Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• M. Imamuddin vs Mst. Surriya Khanum through Legal HeirsPLD'1991 Supreme Court 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-01
  tentative rent orderstriking off defencelandlord and tenant relationshipWest Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinancespecific performanceejectment proceedingsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order striking off the appellant's defense for non-compliance with a tentative rent order passed under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions concerned whether a Rent Controller must determine the landlord-tenant relationship before issuing a tentative rent order, whether the High Court possesses co-extensive powers to pass such orders, and whether the appellant’s failure to comply justified the striking of his defense. The Supreme Court held that a prior determination of the landlord-tenant relationship is unnecessary under Section 13(6) unless the tenant explicitly denies the relationship. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the High Court’s appellate powers are co-extensive with those of the Rent Controller. Regarding the specific facts, the Court found no valid justification for the appellant's failure to deposit rent and ruled that the striking of the defense was legally sound. The Court established that the special provisions of the Rent Ordinance prevail over the Transfer of Property Act in cases of inconsistency, and non-compliance with a tentative rent order warrants striking the defense absent uncontrollable circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Must a Rent Controller determine the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship before passing a tentative rent order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Are the powers of the High Court in an appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 co-extensive with those of the Rent Controller?
  • Does the non-compliance with a tentative rent order by a tenant justify the striking off of the defense in the absence of reasons beyond the tenant's control?
  • In case of inconsistency, which prevails: the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 or the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
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• Lutfi Siddiqui vs The Secretary, Establishment Division, Rawalpindi And 2 Other1991 SCMR 125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-26
  service appealsenioritycivil servantlimitation periodretrospective promotionback benefitsautonomous bodysupersession
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal concerns the seniority and promotion rights of a civil servant formerly employed by the Family Planning Board. The core legal questions were whether the appellant’s appeal before the Service Tribunal was time-barred and whether he was entitled to retrospective seniority and promotion benefits from the date he became a civil servant, notwithstanding his earlier supersession while employed by an autonomous body. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was within time, as it was filed against the final departmental notification addressing the appellant's representation. On merits, the Court found that the appellant had been unfairly superseded during his tenure in the autonomous body. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and ruled that the appellant was entitled to be treated as a Grade-19 officer effective from May 11, 1981—the date he became a civil servant—for the purposes of pay, seniority, arrears, and pension. The judgment establishes that once a civil servant’s status is regularized, they are entitled to full consequential benefits for past service irregularities, provided the claim is brought against the final departmental order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent departmental notification issued on a representation provide a fresh starting point for the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to seniority and pay fixation from the date of their regularization as a civil servant, even if they were previously superseded while employed by an autonomous body?
  • Are government service rules applicable to autonomous bodies stricto senso?
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• Lilaram vs Ghulam Ali Alias Essa Through Legal Heirs And Other1991 SCMR 932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-11
  execution of decreespecific performancelegal representativesOrder XXI Rule 22non-prosecutioncoram non judicefraudulent entrylimitation in executionremand for inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose out of execution proceedings relating to a 1949 decree for specific performance. The judgment-debtor's legal representative challenged the High Court's dismissal of his execution appeal on grounds that the execution application had been dismissed for non-prosecution, that mandatory notice under Order XXI Rule 22 read with Section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was absent, and that the execution application was barred by limitation due to fraudulent ante-dating in the institution register. The Supreme Court held that an order dismissing execution without notice to the parties is non est and coram non judice, and the dismissal in question related to a previously disposed of execution file rather than the active one. Further, where a substituted legal representative receives actual notice and files objections, failure to serve formal notice under Order XXI Rule 22 constitutes a curable irregularity and not a jurisdictional defect. However, noting prima facie evidence of forgery in the execution register impacting limitation, the Court remanded the matter to the executing court under Section 12(2) for a factual inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order dismissing an execution application for non-prosecution passed without prior notice to the decree-holders void and coram non judice?
  • Does the absence of a formal notice under Order XXI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 vitiate execution proceedings where the legal representative has actual notice and actively participates by filing objections?
  • Can a party who voluntarily applied and was substituted as the sole legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor subsequently object that other legal heirs were omitted?
  • Should an allegation of fraudulent ante-dating of an execution application in court registers affecting limitation be referred to the executing court for inquiry under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Liaqat Hussain Shah And Another vs The State1991 SCMR 1124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-27
  murder convictioninterested witnessesalibi defensefalse implicationcriminal appealcross-examinationeyewitness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions concerned whether the conviction was sustainable despite the appellants' plea of alibi, the acquittal of co-accused, and allegations of false implication due to long-standing enmity. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. The Court held that the testimony of interested witnesses is not inherently unreliable due to enmity, particularly when corroborated by the circumstances of the case. It emphasized that a complainant is unlikely to substitute an innocent person for the actual killer of their own child. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the opinion of an Investigating Officer regarding an accused's innocence is not binding, as the court must independently assess the evidence. The judgment also established that trial courts have a duty to regulate proceedings to prevent the wastage of judicial time through excessive and irrelevant cross-examination, and that a plea of alibi requires more than a mere oral statement to be credible.

  Questions settled

  • Is the opinion of an Investigating Officer regarding the innocence of an accused binding upon the court?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused automatically render the conviction of remaining accused doubtful?
  • Can the testimony of interested witnesses be rejected solely on the ground of enmity?
  • What is the legal effect of a failure to support a plea of alibi with documentary or circumstantial evidence?
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• Land Acquisition Collector And Another vs Afzal Shah1991 SCMR 1510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-15
  land acquisitioncompensationleave to appealenhancement of compensationSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Land Acquisition Collector challenging the judgment of the High Court dated 29th January, 1990, which had enhanced the amount of compensation awarded by the lower forums in favour of the respondent. The core legal question before the court involved the correctness of the High Court's enhancement of compensation in land acquisition matters. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider the matter alongside a connected pending appeal, Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1990, to be heard on the present record with directions for the parties to file necessary documents for disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted against a High Court judgment enhancing land acquisition compensation when a related appeal is already pending before the Supreme Court?
  • Can connected cases dealt with in a single impugned judgment be heard together upon the grant of leave to appeal?
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• Lal Khan vs Mst. Zarina Jan And Another1991 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-28
  pre-emptionlimitationconcurrent findings of factsale mutationleave to appealpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against judgments of the Peshawar High Court, which arose from consolidated pre-emption suits filed by Lal Khan and Khani Zaman against a vendee, Mst. Zarina Jan. The core legal question was whether the pre-emption suit filed by Khani Zaman was time-barred, specifically hinging on whether the limitation period commenced from the date of alleged possession or the date of the attestation of the sale mutation. The trial court, the District Judge, and the High Court all concurrently found that possession of the disputed land had not passed to the vendee at the time of the alleged transaction, and therefore, the limitation period commenced from the date of the attestation of the sale mutation, rendering the suit within time. The Supreme Court upheld these concurrent findings of fact, holding that there was no merit in the petitions and no grounds for interference with the lower courts' findings. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will generally decline to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commence from the date of possession or the date of attestation of the sale mutation when possession is disputed?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by three lower courts in a pre-emption matter?
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• Lal Khan And Another vs Sham Din And Other1991 SCMR 826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-20
  mukhbari applicationland allotmentsettlement authoritiesnon-completion of recordinformer rightscivil appealallotment cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil appeals filed by appellants claiming a superior right to land allotments as informers (mukhbir) against private respondents who were allotted the same land as claimants. The core legal questions were whether the appellants had established their status as informers and whether the High Court erred in upholding the cancellation of the appellants' claims. The Supreme Court found that the appellants failed to provide the necessary record, specifically the Mukhbari application and relevant settlement orders, resulting in a clear non-compliance with Order 14 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. On merits, the Court held that the initial Mukhbari application had been consigned to the record, terminating those proceedings, and that subsequent actions were initiated by different parties. Furthermore, the Court noted serious doubts regarding the bona fides of the application, as the alleged informers never appeared during the inquiry. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed for non-completion of the record and on merits, affirming the High Court's decision that the respondents' allotments were valid and could not be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide essential documents in an appeal constitute grounds for dismissal under the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
  • Can a claim as an informer be sustained when the initial Mukhbari application has been consigned to the record and proceedings terminated?
  • Are allotments made to regular claimants liable to be disturbed in the absence of clear evidence supporting an informer's claim?
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• Lal Din vs Bashir Ahmad1991 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-18
  pre-emptiontenantChakotaLand Reforms RegulationWest Pakistan Land Revenue Actagricultural landfixed rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns a pre-emption suit involving agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the appellant, described in revenue records as a "Ghair Dakheel Kar" paying "Chakota" (fixed rent), qualified as a "tenant" under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, thereby possessing a right of pre-emption. The respondent argued that "Chakota" indicated a fixed-term lease rather than a tenancy. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was a tenant. The Court reasoned that the definition of "tenant" under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, which applies to the Regulation, does not exclude persons paying cash rent. It determined that "Chakota" represents a valid mode of rent payment, and the status of a tenant is established by the relationship of holding land under a landlord, regardless of whether the rent is paid in cash or kind. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restoring the pre-emption decree in favor of the appellant, affirming that the mode of payment does not alter the essential legal status of a tenant entitled to pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person paying 'Chakota' (fixed rent) qualify as a tenant under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
  • Can the definition of 'tenant' provided in the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, be applied to the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
  • Does the payment of rent in cash, rather than in kind, negate the status of a tenant for the purpose of pre-emption rights?
  • Is the Supreme Court of Pakistan restricted to deciding only the specific points on which leave to appeal was granted?
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• Lal Din And Others vs Ali Ahmad And Other1991 SCMR 1553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-16
  mukhbari applicationallotment cancellationevacuee propertyconstitutional jurisdictiondisplaced personsstatutory rightsrepeal act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the interpretation of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The core legal questions involve whether a pending mukhbari application, upon which no action has been taken, constitutes proceedings saved under the Repeal Act of 1975; whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, may set aside a notified officer's order cancelling an allotment without a definitive finding on whether the allotment was in excess; and whether a mukhbir holds a statutory right to claim land against an unsatisfied claim from an allotment cancelled due to their information. The Court granted leave to appeal to address these significant questions of law concerning the rights of mukhbirs and the scope of constitutional review regarding the cancellation of allotments. The proceedings were directed to be prepared for hearing on the existing record, with liberty for parties to file additional documents, thereby setting the stage for a determination on the merits of these statutory and jurisdictional interpretations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mukhbari application under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, upon which no action has been taken, be treated as proceedings saved by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
  • May the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction set aside an order cancelling an allotment without a definite finding that the allotment was in excess?
  • Does a mukhbir possess a statutory right to seek allotment of land against an unsatisfied claim out of an allotment cancelled due to information supplied by them?
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• Lahore Municipal Corporation vs Muhammad Anwar And Other1991 SCMR 1821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-17
  settlement allotmentcompensation poolleave to appealmunicipal landcancellation of allotmentwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Lahore Municipal Corporation against a High Court judgment that set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner. The dispute arose over a piece of land measuring 9 Marlas, which had been allotted by Settlement authorities to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest. The respondents had subsequently constructed a structure on the land with the Corporation's permission. However, the Settlement Commissioner later cancelled the allotment upon a Mukhbari application, asserting the land belonged to the Municipal Corporation. The High Court declared this cancellation illegal. The petitioner contends that because the property was never part of the compensation pool, the Settlement authorities lacked the jurisdiction to transfer it, and that the Corporation's prior sanction for construction did not estop it from asserting ownership. The Supreme Court, finding that the contentions raised regarding the scope of the compensation pool and the authority of the Settlement Commissioner require deeper judicial examination, granted leave to appeal to resolve whether the land was lawfully transferable by the Settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can land that does not form part of the compensation pool be validly transferred by Settlement authorities?
  • Does the grant of building permission by a Municipal Corporation estop it from later claiming ownership of the land?
  • Are the considerations of prior sanction and lack of previous claim sufficient to set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner cancelling an allotment?
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• Laeeq Ahmad And Another vs Maqsood Ahmad And Another1991 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-23
  Permanent Transfer DeedP.T.D. cancellationSettlement Department authorityCivil Court jurisdictionwrit jurisdictiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a writ petition filed by the respondent. The dispute arose over the transfer of a plot of land, for which the respondent had obtained a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) in 1973. Subsequently, the petitioners claimed the land had been purchased by them in an open auction, leading the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (D.S.C.) to cancel the respondent's P.T.D. in 1978. The High Court set aside this cancellation, holding that the D.S.C. lacked the authority to cancel a P.T.D. once issued, particularly in the absence of fraud, and that such disputes must be adjudicated by a Civil Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, finding no legal infirmity in the reasoning. The Court affirmed that administrative departments possess no authority to cancel a P.T.D. after its issuance, establishing the principle that any subsequent dispute regarding title or entitlement after the issuance of a P.T.D. must be resolved exclusively through civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Deputy Settlement Commissioner have the authority to cancel a Permanent Transfer Deed once it has been issued?
  • Is a Civil Court the appropriate forum to resolve disputes regarding property title after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Can a Permanent Transfer Deed be cancelled by the Settlement Department in the absence of fraud?
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• Khurshid Anwar vs Muhammadazhar Sajid And Other1991 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  allotment cancellationderivative titleco-operative societiesexecution of decreecivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a disputed plot originally allotted in 1959, subsequently cancelled in 1963, and reallotted to respondent No.1. The core legal question is whether a subsequent purchaser from the original allottee can claim valid title when the original allotment was lawfully cancelled, and all legal challenges by the original allottee, including a dismissed civil suit and appeal, had failed. The Supreme Court held that once the original allottee's title was extinguished and the cancellation orders became final, no valid title could be derived or transferred to the petitioner through a subsequent agreement to sell. The court laid down the principle that a derivative title cannot survive when the foundational right has been lawfully extinguished through final judicial and administrative proceedings, rendering subsequent claims based thereon legally untenable. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subsequent purchaser claim valid title from an allottee whose allotment was previously cancelled and whose legal challenges failed?
  • Whether an agreement to sell executed by an allottee whose title has been extinguished carries any legal effect?
  • Does a petition for leave to appeal maintain merit when the foundational title has ended in smoke through final orders?
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• Khurshid Ahmad and 4 others vs Syed Akhtar Hussin Gilani and 4 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1070 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-10
  pre-emptionspecific performanceoral salemutationphysical possessionpunjab pre-emption actlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had allowed the respondents' Regular Second Appeal and dismissed the appellants' pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a transfer of property made in pursuance of a decree for specific performance, accompanied by payment of the sale price and delivery of possession, amounts to a 'sale' subject to pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that a sale in pursuance of a decree for specific performance, where possession is delivered and the price is paid, constitutes a valid sale and is not excluded from the definition of 'sale' under section 3(5) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The key principle laid down is that transactions of sale need not necessarily be executed via a registered sale-deed where oral sales accompanied by physical possession or mutations are recognized, and decrees for specific performance resulting in such transfers are fully amenable to pre-emption suits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a transfer of property pursuant to a decree for specific performance amount to a sale subject to pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Is a sale resulting from a decree for specific performance excluded under section 3(5) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Can a pre-emption suit be maintained on the basis of an oral sale followed by delivery of possession without a registered sale-deed?
  • What is the starting point of limitation under section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 when a sale is not followed by a mutation?
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• Khudai Rahim vs The State1991 SCMR 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-26
  leave to appealprohibited bore weaponillegal arms possessionpolice witnessesprobation and parolearms ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan, which dismissed his appeal against conviction and sentence under Section 13-E of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, for illegal possession of a prohibited bore weapon. The core legal questions involved whether a 7.62 M.M. rifle falls within the prohibited bore category and whether police testimony alone, without public witnesses, is sufficient to prove recovery in emergent circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the 7.62 M.M. calibre is not excluded from the prohibited bore under the applicable government notification, and that the absence of public witnesses does not invalidate the recovery when the police acted promptly in an emergent situation. Furthermore, the Court held that releasing a first offender on probation or parole is discretionary and its denial is not illegal unless perverse. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, laying down principles regarding weapon classification under arms laws and the evaluation of police evidence during emergent recoveries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether 7.62 M.M. calibre rifles fall within the category of prohibited bore arms under the Arms Ordinance?
  • Is police evidence alone sufficient to prove the recovery of an illicit weapon when public witnesses are unavailable due to emergent circumstances?
  • Whether the denial of probation or parole to a first offender constitutes a perversity or illegality warranting interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Khuda Bakhsh vs Muhammad Yaqub1991 SCMR 205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-01
  pre-emptioncourt-feedeficient court-feecivil revisionremandpossession of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a suit for possession of land based on a superior right of pre-emption. The trial court initially dismissed the suit primarily due to a deficiency in the payment of court-fee. Although the appellate court reversed this finding, the High Court subsequently allowed a revision petition against that reversal, holding that the appellant was negligent and contumacious in filing an appeal with deficient court-fee. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the correctness of the High Court's judgment in light of the precedent established in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan (PLD 1984 SC 289). Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the High Court's judgment could not be sustained in view of the cited authority. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the High Court for a rehearing of the revision petition on its merits. The judgment reaffirms the necessity of adhering to established Supreme Court guidelines regarding the treatment of deficient court-fee matters in litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit or appeal be dismissed solely on the ground of deficient court-fee without following the procedural requirements established in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan?
  • Is a finding of negligence and contumacy regarding court-fee payment sufficient to dismiss an appeal without further opportunity to rectify the deficiency?
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• Khuda Bakhsh And Others vs Muhammad Din And Other1991 SCMR 1507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-30
  leave to appealwidow allotmentlimited ownerinheritancelast male owner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from impugned orders concerning the inheritance of land allotted to a widow. The petitioners contend that the allotment was made in lieu of rights abandoned in India as a limited owner, wherein upon her marriage or demise, the property should revert to the last male owner, her husband, and pass to his heirs. The core legal question involves the nature of a widow's allotment and the proper mode of succession upon her death. The court held that the contentions raised require consideration and granted leave to appeal, directing that respondents shall not alienate the property in the meantime. The key principle laid down is that questions concerning the nature of a widow's land grant and subsequent inheritance rights warrant a full hearing by the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land allotted to a widow in lieu of abandoned rights is held as a limited owner?
  • Does property allotted to a widow revert to the last male owner upon her marriage or demise?
  • Who is entitled to inheritance of property held by a widow as a limited owner?
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• Khawaja Muhammad Rafique vs Haji Allah Noor1991 SCMR 1345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-24
  rent defaulteviction applicationleave to appealrent controllerlandlord-tenant disputeirregular rent payment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which upheld a Rent Controller's decision dismissing the landlord's eviction application against a tenant. The landlord alleged default in rent payment from January to November 1984. The tenant contended that rent had been paid in advance, though no receipts were issued, and argued the eviction application was mala fide. The Rent Controller, noting the history of irregular rent collection and the landlord's unexplained delay in seeking eviction, exercised discretion to resolve the doubt in the tenant's favor. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that the lower courts' reliance on the history of irregular rent acceptance conflicted with established Supreme Court precedents, which hold that irregular acceptance of rent does not absolve a tenant of default. The Supreme Court found that the submissions raised substantial legal questions regarding the interpretation of rent default and the application of established precedents, thereby granting leave to appeal to examine whether the lower courts erred in their assessment of the default.

