Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Riffat Hayat vs Judge Speical Court for Suppression of Terrorist1995 SCMR 1095 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-16
  leave to appealcognizanceprivate complaintpolice reportchallancolumn No. 2Special CourtSuppression of Terrorist Activities Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a petition seeking leave to appeal concerning the jurisdiction and procedure of the Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. The central legal issue raised was whether, in light of the special provisions embodied in Section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 regulating the conditions for taking cognizance of an offence, a private complaint could be validly entertained by the Special Court after a police report (challan) had already been submitted in the matter naming all the accused persons, including those placed in column No. 2. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine and determine this substantial question of law regarding the interplay between police challans and private complaints under the special enactment. Furthermore, the Court directed that the interim relief granted on 12-02-1994 shall continue to remain operative pending the final decision of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Special Court entertain a private complaint under Section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 after a police challan has already been submitted in the same case?
  • Whether the inclusion of accused persons in column No. 2 of a police challan permits the filing and entertainment of a subsequent private complaint before a Special Court?
  • Does Section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 bar cognizance via a private complaint when all accused persons are already named in a police report?
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• Riaz Masih alias Mithoo vs The State1995 SCMR 1730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-12
  criminal appealmurder convictionocular evidencewitness credibilityrecovery of weaponpolice custodysafe administration of justicereasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Shamoon. The core legal question was whether the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution’s eye-witnesses, alongside the recovery of a blood-stained knife, provided a sufficient basis for conviction. The Supreme Court held that the conviction could not be sustained. The Court found the ocular evidence unreliable, noting that one witness was omitted from the FIR despite being present, and the other witness had been detained as a suspect by the police, rendering his testimony unsafe. Furthermore, the Court determined the recovery of the weapon was doubtful, as it occurred while the appellant was in police custody, lacked independent witnesses, and appeared suspicious. The Court laid down the principle that for the safe administration of criminal justice, if reasonable doubt exists regarding a witness's presence or impartiality, their testimony must be excluded. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that recovery evidence alone is insufficient for a murder conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the uncorroborated testimony of a witness who was previously detained as a suspect sufficient to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Does the omission of an eye-witness from the FIR, despite their alleged presence, create sufficient grounds to discard their testimony?
  • Is a recovery of a weapon effected solely by police officials, without independent witnesses, sufficient to support a conviction for murder?
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• Riaz Hussain Shah vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-27
  leave to appealwithdrawal of prosecutionsuo motu jurisdictionSpecial CourtSuppression of Terrorist Activities ActArms Ordinancecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court, which set aside the withdrawal of a criminal case against the petitioner and ordered it to be deemed pending before the Special Court. The petitioner faced criminal cases under the Arms Ordinance, 1965, in connection with which the District Magistrate had ordered the withdrawal of prosecution. The High Court, taking suo motu notice during the hearing of another appeal involving the same police officials, set aside the withdrawal order. The core legal questions involve the applicability of section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975, the finality of orders passed by the Special Court, and the scope of the High Court's suo motu jurisdiction in light of ouster clauses. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider these contentions, issued notice to the Attorney-General, and stayed the operation of the impugned order subject to the petitioner furnishing surety bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 remain intact and applicable after the promulgation of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975?
  • Does Section 7 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to take suo motu notice of an order withdrawing a case?
  • Whether an order of withdrawal of a case passed by a Special Court attains finality precluding interference by the High Court?
  • Can the provisions of section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 be invoked exclusively for the purpose of bail and not for other matters?
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• Rehmat Shah and 2 others vs Amir Gul and 3 others1995 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-26
  ejectmentpersonal requirementres judicatafresh cause of actionconcurrent findingsconstitutional jurisdictionrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional writ petition challenging their ejectment from a commercial shop. The landlords sought ejectment on grounds of personal requirement, default, and subletting. The petitioners contested the action, arguing that the fresh ejectment petition was barred by res judicata under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 due to the dismissal of prior ejectment applications on similar grounds. The Rent Controller and Additional District Judge concurrently held that a fresh cause of action existed because the landlord had retired, remained jobless, and required the premises for his family, which findings were upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a withdrawal with permission to file a fresh petition based on a subsequent, genuine cause of action prevents the bar under Section 14, and concurrent findings of fact on personal requirement cannot be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 14 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 bar a fresh ejectment petition if a previous petition was withdrawn with permission to file afresh on a new cause of action?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's personal requirement be interfered with by the High Court under constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Rehmat alias Rehma Masih vs The State1995 SCMR 733 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-22
  criminal appealmurderocular evidenceacquittalbenefit of doubtreappraisal of evidencecommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant under section 302/34, P.P.C., with a sentence of imprisonment for life and fine. The core legal question was whether the ocular evidence relied upon by the courts below was sufficient to sustain the conviction, particularly when a co-accused facing the same evidence had already been acquitted by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the presence of the eye-witnesses at the scene was chancy and unnatural, and the evidence on record was insufficient to warrant a conviction in accordance with the principles of safe administration of criminal justice. Finding the appellant's case indistinguishable from that of the acquitted co-convict, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and ordered the immediate acquittal and release of the appellant. The key principle laid down is that where co-accused are implicated on identical and insufficient evidence, the benefit of acquittal extended to one must be applied to the others.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular evidence of witnesses whose presence at the scene of occurrence is chancy and unnatural can form the basis of a conviction under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does an acquittal granted to a co-accused on the basis of insufficient ocular evidence extend to another co-convict whose case is indistinguishable?
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• Reheem Bux vs Abdul Subhan and another1995 SCMR 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-19Read full judgment →
• Rawalpindi Development Authority, Rawalpindi vs Sadiqa Begum1995 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-18
  land acquisitionhousing schemeexemption of landImprovement Trustpolicy decisionProvincial Government controlpermanent injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal converted into an appeal, challenging concurrent judgments of the courts below and the Lahore High Court, which decreed a permanent injunction in favor of the respondent landowner against the Rawalpindi Development Authority. The core legal question is whether a policy letter issued by the Provincial Government regarding the exemption of land in development schemes framed by Improvement Trusts has binding statutory or administrative force, and whether the Trust was bound to follow it. The Supreme Court held that even if the policy letter did not constitute a formal rule framed under section 73 of the Town Improvement Act, 1922, the Provincial Government possessed wide controlling powers under section 21-A of the Act to issue binding instructions and policy decisions to the Trust, especially since the appellant authority had consistently followed the policy. The appeal was accordingly disposed of with a modification regarding the calculation of the plot size.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a policy letter issued by the Provincial Government regarding land exemption in development schemes has binding force over an Improvement Trust under the Town Improvement Act, 1922?
  • Does the Provincial Government possess the power under section 21-A of the Town Improvement Act, 1922 to issue binding instructions and control the activities of an Improvement Trust?
  • Is an Improvement Trust bound by a consistent past practice of following a government policy decision concerning the exemption of land for local landowners?
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• Rauf Ahmad vs Mst. Walayat Begum1995 PLD Supreme Court 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-08-01
  evictiondefault in payment of rentstriking off defenceoral tenancyPunjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an eviction petition filed against the petitioner-tenant for default in rent payment and bona fide personal requirement under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Rent Controller directed the tenant to deposit future rent by a specified date each month, and subsequently struck off the tenant's defence for a delayed deposit. The ejectment order was upheld by the Additional District Judge and the Lahore High Court in a writ petition. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the tenancy was oral and therefore the rent payment timeline under section 13(6) of the Ordinance should be computed differently. The Supreme Court held that an objection regarding the nature of the tenancy, being a mixed question of fact and law requiring evidence, cannot be raised for the first time before the apex court when it was never pleaded before the lower forums. Furthermore, the Court held that it cannot grant time to a tenant to vacate or modify lower court orders without first granting leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea regarding the nature of tenancy being oral be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can grant time to vacate premises or modify lower court orders without granting leave to appeal?
  • Does a delay in depositing monthly rent pursuant to an order under section 13(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 warrant striking off the tenant's defence?
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• Rasta Mal Khan And Other vs Nabi Sarwar Khan And OtherK.L.R. 1997 Revenue Cases 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-29
  land revenuemutationgiftsalepre-emptionfraudjurisdiction of civil court
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from civil petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside the concurrent findings of the courts below and decreed the respondents-plaintiffs' suits. The core legal question involved the nature of certain land mutations, specifically whether the transactions were genuine gifts or subsequently and fraudulently altered to sales to facilitate pre-emption claims. The Supreme Court observed that multiple mutations were originally entered as family settlements by way of gifts to manage joint holdings, but the disputed mutations contained unauthorized cuttings, overwriting, and arbitrary insertion of nominal sale considerations without compliance with mandatory revenue procedures or reports to revenue officers. The Court held that the High Court was legally justified in re-appreciating the evidence, as the lower courts had misread the evidence and ignored glaring infirmities, mala fides, and fraud. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that civil courts retain jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief when revenue entries interfere with substantive property rights. Leave to appeal was refused and all petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court is justified in reversing concurrent findings of fact where the lower courts misread evidence and ignored material infirmities?
  • Can revenue authorities convert a mutation of gift into a sale without recording a report and complying with statutory provisions under the Land Revenue Act?
  • Does the civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit regarding the true nature of revenue entries when such entries interfere with substantive property rights?
  • Whether the fraudulent alteration of gift mutations to sales without the consent of the parties renders the transaction void?
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• Rashida Bibi and 14 others vs Amir Yusaf Ali Khan, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Islamabad and another1995 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-11
  evacuee trust propertyprovisional transfer orderbona fide transferleave to appealwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition against the order of the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Religious and Minority Affairs, which had set aside the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Board's order and declared the disputed property as evacuee trust property. The core legal question revolves around whether the transfer of the property in favor of the petitioners' predecessor was saved under section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975 as a bona fide transfer made prior to June 1968. The Supreme Court held that the transfer could not be deemed bona fide because the property was declared as trust property prior to the issuance of the transfer order and PTD, meaning the transferee had knowledge of the trust character of the property. Consequently, the Court affirmed the impugned judgment and refused leave to appeal, laying down the principle that transfers effected with the knowledge of pending claims regarding a property's trust status do not qualify for protection as bona fide transfers under section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transfer of property made with the knowledge that the property is claimed as trust property can be considered a bona fide transfer under section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
  • Can provisional transfer orders issued prior to June 1968 be deemed permanent transfer deeds for the purposes of section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
  • Did the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Board err in law in validating the transfer of property that was rightfully vested in the Evacuee Trust Property Board?
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• Rana Muhammad Akram vs The State and others1995 SCMR 1144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-11
  leave to appealacquittalprivate complainthostile witnessmurdercriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed his criminal revision petition arising from the acquittal of the respondents under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner had lodged a private complaint under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his brother after the police report placed the respondents in column No. 2 of the challan. The trial court acquitted the respondents, and the High Court dismissed the revision. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in acquitting the respondents and disregarding the dying declaration and ocular testimony. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgments suffered from no legal infirmity, noting that material prosecution witnesses were either given up or turned hostile by stating the assailants were muffled-faced or unknown. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that concurrent findings of acquittal based on unreliable ocular evidence will not be interfered with absent legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent orders of acquittal when prosecution witnesses turn hostile?
  • Can a trial court acquit accused persons under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a private complaint case?
  • Does the testimony of hostile witnesses regarding muffled faces affect the credibility of a dying declaration in a murder trial?
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• Rana Manzoor-Ul-Hassan vs Secretary, Ministry of Education, Islamabad and 5 others1995 SCMR 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-27
  civil servicepromotionfitness for promotionmove-overservice tribunal jurisdictionACRdepartmental selection board
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's grievance regarding the denial of promotion to Grade-19 and the refusal of move-over to that grade. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal concerning the fitness of a civil servant for promotion and whether the denial of move-over was justified based on the appellant's service record. The Supreme Court held that the appeal before the Tribunal was incompetent because statutory provisions expressly bar appeals against departmental decisions determining the fitness of a person for promotion. Furthermore, the Court examined the appellant's Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) and concluded that he failed to meet the requisite criteria for move-over, as he lacked the necessary 'good' reports during the relevant five-year period. The Court affirmed the principle that the determination of fitness for promotion is a matter within the exclusive domain of the departmental selection authority, and courts or tribunals cannot substitute their judgment for such administrative determinations, nor can they entertain appeals where the law explicitly prohibits them.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to a Service Tribunal against a departmental decision determining the fitness of a civil servant for promotion?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to challenge the determination of their fitness for promotion before a Service Tribunal?
  • What is the criteria for a civil servant to qualify for move-over from Grade-18 to Grade-19?
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• Raja Sondha Khan vs Muhammad Asghar and another1995 SCMR 1149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30
  suspension of sentencemurder caseleave to appealdiscretionary ordercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the order of the Lahore High Court suspending the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to Muhammad Asghar, respondent, in a murder case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in exercising its discretion to suspend the respondent's sentence. The Supreme Court held that no interference was warranted with the discretionary order of the High Court, noting the trial court's observations that the role attributed to the respondent regarding injuries to prosecution witnesses was not established and that he was allegedly hit by stray pellets or simply present without a proven motive or direct role in the firing. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the principle that appellate courts will generally not interfere with discretionary orders for the suspension of sentences unless compelling grounds are shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a discretionary order of the High Court suspending a criminal sentence without strong grounds?
  • Does the mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime, without established motive or overt acts of firing, warrant the denial of suspension of sentence?
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• Raja Muhammad Iqbal and 6 others vs Muhammad Hamidullah Sheikh1995 PLC (C.S.) 850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-02
  service tribunalseniorityprovincial civil serviceinitial recruitmentpromotionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 7-8-1994, which declared respondent No. 1 and other officers senior to the petitioners in the Provincial Civil Service (Executive Branch). The core legal question concerns the determination of seniority between promotees appointed in 1974 and direct recruits selected through a 1972 competitive examination whose recommendations and appointments were split into two batches, and the applicability of the explanation to rule 8(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 versus rule 9(3) of the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the protection of accrued seniority rights and the non-retroactivity of newly enforced rules required detailed examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether direct recruits recommended in separate batches from the same competitive examination can be treated as a single group for seniority under the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974?
  • Can a subsequent amendment or rule explanation deprive civil servants of a seniority right already acquired under the rules in force at the time they joined service?
  • How is inter se seniority determined between promotees and direct recruits appointed in the same year under the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964?
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• Raja Muhammad Iobal and 6 others vs Muhammad Hamidullah Sheikh1995 SCMR 952 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-02
  civil service seniorityseniority determinationinitial recruitmentpromotionretrospective application of rulesvested rightsPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding the seniority of civil servants. The dispute arose between petitioners, appointed to the Provincial Civil Service (Executive Branch) by promotion in 1974, and respondent No. 1, who was appointed via initial recruitment through the Punjab Public Service Commission in the same year but as part of a second batch. The Tribunal had ruled in favor of the respondent, applying the Explanation to rule 8(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, to grant seniority based on the earliest joining date of the first batch. The petitioners challenged this, arguing that their seniority was established under the West Pakistan Civil Service (EB) Rules, 1964, and that the subsequent 1974 rules could not retrospectively deprive them of vested seniority rights. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the contentions regarding the non-retrospective application of the rules and the protection of acquired seniority rights required further judicial examination.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Explanation to rule 8(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 be applied retrospectively to deprive civil servants of seniority rights acquired under the West Pakistan Civil Service (EB) Rules, 1964?
  • Does the appointment of candidates in different batches by the Public Service Commission constitute a single group for the purpose of determining seniority under the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974?
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• Rahim Bakhsh vs Mian Muhammad Shafi and 7 others1995 SCMR 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-16
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionpre-emption decreecut-off dateleave to appealsuit for pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the petitioner, Rahim Bakhsh, sought to challenge a Lahore High Court order dismissing his appeal. The petitioner's suit for pre-emption had been dismissed by the trial court on 10-5-1980, while a rival pre-emptor's suit was decreed. Both the petitioner and the rival pre-emptors appealed, but the District Judge dismissed both appeals. The core legal question was whether a pre-emption plaintiff who failed to obtain a decree in their favor in the trial court or any appellate forum before 31-7-1986 could still be granted a decree by a higher forum, including the Supreme Court, after that date. Relying on the precedent established in Malik Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360) and clarified in Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287), the Supreme Court held that such a decree could not be granted. The Court affirmed that if a pre-emption plaintiff remained unsuccessful in obtaining a decree before the cut-off date of 31-7-1986, no higher forum could grant relief thereafter. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit who failed to obtain a decree in their favor before 31st July 1986 be granted a decree by a higher forum thereafter?
  • Does a decree awarded to a rival pre-emptor in a consolidated suit ensure for the benefit of an unsuccessful pre-emptor whose own suit was dismissed?
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• Rafique Ahmed vs Mukhtar Ahmed and others1995 SCMR 1783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-07
  grave and sudden provocationmurderacquittalleave to appealbenefit of doubtpresumption of innocencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding a murder conviction. The core legal questions were whether the High Court correctly acquitted two co-accused and whether the petitioners successfully established the defense of grave and sudden provocation for the murder of the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s acquittal of the two co-accused was based on sound reasoning, noting that upon acquittal, the presumption of innocence is doubled, and interference is warranted only in exceptional cases of miscarriage of justice. Regarding the plea of grave and sudden provocation, the Court held that the defense failed to substantiate its version, noting the absence of corroborative evidence, the failure to produce the alleged witness, and the accused's refusal to testify on oath under Section 340(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court dismissed both petitions, affirming the High Court's decision to maintain the convictions of the primary accused while upholding the acquittal of the co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court should interfere with an acquittal when the reasons for such acquittal are sound and not artificial?
  • Does the failure of an accused to testify on oath under Section 340(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 weaken a plea of grave and sudden provocation?
  • Is the presumption of innocence doubled upon the acquittal of an accused by a High Court?
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• Rafiq Khan vs The State1995 SCMR 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-21
  post-arrest bailLalkaracriminal appealbail bondmurder charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of the High Court to consider the petitioner's bail applications on their merits. The petitioner was arrested in connection with a criminal case registered under sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from an incident on 13-12-1992 in District Narowal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the grant of post-arrest bail given the nature of the allegations against him. Upon review, the Court observed that the only active role attributed to the petitioner in the alleged occurrence was that of raising a 'Lalkara'. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the petitioner was entitled to be released on bail. The Court directed the petitioner to be released upon executing a bail bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000 with two sureties to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner, Narowal, thereby establishing the principle that a mere allegation of raising a 'Lalkara' may be insufficient to deny bail in serious criminal charges.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person accused of murder entitled to bail when the only allegation against them is raising a Lalkara?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal and grant bail directly?
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• Rafi-Ud-Din vs Member, Board of Revenue and others1995 PLC (C.S.) 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-23
  Service TribunalFull Benchjudicial decision-makingabsentee memberprocedural irregularityremandPunjab Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules 1975
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the dismissal of a Patwari and the subsequent appellate proceedings before the Punjab Service Tribunal. The core legal question was whether an order issued by a Full Bench of the Tribunal is legally valid when signed only by the Chairman and one member, following the transfer of the third member after the hearing but before the order was finalized. The Supreme Court held that the order was invalid, setting it aside and remanding the case for a fresh decision. The Court established that under Rule 24 of the Punjab Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1975, if a member is unable to participate in the proceedings, the proposed decision must be shown to the absentee member to afford them an opportunity to express their views. A judgment must be an expression of the collective mind of the Tribunal at the time of delivery; therefore, failing to comply with these mandatory procedural requirements renders the decision legally ineffective as it does not represent the Tribunal as a whole.

