Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Ashiq Hussain alias Muhammad Ashiq vs The State1995 SCMR 1494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-16
  sodomyleave to appealcriminal convictionmedical evidencecorroborationvictim testimonysentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Ashiq Hussain, who was convicted under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing sodomy against a minor victim. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to five years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine, which the Federal Shariat Court subsequently reduced to three years of rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the fine. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts, based on the victim's testimony, medical evidence, and the Chemical Examiner's report, were sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding no infirmity in the evidence or the impugned judgments. The court affirmed that the victim's testimony, corroborated by medical evidence and the Chemical Examiner's report, established the petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in the absence of any motive for false implication or evidence of substitution. Consequently, the court refused leave to appeal, dismissed the petition, and ordered the petitioner to be taken into custody to serve the remainder of his sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a minor victim sufficient to sustain a conviction for sodomy when corroborated by medical evidence and a Chemical Examiner's report?
  • Does the absence of a motive for false implication strengthen the credibility of a victim's testimony in a criminal trial?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Khan vs Muhammad Khan1995 SCMR 746 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-20
  possession suitsettlement schemeconcurrent findingsallotment orderproperty disputeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the possession of a house in Bhai Pheru, originally transferred to the respondent under Settlement Scheme No. VII in 1969. The respondent filed a suit for possession against the petitioner, alleging forceful occupation. The petitioner contested the claim, asserting that the house in his possession was transferred to his father and was distinct from the property claimed by the respondent. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, a decision upheld by the Additional District Judge in appeal and the High Court in revision. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could substantiate his claim that the property in his occupation was different from the property transferred to the respondent. The Supreme Court held that while the respondent produced valid allotment orders and defined boundaries, the petitioner failed to provide evidence demonstrating that the house transferred to his father was the same as the disputed property. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner succeed in a property dispute by claiming the property in his possession is different from the one claimed by the respondent without providing evidence?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when the petitioner fails to substantiate his defense?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs Muhammad Rafiq and 2 others1995 SCMR 1134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-24
  pre-arrest bailfalse implicationleave to appealcriminal investigationarbitration agreementretaliatory F.I.R.
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the High Court confirming the pre-arrest bail of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The petitioner alleged that the respondents committed theft of cloth from his power loom factory. The respondents, however, contended that the case was a retaliatory measure, noting that they had previously obtained a High Court order directing the police to register a complaint against the petitioner just days before the petitioner lodged the F.I.R. against them. The High Court, observing that the respondents had been cooperating with the investigation and that the timing of the F.I.R. suggested a possibility of false implication, confirmed their pre-arrest bail. The petitioner argued that the respondents had admitted guilt and agreed to arbitration, but the Supreme Court found that the arbitration agreement did not constitute an admission of liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the circumstances justified the grant of pre-arrest bail, and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration constitute an admission of guilt in a criminal case?
  • Can the timing of an F.I.R. relative to a prior legal action by the accused against the complainant support a finding of potential false implication?
  • Is the cooperation of an accused with the investigation a relevant factor in confirming pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Army No. 8470067 Muhammad Farrukh Bashir Bhatti vs Engineerinchief, GHQ, Rawalpindi and another1995 SCMR 1000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-20
  leave to appeallimitationservice appealcondonation of delayFederal Service Tribunaladverse ACR entries
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed his service appeal as time-barred. The petitioner contended that after his departmental representation against adverse ACR entries was disposed of, he filed an appeal under the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977, which was later returned as not maintainable. He argued that the time spent pursuing that appeal constituted a valid ground for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before the Service Tribunal under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court found the contentions raised by the petitioner's counsel to require consideration and accordingly granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time spent pursuing an incompetent appeal before an appellate authority constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the pursuit of a mistaken remedy before an appellate authority attract the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwarul Haq vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 13 others1995 SCMR 1505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-30
  seniority disputeservice lawlimitation periodinterpretation of documentsredesignation of postFederal Service Tribunalservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that dismissed the petitioner's service appeal regarding seniority. The petitioner, a redesignated Assistant Executive Engineer, claimed seniority over respondents who were directly appointed, relying on a 1975 government letter. The core legal question concerned the proper interpretation of this letter and whether the petitioner’s seniority claim was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the letter, when read as a whole, established separate seniority frameworks for redesignated officers and existing officers, refuting the petitioner's claim. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the petitioner was aware of his seniority position since the issuance of the letter in 1975. Consequently, the Court ruled that challenging a seniority list after an 18-year delay was impermissible. The Court upheld the principle that an appeal before the Tribunal is incompetent if the underlying departmental appeal is time-barred. The petition was dismissed, affirming that documents must be construed in their entirety and that stale claims regarding seniority cannot be entertained after significant lapses of time.

  Questions settled

  • How should a government notification regarding seniority be interpreted when read as a whole?
  • Is an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal competent if the underlying departmental appeal is time-barred?
  • Can a government employee challenge a seniority list after an inordinate delay of eighteen years?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwar Muhammad vs General Manager, Pakistan Railways, Lahore1995 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-30
  adverse remarksACRFederal Service Tribunalcompetent authorityCountersigning Officerimplied condonation of delayservice appeallimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil service appeal arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's service appeal as time-barred. The appellant challenged adverse remarks recorded in his ACR for the year 1983. Initially, the appellant filed a representation before the Divisional Superintendent, who was the Countersigning Officer, and it was rejected. Years later, the appellant made a representation to the General Manager, Pakistan Railways, which was considered and rejected on the merits rather than on the ground of limitation. When the appellant appealed before the Federal Service Tribunal, the Tribunal dismissed it as hopelessly time-barred. The Supreme Court observed that under Para. 3.39 of 'A Guide to Performance Evaluation', the competent authority was an authority higher than the Countersigning Officer, rendering the initial representation and order void for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that since the competent authority decided the belated representation on the merits without raising an objection to limitation, it impliedly condoned the delay. Consequently, the Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the appeal on limitation and ought to have decided it on the merits. The appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Service Tribunal dismiss a service appeal as time-barred when the competent departmental authority decided the underlying representation on merits without objecting to limitation?
  • Does a departmental competent authority impliedly condone the delay in filing a representation if it decides the representation on merits rather than dismissing it for limitation?
  • Is a departmental representation and the resulting rejection order without jurisdiction if passed by the Countersigning Officer rather than the authority next higher under service rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Anas Muhammad and anothers vs V.C.N.E.D University, Karachi1995 SCMR 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-24
  out-of-court settlementnot presseddisposal of casecompromisecivil petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition involving Anas Muhammad and others against the Vice Chancellor of N.E.D. University, Karachi. The core legal question concerned the resolution of the dispute between the parties. During the proceedings, the learned counsel for the petitioners informed the Court that the matter had been amicably settled and patched up between the parties out of Court. Consequently, the counsel did not press the cases. In light of this out-of-court settlement, the Supreme Court disposed of both cases accordingly without rendering a decision on the merits. The key principle laid down is that where parties reach an amicable out-of-court settlement, the court may dispose of the pending cases as not pressed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition be disposed of by the Supreme Court if the parties reach an amicable out-of-court settlement?
  • What is the effect of a petitioner's counsel stating they do not press the case due to an out-of-court compromise?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad Iqbal vs The State1995 SCMR 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-07
  illegal gratificationcorruptiontainted currency notesconcurrent findingsleave to appealtrap raid
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, regarding the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a Sub-Inspector in the Cooperatives Department. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, based on the recovery of tainted currency notes and the testimony of disinterested witnesses, were sustainable. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the prosecution successfully proved the charge through the testimony of the complainant, the Inspector, and the Magistrate who supervised the raid. The Court held that the petitioner's inconsistent explanations—initially acknowledging receipt of money while claiming it was for a superior, then later denying the recovery entirely—undermined his defense. The key principle affirmed is that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts, supported by credible evidence and the recovery of tainted money, will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal error or perversity.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a corruption case?
  • Does an inconsistent defense statement by an accused undermine the credibility of their testimony?
  • Is the testimony of a Magistrate and an Inspector sufficient to establish the recovery of tainted money in a corruption trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Khan vs Chief Secretary, Government of N.W.F.P. and 21995 SCMR 1856 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-24
  departmental inquirysubstitution of inquiry officercasus omissusconstruction of statutescivil serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging the substitution of an inquiry officer during a departmental inquiry. The petitioner, a Chief Officer, faced allegations of financial irregularities involving missing funds in District Council, Bannu, leading to a departmental inquiry under the N.-W.F.P. Local Councils Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1980. The core legal question was whether an inquiry officer could be lawfully substituted during departmental proceedings when the rules were silent on substitution following the routine transfer of the initial inquiry officer. The Supreme Court held that the absence of a provision explicitly permitting substitution does not imply a legal prohibition, as courts cannot supply missing words or fill legislative gaps under the doctrine of casus omissus. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal, ruling that substitution resulting from a routine transfer is permissible in the absence of an express bar, and declined to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inquiry officer can be substituted in a departmental inquiry when the governing rules are silent on substitution?
  • Can a court supply missing words or fill a gap in a statute or rule under the doctrine of casus omissus?
  • Does the routine transfer of an initial inquiry officer justify the appointment of a substitute inquiry officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Khan and anothers vs Chairman, Medical Research Council1995 SCMR 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-23
  original jurisdictionpublic interest litigationfundamental rightscigarette commercialstelevision advertisementsright to lifehealth hazard
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking a ban on cigarette commercials on television due to the public health hazards associated with smoking. The core legal question was whether the petition met the threshold requirements for the direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) is strictly limited to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights contained in Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution. The Court observed that Article 4(2)(a) does not fall within Chapter I of Part II, Article 25(1) was not impinged by television advertising, and Article 9, even if broadly construed to cover the quality of life, was not violated given the health warnings displayed after commercials. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution restricted strictly to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights in Chapter I of Part II?
  • Can Article 4(2)(a) of the Constitution be directly enforced through an application under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Does the broadcasting of commercial advertisements for cigarettes on television violate Article 9 or Article 25(1) of the Constitution where health warnings are simultaneously displayed?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Yar and 3 others vs Sher Muhammad and 2 others1995 SCMR 749 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-20
  government landauction bidproprietary rightsBoard of Revenuecompetent authorityoral agreementco-sharers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the ownership of government land. The petitioners claimed that despite the government auction of land being awarded solely to respondent Sher Muhammad, there existed a prior oral agreement for joint ownership and possession. They sought to enforce this arrangement, relying on a 1980 Collector's order that purportedly recognized their co-share status. The core legal question was whether an oral agreement between private parties regarding government land, made prior to an auction, could override the official auction record and bind the government without the sanction of the competent authority. The Supreme Court held that the Collector lacked the authority to alter the auction terms approved by the Board of Revenue. The Court ruled that such private arrangements are not binding on the government unless formally incorporated into the auction bid and approved by the competent authority. Consequently, the Court affirmed that possession and private agreements cannot confer proprietary rights in government land without proper sanction, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an oral agreement between private parties regarding government land bind the government if it was not part of the original auction bid?
  • Does a Collector have the authority to alter the terms of a government land auction approved by the Board of Revenue?
  • Can possession of government land create proprietary rights in the absence of sanction from the competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha vs The State and 2 others1995 SCMR 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-09
  post-arrest bailmurder casecancellation of bailgrave and sudden provocationexculpatory statementsinvestigation findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant, Allah Rakha, challenging a Lahore High Court order that granted bail to respondents Muhammad Hassan and Muhammad Iqbal in a murder case. The deceased, Ibrahim, was allegedly murdered due to an illicit liaison. The High Court granted bail to Muhammad Hassan, noting he lacked a motive, the investigation suggested the incident occurred under grave and sudden provocation at a different location, and co-accused provided exculpatory statements exonerating him. Bail for Muhammad Iqbal was granted based on a finding of innocence during the police investigation. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that Muhammad Hassan was named in the F.I.R. with a specific role, thus disentitling him to bail. However, the petitioner could not refute the High Court's findings, and the State did not support the cancellation of bail. Given that the trial was imminent and scheduled for a specific date, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's discretion at this stage and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's grant of bail when the trial is imminent and the State does not support cancellation?
  • Does the presence of a specific role in an F.I.R. automatically disentitle an accused to bail if investigation findings suggest otherwise?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Diwaya alias Allah Ditta vs The State1995 SCMR 917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-16
  free-fightculpable homicidereduction of sentenceleave to appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Allah Diwaya alias Allah Ditta against the judgment of the High Court, which had altered his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 304, Part I, and reduced his sentence of death to imprisonment for life for causing the death of a deceased person during a free-fight. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded by the High Court was excessive under the circumstances of a non-pre-planned free-fight. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the substantive sentence was indeed excessive given that the incident was a free-fight precipitated by the complainant party. Consequently, the Court reduced the petitioner's substantive sentence to rigorous imprisonment for ten years while maintaining the fine and granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that in cases of sudden free-fights without premeditation, the sentence for culpable homicide not amounting to murder should be adjusted commensurately.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sentence of imprisonment for life is excessive in a case of culpable homicide arising out of a sudden free-fight?
  • Can the Supreme Court reduce a substantive criminal sentence upon converting a petition for leave into an appeal?
  • Is a convict entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 upon reduction of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta and 2 others vs Daulat Bibi and 3 others1995 SCMR 979 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  leave to appealpermanent injunctionproperty descriptionburden of proofrevision application
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners seek leave to appeal against the dismissal of their revision application by the High Court, which had upheld the decree passed in favor of the respondents in a suit for permanent injunction. The respondents filed the suit claiming ownership and possession of a house without providing Khasra numbers in the plaint, alleging long-term possession, damage during floods, subsequent repair, and interference by the petitioners. After fluctuating decisions by the trial and appellate courts, the suit was ultimately decreed in favor of the respondents, and the revision was dismissed. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency of property description in the plaint and the burden of proof regarding ownership. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the petitioners' contentions regarding the lack of specific property particulars and discrepancies in evidence warrant further examination. The key principle laid down is that a party claiming ownership must sufficiently identify the property and substantiate its claim through consistent evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff claiming ownership and permanent injunction must provide specific particulars such as Khasra numbers in the plaint?
  • Does a discrepancy between the description of property given in the plaint and the evidence produced vitiate the suit?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when concurrent findings of lower courts involve substantial questions regarding property identification?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dad and anothers vs The State1995 SCMR 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-26
  criminal appealmurderdeath sentencereappraisal of evidenceidentification of accusedsentence mitigationconcurrent sentences
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and sentencing of the appellants for murder and murderous assault. The appellants were originally convicted by the trial court under Sections 302, 307, and 449 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with death sentences imposed on the appellants. The Lahore High Court maintained the convictions but altered the death sentence of one appellant to life imprisonment. Before the Supreme Court, the appellants challenged the identification of the accused, arguing that the occurrence took place at night. The Supreme Court held that the eyewitnesses were natural, being inmates of the house, and that the appellants were known to them. Finding no misreading of evidence by the lower courts, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the convictions. However, regarding the sentencing, the Court held that because the evidence did not conclusively establish which specific appellant fired the fatal shot, the death sentence was inappropriate. Consequently, the Court substituted the death sentence with imprisonment for life, while maintaining other sentences and granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court required to perform a fresh reappraisal of evidence when two lower courts have already concurrently found the accused guilty?
  • Can a death sentence be maintained when the evidence fails to conclusively establish which of the co-accused fired the fatal shot?
  • Are eyewitnesses who are inmates of the house where the crime occurred considered natural witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Murad vs Ayub and another1995 SCMR 1105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-20
  leave to appealacquittalocular testimonydying declarationappreciation of evidencemurder referencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against an order of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted respondent No. 1 of the charge of murder. The respondent had been convicted by the trial court for the murder of the petitioner's father, Ali Baig, based on ocular testimony, a dying declaration, medical evidence, and forensic reports regarding a recovered firearm. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the High Court erred in setting aside the conviction and acquitting the respondent based on assumptions regarding the deceased's physical capacity to speak after receiving the injury, despite the presence of direct, corroborated evidence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the contentions raised regarding the misappreciation of evidence by the High Court warranted further examination. The Court held that the case requires a full review of whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the prosecution's evidence, which included eyewitness accounts and forensic support, based on mere assumptions. Consequently, the Court issued bailable warrants for the respondent's arrest to ensure his presence during the appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court set aside a conviction based on assumptions regarding the physical capacity of a deceased person to speak after receiving a fatal injury?
  • Is the High Court justified in rejecting direct, corroborated ocular evidence in a murder case without sufficient grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad vs Mst. Murad Bibi1995 SCMR 773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-07
  specific performanceright to cross-examinedue processremand of caseprocedural irregularitytrial court procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld an appellate decision setting aside a trial court's judgment and decree in a suit for specific performance. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted lawfully when it closed the respondent's right to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses and proceeded to pass a final decree on the same day, without affording the respondent an opportunity to produce evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the trial court's actions were procedurally flawed and unsustainable. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to remand the case for a fresh trial, emphasizing that a court cannot bypass fundamental procedural requirements of due process. The key principle laid down is that a trial court acts in excess of its authority and prejudices a party's rights when it closes the right to cross-examine and immediately renders a final judgment without allowing the opposing party to present their evidence, thereby necessitating a remand to ensure a trial conducted in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court pass a final decree on the same day it closes a party's right to cross-examine without allowing that party to produce evidence?
  • Is a judgment and decree passed in haste, without following the procedure laid down by law, liable to be set aside and remanded for a fresh trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad vs Commissioner Afghan Refugees, N.W.F.P. and another1995 SCMR 1675 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-07
  dismissal in liminecivil servicetemporary employeepensionary benefitstermination of servicefirst appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, who had served for over ten years in the office of the Commissioner Afghan Refugees, N.W.F.P., challenged the Federal Service Tribunal's dismissal of his appeal in limine. The appellant's services had been summarily terminated on the ground that they were no longer required, despite his long service and a prior departmental inquiry that had exonerated him. The core legal questions were whether the Service Tribunal could dismiss a first appeal in limine when disputed questions of fact and law were involved, and whether an employee with over ten years of service could be summarily terminated as a temporary employee without pensionary benefits. The Supreme Court held that while Rule 11 of the Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1974 permits dismissal in limine, this power should not be exercised where disputed questions of fact and law require the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of documents. The Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case for a regular hearing on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can the Federal Service Tribunal dismiss an appeal in limine under Rule 11 of the Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1974?
  • Is dismissal in limine appropriate when a first appeal involves disputed questions of fact and law requiring the appreciation of evidence?
  • Can an employee who has served for more than ten years be summarily terminated as a temporary employee without determining their entitlement to pensionary benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Ahmad vs Director (Admn.) FIA, and others1995 SCMR 986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-15
  service lawpro forma promotionsenioritylimitation perioddepartmental promotionmandatory training course
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding seniority and pro forma promotion. The petitioner, a Head Constable in the Federal Investigation Agency, challenged the denial of his request for seniority restoration and pro forma promotion to the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector (A.S.I.) from the date his juniors were promoted, following the withdrawal of a prior reversion order. The core legal questions were whether the appeal was barred by limitation due to an amendment and whether the petitioner was entitled to pro forma promotion despite not having completed the mandatory training course. The Supreme Court held that while the Tribunal erred in its computation of limitation—as the limitation period should be calculated from the date of the original appeal filing rather than the amendment—the petition failed on merits. The Court affirmed that pro forma promotion could not be granted retrospectively because the petitioner had not successfully completed the required Intermediate Training Course until December 1990, thereby establishing that promotion eligibility is contingent upon fulfilling mandatory service qualifications.

