 103 CrPCprevious criminal recordbail for female accusedprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a bail application by the Sindh High Court regarding a narcotics case. The petitioner, a female, was arrested for the alleged possession of 35 grams of heroin. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail, considering the pendency of prior criminal cases and the procedural validity of the recovery. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had improperly denied bail based solely on the pendency of previous cases, noting that the petitioner had been acquitted in three of those cases and was on bail in the others. Furthermore, the Court highlighted a violation of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as no respectable inhabitants of the locality were associated with the search proceedings. Given the small quantity of the contraband, the maximum potential sentence, and the petitioner's gender, the Court held that a case for bail was established. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, and bail was granted subject to the furnishing of sureties.

  Questions settled

  • Should bail be denied to an accused solely on the ground that other criminal cases are pending against them?
  • Does the failure to associate respectable inhabitants of the locality during a search violate Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a female accused entitled to bail when the recovered contraband is small and procedural requirements for search were not strictly followed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dilbar Hamid Applicant vs Dr. Ghulam Bheek Khan And Other1997 SCMR 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-15
  Section 12(2) CPCmaintainabilityreview petitionsetting aside judgmentprocedural lawSupreme Court judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a miscellaneous application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking to set aside a judgment of the Supreme Court dated 11-8-1991. It was undisputed that prior to this application, two review petitions had been filed challenging the same judgment, and the petitioner's name appeared as an applicant in both. The petitioner contended that she was a permanent resident of Canada and had not authorized any counsel to file those review petitions. The Court observed that there was no material provided to substantiate the claim that the petitioner had not authorized the previous review petitions. Furthermore, the Court held that an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is not maintainable after the dismissal of a review petition by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court dismissed the miscellaneous application as not maintainable, affirming that the statutory remedy under Section 12(2) cannot be invoked once the review process has been exhausted and the judgment has been upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable after the dismissal of a review petition by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a party challenge a judgment under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after having previously participated in review proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Allah Jowai vs Wali Dad And Another1997 SCMR 1456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-19
  sale-deedfraud and misrepresentationindependent adviceleave to appealcivil litigationburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a civil dispute over the validity of a sale-deed involving agricultural land. The petitioner, Mst. Allah Jowai, challenged the sale-deed in the trial court, alleging that the respondents, Wali Dad and another, obtained the document through fraud and misrepresentation. A central legal question emerged regarding whether the petitioner had the benefit of independent advice at the time of the sale's registration. The trial court, the appellate court, and the High Court all dismissed the petitioner's claims, concluding that she had received independent advice because her son, Khizar Hayat, was present during the registration process. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the petitioner contended her son was the son-in-law of the respondent, a crucial fact that had not been adequately considered by the lower courts in determining the independence of the advice provided. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether, given the familial relationship between the petitioner's son and the respondent, the petitioner truly had access to independent advice during the transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of a family member during the registration of a sale-deed constitute independent advice if that family member has a conflict of interest?
  • Is the determination of whether a party received independent advice a question of fact that requires consideration of all surrounding circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Akhtar Jabeen And Another vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Circle III, Lahore And Another1997 SCMR 1402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-04
  evacuee propertyfraud vitiates proceedingstransfer ordersettlement recordsinheritance of propertycivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision against concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had dismissed the petitioners' suit for a declaration of exclusive ownership of an evacuee house. The core legal question concerned whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner retained jurisdiction to rectify a transfer order obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, and whether the house in dispute constituted the property of the petitioners' mother via an alleged gift in India. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-establishment of the gift and the ownership of the original allottee were unassailable, and reaffirmed the principle that fraud vitiates all solemn proceedings, thereby empowering settlement authorities to recall orders procured by deceit. Consequently, all three legal heirs of the original transferee were entitled to equal shares, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner has the jurisdiction to recall a transfer order procured through fraud and misrepresentation?
  • Does fraud vitiate solemn proceedings allowing authorities to undo fraudulent acts?
  • Are all legal heirs entitled to equal shares in property transferred to a deceased allottee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Tayuba Farooqi And Another vs Prime Minister of Pakistan And Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-13
  service lawseniority disputepromotion eligibilityFederal Service Tribunaladministrative rulesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals regarding seniority disputes. The petitioners challenged the promotion of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 to the post of Research Officer (B-17), arguing that under previous rules (1974 and 1981), the respondents were ineligible as they were not serving as Assistants in the Statistics Department at the relevant time. The core legal question was whether the promotions were validly made under the rules notified on 12-12-1989. The Supreme Court held that the promotions were lawful as the respondents met the eligibility criteria established by the 1989 rules and held seniority in grade over the petitioners. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision not to interfere with the promotions. While the Tribunal had noted an anomaly regarding the lack of proportionate representation for different feeder categories for promotion to B-17, the Court clarified that such observations did not invalidate the existing promotions and expressed confidence that the department would address these administrative concerns in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether promotions made in accordance with the rules notified on 12-12-1989 are valid despite arguments based on previous rules?
  • Do observations by a Tribunal regarding potential administrative anomalies in promotion policies automatically nullify existing promotions?
  • Can seniority disputes be sustained when the promoted individuals meet the eligibility criteria under the governing rules?
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• Mrs. Seemin Khan vs Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Establishment DivisionGovernment Of Pakistan And 16 Other1997 SCMR 1216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-12
  leave to appealseniorityCentral Superior Services Examinationretrospective effectFederal Service Tribunalcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed her service appeal regarding the determination of her seniority. The petitioner had been selected in the Accounts Group through the Central Superior Services Examination and completed her training with the 15th Common Training Programme due to administrative delays. Her seniority was initially fixed based on the aggregate marks in the Central Superior Services Examination and the final passing out examination, placing her at the top of the provisional seniority list. Subsequently, the practice of including marks from the final passing out examination was discontinued retrospectively, resulting in the reshuffling of her seniority and placing her junior to private respondents. Her departmental representation and subsequent service appeal were dismissed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether a settled seniority list that had attained finality could be disturbed through a retrospective policy change and whether the petitioner was condemned unheard.

  Questions settled

  • Can a settled seniority list that has attained finality be disturbed through a retrospective policy change?
  • Whether the practice of calculating inter se seniority of civil servants based on aggregate examination marks can be altered retrospectively?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to a hearing before an administrative decision adversely affecting their settled seniority is made?
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• Mrs. Farhat Yasmine vs Malik Zulfiqar And Other1997 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-13
  custody of minorguardian and wardconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsleave to appealwelfare of minor
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the concurrent judgments of the Guardian Judge and the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, and granted the custody of the minor daughter to the respondent-father. The petitioner-mother contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court was not justified in interfering with concurrent factual findings regarding the welfare of the minor and that, under Muslim Law, she was entitled to custody of the female child until her marriage in the absence of disqualifications. The Supreme Court considered whether the learned Judge in Chambers was justified in exercising constitutional jurisdiction to set aside the concurrent findings of two competent courts. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and stayed the execution proceedings before the trial court pursuant to the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in interfering with concurrent findings of competent courts regarding the custody of a minor in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the mother retain the right to custody of a female minor until marriage under Muslim Law in the absence of disqualifications?
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• Mrs. Bilquis Anwar Khan And Others vs Pakistan Through Secretary, Cabinet Division, IslamabadAnd Other1997 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-06
  property taxCapital Development Authoritymunicipal functionsleave to appealstay of recoveryIslamabad Capital Territory
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, residents of the Islamabad Capital Territory, challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the competency of the Capital Development Authority (C.D.A.) to levy property tax under section 15-A of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960. The core legal question was whether the C.D.A., upon being assigned the functions of a Municipal Committee under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, possessed the legal authority to levy property tax on urban immovable properties, given that the Municipal Administration Ordinance did not provide for such a levy. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioners required detailed examination and consequently granted leave to appeal. Pending the final decision, the recovery of property tax from the petitioners was stayed subject to the furnishing of security equivalent to the demanded tax amount before the Nazir of the High Court. The key principle established relates to the scope of taxing powers transferred or assigned to civic authorities under municipal and development statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Capital Development Authority have the legal competency to levy property tax on properties situated within the Islamabad Capital Territory under section 15-A of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960?
  • Whether the assignment of functions of a Municipal Committee under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, restricts the Capital Development Authority from levying property tax not explicitly provided under that ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Moor Elahi vs Director of Civilian Personnel, Rear Air Headquarters, Peshawar And 2 Other1997 SCMR 1749 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-13
  Annual Confidential Reportadverse remarksservice lawexpunction of remarksadministrative procedurereporting officerdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's challenge to adverse remarks in his 1991 Annual Confidential Report (ACR). The appellant, a Head Clerk in the Pakistan Air Force, contended that the remarks were biased, vague, and communicated with a significant delay, violating established departmental instructions. The core legal question was whether the adverse remarks, which were communicated four years late and lacked specific supporting material, were legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the reporting officer failed to adhere to the mandatory procedure requiring timely communication of adverse remarks, which serves the dual purpose of administrative efficiency and enabling the employee to rectify defects. Furthermore, the Court found the remarks to be vague and lacking the necessary objective assessment required for such reports. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and ordered the expunction of the adverse remarks. The key principle laid down is that adverse remarks must be communicated promptly and with sufficient particularity; failure to do so, or the use of vague, subjective, and unsubstantiated remarks, renders them liable to be expunged.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to communicate adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report within the stipulated timeframe invalidate those remarks?
  • Can adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report be expunged if they are found to be vague and lacking in objective assessment?
  • Is a reporting officer required to provide specific material to support adverse remarks when an employee has a history of otherwise spotless service records?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto And Another vs President of Pakistan And Other1997 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-29
  dissolution of National AssemblyArticle 58(2)(b)constitutional machineryjudicial reviewpresidential discretionextra-judicial killingsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions challenging the President of Pakistan’s order dissolving the National Assembly under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution. The core legal question was whether the President’s discretionary power to dissolve the Assembly requires a total breakdown of constitutional machinery or if it extends to situations where the government cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court, by a majority, upheld the dissolution, rejecting the contention that the power is restricted to martial law-like scenarios. The Court held that the President may dissolve the Assembly upon forming an opinion based on material having a nexus with the dissolution order. It further established that corroborative material produced after the dissolution date is admissible, and newspaper cuttings constitute valid material. The Court found sufficient evidence supporting grounds including extra-judicial killings, non-implementation of judicial judgments, and the tapping of telephones of constitutional functionaries. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, affirming that the President’s exercise of discretion was justified by the material presented, thereby validating the dissolution of the National Assembly and the dismissal of the Cabinet.