  Questions settled

  • Does the irregular acceptance of rent by a landlord absolve a tenant of the liability for default under rent laws?
  • Can a Rent Controller resolve doubts regarding rent payment in favor of a tenant based on the landlord's unexplained delay in filing an eviction application?
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• Khawaja Muhammad Rafiq vs Haji Allah Noor1991 SCMR 2039 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-27
  evictiondefault in rentburden of proofrent restrictionlandlord and tenantirregular payment practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from eviction proceedings initiated by the appellant-landlord against the respondent-tenant on the ground of default in rent payment. The Rent Controller and the High Court dismissed the eviction application, relying on the presumption of an established practice of irregular, lump-sum rent payments, and giving the tenant the benefit of the doubt regarding payment. The Supreme Court set aside these orders, holding that the lower courts erred by deciding the case on presumptions rather than evidence. The Court emphasized that the tenant failed to produce any receipts or credible evidence to prove payment for the period in question, despite admitting that the landlord historically issued receipts. The Court reaffirmed that a practice of irregular payment does not absolve a tenant of the statutory obligation to pay rent, nor can parties contract out of the provisions of the relevant rent restriction law. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered the eviction of the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a past practice of irregular or lump-sum rent payments absolve a tenant from the liability of default?
  • Can parties contract out of the provisions of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Is a Rent Controller permitted to decide an eviction case based on presumptions rather than evidence?
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• Khawaja Bashir Ahmad vs The Additional Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi And Other1991 SCMR 1604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-03
  evacuee propertysettlement lawsrepeal of statutesjurisdictionpast and closed transactionsPermanent Transfer Deedremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that remanded a property dispute to a 'notified officer' for further inquiry. The appellant had acquired property via a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) in 1964, which remained unchallenged for over a decade. The core legal question was whether, following the repeal of evacuee laws by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, a notified officer possessed jurisdiction to reopen a finalized settlement transaction where no proceedings were pending at the time of repeal. The Supreme Court held that because the transfer was a past and closed transaction and no proceedings were pending on the date of repeal (January 28, 1975), the notified officer lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. Consequently, the Court set aside the remand order and the notified officer's decision, ruling that the settlement authorities were functus officio. The key principle established is that after the repeal of evacuee laws, settlement authorities cannot reopen closed transactions; aggrieved parties must instead seek redress through the civil courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notified officer have jurisdiction to reopen a settlement transaction after the repeal of evacuee laws if no proceedings were pending at the time of repeal?
  • Can a High Court remand a case to a notified officer regarding a property dispute that was already a past and closed transaction prior to the repeal of evacuee laws?
  • What is the appropriate forum for seeking redress regarding property disputes after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
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• Khan Saeed Alam vs Tariq Mustafa And Other1991 SCMR 1794 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-28
  specific performancestatus quointerlocutory orderleave to appealoral agreementdiscretionary powerappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court, which declined to grant a status quo order regarding the western half of a plot in the Blue Area, Islamabad, pending the disposal of the petitioner's regular first appeal. The petitioner had originally filed a suit for specific performance based on an alleged oral agreement for the sale of property, claiming payment of substantial sums. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the High Court subsequently refused to maintain the status quo during the pendency of the appeal, noting that the transaction was not free from blemish and lacked proper authorization from the respondents. The core legal question was whether the High Court's refusal to grant the interlocutory status quo order was justified. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s exercise of discretion was neither illegal nor capricious. The Court affirmed that it generally does not interfere in interlocutory matters where the lower court's order is proper and correct. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court generally interfere with interlocutory orders passed by the High Court?
  • Can a status quo order be granted in a suit for specific performance where the underlying transaction lacks proper authorization?
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• Khan Muhammad vs The State1991 SCMR 2015 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-02
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptiondefence evidenceleave to appealcriminal convictionappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction for receiving illegal gratification. The petitioner, a police official, was convicted by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, receiving a sentence of one year imprisonment and a fine. The High Court maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence to six months, granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Upon review, the Supreme Court identified a critical legal omission: the lower courts failed to consider the evidence presented by the defence. Specifically, defence witnesses testified that the disputed funds were intended for disbursement as Travelling Allowance (TA) at the police station, a claim not addressed in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the failure to evaluate defence evidence constitutes a material irregularity in the judicial process requiring appellate intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to consider defence evidence constitute sufficient grounds for granting leave to appeal?
  • Is a conviction for illegal gratification sustainable if the defence evidence regarding the nature of the funds remains unexamined?
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• Khan Muhammad And Others vs The State And Other1991 SCMR 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-06
  leave to appealcriminal appealconviction modificationsentencingvicarious liabilitymurderattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which modified the convictions and sentences of seven individuals previously convicted by a Sessions Judge for murder and attempted murder. The High Court had acquitted the petitioners of charges under Sections 302/149 and 307/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, substituting them with convictions under Sections 326/149, 325/149, 324/149, and 323/149, while maintaining convictions under Section 148. The core legal questions involve whether the evidence on record justified the original convictions and sentences, whether the High Court was legally justified in setting aside the convictions under Sections 302/149 and 307/149, and whether the High Court erred in awarding life imprisonment to a convict under Section 326/149 despite finding he did not inflict the fatal injury, and whether the sentences imposed on the other convicts were commensurate with their proven overt acts. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these issues, noting the necessity of reviewing the evidentiary basis and the legality of the High Court's sentencing modifications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside convictions under Sections 302/149 and 307/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a sentence of life imprisonment be awarded under Section 326/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the convict did not inflict the fatal injury?
  • Whether the sentences awarded to convicts by the High Court were commensurate with the overt acts attributed and proved against them?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ur Rehman vs WAPDA Through Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore And Other1991 SCMR 1525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-29
  leave to appealservice tribunalpromotioneligibility for BPS-16WAPDA employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning the denial of the grant of BPS-16. The petitioner, a qualified Draftsman from the Army initially appointed in WAPDA in 1963 and subsequently promoted to Chief Draftsman, sought inclusion in BPS-16 pursuant to an office order governing non-Matric senior subordinates and diploma engineers. The core legal question involves the interpretation and applicability of office orders regarding eligibility criteria and deemed qualifications for the grant of BPS-16 to non-Matriculate employees holding specific technical posts. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the import of the cited office order renders the petitioner's case worthy of consideration. The key principle laid down is that individuals appointed against specific technical posts under prescribed qualifications prior to a notification may be deemed to possess the requisite status for all service benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee appointed against a post prior to a notification can be deemed to fulfill the qualifications for all purposes under the relevant office order?
  • Does the denial of BPS-16 to a senior subordinate non-Matriculate employee warrant leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Pervaiz vs Amir Akhtar Bhatti And Other1991 SCMR 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-23
  evictionpersonal usebona fide requirementrent restrictionconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an eviction order passed by the Additional Rent Controller, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court. The petitioner, a tenant of a shop in Lahore Cantonment, challenged the eviction order, arguing that the respondents' claim of requiring the premises for personal use was not bona fide but a pretext to increase rent. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the landlord's personal need for the property were supported by evidence and free from legal infirmity. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the Additional Rent Controller and the High Court were sound and did not suffer from any legal infirmity. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the landlord's requirement for personal use was established. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will generally not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in rent restriction matters unless a clear legal error or infirmity is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding a landlord's personal need for premises?
  • Is a landlord's claim for personal use of a rented shop sufficient grounds for eviction under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mahmud, Advocate And 3 Others vs Muhammad Yaseen And 31991 SCMR 1401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-23
  settlement lawsproperty transferlocus standiwrit jurisdictionnatural justicefinality of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition that challenged the transfer of property (Unit No. NE-VIII-2-S-6) to the respondent under settlement laws. The appellants, who were occupants of various units within the property, claimed entitlement based on an order by the Additional Settlement Commissioner dated 11-6-1963, which suggested transferring property to occupants to avoid dislocation. They further argued that an earlier order dated 14-7-1960 rejecting the respondent's claim had attained finality. The Supreme Court found that none of the appellants had filed valid forms for the specific property in question, nor were they parties to the proceedings where the respondent's claim was processed. The Court held that the initial rejection order of 14-7-1960 was legally ineffective against the respondent as he was not notified or heard in those proceedings. Consequently, the Court affirmed the transfer of the property to the respondent, ruling that the appellants lacked the locus standi to challenge the transfer as they had no valid competing claim to the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order passed without notice to a party have legal effect against that party?
  • Can a person challenge the transfer of property under settlement laws without having filed a valid claim form for that specific property?
  • Does an observation in an order regarding the transfer of property to occupants create a vested right for those who did not file the requisite forms?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Hameed vs Additional District Judge, Sahiwal And Other1991 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-23
  ejectmenttenant defencenon-compliancerent depositconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking to challenge the dismissal of the petitioner's constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the concurrent orders of the lower courts directing the ejectment of the tenant-petitioner. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller could validly pass an order under Section 13(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, when the eviction application allegedly did not plead default in rent payment. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's contention was factually incorrect as the eviction application indeed pleaded default, and consequently, non-compliance with the rent deposit order justified the striking off of the tenant's defence and subsequent ejectment. The key principle laid down is that where default in rent is duly pleaded and an order under Section 13(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 is violated, the Rent Controller acts lawfully in striking off the defence and ordering eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller make an order under Section 13(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 if default in payment of rent has been pleaded?
  • Is the striking off of a tenant's defence justified upon failure to comply with a rent deposit order under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Khair Shah And Another vs Muhammad Riasat And Other1991 SCMR 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-16
  leave to appealacquittalappreciation of evidenceocular accountmedical evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted the respondent, Muhammad Riasat, of murder charges and dismissed a revision petition filed by the complainant. The prosecution alleged that the respondent and others attacked the deceased, Muhammad Arif, resulting in his death. The trial court had initially convicted the respondent under Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but the appellate court acquitted him, citing doubts regarding the presence of the ocular witnesses and contradictions between the ocular account and medical evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the analysis of the evidence by the lower courts appeared confused and lacked the requisite scrutiny required by established legal principles regarding the appreciation of evidence. The Court found that the case warranted further examination to determine if the acquittal was based on a proper assessment of the record. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal specifically regarding the acquittal of Muhammad Riasat, while dismissing the petition concerning the other respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate court's failure to properly scrutinize medical evidence and ocular testimony in a murder case warrant the granting of leave to appeal?
  • Can a trial court's confusion regarding the cause of death and the reliability of recovery witnesses justify the acquittal of an accused in a homicide case?
  Read full judgment →
• KH Ush I Muhammad vs Sajjad Hussain and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 1102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-28
  pre-emptionZar-e-Panjumremandappellate procedurerestoration of decreecivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a pre-emption suit where the trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent. The District Court initially set aside the decree on technical grounds regarding the deposit of Zar-e-Panjum, though it upheld the trial court's findings on merits like superior right of pre-emption and estoppel. The High Court subsequently set aside the appellate order and restored the trial court's decree without addressing the remaining merits. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the High Court erred by restoring the decree without deciding the other outstanding issues on merits. The Supreme Court observed that the controversy regarding Zar-e-Panjum had been settled by its earlier precedent in Malik Barkat Ali Dogar v. Muhammad Shafi. Consequently, the Court held that it was improper for the High Court to restore the trial court's decree without adjudicating the remaining factual controversies. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case for a fresh decision, while granting the appellant leave to file a formal appeal or cross-objection regarding the merits to ensure complete justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court restore a trial court's decree in a pre-emption suit without deciding all outstanding issues on merits?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to remand a case to the High Court for a fresh decision when the High Court failed to address all factual controversies?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to permit the filing of a formal appeal or cross-objection to ensure complete justice in a remanded matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Kenneth Marshall vs The State and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-09
  quashment of proceedingssmugglingnarcoticsSection 265-K CrPCcriminal trialCustoms Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a criminal miscellaneous application by the High Court, which had refused to quash proceedings pending before a Special Judge (Customs & Taxation) against the appellant regarding the smuggling of heroin. The core legal question was whether the proceedings should be quashed on the premise that the prosecution evidence, even if accepted at its highest, failed to connect the appellant to the alleged offenses. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution’s challan contained specific, detailed allegations of the appellant's involvement, including unauthorized access to cargo facilities and bypassing standard operating procedures. The Court ruled that interfering with the trial at this stage would be premature and would stifle the proceedings. It affirmed that the trial must proceed, noting that the appellant retains the right to seek acquittal under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the evidence remains insufficient. The key principle laid down is that courts should not quash criminal proceedings when the prosecution's case rests on disputed questions of fact and specific allegations that require trial adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed when the prosecution's challan contains specific allegations connecting the accused to the crime?
  • Is it appropriate to quash criminal proceedings when the case involves disputed questions of fact?
  • What is the proper remedy for an accused seeking acquittal when the prosecution evidence is allegedly insufficient to sustain a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Karim Bashkh vs Muhammad Nawaz And 2 Other1991 SCMR 2268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-29
  murderculpable homicidecommon intentionsudden fightnature of weaponscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the complainant to challenge the Lahore High Court's decision maintaining the conviction of two respondents under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, instead of Section 302 of the same Code. The prosecution case arose from an incident where the respondents attacked the deceased with sticks (sotis) following an altercation from the previous day. The trial court had convicted the respondents under Section 304, Part II, P.P.C., noting that the weapons used were not capable of causing fatal blows, the fatal injury was not specifically attributed to any single accused, and there was no outstanding enmity. The High Court dismissed the State's appeal against this lesser conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court properly considered the gravity of the enmity, the immediate cause of the occurrence, the nature of the weapons, and the overall circumstances to determine the nature of the offence and the extent of liability, thereby violating no legal principles.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offence should be categorized under Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the fatal injury cannot be specifically attributed to any single accused?
  • What factors must a court consider when determining the nature of an offence and the extent of liability in a physical assault resulting in death?
  • Can a conviction under Section 304 Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained if the weapons used were not inherently lethal and there was no pre-existing deep-seated enmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Karim Bakhsh vs The District Judge, Lahore And Other1991 SCMR 1823 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-27
  adjournmenttrial court discretionproduction of evidencecivil procedureconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Karim Bakhsh, filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief. During the trial proceedings, the court fixed a date for recording evidence. On the scheduled date, the petitioner examined five witnesses but subsequently requested an adjournment to produce further evidence. The trial court refused this request, a decision later upheld by the District Judge in revision and subsequently affirmed by the Lahore High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the trial court was obligated to grant additional time for evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion. The Court emphasized that a party is responsible for prioritizing the examination of essential witnesses rather than delaying such production until the final stages of the trial. The judgment reinforces the principle that trial courts possess the discretion to manage proceedings and deny adjournments when a party fails to demonstrate due diligence in presenting their case, particularly when essential evidence is left for the last moment without justification.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court legally bound to grant an adjournment for the production of further evidence upon the request of a party?
  • Does the failure to examine essential witnesses in the first instance justify a trial court's refusal to grant further time for evidence?
  • Can a trial court's refusal to grant an adjournment be challenged in constitutional jurisdiction if the party failed to exercise due diligence?
  Read full judgment →
• Karim Bakhsh vs Haji Ghulam Dastgir And Other1991 SCMR 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-30
  ejectment applicationlandlord and tenant relationshipdefault in rentpersonal needconcurrent findings of factsuit for declarationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondents against the petitioner on grounds of rent default and personal need. The petitioner resisted the application by denying the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and subsequently instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration of ownership regarding the disputed property. The Rent Controller found the relationship of landlord and tenant established against the petitioner and ordered his ejectment. This decision was affirmed by the appellate authority and upheld by the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether concurrent findings of fact establishing a landlord-tenant relationship warrant interference in extraordinary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower forums. The Court laid down that concurrent factual determinations regarding tenancy relationships will not be disturbed, and the mere pendency of a declaratory suit regarding ownership does not preclude or invalidate ejectment proceedings under rent laws.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Does the filing of a civil suit for a declaration of ownership by a tenant oust or stay the jurisdiction of rent authorities to decide an ejectment application?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact on tenancy be challenged in constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Karamat Hussain Shah vs Khuda Bakhsh1991 SCMR 2058 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-05
  pre-emptionexemption notificationdisplaced personousteeIslamabad Capitalcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant/vendee's Civil Revision arising out of a pre-emption decree passed in favour of the respondent. The appellant claimed exemption from pre-emption as a displaced person from Islamabad under a notification issued pursuant to the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The core legal question was whether the appellant could claim the exemption and whether he fulfilled the strict requirements of being a certified 'displaced person' under the relevant notification. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the certificate relied upon by the appellant declared him merely an 'oustee' rather than a 'displaced person', and such certification requirements must be strictly construed. The key principle laid down is that statutory notifications granting exemptions from pre-emption rights must be strictly complied with, and the conditions—including mandatory certification as a displaced person—must be rigorously satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a vendee claiming exemption from pre-emption under a notification for displaced persons must strictly satisfy the certification requirement?
  • Does a certificate declaring a person as an 'oustee' satisfy the condition of being a 'displaced person' under the pre-emption exemption notification?
  • Whether a pre-emption suit abates automatically upon the issuance of an exemption notification if the conditions thereof are satisfied and proved before the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Karam Din vs Hashmatey And Other1991 SCMR 1822 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-30Read full judgment →
• Karachi Development Authority And Another vs Wali Ahmed Khan And Other1991 SCMR 2434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-24
  constitutional petitionmaster and servantpublic officemala fidesstatutory bodyremoval from servicewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated appeal arose from a High Court judgment under Article 199 of the Constitution regarding the removal of an employee from service by the Karachi Development Authority (KDA). The key issues were whether an employee of a statutory body/local authority whose service terms are not governed by statutory rules can invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge his removal, and whether a mala fide exercise of power overrides the general master-and-servant rule. The Supreme Court held that while the general rule governs service with statutory corporations as master and servant—precluding a declaration or reinstatement under writ jurisdiction unless statutory rules regulate service conditions or the employee holds a public office—an exception exists when the action is tainted with mala fides. The Court ruled that a mala fide exercise of statutory power is a fraud on the statute and void, making it amenable to judicial review under Article 199. Consequently, both appeals were dismissed, maintaining the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee of a statutory corporation invoke constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to challenge their removal from service?
  • Does the master-and-servant rule bar writ jurisdiction when the dismissal of a statutory employee is tainted with mala fides?
  • Under what circumstances can a statutory power of removal from service be subjected to judicial scrutiny?
  Read full judgment →
• Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba (also trading as Toshiba Corporation) vs Ch.1991 PLD Supreme Court 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-20
  Trade mark registrationLikelihood of confusionTrade Marks Act 1940Phonetic identityRegistrar of Trade MarksJudicial reviewIntellectual property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a trade mark dispute where a local manufacturer sought to register the mark 'TOSHIBA' for electric fans, despite the existence of a prior registered mark by a Japanese corporation. The High Court had upheld the Registrar’s decision to allow the registration, applying a restrictive standard that required the Registrar’s findings to be 'absurd' or 'perverse' to warrant interference. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Registrar lacks discretion to register a mark if it violates the prohibitions under Sections 8(a) and 10(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The Court clarified that the Registrar must record a finding of fact regarding the likelihood of confusion, which is subject to judicial review for correctness, not merely for perversity. Furthermore, the Court established that 'honest intention' in adopting a mark is irrelevant if the mark is phonetically identical and likely to cause deception or confusion among consumers. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower judgments and refused the registration of the respondent's mark, emphasizing the protection of established international trade marks.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Registrar of Trade Marks have discretion to register a mark that falls within the prohibited categories of Sections 8(a) and 10(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940?
  • Is the 'honest intention' of a user a valid defense against an opposition based on the likelihood of confusion and deception?
  • What is the correct standard of judicial review for a finding of fact made by the Registrar of Trade Marks?
  Read full judgment →
• K.E.S.C. Progressive Workers' Union Through Its Chairman And Others vs K.E.S.C. Labour Union Through Its General Secretary And Other1991 SCMR 888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-11
  collective bargaining agentindustrial relations ordinancestatutory interpretationproviso constructionreview petitionvoter list
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses review petitions arising from a dispute concerning the determination of a Collective Bargaining Agent under section 22 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The core legal question was whether the 'total number of workmen employed in the establishment,' as referenced in the first proviso to subsection (9) of section 22, includes workmen who have not completed ninety days of employment or are otherwise non-voters. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that the Registrar has no statutory provision to prepare a list of total workmen, and that the proviso must be construed as subordinate and limited to the preceding substantive provisions governing voters. The Court laid down the principle that a statutory proviso cannot be treated as an independent enacting clause and must be interpreted in harmony with the main enactment, meaning that the total number of workmen for the purpose of the proviso is confined to qualified voters whose period of employment is not less than three months and whose names appear on the certified voter list.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the total number of workmen employed in an establishment under the first proviso to section 22(9) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 includes workmen who have not completed 90 days of employment?
  • Does the Registrar have the statutory power to prepare and certify a list of the total workmen employed in an establishment under section 22 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • How is a statutory proviso to be construed in relation to the main enacting clauses of a statute?
  • Are non-voters entitled to be counted for determining the requisite percentage of votes for declaring a Collective Bargaining Agent under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Joint Secretary, Central Board of Revenue(Customs) And Others vs Raja Nazar Hussain And Another1991 SCMR 647 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Customs Act 1969smuggled goodsshow-cause noticeconfiscation of goodsimposition of penaltystatutory time limitseizure of goods
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that quashed a penalty imposed by Customs authorities on the respondent for possessing smuggled goods. The core legal question was whether the failure to issue a show-cause notice within the time limit prescribed by Section 168(2) of the Customs Act 1969—which necessitates the return of seized goods—also invalidates the imposition of a penalty under Section 156(89) of the same Act. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its conclusion. The Court ruled that while Section 168(2) mandates a strict timeline for issuing notices regarding the confiscation of seized goods, Section 180 of the Customs Act 1969, which governs the imposition of penalties, contains no such time limitation. Consequently, the mandatory return of goods due to a procedural lapse under Section 168(2) does not absolve an offender from liability for penalties under Section 156(89). The Court established the principle that the procedural requirements for confiscation and penalty imposition are distinct, and the absence of a time limit in Section 180 cannot be imported from Section 168(2).