  Questions settled

  • Is the limitation period for an amended appeal computed from the date of the original appeal filing?
  • Can a civil servant claim pro forma promotion prior to completing mandatory training requirements?
  • Does the withdrawal of a reversion order automatically entitle a civil servant to retrospective seniority and promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Ahmad and others vs Municipal Committee, Talagang and others1995 SCMR 1523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-31
  evacuee propertyland use restrictionsRafah-e-Aambuilding plancivil suitstatus quoleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their civil suits and subsequent revision petitions by the Lahore High Court concerning a plot of land originally allotted as evacuee property and later purchased by them. The petitioners obtained a building plan sanction, which was recalled by the Municipal Committee following objections from local residents, leading to concurrent findings against the petitioners by the trial court, district court, and the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court involved examining the nature of the petitioners' ownership rights against the restrictions imposed by the Revenue Department limiting the land use to 'Rafah-e-Aam' (public welfare). Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the delay in filing the petitions ought to be condoned and that the matter warranted a thorough examination of the extent to which such revenue conditions restrict an absolute owner's rights, while directing status quo to be maintained pending the final disposal of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does permanent settlement of evacuee property vest absolute ownership in the transferee free from revenue restrictions?
  • Can a municipal committee recall a sanctioned building plan based on objections from local residents?
  • To what extent can a revenue department condition restrict the rights of an absolute owner of land?
  Read full judgment →
• Aleem Jaffar vs WAPDA through its Chairman,WAPDA House, Lahore and 21995 PLC (C.S.) 651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  WAPDA employeedismissal from serviceSection 17(1-A) WAPDA Actdouble jeopardyleave to appealservice lawreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the petitioner's dismissal from service by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The petitioner, an ex-Line Superintendent, was initially dismissed following a criminal conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Although the petitioner was reinstated following his acquittal by the High Court, WAPDA subsequently removed him from service again, invoking Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. The petitioner challenged this second removal, arguing that it constituted double jeopardy and violated established legal principles regarding the exercise of powers under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. The Supreme Court observed that the contentions raised by the petitioner regarding the legality of the second dismissal, particularly in light of previous judicial precedents, required deeper examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the authority could invoke Section 17(1-A) to remove an employee after they had already been exonerated of the charges that formed the initial basis for their dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Water and Power Development Authority invoke Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act to dismiss an employee after they have been acquitted of the criminal charges that led to their initial removal?
  • Does the removal of an employee under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act after a previous exoneration constitute double jeopardy?
  Read full judgment →
• Aleem Jaffar vs WAPDA through Chairman and 2 others1995 SCMR 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  leave to appealdismissal from serviceWAPDA employeedouble jeopardyacquittalservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Aleem Jaffar, an Ex-Line Superintendent in WAPDA, challenging the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which upheld his dismissal from service under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. The petitioner was initially convicted under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, leading to his dismissal. After protracted litigation through the Labour Court, High Court, and Federal Service Tribunal—during which his conviction was set aside and he was acquitted—he was reinstated. Subsequently, WAPDA suspended and removed him anew under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. The core legal question concerns whether the employer can invoke Section 17(1-A) to remove an employee after their conviction is set aside and they are reinstated. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether this action constitutes double jeopardy in light of established precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Can WAPDA invoke Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act to remove an employee after their initial conviction and dismissal have been set aside and they have been acquitted?
  • Does the removal of an employee under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act after they have been exonerated amount to double jeopardy?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam Ali Syed vs United Bank Ltd., Lahore and another1995 SCMR 936 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08
  Banking Tribunalex parte decreerestoration of applicationlimitation periodleave to appealrecovery of loan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court dismissing an appeal filed under the Banking Tribunal Ordinance, 1984. The respondent bank had obtained a decree against the petitioner for the recovery of a loan. The petitioner subsequently filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree, alleging lack of service. This application was dismissed in default due to the petitioner's non-appearance on the date of hearing. A subsequent application for restoration of the initial application was also rejected by the Banking Tribunal. The High Court affirmed this dismissal, noting that the original application to set aside the ex parte decree was time-barred and that no sufficient cause was shown for the restoration of the application. The Supreme Court examined the proceedings and found no legal infirmity in the High Court's decision. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficient grounds for restoration or to overcome the limitation issue, and thus refused to grant leave to appeal, upholding the lower court's dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application for restoration of an application to set aside an ex parte decree be granted if the original application was filed beyond the period of limitation?
  • Is an appellate court justified in dismissing an appeal against the refusal to restore an application where no sufficient cause for non-appearance is established?
  Read full judgment →
• Akram and others vs Khushi Muhammad and others1995 SCMR 982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-07
  specific performanceregistered agreement of saleconcurrent findings of factcontractual obligationminors' interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. The core legal question was whether the agreement of sale, which was registered and involved payment of consideration, was enforceable against the vendors and subsequent purchasers (the petitioners). The trial court, the first appellate court, and the High Court concurrently found that the vendors had validly agreed to sell the land to the plaintiffs, that a significant portion of the consideration was paid before the Registering Officer, and that the plaintiffs remained ready and willing to perform their obligations. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of the agreement and the plaintiffs' readiness to perform were well-founded. The Court further rejected arguments regarding the minority of some plaintiffs, noting that the transaction was entered into for the benefit of all parties and that the interest of minors had been adequately protected. The judgment affirms the sanctity of registered sale agreements and the finality of concurrent findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the validity of a sale agreement binding on the Supreme Court?
  • Can a registered agreement of sale be enforced against subsequent purchasers who bought the land during the pendency of a specific performance suit?
  • Does a contract entered into by an adult on behalf of minors for their benefit remain valid and enforceable?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Hussain Jan vs Government of Pakistan and 3 others1995 SCMR 1554 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-30
  Kashmiri migrantPakistan citizenshipJammu and Kashmirdeportation orderconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's writ petition against an order directing him to leave Pakistan. The core legal question is whether the appellant, a subject of the State of Jammu and Kashmir who migrated to Pakistan in 1971, qualifies for citizenship under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951. The Supreme Court held that the appellant fulfilled all the requirements of having migrated from Jammu and Kashmir with the intention of residing in Pakistan as contemplated by the law. The Court established that upon satisfying the factual criteria under Section 14-B, a Kashmiri migrant automatically attains the status of a citizen of Pakistan, thereby setting aside the deportation order and allowing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subject of the State of Jammu and Kashmir who migrated to Pakistan is entitled to citizenship under Section 14-B of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951?
  • Does continuous residence, marriage, and business establishment in Pakistan suffice to prove the intention of residing in Pakistan under Section 14-B?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Ali vs Mansoorul Haq and others1995 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-15
  personal requirementejectmentlandlord and tenantrent controllerbona fide requirementleave to appealcommercial property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that reversed a Rent Controller’s order and granted an ejectment decree against a tenant based on the landlord’s personal requirement. The core legal question was whether a landlord’s plea for personal requirement is defeated by the fact that other properties were previously let out, and whether the landlord must prove financial capacity or specific business plans to establish such a requirement. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court’s decision. The Court held that the selection of premises is the landlord’s prerogative, and the mere fact that other shops were let out previously does not negate the plea of personal requirement. Furthermore, the Court established that a landlord is not required to prove the nature of the business, financial readiness, or the possession of licenses to succeed in an ejectment application. The Court emphasized that prior letting of other properties does not prejudice a current, bona fide claim for personal use.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's previous act of letting out other properties negate a current claim for personal requirement?
  • Is a landlord required to prove financial capacity or the possession of a business license to establish a bona fide personal requirement for a rented shop?
  • Does the retirement of a landlord on medical grounds automatically disqualify them from establishing a personal requirement to start a business?
  • Is the selection of specific premises for personal business a matter of choice for the landlord?
  Read full judgment →
• Ajab Shafi vs The State and another1995 SCMR 1172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-17
  leave to appealmurderocular evidenceinterested witnessesabscondencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Ajab Shafi against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed his criminal appeal and upheld his conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the uncorroborated testimony of interested eyewitnesses, coupled with the petitioner's prolonged abscondence and an existing land dispute motive, was sufficient to sustain a murder conviction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on a proper appreciation of evidence, noting that close relatives would not easily substitute an innocent person for the real culprit in a broad daylight occurrence, and that the petitioner's unexplained abscondence for nearly three years provided strong corroboration of his guilt. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the principle that ocular testimony found credible and corroborated by subsequent flight is sufficient to maintain a criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of interested eyewitnesses is sufficient to warrant a conviction for murder?
  • Does prolonged abscondence of an accused provide substantial corroboration to the ocular account?
  • Can a prior land dispute between parties serve as a valid motive for sustaining a criminal conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahsan Guftar vs The State1995 SCMR 837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-09
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailfurther inquirymedical evidenceseminal stains
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court dated 31-5-1994, whereby bail previously granted to the petitioner by an Additional Sessions Judge was cancelled. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail where the FIR alleged compromising circumstances and subsequent medical evidence detected semen on vaginal swabs of the deceased. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that no interference was warranted against the High Court's order cancelling bail, as the detection of semen corroborated the allegations in the FIR and connected the petitioner to the crime, precluding a case for further inquiry at this stage. The key principle laid down is that where medical evidence corroborates the ocular account regarding illicit relations and sexual activity leading to an offence, bail granted by ignoring such material evidence is rightly cancelled.