  Questions settled

  • Does the President's power to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 require a total breakdown of constitutional machinery?
  • Can material produced after the date of a dissolution order be considered as corroborative evidence to support the grounds for dissolution?
  • Are newspaper cuttings admissible as material to support the grounds for the dissolution of the National Assembly?
  • Is the President's opinion regarding the dissolution of the National Assembly subject to judicial review based on the existence of a nexus between the material and the dissolution order?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Tahira Ayyaz vs Principal, Khyber Medical College, Peshawar And 2 Other1997 SCMR 1188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-27
  medical college admissionreserved seatnaval quotacompetent authorityadmission cancellationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed her writ petition challenging the cancellation of her admission to the M.B.,B.S. course at Khyber Medical College, Peshawar for the 1994/95 session. The core legal question was whether her admission against a seat reserved for the children of Naval personnel was valid when she was not nominated by the competent authority, the Director Naval Education Services, Naval Headquarters, Islamabad, but rather by an officer who had merely recommended her in his personal capacity. The Supreme Court held that the cancellation of the petitioner's admission was lawful because the nominating authority was exclusively the Director Naval Education Services, and another candidate who was duly nominated by that competent authority was rightly admitted. The court established the principle that admission against a reserved institutional quota must strictly comply with nominations issued solely by the designated competent authority, and recommendations by unauthorized officers confer no legal right to admission. Consequently, leave to appeal was declined and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether admission against a reserved quota for Naval personnel is valid without nomination by the designated competent authority?
  • Does a recommendation by an unauthorized officer confer a legal right to admission against a reserved institutional seat?
  • Can the cancellation of an admission made without proper nomination by the competent authority be upheld by the courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Rukhsana Ijaz vs Secretary, Education, Punjab And Others1997 PLC (C.S.) 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-20
  service mattertransfer and postingjurisdiction of High CourtService Tribunalcivil servantconstitutional petitioninterim stay order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an interim stay order passed by the Lahore High Court in a service dispute between two civil servants regarding their transfer and posting. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional petition challenging the transfer and posting orders of civil servants, given the statutory framework governing service matters. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that disputes regarding the transfer and posting of civil servants relate exclusively to the terms and conditions of their service. Consequently, such matters fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, and the jurisdiction of the High Court is expressly barred by the Constitution. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's stay order, ruling that the High Court must first determine the question of its own jurisdiction before granting any interim relief in such service-related disputes. The principle laid down is that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to interfere in matters of transfer and posting of civil servants, as these are exclusively within the domain of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional petition regarding the transfer and posting of civil servants?
  • Are disputes concerning the transfer and posting of civil servants considered matters relating to the terms and conditions of service?
  • Must the High Court decide the question of its jurisdiction before passing an interim stay order in a service-related matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Rukhsana Ijaz vs Secretary, Education, Punjab And Other1997 SCMR 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-20
  civil servanttransfer and postingjurisdiction of High CourtService Tribunalconstitutional petitionstay order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court whereby a constitutional petition challenging a transfer and posting order of two civil servants was admitted to regular hearing and an interim stay order was issued. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain a service dispute relating to the transfer and posting of civil servants in light of constitutional bars. The Supreme Court held that disputes concerning the terms and conditions of service of civil servants, including transfers and postings, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 212(2) of the Constitution. The ratio decidendi is that the High Court cannot issue interim stay orders or exercise jurisdiction in matters exclusively lying within the domain of the Service Tribunal without first determining its own jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed, the impugned stay order was set aside, and the High Court was directed to decide the question of its jurisdiction before passing any stay orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional petition regarding the transfer and posting of a civil servant?
  • Does a dispute relating to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • Can the High Court issue a stay order in a service matter before deciding the question of its own jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Nuzhat Mahmood, Chemist, Hydrocarbon Development Institute,Islamabad vs The Director General, Hydrocarbon Institute, Islamabad And 5Other1997 SCMR 1740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-25
  service tribunalinter se senioritypromotiongrade versus postcivil servanthydrocarbon development institute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's challenge to an inter se seniority list of B-17 officers in the Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan. The appellant, initially appointed as an Assistant Scientific Officer (Chemist) in Grade B-16, contested the seniority assigned to the private respondents who were promoted to Grade B-17 on the same day as the appellant, having previously served as Laboratory Technicians in Grade B-16. The core legal question was whether officers holding distinct posts with different initial qualifications and duties in Grade B-16 could be assigned seniority in Grade B-17 based on their inter se seniority in the lower grade when sharing a common channel of promotion. The Supreme Court held that under the applicable service rules, employees promoted to a higher grade in the same batch retain their inter se seniority from the lower grade, and since both parties shared a common channel of promotion and were in Grade B-16, the Tribunal's decision contained no legal infirmity. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees promoted to a higher grade in one batch retain their inter se seniority as established in the lower grade?
  • Does a difference in initial qualifications and nomenclature of posts in a lower grade prevent the application of joint seniority upon promotion to a higher grade under departmental rules?
  • Whether seniority upon promotion to a higher grade is to be reckoned from the date of regular appointment to the post or grade under the applicable rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Nuzhat Mahmood vs The Director-General, Hydrocarbon1997 PLC (C.S.) 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-25
  inter se senioritypromotionfeeder gradeservice tribunalhydrocarbon development institutecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a service dispute concerning inter se seniority between the appellant and private respondents to the post of Chemist (B-17) in the Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan. The core legal question is whether officers promoted to a higher grade on the same day from different feeder posts in Grade-16 should have their inter se seniority determined by their previous seniority in the lower grade or by the distinct nature and initial qualifications of their respective posts. The Supreme Court held that since the applicable service rules provided a common channel of promotion for Grade-16 officers and mandated that employees promoted to a higher grade in one batch retain their inter se seniority from the lower grade, the respondents were rightly placed senior to the appellant based on their existing lower-grade seniority. The key principles laid down are that seniority upon promotion in a single batch is governed by inter se standing in the feeder grade under the applicable departmental rules, and nomenclature differences or higher initial entry qualifications alone do not displace statutory promotion rules.

