Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muslim Commercial Bank Limited Employees' Union, Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Wah Zones through its General Secretary vs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi and others1994 SCMR 1031 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-06
  transfer of proceedingsjurisdiction of High Courtinterest of justiceconstitutional petitiontrade union registrationcollective bargaining agent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed under Article 186-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, seeking the transfer of a constitutional petition pending before the High Court of Sindh to the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench. The petitioner, a trade union, argued that because its registration and certification as a Collective Bargaining Agent occurred in Islamabad, the Sindh High Court lacked jurisdiction, and defending the case in Karachi caused inconvenience. The Supreme Court addressed the scope of its power under Article 186-A to transfer proceedings between High Courts. The Court held that while it possesses the authority to transfer cases in the interest of justice, this power is not equivalent to Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and cannot be invoked as a matter of course. The Court established the principle that mere inconvenience to a party or an assertion of lack of jurisdiction is insufficient to warrant a transfer. Instead, the appropriate legal remedy is to raise the plea of jurisdiction directly before the High Court where the case is pending.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court's power to transfer cases under Article 186-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 equate to the power of transfer under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is mere inconvenience to a party or an assertion of lack of jurisdiction sufficient grounds for the Supreme Court to transfer a case between High Courts?
  • Should a party seeking to challenge the jurisdiction of a High Court file a transfer petition in the Supreme Court or raise the plea before the High Court itself?
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• Mushtaq Ahmed and anothers vs Mst. Sat Bharai and 5 others1994 SCMR 1720 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-08
  leave to appealeffective talakdivorce noticeinheritance rightsMuslim Family Laws Ordinancerevocation of divorce
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment dismissing the petitioners' regular second appeal regarding inheritance rights to agricultural land left by the deceased, Gheba Khan. The core legal question was whether a divorce pronounced by the deceased husband became effective before his death, given that he died before the expiry of the ninety-day period following the notice of talak under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, thereby determining whether the respondent, his divorcee, was entitled to inherit his estate. The Supreme Court held that under section 7(3) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, a talak does not become effective until the expiration of ninety days from the delivery of notice to the Chairman, during which period the husband retains the option to revoke it and reconciliation proceedings take place. Because the husband died before the expiry of this statutory period, the talak never became effective, and the respondent legally continued to be his wife at the time of his death, making her fully entitled to inherit his property. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pronouncement of divorce become effective immediately upon notice to the Chairman under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • Is a wife entitled to inherit the estate of her deceased husband if he dies before the expiry of the ninety-day period following a notice of talak?
  • Can a husband revoke a pronouncement of divorce during the ninety-day reconciliation period provided under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
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• Musharaf Hussain vs The State1994 SCMR 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-10
  post-arrest bailZinaHudood Ordinancecredibility of witnessesafterthoughtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order dismissing the petitioner's bail application in a case involving an alleged offence of Zina. The petitioner was initially implicated in a murder case, but subsequently, a case under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 was registered against him following the death of the female victim and the receipt of a positive report regarding vaginal swabs. The core legal question was whether, given the circumstances and the credibility of the evidence, the petitioner was entitled to bail. The Supreme Court observed that the two alleged eyewitnesses to the Zina had been examined during the initial murder investigation but had failed to mention any allegation of Zina, making their subsequent statements recorded three months later appear as an afterthought. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed bail, holding that the unexplained delay and omission in the initial statements cast sufficient doubt on the prosecution's case at the pre-trial stage to warrant the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of eyewitnesses to mention an alleged offence during the initial investigation of a related crime render their subsequent statements regarding that offence suspect?
  • Is bail appropriate when the prosecution's case relies on statements recorded with significant delay after the initial investigation?
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• Munir Ahmed vs Shahid Mahmood and 2 others1994 SCMR 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-25
  ejectmentrestoration of appealnon-prosecutioncommercial premisesconsent decreevacation of premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as an appeal against an ejectment order, which was initially dismissed for non-prosecution but subsequently restored upon the appellant's application. Upon hearing the appeal on its merits, the Court found no legal infirmity in the impugned order. During the proceedings, the appellant's counsel offered to withdraw the appeal if granted reasonable time to vacate the commercial premises. The respondents, represented by counsel and present in person, consented to this proposal on the condition that the appellant provides a formal undertaking to vacate voluntarily by a specified date without requiring execution proceedings. The Court, noting the long-standing nature of the ejectment case initiated in 1985, accepted the compromise. The Court granted the appellant time until 30-3-1994 to vacate the premises, subject to the condition that the appellant continues to pay rent regularly and surrenders peaceful possession by the deadline. It was further ordered that failure to comply would result in immediate eviction, using force if necessary, without further notice.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court grant time for vacating premises based on a mutual undertaking between the parties?
  • What are the consequences of failing to vacate commercial premises after an undertaking is given to the Supreme Court?
  • Is an appeal that was dismissed for non-prosecution eligible for restoration upon application?
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• Munir Ahmed Shaikh vs Government of Sindh through Additional Chief1994 PLD Supreme Court 899 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-26
  service senioritycivil servanttransfer on requestretrospective seniorityplenary powersvested rightsregularization of ad hoc appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal arose from a seniority dispute between two civil servants in the Public Health Engineering Department of the Government of Sindh. The core legal question was whether an order granting retrospective seniority to a civil servant transferred on his own request was valid, particularly when it adversely affected the seniority of another civil servant who had already been regularized in the same cadre. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Service Tribunal's decision that the retrospective seniority order was illegal. The Court held that under Rule 12 of the Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, a civil servant transferred on their own request must rank junior to those already appointed on a regular basis. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that while the government possesses plenary powers under Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, to alleviate hardship, such powers cannot be exercised to impair the vested statutory rights of other civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant transferred on their own request rank junior to those already appointed on a regular basis in the new department?
  • Can the government exercise plenary powers under Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 to grant retrospective seniority if it impairs the vested rights of other civil servants?
  • Is an order granting retrospective seniority valid if it is passed after another civil servant has already been regularized in the same cadre?
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• Munir Ahmed Shaikh vs Government of Sindh Through Additional Chief1994 PLD Supreme Court 899 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-26
  civil servantsseniorityretrospective senioritytransfer on requestregularization of ad hoc appointmentplenary powershardship caseservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, which allowed a service appeal filed by respondent No.3, Khalil Ahmed Soomro, claiming seniority over the appellant, Munir Ahmed Shaikh, in the Public Health Engineering Department. The core legal questions involve determining whether a civil servant transferred on their own request has a better right to seniority than one regularized under the Sindh Civil Servants (Regularization of Ad hoc Appointment) Act, 1989, and the legality of granting retrospective seniority in a manner that adversely affects accrued statutory rights of another civil servant. The Supreme Court held that the order granting retrospective seniority to the appellant from the date of his transfer was illegal and invalid, as his permanent absorption was originally effected from a later date, whereas the respondent had already been regularized earlier in time. The Court laid down the principle that while the Government may exercise its plenary powers to alleviate hardship under section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, such powers cannot be exercised to impair or impinge upon the vested statutory seniority rights of other civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant transferred from one department to another on their own request ranks junior to persons appointed before them on a regular basis under Rule 12 of the Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975?
  • Can an order granting retrospective seniority to a civil servant be passed if it impairs the vested statutory rights of another civil servant?
  • Whether the Government can exercise its plenary powers under section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, to the detriment of another civil servant's accrued seniority?
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• Munir Ahmad vs The State1994 SCMR 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-08
  grave and sudden provocationculpable homicide not amounting to murdermurderreduction of sentenceillicit relationsmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased, whom the appellant suspected of having illicit relations with his wife. The trial court sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for life, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court after rejecting the plea of grave and sudden provocation as an afterthought. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the act of the appellant fell under premeditated murder or was committed under grave and sudden provocation. The Supreme Court held that the plea of grave and sudden provocation was substantiated by the prosecution's own record regarding the motive, and therefore set aside the conviction under Section 302 and converted it to Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principle laid down is that where the motive alleged by the prosecution itself supports the existence of strained relations and prior illicit conduct regarding the accused's wife, a sudden altercation and provocative remark can bring the case out of premeditated murder into culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of grave and sudden provocation can be treated as an afterthought when the prosecution's own case and FIR allege a motive involving illicit relations?
  • Does killing a person who uttered provocative insults regarding the accused's wife constitute premeditated murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in cases of sudden provocation?
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• Municipal Committee, Daska through its Chairman vs M/s. Farhat1994 SCMR 1235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-18
  arrears of land revenuemunicipal committeecontractual disputesummary recoverydefinition of rentlocal government ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether a Municipal Committee can recover outstanding dues from a contractor, who held a contract to collect bus stand fees, as arrears of land revenue under Section 141 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. The appellant argued that the dues constituted 'rent,' which is expressly recoverable under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court examined the definition of 'rent' under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, noting that while the Ordinance allows recovery of 'rents' as arrears of land revenue, the contract in question involved the right to collect fees, not the lease of immovable property. The Court held that the amount sought was not 'rent' in the legal sense, as the contract was merely for the right to collect taxes or fees, not for the use or occupation of property. Consequently, the Court ruled that the summary recovery mechanism under the Ordinance was inapplicable, as the matter required accounting and adjudication, and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to collect bus stand fees under a contract constitute 'rent' within the meaning of Section 141 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can a Municipal Committee recover contractual dues as arrears of land revenue if the amount is not 'rent' as defined by law?
  • Is a contract granting the right to collect fees from a bus stand equivalent to a lease of immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
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• Mumtaz Imran and others vs Nasrin Mehmooda1994 SCMR 1877 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-26
  pre-emptionleave to appealcompensation for improvementspleadingstenancy rightsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal regarding a pre-emption suit. The respondent had successfully instituted a suit for pre-emption of land sold in 1979, with the trial court, district court, and High Court all ruling in favor of the respondent. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the petitioners could raise a plea of superior pre-emption rights based on tenancy for the first time in appeal, and whether the compensation awarded for improvements to the land was inadequate. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners could not raise the tenancy plea as it was not pleaded in the written statement. Furthermore, regarding compensation, the Court found that the amount awarded exceeded the petitioners' own stated claim before the trial court, based on a report by a Local Commissioner appointed with the parties' consent. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that appellate courts are not required to entertain pleas not raised in the pleadings, and findings based on consent-based reports are generally conclusive.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea of superior pre-emption rights based on tenancy for the first time in appeal if it was not pleaded in the written statement?
  • Is an appellate court justified in refusing to consider a new ground of defense not raised in the trial court pleadings?
  • Can a party challenge the quantum of compensation for improvements when the amount awarded exceeds the claim originally stated by that party before the trial court?
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• Mumtaz Ali Shah and 6 others vs Sultan and 2 others by Legal Heirs1994 SCMR 1725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-21
  res judicatapartition suitcause of actionpossessionleave to appealrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the defendants' revision petition against an appellate order which had remanded a partition suit for trial on merits. The core legal question is whether a subsequent suit for possession through partition is barred by the principle of res judicata on account of a previously decreed possession suit involving the same land. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent suit is based on a distinct and different cause of action, namely that the land has turned into a vacant site within the village abadi and the defendants refused a private partition for construction purposes, rendering the bar of res judicata inapplicable. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower appellate court and the High Court, establishing that a change in the nature of the property and a fresh cause of action for partition removes the bar of res judicata from a prior possessory suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for possession through partition is barred by res judicata due to a previously decreed suit for possession regarding the same land?
  • Does a change in the nature of the land into a vacant site within village limits constitute a different cause of action for partition?
  • Can the rule of res judicata be invoked when the subsequent proceedings arise from a distinct cause of action?
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• Mukhtar Ahmed vs Bashir Ahmad and 3 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 674 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-17
  specific performancebona fide purchasersubsequent transfereenotice of original contractagreement to sellburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal filed under Article 185(2)(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the first appellate court's decree for specific performance and restored the trial court's dismissal of the suit, while granting an alternative money decree for the return of earnest money with interest. The core legal question was whether respondent No. 2 qualified as a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of the prior agreement to sell under section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's own admission in cross-examination established that respondent No. 2 had no prior knowledge of the earlier agreement, and the mere mention of a lower consideration in the sale deed did not negate good faith or valuable consideration. The Court laid down the principle that specific performance cannot be enforced against a subsequent transferee for value who has paid money in good faith and without notice of the original contract, and that the burden of proving want of notice is discharged where admissions or evidence support the purchaser's bona fides.