  Questions settled

  • Whether detection of semen on vaginal swabs is sufficient to connect an accused with Zina when corroborated by FIR allegations?
  • Can bail granted by ignoring material evidence such as a Chemical Examiner's report be maintained?
  • When does a case qualify for further inquiry regarding the tentative assessment of evidence at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Mumtaz and 10 others vs Settlement Commissioner(L) and 51995 SCMR 984 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04
  agricultural land allotmentsettlement commissionerconstitutional jurisdictionarithmetical calculationleave to appealexcess land
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an order by the Chief Settlement Commissioner cancelling the allotment of agricultural land to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Faiz Muhammad, due to an excess of 2919 P.I. Units. The excess land was subsequently allotted to respondents as informers. The petitioners contended that the department had committed errors in the arithmetical calculation of the land entitlement. The Supreme Court reviewed the matter and determined that the High Court had thoroughly examined the calculation aspect in the impugned judgment. The Supreme Court held that arithmetical calculations regarding land entitlement cannot be re-adjudicated through the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal. However, the Court clarified that the petitioners remained at liberty to approach the relevant department to point out any specific arithmetical mistakes in the calculation, provided that such representations do not challenge the merits of the case, such as the classification or type of land originally allotted.

  Questions settled

  • Can arithmetical calculations regarding land entitlement be challenged through the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is it permissible to challenge the merits of a land allotment decision under the guise of correcting arithmetical errors?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Din vs Habib Bank Ltd. and 2 others1995 SCMR 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04
  banking tribunalrecovery suitconditional leave to appealdeposit of decretal amountexecution of decreecivil petition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions arise from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan dismissing appeals against recovery decrees passed by the Banking Tribunal in favour of the respondent bank. The petitioner failed to deposit the decretal amount as ordered by the High Court as a precondition for admitting the appeals, leading to the dismissal of those appeals. Subsequently, the respondent bank initiated execution proceedings and warrants of arrest were issued against the judgment-debtors. The High Court dismissed the subsequent petitions, holding that since the decrees had attained finality, no objections could be raised against their execution based on grounds already decided in the appeals. The Supreme Court of Pakistan found no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court and accordingly refused leave to appeal, holding that a final decree cannot be challenged in execution proceedings on matters already settled.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against a Banking Tribunal decree can be dismissed for failure to deposit the decretal amount as ordered by the High Court?
  • Can objections be raised in execution proceedings against a decree that has attained finality on grounds already decided in appeals?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the concurrent findings of the High Court and the Banking Tribunal regarding recovery suits?
  Read full judgment →
• Adil Khan vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1995 SCMR 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-26
  pre-emptioncourt-fee deficiencylimitationrevision petitionwrit jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the Board of Revenue's decision dismissing the petitioner's revision petition as time-barred by 17 days. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had originally pre-empted the sale of agricultural land, which was eventually decreed subject to making up a deficiency in court-fee. After protracted litigation involving remand orders and writ petitions concerning limitation and court-fee deficiencies, the High Court dismissed the petitioner's challenge against the Board of Revenue's decision on limitation. The core legal question concerns whether a revision petition held to be barred by limitation can be maintained when the initial rejection order was allegedly void and whether delay stands condoned if argued on merits without initial objection. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions regarding the void nature of the initial order, implied condonation of delay, and the raising of limitation objections for the first time in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order rejecting a suit for deficient court-fee is void and can be assailed without the bar of limitation?
  • Does a decision on a revision petition on merits without objection regarding limitation amount to implied condonation of delay?
  • Can a party raise the plea of limitation for the first time in writ jurisdiction after succeeding on merits before lower tribunals?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Masood and others vs Dilshad Khan1995 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-03
  ejectment petitionpersonal needbona fide requirementlandlord-tenant disputeleave to appealburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment matter involving a commercial property in Rawalpindi. The petitioners, successors-in-interest to the original landlord, sought the eviction of the respondent tenant on grounds of rent default, unauthorized subletting, and personal need for the premises. While the Rent Controller dismissed the petition on all counts, the Additional District Judge, on appeal, reversed the decision regarding personal need and ordered eviction. Following multiple rounds of litigation and remands, the Lahore High Court ultimately set aside the appellate order and dismissed the ejectment petition. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that personal need was established by the evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners failed to provide the necessary evidence on record for review. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioners owned numerous other shops, some of which became vacant during the proceedings, yet the petitioners failed to demonstrate why those premises were unsuitable for their needs. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioners failed to prove bona fide personal need and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's failure to provide evidence of personal need for a specific premises, despite owning other vacant properties, justify the dismissal of an ejectment petition?
  • Is a finding of bona fide personal need for a commercial property sustainable when the landlord fails to explain why other vacant properties in their possession are unsuitable?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Hussain and others vs Aziz Fatima and others1995 PLD Supreme Court 399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-29
  revisional jurisdictionlimitation periodjudicial discretioncivil procedurelachescontumacious conductright of revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a civil suit decree challenged by the petitioners through an appeal and subsequently a revision petition before the Lahore High Court. The revision petition was refiled after a significant delay of nearly two years following the removal of objections. The High Court dismissed the revision as time-barred, citing the petitioners' failure to provide a plausible explanation for the delay. The core legal question was whether the High Court is obligated to entertain a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, given that no specific limitation period is prescribed, and whether such revision constitutes an absolute right. The Supreme Court held that while the right to invoke revisional jurisdiction is not merely a privilege, the exercise of such jurisdiction remains discretionary. The Court affirmed that the High Court may decline relief where the petitioner’s conduct is contumacious or where there is undue delay without reasonable cause. The principle established is that while no statutory limitation period exists for revisions, the court may properly exercise its discretion to dismiss petitions filed after undue delay, particularly when the petitioner fails to justify the lapse.

  Questions settled

  • Is the filing of a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 a matter of right or a privilege?
  • Can the High Court refuse to exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to undue delay?
  • Does the absence of a prescribed limitation period for filing a revision petition preclude the High Court from dismissing a petition on the grounds of laches?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman vs Tanveer Hussain and 4 others1995 SCMR 1118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-14
  bail cancellationmurder caseocular evidencemedical evidencecriminal petitionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for the cancellation of bail granted by the Lahore High Court to four respondents accused of murder and causing injuries. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting bail to the respondents despite the presence of ocular and medical evidence implicating them in the crime. The Supreme Court partially allowed the petition. It upheld the bail for respondents Tanveer Hussain and Khadim Hussain, noting that Tanveer caused no injury and Khadim’s weapon, a rifle, did not match the injuries sustained by the victims. However, the Court cancelled the bail for respondents Ghulam Hussain and Muhammad Yousaf, finding that the High Court had erroneously concluded that the victims did not sustain fire-arm injuries, thereby ignoring the prima facie evidence of their involvement. The Court affirmed that bail may be cancelled where the High Court’s order is based on a misreading of the medical evidence or a failure to appreciate the specific role and weapon attributed to an accused in the First Information Report.

  Questions settled

  • Does the finding of innocence by the police during investigation constitute absolute grounds for the grant of bail?
  • Can bail be cancelled if the High Court misreads medical evidence regarding the nature of injuries sustained by the victims?
  • Is bail appropriate for an accused when the medical evidence contradicts the weapon attributed to them in the First Information Report?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman vs Khaliq Dad1995 SCMR 755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-09
  mutationsale of landpassing of considerationdelivery of possessionmisreading of evidencedeclaration suitburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arises out of a suit for declaration filed by the respondent challenging a mutation of sale of land on the ground of fraud, collusion, and lack of consideration. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding the sale transaction genuine, but the first appellate court and the High Court reversed this decision and decreed the suit, doubting the passing of consideration and delivery of possession. The core legal question was whether the first appellate and High Courts were justified in reversing the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the first appellate court and restoring the trial court's dismissal of the suit. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate forums misread and non-read the evidence, particularly ignoring bank testimony proving the payment of consideration and the plaintiff's admitted thumb-impression on the mutation, and reiterated that delivery of possession is not legally essential for a sale transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the first appellate Court was justified in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court?
  • Whether the learned Judge in Chambers had rightly declined to interfere with the appellate judgment and decree?
  • Is delivery of possession legally essential for a transaction of sale under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Razzaq and anothers vs Nawabzada Col. (Retd.) Muhammad1995 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-27
  revenue recordShamilat Dehgift mutationBanjar Qadeemsuit for declarationpossessionlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a property dispute concerning the ownership and possession of land measuring 7 Kanals 1 Marla. The respondent filed a suit for declaration, challenging a gift mutation as collusive and fraudulent, asserting that the land was Shamilat Deh and historically in the possession of his predecessor-in-interest. While the trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, the District Judge reversed this decision, citing the suit as time-barred. The Peshawar High Court subsequently restored the trial court's decree. The Supreme Court examined the revenue records, noting that the land was consistently recorded as Shamilat Deh and in the respondent's possession until an unexplained entry in 1970-71 introduced the petitioner's name. The Court held that the High Court correctly restored the trial court's judgment, finding no justification for the sudden alteration in long-standing revenue entries. The principle established is that unexplained, abrupt changes in revenue records regarding possession, particularly for 'Banjar Qadeem' land, cannot form a valid basis for title or gift mutations when they contradict decades of consistent historical record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sudden, unexplained entry in revenue records regarding possession of 'Banjar Qadeem' land serve as a valid basis for a gift mutation?
  • Does a long-standing historical entry in revenue records prevail over a recent, unsubstantiated entry in a dispute over land ownership?
  • Is a suit for declaration challenging a fraudulent mutation barred by time when the underlying revenue entries were altered without justifiable grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rauf vs The State and another1995 SCMR 833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08
  leave to appealcompounding of offencealteration of chargelegal heirscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question presented for consideration was whether the trial court could lawfully alter the charge against the respondents from an offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to one under Section 308 of the same Code. This alteration was proposed in the context where certain legal heirs of the deceased had expressed their willingness to compound the offence. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the legal propriety of such a charge alteration in light of the compounding of the offence by some, but not necessarily all, of the heirs of the deceased. The judgment focuses on the procedural and substantive implications of compounding offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when multiple heirs are involved, specifically addressing the authority of the court to modify charges based on partial settlements between the parties involved in the criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a charge under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 308 when some heirs of the deceased have agreed to compound the offence?
  • Does the compounding of an offence by some heirs of the deceased justify an alteration of the charge against the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid vs Riazuddin and others1995 SCMR 999 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-10
  public appointmentpolitical recommendationvoid ab initiogovernment servicerecruitment quotaillegal appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal challenging a judgment by a Judge in Chamber, which declared the appointment of the petitioner as a Chowkidar in a Government Primary School to be void ab initio and illegal. The petitioner had been appointed to the post in 1988 based on the recommendation of an M.P.A., following the termination of the respondent, who had previously served as a part-time Bhishti-cum-Chowkidar. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was the validity of government appointments made solely through the recommendations or quotas of political figures such as Ministers, MNAs, or MPAs. Relying on the precedent established in Munawar Khan v. Niaz Muhammad and others (1993 SCMR 1287), the Court held that the allocation of appointment quotas to political representatives and any appointments made pursuant to such recommendations are illegal and void ab initio. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision to invalidate the petitioner's appointment, emphasizing that such practices violate the principles of fair and lawful recruitment into public service.