  Questions settled

  • How is inter se seniority determined when officers from a common feeder grade are promoted to a higher grade on the same date?
  • Does a difference in initial academic qualifications or nomenclature of feeder posts override explicit departmental rules regulating promotion and seniority?
  • Whether employees promoted to a higher grade in one batch retain their seniority position from the lower grade under the applicable service rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Farhat Majeed vs Selection Committee, Bolan Medical College1997 SCMR 1682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-23
  Bolan Medical Collegereserved seatsrural areabona fide residentdomicile certificateconstitutional jurisdictionadmission policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals against a High Court judgment dismissing petitions filed by the appellant regarding the rejection of her admission to Bolan Medical College, Quetta, against reserved seats for rural areas. The core legal question was whether the Selection Committee was justified in rejecting the appellant's candidature on the grounds that her father’s service record listed an address in Punjab and that they lacked landed property in the rural area of Quetta. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Selection Committee acted within its authority under the college prospectus. The Court established that the objective of reserved seats for rural areas is to support bona fide residents who are permanently settled in those regions. Consequently, mere occupation of employer-allotted housing, such as a WAPDA colony residence, does not satisfy the requirement of being a bona fide resident of a rural area. The Court affirmed that applicants must provide reliable evidence of permanent settlement, such as property ownership, and that the Selection Committee’s factual findings on residency are not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction absent legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Does residence in employer-allotted housing satisfy the requirement of being a bona fide resident of a rural area for reserved seat admission?
  • Is the Selection Committee of an educational institution competent to determine the residency status of an applicant based on the prospectus?
  • Can a court interfere with the factual findings of a Selection Committee regarding an applicant's residency status in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Dur E Sameen And Another vs Selection Committee Through Chairman, Balochistan1997 SCMR 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-02
  domicile of choicereserved seatsadmission criteriaconstitutional jurisdictiondisputed questions of factpermanent residence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Balochistan High Court, which had dismissed a constitutional petition regarding the rejection of the petitioner's application for admission to Bolan Medical College against a seat reserved for Loralai District. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had established a valid domicile in Loralai District to qualify for the reserved seat. The Selection Committee had rejected the application, finding that the petitioner's father, despite holding a domicile certificate, was a resident of Dera Ismail Khan and had no permanent ties to Loralai. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate an intention to permanently settle in Loralai. The Court reiterated the principle that for the acquisition of a domicile of choice, there must be a combination of actual residence and a clear intention of permanent or indefinite residence. Mere possession of a domicile certificate or employment in the province is not conclusive evidence of such intention. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, noting that the determination of domicile involved disputed questions of fact.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice?
  • Is the mere possession of a domicile certificate sufficient to establish permanent residence for the purpose of reserved seats?
  • Can the High Court adjudicate upon disputed questions of fact in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does employment in a province by itself constitute conclusive evidence of an intention to settle permanently in that province?
  Read full judgment →
• Misri Through Legal Heirs And Others vs Muhammad Sharif And Other1997 SCMR 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-02
  occupancy tenancyrevenue recordstatutory titledeclaration of rightslimitationcivil revisionsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision and upheld the concurrent judgments of the lower courts non-suiting the petitioners. The petitioners had filed a suit for a declaration that they were co-sharers in possession of 1/3 share in the suit land as occupancy tenants, claiming that the omission of their names from the revenue record since 1904-05 was void. The respondents contended that they had acquired exclusive statutory title under sections 4 and 4-A of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950. The core legal question was whether a person whose name is omitted from the revenue record at the commencement of the Tenancy Act can claim ownership under sections 4 and 4-A without first obtaining a declaration of occupancy rights under section 83 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that sections 4 and 4-A apply only to those recorded as occupancy tenants at the commencement of the Act, and a person not so recorded must first obtain a declaration of occupancy rights within the prescribed period under section 83. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sections 4 and 4-A of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950, apply to a person not recorded as an occupancy tenant at the commencement of the Act?
  • Is it mandatory for an unrecorded claimant to obtain a declaration of occupancy rights under section 83 of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950, before claiming ownership benefits?
  • Does the omission of a name from the revenue record for a long duration without seeking a statutory declaration extinguish the right to claim occupancy tenancy?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Barkat Ali And Another vs The State1997 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-07
  surety bondforfeiture of bondbail bondcriminal procedureremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by Mir Barkat Ali and Retired Subedar Abdul Majeed challenges the judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan, which dismissed their revision petition against the forfeiture of their surety bonds. The appellants stood sureties for the appearance of an accused before the Assistant Commissioner, Dalbandin, in a case under the Arms Ordinance. After the accused was initially convicted and sentenced to a fine, the High Court set aside the conviction on a suo motu reference, holding the trial was without jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the Sessions Judge, Quetta. Upon the accused failing to appear and absconding to Afghanistan, the Sessions Judge initiated proceedings under Section 514-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and forfeited the surety bonds. The core legal question is whether sureties are liable for the non-appearance of an accused in a court other than the specific court named in the bail bond. The Supreme Court held that the appellants undertook to produce the accused only before the Assistant Commissioner and were not liable for his non-appearance in the Sessions Court. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the forfeiture orders were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Are sureties liable for the non-appearance of an accused in a court different from the specific court mentioned in the terms of the bail bond?
  • Whether forfeiture of surety bonds can be sustained under Section 514-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the accused fails to appear before a transferee court after a remand?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Ahmad Khan vs Secretary to Government and others1997 PLC (C.S.) 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-07
  Afghan Refugees Organizationpensionary benefitscivil servantstemporary serviceFederal Service TribunalCivil Service Regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a former Senior Clerk and Assistant in the Afghan Refugees Organization whose services were terminated, challenged the Federal Service Tribunal's judgment dismissing his service appeal. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider whether the appellant was entitled to pensionary benefits under Regulation 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations. The Deputy Attorney-General raised a preliminary objection that employees of the Afghan Refugees Organization were not Government servants since their salaries are ultimately reimbursed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Rejecting this objection based on prior precedents holding that such posts are civil in nature and connected with the affairs of the Federation, the Supreme Court ruled that employees of the Afghan Refugees Organization are Federal Government civil servants. The Court held that the appellant, having rendered more than ten years of continuous temporary service, was entitled to pensionary benefits under Regulation 371-A(i) of the Civil Service Regulations. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of the Afghan Refugees Organization are considered Federal Government civil servants?
  • Are employees of the Afghan Refugees Organization entitled to pensionary benefits under Regulation 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations?
  • Does continuous temporary service exceeding five years qualify for pension or gratuity under Regulation 371-A(i) of the Civil Service Regulations?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Ahmad Khan vs Secretary to Government And Other1997 SCMR 1477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-07
  civil servantsAfghan Refugees Organizationpensionary benefitsRegulation 371-Atemporary serviceFederal Service Tribunalreimbursement by UNHCR
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's appeal against the termination of his services in the Afghan Refugees Organization. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to consider whether the appellant was entitled to pensionary benefits under Regulation 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations. The Deputy Attorney-General raised a preliminary objection asserting that employees of the Afghan Refugees Organization were not Government servants as their salaries were ultimately reimbursed by the UNHCR. Rejection of this objection was supported by precedent establishing that posts connected with the affairs of the Federation paid from the Federal Budget are civil posts whose incumbents are civil servants. The Supreme Court held that the appellant and similarly situated employees are Government civil servants. Under Regulation 371-A(i) of the Civil Service Regulations, continuous temporary service of over five years counts towards pension or gratuity. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Afghan Refugees Organization whose salaries are initially paid from the Federal Budget considered Government civil servants?
  • Does ultimate reimbursement of salaries by an international body like the UNHCR disentitle employees from being treated as Federal Government employees?
  • Does continuous temporary service of over five years qualify a civil servant for pensionary benefits under Regulation 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Shamsul Haq And Others vs Mian Hamid Haq And Other1997 SCMR 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-08-08
  consent decreecompromiseconditional statementremandappellate jurisdictionexecution of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court disposing of an appeal and cross-objections based on statements made by the parties' counsel. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in disposing of the matters on the basis of conditional statements made by the respective parties when those statements did not reflect a consensus on the same terms and did not constitute a valid compromise or consent order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a case cannot be disposed of on the basis of compromise or consent unless the parties mutually agree to identical terms, and statements constituting merely conditional offers cannot amount to a binding agreement or a decision on merits. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that where parties do not reach a true consensus ad idem, a court cannot record a consent judgment, and the matter must instead be adjudicated and decided upon its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court dispose of a case on the basis of a compromise when the parties have not agreed to the same terms?
  • Whether conditional statements made by parties during appeal proceedings can constitute a binding consent order?
  • What is the legal recourse when a High Court disposes of an appeal without a true consensus between the parties and without deciding the case on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Rafiq Saigol and anothers vs Bank of Credit & Commerce1997 PLD Supreme Court 865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-17
  review jurisdictionerror apparentleave to defendbank guaranteesubsequent legislationrehearingbanking recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants sought a review of the Supreme Court's judgment dated 13-2-1996 under Article 188 of the Constitution. The petitioners argued that there was an error apparent on the face of the record because the Court distinguished an Indian Supreme Court precedent based on a mistaken timeline of statutory amendments. They further contended that a later Supreme Court decision had modified the applicable precedent on granting leave to defend, and that the condition of furnishing a bank guarantee was excessively harsh and had been modified by the newly enacted Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finance) Act XV of 1997. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that the scope of civil review under Article 188 and Order XXVI Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 is analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The Court laid down that review proceedings cannot be a rehearing of a decided case, and a conscious, deliberate decision on law or fact cannot be reviewed merely because another view is possible or because of a subsequent change in legislation.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the Supreme Court's review jurisdiction in civil proceedings under Article 188 of the Constitution and Order XXVI Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
  • Can a conscious and deliberate decision of the Supreme Court be reviewed on the ground that another view on reconsideration is possible?
  • Does a subsequent change in legislation enacted after the announcement of a judgment justify a review of that judgment?
  • Can a ground or contention not raised at the hearing of an appeal or petition be allowed to be raised for the first time in review proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Defence. GovernmentOf Pakistan. Islamabad And 8 Other1997 SCMR 1356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-07-30
  leave to appeallocus standihelicopter importcivil aviationwrit petitioninterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging the refusal of the Civil Aviation Authority to allow the operation and flying of an imported MI-8 helicopter, on the grounds of lack of locus standi and merits. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner possessed sufficient locus standi to maintain the writ petition and whether the refusal to permit the operation of the helicopter was legally justified. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether the impugned judgment is sustainable in law, considering the financial interest acquired by the petitioner through the payment of custom duty and the contentions regarding mala fides and political victimization. The Court granted leave to appeal for a detailed examination of the legal contentions raised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who has paid custom duty on an imported helicopter has locus standi to challenge the refusal to allow its operation?
  • Can a writ petition be dismissed on merits after holding that the petitioner lacks locus standi?
  • Whether the refusal by the Civil Aviation Authority to allow the operation of a registered helicopter is sustainable in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Afzaal Hussain vs Abdul Latif1997 SCMR 1382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-09
  fraud and misrepresentationapplication under section 12(2) CPCframing of issuesrecording of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the impugned orders concerning an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question is whether, in view of the allegations of fraud, collusion, and misrepresentation raised in the application, the trial court was required to decide the matter after framing necessary issues and providing an opportunity for the parties to lead evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to examine this question, directing the petitioner to deposit a balance amount of Rs.16,15,000 in the trial court within one month as a condition, failing which the leave granted would stand withdrawn. The holding establishes that allegations of fraud and misrepresentation under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 necessitate a proper inquiry involving the framing of issues and the recording of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 involving allegations of fraud and collusion must be decided after framing issues and recording evidence?
  • What is the consequence of failing to deposit the balance amount directed by the Supreme Court while granting leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs the Lahore Textile & General Mills Ltd., Lahore and others vs The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others1997 PTD 1054 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-24
  income taxturnover taxlegislative competenceconstitutional validityfederal legislative listtaxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of civil petitions challenging the imposition of income tax based solely on 'turnover' under the Income Tax Ordinance. The core legal question granted for leave to appeal is whether the Federal Legislature possesses the constitutional authority, under Item No. 47 of the Federal Legislative List, Part I, of the Constitution (Fourth Schedule), to impose income tax calculated exclusively on turnover without providing an opportunity for subsequent adjustment based on actual income. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of Sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance in light of this constitutional limitation. The Court also directed that notice be issued to the Attorney-General pursuant to Order XXVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, given the constitutional implications of the challenge. Pending the final adjudication of these appeals, the Court ordered that existing interim relief remain in force and prioritized the hearing of these matters due to their impact on federal government finances.