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to issue a show-cause notice within the time limit prescribed by Section 168(2) of the Customs Act 1969 invalidate the imposition of a penalty under Section 156(89) of the same Act?
  • Does Section 180 of the Customs Act 1969 prescribe a time limit for the issuance of a show-cause notice regarding the imposition of a penalty?
  • Are the procedural requirements for the confiscation of seized goods and the imposition of a penalty under the Customs Act 1969 distinct and independent?
  Read full judgment →
• Joint Secretary, Central Board Of Revenue(Customs) And Other vs RajaPTCL 1991 CL. 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  smuggled goodsshow-cause noticeconfiscation of goodsimposition of penaltyseizure of goodscustoms authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether the imposition of a penalty for possessing smuggled goods under the Customs Act, 1969, is dependent upon the actual confiscation of the goods or whether failure to return seized goods within the statutory time limit under Section 168(2) absolves the offender from penal liability. The respondent was found in possession of alleged smuggled goods, but because the show-cause notice under Section 168(2) was delayed beyond the prescribed two-to-four month period, the seized goods were returned. Nevertheless, a penalty was imposed under Section 156(89). The High Court quashed the penalty, holding that returning the goods nullified the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the requirement to return seized goods due to delayed notice under Section 168(2) does not bar the authorities from imposing a penalty under Section 156(89) read with Section 180, as Section 180 prescribes no strict time limit for issuing a show-cause notice for penalties. The appeal was accordingly accepted and the penalty restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the penalty for keeping in possession of smuggled goods is dependent upon the actual confiscation of the goods?
  • Does the failure to issue a show-cause notice within the period prescribed under Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969 absolve the accused from the liability of the imposition of a penalty?
  • Does Section 180 of the Customs Act, 1969 prescribe any time limit for the issuance of a show-cause notice for the imposition of a penalty or confiscation?
  Read full judgment →
• Jiand vs The State1991 SCMR 1268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-19
  criminal appealcommon intentionjoint liabilityocular evidencecurable irregularityrecovery of weaponcapital punishmentconstructive liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the High Court confirmed the death sentence while applying Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant contended that the trial court's failure to explicitly mention Section 34 in the conviction order rendered the conviction illegal, argued that related eye-witnesses required independent corroboration, and challenged the recovery evidence due to the use of police mashirs. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the omission to cite Section 34 in the final order was a curable irregularity under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the accused was charged under Section 302/34 and suffered no prejudice. The Court affirmed that Section 34 does not create a distinct offence but establishes a principle of joint liability. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the relationship of eye-witnesses does not inherently invalidate their testimony if found truthful, and that recovery evidence remains admissible when corroborated by forensic reports, even if police personnel acted as mashirs.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission to mention Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in a conviction order invalidate the conviction if the accused was charged under Section 302/34?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of related eye-witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • Does the use of police personnel as mashirs for the recovery of a crime weapon automatically invalidate the recovery evidence?
  • Is the omission to cite a specific section of the Penal Code in a judgment a curable irregularity under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Javid Akhtar vs Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad And Other1991 SCMR 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-19
  dismissal from serviceshow cause noticedepartmental inquirycivil servantprocedural discretionmisconductleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a former employee of the Federal Investigation Agency against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld his dismissal from service. The petitioner challenged his dismissal on the grounds that the competent authority improperly utilized a summary show-cause procedure instead of a full-fledged departmental inquiry, particularly given the disputed factual allegations. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that inadmissible police file material was used against him and that he was denied access to necessary documents, causing prejudice. The Supreme Court examined whether the shorter procedure adopted under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, was legally permissible. Relying on established precedent, the Court held that the competent authority possesses the discretion to choose between available procedures prescribed by law. It affirmed that a civil servant cannot insist on a specific procedure over another if the chosen method complies with the rules. Finding that the Tribunal had correctly assessed the facts and procedural compliance, the Court refused leave to appeal, concluding no question of law remained for further examination.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have the right to insist on a full-fledged departmental inquiry over a summary show-cause procedure?
  • Is the adoption of a shorter procedure under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, legally permissible when the competent authority deems it appropriate?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a concurrent finding of fact by the Service Tribunal and departmental authorities where no question of law is raised?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal vs Additional Sessions Judge, Sargodha And Other1991 SCMR 1567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-20
  superdariconsent ordervehicle custodywrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition while granting time to comply with a previous conditional order regarding the Superdari of a disputed vehicle. The core legal question involved the validity of a consent order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge concerning the custody and financial liabilities of a vehicle involved in a criminal case where the petitioner's father was murdered by respondent No.2. The Supreme Court held that since the impugned order of the Additional Sessions Judge was passed with the consent of the parties and the High Court merely extended the time for compliance upon the request of the petitioner's counsel, the concurrent findings and the consent order warranted no interference. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that a consent order, particularly one where time for compliance is extended at the request of the party itself, cannot be challenged before a higher appellate forum in the absence of any jurisdictional error.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a consent order passed by a lower forum regarding the Superdari of a vehicle can be challenged in a constitutional petition?
  • Can a party challenge an order before the Supreme Court that was accepted and acted upon with mutual consent before the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Fazal vs Javed Iqbal And 4 Other1991 SCMR 2011 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-06
  admission policyreserved seatseducational institutionleave to appealselection committeedisqualification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that disqualified the petitioner from admission to an Engineering College against a reserved seat for the Kachhi District. The High Court had invalidated the petitioner's selection based on three grounds: his education outside the province without sufficient justification, the timing of his local certificate acquisition, and his failure to appear for the initial interview. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the Selection Committee had already accepted the petitioner's reasons for studying outside Baluchistan. Furthermore, the Court observed that the deadline for application submission had been extended, suggesting the petitioner's local certificate was obtained within the permissible timeframe, and acknowledged that the petitioner did appear for his interview on a subsequent date. Finding that the contentions raised required further examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and suspended the impugned High Court judgment, directing that the respondent be accommodated in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court disqualify a candidate for admission based on grounds already considered and accepted by the relevant Selection Committee?
  • Does the extension of an application deadline validate the submission of supporting documents obtained before the extended date?
  • Is a candidate disqualified from admission if they miss the initial interview date but appear on a subsequent date?
  Read full judgment →
• Jan Muhammad vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahroe1991 SCMR 1843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-08
  review petitionsettlement lawproperty claimpossessionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought review of the Supreme Court's earlier judgment dated 27-3-1989, claiming entitlement to the entire plot in dispute on the ground that the respondents had abandoned their claims. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to an entire plot exceeding his original application and possession. The Supreme Court held that since the Settlement Commissioner had established as a fact that the property was a plot, not a built-up area, and that the petitioner was only in possession of and applied for seven marlas in Form `A', the petitioner could not rely on technical grounds to obtain more than his original claim. The review petition was accordingly dismissed, laying down the principle that a party cannot expand its property claim beyond its initial application and actual possession based on technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can claim a larger portion of property in review than originally applied for in Form `A'?
  • Can technical grounds be made the basis for obtaining property beyond actual possession and initial claim?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to an entire plot when findings of fact restrict their possession and application to a specific lesser area?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamal vs Rai Nadeem Ullah Khan1991 SCMR 1551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  money suitwritten statementleave to appealcivil procedureexecution proceedingsdecree
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a money decree passed against him in a suit where he failed to file a written statement. The trial court had decreed the suit based on the petitioner's failure to comply with an order to file a written statement under Order VIII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner contended that the trial court had not specifically directed the filing of a written statement, but rather that it was treated as a routine proceeding, citing precedent to support the argument that a decree under Order VIII, Rule 1, requires a specific judicial direction. The Supreme Court found merit in the petitioner's argument, noting that the appellate order suggested the filing was not pursuant to a specific or special direction by the trial court. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the decree was legally sustainable in the absence of a specific court direction, and stayed the execution proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court pass a decree against a defendant for failure to file a written statement under Order VIII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, without a specific direction from the court to file such a statement?
  • Does the failure to file a written statement in routine proceedings justify a decree under Order VIII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Itehad Chemicals vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Through Additional1991 SCMR 1676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-03
  leave to appealcentral excisesstatutory constructiontax departmentdemand notices
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Itehad Chemicals against the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The core legal questions for examination involve the interpretation and consistent application of Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, particularly in light of department demand notices and previous leave granted in similar matters. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions concerning excise duty construction and consistency, requiring security in the sum of Rs. 5,000. The holding of the court is limited to the grant of leave to appeal to thoroughly examine the legal contentions raised regarding statutory construction by the tax department.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the department's construction of section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, has been consistent in view of the Deputy Collector's demand notices?
  • On what legal questions does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal regarding excise duty assessments?
  Read full judgment →
• Issa Khan vs Mst. Razma1991 SCMR 2454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-04
  betrothalcivil suitfreedom of marriagereputationIslamic lawcivil rightdeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Civil Revision by the High Court, which had upheld a decree in a suit filed by the respondent. The respondent had sought to negate the petitioner's claim of a betrothal (Mangani) between the parties. The core legal question was whether a suit filed by a female to negate a false claim of betrothal is maintainable and whether such a claim creates an enforceable civil right for the female. The Supreme Court held that while a betrothal does not constitute a valid, enforceable contract of marriage under Islamic law—as marriage requires free consent, witnesses, and dower—a false claim of betrothal by a male creates a 'clog' on the female's freedom of choice and harms her reputation. Consequently, the Court ruled that a female has an actionable civil right to sue to stop a male from falsely claiming a betrothal. The principle established is that a suit for declaration to negate a false claim of betrothal is maintainable as it protects the female's right to reputation and freedom of choice in marriage.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit filed by a female to negate a false claim of betrothal maintainable under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a betrothal agreement create an enforceable civil right to compel a marriage?
  • Does a false claim of betrothal by a male violate the civil rights of a female regarding her reputation and freedom of choice?
  Read full judgment →
• Ismail vs Subedar Gul Inayat Shah1991 PLD Supreme Court 997 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-13
  Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979Section 12(2) CPCex parte eviction orderfraud and misrepresentationinherent jurisdictionequitable principlesRent Controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a landlord-tenant dispute wherein the Rent Controller passed an ex parte eviction order against the tenant under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The tenant filed an application under Section 12(2) read with Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (C.P.C.) seeking to recall the ex parte order on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation, citing a prior written settlement between the parties. The Rent Controller and the Sindh High Court dismissed the application, holding that C.P.C. does not apply to rent proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core legal question of whether Section 12(2) C.P.C., or its underlying principles, apply to proceedings before the Rent Controller under the 1979 Ordinance. Settling the issue, the Supreme Court held that although C.P.C. does not apply by its own force, every court or tribunal possesses inherent jurisdiction to recall orders obtained by fraud or misrepresentation based on equitable principles. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the Rent Controller to decide the application on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is maintainable before a Rent Controller under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does a Rent Controller or special tribunal have inherent power to recall or set aside an eviction order obtained through fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Do equitable principles contained in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to proceedings under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Ismail Deceased Through His L. Rs. vs The Settlement Commissioner, Karachi And Other1991 SCMR 1036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-12
  settlement schemecancellation of transfertransfer pricedefault in paymentletters patent appealsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed the appellant's Letters Patent Appeal and maintained the dismissal of their writ petition regarding the cancellation of the transfer of a house. The core legal questions involved whether the transfer of the house could be cancelled for non-payment of the transfer price within one week contrary to the installment mode provided in Settlement Scheme No. 1, and whether the transfer could be cancelled and reallocated without complying with the procedure in paragraph 35 of the said Scheme. The Supreme Court held that the appellants could not invoke the procedural protections of the Scheme because they had failed to pay the price for over three years and were bound by the unappealed conditional order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner allowing time for payment. The ratio decidendi is that a transferee who is grossly negligent in making payments and fails to challenge a conditional appellate order within the stipulated time cannot subsequently challenge the cancellation of their property transfer on procedural grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property transfer under Settlement Scheme No. 1 can be cancelled for non-payment of the transfer price contrary to the installment provisions when the transferee has failed to make payments for over three years?
  • Can a transferee challenge an adverse conditional order passed by an Additional Settlement Commissioner after failing to file an appeal against it?
  • Does a concurrent finding of fact regarding a party's awareness of an administrative order preclude interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishaq Masih vs The State1991 SCMR 2392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-05
  murderocular evidencesafe administration of justicebenefit of doubteye-witness credibilityalibi
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from the conviction of the appellant and his co-accused under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The prosecution case rested on the ocular account of two eye-witnesses who claimed to have witnessed the assault under torchlight after the deceased left a Baithak to urinate in the fields during a power outage. The trial court and the High Court maintained the conviction based on this eye-witness testimony, while rejecting the evidence of motive and recovery. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the incident was a blind murder, the presence of the eye-witnesses at the scene was highly improbable, and identification from a distance of 66 Karams in a dark winter night was impossible. The Supreme Court held that the presence of the non-resident eye-witnesses and the deceased's journey to a distant spot to urinate in a cold winter night were highly improbable and chancy. Applying the principles of safe administration of criminal justice, the Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of non-resident eye-witnesses whose presence at the scene is highly improbable can form the sole basis of conviction in a capital case?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained under the principles of safe administration of criminal justice when the prosecution's narrative of identification in the dark is highly unnatural and chancy?
  Read full judgment →
• Irfan Alias Fana vs The State1991 SCMR 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-27
  leave to appealinjured witnessappreciation of evidencemurder convictiongeneral amnestydeath sentence commutationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment, which had affirmed the petitioner's conviction and death sentence for murder. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, following a prior altercation, intercepted the deceased and his brother, inflicting fatal injuries with a knife. The trial court acquitted the petitioner's co-accused but convicted the petitioner based on the testimony of an injured eyewitness and the recovery of the weapon. The petitioner argued that the F.I.R. was recorded after a preliminary investigation and contested the recovery of the weapon. The Supreme Court observed that the injured eyewitness's testimony was credible, as the injury on his palm corroborated his presence and attempt to ward off the attack. Finding that the lower courts had thoroughly appraised the evidence and that no error of law existed, the Supreme Court declined to re-appraise the evidence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused, noting that the petitioner's death sentence had already been commuted to life imprisonment due to a general amnesty.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of an injury on an eyewitness provide sufficient corroboration of their presence at the scene of the crime?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a criminal petition where the lower courts have already thoroughly evaluated the testimony?
  • Is the testimony of an injured witness generally considered reliable in the absence of a motive to falsely implicate the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Yousuf vs Kishwar Jehan1991 SCMR 864 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-13
  landlord and tenantsummary evictionstatutory noticemandatory provisionjurisdictional defectpersonal needSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave examined whether the service of a notice under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, is mandatory for seeking tenant eviction, and whether a prior eviction case filed under section 15 constitutes sufficient notice under section 14(1). The Supreme Court held that the requirement to issue a written notice under section 14(1) is mandatory and forms the foundational basis of the Rent Controller's jurisdiction to order summary eviction. Consequently, prior proceedings initiated under section 15 cannot substitute for the mandatory statutory notice under section 14. Furthermore, the court held that while the requirement of notice is mandatory, a premature filing of an eviction application is a procedural defect that can be cured if the statutory two-month notice period expires during the pendency of the proceedings. On the merits of the case, since the landlady failed to dispute the tenant's assertion that she already occupied another building owned by her, she was not entitled to summary eviction. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Rent Controller's order dismissing the ejectment application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether service of notice under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, is mandatory for seeking tenant eviction?
  • Does filing a previous eviction case under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, constitute sufficient notice under section 14(1)?
  • Does the premature filing of an eviction application under section 14 vitiate the proceedings if the cause of action matures during the pendency of the case?
  • Is a landlord entitled to summary eviction under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, if they are already in occupation of another building owned by them?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal vs Mst. Jinan1991 PLD Supreme Court 727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-22
  petition for leave to appealtime-barredproperty dealingsMuslim family propertyfemale inheritanceLegal Aid Department
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against an impugned judgment and was found to be barred by time, leading to its dismissal by the Supreme Court. Upon hearing the petitioner's counsel on merits, the Court also discovered no legal or other infirmity in the impugned judgment. During the proceedings, it transpired that the petitioner had attempted to grab property belonging to his sisters, depriving them of their due share. The Court noted its prior ruling in Ghulam Ali and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 Supreme Court 1) regarding property transactions and surrender or alienation inter se between close Muslim male and female relations. Consequently, for doing complete justice, the Court referred the question of property dealings between the petitioner and his sisters to the Legal Aid Department of fireplaces the Pakistan Bar Council for research, advice, and potential legal action, with the investigation results to be submitted back to the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal barred by time can be entertained when found devoid of merit?
  • What measures can the Supreme Court take to ensure complete justice regarding property grabbing among close Muslim relations?
  Read full judgment →
• Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.,) Limited, Kararchi vs Chairman, Fourth Wage Board And Other1991 SCMR 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-09-26
  Wage Boardnewspaper employeesconstitutional petitiondefinition of wagesgratuitypensionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two cross-petitions for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Sindh High Court dated 26th April, 1989. The underlying constitutional petition challenged specific decisions contained in the award of the Fourth Wage Board for newspaper employees, published via notification in October 1985. The High Court had declared certain paragraphs of the award null and void as being in excess of the Wage Board's powers, while dismissing the petition regarding the remaining paragraphs. Both parties, being dissatisfied with the divided success, approached the Supreme Court. The core legal questions involved examining the scope of the Wage Board's powers under the relevant legislation to define wages, include payments like gratuity and pension, and grant allowances, as well as questions regarding laches and the scope of constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions for a comprehensive examination of the points of law raised, suspended the operation of the High Court's judgment subject to certain conditions, and ordered the appeals to be heard together.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Wage Board constituted under the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973, has unlimited power to declare any payment as wages for the purposes of the said Act?
  • Whether section 17 of the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973, which incorporates Standing Order 12(6) of the W.P. (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, makes the inclusion of gratuity in the meaning of wages under section 2(h) redundant?
  • Whether pension being analogous to gratuity empowers the Board to include it in the meaning of wages under section 2(h) of the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
  • Whether the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction can substitute its own opinion for that of the Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction in the discretionary field?
  • Whether laches debar a petitioner from challenging the inclusion of gratuity in the meaning of wages by Wage Boards?
  Read full judgment →
• Income Tax Officer And 2 Others vs M/s. Shaikh Ghulam Shah1991 SCMR 2368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-18
  self-assessment schemeincome tax assessmentregistered firmcontractor incomemandatory conditionsfiscal circular
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh regarding the eligibility of a registered partnership firm of contractors for assessment under the Self-Assessment Scheme for the assessment year 1982-83, pursuant to Circular No. 10 of 1982. The core legal question was whether a registered firm of contractors that maintained no accounts was required to file a balance sheet and a profit and loss account as a mandatory precondition to qualify for the Self-Assessment Scheme. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that registered firms seeking to avail the benefit of the Self-Assessment Scheme must comply with all mandatory procedural requirements, including the filing of the prescribed accounts and statements according to the nature of their business, irrespective of whether they maintain regular books of accounts. The key principle laid down is that fulfillment of all stipulated conditions in a fiscal circular is mandatory for an assessee to qualify for self-assessment, and in the absence of ambiguity in the scheme, the failure to submit required financial statements disentitles the assessee from its benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a registered firm of contractors is required to file a balance sheet and profit and loss account to qualify for the Self-Assessment Scheme?
  • Does the failure to submit mandatory financial statements under the Self-Assessment Scheme render the return ineligible for self-assessment?
  • Can a registered firm claim the benefit of the Self-Assessment Scheme without fulfilling the procedural conditions stipulated in the governing circular?
  Read full judgment →
• Income Tax Officer and 2 others vs M/s. Shaikh Ghulam Shah-1991 PTD 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-18
  Self-Assessment SchemeIncome TaxRegistered FirmFiscal StatuteMandatory Filing RequirementsTax AssessmentContractor
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment concerning the eligibility of a registered firm of contractors for the Self-Assessment Scheme under Circular No. 10 of 1982. The core legal question was whether a registered firm, despite not maintaining formal accounts, was required to file a Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account to qualify for the Scheme's benefits. The Supreme Court held that the Self-Assessment Scheme imposes mandatory filing requirements on registered firms. The Court determined that the respondent's failure to provide the specified financial statements disqualified them from the Scheme, rendering the return liable for assessment under Section 59(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979. The Court emphasized that the Department requires these documents to verify income and prevent concealment, ensuring the effectiveness of the Scheme's provisions. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, ruling that compliance with the prescribed conditions is a prerequisite for claiming the benefits of the Self-Assessment Scheme, and the Department's demand for these documents was lawful.