  Questions settled

  • Are appointments to government posts made on the recommendation of an M.P.A. valid?
  • Does the allocation of appointment quotas to Ministers, MNAs, or MPAs render resulting appointments illegal?
  • Is an appointment made through political recommendation considered void ab initio?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wahid vs The State and others1995 SCMR 1174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-30
  murderretrialacquittalrevisional jurisdictiontestimony of witnessesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court directing a retrial of the petitioner, who had initially been acquitted by the trial court on a charge of murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's acquittal and ordering a retrial based on the testimony of prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the trial court's reasons for rejecting the testimony of the natural witnesses were unsustainable and legally flawed. The ratio of the decision is that where a trial court's assessment of evidence is demonstrably unsustainable, an appellate or revisional court is empowered to interfere with an acquittal order to ensure the ends of justice. The key principle laid down is that the findings of a trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are subject to judicial review, and if such findings are based on unsustainable reasoning, the order of acquittal can be set aside in favor of a retrial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court order a retrial if the trial court's reasons for rejecting witness testimony are found to be unsustainable?
  • Is an order of acquittal by a trial court immune to interference in revision if the evidence assessment is flawed?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Waheed vs The State1995 SCMR 1498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-18
  Zina-bil-Jabrcorroborationaccomplice evidencedishonest witnesscriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 by the trial court, which was subsequently upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The appellant had been tried for abduction, Zina-bil-Jabr, and theft, but was acquitted of abduction and theft after the trial court concluded that the prosecutrix had accompanied him and submitted to his lust voluntarily. The core legal question was whether a conviction for Zina could be sustained on the solitary statement of the prosecutrix who was found to be an accomplice and a basically dishonest witness, without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence, holding that since the prosecutrix was judicially found to be a participant and her allegations regarding abduction and Zina-bil-Jabr were false, she was a basically dishonest witness upon whose solitary testimony no implicit reliance could be placed without independent and reliable corroboratory evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 be recorded on the solitary statement of a prosecutrix found to be an accomplice without independent corroboration?
  • Whether a witness whose statement regarding abduction and Zina-bil-Jabr has been found false can be considered a basically dishonest witness requiring independent reliable evidence for any conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman vs Inspectorgeneral of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 21995 PLD Supreme Court 546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-08
  Punjab Service Tribunalconstitution of bencheslimitation periodrevisional orderdepartmental appealPolice Rules 1934beneficial constructiontime-barred appealdismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a former Head Constable dismissed for alleged misconduct, challenged an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dismissing his appeal as time-barred. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine two main legal issues: first, whether a single member or Chairman of the Service Tribunal could validly dismiss an appeal; and second, whether limitation should be calculated from the date of the appellate order or the revisional order. Examining Sections 3, 3-A, and 2(g) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, the Supreme Court held that a Bench constituted under Section 3-A consisting of the Chairman alone or one Member is deemed to be a Tribunal competent to pass orders. Addressing the limitation issue, the Court applied a beneficial construction to Section 4(1)(a) of the Act, holding that the term 'appeal' includes 'revision' where such a remedy is explicitly provided by the applicable rules (such as the Police Rules, 1934). Consequently, the limitation period commenced from the dismissal of the revision petition, rendering the appeal timely. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the Tribunal for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chairman alone or a single Member of the Punjab Service Tribunal constitute a valid Bench competent to hear and decide an appeal?
  • Whether the word 'appeal' in proviso (a) to Section 4(1) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 can be interpreted to include a 'revision' provided under applicable service rules?
  • From which date is the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal to be computed when a departmental revision is prescribed and filed under the relevant rules?
  • Can statutory provisions governing limitation be given a beneficial construction to advance the remedy of appeal for an aggrieved party?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman vs Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 21995 PLC (C.S.) 1191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-08
  service tribunallimitation perioddepartmental revisionbeneficial constructionservice appealbench constitutionpolice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a former Head Constable, challenged the dismissal of his service appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had deemed the appeal time-barred. The core legal questions were whether a single member of the Service Tribunal was competent to dismiss an appeal, and whether the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Tribunal should be computed from the date of the appellate order or the date of the revisional order. The Supreme Court held that under Section 3-A of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, a Bench consisting of a single member is deemed a Tribunal and is competent to decide cases. Regarding limitation, the Court applied a beneficial construction to Section 4(1)(a) of the Act, ruling that the term 'appeal' therein should be interpreted to include 'revision' where such a remedy is provided by applicable rules, such as the Police Rules, 1934. Consequently, the limitation period commences from the disposal of the revision application. The appeal was allowed, and the case remanded for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is a single member of the Punjab Service Tribunal competent to dismiss an appeal?
  • Does the term 'appeal' in Section 4(1)(a) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 include a 'revision' petition provided under the Police Rules, 1934?
  • From which date should the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal be computed when a revision application has been filed?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Razzaic and others vs Muhammad Aslam and others1995 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-14
  evictionbona fide personal uselandlord-tenant disputeconcurrent findings of factvacant possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as four eviction applications filed by a landlord against tenants occupying four separate shops, citing grounds of default and bona fide personal use. While the allegation of default was rejected by the lower courts, the eviction applications were granted based on the landlord's established requirement for personal use, specifically to conduct a business involving iron bars and cement. The High Court affirmed these concurrent findings of fact, noting that the individual shops were too small to accommodate the business requirements, necessitating the use of multiple units for storage and office space. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan reviewed the findings and determined that there was no misreading of evidence by the lower courts. Consequently, the Court upheld the eviction orders, dismissing the appeals. The Court affirmed the principle that concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide personal requirement of a landlord, supported by evidence, are generally not disturbed in appellate proceedings. By consent of the parties, the Court granted the appellants a period of six months to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's personal requirement be disturbed in appellate proceedings?
  • Is a landlord entitled to multiple premises for a single business if the individual units are insufficient in size?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rauf Ghauri vs Mrs. Kishwar Sultana and 4 others1995 SCMR 925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-29
  summary suitleave to defendbank guaranteesolvent securitydishonoured chequetriable issuesconditional leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a summary suit instituted under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by the respondents for the recovery of Rs. 19 lakhs based on a dishonoured cheque. The trial court granted the appellant leave to defend the suit on the condition of furnishing a bank guarantee equal to the claimed amount, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court in revision. The appellant contended that because he had raised plausible defences and triable issues based on a conditional agreement, he was entitled to unconditional leave, or at least to a condition of solvent security rather than a bank guarantee. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, setting aside the condition of a bank guarantee and substituting it with a condition to furnish solvent security. The Court reiterated the established principle that where a defendant discloses facts constituting a plausible defence or raising substantial questions of fact or law, they are entitled to leave; even if the defence is vague or doubtful, the defendant should be put on terms to furnish security or deposit the amount, rather than being subjected to an onerous condition like a bank guarantee which practically denies the leave.

