Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Bashiran Bibi Versus Hidayatullah1996 SCMR 1051 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-15Read full judgment →
• Abdul Bari Versus Muhammad Rasheed Khan1995 SCMR 974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-17
  restitution of propertyinherent jurisdictioncivil procedureexecution of decreeleave to appealmesne profits
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding the restitution of property to the respondent. The dispute arose from competing claims over a shop, where the petitioner had initially obtained possession through a civil court decree that was later effectively superseded by a Supreme Court order recognizing the respondent's entitlement to the property upon payment of the auction price. The core legal question was whether the Civil Court could properly order restitution of the property to the respondent following the Supreme Court's final determination. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Court acted correctly in ordering restitution, emphasizing that its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, allowed it to ensure justice. The Court affirmed that when a decree under which possession was taken is subsequently reversed or modified by a higher forum, restitution is appropriate to prevent injustice. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, finding that interference would perpetuate an injustice rather than advance the cause of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Civil Court invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to order the restitution of property?
  • Is restitution of property appropriate when the decree under which possession was originally obtained is subsequently reversed or modified by a higher court?
  • Does the Supreme Court exercise its constitutional discretion to interfere with an order that, while potentially procedurally challenged, serves the ends of justice?
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• Zarin Gul Versus Malik San1995 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-26Read full judgment →
• Babu Versus State1995 SCMR 862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-03Read full judgment →
• Irshad Bibi Versus Member, Board of Revenue1995 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-28
  leave to appealevacuee propertyconstitutional petitiontransfer of propertymisrepresentationpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Constitution petition by the High Court, which had upheld an order of the Senior Member, Board of Revenue concerning the transfer of evacuee property. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner was in lawful pre-1961 occupation and entitled to the transfer of the disputed shop situated on Khasra No. 628, and whether he had validly relinquished his claim in favor of the National Bank of Pakistan. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the Board of Revenue and the High Court were unexceptionable, as the petitioner failed to prove possession of the correct Khasra number through his documents and had attempted to obtain orders through misrepresentation after relinquishing his claim. The key principle laid down is that constitutional jurisdiction will not be exercised to interfere with well-reasoned findings of fact based on thorough inquiries and record assessment where the petitioner's conduct involves misrepresentation and relinquishment of rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether High Court can interfere with findings of fact by the Board of Revenue based on thorough inquiry?
  • Does relinquishment of a claim to evacuee property disentitle a party from its transfer?
  • Is a party who misrepresents facts in judicial proceedings entitled to discretionary constitutional relief?
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• Hassan Masud Malik Versus Muhammad Iqbal1995 SCMR 766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Islamabad Versus Khalida Razi1995 SCMR 698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-08Read full judgment →
• Mir Muhammad Versus State1995 SCMR 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-31
  unlicensed armsrecovery on pointationsearch and seizurepolice witnessescriminal evidenceSection 103 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant under Section 13-E of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, for the possession of an unlicensed firearm, which was affirmed by the High Court of Balochistan. The core legal question presented was whether the recovery of the weapon was rendered illegal due to the failure of the police to associate two respectable inhabitants of the locality as witnesses, as purportedly required by Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court clarified that the provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply only to searches conducted by the police on their own initiative, not to recoveries made pursuant to information provided by or the pointation of the accused. The key principle laid down is that the mandatory requirement of associating independent witnesses from the locality under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is inapplicable where an accused person leads the police to a location and voluntarily facilitates the recovery of incriminating evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses from the locality under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 invalidate a recovery made on the pointation of an accused?
  • Are police officials considered competent witnesses in criminal trials?
  • Does Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to recoveries made pursuant to information provided by an accused?
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• Muhammad Anwar Khan Versus Muhammad Hashim1995 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-03Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad Versus Abdul Qadeem1995 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-22
  adverse possessionlimitationburden of proofevacuee propertypossession and mesne profitsarbitration agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan which maintained the decree of the Majlis-e-Shoora in favor of the respondent regarding an evacuee shop. The core legal question concerned whether the appellant had established title to the property through adverse possession and whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Article 144 applies to suits for possession where the plaintiff was not previously dispossessed, placing the burden of proof squarely on the defendant to plead and prove open, continuous, and hostile possession. The Court laid down the principle that mere long-standing possession by a trespasser without specific pleading and proof of hostile intent and overt acts is insufficient to establish adverse possession, and that referring a dispute to arbitration breaks the continuity of any alleged adverse possession.

  Questions settled

  • What is the distinction between Article 142 and Article 144 of the Limitation Act 1908 regarding the burden of proof and the computation of the limitation period?
  • Can a defendant sustain a plea of adverse possession without expressly pleading and proving material facts such as the date of asserting hostile title and specific overt acts?
  • Does referring a property dispute to arbitration constitute a break in the continuity of adverse possession?
  • Is mere possession of an immovable property by a trespasser for more than twelve years sufficient in itself to establish adverse possession?
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• Ghulam Rasool Versus Muhammad Waris Bismal1995 SCMR 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Versus State1995 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02
  leave to appealself-defencebenefit of doubtdelay in FIRcriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 20-3-1994. The core legal questions raised involve the evaluation of the plea of self-defence, whether it must be accepted or rejected as a whole along with the accompanying explanation, the sustainability of a conviction under Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code based on the evidentiary record, the granting of the benefit of doubt when the defence plea appears more plausible than the prosecution version, and the legal effect of an unexplained two-day delay in lodging the first information report. The Supreme Court considered these contentions and held that leave to appeal should be granted to examine them in detail. The key principle laid down relates to the proper judicial scrutiny of self-defence pleas, the evaluation of prosecution delays, and the application of the benefit of the doubt to criminal defendants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of self-defence must be accepted or rejected as a whole along with the explanation given by the accused?
  • Whether an offence under Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code is made out from the evidence on record in the present case?
  • Does an unexplained delay of two days in lodging the first information report cast serious doubt on the prosecution case?
  • Is the benefit of the doubt to be extended to the accused if the defence plea sounds more plausible than the prosecution version?