  Questions settled

  • Is a registered firm required to file a Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account to qualify for the Self-Assessment Scheme under Circular No. 10 of 1982?
  • Can an assessee claim the benefits of the Self-Assessment Scheme without complying with the mandatory filing requirements prescribed in the relevant Circular?
  • Does the failure to file required financial statements allow the Income Tax Officer to assess income under Section 59(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 instead of the Self-Assessment Scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayatullah And Another vs The Telephone Industries of Pakistan1991 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-19
  industrial relationswage disputecollective bargaining agentsettlementlabour lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding wage disputes between piece-rated workers and their employer, the Telephone Industries of Pakistan. The workers, initially transferred between shops, claimed wages based on a prior settlement (the 'first settlement') despite a subsequent agreement (the 'second settlement') between the employer and the Collective Bargaining Agent. The core legal question was whether the Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal erred by failing to consider the impact of the second settlement on the workers' claims for wage arrears. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was correct in remanding the matter for consideration of the second settlement. The Court reasoned that a settlement between an employer and a Collective Bargaining Agent remains operative for the period specified therein or as provided by law. Consequently, the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal were obligated to evaluate the effect of the subsequent settlement on the petitioners' claims. The petitions were dismissed as the Court found no merit in the contention that the second settlement could not affect the workers' entitlements.