  Questions settled

  • What is the appropriate standard for granting leave to defend in a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court impose the condition of furnishing a bank guarantee for granting leave to defend when the defendant has raised a plausible defence?
  • Whether a defendant whose defence is vague or unsatisfactory should be denied leave to defend altogether or put on terms such as furnishing solvent security?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rasheed vs Muhammad Ashraf and others1995 SCMR 1180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-15
  post-arrest bailabductionOffence of Zinabail cancellationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondent, who was accused alongside co-accused of abducting a woman under sections 10 and 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting bail where the alleged abductee stated she was not subjected to rape and no eye-witnesses to the commission of Zina existed. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that no grounds for interference were made out, noting that the Additional Advocate-General was unable to oppose the bail application in light of the victim's statement in the Civil Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that bail is appropriately granted when the primary allegation of Zina is unsupported by the victim's statement or direct eyewitness testimony at the preliminary stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when the alleged abductee states she was not subjected to rape?
  • Does the absence of eye-witnesses to the commission of Zina justify the grant of bail to an accused?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rahman vs Ghulam Muhammad through Legal Heirs and another1995 SCMR 988 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-29
  pre-emptionwaiverright of pre-emptionappellate interferencemisreading of evidencesecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the petitioner challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that had reversed an appellate court's finding regarding the waiver of the right of pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the pre-emptor had waived his right of pre-emption by declining to purchase the land when offered, and whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the appellate court's factual findings on this issue. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, which had restored the trial court's decree in favor of the pre-emptor. The Court held that the appellate court's judgment was based on a strained interpretation of evidence, whereas the trial court had correctly identified that the defendant's evidence regarding the waiver was self-contradictory and unimpressive. The key principle affirmed is that an appellate court's findings of fact may be set aside in second appeal if they are based on a misreading or non-reading of evidence, or if the evidence relied upon is inherently contradictory and fails to establish the asserted fact of waiver.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court's finding on the issue of waiver be set aside in second appeal if the evidence relied upon is self-contradictory?
  • Does a pre-emptor waive their right of pre-emption if they decline to purchase land due to a lack of funds?
  • Is the High Court justified in reversing an appellate court's finding if the appellate court laboured to stretch evidence in favour of a party?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum vs Lt.Col. (Retd.) Jamilur Rehman Qureshi1995 SCMR 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-20
  bona fide personal requirementevictionlandlord and tenantCantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963rent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which allowed the landlord's appeal and granted eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement under Section 14(4)(b)(i) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The tenant challenged the order, contending that the requirement was not genuine because the landlord had another vacant shop and an advertisement seeking tenants had been published. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in reversing the Rent Controller's dismissal when the landlord explained the availability of the additional space. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the landlord's complete deposition and pleadings demonstrated a genuine need to combine both shops to open a departmental store after retirement. The Court found sufficient, satisfactory evidence supporting the bona fide requirement and dismissed the appeal, allowing the tenant six months to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord claim bona fide personal requirement for a rented shop if an adjacent shop owned by him is also lying vacant?
  • Whether the publication of an advertisement to rent out a vacant shop by a third party automatically disproves a landlord's bona fide requirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Malik vs Mrs. Qaisar Jehan1995 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-15
  ejectmentdefault in rentrent depositlandlord-tenant relationshipgift deedcontumacious conductSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that ordered the appellant's ejectment from rented premises due to default in rent payment. The respondent, claiming ownership via a registered gift deed, served a notice under Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, requiring the appellant to pay rent to her. The appellant, instead of paying, deposited rent in court, naming multiple parties, and challenged the validity of the gift deed. The core legal question was whether the appellant's deposit of rent in court constituted a valid payment or a contumacious act amounting to default. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller cannot adjudicate the validity of a gift deed or title; such disputes must be resolved in a civil court. The Court further held that depositing rent in court without evidence of the landlord's refusal or avoidance, and doing so in a manner that harasses the landlord, does not protect a tenant from ejectment. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the tenant's conduct was mala fide and contumacious, justifying the ejectment order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller adjudicate the validity or legality of a gift deed regarding the title of rented premises?
  • Is a tenant entitled to deposit rent in court under Section 10(3) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, without first establishing the landlord's refusal or avoidance to accept rent?
  • Does the deposit of rent in the names of multiple parties, rather than the landlord alone, constitute contumacious conduct justifying ejectment?
  • Is a tenant permitted to challenge the landlord's title in rent proceedings instead of initiating separate civil litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid and another vs Qazi Abbas Hussain Shah1995 SCMR 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-10
  contempt of courtfinality of judgmentfrivolous litigationstatus quounqualified apologyjudicial discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from contempt of court proceedings initiated against a Senior Civil Judge and an Advocate for entertaining fresh civil suits and granting a status quo order regarding property where ownership had already been finally adjudicated and settled by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The respondent had filed fresh declaratory suits alleging fraud and forgery despite the finality of the previous judicial proceedings. The Advocate assumed responsibility, admitting a mistaken view, and subsequently passed away. The Senior Civil Judge submitted an unconditional and unqualified apology, pleading that the status quo order was granted inadvertently due to a heavy workload and without reading the relevant paragraphs of the plaints mentioning the Supreme Court's final judgment. The Supreme Court deprecated the growing trend of initiating frivolous, vexatious, and secondary rounds of litigation to flout final adjudications. However, balancing this with the Judge's unblemished seventeen-year career, good reputation, and lack of mala fides, the Court took a lenient view, accepted the apology, and discharged the contempt notice with a warning.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subordinate court commits contempt by entertaining fresh suits and granting interim relief on a subject-matter already finally decided by the Supreme Court?
  • What is the legal effect of a Supreme Court decision deciding a question of law on other courts in Pakistan under Article 189 of the Constitution?
  • Under what circumstances may the Supreme Court accept an unqualified apology and discharge a contempt notice against a judicial officer who inadvertently flouted its judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majeed vs Khalil Ahmed and another1995 SCMR 1108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-17
  bail cancellationleave to appealzina-bil-jabardelayed FIRcriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's application for the cancellation of pre-trial or post-arrest bail granted to the respondent in a criminal case registered under Section 10 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and Section 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned the propriety of bail cancellation in light of a delayed First Information Report and subsequent advancements in the trial proceedings. The Supreme Court held that since the trial had progressed significantly—specifically, the statement of the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 had already been recorded and the trial was nearing conclusion—the Court was not inclined to interfere with the impugned order at this late stage. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed, establishing the principle that the Supreme Court will generally decline to interfere with bail matters when the underlying trial has substantially advanced.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order refusing to cancel bail when the trial has substantially concluded?
  • Does a delayed F.I.R. without sufficient explanation warrant the cancellation of bail?
  • Is the recording of an accused person's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a relevant factor when considering a petition against bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majeed Soomro vs The State1995 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-09
  misappropriationbank fraudcriminal breach of trustappellant convictionbenefit of section 382-Bre-appraisement of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, whereby the criminal appeal of the appellant was dismissed with a modification reducing his sentence to the period already undergone by giving him the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appellant, who served as a bank manager, was charged and convicted by the trial court under Section 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the misappropriation of a specific amount, out of multiple instances alleged by the prosecution. The core legal question was whether the trial court's finding regarding the misappropriation was ambiguous and lacked conclusive proof of the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the record and evidence, including witness testimonies and identified signatures on relevant bank documents, clearly supported the finding of guilt regarding the misappropriation and that no ambiguity existed. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact supported by direct documentary evidence and witness testimonies regarding misappropriation will not be disturbed when the evidence conclusively establishes the act against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as being without merit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ambiguous finding by a trial court regarding misappropriation vitiates a conviction when supported by independent documentary evidence?
  • Does the identification of signatures on bank pay-in-slips and counterfoils constitute sufficient proof of misappropriation under Section 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be extended to reduce a sentence to the period already undergone upon dismissal of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Khaliq vs The State1995 SCMR 1083 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-03
  leave to appealsafe administration of justiceinvestigational flawstribal area investigationbenefit of doubtappraisal of evidencecriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Balochistan High Court confirming the petitioner's sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court correctly approached the appraisal of evidence by condoning investigative flaws and delays on account of the socio-legal conditions and transition from tribal systems to regular law in the 'B' area of Chaman. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the petitioner's contentions regarding the High Court's departure from the principles of safe administration of justice in criminal cases merit detailed consideration. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts must rigorously examine whether investigational shortcomings and societal conditions can justify lowering the standards of safe criminal administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether investigative flaws and delays caused by a tribal set-up and lack of investigational skills can be condoned to the detriment of an accused person?
  • Did the High Court's approach to evaluating evidence negate the principles of safe administration of justice in criminal cases?
  • Can the reluctance of the general public to come forward in a deteriorated law and order situation justify dispensing with standard rules of evidence and investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Khaliq and 6 others vs Jumma Allah Rakha and 8 others1995 SCMR 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-18
  evacuee propertyres judicataadverse possessionpossessory titlesettlement authoritiesnon-evacuee character
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a Regular Second Appeal and three Civil Revisions regarding the possession of property. The core dispute involved whether the property in question was evacuee property or non-evacuee property, and whether the plaintiffs, as successors-in-interest of the original purchasers, were entitled to possession against the defendants who claimed title through settlement authorities and adverse possession. The Supreme Court reviewed the history of the litigation, noting that previous rounds of litigation had already conclusively determined that the property was non-evacuee and belonged to the plaintiffs' predecessors. The Court held that the issues regarding the nature of the property and the plaintiffs' entitlement were barred by the principle of res judicata, having been finally settled in earlier proceedings up to the Supreme Court level. Furthermore, the Court rejected the defendants' plea of adverse possession, affirming that possessory title cannot be maintained against the rightful owner established by consistent judicial adjudication. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed as lacking merit, upholding the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can the nature of property as evacuee or non-evacuee be re-litigated once a final determination has been made by the Custodian and upheld by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the principle of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar the re-opening of issues regarding property status and ownership in subsequent suits between the same parties?
  • Can a claim of adverse possession be successfully maintained against a rightful owner whose title has been consistently upheld by judicial adjudication?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Jabbar and anothers vs The State1995 SCMR 830 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-07
  dacoityrobberyeyewitness identificationrecovery of stolen propertycorroborationcriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arose from the conviction of the petitioners for dacoity and robbery at a petrol pump. The petitioners challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment, which had upheld their convictions under sections 392 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while modifying their sentences. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained based on the testimony of eye-witnesses who identified the accused despite the assailants having muffled faces, and whether the subsequent recovery of stolen items provided sufficient corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, noting that the petrol pump was well-lit, allowing witnesses to observe the assailants closely. Furthermore, the Court found that the prompt filing of the F.I.R., which detailed the description of the assailants and the specific items stolen, combined with the subsequent recovery of those exact items from the petitioners, provided sufficient corroboration of their guilt. The Court affirmed the convictions, emphasizing that eyewitness testimony in such circumstances, when corroborated by recovery, is reliable evidence. The petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for dacoity be sustained based on eyewitness testimony where the assailants had muffled their faces?
  • Does the recovery of stolen items mentioned in the F.I.R. from the possession of the accused provide sufficient corroboration for a conviction?
  • Is the testimony of a witness who observed the accused fleeing the scene on a motorcycle reliable evidence in a dacoity case?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid and 8 others vs Haji Shabbir Khan and another1995 PLD Supreme Court 649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-19
  pre-emptionconsent decreecompromiseTalbswaiver of pleaabatement of suitrepeal of statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a pre-emption judgment and decree of the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question was whether a consent decree passed in a pre-emption suit on the basis of a compromise after the enforcement of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1987, could be set aside on the ground of the absence of 'Talbs', notwithstanding that the vendee had waived the plea and entered into a compromise. By a majority view, the Supreme Court held that since the vendee entered into the compromise and chose to give up the plea of 'Talbs', the consent decree was validly passed under the new Act of 1987 and could not be reopened or set aside by the appellate court. The key principle laid down is that the requirement of 'Talbs' is a question of fact which a defendant-vendee may waive or give up, and a compromise decree entered into under the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1987 cannot be invalidated on the absence of 'Talbs' where the vendee has voluntarily settled the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a consent decree passed on the basis of a compromise in a pre-emption suit can be set aside on the ground of absence of 'Talbs' when the vendee has waived the plea?
  • What is the effect of section 35(3) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1987 on pending pre-emption suits filed under the repealed 1950 Act?
  • Can a defendant-vendee legally give up or waive the requirement of making 'Talbs' in a pre-emption suit?
  • Whether an appellate court can set aside a compromise decree after the case has been remanded by the High Court for a specific limited inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs Member, Board of Revenue, B.O.R., Hazara Division, Abbottabad and 13 others1995 SCMR 1557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-13
  ejectment of tenantnon-payment of producewilful defaultNorth-West Frontier Province Tenancy Actlimitationagricultural landtenancy rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld an ejectment order against an agricultural tenant for non-payment of the share of produce. The core legal question was whether a tenant could avoid ejectment by claiming the landlord failed to collect the produce, while simultaneously invoking the statute of limitation to defeat the landlord's claim for arrears. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the ejectment order. The Court held that a tenant who fails to pay the share of produce for an extended period and successfully uses the law of limitation to defeat the landlord's claim for arrears cannot simultaneously seek equitable relief or argue against the finding of wilful default. The Court further clarified that under the North-West Frontier Province Tenancy Act, 1950, a tenant holding for an unspecified period is liable to ejectment upon default. It established that while Section 25 restricts the landlord's right to eject, it permits eviction through the execution of a decree for ejectment or where a decree for arrears remains unsatisfied, subject to the procedural requirements of Sections 26 to 28.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant claim equitable relief against ejectment after successfully using the statute of limitation to defeat a landlord's claim for rent arrears?
  • Does a tenant's failure to pay the share of produce for an extended period constitute a ground for ejectment under the North-West Frontier Province Tenancy Act, 1950?
  • Under what circumstances can a landlord execute a decree of ejectment against a tenant of agricultural land?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Bari vs Muhammad Rasheed Khan and 7 others1995 SCMR 851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-17
  restitutioncivil procedureinherent powersmesne profitsexecution of decreeconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the lower courts' orders for the restitution of a disputed shop to respondent No. 1. The core legal question involved the competence of the Civil Court to order restitution under Section 144, Section 47, and Section 151, read with Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, after the Supreme Court finally determined the property rights in favor of respondent No. 1. The Supreme Court held that the Senior Civil Judge was fully competent, particularly under the inherent jurisdiction of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, to direct restitution of the property to prevent perpetuating an injustice. The key principle laid down is that while exercising constitutional jurisdiction, the paramount consideration of the court is whether interference would advance the cause of justice or perpetuate an injustice, and that inherent powers under Section 151 can be invoked to order restitution following a final determination of property rights by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Civil Court order restitution of property under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after the final determination of property rights by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will exercise its constitutional discretion under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when interference with an impugned order would perpetuate an injustice?
  • Is a party entitled to restitution of possession and mesne profits when a previously executed decree is overturned by the final judgment of a superior court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz vs Muhammad Ashiq1995 SCMR 940 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-11
  pre-emptionleave to appealwaiver and estoppelconcurrent findingscivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision and affirmed the concurrent judgments and decrees of the two courts below decreeing the respondent's suit for pre-emption regarding the suit land, while granting an additional amount to the petitioner vendee. The core legal question raised pertained to whether certain judgments of the Supreme Court had altered the established view on waiver and estoppel in pre-emption suits. The Supreme Court held that it was unnecessary to resolve this question because both the trial court and the appellate court had recorded concurrent findings of fact holding that the respondent was not estopped from claiming the right of pre-emption. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, establishing that concurrent factual findings on issues such as waiver and estoppel obviate the need to examine broader jurisprudential conflicts regarding earlier precedents when such findings decisively settle the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding waiver and estoppel render it unnecessary to examine alleged conflicts in earlier Supreme Court precedents?
  • Does a vendee become entitled to an additional amount when a pre-emption suit is decreed?
  • When can leave to appeal be refused in a pre-emption matter involving concurrent findings?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz vs Ahmed Bakhsh and others1995 SCMR 725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-12
  pre-emptionTalb-e-MawasibatTalb-e-Ishahadleave to appealpossession of landsuit for pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a revision petition regarding a pre-emption suit. The original suit for possession of land, based on the right of pre-emption, was filed by the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest. The trial court initially decreed the suit, but upon appeal, the case was remanded to determine whether the requirements of Talb-e-Mawasibat and Talb-e-Ishahad had been satisfied. Following the remand, the trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the plaintiff had failed to fulfill these essential requirements. The petitioner subsequently sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to specifically examine whether the evidence on record sufficiently established that the petitioner had fulfilled the requirement of Talb-e-Ishahad, thereby entitling him to successfully pre-empt the sale. The core legal question centers on the evidentiary sufficiency regarding the performance of Talb-e-Ishahad in the context of a pre-emption claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the evidence on record sufficiently establish the fulfillment of the requirement of Talb-e-Ishahad to entitle a plaintiff to pre-empt a sale?
  • What are the necessary evidentiary requirements for Talb-e-Ishahad in a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz and others vs Additional District Judge and 4 others1995 SCMR 991 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-13
  ex parte decreeinterlocutory orderwrit jurisdictionamendment of pleadingsrevisional jurisdictionspecific performanceconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition challenging interlocutory orders passed by a trial court. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to interfere in writ jurisdiction regarding an order disallowing an amendment to an application for setting aside an ex parte decree. The trial court had dismissed the petitioners' application to amend their plea for setting aside the ex parte decree, a decision upheld by the Additional District Judge in revision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's order was interlocutory in nature and that the petitioners retained the right to challenge the final order on the application to set aside the ex parte decree, including any legal grounds available, upon the conclusion of those proceedings. The Court affirmed that the High Court rightly declined to exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with such interlocutory orders, finding no jurisdictional error or infirmity in the High Court's judgment. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order disallowing an amendment to an application for setting aside an ex parte decree an interlocutory order?
  • Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with an interlocutory order that does not involve a jurisdictional error?
  • Does a party have the right to challenge an interlocutory order after the final decision of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• (Dr.) Shah Wali Khan Senior Registrar Orthopedics Pgmi_LRH, Peshawar vs Government of NWFP through Secretary Health Department And 2 OtherK.L.R. 1997 Criminal Cases 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-22
  contempt of courtinterpretation of judgmentpromotion eligibilityplenary jurisdictionservice lawjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a contempt application filed by the petitioner, Dr. Shah Wali Khan. The petitioner alleged that the respondents violated a previous High Court order regarding the promotion process for the post of Assistant Professor (Orthopaedics). The core legal question was whether the High Court’s previous judgment had mandated the petitioner's immediate promotion or merely declared him eligible alongside another candidate, Dr. Shahabuddin, thereby allowing the competent authority discretion in selection. The Supreme Court held that the High Court, as the author of the original judgment, possessed the plenary jurisdiction to interpret its own order. The Supreme Court found no legal infirmity in the High Court's determination that its previous order did not mandate the petitioner's automatic promotion but rather established equal eligibility for both candidates. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the contempt application was misconceived, establishing the principle that the court which passes a judgment is the primary authority to interpret its own directions and determine whether a violation has occurred.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have the plenary jurisdiction to interpret its own previous judgment when a contempt application is filed?
  • Can a court's direction to consider a candidate for promotion be interpreted as a mandate for automatic appointment?
  • Is a contempt application maintainable when the alleged violation rests on a misinterpretation of the court's original order?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ali vs The State1994 SCMR 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-23
  suspension of sentencecriminal appealanti-corruptionbail pending appealsentence mitigation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Zulfiqar Ali, challenged an order refusing the suspension of his sentence following his conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The petitioner had been sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Gujranwala. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the duration of the sentence awarded to the petitioner. Consequently, the Court converted the petition for leave to appeal into an appeal. Exercising its discretion, the Court ordered the suspension of the operation of the sentence, subject to the petitioner furnishing two sureties in the sum of Rs. 25,000 each to the satisfaction of the trial court. The judgment establishes the principle that appellate courts may exercise discretion to suspend sentences pending appeal, particularly when considering the length of the sentence imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal to grant relief?
  • Does the appellate court have the discretion to suspend a sentence of imprisonment pending the final adjudication of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Zila Council, Sheikhupura through its Chairman vs M/s. Mian Tyre &1994 PLD Supreme Court 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  export taxzila counciltaxation powerslocal governmentultra virescharging provisionassessment and calculation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment holding that the Zila Council, Sheikhupura, was not competent to levy export tax on an item-wise basis (per piece) and that such tax could only be levied on the basis of gross weight. The core legal question was whether the Zila Council was competent to levy export tax on an item-wise basis or if its competence was confined to charging tax by gross weight under the applicable rules and statutory provisions. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interpreting the assessment and calculation provisions as charging provisions, and that the relevant statutory framework and rules do not restrict the levy of export tax exclusively to weight. However, the Court further held that the Zila Council cannot act outside the rules or in contravention of binding Government directives and the Model Export Tax Schedule. The Supreme Court consequently allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's interpretation, but maintained the relief granted in the writ petitions on the ground that the Zila Council's independent notification varying from the Government directive was without lawful authority, establishing that a local council's taxation powers are strictly subject to provincial government rules and binding directives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Zila Council is competent to levy export tax on an item-wise basis or if its competence is confined to charging tax on the basis of gross weight?
  • Whether Rule 6 of the Punjab Zila Councils (Export Tax) Rules, 1990, constitutes a charging provision or a machinery provision relating to assessment and calculation?
  • Whether a Zila Council can levy export tax at variance with the directive and Model Export Tax Schedule issued by the Provincial Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Zarif and others vs Khizar Hayat1994 SCMR 1753 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-04
  compromise decreeleave to appealcounsel's authoritycivil revisionfinality of judgmentreview petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a review petition challenging a compromise decree. The core legal question was whether a compromise entered into by a party's counsel and an attorney during civil revision proceedings could be challenged on the grounds of lack of authorization and absence of voluntary consent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioners failed to establish valid grounds for interference. The Court emphasized that a statement made by a counsel on behalf of their clients to settle a dispute is binding, particularly when the judgment disposing of the revision petition explicitly records the settlement. The Court affirmed that factual allegations regarding the lack of authority or voluntary consent, when raised after a compromise decree has been passed and affirmed, do not constitute sufficient grounds for leave to appeal, especially where the counsel had acted within their professional capacity. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, upholding the finality of the compromise decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise decree be challenged on the grounds that the counsel lacked authority to settle the dispute?
  • Is a statement made by a counsel in court to settle a dispute binding on the clients?
  • Can factual allegations regarding the lack of voluntary consent to a compromise be raised to seek leave to appeal after a review petition has been dismissed?
  Read full judgment →
• Zakaullah Khan vs Government of Pakistan (now Punjab), through The Secretary, Building Department, Lahore1994 SCMR 1761 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21
  review petitionfull and final settlementarbitrationremand ordercontractual disputewaiver of claims
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a Supreme Court judgment that had remanded a case to the High Court for a fresh decision. The petitioner challenged the remand order, arguing that the Court had erroneously assumed the respondent (Provincial Government) was unrepresented during the initial appeal hearing, despite the judgment stating that counsel for the parties had been heard. The core legal question was whether the alleged error regarding the appearance of counsel warranted a review of the remand order. The Supreme Court acknowledged the confusion regarding the representation of the Provincial Government but held that the remand order remained correct on its merits. The Court emphasized that the petitioner, a contractor, had previously accepted payment in full and final settlement of his claim and provided an undertaking not to raise future disputes. The Court ruled that the Arbitrator and the High Court had failed to give sufficient weight to this binding undertaking. Consequently, the Court dismissed the review petition, affirming that the remand for deeper consideration of the settlement was necessary and justified.