  Questions settled

  • Is the imposition of income tax based solely on turnover, without adjustment for actual income, a permissible exercise of legislative power under the Federal Legislative List?
  • Does the imposition of turnover-based tax exceed the legislative authority granted to the Federal Legislature under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Miraj Bibi vs Mst. Azim Khatoon And Other1997 SCMR 1892 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-20
  suit for pre-emptionright of pre-emptiondisguise vs deviceexchange mutationsale disguised as exchangesecond appealcircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave before the Supreme Court arose out of a pre-emption suit filed by the appellant challenging an exchange transaction as a disguised sale designed to defeat her right of pre-emption. The trial court dismissed the suit holding the transaction to be an exchange; the first appellate court reversed the decision and decreed the suit; and the High Court in regular second appeal restored the trial court's judgment, treating the transaction as a legitimate device. Reversing the High Court, the Supreme Court held that when assessing whether a transaction is a genuine exchange or a sale disguised as an exchange to evade pre-emption, courts must look to its real legal nature based on ocular and circumstantial evidence. Proof of cash consideration passing directly between the parties is not an absolute prerequisite. Where land taken in alleged exchange is simultaneously transferred to the original vendor's close relative without the vendor ever taking actual ownership or possession, the transactions form part of a single transaction concealed under a disguise, rather than a legitimate device. Consequently, the Supreme Court decreed the appellant's pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • What is the essential distinction between a legitimate device and an invalid disguise used to defeat a right of pre-emption?
  • Is proof of cash consideration passing directly between the parties an absolute prerequisite to declare an ostensible exchange transaction to be a sale?
  • Whether the determination of the legal effect of proved facts regarding simultaneous land transactions constitutes a question of law open to review in second appeal?
  • Can a court infer a disguised sale where land ostensibly transferred in exchange is simultaneously sold to a close relative of the exchanger without the transferor ever taking possession?
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• Messrs Sports World And Others vs Onyx Garments (Pvt.) Ltd. And Another1997 SCMR 1199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-11
  attachment before judgmentcivil procedurealienation of propertyinterim reliefleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from a civil dispute involving the attachment of property before judgment. The core legal question presented for consideration is whether property that has already been disposed of by a defendant subsequent to the institution of a civil suit remains eligible for attachment before judgment under the relevant procedural laws. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address this specific issue regarding the scope and applicability of pre-judgment attachment provisions. Pending the final adjudication of the appeal, the Court issued an interim order restraining the respondent, Muhammad Siddique, from further alienating the specific property he acquired through an exchange with the petitioner. The Court further clarified that the pendency of these appellate proceedings should not impede or delay the ongoing trial of the underlying civil suit. The parties were granted liberty to submit relevant documentation to support their respective positions before the matter is scheduled for a final hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Can property that has already been disposed of by a defendant after the institution of a civil suit be the subject-matter of attachment before judgment?
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• Messrs Siemens Pakistan Engineering Company Ltd., Karachi vs Shahzad Saleem And 5 Others1997 PLC 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-10-16
  industrial disputedismissal from servicedomestic inquiryprofessional enquiry officerproportionality of punishmentconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by an employer company against the dismissal of its constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision reinstating four permanent workmen. The employees were dismissed from service after being found playing Ludo during working hours following a domestic inquiry conducted by a professional outsider paid in cash. The core legal questions involved the validity of domestic inquiries conducted by paid professional outsiders, the proportionality of the penalty of dismissal for a single isolated incident of alleged indiscipline, and the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the High Court rightly concluded that the penalty of dismissal was unduly harsh and disproportionate, and properly disapproved of engaging professional enquiry officers on cash payment. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, laying down the principle that the extraordinary discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 199 will not be exercised in aid of injustice or to perpetuate an illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the penalty of dismissal from service is disproportionate and unreasonable for a single isolated incident of idling or playing a game during working hours?
  • Can a domestic inquiry conducted by a professional outsider paid in cash be considered independent and reliable?
  • Whether the High Court can refuse to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 199 where the impugned order fosters substantial justice rather than injustice?
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• Messrs Sardarpur Textile And Others vs Federation of Pakistan And Other1997 SCMR 1164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-12
  Leave to appealConstitutional petitionIncome taxTax recoverySuspension of recoveryInterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in several petitions, noting that they raised the same legal issue as a previously granted leave to appeal in a Constitutional Petition. The Court directed that all these appeals be heard together at an early date. As an interim measure during the pendency of the appeals, the recovery of tax levied or leviable under Sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance was suspended. This suspension was conditional upon the appellants undertaking to pay the tax, along with interest at a rate of 2% over the bank rate, should their appeals ultimately be dismissed.