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• Allah Bakhsh Versus Abdul Rehman1995 SCMR 459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-15Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Anjum Ghauri Versus Abdul Rahim1995 SCMR 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Khan Versus Abdul Qadar1995 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-13Read full judgment →
• Sulaiman Versus Muhammad Daud Khan1995 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-25Read full judgment →
• Bashiran Versus Abdul Ghani1995 SCMR 1833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-06Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa Versus State1995 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafqat Baig Versus Mazhar Hussain Minhas, Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi1995 SCMR 1720 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-02
  court feesmaintenance decreefamily courtappellate valuationstatutory interpretationabolition of court feescivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the liability to pay court fees on a memorandum of appeal arising from a family court decree for maintenance. The core legal question was whether the appellant was required to pay court fees on an appeal against a maintenance decree, specifically considering the impact of the Punjab Court Fees (Abolition) Ordinance, 1983, and the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not liable to pay court fees. The Court reasoned that the artificial valuation method for maintenance suits under Section 7(ii) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, does not apply to the appellate stage. Furthermore, since the subject matter of the appeal—the total maintenance decreed—was less than the Rs. 25,000 threshold, the exemption under Section 2 of the Punjab Court Fees (Abolition) Ordinance, 1983, applied. The Court established the principle that the fiction of 'ten times the annual amount' used for valuing maintenance suits at the trial stage cannot be extended to determine the value of the subject matter for court fee purposes at the appellate stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the artificial valuation method for maintenance suits under Section 7(ii) of the Court Fees Act 1870 apply to the valuation of a memorandum of appeal?
  • Is Section 19 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 applicable to the memorandum of appeal filed against a family court judgment?
  • Does the exemption from court fees under Section 2 of the Punjab Court Fees (Abolition) Ordinance 1983 apply to appeals where the subject matter is less than twenty-five thousand rupees?
  • Can the court-fee valuation fiction for maintenance suits be extended to the appellate stage?
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• Abdur Razzaq Versus Saeeda Fatima1995 SCMR 1697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-11
  allotment of landMukhbari applicationMuafi landtemporary allotteepreferential rightrehabilitation scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a 'Mukhbari' application filed by the appellants challenging the allotment of agricultural land to respondent No. 1 in Mauza Dipalpur. The appellants contended that the respondent's verified claim was in respect of 'Muafi' (charitable/trust) land, which under Paragraph 57 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme 1956 was capped at 500 Produce Index Units (P.I. Units). They also claimed a preferential right to the allotment as they had transferred their units to the village earlier. The Supreme Court examined the relevant Jamabandis and found that, except for 63 units, the land was registered as the personal inherited property of the respondent and her father, and the mere remission of land revenue for charitable purposes did not convert personal ownership into a trust. The Court further held that as a temporary allottee in the village, the respondent possessed a preferential right under Paragraph 9-A of the Scheme. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere remission of land revenue for charitable purposes convert personal ownership of land into a charitable trust or 'Muafi' land under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme 1956?
  • Does a temporary allottee of land have a preferential right of settlement over other claimants who transfer their units to the same village before the allotment is finalized?
  • What is the statutory limit on the allotment of land against verified claims for 'Muafi' land under Paragraph 57 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme 1956?
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• Tariq Versus State1995 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-26
  lesser penaltymitigating circumstancescriminal appealsentence reductionundue influencemurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the sentencing of the appellant, Arif, who was convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Barkat Ali. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to the lesser penalty of life imprisonment rather than the death sentence, given that he committed the offense under the influence and exhortation of his mother and sister following a family dispute over a marriage proposal. The Court held that the appellant's actions were driven by the pressure and influence of his relatives, which served as a mitigating factor. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeal, maintaining the conviction but altering the sentence from death to imprisonment for life, while also imposing a fine and granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The judgment reinforces the principle that mitigating circumstances, such as acting under the undue influence or exhortation of family members, may justify the imposition of a lesser penalty in capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can acting under the influence and exhortation of family members serve as a mitigating factor for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a sentence of life imprisonment?
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• Musharaf Khan Versus Sherin Khan1995 SCMR 1661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-30
  ejectmentrent restrictionsublettingimpairment of valuepartition wallburden of prooftenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four appeals against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding the ejectment of a tenant from a shop. The core legal questions were whether the tenant's removal of a temporary partition wall between two rented portions of the shop constituted impairment of the property's value or utility, and whether the tenant had engaged in unauthorized subletting. The Supreme Court held that the removal of a non-structural partition wall, particularly when it facilitates the intended use of the premises, does not ipso facto impair the value or utility of the property. The Court found that the landlord failed to prove structural damage or that the removal was likely to cause such impairment. Regarding subletting, the Court held that while the burden of proof shifts to the tenant once a landlord shows a third party is using the premises, the tenant here provided a satisfactory explanation that the alleged sub-tenant was merely a former servant. Consequently, the Court set aside the ejectment order, ruling that neither ground for eviction was established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the removal of a non-structural partition wall by a tenant automatically constitute impairment of the value or utility of the rented premises?
  • When does the burden of proof shift from the landlord to the tenant regarding the allegation of subletting?
  • Is a tenant liable for ejectment if they remove a partition wall that was not structural and whose removal was consistent with the intended use of the premises?
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• Riaz Ahmad Versus State1995 SCMR 1636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-19Read full judgment →
• Zahid Farooq Versus Anjuman Jamia Masjid1995 SCMR 1584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-07
  Waqf propertyMutawalliAlienation of trust propertyIslamic LawJudicial sanctionCivil ProcedurePublic trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that declared a plot of land to be Waqf property and set aside its unauthorized sale. The core legal questions were whether the plot, purchased for a mosque, constituted Waqf property and whether the person who purchased it, acting as a Mutawalli, possessed the legal authority to alienate it without judicial sanction. The Supreme Court held that the plot was indeed Waqf property, as it was permanently dedicated to the mosque, evidenced by the Property Transfer Document. The Court affirmed that under Islamic Law, a Mutawalli lacks the power to sell, mortgage, or exchange Waqf property without the express permission of a court, unless the Waqf deed explicitly authorizes such alienation. The Court emphasized that the Civil Court has effectively replaced the Kazi as the state functionary responsible for overseeing Waqf administration. Consequently, the sale was declared void for lack of judicial authorization. The principle established is that Waqf property vests in the Almighty, and any alienation by a manager requires judicial oversight to protect the trust.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Mutawalli have the authority to sell, mortgage, or exchange Waqf property without the permission of a court?
  • What is the legal status of a person who purchases property for a mosque in terms of their power to alienate that property?
  • Which state functionary has replaced the Kazi in the administration and oversight of Waqf properties in Pakistan?
  • Does the use of sale proceeds for the benefit of a mosque constitute sufficient evidence to establish that the property sold was Waqf property?
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• Abdul Ghafoor Versus Muhammad Fazil1995 SCMR 1561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-17
  pre-emption suitLand Reforms Regulation 1972tenancy rightsexclusive jurisdictioncomposite rightscoram non judicecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment concerning a pre-emption suit originally filed on grounds of tenancy and co-ownership. The core legal question was whether the enactment of the Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1976, which added sub-paragraph (5) to paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, mandating the exclusive transfer of pre-emption suits involving tenancy rights to the Collector, rendered the Civil Court's proceedings coram non judice. The Supreme Court held that the appeal should be dismissed. The Court reasoned that because the plaintiffs had abandoned their tenancy claims during the proceedings, the suit was no longer founded on tenancy rights, thereby falling outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector. Consequently, the Civil Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the remaining claim based on co-ownership. The Court further observed that the appellants' objection regarding jurisdiction, raised for the first time at the appellate stage without demonstrating any prejudice, was hyper-technical and legally untenable. The judgment affirms that procedural technicalities regarding jurisdiction do not invalidate proceedings where the substantive basis for the special jurisdiction has been abandoned.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emption suit based on composite rights (tenancy and co-ownership) automatically stand transferred to the Collector under sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972?