  Questions settled

  • Whether specific performance of a contract can be enforced against a subsequent transferee for value without notice?
  • Does the mention of a lesser sale consideration in a registered sale deed automatically render the subsequent purchaser a mala fide transferee?
  • Whether the burden of proving good faith and absence of notice lies upon the person claiming the protection of a bona fide purchaser?
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• Mukhtar Ahmed vs Bashir Ahmad And 3 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 674 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-17
  specific performancebona fide purchasersubsequent transfereeagreement to sellburden of proofnotice of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a dispute over the specific performance of an agreement to sell a plot of land situated in Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore. The core legal question is whether respondent No. 2 qualified as a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice under section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, thus barring the plaintiff-appellant's suit for specific performance. The Supreme Court held that the burden of proving lack of good faith and notice lay on the plaintiff, who himself admitted in cross-examination that the subsequent purchaser had no prior knowledge of the original agreement. The Court further held that a discrepancy between the actual consideration paid and the nominal consideration stated in the sale-deed did not invalidate the transferee's bona fides or defeat the protection of section 27(b). The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court that restored the trial court's dismissal of the suit while upholding the alternative monetary relief granted to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether specific performance of a contract can be enforced against a transferee for value who has paid in good faith and without notice of the original contract?
  • Does a discrepancy between the actual consideration paid and the consideration stated in a sale-deed destroy the status of a bona fide purchaser?
  • On whom lies the burden of proving that a subsequent transferee had notice of a prior agreement to sell?
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• Mukhtar Ahmad vs The State1994 SCMR 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-16
  robberyidentification paradeleave to appealcredible testimonycriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, which modified the petitioner's conviction from Section 392 read with Section 397, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, to Section 392, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and reduced his sentence of imprisonment to five years rigorous imprisonment for robbery. The core legal question concerns the reliability of the identification of the accused, given that the eyewitnesses claimed prior acquaintance at trial which they had not stated to the police, the naming of the accused by a witness who later denied identification, and the absence of an identification parade. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the doubtful identity of the petitioner required formal examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the conviction could be sustained without a proper identification parade or consistent testimony regarding the identity of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for robbery can be sustained when eyewitnesses claim prior acquaintance with the accused at trial but failed to state the same to the police?
  • Is an identification parade necessary when the identity of the accused is provided by a witness who subsequently denies identifying the accused during court proceedings?
  • Does the absence of an identification parade create sufficient doubt regarding the participation of the accused in the crime to warrant leave to appeal?
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• Muhav Mad Usman Qureshi vs Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore and another1994 SCMR 953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-17
  service appealrestoration of appealnon-prosecutionservice of noticeinordinate delayduty of diligenceFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which refused to restore an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioner's appeal was originally dismissed in 1987 after he failed to appear at hearings, despite the Tribunal attempting to serve notice at the address provided by the petitioner. The petitioner subsequently applied for restoration in 1993, claiming he had no knowledge of the hearing dates and that his counsel had misled him regarding the status of the case. The Tribunal rejected the restoration application, noting that the petitioner failed to update his address, that there was an inordinate delay in filing the restoration application, and that the petitioner showed a lack of diligence in pursuing the matter for several years. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the refusal to restore the appeal was a proper exercise of discretion. The Court held that a party is responsible for maintaining contact with the forum and updating their address, and that unexplained, inordinate delay in seeking restoration justifies the dismissal of such applications.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to update one's address with the Tribunal justify the dismissal of an appeal for non-prosecution?
  • Can an appeal be restored after an inordinate delay of several years without a valid explanation?
  • Is the refusal of a Service Tribunal to restore an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution a valid exercise of discretion when the appellant failed to pursue the matter diligently?
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• Muhammd Khan and anothers vs Fazal Muhammad and another1994 SCMR 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-16
  immovable propertyexchange of landregistered deedretrospective operationvoid transactionmutationTransfer of Property Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil dispute concerning the validity of a land exchange mutation executed on 28-11-1975. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, declaring the oral exchange of immovable property void for lack of a registered deed, as required by sections 54 and 118 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which were applicable to the Punjab province at the time via a 1974 notification. Although the first appellate court reversed this decision, the High Court restored the trial court's judgment. The petitioners argued before the Supreme Court that a subsequent 1978 notification, which superseded the 1974 notification, retroactively validated the oral exchange. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the 1978 notification could not operate retrospectively to validate a transaction that was void at the time of its execution. The Court affirmed that the transaction remained void because it failed to comply with the statutory requirements in force at the material time. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subsequent notification restricting the application of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, retroactively validate a transaction that was void at the time of its execution?
  • Is an oral exchange of immovable property valued over Rs. 100 valid in the absence of a registered deed when sections 54 and 118 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are applicable?
  • Does a government notification superseding an earlier notification have retrospective effect to validate previously void transactions?
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• Muhammad Zulfikar vs Muhammad Nazir and another1994 SCMR 1982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-11
  specific performanceagreement to sellconcurrent findings of factleave to appealappreciation of evidenceburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that affirmed the dismissal of a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The petitioner sought the transfer of a plot based on an alleged agreement dated 22-4-1990, claiming partial payment of the consideration. The trial court, the appellate court, and the High Court concurrently dismissed the suit, finding that the petitioner failed to prove the execution of the agreement. Specifically, the courts noted significant contradictions in the testimony of the petitioner's witnesses, including the scribe and the Notary Public, and observed that no independent evidence supported the claim. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution of a document. The Supreme Court held that since the lower courts had properly appraised the evidence and there was no allegation that the judgments were based on no evidence, it would not reappraise the evidence afresh. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that the Supreme Court generally declines to disturb concurrent findings of fact absent illegality or irregularity.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the execution of an agreement?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to reappraise evidence in a petition for leave to appeal where no allegation of 'no evidence' is raised?
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• Muhammad Zaman Khan and 10 others vs Muhammad Ramzan Khan1994 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-30
  review petitionpre-emptionright of pre-emptionmarket valuesale pricealienation of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning a pre-emption dispute. The petitioners raised two new contentions: first, that the respondent pre-emptor had sold the disputed land during the pendency of the appeal, thereby demonstrating a lack of interest in the property; and second, that the petitioners were entitled to the current market value of the land rather than the original sale price. Regarding the first point, the Court held that the document produced was merely an agreement to sell, not a completed sale, and further clarified that a pre-emptor who successfully exercises their superior right is not legally barred from disposing of the property in the future. Regarding the second point, the Court affirmed that under the Punjab Pre-emption Act in force at the relevant time, a pre-emptor is entitled to acquire the land at the price actually paid by the vendee to the vendor. Consequently, the Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the petitioners were entitled only to the original sale price as decreed, not the current market value.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell property by a pre-emptor during the pendency of an appeal constitute a forfeiture of the right of pre-emption?
  • Is a pre-emptor entitled to acquire land at the current market value or the price actually paid by the vendee under the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  • Can a pre-emptor who has acquired land through a superior right dispose of that land in the future?
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• Muhammad Yousuf vs The State1994 SCMR 1148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-12
  ocular evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder convictionappreciation of evidencewitness credibilityacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a High Court judgment that maintained the appellant's conviction for double murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting his co-accused. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony provided by the prosecution witnesses was reliable enough to sustain a conviction, given significant contradictions between their statements and the physical evidence at the crime scene. The Supreme Court observed that the witnesses' claims regarding their presence at the scene were undermined by the absence of expected household items and contradictory accounts of who brought meals to the site. Furthermore, the High Court had already disbelieved these witnesses regarding the participation of the co-accused. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the ocular evidence was insufficient to establish the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying the principle that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused when the prosecution's evidence is inconsistent and unreliable, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of physical evidence at a crime scene, which contradicts the testimony of eye-witnesses, entitle an accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Can an appellate court acquit an accused when the ocular evidence relied upon by the trial court has been disbelieved regarding co-accused in the same case?
  • Is the testimony of eye-witnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction if there are material contradictions regarding their presence at the scene of the occurrence?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs The State1994 SCMR 1733 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-27
  murderself-defenceprivate defencesentence reductiondeath sentence commutationsuppression of motivecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court upholding his conviction under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, for the murder of the deceased, and his sentence of death. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's plea of self-defence was sustainable based on the circumstances and whether the sentence of death was warranted given the suppression of the true motive by prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's plea of self-defence could not be sustained merely because the incident occurred in front of the accused's house or because the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive, thereby upholding the conviction. However, considering that the prosecution witnesses had concealed the true genesis and reason for the attack, the Court converted the petition into an appeal and altered the petitioner's sentence from death to imprisonment for life, while granting the benefit of section 382-B, Criminal Procedure Code. The key principle laid down is that while failure to prove motive or occurrence near the accused's house does not establish private defence, concealment of the true genesis of the occurrence by witnesses can be a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mere fact that an occurrence took place in front of the house of the accused party implies that the accused was under attack?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to establish the motive have a direct bearing on the plea of self-defence?
  • Can the concealment of the true reason for an attack by prosecution witnesses serve as a mitigating circumstance for reducing a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs Muhammad Abdullah and 3 others1994 SCMR 502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-25
  pre-emptioncivil revisionmisreading of evidencenon-reading of evidenceplaint interpretationright of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, brought by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenges the High Court's dismissal of a Civil Revision petition concerning a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the lower courts had committed misreading or non-reading of evidence regarding the respondents' pleadings and their intent to enforce the right of pre-emption over the entire suit land. The appellant contended that the respondents' pleadings indicated an intention to enforce pre-emption only partially, rather than regarding the entire property. Upon review, the Supreme Court examined the plaint and found that the respondents had clearly expressed a desire to enforce their right of pre-emption under all circumstances, regardless of potential failures in the underlying sale transaction. The Court held that there was no evidence of misreading or non-reading by the lower courts, noting that the respondents' consistent pursuit of the entire suit land demonstrated their intent. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the lower courts' findings were based on a correct appreciation of the evidence presented.