  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sardarpur Tex Zahur Textile Mills, Mandiwalla Mauser M/s SH.1997 PTD 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-12
  income taxleave to appealinterim relieftax recoverystay of recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of petitions for leave to appeal regarding the levy of income tax under specific provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal in the present petitions, noting that they raise the same legal issues as those previously identified in C.P. No. 234-L of 1995. The Court directed that all related appeals be heard together at an early date. Pending the final adjudication of these appeals, the Court established a conditional interim relief mechanism. It ordered that the recovery of the tax levied or leviable under the relevant sections of the Income Tax Ordinance shall remain suspended, provided that the appellants furnish an undertaking to pay the tax, along with interest calculated at a rate of 2% over the bank rate, in the event that their appeals are ultimately dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the recovery of tax be suspended pending the final adjudication of an appeal?
  • What conditions may be imposed by the Court for suspending the recovery of tax during the pendency of an appeal?
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• Messrs Saeedullah Khan vs Central Board of Revenue and others1997 PTD 1754 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-15
  leave to appealwithholding taxturnover taxlegislative competenceincome taxcivil contractor
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil contractor, filed a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the levy of withholding tax under section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and its increase under the Finance Act, 1995. The core legal question concerns whether the imposition of income tax on the basis of turnover alone, without providing an opportunity for subsequent adjustment with reference to actual income, is a permissible exercise of legislative power under Item 47 of the Federal Legislative List of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider this constitutional question, following earlier leave-granting orders passed in connected petitions, and ordered that the interim relief previously granted shall remain in force during the pendency of the appeals. The Court laid down that the validity of taxation based purely on turnover without actual income adjustment requires authoritative constitutional interpretation by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Is the imposition of income tax on the basis of turnover alone, without adjustment with reference to actual income, a permissible exercise of legislative power under Item 47 of the Federal Legislative List?
  • Whether deduction of income tax under section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 applies at the rate prevalent at the time of receipt of payment or at the date of the contract?
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• Messrs Saeedullah Khan vs Central Board of Revenue And Other1997 SCMR 1277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-15
  withholding taxincome taxturnover taxleave to appeallegislative competencecivil contractor
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil contractor engaged in road, bridge, and dam construction, sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order dismissing his writ petition challenging the levy of withholding tax under section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and its increase under the Finance Act, 1995. The High Court had relied on precedent holding section 80-C to be valid legislation and that income-tax deduction applies at the rate prevalent at the time of receipt of payment. The Supreme Court considered that leave to appeal had already been granted in connected matters to examine whether imposing income-tax based solely on turnover without adjustment against actual income is a permissible exercise of legislative power under the Federal Legislative List. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and issued a similar interim order keeping the previous interim arrangement in force pending the final hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the imposition of income-tax on the basis of turnover alone, without an opportunity to adjust with actual income, is a permissible exercise of legislative power under the Federal Legislative List?
  • Whether deduction of income-tax under section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 should be at the rate prevalent at the time of the contract or at the time of receipt of payment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Malik Muhammad Nawaz, Haji Aziz Ahmad, Commission Agents, Chakwal vs Syed Mehmood Hussain1997 SCMR 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-02
  summary judgmentleave to defendconditional leavesurety bondGeneral Clauses Actcomputation of timerecovery suitnegotiable instruments
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a recovery suit filed under Order 37, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner challenged the High Court's dismissal of his appeal against a decree granted after he failed to furnish a surety bond within the stipulated time. The core legal questions concerned the propriety of granting conditional leave to defend and the correct computation of a one-month deadline for furnishing surety. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was justified in granting conditional leave, as mere allegations of forgery, without demonstrating a prima facie bona fide defense, do not warrant unconditional leave. Furthermore, the Court clarified that under Section 9, General Clauses Act 1897, when computing a period of one month, the date of the order is excluded, and the period expires on the corresponding day of the following month. If that day is a holiday, the deadline extends to the next working day. Consequently, the Court remanded the matter, granting the petitioner a final opportunity to furnish the required surety.

  Questions settled

  • Is a defendant entitled to unconditional leave to defend a summary suit merely by alleging that the underlying documents are forged?
  • How is a period of one month computed for the purpose of a court order under Section 9, General Clauses Act 1897?
  • Does the exclusion of the date of an order under Section 9, General Clauses Act 1897 apply to the computation of time for furnishing a surety bond?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mahboob Pictures vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Culture, Archaeology, Sports And Tourism, Islamabad And Another1997 SCMR 1973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-24
  contempt of courtconsent orderenforcement of judgmentfilm certificationjurisdictionMartial Law Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for contempt of court proceedings filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from the alleged non-compliance by the Central Board of Film Censors with a previous High Court consent order. The petitioner sought to compel the certification of an Indian-produced film, 'Anmol Ghari', despite a government notification issued under Martial Law Order No. 81 of 1980 prohibiting such films. The High Court had previously directed the respondents to consider the certification application in accordance with a consent order, a decision the Supreme Court had upheld by refusing leave to appeal. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court was the appropriate forum to initiate contempt proceedings for the violation of a High Court order. The Supreme Court held that the application was not properly filed before it, as the alleged violation concerned an order of the High Court. The Court clarified that under Article 187(2) of the Constitution, Supreme Court orders are executed as if issued by the High Court, and enforcement of High Court orders lies within the jurisdiction of the High Court itself.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court the appropriate forum to initiate contempt proceedings for the violation of a High Court order?
  • Under which provision of the Constitution is a Supreme Court order executed as if it were issued by a High Court?
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• Messrs M.Y. Malik & Company And 2 Others vs Messrs Splendours International Through M.D_1997 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-17
  direct appealexecution of decreefinal orderdecretal amountinterest ratesection 34 CPCaggregate sumrevision
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan arose out of execution proceedings following a money suit decree modified by the Supreme Court. The High Court, in revision, determined the judgment-debtors' ultimate financial liability under the decree and ordered payment by instalments, which the judgment-debtors appealed to the Supreme Court. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that no appeal lay as execution was still pending. On merits, the core issue concerned whether post-decree interest was payable on the principal decretal amount alone or on the aggregate sum combining principal and pre-decree interest under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's determination of liability constituted a final order, making the direct appeal competent under Article 185(2)(d). On the merits, the Court held that grant of interest under Section 34 is discretionary, and where a decree awards post-decree interest without specifying calculation on the aggregate sum, interest cannot be compounded on pre-decree interest. The appeal was allowed and the case remitted to the Executing Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of the High Court in revision determining the final pecuniary liability of a judgment-debtor constitute a final order appealable under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, is a court bound to award post-decree interest on the aggregate sum comprising principal and pre-decree interest?
  • Where a decree is silent regarding the payment of further interest on the aggregate sum, is such interest deemed to have been refused under Section 34(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Messrs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan,Abbottabad vs Messrs1997 SCMR 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-29
  petition for leave to appealcompany judgetransfer of appealjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench, which transferred an appeal filed by the respondents against the petitioner to the Company Judge. The core legal question concerns the mandatory nature of transferring proceedings under section 316(3) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The Supreme Court held that a plain reading of the statutory provision leaves the High Court with no option but to transfer the case to the Company Judge for disposal, rendering the impugned transfer order unexceptionable. The Court further held that any objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Company Judge to hear the appeal as a whole may be raised directly before the Company Judge. The petition was accordingly disposed of, establishing the mandatory nature of case transfers under the specified statutory provision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is bound to transfer a case to the Company Judge under section 316(3) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Can objections regarding the jurisdiction of the Company Judge to hear an appeal be raised before the Company Judge?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Gadoon Textiles Mills Ltd. And Others vs Federation of Pakistan1997 SCMR 1370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-17
  electricity tariffpromissory estoppellegitimate expectationindustrial incentivesconstitutional interpretationWAPDAtaxation powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed writ petitions filed by industrialists operating in the Gadoon Industrial Estate. The petitioners challenged the unilateral withdrawal of a 50% concession on electricity tariffs and fuel adjustment surcharges previously granted by the government to incentivize industrialization in a former poppy-cultivation area. The core legal questions involve the interpretation of constitutional provisions regarding the authority to levy taxes on electricity consumption, the validity of Section 25 of the WAPDA Act, 1958, in light of Article 157 of the Constitution, and the applicability of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel and the principle of Legitimate Expectations regarding the withdrawal of promised incentives. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, recognizing the public importance of the issues involving industrial incentives, public revenue, and constitutional interpretation. The Court ordered that pending the final adjudication, admitted amounts must be paid in cash, while disputed amounts are to be secured via surety bonds, and directed the matter to be heard by a larger bench of five judges.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of promised electricity tariff concessions by WAPDA violate the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel?
  • Is Section 25 of the WAPDA Act, 1958, inconsistent with Article 157 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding the power to levy taxes on electricity consumption?
  • Does the unilateral imposition of additional surcharges on electricity constitute a tax that exceeds the statutory authority of WAPDA?
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• Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills And 814 Others vs WAPDA And Other1997 SCMR 641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Electricity tariffSurchargeAdditional surchargeWAPDACouncil of Common Interests (CCI)Constitutional powersPromissory estoppelGadoon Amazai Industrial EstateConcession withdrawalDiscriminationJudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses appeals and petitions challenging the levy of surcharge and additional surcharge on electricity by WAPDA, and the withdrawal of a 50% electricity tariff concession for certain industries in the Gadoon Amazai Industrial Estate (G.A.I.E.). The core legal questions revolved around the competent authority for tariff determination (WAPDA, Provincial Government, or Council of Common Interests (CCI)), the nature of surcharges (tax vs. tariff component), and the legality of the concession withdrawal based on promissory estoppel and discrimination. The Supreme Court, by majority, dismissed the appeals, holding that WAPDA possesses the power to determine and revise electricity tariffs under Section 25 of the WAPDA Act, and that surcharges are substantively part of the tariff. The withdrawal of the 50% concession for industries on the 'negative list' was deemed reasonable and not discriminatory. However, the Court clarified that for G.A.I.E. consumers still enjoying the 50% concession, this concession must also apply to the surcharge and additional surcharge components, as they are considered part of the overall tariff.