  Questions settled

  • Is a judgment of a Service Tribunal valid if signed only by a majority of the bench after the third member is transferred?
  • What is the mandatory procedure under Rule 24 of the Punjab Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1975 when a member of the Tribunal is unable to participate in the final decision?
  • Does a judgment constitute the operative act of a court if it does not reflect the collective mind of the bench at the time of delivery?
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• Rab Nawaz and anothers vs The State1995 SCMR 844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04
  leave to appealappraisal of evidencesudden provocationcommon intentioncriminal liabilityreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which maintained the convictions and sentences of the petitioners under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the accused, armed with guns, attacked the deceased due to a motive involving illicit relations. The trial court convicted the petitioners, while acquitting a co-accused. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the lower courts failed to properly evaluate the defense's plea in juxtaposition with the prosecution's evidence, particularly regarding the nature of the injuries and the credibility of the prosecution's version of events. The defense argued that only one accused admitted to the act, which was committed under sudden provocation, and that the nature of the injuries—all on the legs—contradicts the prosecution's claim that multiple armed assailants fired shots. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to reappraise the evidence, holding that the consistency of the prosecution's narrative regarding the involvement of multiple shooters requires further judicial scrutiny in light of the specific injury patterns presented.

  Questions settled

  • Does the nature of injuries on a deceased's body, specifically when limited to non-vital areas, warrant a reappraisal of the prosecution's claim regarding the number of assailants involved?
  • Is it a legal error for lower courts to fail to consider the defense's plea in juxtaposition with the prosecution's evidence?
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• Qurban Hussain and others vs Atta Muhammad and others1995 PLD Supreme Court 464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-22
  culpable homicidecausationmedical negligencenovus actus intervenienssudden fightsepticemiacriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the respondent for the murder of the deceased, who died from infection and septicemia following razor injuries inflicted by the respondent. The core legal questions concerned the chain of causation between the initial injury and the subsequent death, and the appropriate classification of the offense under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court held that medical complications arising from a criminal injury do not break the chain of causation unless the treatment is so independent and potent that it renders the original act insignificant. The Court rejected the High Court's application of Exception 4 to Section 300, noting the absence of a sudden fight or quarrel. Determining that the respondent lacked the specific intent to kill but possessed the knowledge that his act was likely to cause death, the Court converted the conviction to Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The judgment establishes that medical treatment for criminal injuries is a cumulative cause of death rather than a novus actus interveniens.

  Questions settled

  • Does death resulting from infection or septicemia following a criminal injury break the chain of causation between the injury and the death?
  • Can the defense of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be invoked without evidence of a sudden fight or quarrel?
  • Under what circumstances does medical treatment for a criminal injury constitute a novus actus interveniens?
  • Does an injury inflicted with knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without specific intent to kill, fall under Part I or Part II of Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Qazi Abdul Ali vs Abdul Raziq and another1995 SCMR 807 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-29
  service lawseniority disputemerit-based selectionzonal allocationpublic service commissionleave to appealcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Forest Ranger, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal regarding seniority over respondent No. 1. The dispute arose from the selection process for the Assistant Conservator of Forest (Grade 17) course. Although the petitioner secured the first position on merit in the competitive examination, the Balochistan Public Service Commission initially recommended respondent No. 1, citing zonal allocation policies, before later selecting the petitioner for a second sanctioned vacancy. Both candidates subsequently completed the course and were appointed as Assistant Conservators of Forest. A final seniority list was issued in 1989, but in 1991, the government issued a notification declaring respondent No. 1 senior to the petitioner. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that seniority should be determined by merit rather than zonal allocation. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the issues regarding the Commission's authority to deviate from merit-based selection and the subsequent determination of seniority based on those selections required judicial consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Public Service Commission deviate from an open merit selection process to apply zonal allocation policies after the examination has concluded?
  • Does the determination of seniority in the civil service depend on the initial merit ranking in a competitive examination or on subsequent administrative reclassifications?
  • Is a government notification superseding a final seniority list valid if it contradicts the established merit-based selection criteria for the initial appointment?
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• Qasim Bibi and others vs Noor Muhammad through Legal Heirs and others1995 SCMR 1072 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-11
  leave to appealallotment of landrefugeeurban agricultural landrehabilitation and settlement schemestatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' Constitution petition against the cancellation of their land allotment. The core legal question revolves around whether agricultural land allotted to a refugee from Azad Jammu and Kashmir could be subsequently re-allotted to other displaced persons under the settlement schemes, considering the extension of municipal limits and subsequent acquisition of portions of the land. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the contentions raised by both parties regarding the classification of the land as urban agricultural land and the applicability of Para. 4-A(ix) of Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme No. II, while ordering the parties to maintain status quo pending the final decision of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether agricultural land allotted to a refugee from Azad Jammu and Kashmir can be re-allotted to other displaced persons under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Schemes?
  • Does the inclusion of allotted agricultural land within extended municipal limits alter its status so as to permit its re-allotment as urban property?
  • Whether the transfer of land under Supplementary Scheme No. II to rival claimants is legal and valid when the original allottee is an Azad Jammu and Kashmir refugee?
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• Qamar-Uz-Zaman vs Directorgeneral (Education), Government of Pakistan and others1995 SCMR 1754 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-05
  dismissal from servicemisconductforged degreeservice tribunalcompetent authorityservice of charge-sheetleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal challenging his dismissal from service as a Graduate Trained Teacher. The petitioner was dismissed after being found guilty of misconduct for producing forged and bogus result cards for his B.Ed. and M.A. (History) examinations, which he used to secure a promotion and claim advance increments. The core legal questions involved whether the dismissal order was passed by a competent authority and whether proper service of the charge-sheet and inquiry procedures were followed. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal order, although signed and communicated by the Director-General, was validly made with the approval of the competent authority, the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan in the Ministry of Education. The Court further held that service of the charge-sheet through post at the petitioner's official and home addresses constituted sufficient compliance with the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Tribunal, holding that the petitioner committed gross misconduct through fraud, and consequently refused to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of dismissal communicated by a Director-General is vitiated when the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan is the competent authority who approved the action?
  • Does the service of a charge-sheet through post at a civil servant's official and home addresses constitute sufficient compliance of law under the relevant rules?
  • Is a fresh inquiry mandatory after a remand by the Service Tribunal when a detailed inquiry under the rules has already been previously conducted establishing the charge?
  Read full judgment →
• Qamar-Uz-Zaman vs Director-General (Education), Government of Pakistan and others1995 PLC (C.S.) 1187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-05
  service tribunaldismissal from serviceforged degreesgross misconductservice of charge-sheetcompetent authorityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal challenging his dismissal from service as a Graduate Trained Teacher. The petitioner had been dismissed after being found guilty of gross misconduct for producing forged result cards for his B.Ed. and M.A. (History) examinations to secure a promotion and advance increments. The core legal questions involved whether the dismissal order was passed by a competent authority and whether proper service of the charge-sheet and inquiry procedure were followed. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal order, approved by the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan and communicated by the Director-General, was lawful, and that service of the charge-sheet through post at the petitioner's official and home addresses was legally sufficient. The Court laid down that an order issued by a subordinate authority with the prior approval of the competent authority is valid, and that postal service of a charge-sheet to a civil servant's correct addresses complies with procedural requirements. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of dismissal communicated by a Director-General is rendered illegal when the competent authority, such as the Secretary to the Government, has approved it?
  • Is service of a charge-sheet through post at the official and home addresses of a civil servant sufficient compliance with the law?
  • Whether a fresh inquiry is mandatory after a remand when a detailed inquiry has already been conducted under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Qaisar Khan vs Province of Balochistan through Secretary, Department of Education, Quetta and others1995 SCMR 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-05
  constitutional petitionnon-joinder of partiesadmission criteriatechnical groundseducational admissionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which held that the petition was not maintainable due to the non-joinder of a candidate (Muhammad Iqbal) who had secured fewer marks than the appellant. The appellant had sought admission to an Engineering College in Balochistan, which was denied on the ground that he had completed his education outside the province. The appellant challenged this decision, specifically targeting the admission of another candidate, Ghulam Mustafa, who had also studied outside the province but was granted admission. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the petition on the technical ground of non-joinder of a party against whom no relief was sought. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal on such technical grounds was improper, particularly where the appellant's case was at par with the respondent (Ghulam Mustafa) and no relief was claimed against the omitted party. The appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the High Court for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be dismissed solely on the ground of non-joinder of a party against whom no relief is claimed?
  • Is it necessary to implead all successful candidates in a petition challenging an admission process when the petitioner only seeks relief against a specific candidate?
  Read full judgment →
• Punjab Seed Corporation and 2 others vs Punjab Labour Appellate1995 PLC 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-28
  permanent workmantermination of serviceindustrial relationslabour lawfinding of factgrievance petitiontemporary appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the termination of a Field Supervisor by the Punjab Seed Corporation. The respondent, initially appointed on a temporary basis, served for over a year before his services were terminated on the grounds that they were no longer required. The respondent challenged this termination under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, asserting his status as a permanent workman entitled to procedural protections. While the Labour Court initially upheld the termination, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal reversed this decision, finding the respondent to be a permanent workman. The Lahore High Court subsequently dismissed the Corporation's constitutional petition, affirming the Tribunal's findings. The Supreme Court, upon review, held that the determination of the respondent's status as a permanent workman was a finding of fact based on evidence of continuous service exceeding six months. Consequently, the Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower forums, ruling that the respondent had attained the status of a permanent workman under the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee who serves for more than six months without complaint attain the status of a permanent workman under the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can a finding of fact made by a Labour Appellate Tribunal based on evidence be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is a termination of service valid if the employee has attained the status of a permanent workman but was not afforded due process?
  Read full judgment →
• Punjab Province through District Collector, Sargodha vs Muhammad Yar1995 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02
  petition for leave to appealsuit for possessionadverse possessionillegal possessionlimitation pleaprovincial government
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Punjab Province against three concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts, which had decreed the respondent's suit for possession in respect of land measuring 35 kanals and 1 marla. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioner could claim adverse possession over the suit land based on entries in the Register Girdawari indicating possession by the Forest Department. The Supreme Court held that the petition was devoid of force, affirming the lower courts' findings that the petitioner had no title and its possession was illegal, as there was no material to establish the starting point of adverse possession to the knowledge of the respondent, and further noted that it does not befit the Provincial Government to expropriate a citizen's property on the plea of limitation. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Provincial Government claim adverse possession without establishing the date or year it commenced to the knowledge of the owner?
  • Whether a suit for possession can be defeated by a plea of limitation or adverse possession raised by a party with no title?
  Read full judgment →
• Punhoon vs The State1995 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-23
  Criminal appealMurder convictionAcquittal of co-accusedDistinguishable evidenceOcular evidenceCorroborationRecovery of weaponBallistic expert reportBenefit of doubtDefence evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court challenged the High Court's decision to uphold the appellant's murder conviction under Section 302, P.P.C., while acquitting co-accused, arguing that the appellant's case was at par with those acquitted. The core legal question was whether the appellant's conviction could be sustained on evidence similar to that which led to the acquittal of co-accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's case was distinguishable from the acquitted co-accused. The court found that the First Information Report specifically attributed the first fatal shot to the appellant, and this ocular evidence was corroborated by the recovery of a gun from him, supported by the Ballistic Expert's positive report. The principles laid down affirm that a conviction can be maintained against one accused even if co-accused are acquitted, provided there is specific, corroborated evidence distinguishing their involvement, and that interested or uncorroborated defence evidence may be disregarded.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be maintained against one accused when co-accused are acquitted on similar prosecution evidence?
  • What factors can distinguish the case of one accused from co-accused for the purpose of upholding a conviction?
  • Is the evidence of a related Mashir (witness to recovery) sufficient for corroboration if supported by other evidence?
  • Can defence evidence be disregarded if it lacks corroboration or appears interested?
  • Does specific attribution in the FIR, corroborated by forensic evidence, distinguish an accused's case from others?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Secretary Education and others vs Mian1995 SCMR 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04
  ejectmentwilful defaultrent restrictionrequisition of propertylandlord and tenantlump sum paymentconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an ejectment petition filed by a landlord against the Education Department for default in rent payment and damage to the rented building. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the petition, but the Additional District Judge allowed it. The High Court subsequently upheld the ejectment order and declared the government's requisition of the premises illegal. The core legal question was whether the default in rent was 'wilful' or excused by a practice of lump-sum payments, and whether the requisition order precluded eviction. The Supreme Court held that the default was indeed wilful, as there was no evidence of a long-standing practice of accepting lump-sum payments, distinguishing the case from Mst. Inayat Begum. Furthermore, since the requisition order was declared illegal, it did not affect the ejectment proceedings. The Court affirmed the principle that where concurrent findings of fact establish wilful default in rent payment, and no evidence supports a custom of lump-sum payments, an order of eviction is legally sound and warrants no interference. The appeal was dismissed, granting the appellants four months to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Does a practice of accepting lump-sum rent payments necessarily negate a finding of wilful default in an ejectment petition?
  • Can an order of requisition of property, subsequently declared illegal, affect pending ejectment proceedings?
  • Is the Supreme Court bound by concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of rent default made by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab and others vs Mrs. Dr. Shahida Shah and others1995 SCMR 948 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-14
  consent orderlimitationcondonation of delaytransfer of government servantjudicial reviewadministrative representation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a consent order passed by a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court regarding the transfer of a government employee, respondent No. 1, from her position as Additional Medical Superintendent. The High Court had directed the Provincial Government to have the Chief Minister decide the respondent's representation against her transfer within a week, with the respondent agreeing to report for her new assignment if the decision went against her. The Province of Punjab contested the High Court's use of the word 'directed' in the order, arguing it was merely a consent arrangement. The Supreme Court found the petition barred by 36 days and held that the reasons provided for condonation of delay were insufficient. Consequently, the petition was dismissed on the ground of limitation. However, the Court clarified that the High Court's direction should be interpreted as a mutual arrangement between the parties, and it remained open for the Chief Minister to decide the representation, with the respondent bound to comply with that decision.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when it is barred by 36 days without sufficient cause for condonation?
  • Can a court order based on a consent arrangement be recharacterized as a mere arrangement rather than a mandatory direction?
  Read full judgment →
• Prof. Dr. Badshah Gul and others vs Prof. Dr. Shafiq Ahmad and others1995 SCMR 1859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-08-06
  inter se senioritycivil servicepost vs gradeamalgamation of cadresseniority listservice tribunalregular appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service dispute regarding the determination of inter se seniority of Professors following the amalgamation of the Khyber Medical College and the Post-Graduate Medical Institute. The core legal question was whether seniority should be determined based on the date of continuous regular appointment to the post or based on the date of grant of a higher grade (BPS-21). The Supreme Court held that the merger notification explicitly mandated that seniority be determined by the date of continuous regular appointment to the respective posts. The Court clarified that 'post' and 'grade' are distinct concepts; a higher grade granted for financial purposes does not constitute a promotion to a higher post and does not override the seniority established by the date of regular appointment to the post. Consequently, the Court set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment, affirming that the government correctly rectified the seniority list to reflect the date of appointment to the post rather than the date of grade advancement, and held that the government is not estopped from correcting errors in a tentative seniority list before it attains finality.