  Questions settled

  • Does a settlement between an employer and a Collective Bargaining Agent remain operative for the period specified in the agreement?
  • Is a Labour Court required to consider the impact of a subsequent settlement on a worker's claim for wage arrears?
  • Can a subsequent settlement between an employer and a Collective Bargaining Agent supersede a prior settlement regarding wage payments?
  Read full judgment →
• In Re: Yakka vs Not1991 SCMR 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-03
  murder convictionocular testimonymotive in criminal lawjail petitioncommutation of death sentenceappreciation of evidencetime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a jail petition filed by the petitioner against his conviction and sentence for murder. The petitioner was tried under Section 302 read with Sections 109 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court sentenced him to death and a fine, which the High Court subsequently commuted to life imprisonment while maintaining the fine. The core legal questions addressed whether the conviction was based on a proper appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the credibility of ocular testimony and the established motive of family honor. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, noting that the prosecution's evidence—including consistent eyewitness accounts and forensic reports—was reliable and that the motive regarding the abduction of the petitioner's sister was credible. Furthermore, the petition was found to be time-barred by 50 days. The Court affirmed the principle that questions of family honor regarding female relatives are of significant weight in assessing motive in criminal cases and upheld the High Court's judgment, dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on ocular testimony that was consistent despite lengthy cross-examination?
  • Is the motive of family honor regarding the abduction of a female relative a relevant factor in assessing criminal liability?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on the same testimony automatically invalidate the conviction of the principal offender?
  Read full judgment →
• Jaffar Abbas and 2 others vs Ahmad and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 1131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-31
  guardian ad litemminorspecial oathprocedural lawevidentiary admissionOrder XXXII rule 7 CPCreferee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for possession of land where the defendants, including a minor, agreed to have the suit decided based on the special oath of a third-party referee. The core legal question was whether an agreement by a guardian ad litem to be bound by a third party's special oath constitutes an 'agreement or compromise' under Order XXXII, rule 7, C.P.C., requiring prior court leave, or if it is merely a procedural mode of evidence. The Supreme Court held that such an agreement is not a compromise or adjustment of the suit under Order XXXII, rule 7, but rather a method of proof and a tactical decision regarding evidence. The Court affirmed that a guardian has the authority to conduct the case, including agreeing to special oaths, without seeking court leave, provided there is no fraud or gross negligence. The principle laid down is that agreeing to be bound by a referee's statement on oath is an evidentiary admission under section 20 of the Evidence Act, not a compromise requiring court sanction under Order XXXII, rule 7, C.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement by a guardian ad litem to be bound by a third party's special oath require the leave of the court under Order XXXII, rule 7, C.P.C.?
  • Is an agreement to be bound by the statement of a referee considered an 'agreement or compromise' under Order XXXII, rule 7, C.P.C.?
  • Can a statement made by a person referred to for information in a dispute be treated as an admission under section 20 of the Evidence Act?
  • Is a minor bound by the consent of their guardian ad litem to a specific mode of evidence if no fraud or gross negligence is present?
  Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Ahmad Khan And Others vs Member, Board of Revenue And Other1991 SCMR 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-29
  restoration of tenancyleave to appealtrespasserrevenue authoritieswrit petitionpossession of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' writ petition challenging concurrent findings of revenue authorities. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, who were alleged trespassers, had any valid interest in the disputed land to challenge the restoration of tenancy granted to the respondents. The respondents had successfully obtained an order from the Collector for the restoration of their tenancy, which the petitioners had repeatedly contested through various revenue forums, including the Tehsildar, Additional Commissioner, and the Member, Board of Revenue, all of whom ruled against the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to establish any legitimate interest in the property and appeared to be trespassers. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that since the order for the restoration of tenancy remained unimplemented and the petitioners failed to demonstrate a legal basis for their possession, there was no justification for granting leave to appeal. The key principle established is that a party lacking a demonstrated legal interest or title in disputed property cannot successfully challenge orders restoring possession to rightful tenants.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claiming no legal interest or title in disputed property successfully challenge an order restoring tenancy to the occupants?
  • Does the failure to implement an order for the restoration of tenancy provide grounds for a petitioner to seek leave to appeal against concurrent findings of revenue courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Ilam Din Through Legal Heirs And Others vs Muhammad Ishaque1991 SCMR 1911 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-22
  oral giftcustomary lawRiwajMuslim Personal Lawpending appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which set aside the concurrent decrees of the lower courts and dismissed the petitioners' civil suit. The petitioners had challenged an oral gift of agricultural land made by Ibrahim to his son-in-law, Muhammad Ishaq, on the ground that under the applicable custom and Riwaj, Ibrahim was not competent to make the gift. During the pendency of the second appeal before the High Court, the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 came into force. The core legal question was the impact of the said Ordinance on pending litigation concerning alienations made under custom. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly applied section 2(a) of the Ordinance to accept the appeal and dismiss the suit. The key principle laid down is that statutory interventions governing personal law and custom apply to pending proceedings, superseding prior customary limitations on property disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 applies to pending proceedings?
  • Is a property owner competent to gift agricultural land under custom when superseded by subsequent statutory amendments?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Hussain Shah And Others vs Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi And Other1991 SCMR 2193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-28
  land acquisitionlocus standiFederal Governmentstatutory interpretationright of appealcivil revisionperson interestedcompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court addressed whether the Federal Government, its departments, or beneficiary institutions possess the locus standi to file appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, against decisions on references under Section 18. The appellants, private landowners, challenged the competence of such appeals, which the High Court had previously accepted. The Court held that the Federal Government and beneficiary entities lack the legal standing to file such appeals. It clarified that constitutional provisions, specifically Articles 149, 152, and 173, do not confer locus standi upon the Federal Government in land acquisition proceedings; such authority must be derived strictly from the Act. The Court rejected the argument that the Provincial Government acts as an agent for the Federal Government in these matters. Additionally, the Court ruled that because the impugned orders were appealable, they could not be treated as Civil Revisions. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Federal Government and beneficiary institutions were dismissed for lack of competence, reaffirming the principle that statutory rights of appeal must be expressly provided.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have the locus standi to file an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, against a decision on a reference under Section 18?
  • Can the Federal Government invoke constitutional provisions like Articles 149, 152, and 173 to establish standing in land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Is a company or local authority for whose benefit land is acquired entitled to demand a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Can an appeal that is incompetent under the Land Acquisition Act be treated as a Civil Revision to protect the impugned decision?
  Read full judgment →
• Ifadur Rahman And 2 Others vs Government of Sindh Through Secretary, Department Of Health And .2 Other1991 SCMR 1512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-15
  medical college admissionmerit-based admissionconstitutional petitionleave to appealexecutive complianceShrin Munir caseclassification of seats
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition concerning medical college admissions in Sindh. The petitioners, male students, contested the authorities' decision to revise admission lists to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling in Shrin Munir v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1990 SC 295). The petitioners argued that the classification of seats between male and female students was reasonable, supported by the prospectus, and that the abrupt implementation of the new policy mid-process was improper. The Supreme Court held that once the law on the subject was declared in Shrin Munir's case, executive authorities were under a mandatory duty to implement it. Notices and lists issued contrary to this declared law could not create vested rights for the petitioners. The Court further held that the arguments regarding the reasonableness of the classification had already been addressed and rejected in the Shrin Munir judgment, which established that such material was insufficient to suppress the merit of female students. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Are executive authorities obligated to implement a Supreme Court judgment regarding admission policies even if it necessitates revising lists already in progress?
  • Can admission notices or lists issued contrary to a declared Supreme Court judgment create vested rights for applicants?
  • Does the existence of a prospectus provision regarding seat classification justify suppressing the merit of female students in medical college admissions?
  Read full judgment →
• Idreesul Hassan Usmani vs Government of Pakistan Through The Secretary To The Government Of Pakistan, Establishment Division And Other1991 SCMR 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-28
  probationerreversionreduction in rankshow-cause noticeservice tribunalcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Idreesul Hassan Usmani against the Government of Pakistan, challenging his reversion from the post of Assistant Director National Savings (BPS-17) to National Savings Officer (BPS-16) during his extended probationary period. The core legal question is whether the reversion of a probationer due to unsatisfactory performance amounts to a reduction in rank requiring a prior show-cause notice and hearing. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the reversion of an employee during probation, based on unsatisfactory performance, is a routine assessment of fitness and does not constitute a punishment or a reduction in rank. Therefore, it can be validly ordered without issuing a show-cause notice. The key principle laid down is that a probationer has no vested right to hold the higher post during probation, and the competent authority may revert them to their original post upon unsatisfactory performance without affording a prior hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reversion of a probationer to their original post due to unsatisfactory performance amount to a reduction in rank?
  • Is a show-cause notice required before reverting an employee during their probationary period?
  • Does an employee have a right to a prior hearing when relieved of a promotional post during probation?
  Read full judgment →
• I.C.I. Pakistan Limited vs Salahuddin And Other1991 SCMR 15 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-19
  land acquisitionright of appealstatutory rightcompensation enhancementeminent domainlocus standistrict construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from land acquisition proceedings where land was acquired for the benefit of the petitioner-company. After the Senior Civil Judge enhanced the compensation on a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, the petitioner-company filed an appeal, which the High Court dismissed as incompetent. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a company for whose benefit land is acquired has the locus standi to file an appeal against a referee court's judgment enhancing compensation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a company has no statutory right of appeal under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The Court laid down the principles that the right of appeal is a creation of statute and cannot be inferred or claimed through administrative acts like a sale-deed transfer. Furthermore, invasive provisions depriving citizens of their property must be construed strictly, and allowing companies to drag displaced landowners into prolonged litigation would defeat the ends of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a company for whose benefit land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 has the right to file an appeal against a judgment passed by a referee court under Section 18?
  • Can a right of appeal be conferred upon a beneficiary company through an administrative act, such as the execution of a sale-deed by the Government?
  • Does the statutory right of a beneficiary company to lodge cross-objections under Sections 20 and 20-A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 imply a corresponding right of appeal against the final award?
  Read full judgment →
• I.A. Sharwani And Others vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary,Finance Division, Islamabad And Other _1991 SCMR 1041 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-01
  pension rightsdiscriminatory treatmentArticle 25 of the Constitutionreasonable classificationpublic interest litigationcivil servantsArticle 184(3) of the Constitutionservice tribunals
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions, filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, challenged the government's practice of denying enhanced pension benefits to retired civil servants and judges based on their date of retirement. The core legal question was whether such sub-classification among pensioners constitutes discriminatory treatment in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that while the government may establish reasonable classifications, it cannot arbitrarily discriminate between pensioners who are otherwise similarly situated. The Court ruled that pensioners constitute a single class, and while the government may fix dates for the enforcement of new benefits, such classification must be based on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Consequently, the Court declared the denial of specific benefits—such as the additional 2% pension for service exceeding 30 years and certain cost-of-living allowances—to those who retired before specified dates as discriminatory and violative of Article 25. The judgment affirms that the state must ensure equitable treatment of pensioners, prohibiting arbitrary distinctions that lack a reasonable basis.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government discriminate between pensioners based solely on their date of retirement when granting pension enhancements?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the vires of rules or notifications affecting pension rights?
  • Are associations of retired civil servants competent to file constitutional petitions under Article 184(3) without complying with Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C.?
  • Does the principle of equal protection of law under Article 25 of the Constitution prohibit the state from creating arbitrary sub-classes among pensioners?
  Read full judgment →
• Hussain vs Allah Bakhsh1991 SCMR 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-03
  execution of decreemortgage with possessionredemption of mortgageoccupancy tenantgift and sale mutationobjector in execution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from execution proceedings where an objector, claiming as a mortgagee with possession, challenged the execution of a decree for possession obtained by a donee. The core legal question was whether the appellant's mortgage rights stood revived after a subsequent sale in his favour was annulled, and whether the High Court erred in directing redemption within the execution proceedings without requiring a separate redemption suit or allowing further defences. The Supreme Court held that the appeal lacks merit, finding that the mortgage had already been redeemed by a definite act and mutation years prior, leaving no dormant element to revive upon the annulment of the subsequent sale, and that the appellant's failure to challenge the redemption mutation or raise the plea during the original suit barred him from raising it in execution. The key principle laid down is that a mortgage extinguished by a distinct transaction and redemption mutation does not automatically revive upon the annulment of a subsequent competing transaction, and a party cannot raise defences in execution proceedings that ought to have been raised during the original trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a mortgage extinguished by a redemption mutation can revive upon the annulment of a subsequent sale transaction?
  • Can an objector raise defenses regarding mortgage redemption in execution proceedings that were not pleaded during the original suit for possession?
  • Whether the High Court can direct the deposit of mortgage money within execution proceedings without necessitating a separate redemption suit under the circumstances?
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• Hussain And Another vs Husaini1991 SCMR 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-24
  leave to appealdefault in payment of rentevictionrent appealtenantlandlord
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal filed by tenants against the dismissal of their rent appeals by the High Court, which affirmed their eviction orders on the ground of default in payment of rent. The core legal question concerned whether the tenants actually defaulted in paying the rent, given that they asserted full payment and produced material before the High Court showing payments through money orders and court deposits. The Supreme Court held that the material prima facie established payment and created a strong impression of a conscious effort by the tenants to avoid default, thereby warranting further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, ruling that the questions raised required detailed consideration on the existing record, while directing the continuation of the stay order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the production of additional documents in the High Court sufficiently establishes the timely payment of rent to avoid eviction for default?
  • Does a tenant's effort to deposit rent through money orders and court proceedings absolve them from the charge of default?