  Questions settled

  • Who is the competent authority to determine electricity tariffs for WAPDA under the Constitution and the WAPDA Act?
  • Are surcharge and additional surcharge levied on electricity consumers to be considered taxes or components of the electricity tariff?
  • Can WAPDA unilaterally withdraw a previously granted 50% electricity tariff concession for industries without a specified period?
  • Is the creation of a 'negative list' of industries, thereby denying them a previously enjoyed concession, violative of Article 25 of the Constitution (equality before law)?
  • Does the doctrine of promissory estoppel apply to prevent the withdrawal of electricity tariff concessions granted to induce industrial investment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M_o Finance, Islamabad and 6 others1997 PTD 1555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  presumptive taxminimum taxturnover taxlegislative competenceconstitutional validityFederal Legislative Listtax holidayProtection of Economic Reforms Act 1992
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan disposed of 294 appeals arising from Lahore High Court judgments challenging the constitutional validity and legislative competence of Sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. These provisions established a presumptive tax regime and minimum tax levy based on annual turnover or gross receipts. The primary questions before the Court were whether the Federal Legislature possessed the competence under Entry 47 read with Entry 52 of the Federal Legislative List to impose presumptive and minimum income taxes without referencing actual net income, and whether such levies violated fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4, 18, and 25 of the Constitution, 1973. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D, holding that the term 'income' must be interpreted broadly and dynamically in tax statutes, permitting taxation based on earning capacity and gross receipts. The Court ruled that presumptive and minimum taxes under Entries 47 and 52 are not inherently expropriatory or discriminatory. However, it clarified that tax protections granted under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 prevail over Section 80-D, and that assessees under Section 80-D remain entitled to carry forward business losses under Section 35.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Parliament has the legislative competence under Entry 47 read with Entry 52 of the Federal Legislative List to impose presumptive and minimum income taxes based on gross turnover?
  • Whether the fiscal incentives and exemptions guaranteed under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 prevail over the minimum tax provisions of Section 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Whether the imposition of a minimum tax under Section 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 prevents an assessee from carrying forward business losses under Section 35 of the same Ordinance?
  • Can a presumptive tax calculated on turnover without reference to actual profit or loss be declared unconstitutional as being expropriatory or violative of fundamental rights under Articles 18 and 25?
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• Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd and others vs Federation of Pakistan throughSecretary Mk) Finance, Islamabad and 6 others1997 PLD Supreme Court 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  presumptive taxminimum taxlegislative competenceconstitutional validityincome taxtax evasionfiscal policyfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of 294 consolidated appeals challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, introduced by the Finance Acts of 1991 and 1992. These provisions imposed presumptive and minimum taxes on turnover. The core legal question was whether the Federal Legislature possessed the competence to levy such taxes under Entry 47 (taxes on income) and Entry 52 (production capacity) of the Federal Legislative List, and whether these levies violated fundamental rights (Articles 4, 18, and 25) by being confiscatory or discriminatory. The Supreme Court upheld the impugned provisions, ruling them intra vires the Constitution. The Court established that the power to tax is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, and legislative entries must be construed liberally. Presumptive and minimum taxes are valid legislative tools to curb evasion and broaden the tax base. The Court emphasized judicial restraint in economic policy, noting that fiscal statutes are not invalid merely because they cause hardship or utilize flat rates, provided they are not confiscatory or extortionate.

  Questions settled

  • Can the legislature impose a presumptive income tax on turnover under Entry 47 and Entry 52 of the Constitution?
  • Are the presumptive tax provisions under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, violative of fundamental rights regarding equality and property?
  • Does the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, prevail over the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, regarding tax exemptions?
  • Can the Central Board of Revenue apply circulars retrospectively if they are beneficial to the assessee?
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• Messrs E.F.U. General Insurance Co. Limited vs The Federation of Pakistan and others1997 PLD Supreme Court 700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-03
  general insurance businessdividend incomereopening of assessmentdefinite informationincome tax assessmenttax ratenon obstante clause
  Summary & questions settled

  The consolidated appeals concern whether tax authorities could lawfully reopen finalized assessments of general insurance companies to tax dividend income at higher normal rates instead of the previously applied lower rates. The appellants challenged the reopening of assessments under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, arguing that the department’s reliance on the Adamjee Insurance Company judgment to justify this change was legally misplaced. The Supreme Court held that the Adamjee and Central Insurance Company decisions did not overrule the American Life Insurance Company case, which established that dividend income of insurance companies remains entitled to lower tax rates under the First Schedule. The Court emphasized that the computation of income and the determination of tax rates are distinct processes. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the department lacked "definite information" under Section 65(2) to reopen finalized assessments, as the previous consistent practice was legally sound. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, allowing the appeals and affirming that general insurance companies cannot be denied the benefit of lower tax rates on dividend income absent specific legislative amendment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether dividend income of a general insurance company is chargeable to tax at the normal rate or at the lower rate prescribed for dividend income in the First Schedule?
  • Does a judgment of a superior court regarding a different legal provision constitute "definite information" under Section 65(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, to justify reopening an assessment?
  • Can an Income Tax Officer reopen a finalized assessment based solely on a change in the interpretation of tax law by the revenue department?
  • Does the non obstante clause in Section 26 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, exclude the application of the general tax rates provided in the First Schedule to dividend income of insurance companies?
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• Messrs Central Insurance Co. Ltd. and others vs Commissioner of Income-Tax and others1997 PTD 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-03
  income taxreopening assessmentdividend incomeleave to appealdefinite informationrule of consistencyinsurance companies
  Summary & questions settled

  This order disposes of petitions for leave to appeal against a common judgment dated 7-2-1995 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh dismissing constitutional petitions. The petitioners, insurance companies, challenged notices issued by official respondents under Sections 65 and 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, seeking to reopen finalized assessments regarding dividend income under Section 26-A read with the First Schedule. The core legal questions pertain to the correct interpretation of Section 26-A read with the Tax Rate Structure provisions of the First Schedule applicable to dividend income, and whether the notices issued under Section 65(2) were based on 'definite information' as contemplated by law. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions, adhering to the rule of consistency as leave had already been granted in connected matters arising from the same High Court judgment. The Court declined to issue a stay order and directed that the appeals be fixed for hearing within three months alongside the earlier connected appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Did the High Court correctly interpret the provisions of Section 26-A read with the Tax Rate Structure of the First Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 regarding dividend income?
  • Whether a notice issued under Section 65(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 was based on 'definite information' as required by law?
  • Should leave to appeal be granted to maintain consistency when leave has already been granted in connected petitions against the same judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ali Match Industries Ltd And 3 Others vs Industrial Development1997 SCMR 943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-08
  leave to defendbanking recoverytriable issuebank guaranteeexecution of decreerecovery of loans
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a recovery suit filed by the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan against the petitioners for Rs. 44,37,607.69. The trial court and the Peshawar High Court dismissed the petitioners' applications for leave to appear and defend the suit, concluding that the petitioners failed to raise a plausible or prima facie defense regarding the correctness of the bank's statement of accounts. The petitioners argued before the Supreme Court that, under established legal principles, leave to defend should be granted if a defendant raises a triable issue, even if the defense appears vague or unsatisfactory, and that the lower courts erred by conducting a trial-like inquiry at the leave-to-defend stage. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the threshold for granting leave to defend required further consideration. The Court directed the petitioners to furnish a bank guarantee for the decretal amount within one month to the satisfaction of the trial court, failing which the leave would be rescinded, and ordered the suspension of the decree's execution upon compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Is a defendant entitled to leave to defend a suit if they raise a defense that constitutes a triable issue, even if the defense is considered vague or unsatisfactory?
  • Should a court grant leave to defend a suit on the condition of furnishing security or depositing the amount if the defense raised is not clearly plausible?
  • Does the stage of seeking leave to defend a suit require the court to conduct a full trial, or merely determine the existence of a bona fide triable issue?
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• Messrs Al-Barkat Industrial Corporation Limited, Faisalabad through Sh. Abdus Salam, Director vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others1997 PTD 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-16
  Income Tax OrdinanceConstitutional interpretationLeave to appealInterim reliefTax recovery suspensionAttorney-General notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the validity of specific taxation provisions. The core legal question involves the constitutionality and interpretation of Sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance. The Court, noting that leave to appeal had already been granted in several connected petitions raising identical legal questions, granted leave in the instant petition as well. Furthermore, recognizing that the matter necessitated the construction of constitutional provisions, the Court ordered that notice be issued to the Attorney-General of Pakistan pursuant to the relevant procedural rules. Regarding interim relief, the Court held that the recovery of the disputed tax would remain suspended during the pendency of the appeals, provided the petitioners furnish an undertaking to pay the tax as levied or leviable under the aforementioned sections, along with interest at a rate of 2% above the bank rate, should the appeals be ultimately dismissed. The Court also directed that the appeal be scheduled for an early hearing due to its impact on federal finances.