  Questions settled

  • Does a conditional statement in a plaint regarding the enforcement of a pre-emption right over part of the land negate the intent to claim the entire suit land?
  • Can a High Court's dismissal of a Civil Revision be overturned on the grounds of misreading or non-reading of evidence if the pleadings clearly support the lower court's findings?
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• Muhammad Younus vs The State1994 SCMR 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-16
  criminal appealmurder convictiondeath sentenceeyewitness testimonymedical evidencepost-mortem reportappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the confirmation of a death sentence by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner, a former employee of the complainant, was convicted of murdering the complainant's sister, Mst. Shamim, following a dispute over a marriage proposal and the victim's subsequent engagement to another person. The core legal questions addressed were whether the prosecution's eyewitness account was physically impossible given the speed of the attack and the proximity of witnesses, and whether discrepancies in the post-mortem report regarding the time of death undermined the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court held that the nature of the injuries, which were severe and consistent with the weapon used, could be inflicted in a short timeframe, and that the witnesses' inability to intervene in time was plausible. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the medical report's estimation of the time of death created a fatal inconsistency, noting the margin of error inherent in such reports. The petition was dismissed, affirming that the evidence sufficiently established the petitioner's guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the defense argues that the time of death estimated in a post-mortem report conflicts with the alleged time of occurrence?
  • Is it physically impossible for an assailant to inflict fatal injuries with a hatchet in the presence of witnesses who are only a few steps away?
  • Does an old rupture of the hymen in a post-mortem report provide sufficient grounds to infer that a murder was committed by a family member due to suspected chastity?
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• Muhammad Younus and anothers vs The State1994 SCMR 700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  post-arrest bailleave to appealmurderunlawful assemblyfirearm injurieseye-witness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court dismissing their bail application in a case involving offences under sections 302, 452, 148, 149 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners, along with others, formed an unlawful assembly, chased the deceased persons into a house, and inflicted fatal firearm injuries. An eye-witness, Mst. Zainab Bibi, corroborated the occurrence and assigned specific roles to the petitioners. The core legal question was whether reasonable grounds existed to believe the petitioners committed the alleged capital offences, disentitling them to post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court held that the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing bail was proper and legal, given the specific attribution of firearm injuries and the presence of an eye-witness. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is specifically charged with fatal injuries supported by eye-witness testimony, reasonable grounds exist to refuse post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be refused when an accused is specifically assigned a role of causing firearm injuries to the deceased?
  • Does the presence of an eye-witness account implicating the accused constitute reasonable grounds to believe that the accused committed the offence?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by a High Court in dismissing a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younas vs Secretary, Law and Justice Division, Islamabad1994 PLC (C.S.) 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30
  leave to appealservice tribunalconcession by counselunauthorized concessionproper disposal of appealseniority and pay
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which disposed of his service appeal based on a statement made by the respondent's counsel that the petitioner's seniority, pay, and fringe benefits would be protected, despite the petitioner's contention that he challenged his illegal transfer and never authorized his counsel to make such a concession. The core legal question was whether the disposal of an appeal by the Service Tribunal on the basis of an admission by the respondent's counsel on a point not forming the subject-matter of the appeal constituted a proper disposal. The Supreme Court held that disposing of the appeal on such a basis raised a substantial question of law regarding the propriety of the Tribunal's adjudication. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the disposal of an appeal by the Service Tribunal on the basis of an admission by the respondent's counsel on a point not forming the subject-matter of the appeal is a proper disposal of the case?
  • Can an appeal be disposed of as not pressed based on a concession allegedly not authorized by the appellant?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younas vs Secretary, Law and Justice Division, Islamabad1994 SCMR 685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30
  Service Tribunalconcession by counselleave to appealservice senioritytransfer orderadjudication of controversy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had disposed of his appeal based on a concession made by his counsel. The petitioner contended that he had challenged the legality of his transfer order and sought reversion to his parent department, but the Tribunal failed to adjudicate this core controversy. Instead, the Tribunal disposed of the appeal as 'not pressed' based on an assurance from the respondent's counsel regarding the protection of the petitioner's seniority and fringe benefits—a matter the petitioner claimed was not the subject of his appeal. Furthermore, the petitioner denied authorizing his counsel to make such a concession. The Supreme Court identified the central legal question as whether the Service Tribunal properly disposed of the appeal by relying on a concession regarding a matter not originally raised in the appeal, effectively bypassing the petitioner's actual grievance. Finding merit in the petition, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the propriety of the Tribunal's disposal of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Service Tribunal can dispose of an appeal based on a concession regarding a matter that was not the subject-matter of the appeal?
  • Does a counsel's concession on a point not raised in the pleadings constitute a valid basis for disposing of a service appeal?
  • Is an order of the Service Tribunal legally sustainable if it fails to address the core controversy raised in the appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar and others vs Additional Commissioner1994 SCMR 1456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-10
  land settlementallotment cancellationfraudulent allotmentnecessary partiesinformer rightsvested rightssubsequent purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a challenge to an order cancelling land allotments obtained by one Muhammad Moosa under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The original allottee had admitted obtaining allotments through fraud and deceit. The petitioners, who were subsequent purchasers of the land from the allottee's transferee, challenged the cancellation order in the Lahore High Court, arguing that the informers who initiated the cancellation proceedings were not necessary parties to the writ petition. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the informers were necessary parties and that the petitioners, as successors-in-interest, could not claim better title than the original allottee who admitted to fraud. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, affirming that informers under Section 14-A of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 possess a vested right to secure allotment of land resumed due to their information. Consequently, the Court held that the informers were indeed necessary parties, and finding no merit in the petitioners' arguments, refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Do informers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 have a vested right to claim land resumed due to their information?
  • Are informers who initiate proceedings for the cancellation of fraudulent land allotments considered necessary parties in subsequent writ petitions?
  • Can a subsequent purchaser of land claim a better title than the original allottee who obtained the land through fraud?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaoob and anothers vs The State1994 MLD 1394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-20
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionkidnapping for ransomchild murderjuvenile offendercapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the convictions and sentences of two minor appellants, Muhammad Yaqoob and Imran Shamas, who were convicted by the Special Court for Speedy Trials under sections 364-A and 302(b)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the kidnapping and murder of a six-year-old boy, Umair Akbar. The core legal questions involve the sufficiency and reliability of circumstantial evidence, including last-seen evidence, extra-judicial confessions, and consequential recoveries, to sustain capital punishment and imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the chain of circumstantial evidence was complete, inspiring confidence, and corroborated by reliable witness testimony and material recoveries. The Court affirmed that despite the absence of direct ocular testimony, reliable circumstantial evidence coupled with extra-judicial confessions and recovery of the murder weapon and dead body is fully sufficient to maintain a conviction in heinous offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder and kidnapping be sustained solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct eyewitness accounts?
  • Whether extra-judicial confessions corroborated by the recovery of the dead body and the weapon of offense are sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Does the youth of an accused convicted of a diabolic murder of a minor child provide a mitigating ground for commuting the death penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Usman Qureshi vs Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore And Another1994 PLC (C.S.) 780 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-17
  service appealdismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appealcondonation of delayleave to appealFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which refused to restore his service appeal that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The appeal, filed in January 1987, was fixed for preliminary hearing, but notices sent to the petitioner's given address were returned with the report that he did not reside there, and further attempts at service through a process-server yielded the same result. The Tribunal ultimately dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution in September 1987. More than five years later, in January 1993, the petitioner filed an application for restoration along with an application for condonation of delay, claiming lack of knowledge of the hearing date and reliance on his counsel. The Tribunal dismissed the restoration application due to lack of diligence, failure to communicate a change of address, and inordinate delay. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's refusal to restore the appeal was based on a proper exercise of discretion, and consequently, dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal properly exercised its discretion in refusing to restore an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution after an inordinate delay?
  • Does failure to provide a correct postal address or communicate a change of address justify the dismissal of an appeal for non-prosecution?
  • Whether an appellant can claim lack of knowledge of hearing dates when notices sent to the provided address are returned unserved?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tufail vs Additional District Judge and another1994 SCMR 1793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-23
  leave to appealex parte decreecross-examinationrevision petitiondamages suitconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's revision petition against the appellate judgment upholding an ex parte decree for damages. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was denied adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and defend the suit, and whether interference was warranted against concurrent findings of lower courts. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner failed to substantiate claims of being denied cross-examination, noting that the assertion was a mere afterthought unsupported by the record, and that no error of law existed to warrant interference. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that concurrent factual findings regarding procedural opportunities will not be disturbed by the apex court in the absence of demonstrable error on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte decree can be set aside when the record shows the party was afforded adequate opportunity to participate?
  • Is a contention regarding denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses sustainable without supporting evidence from the trial court record?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding procedural matters where no error of law is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tufail and anothers vs Mirza Aziz Ullah and 14 others1994 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-19
  review petitionconstitutional powerswaiver of rightssettlement lawinformer's rightChief Settlement Commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, wherein the petitioners challenged the relief granted to the respondents, arguing it exceeded their claims and that the respondents had waived their legal rights. The petitioners further contended that the Chief Settlement Commissioner had acted correctly in ordering the sale of the land in their favour. The core legal questions were whether the Court exceeded its constitutional powers in granting relief and whether the respondents had waived their rights. The Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any restriction on the Court's constitutional powers under Article 187, which had been expressly invoked. Furthermore, the Court determined that no waiver occurred prior to the impugned order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and any subsequent waiver was irrelevant. The Court reaffirmed that the statutory right of an informer prevails over other claims and operates from a retrospective date. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the review petition and dismissed it, upholding the superior statutory right of the informer.

  Questions settled

  • Does a waiver of rights occurring subsequent to an impugned order validate that order?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant relief under Article 187 that exceeds the specific claims made by the parties?
  • Does the statutory right of an informer prevail over other competing claims in settlement matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tufail and 2 others vs The State1994 SCMR 1211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-13
  compromiseqisas and diyatminor heirsacquittalleave to appealinterlocutory order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court, which had questioned an acquittal based on a compromise in a murder case. The petitioners, accused of murder under sections 148, 302, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, had been acquitted by a Special Court following a compromise with the complainant (the deceased's father) and his wife. However, the High Court subsequently noted that the deceased was survived by minor siblings, rendering the compromise legally insufficient for acquittal. The Supreme Court examined the facts and confirmed that the existence of minor heirs was admitted by the petitioners. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's order, which was interlocutory in nature and sought to address the legal validity of the compromise in the presence of minor heirs, did not warrant interference. The Court refused leave to appeal, effectively upholding the High Court's scrutiny of the compromise arrangement.