  • When should leave to appeal be granted in rent matters involving disputed questions of fact regarding rent payment?
  Read full judgment →
• Humayun Saifullah Khan vs Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Justice And Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad And Other1991 SCMR 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  Political Parties ActDefectionWrit of prohibitionElection Commission of PakistanConstitutional jurisdictionLeave to appealVires of statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment, which declared a reference filed under Section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962, as invalid and incompetent. The petitioner, a parliamentary leader, had initiated proceedings before the Election Commission of Pakistan regarding the alleged defection of the respondent, a member of the Provincial Assembly. The High Court had accepted the respondent's constitutional petition, which challenged the vires of Section 8-B as being inconsistent with fundamental rights and constitutional provisions. The core legal questions involve the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition against the Election Commission when a statutory right of appeal to the Supreme Court exists, and whether the High Court could declare the reference incompetent without factual evidence regarding the petitioner's status as a parliamentary leader. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, recognizing the public importance of these constitutional issues, but declined to suspend the High Court's order restraining the Election Commission from proceeding with the reference pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court issue a writ of prohibition against the Election Commission when a statutory right of appeal to the Supreme Court is available?
  • Is it permissible for a High Court to declare a reference before the Election Commission incompetent without factual evidence regarding the petitioner's standing?
  • Does a High Court have the jurisdiction to restrain the Election Commission from deciding a reference filed under Section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. And Others vs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd.1991 SCMR 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-18
  review petitionexecution of decreeBanking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinanceauction saleconfirmation of salejudicial sale
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two review petitions seeking review of the Supreme Court's earlier judgment arising from execution proceedings under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question revolved around whether the power of the Special Court regarding the execution of decrees under section 8(3) of the said Ordinance displaces the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whether a distinction exists between the "confirmation of auction" and "confirmation of sale" such that parties can compromise before final confirmation. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that there is no legal distinction between "auction" and "sale" in the context of execution proceedings, as an auction is simply a public mode of sale. The key principle laid down is that terms like "auction" and "sale" are interchangeable in execution proceedings, and reservations requiring court confirmation of an auction do not create a special distinct procedure exempt from general principles governing judicial sales or allow parties to set aside completed public auctions through subsequent compromises without valid legal grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the terms "auction" and "sale" are interchangeable in the context of execution proceedings under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the power of the Special Court under section 8(3) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, create a distinct procedure for confirmation of auction separate from the confirmation of sale under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Can parties to an execution application enter into a compromise to settle their dispute after a public auction has been conducted but before its formal confirmation by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Hong Leong Finance Limited vs m.v. Asian Queen through Nazir High1991 PLD Supreme Court 1021 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  admiralty jurisdictionmaritime lienpriority of claimssale proceedsaccrued interestadmiralty practicewages of crew
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an admiralty suit involving competing claims against the sale proceeds of the vessel 'm.v. Asian Queen'. The appellant, a mortgagee, challenged an order directing that interest accrued on the sale proceeds deposited in court be paid to the crew members and Master of the vessel, whose claims for wages had been granted priority over the mortgage claim. The core legal question was whether crew members and the Master, having been paid their decretal amounts in full, were entitled to additional interest earned on the sale proceeds while held by the court, despite such interest not being awarded in their original decrees. The Supreme Court held that the crew and Master were not entitled to the accrued interest. The Court reasoned that a maritime lien grants a proprietary interest in the res (or its proceeds) only to the extent of the claim. Once a decree is satisfied, the claimant has no further right to the surplus funds or accrued interest. Interest is discretionary and must be awarded by the court at the time of the decree; it cannot be claimed as a matter of right on equitable grounds after the decree has been satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Does a maritime lien holder have a right to interest accrued on sale proceeds held by the court if such interest was not awarded in the original decree?
  • Does the concept of maritime lien entitle a claimant to interest on the decretal amount beyond the satisfaction of the claim itself?
  • Is the interest earned on sale proceeds deposited in court considered an accretion to the res that must be distributed rateably among all claimants?
  • Can a claimant seek interest on a decretal amount on equitable grounds if the court specifically refused to grant interest at the time of passing the decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Hazrat Umar vs Zafar Majeed and 13 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-21
  rent restrictionevictiondefault in payment of rentstatutory interpretationwrit jurisdictiontenant liabilityfirst default
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a rent restriction matter where the appellant challenged the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld an eviction order based on default in rent payment. The core legal question concerned the applicability of the proviso to Section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (N.-W.F.P.) Ordinance, 1972, which allows a tenant to avoid eviction for a first default by admitting liability and paying the rent. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to satisfy the statutory requirements because he did not unequivocally admit his liability to pay the rent at the appropriate time, instead contesting the eviction while maintaining that rent remained due. The Court clarified that the benefit of the proviso is contingent upon the tenant's prompt admission of liability and payment. Furthermore, while a Rent Controller is generally required to direct the deposit of rent, the Court noted that a tenant's immediate payment or deposit in the Controller's presence may suffice to invoke the proviso's protection. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant qualify for the protection against eviction under the proviso to Section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (N.-W.F.P.) Ordinance, 1972, if they contest the eviction rather than admitting liability for the rent?
  • Is it a mandatory requirement for the Rent Controller to pass a formal order of deposit of rent for a tenant to benefit from the proviso to Section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (N.-W.F.P.) Ordinance, 1972?
  • Can a tenant obtain the benefit of the proviso to Section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (N.-W.F.P.) Ordinance, 1972, if they pay or deposit rent immediately in the presence of the Rent Controller without a prior formal order?
  Read full judgment →
• Hazrat Jamal vs Fazal Rabbi And Another1991 SCMR 1727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-25
  murdersentence reductiondeath sentenceimprisonment for lifegrave and sudden provocationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 28-1-1986, whereby the death sentence awarded to the respondent for murder was reduced to imprisonment for life. The prosecution case was that the deceased and the respondent exchanged hot words after the respondent flashed a torch light on the complainant party, leading shortly thereafter to the fatal shooting of the deceased by the respondent. The High Court had reduced the sentence on the ground of sudden provocation following the verbal altercation. The appellant contended that it was a cold-blooded murder without mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court considered that the occurrence took place in 1982, and following the reasoning in analogous precedent cases regarding the passage of time and general amnesties, it would be incongruous to re-impose the death sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declined to enhance the sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment by the High Court on the ground of sudden provocation?
  • Does the passage of a long period of time since the occurrence affect the re-imposition of a death sentence in appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Hassan Din vs Hafiz Abdus Salam and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-20
  ex parte decreeauction-purchasernecessary partyconstitutional jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionnatural justiceCivil Procedure Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil dispute concerning property foreclosure, an ex parte decree, subsequent execution sales, and concurrent revision and constitutional proceedings. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the decision in Noor Muhammad v. Sarwar Khan ousted the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with orders passed by a District Judge under section 115(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. The core legal questions involved the necessity of impleading subsequent vendees and decree-holder auction-purchasers when setting aside an ex parte decree, and the extent of constitutional intervention against revisional orders. The Supreme Court held that while notice to the decree-holder on record is generally sufficient under Order IX, Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code, where the auction-purchaser is the decree-holder himself and subsequent transferees' titles are adversely affected, such transferees are necessary parties entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Failure to implead them constitutes a jurisdictional error violating natural justice. The principle laid down is that constitutional jurisdiction remains available to correct jurisdictional errors of this magnitude, notwithstanding section 115(4) of the Civil Procedure Code.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar under subsection (4) of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code completely oust the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with an order passed by a District Judge?
  • Is a subsequent vendee from a decree-holder auction-purchaser a necessary party to an application for setting aside an ex parte decree?
  • Does the setting aside of an ex parte decree automatically affect a bona fide third-party auction-purchaser who was not a party to the decree?
  • What constitutes a jurisdictional error versus a mere illegality in proceedings involving the setting aside of an ex parte decree and auction sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Hashim Ali vs Muhammad Rafique And Other1991 SCMR 1833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-30
  declaration suitforged sale-deedfraudulent allotmentconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a civil suit filed by the predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos. 1 to 6 seeking a declaration that he was the owner in possession of land and that a sale-deed in favour of the petitioner was forged. The trial court decreed the suit, and the Additional District Judge and High Court dismissed the subsequent appeal and revision petition. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could challenge the plaintiff's title based on an alleged fraudulent allotment when the petitioner did not claim to have purchased the land from the plaintiff and the plaintiff's allotment remained intact. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts were justified in granting the declaration since the plaintiff was the true owner and his allotment had not been set aside by any competent authority. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot impeach the title of a recorded owner on the ground of fraud in allotment when that allotment remains valid and un-cancelled by a competent forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil court can ignore a subsisting allotment of land that has not been set aside by a competent authority?
  • Is a defendant entitled to challenge a plaintiff's title on the ground of fraudulent allotment when the defendant denies purchasing the property from the plaintiff?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding ownership warrant interference by the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Haq Nawaz And 2 Others vs Mazhar Ali And Other1991 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-03
  murderfamily honormitigating circumstancesocular evidencecorroborationlife imprisonmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard two petitions for leave to appeal arising from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court. The High Court had maintained the convictions of two accused under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the double murder of a couple, while acquitting two other co-accused. The complainant sought enhancement of the life imprisonment sentences to death, while the convicted accused challenged their convictions. The motive for the crime was family honor, as the deceased couple had eloped and married. The Supreme Court observed that although the parties were on inimical terms requiring corroboration of ocular evidence, sufficient corroboration existed against the convicted accused through the recovery of blood-stained weapons and positive chemical reports. Conversely, the acquitted co-accused lacked corroborative evidence due to conflicts between medical and ocular testimonies. On the question of sentence, the Court held that murders committed to vindicate family honor constitute a mitigating circumstance justifying the lesser sentence of life imprisonment. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a murder committed in the name of family honor constitutes a mitigating circumstance justifying the lesser sentence of life imprisonment instead of death?
  • Is corroboration of ocular testimony necessary when the prosecution witnesses and the accused are on inimical terms?
  • Can recoveries of weapons from open fields or reeds be discarded solely on the ground of the location of recovery if witnessed by credible witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Hanan Alias Abdul Manan vs Khalilur Rehman Khan And 6 Other1991 SCMR 1239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-26
  available propertyevacuee propertyBoard of Revenuejurisdictioneasement rightstransfer of propertymutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the jurisdiction of the Member, Board of Revenue, to declare a disputed garage area as 'available property' and order eviction following the repeal of settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the Board of Revenue had the authority to determine the status of the property and whether the appellant held a valid claim to it as part of his transferred house. The Supreme Court held that the Board of Revenue acted within its jurisdiction in determining that the property was 'available' (untransferred) under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, as mutation records confirmed the disputed area was excluded from the appellant's transfer. However, the Court established the principle that while the Board of Revenue may identify available property, it lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate private easement rights or order the removal of obstructions, as such disputes fall under the plenary jurisdiction of civil courts. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Board's authority to classify the property while limiting its adjudicatory scope.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Member, Board of Revenue have the jurisdiction to determine whether a property is 'available property' under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
  • Can the Board of Revenue adjudicate private easement rights or order the removal of obstructions between parties?
  • Does a mutation record serve as evidence to determine the extent of property transferred via a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamid Majid vs Discipline Committee And 4 Other1991 SCMR 2317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-30
  disciplinary actionexamination malpracticefinding of factstudent disciplineSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by a student challenging a disciplinary action that barred him from appearing in certain examinations due to the alleged possession of an incriminating written note during an examination. The core legal question involved whether the finding of fact regarding the possession of the note and the procedural steps taken by the detecting authority warranted interference by the court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that concurrent findings of fact and circumstantial evidence justified the disciplinary action, and no substantial injustice had been done to the petitioner, notwithstanding minor procedural flaws. The court dismissed the petition while observing that systemic corruption in examinations could potentially attract constitutional jurisdiction under Article 184(3) in appropriate future proceedings, but the facts of the present case did not suffice for such an examination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding examination malpractice in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does a technical or procedural failure on the part of a detecting authority automatically vitiate a disciplinary action against a student?
  • Can systemic corruption in educational examinations attract the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamad Ali vs The Province of Punjab And Other1991 SCMR 1859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-16
  State landBara Reclamation Schemeproprietary rightsmoiety allocationcivil suitleave to appealGovernment grant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil suit regarding the allocation of State land under the Bara Reclamation Scheme. The petitioner, having fulfilled the conditions for proprietary rights in half of the 198 Kanals of land granted to him, sought the Northern half. The Collector, exercising the Government's right to select the moiety for transfer, allocated the Southern half instead. The petitioner challenged this allocation through a civil suit, which was initially decreed but subsequently dismissed by the Additional District Judge, a decision upheld by the High Court in revision. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had a vested right to choose the specific portion of land to be transferred. The Supreme Court held that the terms of the grant explicitly reserved the choice of the moiety to the Government. As the petitioner failed to prove any binding agreement granting him the Northern portion, and because the Reclamation Department lacked the authority to make such a choice, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, noting the petitioner could separately approach competent authorities regarding the purchase of the remaining Government share.