  Questions settled

  • Under what conditions may the recovery of tax be suspended during the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Is notice to the Attorney-General mandatory when a case involves the construction of the Constitution and the validity of statutory tax provisions?
  • Does the granting of leave to appeal in connected matters justify the grant of leave in a similar pending petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Member (Colonies), Baord of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore And Another vs Ghulam Ahmad1997 SCMR 624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-17
  state landproprietary rightsWell Sinking Schemeexcess areaallotmenttenancyBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court was filed by the Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, against a Lahore High Court judgment that had directed the appellants to grant proprietary rights to the respondent for an excess area of land on the same terms as his main tenancy. The respondent was allotted 27 acres, 4 Kanals, and 6 Marlas of land under the Well Sinking Scheme, but held actual possession of 43 acres and 5 Marlas. The Board of Revenue had rejected his request to purchase the excess area because it exceeded the 10% limit prescribed by the policy instructions dated 22-1-1971. The Supreme Court held that a tenant can only claim proprietary rights as of right in respect of the area actually allotted under the scheme. Since the excess area exceeded the 10% policy threshold, the High Court's direction to grant proprietary rights for the excess area on the same terms as the main tenancy was unsustainable. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment to that extent, while clarifying that the respondent could apply to purchase the excess area under a subsequent government memorandum dated 30-5-1989.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allottee of State land claim proprietary rights over an excess area in their possession that was not part of the original allotment and exceeds the statutory or policy limits?
  • Whether policy instructions limiting the purchase of excess land to a specific percentage of the prescribed unit are binding on the allottee?
  • Can the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction direct the government to grant proprietary rights over unallotted excess land on the same terms as the main allotted tenancy?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehrban Khan And Another vs Javaid Khan And 2 Other1997 SCMR 1092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-19
  leave to appealdouble murderacquittalconversion of sentenceculpable homicidecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had altered the conviction of one accused from section 302 to section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced him to imprisonment for life, while acquitting the co-accused of double murder charges. The core legal questions involve the correctness of the High Court's reasoning in acquitting one respondent and altering the conviction of the other, and whether proper principles for the safe administration of criminal justice were applied. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to both the complainant and the convict to examine these aspects. The Court laid down that leave is warranted to thoroughly review High Court judgments involving acquvitals and the conversion of murder convictions to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in acquitting a co-accused charged with double murder?
  • Did the High Court err in converting the conviction from section 302 to section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Were the principles enunciated by superior courts for the safe administration of criminal justice kept in view while convicting under section 304 Part I?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehar Zulifqar Ali Babu And 3 Others vs Government of Punjab1997 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-26
  local bodiestenure curtailmentcaretaker governmentnatural justiceaudi alteram partemcorruption allegationsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals against the Lahore High Court's judgments regarding the notification issued by the Governor of Punjab on August 15, 1993, curtailing the tenure of elected local bodies under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, and appointing administrators. The core legal questions are whether the government possesses the power to abruptly curtail the tenure of all local councils in the province under section 26-A of the Ordinance, whether unproved allegations of corruption can justify such an action, and whether the principle of audi alteram partem was violated. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the power under section 26-A was meant for a limited temporary purpose to facilitate fair general elections and did not authorize the total abolition or premature termination of local bodies without due process. The Court ruled that mere allegations of corruption, absent formal proof or inquiry under section 159 of the Ordinance, cannot justify disenfranchising elected representatives. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned High Court judgment, declared the notification illegal, and ordered the restoration of the local councils to complete their term.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government has the power under section 26-A of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 to permanently curtail or abolish the tenure of all local councils in the province?
  • Can unproven allegations of corruption serve as a valid legal basis to prematurely terminate the tenure of elected local council members without an inquiry under section 159 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the curtailment of a local body's tenure without affording an opportunity of hearing violate the principle of audi alteram partem?
  • Whether the power to suspend or dissolve local councils under section 159 can be exercised globally against the entire local government system through a blanket notification.
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• Mazullah And Others vs Abdur Rehman And Other1997 SCMR 1836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-06
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationfurther inquiryevidentiary valuedelayed statementpre-trial baildiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the grant of bail in a murder case arising from an F.I.R. registered in Peshawar. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing bail to one accused and cancelling the bail of another, while maintaining the bail of a third. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by appraising evidence in a manner that effectively determined culpability at the pre-trial stage and by failing to consider relevant factors for bail. The Court found that the delayed statement of the complainant, recorded nine to ten days post-occurrence, warranted further inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, granting bail to the two appellants, and dismissed the petition seeking cancellation of the third accused's bail. The judgment reaffirms that at the bail stage, courts must avoid premature findings on guilt and must focus on whether reasonable grounds exist to believe the accused committed the offense, while considering statutory provisions regarding gender-based bail concessions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after a significant delay warrant further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Is it appropriate for a court to determine the culpability of an accused at the bail stage?
  • Can a High Court cancel bail granted by a lower court without considering the factors that initially weighed in favor of the accused?
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• Mazhar Mehmood vs Basit And Another1997 SCMR 915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-14
  post-arrest bailcancellation of bailpolice investigationcommon intentionleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order by the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondent in a criminal case involving charges under Section 302/324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that the respondent, acting in furtherance of a common intention, caused a firearm injury to the complainant. The High Court had granted bail primarily because the police investigation found the respondent innocent and placed his name in Column No. 2 of the challan, noting he had not caused injury to the deceased. The petitioner argued that the police finding of innocence was not binding on the court. The Supreme Court held that it is primarily a constitutional court and will not interfere with bail orders granted by the High Court absent compelling reasons. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the criteria for cancelling bail are distinct from those for granting it. Finding that the police had based their conclusion of innocence on statements from numerous local residents, the Court refused to interfere, holding that bail once granted should not be cancelled without strong and exceptional grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Is a police finding of innocence binding on the court during bail proceedings?
  • What are the criteria for the cancellation of bail once it has been granted by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a bail order granted by the High Court?
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• Manzoor Ahmad And 6 Others vs Hamid Shah Gilani And Another1997 SCMR 1443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-11
  specific performancead interim injunctiondiscretion of trial courtagreement to sellbalance sale consideration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court modifying a trial court order regarding an ad interim injunction in a suit for specific performance. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners was allotted a plot, and upon his demise, the petitioners entered into an agreement to sell their rights in the plot to respondent No. 1 for a total consideration. After receiving earnest money and handing over possession, disputes arose regarding compliance with payment terms, leading respondent No. 1 to file a suit for specific performance and obtain an ad interim injunction subject to depositing the balance sale consideration. The High Court modified this by allowing a surety bond instead of a cash deposit. The core legal question is whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the trial court's discretion requiring a cash deposit for granting interim relief. The Supreme Court held that the trial Court's discretion in imposing the condition of depositing the balance amount was valid and not arbitrary, and thus the High Court erred in interfering with it. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the trial Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting an ad interim injunction subject to the deposit of the balance sale consideration?
  • Can a plaintiff obtain an interim injunction protecting possession in a suit for specific performance without depositing the remaining sale price when ordered by the trial court?
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• Mansha and 7 others vs Illaqa Magistrate, Police Station Bahlak, District Faisalabad and 4 others1997 PLD Supreme Court 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-22
  police investigationdischarge of accusedMagistrate's powerscognizance of offencewrit jurisdictionfinal reportjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment setting aside an Illaqa Magistrate's order that had discharged accused persons based on a police report declaring them innocent. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate is bound by a police report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to interfere with such a discharge order. The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate is not merely a rubber stamp for police reports and is not bound by the police's opinion regarding the innocence of an accused. The Court affirmed that a Magistrate retains the authority to take cognizance of an offense despite a police report suggesting otherwise. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to declare the Magistrate's discharge order as being without lawful authority, noting that the investigation had been abruptly and improperly concluded. The principle established is that the Magistrate has the power to exercise judicial discretion upon receiving a police report, rather than being compelled to accept the police's findings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate bound by the findings of a police report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a Magistrate take cognizance of an offense even if the police report declares the accused innocent?
  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to set aside a Magistrate's order discharging an accused based on a police report?
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• Mansab Ali And Others vs Malik Muhammad Salam And 3 Other1997 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-03
  leave to appealarbitration awarddecree sheetmemorandum of appealcivil revisionappealable order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed their Regular First Appeal and Civil Revision against an order setting aside an arbitration award. The core legal questions involved whether a decree sheet was mandatory for filing an appeal against an order refusing to make an arbitration award a rule of the court, and whether a civil revision was competent when an appeal lay against such an order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the applicability of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and Section 39(vi) of the Arbitration Act 1940 required detailed examination. The key principle laid down is that an order refusing to make an award a rule of the court is appealable as an order under the Arbitration Act, and no decree is required to be drawn up in such circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a decree sheet is required to be filed with the memorandum of appeal when challenging an order setting aside an arbitration award?