  Questions settled

  • Is inter se seniority of civil servants determined by the date of appointment to a post or by the date of grant of a higher grade?
  • Does the grant of a higher grade to a civil servant constitute a promotion to a higher post for the purpose of seniority?
  • Can the government correct errors in a tentative seniority list after the period for filing objections has expired but before the list is finalized?
  • Are 'post' and 'grade' distinct concepts in the context of civil service rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Present: Salem Akhtar, Zia Mehmood Mirza and Fazal Karim, Hbahadur1995 PLD Supreme Court 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-19
  retracted confessiondeath sentencemurdercorroborationcriminal appealmitigation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the judgment of the High Court confirming his death sentence for the murder of Waris Khan, whose dead body was recovered following a dispute over the sale price of a mule. The core legal question concerned the evidentiary value and treatment of a retracted judicial confession, specifically whether it must be read as a whole and corroborated in material particulars. The Supreme Court held that a retracted confession can form the basis of a conviction if found voluntary and true, but as a rule of prudence, it requires material corroboration, and it must be considered as a whole—incorporating both inculpatory and exculpatory parts. The Court established that where a sudden altercation arises over money in a secluded place, leading to a scuffle where the deceased initiated stone-pelting, the lack of premeditation warrants mitigating the sentence from death to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession form the sole basis of a criminal conviction?
  • Whether a retracted confession must be read as a whole including its exculpatory parts?
  • Is material corroboration required as a rule of prudence before acting upon a retracted confession?
  • Does a sudden altercation over a financial dispute without premeditation justify converting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervez Ijaz Sheikh vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government1995 PLC (C.S.) 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-11
  SeniorityLimitation periodService appealGradation listCivil servantService TribunalTime-barred
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that dismissed the petitioner's service appeal as time-barred. The petitioner, a civil servant, sought to challenge his seniority ranking in the Secretariat Group, which had been fixed in a 1990 gradation list based on his 1984 induction date. The petitioner argued that his seniority should have been calculated from his 1983 promotion in his parent department, relying on a subsequent Supreme Court judgment. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could challenge a long-standing seniority list by filing a belated representation based on a new judicial precedent. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was correctly dismissed as time-barred. The Court affirmed that a civil servant cannot claim a fresh period of limitation by filing a representation against a seniority list that was not challenged when originally issued. The key principle laid down is that subsequent judicial pronouncements do not revive a cause of action for challenging seniority lists that have already attained finality due to the expiration of the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant challenge a seniority list years after its issuance by relying on a subsequent judicial precedent?
  • Does a departmental representation filed against a long-standing seniority list extend the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Can a party claim a fresh period of limitation by filing a representation against a previously un-challenged seniority list?
  Read full judgment →
• Perveen Sitara and others vs Muhammad Younas1995 SCMR 1182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-28
  partition suitexecution proceedingsjudgment-debtorreimbursement claimpreliminary decreewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from execution proceedings following a preliminary decree in a partition suit, wherein the petitioners, holding a 1/4th share in the property, sought reimbursement for alleged expenses incurred on repairs and renovations. The executing Court rejected this claim, a decision subsequently upheld by the first appellate Court and the High Court in a writ petition. The core legal question was whether a judgment-debtor could claim reimbursement for property improvements during execution proceedings when such a plea was not raised during the original suit. The Supreme Court held that the claim was rightly rejected, noting that the petitioners failed to raise the plea of repair expenses in their written statement during the original suit proceedings. The Court affirmed that the executing Court cannot entertain claims that should have been adjudicated during the trial phase. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, finding no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judgment-debtor claim reimbursement for property repairs during execution proceedings if the plea was not raised in the written statement during the original suit?
  • Does an executing court have the authority to adjudicate claims for property improvements that were not part of the original decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Akhtar vs Muhammad Inayat and 4 others1995 SCMR 929 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-11
  post-conviction bailjurisdiction of High Courtsuppression of terrorist activitiesscheduled offencesproofbail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which granted post-conviction bail to respondents pending their criminal appeal against a conviction under Section 435/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as adjudicated by the Special Court for Suppression of Terrorist Activities. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to grant bail to the respondents in light of the principles established in The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah (1992 SCMR 2192), which restricts such jurisdiction in specific scheduled offences. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the High Court lacked the requisite jurisdiction to grant bail in this instance, as the case did not fall within any recognized exceptions. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that findings regarding the use of explosives or mineral oil, as required by the relevant schedule, could be based on material sufficient to constitute 'proof' under Section 3 of the Evidence Act 1872. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order granting bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to grant bail to a convict pending an appeal against a conviction under the Special Court for Suppression of Terrorist Activities?
  • Can findings regarding the use of explosives or mineral oil be based on material that does not strictly meet the definition of evidence under the Evidence Act 1872?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Ahmad alias Paiji vs The State1995 SCMR 1092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-29
  murder convictionleave to appealreappraisal of evidenceinterested witnessesdeath sentence commutationpresidential amnestycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a conviction for murder and house trespass. The petitioner was convicted by the trial court under Section 302 and Section 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving a death sentence, which was subsequently confirmed by the High Court. The prosecution alleged the petitioner entered the complainant's house, demanded the whereabouts of a woman he had previously abducted, and fatally shot the complainant's wife. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that the prosecution witnesses were interested, the presence of a witness was unnatural, and identification in the dark was improbable. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the lower courts, noting that both courts had thoroughly analyzed the evidence and found the prosecution's case established beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the mere possibility of an alternative view of the evidence upon reappraisal does not constitute sufficient grounds for granting leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. However, the Court exercised its discretion to commute the petitioner's death sentence to life imprisonment, citing the presidential amnesty granted in 1988.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere possibility of an alternative view of evidence upon reappraisal constitute sufficient grounds for granting leave to appeal?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted by the Supreme Court based on a presidential amnesty granted after the initial sentencing?
  Read full judgment →
• Parvaiz Iqbal alias Muhammad Iqbal vs The State1995 SCMR 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08
  leave to appealmurdermitigating circumstancessudden provocationappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, upholding the conviction of the appellant for murder. According to the prosecution, a dispute arose between the appellant and the deceased over the draining of accumulated water into a sewerage ditch, leading to a quarrel where the appellant threatened the deceased. Three days later, another altercation occurred over the same issue, prompting the appellant to fetch a gun from his house and shoot the deceased in the head, causing his death. The trial court and High Court both believed the eyewitness testimony, and the appellant admitted to the occurrence during his examination. The Supreme Court considered whether the eyewitnesses were untrustworthy and whether mitigating circumstances warranted a lesser sentence. The Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the appellant's guilt were sound, noting the absence of premeditation and the suddenness of the quarrel as valid mitigating factors that had already spared the appellant the death penalty. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts can be disturbed when the petitioner admits the occurrence?
  • Does the absence of premeditation and a sudden quarrel constitute mitigating circumstances against the death penalty?
  • Whether the testimony of closely related eyewitnesses should be discarded solely due to allegations of their involvement in other cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Pardool and 3 others vs Gulzada and others1995 PLD Supreme Court 410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-27
  res judicataconstructive res judicatasplitting of claimsmortgage redemptioncivil procedurefinality of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit filed by the petitioners seeking a declaration of ownership regarding land originally mortgaged in 1895 and subsequently sub-mortgaged to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The petitioners had previously litigated their claim to ownership based on the sub-mortgage, which was dismissed up to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could initiate a new suit challenging the validity of historical mutations and asserting ownership rights after their previous claims regarding the same property and cause of action had been finally adjudicated. The Supreme Court held that the suit was barred by the principles of res judicata and the prohibition against splitting claims. The Court reasoned that because the petitioners failed to raise their current pleas in the earlier litigation, despite those pleas being available to them at the time, they were precluded from re-litigating the matter. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, emphasizing that parties cannot circumvent final judgments by initiating subsequent litigation based on grounds that should have been raised previously.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to raise available pleas in an earlier suit preclude a party from raising them in a subsequent suit under the principle of res judicata?
  • Can a party initiate a new suit regarding the same cause of action after a previous suit has been dismissed up to the Supreme Court?
  • Does Order 2, Rule 2 of the C.P. Code bar a subsequent suit if the grounds for relief were available but not asserted in the prior litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan through Secretary, Finance and anothers vs Kohat Cement1995 PLD Supreme Court 659 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales tax assessmentexcise dutywholesale cash priceassessable valuepost-manufacture chargesstatutory interpretationoctroi
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the assessment of sales tax on cement produced by the respondent. The core legal question was whether transportation and octroi charges could be deducted from the 'wholesale cash price' when determining the assessable value of goods under Section 4(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The High Court had ruled that such charges were deductible if not incurred by the manufacturer. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court’s view was incorrect. The Court determined that Section 4(1) of the Act provides an exhaustive list of permissible deductions, limited strictly to the amounts of duty and sales tax then payable. Consequently, all other expenses, including post-manufacture charges like freight and octroi, must be included in the computation of the wholesale cash price for assessment purposes. The Court established that the legislative intent behind the provision is to include such elements in the assessable value, regardless of whether the manufacturer or the retailer bears the actual cost of transportation or octroi.