  • Can a party raise an objection to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for the first time in the Supreme Court when the objection was not pursued in the lower courts?
  • Does a Civil Court lose jurisdiction over a pre-emption suit if the plaintiff abandons the claim based on tenancy rights during the pendency of the suit?
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• Abdur Razzaq Versus Shah Jehan1995 SCMR 1489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-18
  InheritanceHibaWillIslamic LawTransfer of possessionConstruction of documentsFormal proof of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a property dispute between the heirs of the deceased, Miangul Sherin. The appellants claimed ownership of the suit property based on documents executed by the deceased, while the respondents sought their share of the inheritance. The core legal question was whether these documents constituted valid gifts (Hiba) or wills. The Supreme Court held that the nature of a document is determined by its substance rather than its title. Under Islamic law, a valid gift requires the immediate transfer of possession, whereas a will takes effect after death and, if made in favor of an heir, requires the consent of other heirs to be valid. The Court found that one document regarding a house constituted a valid gift due to the delivery of possession, while other documents regarding land were wills and, lacking the consent of other heirs, were invalid. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that objections regarding the formal proof of documents must be raised at the trial stage and cannot be introduced for the first time during an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the nature of a document determined by its title or its substance?
  • What is the essential requirement for the validity of a gift (Hiba) under Islamic law?
  • Is a will made in favor of an heir valid without the consent of other heirs?
  • Can an objection regarding the formal proof of a document be raised for the first time at the appellate stage?
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• Fazal Qadeem Versus Amin Khan1995 SCMR 1426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-03
  pre-emption suitcompromise decreepre-emption moneytime limit for depositdefault in paymentdismissal of suitconsent decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the parties entered into a compromise before the trial court. Pursuant to the compromise application, the trial court passed a consent decree allowing pre-emption of a portion of the land upon payment of a specified sum directly to the vendees within one month. The pre-emptor failed to pay the pre-emption money within the prescribed timeframe, leading the respondents to seek dismissal of the suit. The trial court, Additional District Judge, and Peshawar High Court consecutively held that non-payment resulted in the dismissal of the suit. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower decisions, holding that a consent decree passed in a pre-emption suit remains governed by Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The court held that fixing a timeframe for payment is required by law, and default in paying the pre-emption money within the period specified by the court automatically results in dismissal of the suit, notwithstanding the omission of a explicit default clause in the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does a consent decree passed in a pre-emption suit attract the statutory requirements of Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court specify a timeframe for payment of pre-emption money under Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the compromise application does not provide one?
  • Does the non-payment of pre-emption money within the court-specified time entail dismissal of the pre-emption suit even if the consent order omits a default clause?
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• Muhammad Mansha Versus State1995 SCMR 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-25
  narcotics recoverysearch witnessesmandatory provisionshabeas corpusfalse implicationbenefit of the doubtprohibition order
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 for possessing 20 kg of heroin. The core legal questions involve the mandatory compliance with search witness requirements under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the evaluation of a plea of false police implication arising from a prior habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that the failure of the investigating officer to associate two respectable inhabitants of the locality as search witnesses—relying instead on a single public witness—vitiated the search proceedings. Furthermore, the Court established that when a habeas corpus petition is filed against the arresting police officer immediately prior to the alleged recovery, a reasonable possibility of false implication exists, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate two respectable inhabitants of the locality as witnesses vitiate search proceedings under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does joining only a single witness from the public fulfill the mandatory requirements of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the filing of a habeas corpus petition against the arresting officer immediately prior to an alleged recovery creates a reasonable probability of false implication?
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• Abdul Khaliq Versus State1995 SCMR 1412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-26
  Zina-bil-Jabrconsentcredibility of witnesscorroborationacquittalHudood laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge for the offences of abduction and Zina-bil-Jabr, which was subsequently upheld and the sentence enhanced by the Federal Shariat Court. The core legal question was whether the testimony of the prosecutrix could be relied upon to sustain a conviction for Zina-bil-Jabr when both the trial court and the appellate court had concurrently found that the prosecutrix was a consenting party to the sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutrix, having been found to be a woman of easy virtue who voluntarily submitted to the appellant's lust, lacked credibility. By falsely alleging forcible abduction and rape, she compromised her integrity, rendering her an undependable witness whose testimony could not be rehabilitated by corroborative evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence, establishing the principle that where a prosecutrix is found to be a consenting party and has made false allegations of force, her testimony is unreliable and insufficient to support a conviction for Zina-bil-Jabr.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for Zina-bil-Jabr be sustained based on the testimony of a prosecutrix who has been found to be a consenting party?
  • Does the making of a false allegation of abduction and rape by a prosecutrix render her testimony unreliable for the purpose of a criminal conviction?
  • Can corroborative evidence rehabilitate the testimony of a witness who has been found to be fundamentally untruthful regarding the core allegations of force?
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• Atta Muhammad Alias Fauji Versus State1995 SCMR 1409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-24
  narcoticsfalse implicationpolice custodyappreciation of evidenceacquittalrecovery witnessescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Atta Muhammad alias Fauji, who was convicted by a Magistrate under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for the possession of heroin and opium. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution successfully established the time and circumstances of the appellant's arrest and the subsequent recovery of narcotics, given the appellant's defense of false implication. The Court examined the testimony of defense witnesses, including journalists, who corroborated the appellant's claim that he was in police custody prior to the date of the alleged recovery, as evidenced by press reports regarding a police press conference held before the purported arrest date. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's version of events was demonstrably false, as the appellant was clearly in police custody at least two days before the alleged recovery. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The key principle established is that when defense evidence, supported by contemporaneous public records, contradicts the prosecution's timeline of arrest and recovery, the prosecution's case cannot be sustained.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when defense evidence proves the accused was in police custody prior to the alleged date of recovery?
  • Does the publication of news reports regarding an arrest prior to the official recovery date undermine the credibility of prosecution witnesses?
  • Is the statement of an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sufficient to raise a plea of false involvement if supported by independent evidence?