  Questions settled

  • Does a grantee of State land under the Bara Reclamation Scheme have an inherent right to choose which specific portion of the land is transferred to them?
  • Does the Reclamation Department possess the authority to make binding choices on behalf of the Government regarding the allocation of land moieties?
  • Is the Government entitled to select the specific moiety of land to be transferred to a tenant under the terms of a State land grant?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakeem Syed Ashiq Hussain vs Mirza Nasrullah Baig1991 SCMR 1866 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-30
  possession suitleave to appealpleadingsnew casedisputed questions of factsettlement authoritiespermanent transfer deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil suit for possession of a shop, wherein the respondent claimed ownership based on a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) issued by the Settlement Authorities. The petitioner, who was in possession, contested the suit, asserting his own ownership. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, and subsequent appeals by the petitioner were dismissed by the First Appellate Court and the Lahore High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the lower courts failed to consider a specific document (Ex.D-7) and argued that a portion of his own transferred property was erroneously included in the respondent's property. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had failed to raise this specific plea regarding the overlapping boundaries of the properties in his original written statement. The Court held that a party cannot be permitted to introduce a new case or raise fresh disputed questions of fact at the leave to appeal stage that were not pleaded in the trial court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party introduce a new plea or disputed question of fact during a petition for leave to appeal that was not raised in the original written statement?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to challenge the boundaries of property in a possession suit if such a defense was not pleaded before the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Syed Abdul Haleem Shah vs Wali Dad And 6 Other1991 SCMR 1351(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-22
  pre-emptionTalab-e-MowasibatTalab-e-Ishhadleave to appealsufficiency of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court regarding the law of pre-emption. The core legal dispute centers on the sufficiency of evidence required to establish the two essential requirements of pre-emption under Islamic law: Talab-e-Mowasibat (the immediate demand) and Talab-e-Ishhad (the demand with invocation). The Majlis-e-Shoora had previously determined that the evidence regarding Talab-e-Mowasibat was deficient. Conversely, the High Court, in the impugned judgment, concluded that the evidence regarding Talab-e-Ishhad was deficient. The petitioner challenged these findings, contending that the evidence on record was sufficient to satisfy both legal requirements. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower courts erred in their respective assessments of the evidentiary record concerning these demands. The Court's decision to grant leave signifies that the findings of the lower forums regarding the deficiency of evidence in the pre-emption process require further judicial scrutiny to determine if the legal standards for establishing these demands were correctly applied to the facts presented.

  Questions settled

  • Does the evidence on record sufficiently establish the requirements of Talab-e-Mowasibat and Talab-e-Ishhad in a pre-emption claim?
  • Can a finding of evidentiary deficiency regarding Talab-e-Mowasibat by the Majlis-e-Shoora be reconciled with a finding of deficiency regarding Talab-e-Ishhad by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Shakar Khan (Deceased) Through Legal Heirs vs Abdul Qadir And Other1991 SCMR 1246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-11
  tentative rent orderdefault in rentcondonation of delaystriking off defenceurban rent restrictionlandlord and tenantmedical grounds
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from an ejectment proceeding under the Baluchistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The appellant-tenant faced an application for striking off his defence due to a nine-day delay in depositing the monthly rent for October 1985 pursuant to a tentative rent order. The Rent Controller accepted the appellant's explanation of illness supported by a medical certificate and condoned the delay. However, the High Court set aside this order and directed the tenant's eviction, holding the explanation to be an afterthought. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the Rent Controller's discretion, as the appellant's medical explanation and certificate remained uncontroverted by any counter-affidavit, and sweeping generalizations regarding diabetes were unwarranted. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, restored the Rent Controller's order condoning the delay, and remanded the matter for further proceedings in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the Rent Controller's discretion in condoning a minor delay in depositing rent based on uncontroverted medical evidence?
  • Does diabetes constitute an illness that can incapacitate a tenant from depositing rent within the prescribed time under a tentative rent order?
  • Whether an un-controverted explanation supported by a medical certificate regarding illness constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay in rent deposit?
  • Can a tenant raise the defense of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act in rent ejectment proceedings where an agreement to sell is claimed?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Saindino Khan And Another vs Mst. Zaibunnissa Through Legal Heirs1991 SCMR 972 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-27
  specific performancepre-emption clauseconcluded contractlease deedright of first refusalindefinitenessconsideration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of a contract concerning agricultural land. The petitioners had leased the suit land under a registered lease deed containing a pre-emptive clause (Clause 15) stating that if the lessors decided to sell the land, the first option to purchase would be given to the lessees. The lessors subsequently sold the land to a third party. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that Clause 15 did not constitute a complete and concluded agreement of sale, particularly due to the absence of an agreed price. The High Court affirmed this decision, further noting uncontradicted evidence that the lessors had in fact offered the land to the petitioners first, but the petitioners had declined. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, confirming that Clause 15 was vague, uncertain, and lacked essential terms such as consideration, and therefore did not form a binding contract. Furthermore, since the lessors had offered the option and the lessees refused, no breach occurred.

  Questions settled

  • Does a clause in a lease deed granting lessees the first option to purchase land constitute a binding and concluded contract of sale if no price or lawful consideration is specified?
  • Can a party enforce a right of first refusal through a suit for specific performance if evidence establishes that the offer was made to them and rejected prior to sale to a third party?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Said Muhammad And Another vs Mistri Muhammad Hassan1991 SCMR 1178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-26
  suit for declarationrelief of possessionconsequential reliefframing of issuestechnical objectionsproperty titleres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a long-standing property dispute involving a suit for declaration of title and possession of a house. The appellants claimed ownership, while the respondent alleged purchase of the property, which the appellants denied. After multiple rounds of litigation, including remands and amendments to the plaint, the High Court eventually affirmed the appellants' title but declined to grant the consequential relief of possession, citing the absence of a specific issue framed regarding possession. The core legal question was whether the court could grant the relief of possession based on established title despite the technical omission of a specific issue regarding possession. The Supreme Court held that since the appellants' ownership was conclusively established and the respondent failed to prove the alleged purchase, the relief of possession was a natural consequence of the title. The Court ruled that technical omissions, such as the failure to frame a specific issue, should not defeat the ends of justice when the evidence on record is sufficient to support the relief claimed. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a decree for possession was granted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant the relief of possession in a suit for declaration if the issue of possession was not formally framed but the evidence on record supports the claim?
  • Does the principle of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a separate claim for possession if the issue was not determined in previous proceedings?
  • Should a court refuse the relief of possession on technical grounds when the ownership of the property has been conclusively established?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Saadat Hussain vs Inayatullah Khan And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-24
  evictionreconstructionlandlord and tenantgood faithleave to appealconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the dismissal of a Constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld an eviction order based on the landlord's stated requirement for reconstruction. The core legal question is whether an eviction for reconstruction is sought in good faith when the landlord seeks to evict only one tenant while leaving a contiguous tenant undisturbed, and whether such construction could feasibly proceed without the tenant's eviction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the landlord failed to adequately address why the petitioner could not be treated similarly to the other tenant or why the construction could not be executed without disturbing the petitioner's possession. The Court held that these issues require deeper examination to determine the bona fides of the eviction claim. The key principle established is that where a landlord seeks eviction for reconstruction, the court must scrutinize whether the eviction is genuinely necessary for the proposed construction or if it is a pretext, particularly when similar tenants are not subjected to eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an eviction for reconstruction is valid if the landlord fails to demonstrate that the construction cannot be completed without evicting the tenant?
  • Does the selective eviction of one tenant while leaving a contiguous tenant undisturbed raise a presumption of lack of good faith in a reconstruction claim?
  • Is a landlord required to prove that the specific area occupied by a tenant is essential for the proposed reconstruction to justify eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Noorwar Jan vs Senior Member, Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P.1991 PLD Supreme Court 531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-04
  constitutional jurisdictionLambardar appointmentprimogenitureBoard of Revenueerror of lawwrit of certiorariadministrative discretionland revenue rules
  Summary & questions settled