  Questions settled

  • Does an error regarding the appearance of counsel in a judgment necessitate a review if the underlying decision remains substantively correct?
  • Is a contractor bound by an undertaking not to raise future disputes after accepting payment in full and final settlement of a claim?
  • Does an arbitrator's failure to consider a binding settlement agreement justify judicial intervention?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahoor Hussain Shah vs The State and others1994 SCMR 1257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-17
  grave and sudden provocationhomicide not amounting to murderappreciation of evidenceappeal against acquittalcriminal liabilityocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a petition by the complainant party challenging the High Court's judgment, which maintained the respondents' convictions under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the homicide of two individuals, while effectively reducing their sentences to the time already served. The core legal question concerned whether the trial and appellate courts correctly applied criminal law principles regarding the appreciation of evidence, specifically the credibility of eyewitnesses, the probability of the prosecution's narrative regarding the crime scene, and the validity of the defense's plea of grave and sudden provocation. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's version—that the victims were killed at separate locations and the body transported a significant distance—was improbable. Furthermore, the Court found that the defense's claim of finding the victims in a compromising position was plausible, supporting the application of Exception 1 to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Affirming the acquittal on the murder charge, the Court reiterated that it would only interfere in appeals against acquittal where the lower court's conclusion is unreasonable, a threshold not met here.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment?
  • Does the presence of a self-inflicted injury on an eyewitness undermine their credibility?
  • Is the plea of grave and sudden provocation applicable when victims are found in a compromising position?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafar Hussain vs Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry1994 PLC (C.S.) 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-08-28
  move-overfinality of judgmentres judicataservice tribunalleave to appealBPS-19civil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's claim for the ante-dating of his move-over to BPS-19. The petitioner, having previously failed in litigation regarding the same move-over issue, sought to reopen the case based on a subsequent Supreme Court judgment, arguing that it established a fresh cause of action. The core legal question was whether a matter previously adjudicated and finalized by the Supreme Court could be reopened on the basis of a later judicial pronouncement. The Supreme Court held that the controversy had already been resolved against the petitioner in an earlier round of litigation and that the final judgment pronounced by the Court was binding and conclusive. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that once a matter has been finally decided by the Supreme Court, it cannot be re-examined or reopened, regardless of subsequent legal developments, as the principle of finality of litigation must be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Can a service matter previously adjudicated and finalized by the Supreme Court be reopened based on a subsequent Supreme Court judgment?
  • Does a subsequent Supreme Court judgment create a fresh cause of action for a petitioner whose claim was already dismissed in a final judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafar Hayat vs The State1994 SCMR 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-13
  leave to appealmurderappraisal of evidenceeye-witnessdelayed FIRenhancement of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding his conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, wherein his death sentence was altered to imprisonment for life. The core legal question concerned whether the occurrence was unwitnessed, taking place during the dark hours of the night, and whether the petitioner was falsely implicated due to enmity and delay in lodging the first information report. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioner's counsel regarding the presence of eye-witnesses and the delayed lodging of the story required detailed examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to the petitioner and directed that the connected petition for enhancement of sentence be heard along with the main matter, thereby laying down principles regarding the scrutiny of ocular account and circumstantial evidence in criminal appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eye-witnesses is reliable when an occurrence takes place during the dark hours of the night?
  • Does an inordinate delay in lodging the first information report cast doubt on the prosecution case?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted to examine the sufficiency and credibility of evidence in a murder conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Z1la Council, Sheikhupura Through Its Chairman vs M/s. Mian Tyre &1994 PLD Supreme Court 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  export taxzila councillocal governmenttaxation powersmodel scheduleultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals raised the legal question of whether the Zila Council, Sheikhupura, was competent to levy export tax on an item-wise basis or if its competence was confined to charging tax on the basis of gross weight. The respondent manufacturers challenged the Zila Council's notification imposing an export tax per piece on tyres and tubes, which the High Court had struck down on the ground that the relevant rules permitted taxation solely by weight. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interpreting the assessment machinery provisions as charging provisions, and clarified that the charging provisions contained no restriction against charging tax by numbers or pieces. However, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the manufacturers on another ground, holding that the Zila Council lacked the authority to notify a tax schedule at variance with the Model Export Tax Schedule and the binding directives issued by the Government of the Punjab under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. Consequently, the High Court judgment was set aside, and the writ petitions were allowed, declaring the Zila Council's independent notification without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Zila Council is competent to levy export tax on an item-wise basis or if its competence is confined to charging tax on the basis of gross weight?
  • Whether rule 6(6) of the Punjab Zila Councils (Export Tax) Rules, 1990 acts as a charging provision or a machinery provision for assessment and calculation?
  • Whether a Zila Council can notify an export tax schedule at variance with the model schedule and directives issued by the Provincial Government under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Yusuf Ali Khan Barristeratlaw, Lahore vs Messrs Hongkonk &1994 SCMR 1007 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-28
  Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) OrdinancePecuniary jurisdictionTransfer of casesProcedural lawSpecial CourtExclusive jurisdictionPending suitsBanking litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court order transferring a pending civil suit for recovery of a bank loan to a Special Court following the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Act, 1992, which increased the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court. The appellant contended that because the amending Act lacked an explicit provision for transferring pending cases, the High Court retained jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the transfer of pending suits was mandatory despite the absence of an express transfer clause. The Supreme Court held that the amendment was procedural in nature. Affirming the principle that legislative intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction on Special Courts for banking loan matters necessitates the transfer of pending cases, the Court ruled that the suit was correctly transferred. The Court established that where a statute alters the forum of trial by ousting the jurisdiction of one court in favor of another, pending cases are transferred by operation of law, provided no vested rights are prejudiced. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of an express transfer provision in an amending statute prevent the transfer of pending cases when the forum's pecuniary jurisdiction is altered?
  • Is a change in the forum for the trial of a suit considered a matter of procedure or a substantive right?
  • Does the enactment of a law conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a Special Court automatically result in the transfer of pending cases from ordinary civil courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Yousuf Masih alias Bagga Masih and another vs The State1994 SCMR 2102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-29
  Zina-bil-Jabrconsent of minorpubertyburden of proofkidnappingmitigating circumstancescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court confirming the conviction of the appellants under sections 10(3) and 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal questions involved whether the victim was a consenting party and whether the prosecution was required to prove the victim's non-puberty. The Supreme Court held that since the victim was a minor aged about 12 years and 4 months, her consent was legally ineffective, and the burden of proving that she had attained puberty lay upon the defence. The Court laid down that under Islamic jurisprudence and the relevant Ordinance, a girl below the age of 18 cannot be considered an adult unless puberty is affirmatively established, and consent given by a non-adult cannot preclude the offence of Zina-bil-Jabr. Consequently, while upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court reduced the sentences of the appellants to fifteen years' rigorous imprisonment considering mitigating circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the consent of a minor victim is legally valid to exclude the charge of Zina-bil-Jabr?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish the attainment of puberty in a minor victim?
  • Can a court award a lesser punishment than life imprisonment under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
  • What is the minimum age of puberty for a female under Hanafi jurisprudence?
  Read full judgment →
• Youssouf Shaheen vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary, Islamabad and 8 others1994 SCMR 1500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-15
  Senate electionunexpired termcasual vacancyelection voidconstitutional petitionterm of office
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his constitutional petition regarding the duration of his Senate term. The petitioner had been declared elected as a Senator after the Supreme Court declared the election of his predecessor, Haji Ibrahim Hingorjo, void. The petitioner contended that his six-year term should commence from the date of his own notification, rather than being limited to the unexpired term of the predecessor. The Supreme Court examined Article 59 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and Sections 77 and 82 of the Senate (Election) Act, 1975. The Court held that when an election is declared void and a new candidate is declared elected in place of the original member, the term of the successor is strictly limited to the unexpired term of the member whose election was declared void. The Court affirmed that the statutory provisions align with the Constitution, and consequently, the petitioner's term could not extend beyond the unexpired period of the seat he filled. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term of a Senator elected to replace a member whose election was declared void commence anew or is it limited to the unexpired term of the predecessor?
  • Are the provisions of the Senate (Election) Act, 1975 regarding the term of office of a replacement member in conflict with Article 59 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the legal effect of a court declaring an election to the Senate void on the term of the successor candidate?
  Read full judgment →
• Yaq00b Khan and 2 others vs The State and others1994 SCMR 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21
  criminal appealacquittalidentification paradeextra-judicial confessionocular evidenceFIRbenefit of doubtmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal petitions filed by two convicts challenging their convictions for murder and attempted murder, and a cross-petition by the complainant challenging the acquittal of a third co-accused. The core legal questions involved the reliability of identification evidence, the validity of convictions where the accused were not named in the FIR, and the threshold for interfering with an acquittal order. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding the ocular testimony of the injured witness and the identification parade process credible, despite the initial absence of names in the FIR. Regarding the acquittal, the Court held that it cannot interfere with an acquittal judgment if the lower court's conclusion is based on a possible view of the evidence and is neither perverse nor the result of misreading material facts. The Court affirmed that re-appraisal of evidence to reach a different conclusion is not a valid ground for interfering with an acquittal. Consequently, both petitions were dismissed, confirming the High Court’s judgment in its entirety.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment in a criminal case?
  • Does the omission of an accused's name in the FIR automatically render identification parade evidence unreliable?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ocular evidence and identification parades when the accused were not initially named in the FIR?
  Read full judgment →
• Wealth Tax Officer And Another vs Shaukat Afzal And OtherK.L.R. 1994 Tax & Custom Cases 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-26
  wealth taxalternative remedyconstitutional petitionexhaustion of remediesassets definition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which allowed a constitutional petition filed by the respondents and declared the wealth tax assessment orders regarding certain properties as without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether the High Court ought to have entertained a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, when an alternative statutory appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was already pending. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, holding that a party cannot abandon or bypass an alternative statutory remedy once invoked without valid cause to file a constitutional petition. The key principle laid down is that the High Court should not entertain a constitutional petition in the presence of an alternate and efficacious statutory remedy unless there are compelling, valid reasons to do so.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can bypass a pending statutory appeal before the Tribunal to file a constitutional petition under Article 199?
  • Do properties held by an association of persons fall within the definition of 'assets' under section 2(e)(ii) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963?
  • When is the High Court justified in entertaining a constitutional petition despite the availability of an alternate statutory remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• Wazir Ali vs Muhammad Shiraz Hussain Shah and 3 others1994 SCMR 1127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-16
  Contractual interpretationSpecific performanceAgreementLand allotmentPower of attorneyBreach of contractDamagesCivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a civil suit stemming from an agreement between the respondents, who had an unsatisfied claim for 926 produce index units, and the petitioner. The petitioner undertook to secure land allotment for the respondents, who in turn agreed to transfer half of the procured property to him. The agreement also stipulated a payment of Rs. 50,000 if the respondents revoked the power of attorney granted to the petitioner. The petitioner only managed to get 69 units proposed before the power of attorney was revoked. He subsequently sued for a half share in the 69 units. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to a half share in the limited land procured, or if this entitlement was contingent on securing the respondents' entire claim. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, ruling that the petitioner was not entitled to a half share. The Court reasoned that the stipulation for a half share was based on the assumption that the petitioner would secure property against the *entire* 926 units claim, not merely a small fraction. The petitioner was only entitled to the Rs. 50,000 as per the agreement for the revocation of the power of attorney. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party entitled to specific performance of a contractual term when the underlying assumption for that term's application has not been met?
  • Can a claim for a share in property be sustained if the efforts resulted in only a small fraction of the anticipated outcome, and the agreement was premised on a larger achievement?
  • When an agreement specifies a penalty for revocation of a power of attorney, does that preclude other claims if the primary objective of the agreement is not fully met?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Sanitation Authority and another vs Niaz Muhammad and 51994 SCMR 1648 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-11
  land acquisitioncompensation determinationlocus standilocal authoritysubmission to jurisdictionmarket value of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the determination of compensation for land acquired by the Water and Sanitation Authority for a waste water treatment plant. The core legal question was whether the compensation awarded by the High Court was based on proper evidence and whether the appellants, as a local authority, had the standing to challenge the compensation award. The Supreme Court held that while prior jurisprudence established that neither Section 18 nor Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 confers a right of reference upon a local authority for whose benefit land is acquired, the respondent had submitted to the High Court's jurisdiction and accepted its verdict without challenge. Consequently, the technical objection regarding the competency of the appeal could not be entertained at the appellate stage. Regarding the compensation, the Court found that the High Court had duly considered the documentary evidence, including revenue entries and sale deeds, and that the award was based on a reasoned assessment of the land's potential value. The appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 18 or Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 confer a right of reference on a local authority for whose benefit land is acquired?
  • Can a party that has submitted to the jurisdiction of the High Court and accepted its verdict later challenge the competency of the appeal on technical grounds?
  • Is a compensation award based on an assessment of documentary evidence and potential land value sustainable if the High Court has considered the material on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore and 3 others vs Shan1994 SCMR 1670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-21
  service tribunaldismissal from serviceunauthorized absenceefficiency and disciplineleave to appealquantum of punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against the judgment of the Service Tribunal. The respondent, an Assistant Line Man, remained absent from duty after his application for extraordinary leave without pay was refused. Following an unserved notice published in a newspaper, the competent authority dismissed him from service under Rule 8(b) of the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1978, dispensing with the show-cause notice. The Service Tribunal partly accepted the respondent's appeal by substituting the dismissal with a penalty of reduction to the lowest stage in the time scale for two years. WAPDA sought leave to appeal, contending that reduction in penalty was unjustified when the appeal was not pressed on merits, and that Rule 5(a) of the said Rules did not apply to the case. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine these contentions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal is justified in reducing a penalty of dismissal to reduction in time scale when an appeal is not pressed on merits?
  • Whether Rule 5(a) of the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1978 applies to an employee who remains absent rather than an inefficient worker or habitual malingerer?
  • Under what circumstances can the competent authority dispense with a show-cause notice under Rule 8(b) of the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1978?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority vs Zahoor Ahmed1994 PLC (C.S.) 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  service lawWAPDAcompulsory retirementremoval from serviceappellate jurisdictionlimitationcondonation of delaypenalty substitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) challenging a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that converted the respondent's removal from service into compulsory retirement. The respondent, a Line Superintendent-1, had been removed under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. WAPDA contended that the Tribunal erred regarding the limitation period and lacked the authority to substitute the penalty of removal with compulsory retirement. The Supreme Court rejected the limitation argument, noting that the Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to condone delay, a matter generally not re-examined by the Supreme Court. Regarding the substitution of penalty, the Court relied on established precedents (WAPDA v. Abdul Sattar and Aijaz Nabi Abbasi v. WAPDA), affirming that the Tribunal, as an appellate forum, has the power to examine the appropriateness of the penalty and substitute the Authority's order with a more suitable one if deemed necessary. Consequently, the Court held that the Tribunal acted within its legal competence, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to substitute an order of removal from service with an order of compulsory retirement?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the Federal Service Tribunal's decision to condone a delay in filing an appeal?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the authority to examine the appropriateness of a penalty imposed by the WAPDA under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority vs Zahoor Ahmed1994 SCMR 960 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  service tribunalremoval from servicecompulsory retirementsubstitution of penaltycondonation of delaypetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had partly allowed the respondent employee's appeal by converting his order of removal from service into compulsory retirement. The core legal questions involved whether the Tribunal erred on the question of limitation and whether the Tribunal possessed the legal authority to substitute an order of removal with an order of compulsory retirement under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to condone delay and that, as an appellate forum, it had the power to substitute the punishment with a more appropriate one in suitable cases, relying on settled precedents. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the Tribunal's judgment and establishing that the Service Tribunal can modify penalties imposed under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to condone delay in filing an appeal?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal substitute an order of removal from service with an order of compulsory retirement under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act?