  Questions settled

  • Can an acquittal based on a compromise be sustained in a murder case where the deceased is survived by minor heirs?
  • Does the existence of minor heirs invalidate a compromise agreement reached between the accused and the parents of the deceased?
  • Is an order by the High Court directing further consideration of a compromise in a criminal case an interlocutory order that does not warrant Supreme Court interference?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad through Legel Heirs vs Mst. Rehmatan and 4 others1994 SCMR 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-28
  Muslim Family LawsRepugnancy to Injunctions of IslamFederal Shariat Court jurisdictionConstitutional jurisdictionStatutory validity
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had relied upon Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The petitioner contended that the said provision was repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and, therefore, could not form a valid legal basis for the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core legal question of whether it possessed the jurisdiction to declare a statutory provision invalid on the grounds of inconsistency with Islamic Injunctions. The Court held that such a plea is inadmissible before it, as the exclusive forum for determining whether a provision of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 is contrary to the Injunctions of Islam is the Federal Shariat Court, acting under Article 203-D of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that it lacks the jurisdiction in its normal appellate capacity to strike down statutes on the basis of repugnancy to Islamic Injunctions, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court of Pakistan have the jurisdiction to declare a statutory provision invalid on the ground of its inconsistency with the Injunctions of Islam?
  • Which forum is exclusively empowered to determine whether a provision of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 is contrary to the Injunctions of Islam?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tariq vs The Director-General, Maritime Security Agency1994 PLC (C.S.) 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-05-03
  temporary appointmenttermination of serviceabolition of postcivil serviceservice tribunalvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Draftsman appointed on a temporary basis in BPS-14, challenged the termination of his services before the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal. The matter reached the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question was whether a civil servant appointed on a temporary basis against a temporary post possesses a vested legal right to retain that position or claim reinstatement after the post is abolished. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Federal Service Tribunal, holding that the petitioner's appointment was explicitly temporary and the post itself was abolished due to administrative decisions by the Ministry of Defence. The Court reasoned that because the underlying post was not permanent and the appointment was temporary, the petitioner had no legal claim to the position. Consequently, the Court affirmed that a temporary employee whose post is abolished holds no enforceable right to continued employment or to insist on appointment to a lower-graded post, thereby dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant appointed on a temporary basis against a temporary post have a legal right to continue in service after the post is abolished?
  • Can a temporary employee insist on appointment to a lower-graded post after their original temporary post is abolished?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tariq and anothers vs The State1994 SCMR 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  post-arrest bailleave to appealmurderhouse trespasscommon objectbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court dismissing their post-arrest bail application in a case registered under sections 302, 452, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the specific roles attributed to them in the FIR regarding house trespass and facilitating the murder. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners were specifically named for trespassing and breaking open the door through which the deceased was dragged out and killed, the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing bail was proper and warranted no interference. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that accused persons actively participating in house trespass and facilitating a murder during the incident are not entitled to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Are accused persons who are alleged to have broken open a door and facilitated a murder entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretion in refusing bail when direct roles are assigned in the FIR?
  • Does participation in house trespass during the commission of a murder disentitle an accused from receiving bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sultan and others vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue_Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, Lahore and another1994 SCMR 1864 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-01
  evacuee landallotmentProduce Index Unitscancellation of allotmentsupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellants' writ petition in limine regarding the allotment of evacuee land. The core legal question concerns whether the appellants were entitled to the allotment of specific land in their possession against balance unsatisfied Produce Index Units pursuant to a previous final High Court judgment. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were indeed entitled to land equivalent to 1,363 Produce Index Units in preference to respondent No. 2 as the earlier High Court order had attained finality, while excess land allotted beyond that limit was subject to valid cancellation, and pending claims of respondent No. 2 merited adjustment for the remainder. The key principle laid down is that final judicial determinations regarding entitlements to evacuee land claims must be strictly honored and implemented by revenue authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioners were entitled to ask for allotment of land in their possession against balance of unsatisfied P.I. Units in terms of a previous High Court order?
  • Do appellants have a preferential claim over land in their possession under the policy of allotment of evacuee land?
  • Are revenue authorities bound to implement final judgments of the High Court regarding entitlement to land units?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Subhan and anothers vs Mst. Bilous Begum through Legal1994 SCMR 1507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-16
  ejectmentsublettingparting with possessionsole proprietorshippartnership firmrent defaulttenancy rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an ejectment order confirmed by the High Court, based on allegations of rent default and unauthorized subletting of commercial premises. The landlord contended that the tenant, initially a sole proprietor, converted the business into a partnership firm without written consent, constituting subletting under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The petitioners argued that the partnership existed from the inception of the tenancy and that no subletting occurred. The Supreme Court observed that a sole proprietary firm lacks independent legal existence, and its conversion into a partnership fundamentally alters the juristic personality of the tenant, thereby creating new interests in the premises. The Court held that such conversion, without the landlord's written consent, constitutes parting with possession under the Ordinance. Furthermore, the Court noted the tenant's admission of lacking written permission for the induction of the firm. Regarding the rent default, the Court found no valid justification for the delay. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding subletting and default.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conversion of a sole proprietary firm into a partnership firm constitute subletting or parting with possession under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is a tenant liable for ejectment if they induct partners into the business premises without the written consent of the landlord?
  • Does a sole proprietary firm possess a distinct legal personality separate from its proprietor in the context of tenancy agreements?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique vs The State1994 SCMR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-15
  criminal appealmurderdeath sentencealteration of sentencesudden affairmitigating circumstancesquantum of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. Leave to appeal was granted solely to consider the appropriateness of the sentence, as the legality of the conviction was not contested. The prosecution case stemmed from a dispute over the digging of a drain, leading to an altercation, after which the accused party returned and the appellant fired a fatal shot at the deceased. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Supreme Court noted that the incident arose from a sudden quarrel between closely related parties without previous enmity, and the sequence of events indicated that the extreme penalty of death was unwarranted. Consequently, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, altering the appellant's death sentence to imprisonment for life along with a fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the extreme penalty of death is called for when an offense is the result of a sudden altercation without preplanning?
  • Can the sentence of death be altered to imprisonment for life under mitigating circumstances?
  • Whether a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 warrants capital punishment in the absence of previous enmity and premeditation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique Haider Qureshi vs District Judge, Peshawar and 21994 SCMR 1752 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-22
  review petitionrent restrictiondefault in rentstatutory protectionburden of proofcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed by the petitioner against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 15-1-1992, which had dismissed his civil appeal regarding a rent dispute. The core legal question before the Court was whether the respondent was disqualified from claiming the benefit of the second proviso to section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on the basis of being a previous defaulter in rent payments. Upon reviewing the record and hearing the petitioner, the Court held that the review petition lacked merit. The Court reasoned that the petitioner failed to lead any evidence to substantiate the claim that the respondent had defaulted on rent payments on earlier occasions. Consequently, the Court dismissed the review petition, finding no grounds for interference, although it exercised its discretion to waive the costs previously imposed on the petitioner. The judgment reinforces the principle that allegations of previous default must be supported by evidence to deprive a tenant of statutory protections under rent control legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a tenant who has defaulted on rent payments on previous occasions entitled to the benefit of the second proviso of section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does a failure to lead evidence regarding previous defaults preclude a landlord from challenging a tenant's entitlement to statutory protections under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique and anothers vs Member (Consolidation), Board1994 SCMR 1972 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-10
  restoration of petitionnon-prosecutionsufficient causedismissal of writ petitioncounsel negligencecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of a Judge in Chambers, which had dismissed an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the restoration of a Constitution petition previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether the petitioners demonstrated sufficient cause for restoration, given that their original counsel had retired from practice without notifying them, leading to their absence on the date of hearing. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were not negligent, noting that the petition had remained pending for eight years and that parties in constitutional petitions generally rely on their counsel for updates. The Court found that the failure of the retired advocate to inform the clients constituted sufficient ground for restoration. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the dismissal order, and restored the Constitution petition to its original number, subject to the payment of costs by the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Does the retirement of a counsel without notice to the client constitute sufficient cause for the restoration of a petition dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Is a party to a Constitution petition required to appear on every date of hearing regardless of instructions from their counsel?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shuaib and others vs Sessions Judge, Swat and others1994 SCMR 665 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-28
  public nuisancesummary jurisdictionobstruction of pathrevenue recordcivil court jurisdictionquashment of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the obstruction of a path passing through the appellants' privately-owned property. Respondents initiated proceedings under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the Assistant Commissioner/Magistrate, Swat, seeking the removal of the obstruction, claiming it was a public path. The Magistrate's conditional order for removal was upheld by the Sessions Judge, and a subsequent petition for quashment under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was dismissed by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question was whether the summary jurisdiction under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 could be invoked to remove an obstruction on a path where the status of the path as 'public' was disputed and not supported by the Revenue Record. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the impugned orders were unwarranted as the Revenue Record did not support the claim of a public path. The Court established that summary proceedings under Section 133 are inappropriate for resolving disputed questions of title or the public nature of a path; such matters must be adjudicated by a Civil Court of plenary jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can summary proceedings under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to resolve a dispute regarding the existence of a public path?
  • Is a Magistrate empowered to order the removal of an obstruction on a path when the path's status as public is not supported by the Revenue Record?
  • Should disputes concerning the public nature of a path on private property be decided by a Magistrate or a Civil Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sher vs Mst. Salma Bibi and another1994 SCMR 1124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-09-02
  dissolution of marriageKhularestoration of benefitspleadingsleave to appealdower
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that summarily dismissed a writ petition challenging a trial court's decree for the dissolution of marriage via Khula. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in failing to order the restoration of financial benefits allegedly derived by the respondent from the petitioner during the marriage, specifically regarding a sum of Rs. 7,000 sent from abroad. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to raise this specific plea in his written statement or during the trial proceedings. The Court observed that the petitioner had only claimed the restoration of a plot of land in his written statement, not the cash remittance now asserted. Furthermore, the Court noted that the respondent had already relinquished her dower amount of Rs. 15,000 as part of the Khula proceedings. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot raise a new factual contention for the first time before the Supreme Court when no foundation for such a claim was laid in the pleadings or evidence before the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new factual contention for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a husband entitled to the restoration of benefits upon the dissolution of marriage by Khula if he failed to plead such claims in his written statement?
  • Does the relinquishment of dower by a wife satisfy the requirement for the restoration of benefits in a Khula decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and anothers vs The State1994 SCMR 690 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-20
  suretyforfeited bondabsconding accusedleave to appealreduction of forfeited amountcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, who stood as surety for an accused person who subsequently absconded pending trial, sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that reduced the forfeited surety amount from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 20,000. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the discretion exercised in reducing the forfeited bond amount and whether further reduction was warranted given the duration of the accused's abscondence and the delay in filing the petition. The Supreme Court held that appropriate relief had already been granted and the discretion by the High Court was exercised on sound principles, noting additionally that the petition was barred by 128 days. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that no further interference was called for in the matter of surety bond forfeiture.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the discretion exercised in reducing a forfeited surety amount can be interfered with when based on sound principles?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused person justify the forfeiture of a surety bond?
  • Whether a petition filed with a delay of 128 days against the reduction of a forfeited surety amount is maintainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and another vs The State1994 SCMR 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-25
  criminal appealocular testimonycorroborationacquittal of co-accusedmurdercommon intentionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for murder and murderous assault under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellants challenged their conviction, arguing that the ocular testimony was insufficient for conviction without corroboration, particularly because their co-accused, implicated by the same evidence, had been acquitted. The core legal question was whether the acquittal of co-accused on the same evidence rendered the conviction of the appellants unsustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the acquittal of co-accused did not invalidate the conviction of the appellants. The Court reasoned that the appellants were specifically identified as the individuals who caused the fatal injury and the murderous assault, whereas the acquitted co-accused had caused no such injuries. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, finding no justification to interfere with the assessment of evidence. Furthermore, the Court directed that the appellants be granted the benefit of section 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding their sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on the same evidence automatically invalidate the conviction of the remaining accused?
  • Is ocular testimony sufficient for conviction in a murder case without independent corroboration?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi vs Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division and 2 others1994 SCMR 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-13
  No Objection Certificatepetrol pump installationvested rightslocus standiadministrative cancellationPetroleum Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the cancellation of a No Objection Certificate (N.O.C.) for a petrol pump. The petitioner, an agent for Pakistan State Oil Company, had been granted an N.O.C. in 1989, which was subsequently cancelled by the Deputy Commissioner, Chakwal, in 1990 following complaints regarding land ownership and misrepresentation. The petitioner challenged the cancellation, arguing that he had acquired a vested right through significant financial investment, that the cancellation occurred without a hearing, and that the appeal against the N.O.C. was time-barred under the Petroleum Rules, 1937. The High Court had dismissed the petition, citing the petitioner's lack of locus standi and the fact that the petitioner was heard during the appellate proceedings before the Commissioner. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the N.O.C. could be cancelled after such a duration, the validity of the appeal process under the Petroleum Rules, 1937, and the petitioner's standing to challenge the cancellation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a No Objection Certificate for a petrol pump be cancelled after a significant period during which the licensee has made substantial investments?
  • Does an agent of an oil company have the locus standi to challenge the cancellation of a No Objection Certificate granted to the company?
  • Is an appeal against the grant of a No Objection Certificate competent if filed beyond the thirty-day period prescribed under the Petroleum Rules, 1937?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed vs Mst. Sardar Begum and 4 others1994 SCMR 984 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-03
  specific performanceagreement to sellsecond appealfinding of factleave to appealjoint property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had dismissed his suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell a 2/9th share in a joint house, a dismissal previously upheld in a Regular Second Appeal. The core legal question concerned whether the lower appellate courts and the High Court erred in their appreciation of evidence regarding the execution of the agreement to sell and whether a finding of fact could be interfered with in second appeal. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the appellate courts regarding the lack of reliable evidence to prove the transaction were neither against the weight of evidence nor contrary to law. The Court laid down the principle that findings of fact based on a proper survey of evidence cannot be substituted in second appeal unless a clear case of non-reading or misreading of evidence is established.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact reached by the first appellate court be substituted in a second appeal without establishing non-reading or misreading of evidence?
  • Whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution of an agreement to sell can be interfered with by the Supreme Court under leave to appeal when supported by the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed and another vs Muhammad Irfan and others1994 SCMR 1449 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-17
  pre-emptionbenami transactionsettlement of issuesappellate procedurepleadingsagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves five appeals arising from a High Court judgment that dismissed revision petitions concerning competing claims of pre-emption over agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the appellants could challenge the pre-emption suits filed by the vendor's son on the basis that they were 'benami' transactions intended for the vendor's benefit, despite failing to press this plea during the settlement of issues at the trial stage. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were precluded from raising the benami plea because they did not insist on the framing of a specific issue regarding it at the trial court, nor did they raise this grievance in their subsequent appeals before the Additional District Judge. The Court reasoned that the mere existence of stray evidence on the record, in the absence of a framed issue, is insufficient to adjudicate upon such a plea. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, establishing the principle that a party cannot resuscitate a plea in appellate proceedings if they failed to press it during the settlement of issues at the trial stage, even if some evidence regarding that plea exists on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea in appellate proceedings that was included in the written statement but not pressed during the settlement of issues at the trial stage?
  • Is the existence of stray evidence on the record sufficient to adjudicate a plea that was never framed as an issue for trial?
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• Muhammad Riaz vs The State1994 SCMR 1566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-16
  criminal leave to appealmurderocular testimonyrule of prudencebenefit of doubtcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentence of imprisonment for life passed by the trial court, while dismissing both the petitioner's appeal and the complainant's revision for enhancement and acquittal of co-accused. The core legal question is whether the conviction of the sole accused can be sustained solely on ocular testimony when co-accused persons in the same transaction were acquitted and independent corroboration was lacking. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised require detailed examination and granted leave to appeal. The key principle established is that where ocular testimony has been rejected regarding multiple co-accused, the rule of prudence may require independent corroboration before sustaining the conviction of the remaining accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conviction of an accused under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be sustained on ocular testimony alone when co-accused in the same trial have been acquitted?
  • Does the rule of prudence require independent corroboration for the remaining accused when testimony against co-accused is disbelieved?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rauf and 10 others vs Muhammad Abbas and another1994 SCMR 973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-20
  concurrent findings of factsecond appealpower of attorneyforged documentmisappreciation of evidencesuit for declarationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a second appeal regarding a property dispute. The respondent had filed a suit for declaration, claiming that a power of attorney used to sell his property was forged and that he remained the rightful owner. The petitioners, claiming through a registered sale-deed executed by the alleged attorney, contested the suit. The trial court, after evaluating the evidence, concluded the power of attorney was forged and decreed the suit in favor of the respondent. This finding was upheld by the District Judge and subsequently by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact, supported by evidence, cannot be disturbed in second appeal merely on grounds of alleged misappreciation of evidence. The Court affirmed that interference is only warranted if findings are based on extraneous considerations, surmises, or conjectures, or if there is a procedural defect, which was not established here.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts in a second appeal?
  • Is a concurrent finding of fact liable to be set aside merely on the ground of misappreciation of evidence?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact that is supported by evidence on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Muhammad Mumtaz and another1994 SCMR 1204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-16
  leave to appealmurderacquittallimitationcondonation of delaycircumstantial evidenceextra-judicial confessionappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant, Muhammad Ramzan, challenging the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 16-11-1992. The respondent had been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sargodha, under Section 302 and Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving a death sentence for murder. On appeal, the High Court set aside the respondent's conviction and sentence under Section 302, PPC, due to failure of prosecution proof, while maintaining his conviction and sentences under Section 201, PPC. The complainant challenged the acquittal under Section 302, PPC, before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court observed that the petition was barred by limitation by four days without any sufficient ground shown for condonation of delay. Furthermore, on the merits, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were grounded on a proper appraisal of evidence, adhering to established legal principles regarding circumstantial evidence and extra-judicial confessions. Consequently, the leave to appeal was refused and the petition dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal against acquittal can be entertained when filed beyond the period of limitation without sufficient grounds for condonation of delay?
  • Whether the High Court's acquittal of an accused under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, based on the appraisal of circumstantial evidence and extra-judicial confession, warrants interference by the Supreme Court where no legal defect is established?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Establishment Division And Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-24
  service tribunalseniority disputepromotee quotadirect recruitmentleave to appealregularisation of service
  Summary & questions settled