  Questions settled

  • Are transportation and octroi charges deductible from the wholesale cash price when calculating the assessable value of goods under Section 4(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  • Does the phrase 'without any abatement or deduction whatever' in Section 4(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, exclude all deductions except for duty and sales tax?
  • Is the assessable value of goods for excise duty purposes affected by whether the manufacturer or the retailer bears the cost of transportation and octroi?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan through Secretary, Finance and another vs Kohat CementPTCL1995 CL. 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales taxexcise dutywholesale cash priceoctroi and transportation chargesassessable valuecentral excises and salt act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had allowed a writ petition filed by a state-owned cement manufacturing company against the demand for short-paid sales tax and penalty by the tax authorities. The core legal question concerned whether transportation and octroi charges could be included in the wholesale cash price for the purpose of assessing excise duty and sales tax under Section 4(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and Section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the wholesale cash price under Section 4(1) of the 1944 Act must be determined without any abatement or deduction except for the amounts of duty and sales tax expressly provided, and that post-manufacture charges such as transportation and octroi can be included by the department in determining the assessable value. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the High Court judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether transportation and octroi charges are to be included in the wholesale cash price for the assessment of sales tax and excise duty under Section 4(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  • What constitutes the measure of excise duty and sales tax under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  • Whether deductions beyond the amounts of duty and sales tax are permissible when computing the value of an article under Section 4(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan through Military Estate Officer, Kharian Cantt. and anothers vs Abdul Hayee Khan through Legal Heirs and 5 others1995 PLD Supreme Court 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-26
  land acquisitionlocus standiright of appealeminent domaincompensation awardbeneficiary of acquisitionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding land acquisition for the Gujranwala Cantonment. The respondents, whose land was acquired, sought a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to challenge the compensation awarded by the Collector. The Senior Civil Judge enhanced the compensation, and the appellants (the Federal Government through the Military Estate Officer) challenged this decision in the Lahore High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the beneficiary of the acquisition lacked the locus standi to challenge the compensation award. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision. The Court held that the Federal Government and its departments, as beneficiaries of land acquisition, are not competent to file an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act against a court's decision on a reference under Section 18. The Court reaffirmed that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and, absent express provision, beneficiaries cannot challenge compensation awards, as the Land Acquisition Act does not confer such a right upon them.

  Questions settled

  • Does the beneficiary of land acquisition have the right to file an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act against a court's decision on a reference under Section 18?
  • Is the right of appeal under the Land Acquisition Act a statutory right that must be expressly conferred?
  • Can a local authority or company for whom land is acquired demand a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. and anothers vs Ghulam Haider1995 SCMR 879 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-21
  service lawallowanceequal pay for equal workleave to appealservice benefitsnature of work
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) against a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan. The High Court had directed PTV to pay a 20% Secretariat/Personal Allowance to its employees in Quetta, effective from 1-7-1988, based on a similar allowance granted to employees at the PTV Islamabad Centre. The core legal question is whether an allowance granted to a specific class of employees based on the nature of their work can be extended to all employees of the corporation as a matter of right, or if such differentiation is permissible. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the contention regarding the nature of work and the applicability of allowances raises significant legal questions requiring determination. Pending the final appeal, the Court suspended the operation of the High Court's judgment regarding the payment of arrears from 1-7-1988 but declined to stay the payment of the allowance from the date of the High Court's judgment onwards.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allowance granted to a specific class of employees based on the nature of their work be claimed as a matter of right by other employees?
  • Does the principle of equal pay for equal work mandate the extension of specific allowances to all employees regardless of the nature of their duties?
  • Is the determination of pay and allowances dependent on the qualitative difference in work performed by employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways through its General Manager vs Javed Iqbal1995 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-18
  leave to appealdamageschild trespasserrailway negligenceinteresttort law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Pakistan Railways, sought leave to appeal against the High Court judgment that restored a trial court decree ordering the payment of Rs.10,460 with interest to the respondent. The respondent, who was six years old at the time of the incident in 1960, suffered severe injuries resulting in the amputation of his leg after being struck by a railway engine on an unfenced railway track. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court dismissed it, before the High Court restored the decree in a regular second appeal. The core legal question concerned the duty of care owed by the railway towards a child trespasser and the award of interest. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court established negligence on the part of the railway employees regarding the unfenced track, and that the grant of interest was a competent ancillary relief in the interest of justice. The Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, concluding that no legal questions of general importance arose.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the railway administration owes a duty of care to a child trespasser on an unfenced railway track?
  • Is the court competent to grant interest as an ancillary relief even if it was not specifically claimed in the plaint?
  • Do concurrent findings of negligence by the trial court and the High Court warrant interference by the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Herald Workers Union through its General Secretary vs Sindh1995 PLC 554 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-20
  collective bargaining agentindividual grievanceindustrial relationslocus standilabour courtstatutory interpretationbonus payment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the competence of a Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) to file a petition under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, on behalf of workers regarding the short payment of bonuses. The appellants, a workers' union, challenged the lower courts' dismissal of their petition, which had been rejected on the grounds that a CBA lacked the standing to initiate such proceedings. The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 25-A, specifically subsections (1) through (4), which delineate the procedure for redressing individual grievances. The Court held that the statute explicitly empowers a CBA to represent workers in grievance proceedings, provided the procedural requirements—such as serving a grievance notice—are satisfied. The ratio decidendi establishes that while Section 25-A and Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, serve distinct purposes, Section 25-A(4) clearly authorizes a CBA to take a worker's grievance to the Labour Court, provided the conditions precedent in Section 25-A(1) are met. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower judgments and remanded the case for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Collective Bargaining Agent competent to file a petition under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 on behalf of workers?
  • Does the right of a Collective Bargaining Agent to represent workers under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 exist independently of the procedural requirements of Section 25-A(1)?
  • What is the distinction between the scope of proceedings under Section 25-A and Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 regarding a Collective Bargaining Agent's authority?
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• Pakistan Engineering Council and anothers vs Afzal Anwar1995 SCMR 802 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-31
  Pakistan Engineering Councilultra viresbye-lawsprofessional engineering workslicensing of constructorsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the Supreme Court challenged a judgment of the Sindh High Court which had struck down Bye-Law No. 3 of the Construction and Operation of Engineering Works Bye-Laws, 1987, framed under section 25 of the Pakistan Engineering Councils Act, 1976, as ultra vires. The High Court held that the Act was intended solely to regulate professional engineers rather than contractors or engineering works, thereby rendering Bye-Law No. 3—which required constructors and operators to be licensed by the Council—beyond the scope of the Act's functions. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Engineering Council possessed the statutory authority under the parent Act to regulate constructors and operators of engineering works through subordinate legislation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by focusing exclusively on section 8 of the Act and ignoring other vital provisions such as section 2(k), section 12, section 25, and section 27. The Supreme Court ruled that the scope of the Act encompasses not only the engineering profession but also professional engineering works, and that licensing constructors to ensure the employment of qualified engineers falls within the valid purposes of the Council. The appeals were accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Bye-Law No. 3 of the Construction and Operation of Engineering Works Bye-Laws, 1987 is ultra vires the Pakistan Engineering Councils Act, 1976?
  • Does the scope of the Pakistan Engineering Councils Act, 1976 extend to regulating engineering works and constructors in addition to professional engineers?
  • Can the Pakistan Engineering Council require constructors and operators to obtain licences and employ registered professional engineers for carrying out engineering works?
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• Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation vs Sube dar Major (Retd.) Abdul1995 SCMR 1219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-14
  leave to appealdate of birth disputedeclaration suitservice matterreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the Additional District Judge's judgment and restored the Civil Judge's decree in favor of the respondent. The core legal matter arises from a suit for declaration filed by the respondent, Subedar Major (Retd.) Abdul Razzaq, challenging the correction of his date of birth from 1929 to 1927 by the employer. The trial court decreed in favor of the respondent based on a birth certificate, which the petitioner contended belonged to a different individual and contradicted the respondent's earlier declared age upon joining the Pakistan Army. The Supreme Court considered the contentions regarding the disputed evidentiary value of the birth certificate and the respondent's age declarations. Granting leave to appeal, the Court held that the evidence produced by the parties required reappraisal to accurately determine the correct date of birth. The key principle laid down is that where factual determinations regarding a disputed date of birth involve conflicting evidence and questionable documents, the matter warrants a thorough reappraisal by the appellate forum upon the grant of leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the birth date of the respondent is 16-8-1927 or 16-4-1929?
  • Does a birth certificate in the name of a third party suffice to prove the date of birth of an employee?
  • When is leave to appeal granted for the reappraisal of evidence in a date of birth dispute?
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• P.R., Islamabad vs Federal Service Tribunal & OtherK.L.R. 1997 Civil Cases 733 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-11
  advance incrementsservice tribunalpromotioneducational qualificationsFederal Secretariatcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding the withdrawal of four advance increments granted upon attaining a higher educational qualification. The core legal question was whether the appellant, who was promoted from Stenotypist to Stenographer in Pakistan Railways (treated as a Division of the Federal Secretariat), was entitled to advance increments for acquiring a B.A. degree under the Finance Division's Office Memorandum dated 29.6.1991, based on the prescribed recruitment qualifications. The Supreme Court held that since the applicable Federal Government Office Memorandum dated 23.9.1969 dispensed with the higher educational requirement of Intermediate or B.A. for permanent Stenotypists being promoted as Stenographers, the appellant's base required qualification for promotion remained Matriculation. Consequently, having acquired a B.A. degree, he was entitled to four advance increments. The Court set aside the Tribunal's order and allowed the appeal, establishing the principle that departmental promotion rules tied to Federal Secretariat O.M.s govern educational thresholds for advance increment entitlements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a permanent Stenotypist promoted as a Stenographer is required to possess the higher educational qualification prescribed for direct recruits for the purpose of claiming advance increments?
  • Does the qualification prescribed by the Federal Government for the Federal Secretariat apply to Pakistan Railways as a Division of the Federal Secretariat?
  • Is an employee who improves their educational qualification beyond the baseline requirement for their promotional post entitled to advance increments under the Finance Division Office Memorandum dated 29.6.1991?
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• Obaid Asghar vs Farhat Shaheen1995 SCMR 865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-06
  special oathnext friendminorcompromisemethod of proofevidentiary admissioninheritance mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from a dispute regarding the inheritance of the estate of the petitioner's deceased father, where the petitioner, a minor represented by his next friend, challenged the respondent's share, alleging she had been divorced. During the trial, the next friend offered to have the suit dismissed if the respondent's father took a special oath on the Holy Qur'an affirming the marriage subsisted. The oath was taken, and the suit was dismissed. The appellate court set aside this dismissal, arguing that the next friend required court permission under Order XXXII, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to enter into such an agreement. The High Court reversed this, holding the oath was a method of proof, not a compromise. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that an offer to abide by a special oath is a method of proof, not a compromise or agreement requiring court leave under Order XXXII, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The court held such an oath constitutes an evidentiary admission, binding on the minor absent fraud or gross negligence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offer by a next friend to have a suit decided on a special oath constitute a compromise requiring leave of the court under Order XXXII, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a statement made by a referee on a special oath considered an evidentiary admission?
  • Under what circumstances is a minor bound by the actions of their next friend regarding the offer of a special oath?
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• Noor Muhammad vs Muhammad Yaqoob1995 SCMR 935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  leave to appealpre-emptionright of pre-emptionwaiverpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 1-12-1992, which had accepted a revision petition, set aside an order of remand by the District Judge, and maintained the decree for possession through pre-emption granted in favor of the respondent by the Civil Judge. The core legal question was whether the respondent had waived his right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner failed to establish the plea of waiver, as the document relied upon only concerned the waiver of the right of tenancy and made no mention of abandoning the right of pre-emption, while the respondent's status as a collateral of the vendor was undisputed. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a document waiving a right of tenancy can be construed as an abandonment of the right of pre-emption?
  • Did the petitioner successfully establish the plea of waiver against the pre-emptor?
  • Is the High Court justified in setting aside an order of remand and restoring the trial court decree when the plea of waiver is not established?
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• Noor Muhammad alias Noora vs The State1995 SCMR 671 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-11
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonyprivate defenseexecutive amnestycredit of detention periodleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction and death sentence under sections 302, 307, and 460 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and murderous assault. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of ocular testimony by natural witnesses, the rejection of the plea of private defense, and whether the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be claimed when a death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment through executive amnesty rather than by a judicial decision. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts rightly appreciated the evidence and rejected the defense version. Furthermore, the Court held that the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. cannot be granted where the sentence of imprisonment is a result of executive amnesty rather than a judicial decision of the court. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be claimed when a death sentence is converted into life imprisonment through executive amnesty?
  • Can ocular testimony of injured natural witnesses be relied upon in the absence of any motive or ill-will?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts when no misreading of evidence is pointed out?
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• Noor Elahi and 2 others vs Muhammad Sharif Khan Shinwari and 231995 PLD Supreme Court 609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-26
  cantonment rent restrictionejectmentpersonal and bona fide requirementstatutory noticesublettinghotel premiseslandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two connected civil appeals arising from concurrent eviction orders passed against the tenants of a hotel premises under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, on the grounds of personal requirement and unauthorized subletting. The core legal questions centered on whether a lease agreement stipulation regarding the surrender of possession amounted to the mandatory two years' statutory notice required under section 17(4) before seeking ejectment for personal requirement, and whether subletting was established. The Supreme Court held that the service of a formal written two years' notice is a mandatory condition precedent (sine qua non) for an ejectment application on the ground of personal requirement concerning hotel premises, and lease terms or oral assertions cannot substitute it; consequently, the ejectment application on personal requirement was incompetent. However, the Court upheld the eviction order on the alternate ground of unauthorized subletting, as the tenants failed to prove written consent from the landlord. The key principle laid down is that statutory notice requirements for special commercial categories under rent restriction laws are mandatory and strict compliance is required to maintain an eviction action.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service of a two years' statutory notice under the third proviso to section 17(4) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 is mandatory before seeking eviction of a tenant from a hotel on the ground of personal requirement?
  • Does a stipulation in a lease agreement prohibiting extension and requiring surrender of possession amount to a valid statutory notice under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Can an ejectment application filed without complying with mandatory statutory notice requirements be maintained?
  • Whether an appellate court can consider a ground of appeal not specifically mentioned in the leave-granting order if it is necessary for complete justice?
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• Noor Ali Khan vs The Secre Cary, Establishment Division, Islamabad1995 SCMR 874 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-22
  civil servicesenioritydepartmental examinationdeferment of promotionservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal regarding the seniority of a civil servant within the District Management Group. The petitioner, appointed in 1982, challenged his placement in the 1993 seniority list, arguing that his position was incorrectly downgraded. The Federal Service Tribunal had previously dismissed his appeal, reasoning that because the petitioner had failed to clear his departmental examination and his promotion was deferred, he could not claim seniority over colleagues who had cleared the examination and were promoted earlier. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to specifically examine the legal validity of the Tribunal's finding. The core legal question is whether the deferment of a candidate's promotion due to the failure to clear a departmental examination justifies a permanent loss of seniority, or if the candidate is entitled to retain their original seniority position upon subsequently qualifying the examination. The Court indicated that the deferment of promotion on such grounds should not necessarily disturb the inter se seniority of the candidate, which ought to be retained after the examination is cleared.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deferment of a civil servant's promotion due to failure to clear a departmental examination justify a permanent loss of seniority?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to retain their original inter se seniority after subsequently qualifying the required departmental examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Khalil vs Sh. Muhammad Shafiq1995 SCMR 791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-02
  ejectment proceedingsinterlocutory orderright of appealrent depositfragmentary adjudicationCantonments Rent Restriction Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from ejectment proceedings initiated under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963. The core legal question was whether an interlocutory order passed by a Rent Controller under Section 17(8) of the Act, directing a tenant to deposit arrears of rent, is appealable. The Supreme Court held that such an order is of a provisional and incidental character, not deciding the main controversy in the lis. Consequently, it is not appealable unless the relevant statute explicitly provides for such an appeal. The Court reaffirmed that allowing appeals against interlocutory orders leads to fragmentary adjudication, causing inordinate delay and negating the administration of justice. The Court rejected the argument that differences between the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 and the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 rendered the established principle of non-appealability inapplicable. The key principle laid down is that interlocutory orders of a provisional nature, which do not resolve the main dispute, are not subject to appeal unless specifically provided for by law, to prevent the clogging of judicial mechanisms.