  • Whether the Supreme Court interferes with the Tribunal's exercise of discretion regarding the condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority vs Not Found1994 PLC (C.S.) 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  service lawWAPDAcompulsory retirementpenalty substitutionappellate jurisdictioncondonation of delayremoval from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) challenging a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had partially allowed the respondent's appeal against his removal from service under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, converting the penalty of removal into compulsory retirement. The core legal questions were whether the Tribunal erred in condoning the delay in filing the appeal and whether it possessed the legal authority to substitute the penalty of removal with compulsory retirement. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in condoning the delay, a matter generally not re-examined by the Supreme Court. Regarding the substitution of the penalty, the Court affirmed that as an appellate forum, the Tribunal is empowered to examine the material supporting the Authority's order and, in suitable cases, substitute the penalty with one it deems more appropriate. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the Tribunal's authority to modify disciplinary penalties imposed under the WAPDA Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to substitute a penalty of removal with compulsory retirement for a WAPDA employee?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal condone a delay in filing an appeal against a service-related order?
  • Is the Federal Service Tribunal limited to merely reviewing the validity of an order, or can it substitute the penalty imposed by the Authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority and anothers vs Khushi1994 SCMR 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-20
  service matterpromotionleave to appealservice tribunaleducational qualificationeligibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which allowed the respondent's appeal and directed the petitioners to consider the respondent for promotion to BPS-17 based on his Diploma in Technology of Drafting and Designing. The petitioners contended that the respondent is ineligible for promotion as an Assistant Engineer (Civil or Mechanical) because he does not possess a diploma in the specific technologies contemplated under Rule 5(2)(a)(ii)(iii) of the Pakistan WAPDA (Water Wing) Service of Engineers Rules, 1968, and that mere placement in BPS-16 does not qualify him for promotion without the relevant diploma for the available vacancy. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the respondent is eligible for promotion under the prescribed service rules and whether placement in BPS-16 qualifies him for promotion absent the required diploma in the relevant technology.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee eligible for promotion to Assistant Engineer without holding a diploma in the specific technologies contemplated under the relevant service rules?
  • Does placement in BPS-16 automatically qualify an employee for promotion in the absence of a diploma in the relevant technology where a vacancy occurs?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority And Another vs Khushi1994 PLC (C.S.) 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-20
  service appealpromotiondiploma in technologyservice rulesleave to appealFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had allowed the respondent employee's appeal directing the petitioners to consider him for promotion to BPS-17 based on his Diploma in Technology of Drafting and Designing. The respondent, initially inducted as a Field Attendant in 1975 and later appointed as a Sub-Engineer in BPS-10, passed his departmental promotion examination in 1985 and was placed in BPS-16. The core legal question concerns the eligibility of the respondent for promotion as an Assistant Engineer without holding a diploma in the specific technologies contemplated under the relevant service rules. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether placement in BPS-16 qualifies an employee for promotion in the absence of a diploma in the relevant technology where the vacancy occurs, and whether the respondent is eligible under Rule 5(2)(a)(ii)(iii) of the Pakistan WAPDA (Water Wing) Service of Engineers Rules, 1968. The court held that leave is granted to examine these contentions regarding promotion criteria and statutory service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee is eligible to be promoted as an Assistant Engineer without holding a diploma in the specific technologies contemplated under the service rules?
  • Does placement in BPS-16 qualify a Sub-Engineer for promotion to BPS-17 in the absence of a diploma in the relevant technology in which a vacancy occurs?
  Read full judgment →
• Waris Khan And 18.Other vs Col. Humayun Shah And 41 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-03
  civil jurisdictionrevenue recorddeclaration of titlejoint ownershiplimitationperpetual injunctionBanjer Qadeem
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed a revision petition regarding a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction. The respondents (plaintiffs) sought a declaration of ownership of suit land and the correction of revenue record entries, which the trial court and appellate court had granted. The core legal question was whether the Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate title and revenue record corrections, or if such matters were exclusively within the domain of revenue authorities under the Land Revenue Act, and whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that because the defendants denied the plaintiffs' title in their written statement, the Civil Court had the requisite jurisdiction to determine the respective titles of the parties regarding the joint property. The Court further held that as the property was recorded as joint ownership and the land was Banjer Qadeem, no issue of limitation or adverse possession arose. The petition was dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower forums regarding ownership and the incorrectness of the revenue entries.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a suit for declaration of title and correction of revenue records when the defendants deny the plaintiffs' title?
  • Does the law of limitation or adverse possession apply to a suit involving joint ownership of land classified as Banjer Qadeem?
  • Can a party challenge the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to correct revenue records when the defendants themselves have denied the plaintiffs' title in their written statement?
  Read full judgment →
• Waris Khan and 18 others vs Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-03
  civil jurisdictionrevenue record correctionjoint ownershiplimitationBanjer Qadeemdeclaration of titleco-sharer possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that affirmed a decree in favor of the respondents regarding the ownership of suit land and the correction of revenue records. The petitioners argued that the respondents' remedy for correcting revenue entries lay exclusively with revenue officers under the Land Revenue Act, not the Civil Court, and that the suit was time-barred. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, holding that because the defendants denied the plaintiffs' title in their written statement, the Civil Court possessed the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate the respective titles of the parties regarding the joint property. Furthermore, the Court determined that since the suit property was recorded as joint ownership and the land was Banjer Qadeem (uncultivated waste land) without established physical possession by either party, issues of limitation and adverse possession were inapplicable. The Court found no legal error in the concurrent findings of the lower forums, which had declared the plaintiffs as owners and the revenue entries as incorrect, and consequently dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate title and correct revenue records when the defendants deny the plaintiffs' title in their written statement?
  • Does the principle of limitation or adverse possession apply to joint property where the land is Banjer Qadeem and no physical possession is established?
  • Is a suit for declaration of title and correction of revenue records maintainable in a Civil Court when the defendants dispute the plaintiffs' ownership?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA, Lahore and 2 others vs Manzoor Ahmad Arif1994 SCMR 1042 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-13
  Service Tribunaldisciplinary proceedingsquantum of punishmentjudicial reviewreasoned judgmentWAPDAmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged a Service Tribunal decision that reduced a disciplinary penalty imposed on a WAPDA employee. The respondent, an Executive Engineer, faced six charges; while two were not proven, four were established, involving serious allegations of negligence and misconduct regarding meter readings and load management. The Service Tribunal, without detailed analysis, reduced the penalty of reduction in rank to the stoppage of one increment, characterizing the proven charges as mere negligence. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal failed to fulfill its constitutional duty as a final court of fact. The Court emphasized that the Tribunal must thoroughly examine questions of fact and provide reasoned conclusions, rather than making general assumptions. The Tribunal’s judgment was criticized for failing to distinguish between acts of omission and commission and for ignoring the gravity of the established charges. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the matter for a fresh, reasoned decision in accordance with the law, ensuring all factual and technical contentions are properly addressed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Service Tribunal have a constitutional duty to provide reasoned conclusions when deciding questions of fact in disciplinary appeals?
  • Can a Service Tribunal reduce a disciplinary penalty without a thorough examination of the gravity of the established charges?
  • Is a judgment by a Service Tribunal legally sustainable if it relies on general assumptions rather than specific findings on the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA through its Chairman and anothers vs Muhammad Ramzan1994 SCMR 424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-25
  misconductservice tribunalrecovery of embezzled fundsvicarious liabilitydepartmental inquiryleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had granted relief to a WAPDA employee regarding the recovery of embezzled funds. The respondent, an assistant, was charged with misconduct for collecting lesser amounts on electricity bills than were due, resulting in a liability of Rs. 47,625.10. The Tribunal found that the respondent acted under the instructions of a senior official, Zulfiqar, who was the primary actor but had been exonerated by WAPDA. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that the amount already recovered from the respondent was sufficient punishment and ordered the waiver of the remaining recovery. The Supreme Court addressed whether the Tribunal's leniency was justified given the department's inconsistent treatment of the employees involved. The Court held that since the department exonerated the principal offender, it was fair and proper for the Tribunal to mitigate the liability of the assistant who merely followed orders. The petition was dismissed, affirming that the Tribunal's decision did not warrant interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a service tribunal mitigate the punishment of an employee who acted under the instructions of a senior official who was exonerated by the department?
  • Is the Supreme Court of Pakistan empowered to interfere with a finding of fact by the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the quantum of punishment in a disciplinary matter?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA Through Its Chairman And Another vs S.M. Rizwan Abidi1994 PLC (C.S.) 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-07
  Annual Confidential Reportsadverse remarksservice lawcountersignatureexpunction of remarksprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against a Service Tribunal decision that expunged adverse remarks from the respondent's Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) for the years 1980, 1983, and 1984. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal correctly expunged these remarks based on procedural grounds, specifically the lack of countersignatures by superior authorities, the failure to supply complete copies of reports, and the delay in communication. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in expunging the remarks outright. The Court established that an Annual Confidential Report lacking the mandatory countersignature of a superior officer is legally incomplete and cannot be communicated as an adverse report. However, such a defect does not warrant expunction; rather, the proper course is for the relevant authority to complete the report by obtaining the necessary countersignatures. The Court further clarified that procedural issues like the delay in communication or the failure to provide full copies of reports are not valid grounds for expunging adverse remarks.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a countersignature by a superior officer render an Annual Confidential Report incomplete?
  • Can adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report be expunged solely due to delay in communication or failure to supply complete copies?
  • What is the appropriate remedy when an Annual Confidential Report is communicated without the required countersignatures of a superior officer?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA through its Chairman and another vs S.M. Rizwan Abidi1994 SCMR 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-07
  Annual Confidential Reportadverse remarksService Tribunalcountersigning officerincomplete reportservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal filed by WAPDA against the decision of the Service Tribunal, which had expunged adverse remarks in the Annual Confidential Reports of the respondent employee for the years 1980, 1983, and 1984. The core legal question examined was whether the Service Tribunal's decision expunging the adverse remarks was based on provisions of law, particularly concerning incomplete reports lacking countersignatures, delayed communication, and non-supply of complete copies. The Supreme Court held that an Annual Confidential Report lacking required countersignatures of a superior officer is incomplete and cannot be communicated as an adverse report, rendering an appeal against it before completion premature. The Court further ruled that delay in communication, non-supply of complete report copies, and good past record are extraneous grounds for expunction. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the expunction order, and set aside the departmental order utilizing the un-countersigned reports as adverse. The key principle laid down is that an un-countersigned Annual Confidential Report remains incomplete and invalid for communication as an adverse report until properly countersigned by the competent superior authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Annual Confidential Report lacking the countersignatures of a superior officer can be communicated as an adverse report?
  • Does delay in the communication of adverse remarks entitle a government servant to get them expunged?
  • Is the non-supply of complete copies of Annual Confidential Reports a valid ground for their expunction?
  • How should the Service Tribunal deal with an appeal challenging an incomplete Annual Confidential Report lacking countersignatures?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA Through Its Chairman And Another vs Muhammad Ramzan1994 PLC (C.S.) 355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-25
  service tribunalmisconductrecovery of embezzled amountmaster and servantWAPDA employeeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 directed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerns the liability and quantum of recovery imposed on a WAPDA employee found guilty of misconduct involving the collection of lesser amounts on electricity bills, when the principal offender was exonerated by the department. The Supreme Court held that where the department chose to exonerate the principal person involved in the embezzlement, the Service Tribunal took a fair and proper view in treating the amount already recovered from his subordinate assistant as sufficient punishment and waiving the rest. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary penalties and recovery orders must remain equitable and consistent when comparing the culpability of subordinates acting under instructions relative to principal offenders who have been let off by the employer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the reduction of a penalty by the Service Tribunal when the principal offender has been exonerated by the department?
  • Can a subordinate employee acting under the instructions of a senior be subjected to the full recovery of an embezzled amount while the primary culprit is let off?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA Through Chairman And 2 Other vs Muhammad Hussain Gul1994 PLC (C.S.) 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-02
  service tribunalad hoc appointmentcondonation of delaywrong advice of counsellimitationreinstatementWAPDA employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by WAPDA against the judgment of the Service Tribunal Islamabad, which had accepted the respondent's appeal, reinstated him into service without back benefits, and counted his out-of-job period towards length of service. The core legal questions involved whether an ad hoc employee's termination could be challenged before the Service Tribunal, whether the Tribunal erred in condoning a 22-month delay in filing the appeal based on wrong legal advice and complexity in service laws, and whether the respondent fulfilled the conditions of regular appointment. The Supreme Court held that since the respondent successfully qualified the written test and his appointment was approved by the Selection Board in terms of his conditional appointment letter, he was entitled to regular appointment, and no exception could be taken on merits. The Court further held that the Service Tribunal's exercise of discretion in condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, due to bona fide wrong legal advice and complex jurisdictional issues regarding WAPDA employees, suffered from no legal infirmity. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the termination of an ad hoc employee whose appointment was subject to passing a test and approval of the Selection Board can be challenged before the Service Tribunal upon fulfilling those conditions?
  • Can the time spent in wrongly pursuing a remedy before the High Court on the basis of erroneous legal advice constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretionary exercise of power by the Service Tribunal in condoning delay in service appeals?
  Read full judgment →
• Waheed Ullah Khan and 2 others vs Muhammad Hanif and 2 others1994 SCMR 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-15
  evictionlandlord and tenantsettlement propertiestransfer of propertyres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding an eviction order passed against the appellants by the Additional Rent Controller. The core legal question involved whether the appellants could challenge the propriety of the transfer and demarcation of properties by settlement authorities in eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court held that the order of the Settlement Commissioner treating the properties as a single unit and transferring the disputed ground-floor portion to the respondents' predecessor could not be reopened or challenged in eviction proceedings, especially since a previous writ petition challenging the same demarcation had been dismissed by the High Court and attained finality. The Court laid down the principle that a final transfer order and demarcation by settlement authorities cannot be agitated or re-litigated in subsequent rent proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the propriety of a transfer order passed by settlement authorities be challenged in eviction proceedings before a Rent Controller?
  • Whether an issue finally decided in writ jurisdiction can be re-opened in subsequent appellate proceedings arising from an eviction order?
  Read full judgment →
• Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman's Secretariat), Islamabad through S.Q.H.1994 SCMR 979 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-27
  Wafaqi MohtasibOmbudsman jurisdictionservice matterinfructuous petitionmootnessNational Bank of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from petitions challenging a Sindh High Court judgment that declared the Wafaqi Mohtasib lacked jurisdiction to entertain a complaint regarding the non-implementation of a Supreme Court order by the National Bank of Pakistan. The core legal question concerned whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib could investigate a public servant's grievance regarding service matters, specifically in light of the jurisdictional bar under Article 9(2) of President's Order 1 of 1983. However, during the pendency of these proceedings before the Supreme Court, the employee's underlying grievance was fully redressed following a directive from the Prime Minister and a subsequent resolution by the Bank's Board of Directors, which granted the relief originally sought. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petitions had become academic and infructuous. As the primary dispute was resolved, the Court declined to adjudicate the jurisdictional issue, dismissing the petitions without issuing a definitive ruling on the scope of the Ombudsman's authority in such circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • When does a petition before the Supreme Court become infructuous due to the resolution of the underlying grievance?
  • Can a petition be dismissed as academic if the relief sought by the petitioner has been granted by the respondent during the pendency of the proceedings?
  • Does the resolution of a service dispute by a competent authority render a pending challenge regarding the Ombudsman's jurisdiction over that dispute moot?
  Read full judgment →
• Wafaqi Mohtasib (OMBUDSMAN's Secretariat), Islamabad Through S.Q.H.1994 PLC (C.S.) 768 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-27
  Wafaqi Mohtasibjurisdiction of Ombudsmanservice grievanceinfructuous petitionimplementation of court ordersbank employee promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises two petitions directed against an order of the Sindh High Court which had set aside findings and recommendations issued by the Wafaqi Mohtasib. The core legal question concerned whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib possessed jurisdiction to entertain a complaint by a bank employee regarding the non-implementation of an order passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, particularly in light of the statutory bar under Article 9(2) of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order 1983. The Supreme Court observed that subsequent to the impugned High Court judgment, the aggrieved employee's primary grievance was fully redressed when the Prime Minister issued a directive antedating his promotion, which was duly approved and implemented through a resolution by the Board of Directors of the National Bank of Pakistan. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petitions had been rendered entirely infructuous and dismissed them on that basis, leaving the substantive legal question regarding the Mohtasib's jurisdiction open as the matter had become purely academic.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Wafaqi Mohtasib have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint by a public functionary concerning matters relating to the agency in which he is or has been working?
  • Can petitions be dismissed as infructuous when the substantive grievance of the petitioner is redressed during the pendency of the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Uzin Export Import Enterprises for Foreign Trade, Karachi vs Union1994 PLD Supreme Court 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-02
  joinder of partiesproper partynecessary partymultiplicity of proceedingsbank guaranteecivil procedurejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court order allowing the joinder of respondent No. 2 as a defendant in a civil suit for the recovery of funds based on bank guarantees. The appellant argued that respondent No. 2 was neither a necessary nor a proper party, as the guarantees provided for unconditional payment on demand. The core legal question was whether the court properly exercised its discretion under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to implead a party whose interest is affected by the subject matter of the suit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion. The ratio is that a 'proper party' is one whose presence is necessary for the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon all questions involved in the proceedings, even if no direct relief is claimed against them. The principle laid down is that the court may implead a party to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings, provided that party has a material interest in the outcome and their presence facilitates a final determination of the controversy.