  Muhammad Ramzan sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing his appeal regarding a seniority dispute against respondent No. 3. The core legal question concerned whether respondent No. 3, initially promoted on an ad hoc basis, was adjusted against the promotee quota and properly ranked senior to the petitioner, who was directly recruited years later. The Supreme Court held that the petition had no merit because respondent No. 3's appointment was regularised in 1984 against a vacancy reserved for promotees, which was prior to the petitioner's induction into service in 1987. Consequently, the direct recruit petitioner could not claim seniority over a promotee regularly appointed within quota before the petitioner's entry into service. The key principle laid down is that a regularly appointed promotee within the prescribed quota holds valid seniority over a direct recruit inducted into service at a later date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a direct recruit can claim seniority over a promotee regularised against a quota vacancy prior to the direct recruit's induction?
  • Does an ad hoc promotion regularised against a vacant post take effect for seniority from the date of regularisation?
  • Can a petitioner challenge a seniority list when appointed years after the respondent's regular appointment within the applicable quota?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others (Copy)1994 SCMR 411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-24
  seniority disputecivil servicepromotee quotaregularization of servicedirect recruitmentFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a direct appointee to the post of Deputy Director (BPS-18) in the National Archives of Pakistan, challenged his seniority ranking relative to respondent No. 3, who had been promoted to the same rank earlier. The petitioner argued that respondent No. 3's initial promotion in 1976 exceeded the 50% quota reserved for promotees under the relevant Recruitment Rules, thereby rendering his seniority claim invalid. The Federal Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal, leading to the current petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court found that while respondent No. 3 was initially promoted on a temporary basis, his appointment was regularized in 1984 following the retirement of an incumbent and the creation of a new post, both of which fell within the promotee quota. Consequently, the Court held that since the respondent's regular appointment predated the petitioner's induction in 1987, the petitioner's claim of seniority was misconceived. The petition was dismissed, affirming that seniority is determined by the date of regular appointment against a sanctioned post within the prescribed quota.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ad hoc promotion regularized later against a quota vacancy confer seniority over a subsequent direct recruit?
  • Can a direct recruit claim seniority over a promotee whose appointment was regularized prior to the direct recruit's induction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs F.Ia. And Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-10
  service tribunalremoval from serviceunauthorized absencedepartmental inquirymedical certificateleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Ramzan, a BPS-1 employee in the FIA Academy, Islamabad, challenging the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against his removal from service. The core legal question concerned the validity of the departmental removal order passed against the petitioner on the grounds of unauthorized absence from duty and failure to substantiate his plea of illness during the domestic inquiry. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to lead evidence before the inquiry officer to prove his illness or to explain his prolonged absence, and rightly did not get himself treated by an authorized medical officer of the academy. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings upholding the removal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee's failure to produce evidence in defense during a departmental inquiry justifies removal from service for unauthorized absence?
  • Can a temporary employee challenge removal from service based on unverified medical certificates when failing to consult an authorized medical officer?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of a departmental authority and the Service Tribunal regarding employee misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs F.I.A. and others1994 SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30
  service lawunauthorized absencedepartmental inquirytemporary employeeremoval from serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the removal of the petitioner, a temporary employee of the FIA Academy, from service. The core legal question was whether the departmental authority's decision to remove the petitioner for unauthorized absence was justified given the petitioner's claim of illness supported by medical certificates. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to substantiate his defense during the departmental inquiry, specifically by failing to produce the medical officer who issued the certificates and failing to explain why he did not seek treatment from the Academy's own medical staff. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, ruling that the removal from service was lawful due to the petitioner's unexplained and prolonged absence from duty. The key principle laid down is that a temporary employee who fails to lead evidence to justify prolonged absence during a departmental inquiry cannot successfully challenge their removal from service on the basis of unsubstantiated medical claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can a temporary employee challenge their removal from service based on medical grounds if they failed to produce evidence during the departmental inquiry?
  • Is a departmental authority justified in removing an employee for prolonged unauthorized absence if the employee fails to explain the absence or substantiate their medical defense?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan and 12 others vs The Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 7 others1994 SCMR 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-14
  right of pre-emptiontenancydoctrine of sinkerjoinder of plaintiffsrevenue courts
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit filed by the appellants claiming a superior right of pre-emption based on tenancy. The suit underwent various stages in civil and revenue courts, resulting in concurrent findings against the appellants by the revenue hierarchy and the High Court, applying the doctrine of sinker due to the joinder of non-tenant plaintiffs. The core legal question concerned whether the pre-emption suit was vitiated by joining strangers as co-plaintiffs and how pre-emption laws applied to tenancies, alongside the effect of a prior civil court decree. The Supreme Court held that the association of non-tenant co-pre-emptors with tenants extinguished the pre-emption rights of the qualified plaintiffs under the doctrine of sinker. The Court established that revenue forums exercising pre-emption jurisdiction possess deemed civil court status under land reforms legislation, but upheld the dismissal of the suit on findings of fact regarding possession and the fatal defect of joining strangers in the pre-emption claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the joining of non-tenant plaintiffs with tenant pre-emptors extinguish the right of pre-emption under the doctrine of sinker?
  • Whether revenue authorities hearing pre-emption suits are deemed to be civil courts for the purposes of executing decrees?
  • Can the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction re-examine concurrent findings of fact recorded by revenue courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rahim and anothers vs Baita Gul and anothers1994 PLD Supreme Court 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-04
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationfurther inquiryretracted statementsupreme court of pakistancriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court cancelling the post-arrest bail granted to the petitioners by the Sessions Judge in a triple murder case. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's interference with the discretion exercised by the Sessions Judge in granting bail, particularly where two conflicting versions of the incident exist and the case rests heavily on a retracted first information report and a subsequent statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in cancelling the bail as the Sessions Judge had exercised discretion based on salient facts, including the absence of direct eyewitnesses connecting the petitioners and the existence of material calling for further inquiry. The appeal was allowed and the petitioners were admitted to bail, establishing that appellate interference with bail orders requires a showing of arbitrary discretion or legal illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a bail order passed by a Sessions Judge without showing that discretion was exercised arbitrarily or in violation of legal principles?
  • Does a retracted statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute sufficient ground for the cancellation of bail?
  • When does a criminal case fall within the scope of further inquiry under the law of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rahim And Another vs Baita Gul And Another1994 PLD Supreme Court 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-04
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationfurther inquiryconflicting statementssupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court cancelling the post-arrest bail granted to them by the Sessions Judge in a murder case involving double versions and conflicting statements of the sole witness, a young boy who initially implicated another person in the FIR before naming the petitioners under a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the bail granted by the Sessions Judge. The Supreme Court held that the Sessions Judge had properly evaluated the material showing further inquiry into the petitioners' guilt and that the High Court erred in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Sessions Judge without pointing out any illegality or arbitrary exercise of power. The appeal was allowed, and the petitioners were admitted to bail, establishing that an appellate court should not interfere with a bail order granted by a lower court unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or in violation of legal principles.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a bail order passed by a Sessions Judge without showing that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or in violation of legal principles?
  • Does a retracted first information report substituted by a subsequent statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 present a case for further inquiry?
  • Can bail once granted be set aside merely on the ground of abscondence where the material connecting the accused to the crime requires further evaluation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique vs Messrs Habib Bank Limited1994 SCMR 1012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-06
  ejectmentpersonal requirementunregistered leaseperpetual renewalstatutory tenancytransfer of propertyspecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal with leave against the concurrent judgments of the Rent Controller and the High Court dismissing the appellant landlord's ejectment application. The ejectment was sought on the ground of personal requirement, but the lower courts dismissed it relying on a renewal clause in the unregistered tenancy agreement which provided for a perpetual lease option in favor of the respondent tenant, invoking the rule in Mrs. Zehra Begum's case. The core legal question was whether an unregistered lease agreement containing a covenant for renewal from time to time creates a valid perpetual lease or if the relationship is governed as a statutory tenancy under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court held that the unregistered lease agreement purporting to create a lease in perpetuity is void as a lease of that nature and creates a statutory tenancy under the Ordinance, rendering the terms of the unregistered agreement unenforceable. The court further held that a statutory tenant cannot invoke section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act or section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act to claim a perpetual lease. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to determine the bona fide personal requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unregistered lease agreement containing a covenant for perpetual renewal create a valid lease in perpetuity?
  • Can a statutory tenant under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, rely on section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act to claim a lease in perpetuity?
  • Whether the principles in Mrs. Zehra Begum's case apply to an unregistered tenancy agreement lacking a specified renewal period?
  • Can a statutory tenant invoke section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act to protect possession against an ejectment sought on personal requirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique and others vs Deputy Commissioner, Abbottabad1994 SCMR 2011 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-14
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyremand orderprovisional transfer orderconstitutional petitionleave to appealsettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petition regarding the ownership and transfer of eight evacuee shops in Abbottabad. The core legal questions involve whether the remand order passed by the High Court was properly complied with by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, whether the shops in the petitioners' occupation constituted available property under the relevant disposal scheme, and whether a provisional transfer order produced belatedly was genuine. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that substantial questions regarding the entitlement of the parties, the availability of the property, and the authenticity of the contested transfer document required detailed examination. The key principle laid down is that available evacuee properties must be adjudicated strictly in accordance with settlement schemes and proper verification of transfer documents following remand directions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the order of remand passed by the High Court has been properly complied with by the Additional Settlement Commissioner?
  • Whether the shops in occupation of the petitioners are available property within the meaning of the scheme for management and disposal of available properties?
  • Whether the property marked 'C' in the site plan has actually been transferred to the respondent and whether he was entitled to its transfer?
  • Whether the provisional transfer order produced by the respondent before the Additional Settlement Commissioner was a forged document and had ever seen the light of the day before its production?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq vs Mst. Tajan and 3 others1994 SCMR 1859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-20
  leave to appealevidentiary valueappreciation of evidencepedigreeQanun-e-Shahadatwitness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from a dispute involving the evaluation of testimonial evidence and the application of legal principles regarding family relationships. The core legal question presented for the Court's consideration involves the proper interpretation and application of Section 50 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and its counterpart, Article 64 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, specifically regarding the evidentiary value of statements concerning family lineage and relationships. The Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the lower forum erred by selectively accepting one part of a witness's testimony while ignoring a contradictory or qualifying part of the same statement. Specifically, the Court found that the lower court accepted the witness's assertion that a certain individual had no daughter, while simultaneously disregarding the witness's claim that the same individual was his maternal grandfather. The Court emphasized that the interpretation of the relevant evidentiary provisions must align with established judicial precedents, specifically referencing Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1988, to ensure consistency in the assessment of oral evidence regarding pedigree and kinship.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court selectively accept one part of a witness's statement while ignoring a contradictory part of the same statement?
  • Does the interpretation of Article 64 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 require consistency with established Supreme Court precedents regarding the assessment of family relationship evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Pervaiz vs Choudhary Muhammad Riaz and 2 Others1994 SCMR 983 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-05
  election symbolwrit petitionSupreme Court interferenceProvincial Assemblypolitical party candidate
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of an order passed by the High Court issuing a writ to the Returning Officer to allocate the election symbol of 'Tiger' to respondent No. 1. The core legal question is whether the High Court was competent to issue the writ directing the allocation of the election symbol. The Supreme Court held that since respondent No. 1 was the recognized candidate of the Pakistan Muslim League (N), which had been allocated the symbol of 'Tiger' for the General Elections to the Provincial Assembly, it was not a fit case for interference by the Supreme Court with the writ issued by the High Court. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the High Court's constitutional writ regarding the allocation of recognized party election symbols to eligible candidates where no jurisdictional defect is made out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is competent to issue a writ directing the Returning Officer to allocate an election symbol?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court writ regarding the allocation of an election symbol to a recognized party candidate?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Ghulam Fareed and others1994 SCMR 1208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-21
  murderself-defencesentence reductionsudden flare-upcriminal appealconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal filed by both the complainant and the convict, Ghulam Fareed, against a High Court judgment. The convict was tried for the murder of Muhammad Hasnain Raza. The Trial Court convicted the accused under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to death, while acquitting his father. The High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment, finding the incident was a sudden flare-up rather than a pre-planned murder. The core legal questions involved the validity of the convict's plea of self-defence and the appropriateness of the sentence reduction. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, holding that the plea of self-defence was unsupported by the record, as the accused remained unhurt despite alleged gunfire from the deceased. The Court affirmed the High Court's finding that the incident arose from a sudden dispute over the return of the accused's sister-in-law, justifying the reduction of the death sentence. The principle established is that a plea of self-defence requires credible evidence, and a sudden flare-up between relatives can mitigate the sentence for murder.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of a weapon carried by an accused to the victim's house negate a claim of sudden flare-up?
  • Can a plea of self-defence be sustained when the accused remains uninjured despite allegations of being fired upon?
  • Is the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment justified when a murder arises from a sudden domestic dispute between relatives?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz Khan vs Ghulam Ahmad alias Jallah Khan and another1994 SCMR 1064 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-28
  post-arrest baildiscretionary jurisdictionnon-bailable offencescompoundable offencesFIR allegationsbail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court order granting bail to the respondent in a case involving charges under Section 324 of the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance and Sections 458, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail after previous applications had been rejected. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that while the High Court's observations in its orders were arguably unnecessary and tentative, the impugned order was passed within jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that it would not interfere with a discretionary order granting bail unless there was a compelling reason. A key principle laid down is that in bail matters, courts must give due weight to FIR allegations and investigation evidence to determine the prima facie nature of the offence and the prescribed punishment. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the potential for an offence to be compounded at a future stage should not be used as a ground for granting bail in non-bailable offences.