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• Shamoon Alias Shamma Versus State1995 SCMR 1377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-25
  grave and sudden provocationSection 342 statementburden of proofappreciation of evidencecriminal appealculpable homicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The trial court had rejected the ocular testimony but convicted the appellant based solely on his statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, wherein he admitted to the killing but claimed it was committed under grave and sudden provocation upon finding the deceased with his wife. The trial court accepted the admission of the killing but discarded the plea of provocation. The core legal question was whether a court can selectively accept only the inculpatory part of an accused's statement while rejecting the exculpatory part. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt before the burden shifts to the accused. If a conviction is based solely on a statement under Section 342, the court must accept the statement in its entirety or reject it; it cannot pick and choose parts to secure a conviction. Consequently, the Court accepted the plea of grave and sudden provocation, converted the conviction to Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court selectively accept the inculpatory part of an accused's statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, while rejecting the exculpatory part?
  • Does the prosecution need to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt before the burden of proof shifts to the accused to establish a defense?
  • Is it permissible to convict an accused based solely on a partial reliance on his statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Rasool Muhammad Versus Asal Muhammad1995 SCMR 1373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-20
  acquittal appealSection 342 CrPCabscondenceocular evidencecriminal procedureappellate interferencemurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a murder case where the respondents were initially convicted by the trial court but subsequently acquitted by the Peshawar High Court. The complainant challenged the acquittal, arguing that the ocular evidence was corroborated by medical evidence and the respondents' abscondence. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court’s acquittal was perverse or disregarded evidence. The Court held that the High Court’s assessment of the evidence was supportable. Crucially, the Court ruled that an accused cannot be prejudiced by a circumstance—such as the contents of an FIR lodged by the accused—if that specific circumstance was not put to the accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that abscondence, while suspicious, does not constitute per se proof of guilt. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the acquittal, establishing that it will not disturb an acquittal unless the findings are perverse or in total disregard of the evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a circumstance not put to an accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used against him?
  • Is abscondence of an accused sufficient proof of guilt in a murder case?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court?
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• Falak Sher Alias Sheru Versus State1995 SCMR 1350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-26
  criminal appealFirst Information Reportbenefit of doubtsupplementary statementrobberydacoitywitness reliabilityacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for robbery under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The core legal question concerns whether the conviction of an accused, who was previously known to the complainant but omitted from the First Information Report (FIR), can be sustained based on a subsequent supplementary statement. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was unsustainable and acquitted the appellant. The Court established the principle that a supplementary statement recorded by the police during investigation cannot be equated with or read as part of the FIR. Where an accused is previously known to the complainant, the failure to name them in the FIR creates a significant doubt regarding their involvement, which cannot be cured by later improvements. The Court observed that such improvements by the complainant and witnesses render their testimony unreliable. Consequently, the Court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellant, set aside the conviction, and ordered his immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Can a supplementary statement recorded during investigation be equated with or read as part of the First Information Report?
  • Does the failure to name a previously known accused in the First Information Report entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Is the testimony of witnesses reliable when they make improvements to their initial statements during trial?
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• Tariq Pervez Versus State1995 SCMR 1345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  heroin possessionprohibition orderbenefit of doubtchemical examiner reportsample parcelcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Tariq Pervez, was tried and convicted under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 for selling and possessing heroin. The Federal Shariat Court set aside the conviction under Article 3 but maintained the conviction and sentence under Article 4. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the core legal question was whether the failure of the prosecution to send the correct sample parcel to the Chemical Examiner creates a reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that where two separate parcels of heroin were prepared but only one was sent to the Chemical Examiner, and it cannot be identified with certainty which parcel was examined, a reasonable doubt arises. The key principle laid down is that an accused person is entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to send the correct sample parcel to the Chemical Examiner entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when a reasonable doubt is created in a prudent mind?
  • What is the effect on the prosecution case when two separate sample parcels are prepared but only one is sent for chemical analysis?
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• Zahoor Ahmad Versus State1995 SCMR 1338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fazil Versus State1995 SCMR 1330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-23
  constructive liabilityunlawful assemblycommon objectforcible abductionleave to appealcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from criminal proceedings wherein the petitioner, Muhammad Fazil, along with others, was convicted under Section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, Section 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the forcible abduction of a minor girl and the murder of her grandfather during the occurrence. The convictions and sentences were upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner could be held constructively liable under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder committed by a co-accused when the petitioner himself was empty-handed and did not inflict any injury on the deceased. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner shared a common object as part of an unlawful assembly to commit abduction, and given that a co-accused was openly carrying a firearm, the petitioner could foresee resistance and knew that murder was a likely outcome. The key principle laid down is that in cases of forcible abduction by an unlawful assembly where a member is visibly armed with a lethal weapon, participating members are fixed with the knowledge that resistance may result in homicide, thus attracting constructive liability under the second part of Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unarmed member of an unlawful assembly can be convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for a murder committed by a co-accused during the course of a forcible abduction?
  • Does an assembly that was initially lawful subsequently become an unlawful assembly under Section 141 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if its members proceed to commit a crime?
  • Is a participant in the forcible abduction of a woman fixed with the knowledge under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 that resistance by relatives might lead to murder when a co-accused is visibly carrying a firearm?
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• Shaukat Ali Versus State1995 SCMR 1327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-03Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif Sabir Versus Secretary, Interior Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad1995 SCMR 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-29Read full judgment →
• Jamia Mahmoodia Masjid Versus Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Multan Division1995 SCMR 1243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-18
  constitutional jurisdictionjudicial reviewfindings of factsettlement schemetenancymisreading of evidenceurban property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that interfered with findings of fact made by settlement tribunals regarding the transfer of urban property. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, was justified in setting aside the findings of the Deputy Administrator and the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) that the respondents were tenants of the appellant mosque, rather than owners entitled to the transfer of the disputed property. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by re-evaluating evidence and acting as an appellate court, thereby exceeding its constitutional jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that findings of fact recorded by tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction are not open to interference in constitutional jurisdiction unless based on no evidence, misreading, or non-reading of evidence. The Court established that where tribunals have relied on valid evidence—such as rent receipts, excise records, and admissions—the High Court cannot substitute its own assessment of facts or re-weigh evidence, as judicial review is not an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact recorded by a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is a finding of fact by a tribunal immune from interference in constitutional jurisdiction if it is supported by oral and documentary evidence?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to re-weigh evidence or act as a court of appeal when exercising its constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Khurshid Begum Versus Chiragh Muhammad1995 SCMR 1237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sanaullah Versus Shamim Naz Kausar1995 SCMR 1208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-14Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta Versus Khurshid Bibi1995 SCMR 1203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz Versus State1995 SCMR 1162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1094-02-13
  Presidential AmnestyCommutation of SentenceDeath PenaltyLife ImprisonmentComputation of SentenceCriminal Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's judgment, which had upheld the petitioner's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the subsequent sentence of death. The core legal question concerned the applicability of a Presidential Amnesty order dated 7-12-1988 to the petitioner's death sentence, given that the trial court's judgment was rendered on 22-1-1986. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but held that the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the Amnesty order, which extended to all convicts sentenced to death by courts up to 6-12-1988, regardless of whether the sentence had been confirmed by higher courts on appeal. Consequently, the Court commuted the petitioner's death sentence to life imprisonment and directed that the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be applied regarding the computation of the sentence. The principle laid down is that presidential amnesty orders covering death sentences apply to all such sentences passed by the cut-off date, irrespective of appellate confirmation status.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Presidential Amnesty order covering death sentences apply to convicts whose sentences were confirmed by higher courts after the amnesty date?