  Questions settled

  • Is an interlocutory order directing the deposit of rent under Section 17(8) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 appealable?
  • Does the absence of a provision in the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 explicitly requiring the final determination of rent due make an interlocutory rent deposit order appealable?
  • Should the term 'an order' in a statute providing for appeals be interpreted in its widest generality to include all interlocutory orders?
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• Niaz Ali vs Adalat Hussain and 3 others1995 SCMR 1089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-16
  statutory baildiscretionary orderbail applicationrepeal of enactmentcriminal procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the High Court, which had granted bail to the respondents on statutory grounds. The respondents were arrested on 11-6-1991, and their trial remained unconcluded at the time of the petition. The core legal question concerned whether the respondents were entitled to bail under the statutory provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically considering the status of the third and fourth provisos to subsection (1) of section 497 at the time of their arrest and the subsequent legislative changes. The High Court had exercised its discretion to grant bail, relying on the principle that the repeal of an amending enactment does not necessarily affect the continuance of amendments already made. The Supreme Court found no merit in the petitioner's challenge. It held that since the High Court had exercised its discretion appropriately and the third proviso was indeed part of the law at the time of the respondents' arrest, there was no ground to interfere with the High Court's order. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeal of an amending enactment affect the continuance of amendments made by that enactment?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere with a High Court's discretionary order granting bail when the trial has not concluded?
  • Does the statutory right to bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply based on the law in force at the time of arrest?
  Read full judgment →
• New Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd. vs The Collector of Customs, Dry Port, Lahore and others1995 SCMR 1535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-04
  leave to appealcustoms duty recoverycoercive measuresterritorial jurisdictionbonded warehouseinsurance policyconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioner insurance company's constitutional petition, which challenged the demand and coercive measures threatened by the Collector of Customs under the Customs Act, 1969, for recovery of customs duty and taxes under an insurance policy following a fire in a bonded warehouse. The core legal questions involved the applicability of section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969 for recovering insurance policy dues, the exhaustion of alternate remedies, and the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Sindh under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 where coercive actions or recoveries are to be executed within its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised require detailed interpretation of the Constitution and the Customs Act, while restraining the respondent from taking coercive measures subject to the petitioner executing a bond for the disputed demand.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Collector of Customs is authorized under section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969 to take coercive measures for the recovery of dues payable under an insurance policy?
  • Does the High Court of Sindh possess territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 to entertain a petition where the coercive recovery action is to be executed within its territorial jurisdiction?
  • Whether a constitutional petition against a demand notice issued by a customs authority is barred for failure to exhaust alternate remedies under the Customs Act, 1969 when the applicability of the empowering section itself is challenged?
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• Nazir Ahmed and others vs Muhammad Din and others1995 SCMR 933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-10
  consent decreeexecution of decreelimitation periodmutationapprobate and reprobateproperty inheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision regarding a property dispute. The core legal question was whether a consent decree passed in 1968, which recognized the respondents' predecessor-in-interest's 1/8th share in the subject land, had become inexecutable due to the passage of time, thereby barring the respondents' subsequent suit. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' contention was unfounded. The Court observed that the petitioners themselves had sought and obtained a modification of the original decree in 1983 and subsequently sanctioned mutations based on that decree. Consequently, the petitioners could not simultaneously rely on the decree to claim ownership while arguing it was inexecutable against the respondents' rightful share. The Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the respondents' suit was maintainable and within time. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot approbate and reprobate; having acted upon a consent decree to secure their own interests, they are estopped from challenging its executability against other beneficiaries.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the executability of a consent decree after having acted upon it to secure their own interests?
  • Does the modification of a consent decree by a party preclude them from later claiming the original decree was inexecutable due to the passage of time?
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• Nazir Ahmed and 6 others vs Ghulam Mustafa1995 SCMR 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  pre-emptionexecution proceedingsconsolidation of holdingsamendment of plaintmisdescription of propertysubstantial justicefinality of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding the execution of a pre-emption decree. The core legal question was whether a decree-holder is entitled to amend a plaint and decree during execution proceedings to correctly describe land that underwent consolidation operations, and whether such an amendment constitutes partial pre-emption or impermissible alteration of the suit's complexion. The Supreme Court held that the decree-holder is entitled to follow the land allotted to the judgment-debtor in lieu of the original suit land, particularly when the initial description was a misdescription caused by inaccurate revenue records. The Court affirmed that once an order allowing such an amendment in execution proceedings has attained finality, it cannot be reagitated. The principle laid down is that where land is subject to consolidation, a pre-emptor may follow the substituted land, and an amendment to correct the description of property in a decree, aimed at achieving substantial justice, is permissible during execution, provided the underlying identity of the property remains consistent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree-holder amend a plaint and decree during execution proceedings to reflect land allotted in consolidation operations?
  • Does the correction of a misdescription of property in a decree during execution proceedings constitute partial pre-emption?
  • Can a party reagitate an order allowing an amendment of a plaint in execution proceedings if that order has already attained finality?
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• Nazir Ahmad vs The State1995 SCMR 1181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04
  illegal gratificationbriberyconcurrent findingsleave to appealtainted currencyraiding magistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a conviction for demanding illegal gratification. The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector of a Cooperative Society, was apprehended in a raid supervised by a Magistrate after allegedly demanding a bribe from a cashier to process a loan application. The tainted currency notes were recovered from the petitioner, and the Magistrate testified to hearing the conversation between the petitioner and the complainant. The petitioner’s defense—that the money was intended for deposit into a bank on the complainant's behalf—was rejected by both the trial court and the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that there were concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts and no evidence of misreading of the record. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to allege any ill-will or bias against the Magistrate who supervised the raid. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts, and refused the leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a criminal matter?
  • Is the testimony of a raiding Magistrate regarding the recovery of tainted currency sufficient to sustain a conviction for bribery?
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• Nazir Ahmad vs Nisar Ahmad and another1995 SCMR 840 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-23
  ocular evidencemurder convictionsentence commutationmotiveleave to appealcriminal petitiondeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the conviction of the petitioner for murder under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while commuting his death sentence to imprisonment for life. The core legal question was whether the ocular evidence provided by the complainant and an eyewitness was sufficient to sustain the conviction, and whether the High Court erred in reducing the sentence due to the prosecution's failure to prove the specific motive. The Supreme Court held that the ocular evidence was credible, noting the absence of prior enmity or motive for the eyewitness to falsely implicate the petitioner. The Court affirmed the conviction, finding it well-founded on the testimony of the witnesses. Regarding the sentence, the Court upheld the High Court's decision to commute the death penalty, agreeing that the failure to establish a specific motive justified the reduction. The principle laid down is that while ocular evidence can be sufficient for conviction, the failure to prove motive may be a valid ground for mitigating a death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Is ocular evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the absence of established motive?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove a specific motive justify the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Can a medical officer prove a post-mortem report prepared by another doctor who has since died?
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• Nazir Ahmad and anothers vs Muhammad Siddique and others1995 SCMR 1740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-07
  murdervicarious liabilitycommon intentionspur of the momentappreciation of evidenceinterested witnesscriminal appealhouse trespass
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against a High Court judgment that modified convictions for murder and assault. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court correctly reduced the death sentence of the principal accused to life imprisonment, whether the acquittal of co-accused on murder charges was justified, and whether the principle of vicarious liability applied to the incident. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision was sound, noting that the incident occurred at the spur of the moment without premeditation, thereby negating common intention and justifying the reduction of the sentence and the acquittal of co-accused. The Court affirmed that individual liability applies where common intention is absent. Furthermore, the Court upheld the acquittal regarding house trespass due to insufficient evidence of the enclosure's nature. Key principles laid down include that the mere relationship of witnesses to the deceased does not render them unreliable if their testimony is consistent and corroborated, and that vicarious liability cannot be invoked where the crime lacks premeditation and arises from a spontaneous altercation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere relationship of eye-witnesses to the deceased render their testimony unreliable or interested?
  • Can a conviction for house trespass under Section 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained if the prosecution fails to prove the essential ingredients of the enclosure?
  • Is the principle of vicarious liability applicable when an incident occurs at the spur of the moment without premeditation?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on murder charges necessitate the acquittal of the principal offender on the principle of consistency?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad alias Haji and anothers vs The State1995 SCMR 1347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-23
  limitation periodcriminal appealcondonation of delayFederal Shariat CourtnarcoticsProhibition Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from the conviction of the appellants under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 for possession of heroin, whose appeal before the Federal Shariat Court was dismissed as barred by time by thirty-four days. The core legal question was whether the Federal Shariat Court was legally justified in dismissing the appeal as barred by time and whether sufficient cause was shown for condoning the delay. The Supreme Court held that a limitation period of sixty days is prescribed under the Federal Shariat Court (Procedure) Rules, 1981, and that no sufficient cause or justifiable grounds existed for extending the period of limitation, given the evidence of managed medical certificates and attempts to secure release through improper means. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Shariat Court was legally justified in dismissing the appeal as barred by time?
  • Is there a prescribed period of limitation for filing a criminal appeal before the Federal Shariat Court?
  • Whether illness of a relative pursuing the case constitutes sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing an appeal from jail?
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• Nazar Muhammad vs The State1995 SCMR 1497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-16
  possession of liquorProhibition Orderrecovery witnessesleave to appealappellate interferencecriminal convictionHadd
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner, Nazar Muhammad, for the possession of 599 bottles of foreign liquor, recovered from his vehicle and a godown upon his pointation. The trial court convicted the petitioner under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. On appeal, the Federal Shariat Court acquitted the petitioner of the charge under Article 3 but maintained the conviction and sentence under Article 4. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the recovery of the contraband and the credibility of the prosecution witnesses were sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was credible and that the petitioner failed to substantiate his plea of enmity or provide evidence to rebut the recovery. Finding no infirmity in the reasoning of the Federal Shariat Court, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that appellate interference is unwarranted where the lower courts have properly appreciated the evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the recovery of contraband when the lower courts have believed the prosecution witnesses?
  • Does the failure of an accused to prove enmity with recovery witnesses undermine the prosecution's case in a narcotics or prohibition offense?
  • Is the testimony of recovery witnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawaz Khan and another vs Ghulam Shabbir and another1995 SCMR 1007 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-08
  leave to appealmurdermitigating circumstancesenhancement of sentencelocus standiaggrieved personbenefit of reasonable doubtimprisonment for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed respectively by a convicted accused seeking to challenge his murder conviction and by the father of the deceased seeking enhancement of sentence from imprisonment for life to death. The core legal questions involve the locus standi of a father of a deceased—who was neither the original complainant nor a testifying witness—to maintain a petition for leave to appeal against an appellate judgment, and whether the High Court correctly exercised discretion in mitigating a death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that the father, having been cited as a witness though given up, and otherwise qualifying as an aggrieved person, had the locus standi to file the petition. On merits, the Court held that where the real motive or cause of a murder is shrouded in mystery or obscure due to provocation, the benefit of reasonable doubt regarding the true cause warrants the lesser punishment of imprisonment for life. Consequently, both petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the father of a deceased who was neither the complainant nor a testifying witness has the locus standi to file a petition for leave to appeal against an appellate judgment?
  • Can the benefit of reasonable doubt regarding the real motive or cause of a murder be applied to determine the quantum of sentence?
  • Does the obscurity or concealment of the real cause of a murder justify awarding the lesser punishment of imprisonment for life instead of death?
  Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority vs M/s. Daewoo Corporation1995 SCMR 1221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-07
  ArbitrationSummoning of ArbitratorTrial Court discretionEvidence recordingCivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from a dispute regarding the summoning of an Arbitrator in legal proceedings. The core legal question concerned whether the trial Court should be directed to summon the Arbitrator as a witness or if such a decision should be left to the trial Court's discretion after hearing the parties. By consent of the parties, the Supreme Court held that the decision regarding whether to summon the Arbitrator must be determined by the trial Court itself, following the recording of any necessary evidence and after hearing the parties. Consequently, the High Court's order dated 21st December 1994 was upheld, subject to the deletion of the specific paragraph mandating the summoning of the Arbitrator and imposing conditions thereon. Additionally, the Supreme Court ordered the deletion of observations in the trial Court's order dated 31st July 1994, which had prematurely accepted an application filed under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The petition was disposed of in these terms, affirming the trial Court's authority to manage its own evidentiary process regarding the Arbitrator.