  Questions settled

  • Should the potential for an offence to be compounded at a future stage be considered a valid ground for granting bail in non-bailable offences?
  • What weight should be given to FIR allegations and investigation evidence when deciding a bail application?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's discretionary order granting bail if the order was passed within jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz and others vs The State1994 SCMR 1614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealmurder convictionself-defense pleaocular testimonymedical evidencecommon intentionbeyond reasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the High Court's judgment maintaining the appellants' convictions for murder and related offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, specifically addressing the appellants' plea of self-defense and the reliability of ocular testimony versus medical evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the appellants, noting that the eyewitnesses were credible, their presence at the scene was corroborated by their own injuries, and the defense's counter-version was unsubstantiated and likely fabricated. The Court affirmed that medical evidence cannot override consistent direct testimony and that the prosecution is not required to disprove a false defense version if its own case is proven on its own merits. The key principle laid down is that while the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, consistent ocular testimony from injured witnesses remains highly probative, and a court must assess the evidence in its entirety rather than relying on probabilities or conflicting medical opinions that contradict established facts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be based on high probabilities inferred from evidence rather than firm proof?
  • Does medical evidence override direct eyewitness testimony when the witnesses are consistent?
  • Is the prosecution required to disprove a defense version if its own case is proven beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Does the presence of injuries on eyewitnesses corroborate their presence at the scene of the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz and 5 others vs Ahmad Ali and 6 others1994 SCMR 1861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-19
  redemption of mortgageabatement of appealco-appellantslegal heirsequity of redemptioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legal consequences of the death of one of several co-appellants during the pendency of a second appeal regarding a suit for redemption of mortgage. The core legal question was whether the failure to bring the legal heirs of a deceased co-appellant on record within the prescribed period resulted in the total abatement of the entire appeal, or if the remaining co-appellants could continue the proceedings. The High Court, in a Letters Patent Appeal, held that the appeal did not abate in its entirety and could be prosecuted by the surviving co-appellants. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, refusing leave to appeal. The Court affirmed that because an inheritor or transferee of even a portion of the equity of redemption possesses the right to redeem the mortgage in its entirety, the death of one co-appellant does not preclude the remaining co-appellants from pursuing the appeal. The principle established is that the right of redemption is indivisible, allowing surviving co-appellants to maintain an appeal despite the abatement regarding a deceased co-appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of one co-appellant and the subsequent failure to bring legal heirs on record cause the total abatement of an appeal?
  • Can surviving co-appellants continue an appeal for the redemption of a mortgage if the appeal has abated regarding one of the original appellants?
  • Is the right to redeem a mortgage divisible among co-appellants?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem vs Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department, Quetta1994 SCMR 2059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-05
  irrigation departmentpublic dutyconstitutional petitionleave to appealpublic interest litigationadministrative negligencewater rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing his constitutional petition, which sought directions for the Irrigation Department to provide a rig machine for excavating a tubewell on his land. The petitioner had paid the requisite charges, but alleged the machine was diverted to other sites to favor influential persons. The respondents contended the petitioner refused to accept the rig due to its age and refused to bear operational costs. The High Court had dismissed the petition, finding no vested right. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the Department had undertaken a duty to supply rig machines for irrigation purposes upon payment of charges. The Court held that once such a duty is assumed, the Department is obligated to provide functional, defect-free equipment to ensure the public benefit of irrigation. Failure to perform this duty constitutes an omission to perform a legal obligation. Given the public interest in irrigation and water access, the Court granted leave to appeal, noting the matter could also be considered under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Irrigation Department have a legal duty to provide functional equipment once charges for such services have been accepted?
  • Can a failure to provide promised irrigation equipment be considered an omission to perform a duty according to law?
  • Does a petition regarding irrigation and water access for the general public fall within the scope of Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem and others vs Ghulam Muhammad and others1994 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-22
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionburden of proofpedigree-tablecivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondents claiming a superior right to purchase land measuring 35 Kanals 18 Marlas, which was decreed by the trial court and upheld in first appeal and regular second appeal. The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs-respondents had established their preferential right of pre-emption through sufficient legal evidence regarding their alleged relationship with the vendor. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the pre-emptors produced no oral or documentary evidence whatsoever—not even appearing themselves or producing witnesses, but merely having their counsel tender a copy of pedigree-tables—to prove their relationship with the vendor, the pre-emption suit cannot be decreed. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower courts' judgments, laying down the principle that mere tendering of pedigree-tables by counsel without supporting evidence to link them to the claimants is insufficient to prove a superior right of pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor can establish a superior right of pre-emption without producing oral or documentary evidence to prove their relationship with the vendor?
  • Is the mere tendering of a pedigree-table by a counsel in court sufficient proof of a pre-emptor's preferential right?
  • Can a pre-emption suit be decreed in the complete absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff's claimed relationship to the vendor?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Munir vs Rana Umar Hayat and 2 others1994 SCMR 1672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-15
  seniorityvoluntary transferservice lawPost Offices Manualcadre seniorityFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the determination of seniority for an Inspector of Post Offices. The petitioner, originally appointed in the Karachi Circle, was transferred to the Lahore Circle upon his own request. Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Post Offices Manual, Volume IV, he was placed at the bottom of the seniority list in his new circle. The petitioner subsequently challenged this placement, obtaining an order to re-fix his seniority based on his original appointment date, which adversely affected the seniority of respondent No. 1. The Federal Service Tribunal set aside this re-fixation, ruling that the petitioner’s voluntary transfer necessitated his placement at the bottom of the seniority list. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that by seeking a transfer, the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the benefit of his previous service regarding seniority. The Court held that the petitioner could not claim the advantage of his prior service, and the declaration of the cadre as a circle cadre did not override the clear provisions of Rule 38.

  Questions settled

  • Does a voluntary transfer from one circle to another require an employee to be placed at the bottom of the seniority list in the new circle?
  • Can an employee claim the benefit of previous service for seniority purposes after voluntarily transferring to a new circle?
  • Does the declaration of a cadre as a circle cadre override the seniority rules governing voluntary transfers?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mumtaz Khan Bhaba vs Special Court of MR. Justice Munir1994 SCMR 728 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-02
  misconductdisqualificationpublic fundswilful maladministrationPeople's Works Programmefiduciary dutyabuse of authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Special Court which disqualified the appellant, a former Member of the National Assembly and District Administrator of the People's Works Programme, for seven years under the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for Membership) Order, 1977. The core legal question was whether the appellant's failure to personally verify the physical progress of development schemes before authorizing payments, which resulted in payments for work not performed, constituted 'misconduct' under the Order. The Supreme Court upheld the Special Court's decision, finding the appellant guilty of wilful maladministration and abuse of authority. The Court held that the appellant, as a trustee of public funds, could not evade responsibility by claiming ignorance of his duties or by acting merely as a 'signing machine' for subordinates. The key principle laid down is that public officials entrusted with financial authority have a non-delegable duty to exercise due diligence, including physical verification of projects, and that failure to do so, resulting in wrongful loss to the exchequer, constitutes wilful misconduct under the 1977 Order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a District Administrator to personally verify the physical progress of development projects before authorizing payments constitute 'misconduct' under the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for Membership) Order, 1977?
  • Can a public official entrusted with the administration of public funds escape liability for financial irregularities by claiming they acted solely on the advice of subordinates?
  • What is the legal definition of 'wilful maladministration' in the context of the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for Membership) Order, 1977?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Manzoor vs Ghulam Murtaza1994 SCMR 987 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-22
  leave to appealcondonation of delaylimitation periodwaiver and estoppelpreemptionfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff/preemptor against a High Court judgment that dismissed their claim based on the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. The petition was filed 21 days beyond the statutory limitation period. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, attributing the lapse to erroneous legal advice received from a local lawyer regarding the applicable limitation period for filing such a petition. The Supreme Court rejected the request for condonation, noting the absence of a supporting affidavit from the lawyer in question, which is a necessary requirement for such a plea. Furthermore, upon reviewing the merits, the Court found that the High Court had provided cogent reasons for its findings of fact, which did not warrant interference by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, upholding the High Court's decision on both procedural and substantive grounds. The judgment reinforces the principle that claims of erroneous legal advice for condonation of delay must be substantiated by evidence, such as an affidavit.

  Questions settled

  • Is a supporting affidavit from a lawyer required to substantiate a claim of erroneous legal advice for the purpose of condoning a delay in filing an appeal?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's finding of fact when cogent reasons have been provided?
  • Does erroneous legal advice regarding the limitation period constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay without supporting evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif vs The State1994 SCMR 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-29
  murderdeath sentencenatural witnessescorroborative evidencecriminal petitionidentification of accusedinjuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition filed by a convict, Muhammad Latif, challenging the Lahore High Court's judgment that upheld his conviction and death sentence for murder. The petitioner was convicted by the trial court for the murder of the complainant's father and for causing injuries to the complainant during a house trespass incident. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained given the defense's argument that the murder was a blind incident and the accused was falsely implicated due to suspicion. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court relied on the testimony of natural witnesses who were present in the house, the fact that the complainant sustained multiple injuries during the struggle, and the corroborative evidence of a blood-stained hatchet recovered at the scene. The Court affirmed that the presence of the witnesses, the duration of the attack, and the specific injuries sustained provided sufficient identification of the assailant, thereby justifying the conviction and the sentence imposed under the relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of inmates of a house be considered sufficient to identify an assailant in a murder case?
  • Does the presence of injuries on a complainant serve as corroborative evidence of their presence at the scene of a crime?
  • Is a conviction for murder sustainable where the accused is known to the witnesses and the attack duration allowed for identification?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif vs Bahawal Bakhsh and 5 others1994 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-22
  culpable homicideocular evidencebenefit of doubtunnatural conduct of witnessescriminal appealmurder convictionblunt weapon injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment that modified the convictions of the respondents from murder under Section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting one co-accused. The appellant sought enhancement of the sentences, arguing that the nature of the injuries indicated an intent to kill. The core legal question was whether the ocular evidence was sufficiently reliable to sustain a conviction for murder or to warrant enhancement of the sentence. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution witnesses exhibited unnatural behavior, failing to intervene during the assault or seek timely assistance, and noted significant contradictions between the FIR and trial testimony. Consequently, the Court held that the ocular account was unreliable and insufficient to support a conviction for murder. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to maintain the conviction under Section 304-I, as the prosecution failed to prove the higher charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the ocular evidence is found to be unnatural and contradictory?
  • Does the failure of eye-witnesses to intervene or seek timely assistance render their testimony unreliable?
  • Is an appellate court justified in maintaining a conviction under Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the prosecution fails to prove the intent required for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan vs The State1994 SCMR 1543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Prohibition Ordernarcotics recoverypolice witnesspublic witnessessearch and seizurecriminal petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from criminal petitions filed by Muhammad Khan against the dismissal of his appeals by the Federal Shariat Court, which had upheld his conviction and sentence under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for possession and sale of narcotics across two separate F.I.R.s. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the non-association of independent public witnesses during the recoveries, allegedly in violation of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, vitiates the conviction and renders police testimony unreliable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that while Section 103 contemplates independent witnesses to prevent planting of evidence, police officials are nonetheless competent witnesses as good as any public witness, provided there is no proven animosity or mala fides, especially in situations where public witnesses are either unavailable or unwilling to come forward due to fear. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of police officials regarding recoveries cannot be discarded solely due to the absence of public witnesses under Section 103, Cr.P.C., when no enmity or possibility of evidence-planting is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of police officials alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction for narcotics recovery in the absence of independent public witnesses?
  • Does the non-compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically vitiate a search and recovery made by the police?
  • Can police officials be regarded as competent and reliable witnesses regarding the recovery of illicit substances when no prior enmity or mala fides is established against them?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jehangir alias Badshah and anothers vs The State1994 SCMR 1215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-27
  leave to appealreappraisal of evidenceacquittal of co-accusedeyewitness testimonycriminal appealcorroborative evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the convictions of the petitioners, Muhammad Jehangir and Muhammad Naveed, for murder and attempted murder, while acquitting two co-accused, Latif and Farooq, in the same incident. The core legal question is whether the conviction of the petitioners can be sustained when the testimony of the injured eyewitnesses was not believed in its totality and the co-accused were acquitted based on the same evidence. The petitioners contend that the acquittal of co-accused necessitates a deeper and more careful scrutiny of the evidence against the remaining accused. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to reappraise the evidence, noting that the trial court's reliance on the eyewitnesses was inconsistent given the acquittal of co-accused Latif and Farooq. The Court established that when co-accused are acquitted on the basis of the same evidence, the remaining convictions require rigorous judicial scrutiny to ensure the evidence against the appellants is independently corroborated and reliable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on the same evidence necessitate a deeper scrutiny of the evidence against the remaining convicted accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the testimony of injured eyewitnesses is not believed in its totality?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jamil Khan and 3 others vs Additional Commissioner1994 SCMR 1647 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-20
  leave to appealinformer statusdisplaced personsland settlementconsolidation of appeals
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, concerning the status of the petitioners as informers under land settlement laws. The core legal question is whether the petitioners or any of them could be treated as an informer within the meaning of the relevant statutory provision on the given facts. The Court held that since leave to appeal had already been granted in connected civil petitions raising the identical question, leave to appeal should likewise be granted in the present petitions. The Court ordered that all the resulting appeals be heard together. The key principle laid down is that matters involving identical questions of law regarding statutory interpretations of informer status under settlement laws ought to be consolidated and heard together upon the grant of leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioners or any one of them could be treated as an informer within the meaning of section 14(1A), Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Izharul Ahsan Qureshi vs M/s. P.I.A.C.1994 PLC 507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-29
  dismissal from servicedomestic inquiryres judicatacriminal acquittalforged documentsconcurrent proceedingsreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which upheld the termination of the petitioner's employment with the respondent Corporation. The petitioner, previously dismissed for submitting forged educational certificates, sought reinstatement following his acquittal in a parallel criminal case. The core legal question was whether an employee, whose dismissal from service was upheld by the Supreme Court, could re-agitate the matter based on a subsequent acquittal in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the petitioner had attained finality and could not be reopened. The Court affirmed that domestic inquiry proceedings and criminal trials are distinct processes that can proceed concurrently. Crucially, the Court laid down the principle that a finding of guilt in domestic inquiry proceedings is independent and can survive regardless of an acquittal in a criminal case, particularly when the acquittal is based on technical grounds such as lack of corroboration. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the matter was barred by the principle of res judicata.