  • Is a civil revision competent against an order that is separately appealable under the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • When is a decree required to be prepared under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
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• Mandviwalla Mauser Plastic Industries Limited,Pechs, Karachi And 41997 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-15
  Banking TribunalModaraba companySchedule inclusionFederal Government notificationleave to appealrecovery of finance
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petitions challenging the jurisdiction of the Banking Tribunal. The respondents had filed recovery suits under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, after the Federal Government issued a notification under section 13 of the said Ordinance to include First, Second, and Third Prudential Modarabas in the Schedule below the Ordinance. The core legal questions involve whether a Modaraba company can be covered by the term 'a company specified in the Schedule' under section 2(a)(i) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, and whether the Federal Government was competent to incorporate Modarabas into the Schedule. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that an authoritative decision is necessary regarding the interpretation of 'company' in the Ordinance and the extent of the Federal Government's powers under section 13.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Modaraba company defined by clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 2 of the Ordinance of 1980 can be covered by the words 'a company specified in the Schedule' appearing in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 2 of the Ordinance of 1984?
  • Whether the Federal Government was competent to incorporate in the Schedule below Ordinance of 1984 the First Prudential Modaraba, the Second Prudential Modaraba and the Third Prudential Modaraba?
  • Whether the word 'company' mentioned in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 2 of the Ordinance of 1984 was intended by the Legislature to be understood and interpreted in light of the preamble to said Ordinance and was to be influenced by the earlier sub-clauses of clause (a) of section 2 of the Ordinance of 1984?
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• Managing Committee, P.A.F. Model Inter College, Sargodha Through Chairman And 4 Others vs Malik Muhammad Pervaiz Akhtar1997 SCMR 1957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-07-25
  civil servantservice tribunal jurisdictiontermination of servicenatural justicedefence servicesself-financing institutionvoid ab initio
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which reinstated a teacher terminated by the Managing Committee of the P.A.F. Model Inter College, Sargodha. The primary legal question was whether the respondent, employed by an institution managed by Pakistan Air Force officers but operating on a self-financing basis, constituted a "civil servant" under Section 2(1)(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, thus falling within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, by majority, dismissed the appeal and upheld the Tribunal's decision. The Court held that the respondent’s post was connected with the affairs of the Federation and the defence of Pakistan, given the institution's administrative control by the Pakistan Air Force and the application of government-equivalent pay scales and benefits. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the termination proceedings were void ab initio because the respondent was condemned unheard, denied access to the inquiry report, and deprived of a final show-cause notice. The judgment reinforces that such employees are civil servants entitled to the protection of service laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does a teacher employed at a P.A.F. Model Inter College hold a civil post connected with the defence of Pakistan?
  • Is an employee of a self-financing educational institution managed by the Pakistan Air Force a civil servant under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Are termination proceedings void ab initio if an employee is denied a copy of the inquiry report and a final show-cause notice?
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• Malik Safdar Hussain vs Lutuf Ahmad Khan And Other1997 SCMR 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-23
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantdefault in payment of rentnotice of attornmentconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition upholding concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and appellate authority ordering the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant. The core legal questions involved whether the absence of a formal notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance vitiates an ejectment order, and whether denial of the landlord-tenant relationship after having sufficient notice of transfer warrants ejectment without further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that where a tenant has clear and sufficient notice of the transfer of ownership, the lack of a formal statutory notice is immaterial, and a contumacious denial of the landlord-tenant relationship justifies an order of ejectment. The key principle laid down is that actual knowledge of ownership substitutes for formal statutory notice of attornment, and contumacious denial of the tenancy disentitles the tenant from demanding further evidentiary proceedings on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of a formal notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance invalidates an ejectment order when the tenant has actual knowledge of the property transfer?
  • Does a tenant's denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant after having sufficient notice of ownership entitle the Rent Controller to order ejectment without recording further evidence?
  • Can a tenant who sets up a false or contumacious denial of tenancy claim the right to a determination on other issues on merits?
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• Malik Muhammad Saleheen And Others vs Arshad Siddiq And 2 Other1997 SCMR 1829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-07-02
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationplea of alibifurther inquirymurdercriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal petitions for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against the grant of pre-arrest bail to two accused and the refusal to cancel the bail of two other co-accused in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in considering a plea of alibi at the bail stage and whether the grant of bail to the respondents was justified given the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the High Court did not act unreasonably or perversely in its assessment. The Court clarified that there is no absolute legal prohibition against considering a plea of alibi during bail proceedings; rather, the court must examine whether reasonable grounds exist to believe the accused is guilty of an offence punishable by death or life imprisonment. The Court affirmed that the trial judge retains full independence to evaluate evidence during the trial, irrespective of observations made during the bail stage. The petitions were dismissed, maintaining the bail granted to the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of alibi be considered by a court during bail proceedings?
  • Does the consideration of a plea of alibi at the bail stage bind the trial court's assessment of evidence during the trial?
  • Under what circumstances does a case fall within the scope of further inquiry for the purpose of bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Malik Azizur Rehman vs I.C.I. Pakistan Limited,'Soda Ash Works Khewra, District Jhelum and another1997 PLC 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-11
  leave to appealquashment of charge-sheetnational industrial relations commissiontrade union victimisationlabour court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the High Court, which had dismissed a constitutional petition filed against the order of a Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). The petitioner, employed as a Timekeeper and serving as a union official, was issued a charge-sheet for alleged misappropriation and unauthorised absence. He approached the NIRC seeking quashment of the charge-sheet on the ground of victimisation for trade union activities. While the Chairman of the NIRC initially quashed the charge-sheet, a Full Bench of the NIRC allowed the employer's appeal and restored it, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerned the validity of the charge-sheet and whether it was motivated by trade union victimisation. The Supreme Court held that the Full Bench and the High Court committed no illegality, noting that the petitioner had already been removed from service and had challenged the dismissal before the Labour Court. The Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that questions regarding the correctness of the charge-sheet and allegations are properly to be adjudicated by the Labour Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a charge-sheet issued to an employee can be quashed on the ground of trade union victimisation?
  • Does the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court regarding an employee's removal affect the validity of a charge-sheet upheld by the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court judgment upholding the decision of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission regarding the validity of a charge-sheet?
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• Malik Azizur Rehman vs I.C.I. Pakistan Limited, Soda Ash Works Khewra, District Jhelum And Another,1997 PLC 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-11
  charge-sheetnational industrial relations commissionunfair labour practicetrade union activitiesconstitutional petitionleave to appealmisappropriation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition, which had challenged a Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) order setting aside the quashment of a charge-sheet issued against him for misappropriation and unauthorized absence. The core legal question was whether the charge-sheet issued by the employer was a result of victimization for trade union activities or for valid disciplinary reasons. The Supreme Court held that the majority view of the Full Bench of NIRC, finding the charge-sheet to be valid and unconnected to trade union activities, suffered from no illegality or lack of jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that since the petitioner had already been removed from service and had challenged that removal before the Labour Court, all factual controversies regarding the correctness and legality of the charge-sheet should be determined by the Labour Court. Leave to appeal was consequently refused, with the clarification that prior findings would not prejudice the Labour Court proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a charge-sheet issued by an employer can be quashed on the ground of victimization for trade union activities?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have the jurisdiction to interfere with disciplinary proceedings at the charge-sheet stage?
  • Will observations made in constitutional proceedings prejudice a pending matter before the Labour Court regarding an employee's removal from service?
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• Mahboob Khan vs The State1997 SCMR 1537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-05-21
  criminal appealmurderrelated witnessessifting grain from chafffalsus in uno falsus in omnibusbenefit of doubtocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by special leave of the Supreme Court, arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which partially allowed an appeal, acquitting one co-accused while maintaining the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Mahboob Khan, under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder. The core legal questions involved the reliability of related and partisan eye-witnesses, the applicability of the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, and whether the acquittal of certain co-accused entitles another co-accused to an acquittal on the same evidence. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of related witnesses cannot be discarded solely due to their relationship, that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not applicable in Pakistan where courts must sift grain from chaff, and that the acquittal of some co-accused does not automatically require the acquittal of others when individual participation is proven. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related and partisan eye-witnesses can be relied upon without strong corroboration in a criminal trial?
  • Does the acquittal of certain co-accused automatically entitle the remaining accused to an acquittal on the same evidence?
  • Is the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applicable to criminal jurisprudence in Pakistan?
  • What is the duty of the court when witnesses exaggerate the charges or attempt to rope in innocent persons along with the guilty?
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