  Questions settled

  • Should the decision to summon an Arbitrator be determined by the trial Court after hearing the parties?
  • Can a High Court order mandating the summoning of an Arbitrator be modified by consent of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan vs Nazir Ahmed alias Kashif Nadeem1995 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-19
  Special Court (Offences in Banks)scheduled offencejurisdiction of Special CourtPrevention of Corruption ActOffences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinanceremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the National Bank of Pakistan against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the conviction of the respondent for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The High Court had acquitted the respondent on the ground that the Special Court (Offences in Banks) lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that the offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 was not a scheduled offence under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance 1984. The core legal question was whether the offence under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 was a scheduled offence triable by the Special Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred because a Federal Government notification dated 28th April 1985 had explicitly added offences punishable under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 to the First Schedule of the Ordinance. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, allowed the appeal, and remanded the case for a decision on merits, affirming that the Special Court possessed the requisite jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is an offence under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 a scheduled offence under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance 1984?
  • Does the Special Court (Offences in Banks) have jurisdiction to try offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947?
  Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan vs Chairman, Sindh Labour Appellate1995 SCMR 690 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-23
  leave to appealmaster and servantmisappropriationdepartmental inquiryservice rulesgrievance petitionworker
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, National Bank of Pakistan, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed its constitutional petition challenging the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal's order declaring the dismissal of respondent No. 3 (a messenger) from service as illegal. Respondent No. 3 had been dismissed following an inquiry into allegations of misappropriating customer funds. His grievance application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was allowed by the Labour Court, and the Appellate Tribunal upheld it, holding that the inquiry was wrongly initiated under the Rules of 1980 instead of the Rules of 1973. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that there was no material difference between the two sets of rules to cause prejudice, that a conflict of opinion existed on the issue, and that respondent No. 3 did not qualify as a 'worker' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the inquiry proceedings were vitiated merely due to the reference to the Rules of 1980, and whether the grievance petition was maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inquiry proceeding is vitiated merely because it was initiated under the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules of 1980 instead of the Rules of 1973?
  • Whether a bank employee dismissed for misappropriation falls within the definition of worker under the Industrial Relations Ordinance for maintaining a grievance petition under section 25-A?
  • Does the invocation of a different set of departmental rules cause material prejudice to an employee when the procedure and punishments under both sets of rules are substantially the same?
  Read full judgment →
• Nathey Khan vs Khanu alias Khan and others1995 SCMR 980 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08
  Special Court jurisdictionquashment of proceedingsretrospective application of lawprivate complaintscheduled offencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which quashed criminal proceedings initiated by a private complaint before a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. The core legal question was whether the Special Court had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint filed specifically under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for an alleged offence committed on July 11, 1987, given that Section 365-A was only incorporated into the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, on September 3, 1989. The Supreme Court held that the Special Court lacked jurisdiction because the alleged offence occurred prior to the enactment of the relevant provision, and the offence was not a scheduled offence at the time of its commission. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the complaint should have been maintained under Section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, noting that the complaint was specifically framed under Section 365-A and no request for amendment or substitution of the charge had been made before the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Special Court have jurisdiction to try an offence under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the alleged offence occurred before the section was incorporated into the Code?
  • Can a private complaint filed under a specific section of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained under a different section if no request for amendment was made before the trial court?
  • Is a Special Court's cognizance of a complaint valid if the offence alleged is not a scheduled offence at the time of its commission?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasrullah Khan through his Legal Heirs and others vs Mst. Quresha1995 SCMR 1521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-14
  declaration suitownership of propertyAbadi Dehburden of proofpartition deedpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, which had upheld the appellate court's judgment setting aside a trial court decree in favor of the plaintiffs. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had instituted a suit for declaration of ownership of a house based on a family arrangement and partition deed, alleging the defendant's husband was a tenant. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court reversed it upon evaluating additional evidence and records, finding the plaintiff failed to establish ownership of the Abadi Deh property, which was not part of Shamilat Deh or owned by the village proprietary body. The core legal question concerned the proof of ownership and possession in declaratory suits involving Abadi Deh properties. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving ownership and that the partition document relied upon was ambiguous and unsupported by independent evidence. Consequently, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower forums and refused leave to appeal, laying down that a plaintiff seeking a declaration of ownership in Abadi Deh must establish clear title and possession without relying on ambiguous partition deeds not binding on the contesting party.

  Questions settled

  • Does a plaintiff seeking a declaration of ownership of a house situated in Abadi Deh bear the burden of proving title and physical or constructive possession?
  • Can an ambiguous partition document not signed by the contesting party serve as sufficient proof of ownership without independent corroborative evidence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding property ownership supported by evidence on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Abbas vs The State1995 SCMR 1333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-03
  criminal petitionleave to appealdelayed FIRpolice opinionminority pleacommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal case where the petitioner, Nasir Abbas, along with co-accused, was convicted under sections 302/34, 307/34, and 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code for house trespass and causing death and injuries following a family dispute. The Lahore High Court maintained the convictions while modifying certain sentences. The core legal questions involved the effect of the petitioner's alleged minority, the reliability of the First Information Report despite purported delays, the evidentiary value of police opinion regarding innocence during investigation, and the presence of the accused at the crime scene. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had attained sufficient maturity at the time of the incident, that the First Information Report was not unduly delayed given the circumstances of transporting the injured to the hospital, and that the police's opinion on guilt or innocence is irrelevant and inadmissible before the court. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the opinion of a police officer regarding the guilt or innocence of an accused admissible in evidence during trial?
  • Does a delay in lodging the First Information Report vitiate the prosecution's case when satisfactorily explained by the time taken to transport injured persons to the hospital?
  • Whether an accused person who has reached the age of maturity and understanding can claim leniency on the ground of minor age during a pre-planned assault?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasimullah vs Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P, Peshawar and 2 others1995 SCMR 1545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-13
  ad hoc appointmentregularization of servicecivil servicestop-gap arrangementpromotioninitial recruitmentService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's appeal seeking regularization of his service under the North-West Frontier Province Ad hoc Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act 1987. The appellant, originally appointed as a Patwari and later selected as a regular Qanungo, had been promoted on an ad hoc basis to the post of Naib-Tehsildar. The core legal question was whether a civil servant promoted from a lower cadre to officiate on an ad hoc basis is entitled to regularization under Section 3 of the 1987 Act read with the definition of 'ad hoc appointment' under Section 2(a) of the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants Act 1973. The Supreme Court held that the 1987 Act was intended to regularize only those persons appointed on an ad hoc basis through initial recruitment, and its benefits do not extend to civil servants promoted from a lower cadre to officiate on an ad hoc basis. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the North-West Frontier Province Ad hoc Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act 1987 apply to civil servants promoted to officiate on an ad hoc basis from a lower cadre?
  • Can a civil servant who is promoted on an ad hoc or temporary basis claim the benefit of regularization under Section 3 of the North-West Frontier Province Ad hoc Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act 1987?
  • Is regularization under the North-West Frontier Province Ad hoc Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act 1987 restricted exclusively to persons inducted through initial recruitment?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasimul Haque Malik vs Chief Secretary to Government of Sindh and 41995 SCMR 872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-20
  service lawseniority disputedirect recruitment quotadepartmental promotionad hoc appointmentregularization of serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, which had declared respondents Nos. 4 and 5 senior to the petitioner in the cadre of Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies. The petitioner, a direct recruit appointed in 1981, challenged his junior status, arguing that the respondents' promotion was irregular because it occurred against the quota reserved for direct recruits, rendering their appointments ad hoc rather than regular. The Chief Secretary had initially accepted the petitioner's departmental representation, finding no vacancy existed in the promotee quota at the time of the respondents' promotion. The Service Tribunal reversed this, finding that the respondents' earlier ad hoc appointments were regularized in 1977 when vacancies were available. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying a significant question of law regarding whether the respondents' 1977 promotion violated established principles concerning the filling of direct recruitment vacancies by departmental promotees, specifically referencing the rule laid down in Federation of Pakistan v. Azam Ali and others.

  Questions settled

  • Does the promotion of a departmental candidate against a vacancy reserved for direct recruitment constitute an ad hoc appointment?
  • Whether the regularization of ad hoc appointees in the presence of available promotee quota vacancies violates service rules regarding seniority?
  • Can a service tribunal's finding of fact regarding the availability of vacancies be challenged when documentary evidence suggests otherwise?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseem Ahmad Chaudhry vs Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate1995 SCMR 1655 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-02
  grievance petitioncondonation of delaylimitationindustrial relationsnationalized banksdiscretionary powerservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the dismissal of a bank employee and the subsequent limitation period for filing a grievance petition. The core legal question was whether the Labour Court properly exercised its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing a grievance petition under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court’s decision to condone the delay was neither arbitrary nor illegal, as it was based on the prevailing legal uncertainty regarding the jurisdiction of Labour Courts over nationalized bank employees, which was only resolved by the Supreme Court’s decision in Iftikhar Ahmed v. President, National Bank of Pakistan. The Court ruled that the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court erred by misinterpreting the timeline and failing to recognize that the appellant was pursuing a remedy in the High Court during a period of legal ambiguity. The principle established is that an appellate court should not interfere with a lower court's discretionary decision to condone delay unless that discretion was exercised arbitrarily or in violation of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with a lower court's discretionary decision to condone delay under the Limitation Act?
  • Does legal uncertainty regarding the jurisdiction of a forum constitute a valid ground for condoning delay in filing a grievance petition?
  • Are employees of nationalized banks entitled to approach a Labour Court under the Industrial Relations Ordinance for individual grievances?
  Read full judgment →
• Naeem Ahmad vs Rana Muhamamd Majeed and others1995 SCMR 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-26
  quashment of proceedingsinherent powers of High Courtprevention of corruptionabuse of processcriminal investigationbribery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had quashed criminal proceedings against the respondent, a police inspector. The petitioner, the complainant, had alleged offences under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Investigating officers had previously recommended the cancellation of the case against the respondent due to a lack of evidence regarding the demand or acceptance of a bribe. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its inherent powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to quash proceedings at an initial stage where no evidence of the alleged offence existed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court rightly quashed the proceedings as the prosecution failed to establish any evidence of the respondent demanding or accepting a bribe. The Court affirmed that continuing such proceedings would constitute an abuse of the process of the court, emphasizing that trial courts must independently appraise evidence without being prejudiced by the quashment of proceedings against co-accused parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash criminal proceedings at an initial stage under its inherent powers when no evidence of the alleged offence is made out?
  • Does the quashment of proceedings against one accused person necessarily prejudice the trial of co-accused persons?
  • Is a trial judge required to independently appraise evidence regardless of the status of proceedings against other co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadir Khan vs Muhammad Aslam1995 SCMR 1074 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-22
  pre-emptionTalb-e-MuwathibatTalb-e-Ishhadconcurrent findings of factlimitationcontiguous ownerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a civil revision application and maintaining concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which decreed a suit for possession through pre-emption. The core legal questions involve whether the statutory requirements of 'Talabs' under pre-emption law were duly fulfilled, whether the suit was barred by limitation, and whether the plaintiff possessed the requisite qualification of being a contiguous owner at the relevant time. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the three lower courts regarding the making of 'Talabs' and limitation were unexceptionable, as no misreading or non-consideration of evidence was established. The Court affirmed that a cause of action for exercising a right of pre-emption arises from the date of attestation of the mutation rather than prior negotiations, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cause of action for exercising a right of pre-emption arises from the date of attestation of the mutation or from prior negotiations?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the making of Talabs under pre-emption law be disturbed in civil revision or leave to appeal?
  • Whether a suit for pre-emption is rendered time-barred when a transaction originally styled as an exchange or gift is found to pertain to a sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadir Khan and others Nosheen ZAIDLand others vs Principal, Khyber1995 SCMR 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-19
  medical educationacademic promotionPMDC regulationsstudent disciplineeducational institution prospectusuniform standardswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against the Peshawar High Court's dismissal of writ petitions filed by medical students. The students sought directions to be promoted to the next academic year of their M.B.,B.S. programs despite failing certain subjects. The core legal question was whether the college prospectus rule, which denies promotion to students failing any subject, was discriminatory or inconsistent with the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC) regulations. The Supreme Court held that the college prospectus rule was not in conflict with PMDC regulations. The Court affirmed that PMDC Regulations 6 and 21, framed under the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962, are binding on all medical colleges in Pakistan. These regulations mandate that a student must pass all subjects of the previous class to be promoted to the next higher class. Consequently, the Court ruled that the college authorities acted within their jurisdiction in denying promotion to the failed students. The petitions were dismissed, establishing that PMDC regulations provide a uniform standard for medical education that overrides any alleged local inconsistencies.