  • Is a convict entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment?
  • Does the cut-off date for a Presidential Amnesty order regarding death sentences apply to the date of the trial court's judgment?
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• Muhammad Ramzan Versus General Iron Stores1995 SCMR 1125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-09-01Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Shah Versus State1995 SCMR 1099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-21Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat Versus State1995 SCMR 1005 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan Versus Muhammad Shafi Muhammadi, Advocate1994 SCMR 932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-22
  accomplice testimonycorroborationHaddQisasTa'zirFederal Shariat CourtIslamic Injunctions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals directed against a common judgment of the Federal Shariat Court concerning the validity of Article 16 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, relating to the competency and evidentiary value of an accomplice's testimony under Islamic Injunctions. The core legal questions revolved around whether the testimony of an accomplice is admissible in offenses punishable with Hadd, Qisas, and Ta'zir, and whether a conviction based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony is legally sustainable. By majority view, the Supreme Court held that the evidence of an accomplice is completely inadmissible in offenses punishable with Hadd or Qisas. In cases of Ta'zir, an accomplice's testimony is admissible and can form the basis of a conviction provided it is corroborated in material particulars, though the majority noted that in exceptional cases, for reasons recorded, uncorroborated testimony might suffice, whereas the minority view maintained that corroboration is strictly mandatory. The Court laid down that statutory provisions must harmonize with Islamic Injunctions, rendering accomplice evidence inadmissible in Hadd and Qisas, and subject to strict corroboration requirements in Ta'zir.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of an accomplice admissible in offenses punishable with Hadd or Qisas under Islamic law?
  • Can a conviction for an offense punishable with Ta'zir be based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice?
  • How is Article 16 to be harmonized with illustration (b) to Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984?
  • Does the Holy Qur'an require the verification of news brought by a sinful person before taking action upon it?
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• Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan Versus Muhammad Anwar Bajwa1994 SCMR 852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-26Read full judgment →
• Annaporna Dutt Versus State of U.P.1994 SCMR 611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-09-24Read full judgment →
• Shah Muhammad Versus Imtiaz Ahmad1994 SCMR 579 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-19Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum Versus Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad1994 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-29
  leave to appealservice matterequivalence of degreesDeeni AsnadseniorityUniversity Grants Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal which had dismissed the petitioner's service appeal as not maintainable. The petitioner, appearing in person, argued that the Tribunal failed to correctly appreciate his contention regarding the equivalence of 'Deeni Asnad' (religious qualifications) held by the respondents. The petitioner did not challenge the general recognition of these qualifications by the University Grants Commission, but contended that the respondents failed to satisfy the specific conditions prescribed in the Commission's circular dated 17-11-1982. Specifically, the circular required such 'Sanad' holders to qualify in additional elective papers (Pakistan Studies and Islamic Studies) at the B.A. level to be treated at par with regular degree holders for seniority. Finding that the question raised was of general importance and likely to affect a large number of persons employed in educational institutions under the circular, the Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider the contention.

  Questions settled

  • Whether holders of 'Deeni Asnad' must qualify in the additional subjects prescribed by the University Grants Commission's circular to be treated at par with regular degree holders for the purpose of seniority?
  • Did the Federal Service Tribunal err in dismissing the service appeal as not maintainable without considering whether the respondents met the specific conditions for degree equivalence?
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• Muhammad Bakhsh Versus Muhammad Jan , Muhammad Younas (Office Assistant)1994 SCMR 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan Versus Abdul Ghani , Yousaf Rafi, Advocate-on-Record1994 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-20Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Versus Zafar Ali Shah1994 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-12Read full judgment →
• State Versus Muhammad Arshad Amin1994 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-23
  appeal against acquittalcriminal conspiracyappreciation of evidenceinterested witnessperverse findingocular evidencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal by the State against the acquittal of several respondents by the Special Court for Speedy Trials, Lahore, in a case involving charges of murder and criminal conspiracy. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal was perverse or unsupported by the evidence, thereby warranting appellate interference. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were sound and that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found the evidence regarding the alleged criminal conspiracy unreliable due to the inconsistent testimony of the key witness. Furthermore, the ocular evidence was deemed insufficient, as the eye-witnesses were either found to be inimical, interested, or unreliable, and the initial version of the incident recorded in the inquest report contradicted the subsequent First Information Report. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court should not interfere with a judgment of acquittal merely because it might reach a different conclusion on re-appraisal of evidence, provided the trial court's findings are reasonably possible and not perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances may an appellate court interfere with a trial court's judgment of acquittal?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution's initial version of the occurrence, as recorded in the inquest report, contradicts the subsequent First Information Report?
  • Can a criminal conspiracy charge be sustained solely on the testimony of a witness who has provided contradictory affidavits?
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• Noor Muhammad Arain Versus Muhammad Mubarik Khan , Nemo1994 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-17
  displaced personscompensation poolexcess areasettlement authoritiesplinth areapermanent transfer deedauction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside the auction of an "excess area" of land associated with a bungalow transferred to the respondent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The respondent, a displaced person, had been transferred the "full house" including appurtenant land. Settlement authorities later determined that 4,413 square yards of this land exceeded the permissible limit under the Act and auctioned it. The High Court held the auction invalid, reasoning that the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) removed the property from the Compensation Pool and that the respondent was not heard during the review. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that under the second proviso to Section 2(4) of the 1958 Act, land exceeding three times the plinth area of a house is not treated as part of the house unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise. Since no such order existed, the excess land was never legally transferred to the respondent, rendering the High Court's decision unsustainable in law.

  Questions settled

  • Does land exceeding three times the plinth area of a house automatically form part of the house transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) be construed to transfer land that is legally excluded from the definition of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Is the Chief Settlement Commissioner's specific order required to include land exceeding three times the plinth area in the transfer of a house?