  Questions settled

  • Can domestic inquiry proceedings and criminal trials proceed concurrently?
  • Does an acquittal in a criminal case automatically invalidate a prior dismissal from service based on a domestic inquiry?
  • Can a petitioner re-agitate a dismissal order after the matter has attained finality through previous Supreme Court litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Izharul Ahsan Qureshi vs M/s. P.I.A.C.1994 SCMR 1608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-29
  departmental inquiryres judicatadismissal from servicecriminal acquittalparallel proceedingsforged documentsgrievance petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the dismissal of the petitioner from service by the respondent Corporation for submitting forged educational certificates and documents. The petitioner previously challenged his dismissal through multiple forums, including the Labour Court, Labour Appellate Tribunal, High Court, and the Supreme Court, all of which upheld the dismissal. Following his subsequent acquittal in a related criminal case, the petitioner sought reinstatement, which was rejected. He then filed a grievance petition, which was dismissed on grounds of res judicata and limitation, a decision affirmed by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an employee, having exhausted all legal remedies against a dismissal order arising from departmental inquiry proceedings, can re-agitate the matter based on a subsequent acquittal in a parallel criminal case. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal order attained finality and could not be reopened. The Court affirmed the principle that departmental inquiry proceedings and criminal cases are distinct processes that can proceed simultaneously, and a finding of acquittal in a criminal trial does not automatically invalidate or affect the outcome of valid departmental inquiry proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee re-agitate a dismissal order in a grievance petition after the dismissal has been upheld by the Supreme Court?
  • Does an acquittal in a criminal case automatically invalidate a prior dismissal order resulting from departmental inquiry proceedings?
  • Can departmental inquiry proceedings and criminal cases proceed simultaneously against an employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Islam and 5 others vs General Manager, Pakistan Railways, Lahore1994 SCMR 1626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  selection gradepromotionspecial payservice tribunalsalary fixationrailway employees
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises cross-petitions directed against a common judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal concerning the fixation of salaries in selection grade 16 and claims for special pay by employees of Pakistan Railways. The core legal questions involved whether the grant of a selection grade constitutes a promotion and whether the employees are entitled to a special pay of Rs. 75 per month. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal was just and proper and that the case did not involve any substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The key principle laid down is that the grant of a selection grade involving a change of grade or post for the better entails an element of selection amounting to promotion, and leave to appeal is refused where no substantial question of law of public importance arises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether grant of a selection grade amounts to promotion?
  • Whether employees are entitled to special pay upon being granted a selection grade?
  • What constitutes a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaque Khan and others vs The State and others1994 PLD Supreme Court 259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-08
  criminal appealsentence enhancementbenefit of doubtocular testimonycorroborationself-defensefalse defense pleamurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals and petitions arising from convictions under Sections 302/34 and 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the propriety of the High Court’s enhancement of a death sentence based on a 'leading role' and a false defense plea, and the sustainability of convictions where the prosecution failed to prove motive and the parties were embroiled in deep-seated enmity. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in enhancing the sentence, ruling that the falseness of a defense plea cannot relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof, nor does it justify enhanced punishment. Furthermore, the Court acquitted one co-accused, Ejaz, due to the absence of independent corroboration for ocular testimony in a case shrouded in mystery and enmity. The key principle laid down is that while the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the weakness or falseness of a defense plea cannot be utilized to strengthen the prosecution's case or to impose a harsher sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the falseness of a defense plea justify the enhancement of a criminal sentence?
  • Is independent corroboration of ocular testimony required in criminal cases involving deep-seated enmity?
  • Does the failure of a defense plea relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Can a court enhance a sentence based solely on the accused's alleged 'leading role' when the evidence does not distinguish their culpability from co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaque Khan And Other vs The State And Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaq Dar vs Shahid Nabi Malik and another1994 SCMR 2000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-07
  bye-electionelection resultsinterim reliefwrit petitionNational Assemblyelection notification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court regarding the bye-election for National Assembly Constituency No. NA-95-Lahore-IV. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's interim order restraining the announcement and notification of the election results pending the final decision of a writ petition was appropriate, or whether the election process should be allowed to reach its conclusion despite the pending litigation. Upon hearing the arguments from both parties, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it. The Court held that the High Court's direction prohibiting the announcement and notification of the election result should be substituted. Consequently, the Supreme Court directed that the election authorities must announce and notify the result of the bye-election, and the candidate declared successful shall be permitted to take their seat in the National Assembly. This permission is explicitly made subject to the final outcome of the writ petition pending before the High Court, thereby balancing the electoral process with judicial oversight.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court restrain the notification of election results pending the final decision of a writ petition?
  • Should a candidate declared elected in a bye-election be allowed to take their seat in the National Assembly while a writ petition challenging the election is pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Isa and anothers vs Qaiser and others1994 SCMR 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-20
  pre-emptionright of substitutionbenamidarleave to appealvendeeostensible owner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from concurrent findings of three lower courts against the petitioner, a vendee, in a pre-emption suit. The petitioner challenged the pre-emption claim on two grounds: first, that he had become an owner in the estate through an intermediary purchase, allowing him to match the pre-emptor's right; and second, that the vendor was merely an ostensible owner (Benamidar), rendering the sale a reconveyance rather than an independent sale. The Supreme Court rejected both contentions. Regarding the first ground, the Court held it was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court and, substantively, an owner of the same estate holds a lower entitlement than the heirs of the vendor under the relevant pre-emption law. Regarding the second ground, the Court clarified that the right of pre-emption is a right of substitution; therefore, any defects, reservations, or pre-existing conditions attached to the purchase are transferred to the successful pre-emptor and do not invalidate the substitution itself. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does an owner of the same estate have a superior right of pre-emption compared to the heirs of the vendor?
  • Does the right of pre-emption as a right of substitution transfer defects, reservations, and pre-existing conditions of the purchase to the pre-emptor?
  • Can a claim of benami ownership by the vendor defeat a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Sultan Akbar and 2 others1994 SCMR 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-01
  clerical correctionpartition suitpreliminary decreeaccidental slipcivil revisionleave to appealjoint possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a Civil Revision, which had challenged a trial court's decision to correct a clerical error in a partition suit decree. The core legal issue concerned whether an accidental, typographical inconsistency in the appellate judgment—misstating the respondent's share in a specific shop—could be corrected by the court, and whether a new legal question regarding the necessity of seeking joint possession in a partition suit could be raised for the first time at the Supreme Court level. The Supreme Court held that the correction of the clerical error was unassailable, as the inconsistency was patent on the face of the record and contradicted the court's own findings and the underlying sale deed. Furthermore, the Court refused to entertain the new legal question regarding the necessity of a joint possession decree, noting it was not raised before the High Court and was technical in nature. The petition was dismissed, though the Court noted that parties could still seek review if an out-of-court settlement was reached.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court correct an accidental or typing mistake in a judgment that contradicts its own findings?
  • Is a party permitted to raise a new question of law in a petition for leave to appeal that was not agitated before the High Court?
  • Does a clerical error in a decree that is patent on the face of the record warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs National Bank of Pakistan through its President1994 SCMR 1651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21
  leave to appealreview petitioncounsel authoritycompromise by counselmaster and servantstatutory ruleswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a review petition arising from a writ petition challenging the dismissal of the petitioner from service by the National Bank of Pakistan. The petitioner's counsel had withdrawn the writ petition based on an assurance by the respondent-bank to sympathetically consider converting the dismissal into removal without back benefits, a step taken without the petitioner's specific authority. The High Court refused review on the ground that it involved disputed questions of fact regarding counsel's authority. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the Service Rules of the National Bank of Pakistan possess statutory status such that their violation can be challenged through a constitutional writ petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Rules framed by the National Bank of Pakistan possess the status of statutory rules?
  • Can the violation of National Bank of Pakistan Service Rules be questioned through a writ petition?
  • Does the general authority of a counsel extend to compromising a case or withdrawing a writ petition without specific instructions?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Abid Hussain alias Mithu and 6 others1994 SCMR 1928 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-19
  appeal against acquittalsuppression of injuriesself-defenceeyewitness credibilityleave to appealcriminal jurisprudencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the acquittal of respondents by the Lahore High Court for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns the principles for interfering with an acquittal judgment, particularly regarding the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused and the credibility of eyewitness testimony. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where prosecution witnesses suppress injuries sustained by the accused during the occurrence and fail to establish motive, the eyewitnesses lose their veracity, rendering the prosecution case doubtful. The Court affirmed that interference with an acquittal requires exceptional circumstances where the High Court's judgment is perverse or unsupportable from the record. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • What are the well-settled principles for the appreciation of appeals and petitions against acquittal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by an accused person in the F.I.R. and ocular testimony render the prosecution case doubtful?
  • Can medical evidence alone connect an accused person with the commission of a crime without independent corroboration?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a well-reasoned judgment of acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and others vs Abdul Bari and others1994 SCMR 379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-08-07
  Section 145 Cr.P.C.breach of peaceconstitutional jurisdictionpending civil suitleave to appealMagistrate's discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had set aside the decisions of a Magistrate and an Additional Sessions Judge regarding proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Magistrate had initially dismissed the police complaint, finding no imminent breach of peace concerning the disputed land, a conclusion affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court, exercising its constitutional jurisdiction, interfered with these concurrent findings and directed the Magistrate to proceed with the matter on its merits. The petitioners contend that the High Court's interference was improper given the existing civil litigation between the parties regarding the title of the land and the concurrent findings of the lower courts that no imminent breach of peace existed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction in setting aside the orders of the lower courts under the circumstances where civil proceedings were already pending and no imminent breach of peace was established.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when lower courts have concurrently found no imminent breach of peace?
  • Is the existence of a pending civil suit relevant to the initiation or continuation of proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and anothers vs The State1994 SCMR 1621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-07
  leave to appealDiyyatconvictionsentencenon-payment of Diyyatcriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against their conviction and sentence under Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which included five years' rigorous imprisonment along with payment of Diyyat amounting to Rs. 1,75,000 to the legal heirs of the deceased. The core legal question raised was whether a poor convict, unable to pay the Diyyat amount immediately, is required to remain in jail indefinitely or for a long term for non-payment, or whether they are entitled to be released on the condition to earn and pay the same. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the question raised is of general legal importance requiring further consideration, and consequently granted leave to appeal. The principle laid down involves examining the proper execution and incarceration rules relating to the non-payment of Diyyat under Islamic penal jurisprudence as applied through statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a convict unable to pay Diyyat due to poverty is required to remain in jail for non-payment?
  • Is a convict entitled to be released on the condition to earn and pay the Diyyat amount?
  • Does the concept of Diyyat under Islamic law contemplate prolonged imprisonment for failure to pay?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and anothers vs Sikandar Khan1994 SCMR 2014 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-10
  pre-emptionco-sharerbenami transactionleave to appealPunjab Pre-emption Actland alienation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two separate petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, both concerning the interpretation of pre-emption rights. In the first case, the petitioners challenged the dismissal of their pre-emption suit, arguing that while they conceded the vendee's co-sharer status regarding one portion of the land, they retained a superior right of pre-emption over a specific 5-kanal portion of land. The Court granted leave to determine whether the vendee could defeat the pre-emption right over that specific portion based on co-sharer status acquired in a different Khasra number. In the second case, the petitioner challenged the lower courts' finding that the named vendees were merely Benamidars for their fathers, arguing that the courts lacked the competence to investigate the Benami nature of a transaction under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The Court granted leave to examine whether the enabling provision of Section 4 of the Act limits the court's authority to only determining if a transaction is a sale, or if it extends to investigating Benami transactions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendee defeat a pre-emption claim over a specific plot of land by asserting co-sharer status acquired in a different Khasra number?
  • Does Section 4 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 preclude courts from investigating whether a transaction is Benami?
  • Is the latter part of Section 4 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 an enabling provision that does not control the earlier part of the section?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and 3 others vs Muhammad Akram and 4 others1994 SCMR 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-13
  leave to appealocular evidencemedical evidencefiring distanceevidentiary conflictcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from a criminal conviction. The core legal question presented for consideration is whether, in the presence of a conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence—specifically regarding the firing distance as depicted in the site plan versus the medical findings—the court can place implicit reliance on eyewitness accounts solely on the basis of an absence of prior enmity between the parties. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the convicts to examine this evidentiary discrepancy. Furthermore, the Court granted leave to appeal in a related criminal petition against the respondent, Muhammad Akram, and directed the issuance of bailable warrants to secure his attendance. The judgment highlights the necessity of scrutinizing the consistency of prosecution evidence when material contradictions exist between witness statements and expert medical reports, establishing that the absence of motive or enmity does not automatically validate testimony that is otherwise contradicted by physical or medical evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can implicit reliance be placed on eyewitness testimony solely due to the absence of enmity when there is a conflict between ocular and medical evidence?
  • Does a discrepancy regarding firing distance in a site plan versus medical evidence warrant a re-examination of conviction by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iobal vs The State1994 PLD Supreme Court 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-10
  murderdeath sentencemedical evidencecausation of deathfirearm injurycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Muhammad Ramzan. The core legal question was whether the death of the deceased was the direct result of the firearm injury or caused by improper medical care and frequent shifting between hospitals. The Supreme Court held that the medical and ocular evidence clearly established that the firearm injury sustained by the deceased was the direct cause of death, and the shifting between medical facilities was necessitated by initial absences and lack of proper treatment rather than any contributory negligence by the victim or complainant. Consequently, the Court found no mitigating circumstance to interfere with the sentence and dismissed the appeal, laying down the principle that mere shifting of an injured person between medical facilities due to inadequate initial treatment does not break the causal link between the firearm injury and death where medical testimony confirms the injury as sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