  Questions settled

  • Are the regulations framed by the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council binding on all medical colleges in Pakistan?
  • Does a medical student have a right to be promoted to the next academic year if they have failed in one or more subjects?
  • Is Rule 16 of the Prospectus of Medical Colleges in N.-W.F.P. inconsistent with the regulations of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council?
  Read full judgment →
• N.-W.F.P. through Chief Secretary and anothers vs Dr. Irfan Mir and 21995 SCMR 1690 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-06
  service lawpromotionseniority-cum-meritstatutory qualificationservice rulesimplied repealcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals challenged N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal judgments regarding the promotion of medical officers from Grade-17 to Grade-18. The core legal question was whether the Diploma in Public Health (D.P.H.) requirement, stipulated in the West Pakistan Health Service (Class I) Rules, 1969, remained a mandatory prerequisite for promotion, and whether possessing this qualification entitled junior officers to supersede senior colleagues. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the Tribunal’s finding that the D.P.H. requirement had effectively fallen into disuse and was impliedly abolished long before the promotions in question. The Court held that when a statutory qualification rule has practically lapsed, it cannot be selectively revived to grant preferential treatment to junior officers. The Court established that merit for promotion is a composite concept including seniority, experience, and service record, not merely academic credentials. Consequently, the mere possession of a qualification that has been ignored in practice does not provide a legal basis for superseding senior, experienced civil servants, as doing so would constitute unfair and unjust discrimination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of a specific academic qualification grant a preferential right to promotion over senior colleagues if the rule requiring such qualification has fallen into disuse?
  • Can a statutory requirement for promotion be considered impliedly abolished if it has been consistently ignored by the government in practice?
  • Does the concept of merit for promotion purposes include factors other than academic qualifications, such as seniority and experience?
  • Is it legally permissible to selectively revive a dormant service rule to favor specific candidates over their seniors?
  Read full judgment →
• M_S.) Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. And Others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secy. M_O. Finance, Islamabad And Others1997 P.C.T.L.R. 845 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  presumptive taxminimum taxlegislative competenceconstitutional validityincome tax evasionfundamental rightsfiscal policytax on turnover
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns 294 appeals challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 80C, 80CC, and 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, which introduced presumptive and minimum tax regimes. The core legal questions addressed whether the legislature was competent to enact these provisions under Entry 47 of the Federal Legislative List, whether they violated fundamental rights under Articles 4, 18, and 25 of the Constitution, and whether they were confiscatory. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of these provisions, ruling that the legislature possesses plenary power to impose taxes, and presumptive or minimum tax regimes are valid legislative measures to broaden the tax base and curb evasion. The Court held that Entry 47, read with Entry 52, provides sufficient legislative competence. The key principles laid down include that fiscal statutes are subject to a presumption of constitutionality, economic regulations are viewed with greater judicial latitude, and presumptive taxation is a valid mechanism for revenue collection, provided it is not patently discriminatory, arbitrary, or confiscatory in nature.

  Questions settled

  • Is the imposition of presumptive income tax on the basis of declared turnover a permissible exercise of legislative power under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the legislature have the competence to enact presumptive tax provisions under Entry 47 of the Federal Legislative List?
  • Are the presumptive tax provisions in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, violative of fundamental rights regarding equality and the right to carry on business?
  • Does the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, prevail over the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, regarding tax exemptions?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Shafsal Enterprizes, Government Contractors- vs Province of1995 SCMR 708 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-04
  arbitration awardexecution of decreestay of executionmoney decreecivil procedurediscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the execution of an arbitration award. The petitioner, having obtained an arbitration award made rule of the court, faced an appeal by the respondents in the Lahore High Court, where the execution of the decree was stayed. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion under Order XLI, Rule 5(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in staying the execution of a money decree without sufficient justification, thereby depriving the decree-holder of the fruits of the judgment. The Supreme Court held that the execution should not be stayed unconditionally. Relying on established precedents, the Court determined that a decree-holder should not be reduced to holding a mere 'paper decree' while the judgment-debtor appeals. The Court allowed the appeal, directing that the execution shall not be suspended, provided the respondents deposit the awarded amount. The petitioner was permitted to withdraw the deposited funds upon furnishing security for reimbursement, ensuring the interests of both parties were balanced pending the final outcome of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Under what conditions can a court stay the execution of a money decree pending an appeal?
  • Is a decree-holder entitled to the fruits of a decree despite a pending appeal by the judgment-debtor?
  • Can a court allow the withdrawal of a deposited decretal amount by a decree-holder pending an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Pragma Leather Industries vs Mrs. Sadia Sajjad1995 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-28
  rent controlejectmentdefault in rentlump sum paymenttenancy agreementleave to appealjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent judgments of the Rent Controller and the High Court of Sindh, which ordered the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant on the ground of default in rent payment for the period between July 1984 and December 1984. The petitioner contended that the parties had an established practice of paying accumulated rent in lump sums via cheques, a practice previously accepted by the respondent without protest for five prior instances. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Rent Controller properly exercised discretion in ordering ejectment despite the history of lump-sum payments, and whether the legal precedent established in Mrs. Alima Ahmed v. Amir Ali (PLD 1984 SC 32) was correctly applied, or if the principles in Muhammad Yunus Malik v. Mst. Zahida Irshad and related cases were more applicable. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the lower courts erred in their application of these precedents and the exercise of judicial discretion regarding the alleged default.

  Questions settled

  • Does a history of accepting accumulated rent payments in lump sums preclude a landlord from seeking ejectment on the ground of default?
  • Is the exercise of discretion by a Rent Controller in granting an ejectment order subject to review when there is evidence of a prior course of dealing between the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Muhammad Hussain and Lala Ram vs M/s. Mumtaz Ali and1995 SCMR 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ad interim orderinterim injunctionleave to appealdiscretionary reliefoctroi taxauction bid
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an ad interim order of the High Court of Sindh, which had suspended the Government of Sindh's confirmation of the petitioners' bid for the collection of Octroi Tax. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court of Pakistan should interfere with an ad interim discretionary order passed by a High Court. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition. The Court held that it is the settled practice of the Supreme Court to keep interference with discretionary interim orders passed by the High Courts to a minimum, and it will normally decline to interfere unless a grave illegality, a clear abuse of power, or a gross injustice is easily discoverable. Since the High Court had not yet taken a final view on the merits and the scope for consideration remained open, the petitioners were directed to agitate the matter before the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court of Pakistan interfere with an ad interim discretionary order passed by a High Court?
  • Should a petitioner challenge an ad interim stay order in the Supreme Court before seeking its vacation in the High Court that issued it?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. MTM International Bearing Industry Ltd. vs Aizad Hasan and1995 SCMR 1004 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-25
  quashment of proceedingscriminal defamationleave to appealpreliminary evidencebona fide intentinherent powers of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which quashed criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents under sections 500 and 506/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The proceedings were quashed by the High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after the Magistrate had issued process but before evidence was recorded. The petitioner contends that the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings at such an early stage, arguing that the determination of whether the respondents' actions—specifically the issuance of a letter containing imputations to the Central Board of Revenue—were bona fide or mala fide requires the recording of evidence. The Supreme Court, finding merit in the petitioner's submission that factual disputes regarding intent cannot be resolved on bald allegations without evidence, granted leave to appeal to consider whether the High Court's interference was premature and legally justified in the circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the recording of evidence when the issue of intent is in dispute?
  • Is it appropriate for the High Court to determine the bona fides of a party's actions based solely on pleadings without recording evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. M.Y. Electronics Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Manager., M/s. Dye- Cham Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., M/s. Margalla Package and Allied Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., M/s. Amazal Textile Mills Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan (Ministry of Finance), Islamabad and 5 others., Federal Government of Pakistan andPTCL 1995 CL 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-15
  fiscal exemptionspromissory estoppellegitimate expectationslocus paenitentiaeMoney Billcustoms dutyindustrial incentives
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against the dismissal of constitutional petitions by the Peshawar High Court, which had challenged the withdrawal of tax and customs duty exemptions previously granted to industries established in the Gadoon Amazai Industrial Estate. The Government of Pakistan had initially provided these incentives via notifications to encourage investment in this backward area, subject to specific conditions including deletion programmes. Subsequently, the government withdrew these exemptions, prompting legal challenges based on the doctrines of promissory estoppel, locus paenitentiae, and legitimate expectations. The petitioners argued that the withdrawal was unjustified, particularly given their adherence to the five-year deletion programmes. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine significant constitutional and fiscal questions. The Court specifically identified issues regarding the interpretation of fiscal statutes, the scope of the Customs Act, 1969, and the constitutional validity of amendments made via Money Bills. The Court ordered that the previously granted interim relief remain in force pending the final adjudication of these matters, while noting the government's stated intent to restore the exemptions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the words 'charged and paid' in Section 6 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 incorporate the entire Customs law?
  • What is the scope of a Money Bill and can amendments to fiscal laws be made through such bills without Senate approval?
  • Do cases involving the withdrawal of industrial exemptions fall outside the scope of Section 31-A of the Customs Act 1969 by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectations?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Daewoo Corporation vs Government of Punjab and others1995 SCMR 977 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-17
  writ jurisdictionexhaustion of statutory remedieslocal government taxrevisional authorityleave to appealmaintainability of writ petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petitions challenging the levy of excavation, quarrying, and exit taxes by the Zila Councils of Attock and Rawalpindi. The High Court had dismissed the petitions on the ground that the petitioners failed to exhaust the statutory remedy of revision available under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 before invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The petitioners contended that the revision remedy was illusory because the revisional authority was the same official who had previously dismissed their statutory appeal, thus creating a bias. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the contention regarding the adequacy and efficacy of the statutory remedy of revision, specifically where the revisional authority is the same person who decided the appeal, raises a substantial legal question requiring further consideration. The Court thus set the stage to examine whether the exhaustion of such a remedy is mandatory when the remedy itself is alleged to be ineffective or biased.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to exhaust a statutory revision remedy render a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan premature?
  • Can a statutory remedy be considered illusory if the revisional authority is the same person who decided the initial appeal?
  • Is it mandatory to exhaust all statutory remedies before challenging a tax levy in a writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Al-Faridia Industries vs M/s. Alfa Insurance Co. Ltd. and 4 others1995 SCMR 1063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-13
  Arbitration Actstay of proceedingsstep in the proceedingsarbitration clausecondition precedentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a judgment dismissing their appeal against an order staying proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The petitioner argued that the respondents, by repeatedly seeking adjournments to file a written statement, had taken 'steps in the proceedings,' thereby waiving their right to invoke the arbitration clause. The trial court and the appellate court had previously held that the respondents' conduct did not constitute a 'step in the proceedings' sufficient to disentitle them to arbitration, noting that the arbitration agreement was a condition precedent to any right of action. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying a significant legal question regarding whether seeking multiple adjournments to file a written statement constitutes a 'step in the proceedings' under the Arbitration Act 1940. Furthermore, the Court noted a potential issue regarding the stay of a suit involving multiple defendants where the arbitration agreement existed only between the plaintiff and two of the five defendants.

  Questions settled

  • Does seeking adjournments to file a written statement constitute a 'step in the proceedings' under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Can a suit be stayed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 when the arbitration agreement exists only between the plaintiff and some, but not all, of the defendants?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s) E.F.U. General Insurance Limited vs The Federation of Pakistan & Others1997 P.C.T.L.R. 1020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-10
  income taxgeneral insurance businessdividend incomereopening of assessmentdefinite informationpreferential tax rateinsurance accounts
  Summary & questions settled

  This batch of civil appeals by general insurance companies challenges the reopening of their past income tax assessments and the revision of tax rates applied to their dividend income. The core legal question is whether the tax authorities could lawfully reopen finalized assessments under Section 65 or Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, to tax dividend income at normal company rates rather than the lower preferential rates previously applied, relying on earlier judgments concerning general insurance profits. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court judgment, holding that neither the decision in Adamjee Insurance Company nor Central Insurance Company overruled the established principle in American Life Insurance Company that computation of insurance profits and determination of tax rates are distinct. The Court laid down that while general insurance profits are computed under the Fourth Schedule, general provisions of the First Schedule apply for tax computation, and insurance companies are entitled to lower tax rates on dividends unless specifically excluded by law. Furthermore, previous judgments on tax exemptions do not constitute 'definite information' to justify reopening assessments settled under long-standing departmental practice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the income tax authorities can lawfully reopen completed assessments of general insurance companies under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, on the basis of a judgment that dealt strictly with tax exemptions rather than dividend tax rates?
  • Does the computation of profits and gains of general insurance business under the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, preclude the application of lower preferential tax rates on dividend income as provided in the First Schedule?
  • Whether a binding judgment of a superior court that does not alter or overrule a long-standing interpretation regarding tax rates constitutes 'definite information' under Section 65(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Are insurance companies entitled to the benefit of lower rates of tax on dividend income contained in the First Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Muzaffar Khan and 16 others vs Abdul Wahab and 31 others1995 SCMR 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-22
  declaratory suitinheritancepedigree tablerevenue recordconcurrent findingsreversioners
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises out of a declaratory suit filed by the appellants claiming a share in the property left by Abdul Majid and Abdul Karim, asserting they were collaterals in the third degree through their common ancestor Azad Khan. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the lower appellate court dismissed the subsequent appeal. A revision petition in the High Court partly succeeded. The core legal question was whether the appellants successfully established their pedigree and relationship as brothers of the propositus's father based on revenue records and previous litigation judgments. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the subordinate courts regarding the pedigree table entries were correct and that previous litigation judgments did not prove the asserted brotherhood. The appeal was consequently dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can revenue records and pedigree tables form the basis for concurrent findings regarding family relationships in inheritance matters?
  • Do previous litigation judgments not explicitly establishing brotherhood suffice to overturn concurrent factual findings on pedigree?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq alias Shaman vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-05
  ocular testimonyinterested witnesscriminal appealappreciation of evidencecontradictions in testimonyleave to appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner against his conviction and death sentence for murder under Section 302, P.P.C., as upheld by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner challenged the conviction on three grounds: contradictions in ocular testimony, the interested nature of the eye-witnesses due to their relationship with the deceased, and a discrepancy between the number of wounds on the deceased and the marks on his clothing. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the relationship of witnesses to the deceased does not automatically invalidate their testimony if their presence at the scene is natural and their account is corroborated. Regarding contradictions, the Court held that variations in testimony that do not pertain to the material or salient features of the prosecution case do not destroy the credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a new factual argument, such as the discrepancy in clothing marks, cannot be raised for the first time at the Supreme Court level if it was not presented in the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relationship of an eye-witness to the deceased automatically render their testimony unreliable?
  • Do contradictions in the testimony of eye-witnesses regarding non-material details necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can a party raise a new factual argument before the Supreme Court that was not presented in the trial or appellate courts?
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• Mushtaq Ahmad vs The State1995 SCMR 510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-06
  Prohibition Enforcement of Hadd Order 1979recovery of heroinpolice witnessessearch without warrantSection 103 CrPCcognizable offenceco-accused acquittalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the petitioner against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which maintained his conviction under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 for possessing 2.5 kilograms of heroin. The primary legal questions concerned whether the raid conducted without a search warrant and without compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiated the conviction, whether police officials could serve as credible witnesses in the absence of independent witnesses, and whether the acquittal of a co-accused warranted the petitioner's acquittal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction. The Court held that police officials are competent witnesses whose testimony cannot be discarded absent proof of enmity, especially where a large quantity of contraband was recovered. Furthermore, the absence of a search warrant was justified by urgency and because the suspected offence fell under Article 3, making it cognizable under Article 16(1)(a) of the Prohibition Order, 1979.