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• Saeed Akhtar Hussain Bokhari Versus Muslim Commercial Bank Limited1994 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-09
  mortgage suitconsent decreeconditional admissionbanking recoveryinterest ratepreliminary decreesummary procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside a Special Judge's decree in a mortgage suit filed by a bank against the appellants. The core legal questions were whether the Special Judge's decree constituted a consent decree immune to appeal, and whether the appellant's statement admitting liability while requesting concessions in interest and installments constituted a conditional admission requiring acceptance in its entirety or rejection. The Supreme Court held that the Special Judge's decree was not a consent decree, as the bank did not consent to the reduced interest and installment terms imposed. Furthermore, the appellant's admission of the debt was unconditional, and the request for concessions did not invalidate the admission of liability. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision to pass a preliminary decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, but modified the interest rate to reflect the law applicable at the time of the suit's institution. The principle established is that a debtor's request for concessions does not render an admission of liability conditional, nor does a court's unilateral grant of such concessions create a consent decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a debtor's request for concessions in interest and installments render an admission of liability conditional?
  • Does a decree passed by a Special Judge granting concessions not agreed to by the creditor constitute a consent decree?
  • Is a preliminary decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 required in a mortgage suit filed under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  • Can interest rates be reduced by a court below the contracted rate in a banking recovery suit?
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• Lal Khan Versus Khizar Hayat1994 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-21Read full judgment →
• Union of India Versus W.N. Chadha1994 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-17Read full judgment →
• Glaxo Laboratories of Pakistan Ltd. Versus Federation of Pakistan1994 SCMR 2316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-12Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Ahmed Versus State1994 SCMR 2311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-30
  acquittal appealpresumption of innocenceocular evidencedying declarationappellate interferencemisreading of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a High Court judgment that overturned the appellants' acquittal for murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's acquittal based on a re-evaluation of ocular evidence and dying declarations. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and restored the acquittal. The Court held that an order of acquittal strengthens the initial presumption of innocence, and appellate interference is only permissible if the acquittal is perverse or based on unreasonable grounds. The Supreme Court determined that the High Court misread the evidence regarding the independence of a key witness and failed to demonstrate that the trial court's view was unreasonable. Since the trial court’s acquittal was a reasonably possible view of the evidence, the High Court erred in substituting its own assessment. The Court affirmed that the mere possibility of a different evidentiary interpretation does not constitute valid grounds for overturning an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Does the mere possibility of a different view of evidence justify overturning an acquittal?
  • Is an appellate court permitted to interfere with an acquittal if the trial court's view is reasonably possible?
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• Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Versus Assistant Chief Ordnance1994 SCMR 2310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-09
  leave to appealservice tribunaldismissal from servicemisconductright of cross-examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his dismissal from service for misconduct. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the departmental inquiry conducted against the petitioner suffered from legal infirmities, specifically the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, the failure to furnish copies of witness statements, and insufficient time to respond to the charge-sheet. The Supreme Court held that sufficient grounds were made out to grant leave to appeal to examine whether the inquiry suffered from legal infirmity warranting interference. The key principle laid down is that a civil servant facing disciplinary proceedings must be afforded adequate procedural safeguards, including the right to cross-examine witnesses and receive copies of witness statements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inquiry held against a civil servant suffers from legal infirmity if he is denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to copies of statements of witnesses during a departmental inquiry?
  • Does failure to provide sufficient time to reply to a charge-sheet vitiate dismissal from service?
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• Muhammad Akram Versus P.I.a1994 SCMR 2308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  martial law removalreinstatementreview boardindustrial relations commissionterminal benefitsgolden handshakesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Haji Muhammad Akram, a former Canteen Supervisor of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), aggrieved by his removal from service on August 11, 1982, alongside numerous other employees under Martial Law Order No. 52. Following the establishment of a Review Board in 1989 to examine cases of employees removed under martial law provisions, and subsequent proceedings before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), the petitioner sought reinstatement. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to mandatory reinstatement based on recommendations and orders passed in relation to the review process and NIRC proceedings, and whether the matter involved a constitutional violation of public importance. The Supreme Court held that the Review Board acted merely as a recommendatory body whose recommendations were subject to government acceptance, and that the Government lawfully declined the petitioner's re-employment due to his age and the prior settlement of all terminal dues under a golden handshake policy nearly a decade prior. Consequently, the Court ruled that no human rights violation of public importance was involved and dismissed the petition as incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether recommendations made by a review board set up to review termination of employees under martial law orders are binding on the Government?
  • Does a petition seeking reinstatement after a delayed challenge from 1982 to 1989 involve a human rights violation of public importance and great urgency?
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• Muhammad Naeem Versus Muhammad Haroon Khan1994 SCMR 2306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-19
  service lawlocus standimaintainability of appealreinstatementaggrieved personservice tribunal jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the N.W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had reinstated respondent No. 1, Muhammad Haroon Khan, into service after his termination by the Local Government and Rural Development Department. The appellant, Muhammad Naeem, challenged this reinstatement, claiming he had originally secured the first position in a competitive test for the post of Supervisor, whereas the respondent had been appointed on political grounds despite being over-aged. The core legal question was whether the appellant, who was serving as a Secretary, Union Council, at the time of the respondent's appointment and subsequent termination, possessed the necessary locus standi to challenge the Service Tribunal's order reinstating the respondent. The Supreme Court upheld a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal. It held that because the appellant was not holding the post of Supervisor at the relevant times and had not challenged the respondent's initial appointment, he was not an aggrieved person entitled to contest the reinstatement order. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a candidate who did not challenge an initial appointment have the locus standi to challenge a subsequent reinstatement order of that appointee?
  • Can an individual who was not holding the specific post in question at the time of a service dispute maintain an appeal against an order regarding that post?
  • Is an appeal maintainable before the Supreme Court when the appellant fails to demonstrate they are an aggrieved person?
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• Muhammad Idrees Versus Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore1994 SCMR 2303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  back benefitsreinstatementlabour lawreview petitionerror on the face of the recordadditional evidenceprocedural technicalities
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged a Supreme Court judgment that denied back benefits to a reinstated employee. The core legal question was whether the denial of back benefits was based on a factual error regarding the petitioner's failure to assert his unemployment status during the period of severance. The Court held that an error patent on the face of the record had occurred, as the Court had mistakenly attributed findings from a connected appeal to the petitioner's case, thereby ignoring that the petitioner had explicitly sought to lead additional evidence regarding his unemployment status. The Court established the principle that procedural and technical rules should not be strictly enforced to impede the ascertainment of the true position of a case, particularly in labour proceedings. Consequently, the Court set aside the previous order and remanded the matter to the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, directing it to allow the petitioner to lead evidence on his employment status during the period of severance, with the respondents granted liberty to rebut such evidence before a fresh decision is rendered.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court review its own judgment if it contains an error patent on the face of the record?
  • Should procedural and technical rules be strictly enforced if they impede the ascertainment of the true position of a case in labour proceedings?