  Questions settled

  • What is the difference between a 'necessary party' and a 'proper party' under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court add a party to a suit even if no direct relief is claimed against that party?
  • Does the court have the power to add a party to a suit to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings?
  • Is the joinder of a party under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 a matter of initial jurisdiction or judicial discretion?
  Read full judgment →
• United Bank Ltd, through Senior VicePresident, Zonal Office, Faisalabad vs Muhammad Saleem Raza and 2 others1994 SCMR 1795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-22
  review petitioncivil appealdismissal of appealdecision on meritsprocedural justiceSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 10-3-1993, which had dismissed Civil Appeal No. 1263 of 1990. The dismissal was based solely on the fact that a similar case, which had served as the basis for granting leave to appeal, was subsequently withdrawn. The petitioner sought review, arguing that the appeal should have been decided on its merits rather than being dismissed summarily. The petitioner further contended that the Court had granted leave in another related case, 'National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court No. 5, Faisalabad,' which was eventually allowed on merits, reported as 1993 SCMR 672. The Supreme Court accepted this contention, acknowledging that the dismissal of the appeal without addressing the merits was unjustified given the subsequent legal developments. Consequently, the Court set aside its previous order dated 10-3-1993, revived Civil Appeal No. 1263 of 1990, and directed that notice be issued to the respondents for a decision on the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil appeal be dismissed solely because a similar case used as a precedent for granting leave was withdrawn?
  • Is a party entitled to a decision on the merits of an appeal if the grounds for summary dismissal are shown to be erroneous?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to revive an appeal that was dismissed without consideration of its merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Umer Khitab vs Chief Superintendent, Central Telegraph Office, Peshawar And Another1994 PLC (C.S.) 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-20
  service tribunaldismissal from servicecompulsory retirementparity in punishmentmisconductleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examined whether the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the appellant should have been modified by the Service Tribunal into compulsory retirement, similar to the relief granted to a co-accused, Muhammad Hanif. The core legal question concerned the applicability of the principle of parity in punishment where co-workers were disciplined for misconduct. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not entitled to mitigation or parity in sentence because his case possessed numerous distinguishing features, notably that the nature and specifics of his charges—involving systemic failure to maintain office records leading to unfixable embezzlement responsibilities—differed substantially from those of the co-accused, and that the appellant additionally possessed a past blemished service record. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as being without merit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the penalty of dismissal from service must be modified into compulsory retirement on the ground of parity when a co-accused receives a lesser punishment?
  • Does a past blemished service record preclude a civil servant from claiming mitigation in penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• Umer Khitab vs Chief Superintendent, Central Telegraph Office, Peshawar and another (Copy)1994 SCMR 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-20
  service lawdismissal from serviceparity of punishmentmisconductservice tribunaldisciplinary proceedingsmitigation of penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a service dispute where the appellant, Umer Khitab, challenged his dismissal from service. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was legally obligated to modify the appellant's penalty of dismissal to compulsory retirement, citing the principle of consistency, because a co-accused, Muhammad Hanif, who was allegedly guilty of similar misconduct, had received a more lenient penalty. Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found that the charges against the appellant and the co-accused were fundamentally distinct. The co-accused faced allegations of intentional destruction of official records and misappropriation, whereas the appellant was charged with gross negligence in maintaining office records, which facilitated embezzlement by subordinates. Furthermore, the Court noted that the appellant possessed a prior blemished service record involving previous penalties. Consequently, the Court held that the principle of parity in punishment did not apply due to these material differences in conduct and service history. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the appellant was not entitled to mitigation based on the co-accused's sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Is a service tribunal required to impose identical penalties on co-accused employees regardless of differences in their specific misconduct?
  • Does the principle of parity in punishment apply when the nature of the charges and the service records of the employees involved are materially different?
  • Can an employee claim mitigation of a dismissal penalty based solely on the leniency shown to another employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Said and 2 others vs The State1994 PLD Supreme Court 255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-15
  Prohibition OrderHaddopium recoverydual convictionFIR as evidenceappellate reduction of sentencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court upholding the conviction of the three appellants under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The prosecution case alleged that a large quantity of opium was recovered from a secret chamber in a truck driven by the third appellant, with the first and second appellants sitting inside. The core legal questions involve the sufficiency of evidence regarding the identity and participation of the first two appellants who were not named by prosecution witnesses in court, and the propriety of dual convictions under both Articles 3 and 4 of the said Order for the same transaction. The Supreme Court held that an F.I.R. is not substantive evidence and cannot sustain a conviction unless supported by sworn testimony in court, thereby acquitting the first two appellants due to lack of ocular evidence. Regarding the third appellant, the Court held that a person cannot be dually convicted under both Articles 3 and 4 when the primary offence of transportation or trafficking inherently includes possession, reducing his sentence accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based solely on the contents of an F.I.R. when prosecution witnesses fail to name or identify the accused in court?
  • Is it proper to convict an accused person under both Article 3 and Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 for the same act of transporting and possessing an intoxicant?
  • Whether the offence of transporting or importing an intoxicant under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 inherently includes the offence of possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat Khan vs Inayatullah Butt and others1994 SCMR 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-19
  ejectment petitionrelationship of landlord and tenantdisputed titleconstitutional jurisdictionRent Controlleridentity of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of an ejectment petition filed by the appellant against the respondent on the grounds of default and personal need. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition, holding that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist. The appellate court reversed this decision and ordered eviction. Subsequently, the High Court accepted the respondent's constitutional petition, set aside the appellate order, and directed the landlord to establish his title before a competent civil court due to complex and conflicting evidence regarding the identity and ownership of the property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that when the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant depends squarely on complex questions of title and ownership, the Rent Controller cannot conclusively determine the matter without a proper civil adjudication. The apex court affirmed that while constitutional courts generally do not interfere with concurrent or appellate findings of fact, findings vitiated by non-consideration of material evidence or patent illegality are amenable to judicial review, and the proper course in such title-disputed tenancy matters is to relegate the parties to a civil court.

  Questions settled

  • What is the proper course for a Rent Controller when the determination of the relationship of landlord and tenant depends fundamentally on a complex question of title?
  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact rendered by an appellate rent tribunal in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether an ejectment petition is maintainable when the identity of the rented property is seriously disputed and clouded by conflicting evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Bakhsh and others vs The State1994 MLD 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-20
  criminal appealacid attackinjured witnessmedical evidenceappreciation of evidenceconvictioncompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Court for Speedy Trials, Multan, upon the appellants for offences involving physical assault and the use of acid. The appellants were convicted under Section 336 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving ten years' rigorous imprisonment and compensation orders under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, given the conflicting versions of the incident and the appellants' claim of self-defence regarding a land dispute. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding that the ocular testimony of the injured witnesses was consistent, credible, and materially corroborated by medical evidence, which confirmed the brutal nature of the injuries, including the loss of eyesight caused by acid. The Court held that the presence of injuries on the victims, combined with the preplanned nature of the attack, negated the appellants' defence. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the testimony of injured witnesses, when corroborated by medical evidence, carries significant evidentiary weight in criminal trials.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of an injured witness, when corroborated by medical evidence, provide sufficient grounds for conviction?
  • Can a plea of self-defence be sustained when the prosecution evidence establishes a preplanned attack?
  • Is the recovery of weapons and medical confirmation of injuries sufficient to reject a defence claim of false implication?
  Read full judgment →