  These three consolidated civil appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan examine the scope and limits of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to interfere in administrative appointments of Lambardars (headmen) by revenue authorities. The core legal questions involved whether revenue tribunals committed errors of law apparent on the face of the record regarding the creation of Lambardari posts, the application of primogeniture rules, and the rights of minor successors or heirs of removed Lambardars, and whether such administrative discretion shields revenue decisions from judicial review. The Supreme Court held that while the appointment of a Lambardar is an administrative function and courts cannot sit as courts of appeal on facts, tribunals are bound to apply the law correctly. An error of law or jurisdictional defect committed by the Board of Revenue—such as rewriting statutory rules or acting on nonexistent posts—subverts the rule of law and is amenable to correction through constitutional jurisdiction. The Court established that supervisory courts may quash illegal orders of tribunals but cannot substitute their own administrative choices or finalize appointments, which remain the exclusive executive domain of revenue authorities. Consequently, one appeal was dismissed and two were remanded to the Board of Revenue for fresh decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court extend to interfering in the administrative appointment of a Lambardar if revenue tribunals commit an error of law apparent on the face of the record?
  • Can a supervisory court, upon quashing an illegal order of the Board of Revenue regarding a Lambardar's appointment, finalize the appointment itself instead of remanding the matter?
  • Does the removal of a Lambardar for becoming landless extinguish the right of primogeniture for his heir under the Land Revenue Rules?
  • Does minority operate as a disqualification for the appointment of a successor Lambardar under the rules of primogeniture?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Murad Ali And Others vs The Political Agent, Chagai And Other1991 SCMR 1466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-26
  water rightsriparian rightsinterim injunctioninterlocutory ordersleave to appealcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding a dispute over water rights from a stream known as Manda-e-Khaiser. The petitioners, claiming to be upper riparian landowners, sought a declaration and injunction against private respondents, alleging interference with their water supply and attempted dispossession. The trial court initially granted an interim injunction, which was subsequently vacated by the Additional District Judge, a decision upheld by the High Court in civil revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that their position as upper riparians made interference by downstream respondents unlikely, yet feared potential forceful obstruction. The respondents denied using force and undertook to pursue any grievances regarding water rights solely through official legal channels. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of evidence of forceful interference and given the respondents' undertaking to act through legal agencies, there was no ground for interference. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that it does not ordinarily interfere with interlocutory orders of a tentative nature, as parties must establish their respective cases during the full trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court ordinarily interfere with interlocutory orders of a tentative nature?
  • Can a party seek an injunction based on a mere apprehension of force without supporting evidence?
  • Is a statement by a party to pursue grievances through official agencies sufficient to resolve a dispute regarding potential interference with water rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad vs The State1991 SCMR 966 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-08
  murder convictionsole testimonycorroborative evidenceapprehension at spotrecovery of weaponcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his wife, Mst. Mukhtar Begum, which resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained when based on the testimony of a single witness (the deceased's father) who allegedly held a grudge against the appellant, and whether such testimony required independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, as the testimony of the complainant was not only unimpeachable but was also strongly corroborated by independent evidence. Specifically, the Court noted the appellant was apprehended at the scene of the crime, the blood-stained weapon was recovered from his possession, and the appellant was wearing blood-stained clothing at the time of his arrest. The Court affirmed that where testimonial evidence is supported by recovery of the murder weapon and forensic evidence of blood-stained clothing, the conviction rests on a firm legal footing, even if the primary witness is related to the deceased.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the testimony of a single witness if it is corroborated by independent evidence?
  • Does the recovery of a blood-stained weapon and blood-stained clothing from an accused at the scene of the crime constitute sufficient corroboration for a conviction?
  • Is the testimony of a deceased's relative inherently unreliable in a murder trial absent proof of deep-rooted enmity?
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• Haji Muhammad vs Syed Muhammad Shafi1991 SCMR 1831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-27
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantpersonal needadmission in pleadingsrent controlleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order against a tenant. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant from a shop on the grounds of personal need and default in rent payment. The Rent Controller initially rejected the eviction application, finding no evidence of a Musafirkhana (guest house) and concluding the landlord's true motive was to force a rent enhancement. However, the Baluchistan High Court reversed this decision, relying on the tenant's admission in the pleadings regarding the existence of the Musafirkhana. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the Musafirkhana was merely a private guest house, that the landlord had already vacated other premises (a hotel), and that the landlord's involvement in other businesses negated his claim of personal need. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the tenant's admission regarding the Musafirkhana was conclusive. Furthermore, the Court held that a landlord is not disentitled from seeking eviction for personal need simply because they previously vacated other premises, nor does the ownership of other businesses automatically disqualify a landlord from asserting personal necessity for a specific property.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's admission in pleadings regarding the existence of a facility like a Musafirkhana dispense with the need for further proof?
  • Does a landlord's possession of other business interests or properties automatically disqualify them from seeking eviction on the ground of personal need?
  • Can a landlord seek eviction for personal need if they have previously vacated other premises?
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• Haji Muhammad Shafi And Others vs Wealth Tax Officer And Other1991 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-27
  Wealth TaxConstitutional LawDouble TaxationUltra ViresImmovable Property TaxLeave to Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the validity of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963. The petitioners raised significant legal questions regarding the constitutionality of the Act and the legality of concurrent taxation by both the Federation and the Province on the same immovable property. Specifically, the Court identified two core issues for authoritative determination: first, whether the Wealth Tax Act, 1963, is ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan; and second, whether the imposition of tax on the same immovable property by both the Federation under the Wealth Tax Act, 1963, and the Province under the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, constitutes double jeopardy and is therefore illegal. Finding these questions worthy of consideration, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, directing that the appeal be heard on the existing record while permitting the parties to file additional documentation if necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Wealth Tax Act, 1963, ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the imposition of tax on the same immovable property by both the Federation and the Province constitute double jeopardy and illegality?
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• Haji Muhammad Khan And Others vs Muhammad Farooq Khan And Other1991 SCMR 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-22
  leave to appealservice tribunalseniorityretrospective seniorityadverse remarkscountersigning authoritycondonation of delaypromotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises five petitions for leave to appeal directed against the judgments of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, Peshawar, dated 10-11-1988. The Service Tribunal had allowed seniority to Muhammad Farooq Khan with retrospective effect from 10-4-1982 and expunged adverse remarks recorded in his Annual Confidential Reports for the years 1980, 1981, and 1985. The core legal questions relate to whether the Service Tribunal was justified in deciding the appeal on merits without recording reasons for condonation of delay, whether retrospective seniority could be granted over persons promoted earlier, whether the Tribunal's decision amounted to determining fitness for promotion barred by law, the effect of remission of penalty under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules 1973, and the competency of the Countersigning Authority regarding adverse remarks. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions and suspended the operation of the impugned orders pending final disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether or not the Service Tribunal was legally justified in considering and allowing the appeal on merits without recording any reason for condonation of delay when a preliminary objection was raised?
  • Whether under the law seniority in the cadre of Additional District and Sessions Judge could take effect from a retrospective earlier date over the heads of persons promoted earlier?
  • Whether the decision of the Service Tribunal amounts to the determination of fitness of a civil servant to hold a particular post or to be promoted in respect of which no appeal lay?
  • Whether remission of penalty or stoppage of promotion imposed under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules 1973 entitled a civil servant to be considered for promotion retrospectively?
  • Whether the Countersigning Authority is competent under the law to disagree with the Reporting Officer in the matter of Annual Confidential Reports?
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• Haji Mitha Khan vs Muhammad Younus And 2 Other1991 SC MR 2030 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-27
  rejection of plaintcause of actionprocedural defectcivil procedureremedy for defective plaintcompromise agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that rejected a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, citing a lack of cause of action and procedural defects. The appellant had filed a suit alleging violation of a 1915 compromise agreement, which had been previously adjudicated by a Qazi and subsequently remanded. The High Court, in revision, concluded that the plaint was vague, lacked a clear cause of action, and suffered from procedural deficiencies, thereby rendering the entire proceedings incompetent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the plaint on these grounds. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's finding regarding the lack of cause of action was unsustainable. It established that the test for a cause of action is whether the plaintiff's stated facts, if accepted as true, would entitle them to legal relief. The Court further held that procedural defects, such as vague pleadings or deficient court fees, require an opportunity for the party to rectify the errors rather than immediate rejection of the plaint.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal test for determining whether a plaint discloses a cause of action?
  • Can a plaint be rejected for procedural defects like vagueness or deficient court fees without first allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to rectify them?
  • Does the filing of an incompetent plaint preclude a court from deciding the matter on its merits?
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• Haji Mir Baz Khan vs Chairman, Town Committee And Another1991 SCMR 2025 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-28
  landlord and tenantdoctrine of estoppelsuit for declarationpermissive possessionconcurrent findingscivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the court arises from the dismissal of the appellant's suit for declaration and injunction by the trial court, which decisions were upheld by the District Judge and the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether a tenant in possession of land owned by a local authority, who has continuously paid rent to the landlord, can maintain a suit for declaration of title and challenge the landlord's title based on long possession. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, being a tenant who paid rent to the respondent without objection, is estopped under the doctrine of estoppel from challenging the title of his landlord and possesses no legal character to claim equitable relief. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant is estopped from challenging the title of his landlord under the law?
  • Can a person in possession of property as a tenant maintain a suit for declaration of title against the landlord?
  • Whether long possession alone confers a right to seek a declaration and equitable relief against the true owner or lessor?
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• Haji Maqbool Ur Rehman Khan And Others vs Deputy1991 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-16
  withdrawal of writ petitionreview applicationerror apparent on the face of the recordcostsdiscretionary powerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a review application filed by the petitioners against an earlier order allowing them to withdraw their writ petition with permission to file a fresh one, subject to the payment of costs. The High Court had permitted the withdrawal due to formal and technical defects in the original petition, relying on the principle that no error apparent on the face of the record existed to justify a review under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that if the petitioners were aggrieved by the imposition of costs, they should have challenged that specific order or sought to amend their petition rather than withdrawing it conditionally. The Court further observed that since the petitioners had already filed a fresh writ petition pursuant to the High Court's order, there was no merit in their grievance. The Supreme Court affirmed that the High Court exercised its discretion appropriately in granting withdrawal on specific terms, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a review application maintainable against an order allowing the withdrawal of a writ petition where no error apparent on the face of the record exists?
  • Can a petitioner seek review of an order allowing the withdrawal of a writ petition on the ground of costs imposed as a condition for withdrawal?
  • Does the High Court have the discretion to impose costs as a condition for granting permission to withdraw a writ petition with liberty to file a fresh one?
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• Haji Allah Bakhsh And 2 Others vs Ghulam Ali And Other1991 SCMR 1493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  leave to appealpre-emptionrevenue recordforgery and interpolationcultivating tenantsKhasra Girdawari
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who were plaintiffs and pre-emptors, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a revision petition, reversed the judgment of the first appellate court, and dismissed their pre-emption suit. The trial court had dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court ruled in favor of the petitioners, establishing their superior right of pre-emption and rejecting the respondents' claim as cultivating tenants due to alleged forgeries in the revenue record. The High Court, however, reversed this finding of fact regarding tenancy and record interpolation. The core legal question concerns the proper judicial approach in examining allegations of forgery and interpolation in revenue records, particularly regarding primary evidence and the finality of revenue proceedings before the Collector. The Supreme Court held that the matter required fuller examination and an authoritative pronouncement, as the approach adopted by the High Court in accepting the correctness of the record without examining original records or primary evidence warranted closer scrutiny. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal along with interim protective orders regarding the suit property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can reverse a finding of forgery and interpolation in revenue records without examining the original record and primary evidence?
  • Does a proceeding before the Collector regarding revenue record corrections possess finality and exclusiveness when the matter is simultaneously under examination in a civil court?
  • Whether a pre-emptor's superior right of pre-emption can be defeated by a tenant's claim established through interpolated revenue entries?
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• Haji Ajab Gul And 3 Others vs Rahim Gul And 28 Other1991 SCMR 2500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-09-12
  dowermahrlife interestMuslim lawusufructtransfer of propertyconditions of dower
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal and petition arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 15-12-1987, which dismissed a declaration suit filed by the heirs of Habibullah concerning property given as dower. At the time of Mst. Shamala's marriage to Waheed Gul, Habibullah executed a deed giving a house and two shops as dower, subject to the condition that she would enjoy the usufruct for her life without power to mortgage, after which the property would revert to the legal heirs. Mst. Shamala subsequently transferred the property to third parties, prompting the plaintiffs to challenge the sale. The trial court decreed the suit, holding the deed was an 'Areeat' (limited interest) rather than a dower deed. However, the High Court reversed this decision, holding that the transaction was a dower and conditions derogating from absolute ownership were void. The core legal question was whether dower can be validly fixed in the form of a life interest and whether conditions attached to a dower deed limiting ownership are enforceable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where property is demanded and given as dower in compliance with a marriage contract, the wife takes the property absolutely as her own, and any restrictive conditions attached to it without her express consent are void. The appeal and petition were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether dower can be fixed in the form of a life interest in property under Muslim Law?
  • Can a condition attached to a dower deed restricting the wife's ownership to a life interest be enforced without her express consent?
  • Does a grant of property given as dower operate to transfer absolute ownership, rendering repugnant conditions void?
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• Haji Abdul Wali Khan And Another vs Muhammad Hanif And Another1991 SCMR 2457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-01
  rent restrictionexecution proceedingsright of appealstatutory interpretationrent controllerejectment ordercivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals addressed whether an order passed by a Rent Controller during execution proceedings under Section 17 of the Baluchistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, is appealable under Section 15, given that Section 17 is not explicitly enumerated in the appeal provision. The High Court had previously held such orders non-appealable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeals, holding that an order passed by a Rent Controller in execution proceedings is appealable under Section 15. The Court reasoned that execution proceedings are a continuation of the original ejectment proceedings initiated under Section 13. Consequently, an order passed in execution is effectively an order under Section 13, making it appealable. The Court emphasized that statutes must be liberally construed to preserve the right of appeal, and such a right should not be extinguished by implication unless the legislative intent is clear. This case was distinguished from Muhammad Arif v. Mst. Amina Begum, as Section 13-B constituted a self-contained code, whereas Section 17 execution remains part of the original proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed by a Rent Controller in execution proceedings under Section 17 of the Baluchistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, appealable under Section 15 of the same Ordinance?
  • Are execution proceedings under the Rent Restriction Ordinance considered a continuation of the original ejectment proceedings?
  • Does the omission of Section 17 from the list of appealable orders in Section 15 of the Baluchistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, imply that no appeal lies against execution orders?
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• Haji Abdul Wahab vs Mst. Ramzan Bibi And Other1991 SCMR 1644 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-20
  limitationdeclaration suitstate land allotmentleave to appealmesne profits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the First Appellate Court and the High Court, which decreed the respondents' suit for declaration relating to the allotment of State land. The petitioner sought to non-suit the respondents primarily on the ground of limitation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and considered it proper to examine whether the suit filed by the respondents was within limitation and whether it was a suit for mere declaration or whether it was essential for the plaintiffs to seek the setting aside of certain orders passed in favour of the petitioner, either directly or indirectly. Pending further examination, the Court granted security terms regarding the possession of the land in dispute, directing the petitioner to furnish security for mesne profits to the satisfaction of the executing or trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the suit filed by the respondents was within limitation?
  • Whether the suit was for mere declaration or if it was essential for the plaintiffs to seek setting aside of certain orders passed in favour of the defendant side?
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• Haji Abdul Karim And Others vs Ahmed Yar Khan And Other1991 SCMR 1237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-13
  civil suitHaq MalkanaLath Band Bazgarevictionrevision applicationShishak
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court partly allowing a revision application arising out of a civil suit initiated under the Frontier Crimes Regulation. The original suit involved claims for ownership, 1/4th share of produce by way of Haq Malkana, and eviction of the appellants as Lath Band Bazgars. The Qazi decreed the suit for ownership and share of produce, which was modified by the Majlis-e-Shoora to include eviction. The High Court maintained the declaration of ownership and entitlement to produce but set aside the eviction relief. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the courts below failed to decide the question of Shishak. The Supreme Court held that the High Court adequately and properly dealt with all raised questions for cogent reasons. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs, establishing that concurrent findings adequately addressing the points in controversy are unexceptionable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court properly dealt with all questions raised in the revision application regarding ownership and produce share?
  • Did the courts below fail to decide the important question of Shishak expressly raised in the case?
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• Haji Abdul Hayee And Another vs Mst. Mehboob And Other1991 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-25
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer orderjurisdictionestoppelnotified officerrepealing actsettlement laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of a shop. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal after the repeal of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws, specifically in light of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, having themselves invoked his authority to decide the appeal after the relevant repeal date. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under the repealing Act, pending proceedings were to be disposed of by notified officers, and since the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was a notified officer, his actions were lawful. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by invoking the jurisdiction of an authority and subsequently challenging that same authority's competence to decide the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the jurisdiction of an authority after having actively invoked that authority's jurisdiction to decide the matter?
  • Are pending proceedings under the repealed Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws valid if decided by a notified officer?
  • Does the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973, mandate the transfer of all pending appeals to the Commissioner?
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