  • Is an employee entitled to lead additional evidence to prove they remained unemployed during the period of severance to claim back benefits?
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• Muhammad Rafi Versus Muhammad Ashfaq, Civil Judge,Hasilpir1994 SCMR 2301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-08Read full judgment →
• Sardara Versus Muhammad1994 SCMR 2299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  cancellation of sale deedregistered sale deedfraud and misrepresentationlimitationburden of proofleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for declaration and cancellation of a registered sale deed dated 12-11-1960. The plaintiff (predecessor of the petitioners) alleged that the sale deed was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, asserting he had intended to execute a lease deed due to his illness. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court decreed it. The High Court, in a regular second appeal, reversed the appellate court's decision and dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dismissing the petition, held that the petitioners failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation. The Court emphasized that the sale deed was a registered document, executed before a Registering Officer where the parties were identified by an Advocate, and the consideration was paid. Furthermore, the suit was filed six years after the registration of the deed, and the mere fact of the plaintiff remaining in possession of the land was insufficient to prove the allegations of fraud. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a registered sale deed can be cancelled on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation without strong and satisfactory evidence?
  • Does the mere fact of a vendor remaining in possession of land after executing a registered sale deed constitute sufficient proof of fraud or misrepresentation?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a sale deed registered before a Registering Officer where the parties were identified by an Advocate?
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• Manzoor Hussain Alias Faqir Sain Versus Additional District Judge, Sialkot1994 SCMR 2297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-08
  pre-emption suitrestoration of suitlimitation periodstatutory interpretationPunjab Pre-emption Act 1991condonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld an order setting aside the restoration of a pre-emption suit. The petitioner had filed a pre-emption suit that was rejected in 1990 following the Supreme Court's declaration that the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 was contrary to Islamic Injunctions. Following the enactment of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, the petitioner sought restoration of the suit under section 35 of the new Act. The core legal question was whether the application for restoration was time-barred and whether the provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 excluded reliance on Muslim Personal Law or the application of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court held that the application for restoration was filed beyond the statutory 60-day period prescribed by the 1991 Act. The Court affirmed that the 1991 Act occupied the field, precluding reliance on general Muslim Personal Law, and that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was inapplicable to the statutory limitation period provided for such restoration applications.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 exclude the application of Muslim Personal Law regarding the right of pre-emption?
  • Is section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to an application for restoration of a suit filed under section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991?
  • What is the limitation period for filing an application for the restoration of a pre-emption suit under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991?
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• Manzoor Oadir Versus Rajab Ali1994 SCMR 2295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09Read full judgment →
• Imam Hussain Versus Sher Ali Shah1994 SCMR 2293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11Read full judgment →
• Baigan Versus Muhammad Anwar A.R. Sheikh, Raja Muhammad Anwar and Salim Ahmad , Ch. Khurshid Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Aslam Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record1994 SCMR 2292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  inheritancelimited interestShajra Nasabpedigree tableleave to appealpossession of landheirship
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed a decree granting possession of land to the respondent, Muhammad Anwar. The dispute concerns the inheritance of property originally owned by one Fateh Din, who died in 1905. Following the death of the last male owner and the subsequent termination of the limited interest held by his widow, Mst. Baigan, the respondent claimed entitlement to the estate as the grandson (Nawasa) of Mst. Mehran, alleged to be the sister of the deceased. The petitioners contested the respondent's status as an heir, arguing that the inclusion of Mst. Mehran and Mst. Roshnai as sisters of the deceased in the pedigree table (Shajra Nasab) was erroneous and lacked evidentiary value. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the evidence on record sufficiently establishes the relationship of Mst. Mehran as the sister of the deceased and the respondent as her grandson, and consequently, the extent of his entitlement to inherit from the estate of the last male owner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the evidence on record is sufficient to prove that Mst. Mehran was the sister of the last male owner, Fateh Din?
  • Whether the respondent is entitled to inherit from the estate of the last male owner as the grandson of his alleged sister?
  • To what share of the estate is the respondent entitled if his relationship as the grandson of the deceased's sister is established?
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• Amanullah Jan Versus Regional Development Finance Corporation, Islamabad1994 SCMR 2291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21Read full judgment →
• Arshad Muhammad Khan Versus Kalsoom Bibi1994 SCMR 2288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-24
  rent restrictionevictiondefault in payment of rentburden of prooflandlord and tenantsuccessor-in-interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a landlord's attempt to evict a tenant on the grounds of rent default. The Rent Controller had initially ordered eviction, but the Peshawar High Court set aside that order. The Supreme Court examined whether the landlord had sufficiently proven the alleged default. The Court held that the burden of proving default lies squarely on the landlord. In this case, the landlord failed to specify critical details, such as the date of death of the original tenant (the respondent's mother) or the timeline of the respondent's exclusive possession, making it impossible to establish liability for the alleged arrears. The Court affirmed that rent restriction laws are designed to protect tenants from arbitrary eviction, and such eviction can only occur when statutory conditions are strictly satisfied. Finding that the landlord failed to affirmatively establish the default and that the High Court's factual findings contained no legal infirmity, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish default in payment of rent in an eviction proceeding?
  • Is a successor-in-interest liable for rent default committed by the original tenant without proof of the timing of succession and possession?
  • Can a High Court's factual findings regarding rent default be interfered with by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal infirmity or misreading of evidence?
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• Muhammad Mumtaz Masud Versus House Building Finance Corporation1994 SCMR 2287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mushtaq Versus Federation of Pakistan1994 SCMR 2286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-05
  Constitutional PetitionWrit JurisdictionFundamental RightsArmed ForcesJurisdictional Bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Constitutional Petition by the High Court. The petitioner challenged the High Court's order, arguing that despite the bar under Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the High Court should have entertained the petition because it involved the enforcement of fundamental rights. The core legal question was whether the constitutional bar on the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199(3) could be bypassed when a petitioner invokes fundamental rights. The Supreme Court held that the relief sought under Article 199(1) regarding fundamental rights is explicitly subject to the bar imposed by Article 199(3). Consequently, the High Court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The Court affirmed that the jurisdictional restriction in Article 199(3) is absolute and cannot be circumvented by pleading fundamental rights. Leave to appeal was refused as the impugned order was legally sound.

  Questions settled

  • Can the bar under Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be ignored if a petition involves fundamental rights?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199(1) to grant relief in matters barred by Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Muhammad Javed Shafi Versus Hanifa Begum1994 SCMR 2284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-21
  petition for leave to appealinterlocutory ordernon-maintainabilitycompany jurisdictionproduction of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against an interlocutory order passed by the Company Judge of the Lahore High Court, whereby notice was issued to an advocate to bring certain blank transfer deeds that were allegedly handed over to him according to the petitioner's own statement. The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard the matter and dismissed the petition on the short ground of non-maintainability. The Court held that the impugned order was not adverse to the interest of the petitioner in any manner, noting that if the petitioner had any objection to the production of the documents, such objections could be raised before the High Court to be decided on merits. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that an interlocutory order which does not prejudice a party or adversely affect their legal rights is not maintainable for challenge by way of a petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is an interlocutory order that is not adverse to the interest of a petitioner maintainable for leave to appeal?