  Questions settled

  • Whether shifting an injured person from one hospital to another due to lack of medical attendance breaks the chain of causation between a firearm injury and subsequent death?
  • Does improper medical treatment or frequent shifting of a deceased constitute a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Is a medical officer's opinion regarding the cause of death sufficient to establish liability when supported by post-mortem examination and operation notes?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Inayat and 5 others vs Mst. Nisar Fatima1994 PLD Supreme Court 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-21
  pre-emptiondoctrine of sinkerlimitation periodregistration of sale deedpossession under saleco-sharer
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent against the appellants regarding the sale of land. The respondent claimed a superior right of pre-emption as a co-sharer and sister of the vendor. The trial court decreed the suit, applying the doctrine of sinker, finding the vendees did not collectively possess the land. The first appellate court reversed this, finding that since specified shares were purchased, the doctrine of sinker did not apply. The High Court restored the trial court's decree. Before the Supreme Court, the appellants argued the suit was time-barred, asserting that possession obtained under an agreement to sell prior to registration triggered the limitation period. The Supreme Court held that where the parties intended the sale to be complete only upon registration, possession obtained under an agreement to sell does not constitute possession under the sale for the purposes of limitation. Consequently, the suit filed within one year of the registration of the sale deed was held to be within time. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does possession obtained under an agreement to sell constitute possession under the sale for the purpose of calculating the limitation period for a pre-emption suit?
  • When does a sale become complete for the purpose of triggering the limitation period in a pre-emption suit where the parties intended registration to be the completion of the sale?
  • Does the doctrine of sinker apply when vendees purchase specified shares in a property?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Inayat And 5 Other vs Mst. Nisar Fatima1994 PLD Supreme Court 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-21
  pre-emptiondoctrine of sinkersuperior right of pre-emptionlimitationpossession under saleagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a direct appeal under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which decreed a suit of pre-emption filed by the respondent. The core legal questions involved whether the respondent possessed a superior right of pre-emption through the application of the doctrine of sinker where shares were sold jointly, and whether the suit was barred by limitation based on possession obtained prior to the registration of the sale deed. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly applied the doctrine of sinker as the payment of proportionate price separately by each set of purchasers was not proved, and further held that possession obtained under an agreement to sell prior to registration does not constitute possession under the sale for the purpose of limitation where the sale is intended to be complete only upon registration. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of sinker apply to a joint sale of shares where separate payment of price by individual vendees is not proved?
  • Does possession obtained under an agreement to sell prior to the registration of the sale deed constitute possession under the sale for computing limitation in a pre-emption suit?
  • When is a sale deemed complete for the purpose of limitation under pre-emption law?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ikram vs Namroz Khan1994 SCMR 1121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-01
  ejectmentpersonal and bona fide requirementtenantlandlordleave to appealburden of proofrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court upholding the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from a shop on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement of the respondent-landlord. The core legal questions involve whether the landlord had previously vacated and re-rented other properties at higher rents, and whether the High Court properly evaluated the bona fide requirement and the non-appearance of the tenant. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to substantiate claims that the landlord had vacated other shops in the same urban area for higher rent, and that the concurrent findings of the lower forums regarding the landlord's personal and bona fide requirement involved no misreading or perversity of evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the burden of proving assertions of ulterior motives in ejectment lies on the tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the burden of proving that a landlord got other shops vacated and re-rented at higher rent lies on the tenant?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding personal and bona fide requirement be interfered with without showing misreading or perversity of evidence?
  • Whether observations made by an appellate court regarding a tenant's non-appearance and alternative business amount to a distinct and unpleaded ground for ejectment?
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• Muhammad Ikram Khan through Legal Heirs vs The Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Rawalpindi and 11 others1994 SCMR 1984 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-25
  evacuee propertyundisputed possessionallotment cancellationejectment ordersettlement schemedisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which challenged the refusal of settlement authorities to transfer an evacuee house to the petitioner, Muhammad Ikram Khan. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could claim the transfer of the property based on 'undisputed possession' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, despite a prior, final order of ejectment against his son, the original allottee, whose allotment had been cancelled. The Supreme Court held that because the ejectment order against the original allottee had attained finality and remained in force, the petitioner could not be considered to be in 'undisputed possession' of the property. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that the petitioner was ineligible for the transfer of the house. The key principle laid down is that an occupant cannot claim 'undisputed possession' for the purpose of property transfer under the settlement laws when there exists a valid, subsisting, and final order of ejectment against them or the person through whom they claim possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can an occupant claim 'undisputed possession' for property transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 if a final ejectment order exists against them?
  • Does the cancellation of an original allotment and a subsequent ejectment order preclude a claimant from establishing 'undisputed possession'?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to the transfer of an evacuee house if the previous order of eviction against the original allottee has attained finality?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Makhan and another1994 SCMR 1451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-09
  pre-emptionco-shareradverse possessionoral salesuperior right
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a pre-emption suit filed by the appellant claiming a superior right as a co-sharer in Khata No. 25. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed the suit, holding that the appellant had acquired ownership through adverse possession based on prior oral sales, despite contravention of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. However, the High Court reversed the judgment, finding that the requisite twelve-year prescriptive period for adverse possession was incomplete when the pre-empted sale was attested. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether the High Court misread a registered sale-deed. Upon hearing, the Supreme Court held that the registered sale-deed did not concern the Khata in question and that adverse possession cannot be used as a sword to claim a preferential right of pre-emption against a third party, as possession under an oral sale is permissive rather than hostile. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can adverse possession be used as a sword to establish a superior right of pre-emption?
  • Does possession under an oral sale constitute adverse and hostile possession against the rightful owner?
  • Whether a plaintiff can claim a preferential right to pre-empt on the basis of a title not connected to the disputed Khata?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Ghulam Hussain and 12 others1994 SCMR 841 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-02
  land settlementallotment cancellationfraudmukhbari applicationbona fide purchaserClaims Organizationdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had set aside an order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner cancelling a land allotment. The core legal question was whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner, exercising powers under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, was competent to reopen and examine the genuineness of a verified claim and set aside an allotment on the ground of fraud allegedly committed before the Claims Organization. The Supreme Court held that the allegations of fraud regarding non-migration of the original allottee were not successfully established on evidence, and further affirmed that the Settlement Commissioner's jurisdiction under sections 10 and 11 does not extend to inquiring into or adjudicating upon fraud allegedly practised upon the Claims Commissioner during the verification of claims under the relevant registration of claims statutes. Moreover, the Court protected the rights of the subsequent alienees who were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner has the jurisdiction under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 to inquire into fraud allegedly practised upon the Claims Commissioner during the verification of a claim?
  • Can an allotment of land be set aside on the basis of a mukhbari application alleging non-migration of the claimant without cogent and conclusive proof?
  • Are subsequent transferees for valuable consideration protected as bona fide purchasers when an earlier allotment is challenged on grounds of fraud?
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• Muhammad Hussain and another vs Mst. Bhoori1994 SCMR 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-04
  pre-emption suitcourt-feelimitationdeficiency in court-feeRegular Second Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from a suit for pre-emption, challenging the dismissal of the appellants' Regular Second Appeal by the High Court. The core legal question examined was whether the respondent plaintiff's pre-emption suit was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation due to a delay in supplying a deficiency in court-fee pointed out by the trial Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the case is squarely covered by the precedent in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan (PLD 1984 Supreme Court 289). The Court laid down the principle that a plaintiff is entitled as of right to the grant of time in the first instance to make up a deficiency in court-fee, and it is the duty of the trial Court to specify the exact amount to be paid after proper determination, provided the plaintiff's conduct is not contumacious.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation if a deficiency in court-fee is not supplied within the limitation period?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled as of right to the grant of time in the first instance to make good a deficiency in court-fee?
  • Whose duty is it to specify the exact amount of court-fee to be paid after a determination of deficiency?
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• Muhammad Hussain and 2 others vs The State1994 SCMR 1568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  post-arrest bailsectarian violenceSection 302 PPCleave to appealfiring from housegrant of bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by three petitioners against an order of the High Court dated 27-6-1993, which denied them bail in a case involving charges under Sections 302, 188, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The allegations stemmed from a sectarian clash on 12-7-1992, wherein the petitioners were accused of firing from inside the house of a named individual, resulting in the death of two persons. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to the grant of post-arrest bail given the nature and gravity of the allegations. The Supreme Court held that firing from inside a house upon a sectarian group constitutes a serious matter, rendering the petitioners' claim to bail undeserving at this stage. Dismissing the petition, the Court affirmed the High Court's order refusing bail, establishing that severe involvement in sectarian violence with deliberate firing weighs heavily against exercising discretion to grant bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused charged with fatal firing during a sectarian clash is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does deliberate firing from inside a premises during sectarian violence constitute a ground to refuse bail?
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• Muhammad Hussain and 2 others vs Eisa and another1994 SCMR 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-29
  pre-emptionlimitationKhasra Girdawariconcurrent findingspossessionsale deedtenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the appellants challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the limitation period. The core legal question was whether the suit was barred by time, specifically whether the limitation period commenced from the date of an alleged prior possession under an agreement to sell or from the date of the registered sale deed. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to establish that their possession had changed from that of tenants to that of vendees prior to the execution of the sale deed. The Court found that the Khasra Girdawari relied upon by the appellants was unreliable, as it contained inconsistencies regarding the date of possession and lacked corroboration from the Patwari’s daily diary. Consequently, the Court upheld the concurrent findings that the suit was within time, as the limitation period was correctly calculated from the date of the registered sale deed. The principle laid down is that entries in Khasra Girdawari do not carry a presumption of correctness and cannot establish a change in the nature of possession without reliable, corroborative evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commence from the date of possession under an agreement to sell or from the date of the registered sale deed?
  • Does an entry in the Khasra Girdawari carry a presumption of correctness?
  • Can a tenant claiming possession under an agreement to sell rely on their prior possession as a tenant to establish the starting point of limitation for a pre-emption suit?
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• Muhammad Hussain and 11 others vs Deputy Settlement1994 SCMR 1635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-18
  evacuee propertycompensation poolsettlement authoritiesScheme No. VIIIwrit jurisdictionnon-prosecutionres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment concerning the ownership of land formerly classified as evacuee property in Jia Musa, Lahore. The core legal question was whether land validly sold by the Custodian of Evacuee Property with Central Government approval could subsequently be transferred to third parties under Scheme No. VIII by Settlement Authorities. The Supreme Court held that once the property was sold to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, it ceased to be available for disposal under Scheme No. VIII. The Court affirmed that the Chief Settlement Commissioner possessed the competence to sell land from the compensation pool under the relevant statutes. Furthermore, the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's refusal to grant relief in a second writ petition where an earlier petition regarding the same subject matter had been dismissed for non-prosecution without adequate explanation. The petitions were dismissed, upholding the finality of the initial sale and the impropriety of subsequent transfers of the same property by Settlement Authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can property already sold by the Custodian of Evacuee Property be subsequently transferred by Settlement Authorities under Scheme No. VIII?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the authority to sell land forming part of the compensation pool?
  • Is a second writ petition maintainable when an earlier petition on the same subject matter was dismissed for non-prosecution without explanation?
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• Muhammad Hussain alias Muhammada vs The State and another1994 SCMR 999 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-08
  bail cancellationabsconderproclaimed offenderleave to appealjudicial discretioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had cancelled the bail previously granted to the petitioner by an Additional Sessions Judge in a case involving an offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had cancelled the bail primarily because the petitioner possessed a motive for the crime and had been an absconder prior to his arrest. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that no effective firing was attributed to him and disputed his status as an absconder, claiming no formal proclamation had been issued. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioner's failure to surrender despite being aware of the allegations and his associates' involvement justified treating him as a proclaimed offender for bail purposes, even in the absence of technical compliance with proclamation requirements. The Court concluded that the High Court's exercise of discretion was sound and refused to interfere, thereby dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court treat an accused as a proclaimed offender for bail purposes even without the technical satisfaction of the requirements of a formal proclamation?
  • Does the failure of an accused to surrender despite knowledge of allegations justify the cancellation of bail?
  • Is the High Court's discretion to cancel bail based on the accused's status as an absconder and the existence of motive subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Muhammad Hanif and anothers vs Sultan1994 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-12
  review petitionappraisal of evidencecomplete justiceconstitutional dutyappellate jurisdictionfactual grounds
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed against a Supreme Court judgment dated 26-11-1992, challenging the Court's examination of factual grounds that were allegedly not argued before the High Court, and disputing the Court's appraisal of evidence regarding inconsistencies. The petitioners contended that the Supreme Court was restricted from considering arguments not advanced in the High Court. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, holding that the mere fact that an argument was not orally advanced in the High Court does not preclude the Supreme Court from considering it, provided the ground was raised in the memorandum of appeal. The Court affirmed its constitutional duty to ensure complete justice, which necessitates an overall view of the case, including all aspects of the record. Furthermore, the Court found no merit in the challenge to its appraisal of evidence, noting that the petitioners failed to provide a valid rebuttal to the reasoning provided in the original judgment. Consequently, the Court held that no case for review was established and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court consider a legal ground in an appeal that was raised in the memorandum of appeal but not orally argued in the High Court?
  • Does the Supreme Court's duty to do complete justice allow it to examine all aspects of a case regardless of whether they were argued in the lower court?
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