  Questions settled

  • Are police officials considered competent witnesses in narcotic recovery cases where no enmity against the accused is established?
  • Does the failure to obtain a search warrant vitiate a raid and recovery when the police act on urgent secret information regarding a cognizable offence under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused on factual grounds automatically entitle another co-accused from whom contraband was recovered to an acquittal?
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• Mushtaq Ahmad Chaudhry vs Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others1995 PLC (C.S.) 657, 1995 SCMR 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-23
  Secretariat Allowanceleave to appealinterim reliefconstitutional petitionservice benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Balochistan High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition in limine. The core legal question concerns the entitlement of the petitioners to a 20% Secretariat Allowance, a benefit reportedly enjoyed by their counterparts in other provinces and departments. The petitioners argued that because they were not drawing this allowance on 31st May 1994, they were excluded from the benefits conferred by the Finance Act of 1994. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the issue required further examination. As an interim measure, the Court directed that the petitioners be paid the 20% Secretariat Allowance effective from 31st May 1994, pending the final disposal of the case. This relief was granted subject to a condition of recovery: should the Court ultimately determine that the petitioners are not legally entitled to the allowance, the amounts paid during the pendency of the proceedings would be recoverable from them by the competent authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees entitled to the 20% Secretariat Allowance if they were not drawing it on 31st May 1994?
  • Can interim relief be granted in a service matter subject to recovery if the final decision is adverse?
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• Munjri Khan and others vs Faridoon and 5 others1995 SCMR 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-24
  landlord and tenanttenant estoppelejectment suitrevisional jurisdictiontitle paramountrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning a suit for ejectment and recovery of produce filed by the respondent against the appellants. The core legal question involved whether tenants inducted by the landlord could deny his title or claim that the landlord's title had extinguished during the continuance of tenancy. The Supreme Court held that once a tenant is inducted into possession by a landlord, the tenant is estopped under section 116 of the Evidence Act from denying or repudiating the landlord's title so long as they remain in possession, and cannot avoid payment of lease money or rent. The Court further laid down that the rule of estoppel restricts the tenant from challenging the landlord's title at the beginning of the tenancy, and concurrent findings of fact by revenue courts regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be interfered with in revision without strong grounds of misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant inducted into possession is estopped from denying the landlord's title under section 116 of the Evidence Act?
  • Can a tenant refuse to pay rent or lease money by pleading that the landlord's title has come to an end without surrendering possession?
  • Whether the Board of Revenue can interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by subordinate revenue authorities in the absence of misreading of evidence?
  • What is the scope of revisional powers under section 56 of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act 1950?
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• Munir Ahmed Shaikh vs Government of Sindh through Additional Chief1995 PLC (C.S.) 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-26
  civil service senioritytransfer on requestretrospective seniorityregularization of ad hoc appointmentplenary powersvested rightsservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Sindh Service Tribunal judgment regarding the determination of seniority between two civil servants in the Public Health Engineering Department. The core legal question was whether the government could retrospectively grant seniority to an employee transferred on his own request, effectively superseding the seniority of another civil servant regularized in the same cadre earlier by operation of law. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Tribunal's decision that the retrospective seniority order was illegal. The Court held that under Rule 12 of the Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, a civil servant transferred on request ranks junior to those already in the cadre. Furthermore, while the government possesses plenary powers under Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, to alleviate hardship, such powers cannot be exercised to impair the vested statutory seniority rights of other civil servants. The retrospective order was invalid as it prejudiced the respondent’s established seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant transferred to a new department on their own request rank junior to those already serving in that cadre?
  • Can the government exercise plenary powers under Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 to grant retrospective seniority if it impairs the statutory rights of other civil servants?
  • Is an order granting retrospective seniority valid if it is passed after another civil servant has already been regularized in the same cadre by operation of law?
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• Munawar Bibi vs Muhammad Amin and another1995 SCMR 1206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-10
  child custodyHizanatminor daughtersguardian and wardleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court which had restored the order of the Guardian Judge denying her custody of her minor children. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was dissolved by Talaq in July 1992, after which the petitioner applied for the Hizanat (custody) of their five children. The Guardian Judge dismissed the application based on an allegation that the petitioner was living in an immoral union with her brother-in-law, a finding relied upon despite her acquittal of Zina charges. On appeal, the Additional District Judge granted custody of the daughters to the petitioner while leaving the son with the father. However, a constitutional petition filed by the respondent in the High Court set aside the appellate order and restored the Guardian Judge's dismissal. Upon petition, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court was justified in depriving the petitioner of the custody of her minor daughters, noting that her acquittal reinforced her presumption of innocence and that maintenance was the father's obligation.

  Questions settled

  • Was the High Court justified in depriving the mother of the custody of her minor daughters based on allegations of an immoral union despite her acquittal?
  • Does the pendency of an appeal against an acquittal for Zina destroy the presumption of innocence in child custody matters?
  • Can a mother be denied the custody of her minor children on the ground of financial inability when maintenance is the father's legal responsibility?
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• Multiline Associates vs Ardeshir Cowasjee and others1995 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-22
  locus standihigh-rise constructionbuilding regulationsjudicial precedentpublic interest litigationdiscretionary relieflachesSindh Buildings Control Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment ordering the demolition of a high-rise building in Karachi for alleged violations of building regulations. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court was bound by its own earlier precedent, the locus standi of the petitioners, the enforceability of building regulations, and the Chief Minister's authority to regularize building plans. The Court held that a High Court bench is bound by the judgment of an equal bench of the same court; if a contrary view is required, the matter must be referred to a larger bench. Furthermore, while locus standi in constitutional petitions is broad, discretionary relief should be denied where there is inordinate delay and the petitioner has acquiesced to similar constructions in the area. The Court clarified that subordinate regulations must yield to substantive law in case of inconsistency and affirmed the Chief Minister's statutory power to regularize building plans under the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance. Consequently, the Court set aside the demolition order, emphasizing that the petitioners' belated challenge, despite existing high-rise structures, precluded discretionary relief.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Division Bench of a High Court bound by the judgment of an equal bench of the same court?
  • Does a petitioner have locus standi to challenge building construction if they have acquiesced to similar constructions in the same area?
  • Does the Chief Minister have the statutory authority to regularize building plans under the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979?
  • In the event of an inconsistency between an Ordinance and subordinate regulations, which prevails?
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• Multiline Associates vs Ardeshir Cowasjee and 2 others1995 PLD Supreme Court 423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-22
  High-rise buildingBuilding regulationsConstitutional petitionLocus standiPublic interest litigationAcquiescenceDelay and lachesVested rightsChief Minister's powersRegularization of building planSubordinate legislationBinding precedentKarachi Building Control AuthorityDemolition order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, with leave of the Supreme Court, challenged a Sindh High Court judgment that allowed a constitutional petition, declaring a Ground plus Nine Floors construction violative of the Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations and directing its demolition. The Supreme Court considered four questions: the binding nature of an earlier High Court judgment, the locus standi of the respondents, the enforceability of building regulations, and the Chief Minister's power to permit deviation or regularization. The Court held that the High Court's Division Bench was bound by an earlier equal bench's finding that the Regulations were not in force, and a larger bench should have been constituted if a contrary view was intended. While acknowledging an extended scope of locus standi in public interest litigation, the Court found the petitioners acted belatedly, acquiesced to other similar constructions, and that discretionary relief should not have been granted, especially when third-party rights had accrued. The Court further held that the Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations, 1979, were in force by virtue of Section 21-A(3) of the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979, and that the Chief Minister's regularization order was a valid exercise of statutory power under Section 6 of the Ordinance, which, as substantive law, prevailed over any inconsistent regulations. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Division Bench of the High Court is bound by an earlier judgment of an equal Bench of the same Court?
  • Whether respondents have the locus standi to file a writ petition in circumstances where they are not immediate neighbours and have delayed raising objections?
  • Whether the Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations, 1979, were in force in the area at the relevant time?
  • Can the Chief Minister or the Karachi Building Control Authority permit deviation from building regulations or compound an offence under the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979?
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• Mulazim Hussain Shah and anothers vs Allah Bakhsh1995 SCMR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-27
  leave to appealco-sharerpossessionjoint propertycivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a civil revision and upholding the decree passed by the Additional District Judge in favor of the respondents. The respondents had sued the appellant for possession of a house, alleging that possession was handed over to the appellant on the condition that it would be vacated upon request, which the appellant subsequently refused to do while claiming title. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, finding that the respondent failed to prove possession and that the appellant was a co-sharer in the Khata. However, the appellate court set aside the dismissal and decreed the suit, a decision maintained in revision. The core legal question concerns the rights of co-sharers regarding exclusive possession of specific portions of joint property and the proper appraisal of evidence by the lower courts. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions regarding the co-ownership status and continuous possession require further consideration, and ordered that the status quo continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-sharer can be dispossessed from a specific portion of joint property without a formal partition?
  • Does a permissive user claim require proof of exclusive prior possession by the plaintiff?
  • How should the courts evaluate the possessory rights of co-owners in a joint Khata?
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• Mukhtiar Hamid Abid Tabassum vs Pakistan Engineering Council1995 SCMR 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-18
  territorial jurisdictionconstitutional petitionforeign qualificationengineering councilleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed against the refusal of the Pakistan Engineering Council to register the petitioners' foreign engineering degrees obtained from a University in the Philippines, on the ground that the said University had been de-recognised. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the constitutional petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, holding that the respondent performed the impugned acts outside its territorial jurisdiction and no cause of action arose within it. Upon appeal, the core legal question before the Supreme Court involved the interpretation of constitutional provisions regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, specifically whether the performance of functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation within the territorial limits is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction regardless of the location of the office or cause of action. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these substantial questions of law concerning constitutional interpretation and High Court jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 over an authority performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation outside its physical territorial limits?
  • Is the existence of an office or the accrual of a cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court mandatory for maintaining a constitutional petition under Article 199?
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• Muharram Ali vs The State1995 SCMR 1157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-18
  criminal appealsentence reductionexplosive substancesarms ordinancequantum of sentencerigorous imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the petitioner's conviction under section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965 and section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act 1908. The petitioner had been originally sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment for the arms offense and ten years for the explosive substances offense, with the sentences running concurrently. On appeal, the High Court maintained the convictions but reduced the sentence for the explosive substances offense to seven years and the fine to Rs. 5,000, while granting the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the reduced sentence of seven years for the explosive substances offense to be excessive. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal and further reduced the sentence for the explosive substances offense to five years of rigorous imprisonment. The key principle affirmed is the appellate court's authority to exercise discretion in mitigating sentences deemed disproportionate or excessive relative to the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court reduce a sentence imposed by the High Court if it deems the punishment excessive?
  • Does the appellate court have the authority to modify the quantum of sentence while maintaining the conviction?
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• Muhammad Zaman vs The State1995 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04
  leave to appealcriminal convictionappraisal of evidencemotivesafe administration of criminal justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his appeal against a conviction and sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Sahib Khatoon. While the trial court acquitted five co-accused, it convicted the petitioner. The High Court rejected the prosecution's theory of an ambushed murderous assault but maintained the conviction, reasoning that the incident arose from a dispute over fetching water and that the petitioner was motivated by a desire to avenge a prior murder of one Saadullah. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that the High Court's reasoning was factually incorrect because the incident occurred in August 1989, whereas the murder of Saadullah took place in January 1990, making the alleged motive impossible. The Supreme Court found that the High Court's reasoning was contrary to the record. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted to reappraise the evidence to ensure the safe administration of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on a motive that is chronologically impossible based on the trial record?
  • Does a factual error regarding the motive for a crime warrant the granting of leave to appeal in a criminal case?
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• Muhammad Zahid vs The State1995 SCMR 1302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-11
  post-arrest bailsmugglingfurther inquiryCustoms Actbail consistencycarrier liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of a bail application in a case involving the alleged smuggling of gold, silver, and liquor under the Customs Act, 1969. The petitioner, Muhammad Zahid, was apprehended while transporting goods, but contended that the gold was legally imported, relying on a government notification allowing gold imports. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given that the co-accused, who claimed ownership of the consignment, had already been granted bail by the High Court, and whether the validity of the import documents constituted a matter for further inquiry. The Supreme Court held that since the main accused, who admitted ownership, had been granted bail and that order had attained finality, the petitioner—whose role was at most that of a carrier—was also entitled to bail. The Court ruled that the determination of the genuineness of the documents and the truth of the defense plea were matters for the trial court to decide upon trial, thereby satisfying the requirement for further inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of bail to a co-accused who claims ownership of the allegedly smuggled goods entitle a carrier to bail?
  • Is the determination of the genuineness of import documents a matter for the trial court rather than a bail stage consideration?
  • Does the existence of a triable issue regarding the legality of imported goods constitute a case for further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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