  • Can a party object to the production of documents before the trial court rather than challenging an interlocutory notice?
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• Ramzan Sugar Mills Ltd. Versus Mian Miraj-Ud-Din1994 SCMR 2281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-21
  interlocutory ordersleave to appealcompany benchinterim relieflocal commissionerdiscretionary powersCompanies Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from interlocutory orders passed by the Company Judge of the Lahore High Court in civil original petitions filed under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, seeking the appointment of an inspector and interim relief including the appointment of a local commissioner to inspect factory premises and inventory sugar stocks. The core legal question concerned whether the Supreme Court should interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a court of competent jurisdiction where the matters and applications for interim relief remained pending adjudication before the lower court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that non-interference with interim orders is the general rule and interference is an exception, especially when the impugned orders were passed subject to notice and the petitioners had the opportunity to raise all objections before the Company Judge. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court ordinarily declines to interfere with interlocutory orders under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, leaving parties to agitate their grievances before the original forum.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a court of competent jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can a party challenge an interim order before the Supreme Court when the main petition and miscellaneous applications are still pending before the High Court?
  • Does the appointment of a local commissioner to inspect factory premises and inventory stocks amount to an absolute final decision?
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• Muhammad Akram Bunda Versus Pakistan Television Corporation, PTV Headquarters, Islamabad1994 SCMR 2279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-17Read full judgment →
• Bibi Rani Versus Najabat Ali1994 SCMR 2277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-28Read full judgment →
• Nouroz Khan Versus Zulekha1994 SCMR 2276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-28Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal Versus Manager, Personnel and Administration, P.N. Dockyard, Karachi1994 SCMR 2274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-29
  service lawlimitation periodtime-barred appealdepartmental appealFederal Service Tribunalunauthorized absenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal as time-barred. The petitioner, a former Store House Assistant in the Pakistan Navy, was removed from service for unauthorized absence. He filed a departmental appeal, which was rejected, and subsequently filed an appeal before the Tribunal well beyond the prescribed limitation period. The core legal question addressed was whether the petitioner had demonstrated sufficient cause for the delay in filing his appeal before the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was indeed time-barred, noting that the petitioner failed to file within the statutory period, whether calculated from the date of the departmental decision or from the expiry of the period for non-disposal of a departmental appeal. The Court affirmed that subsequent applications after a final departmental order do not extend the limitation period. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that strict adherence to limitation periods is required in service matters and that ignorance or failure to act within statutory deadlines without sufficient cause is fatal to an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a departmental appeal filed after the final order of the departmental authority stop the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • What is the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal in the event of non-disposal of a departmental appeal?
  • Can an appeal be filed before the Service Tribunal if the departmental appeal has not yet been decided?
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• Nabil Dar Versus Suhair Mamdouh Sudki Deais Dar1994 SCMR 2271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-24Read full judgment →
• Rani Versus Razia Sultana1994 SCMR 2268 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Noor Jahan Versus Roshan Jahan1994 SCMR 2265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-15Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed Versus Nek Muhammad1994 SCMR 2255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-22
  own occupation or useejectmentlandlord and tenantpartnership firmpersonal useSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether a landlord who is a partner in a business firm can seek the ejectment of a tenant under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, on the ground that the premises are required for the "own occupation or use" of the landlord, when the premises are intended to be utilized for the business of the partnership firm in which the landlord holds a fractional share alongside other partners. The core legal question concerns the proper interpretation of the expression "his own occupation or use" under section 15(2)(vii) of the Ordinance and whether it extends to encompass a partnership business. The Court held that while the expression "own occupation or use" admits a liberal interpretation to include family members and dependents residing with the landlord, it cannot be stretched to include commercial or business partnerships where third parties possess an independent interest in the business. The ratio is that occupation by a partnership firm of which the landlord is only a fractional partner does not constitute "own occupation or use" of the landlord alone, as a partnership business is run for the benefit of all partners. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the expression 'his own occupation or use' under section 15(2)(vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 include the business requirements of a partnership firm of which the landlord is a partner?
  • Can commercial and business relationships be treated at par with family and personal relationships for the purpose of a liberal interpretation of 'own occupation or use'?
  • Does occupation by a partnership firm amount to exclusive possession and occupation by a landlord partner alone?
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• Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Versus Maida Limited , S.M. Noorul Hasan, Advocate Supreme Court1994 SCMR 2248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-13Read full judgment →
• Elahi Bakhsh Versus Bhirawan1994 SCMR 2246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-12Read full judgment →
• Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Bahawalnagar Versus Muhammad Afzal Abbasi1994 SCMR 2245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service tribunalconfidential reportsexpunction of remarkslimitationleave to appealservice record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Bahawalnagar, against an order of the Service Tribunal. The core legal question presented for the Supreme Court's consideration is whether the Service Tribunal erred in law by expunging adverse remarks recorded in the respondent's confidential reports without properly addressing the critical issue of limitation. Furthermore, the Court seeks to determine if the Tribunal failed to adequately consider the material evidence, specifically the comments of the Reporting Officer and the relevant appellate orders, which were duly placed on the record by the department. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to examine these procedural and substantive oversights. The Court directed that the record of the appeals before the Service Tribunal be produced and ordered that the matter be heard in conjunction with another related appeal, thereby setting the stage for a determination on whether the Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction was legally sound regarding the expunction of service record entries.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal expunge adverse remarks from a confidential report without addressing the question of limitation?
  • Is a Service Tribunal required to consider the comments of the Reporting Officer and appellate orders when deciding on the expunction of service record remarks?
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• Allah Rakhi Versus Irshad Bibi1994 SCMR 2244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  leave to appealtime-barred petitioncondonation of delaycivil revisionlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a civil revision in limine. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petition, which was barred by a significant delay of 377 days, could be entertained without an application for condonation of delay or a satisfactory explanation from the counsel. The Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by time and could not be entertained in the absence of any application for condonation of delay or a satisfactory explanation. The key principle laid down is that a time-barred petition without proper application or justification for the delay is liable to be dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition filed beyond the period of limitation can be entertained without an application for condonation of delay?
  • Can a time-barred petition be maintained when the counsel fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay?
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• Wali Muhammad Versus Meena1994 SCMR 2243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-28Read full judgment →
• Barkat Bibi Versus Khushi Muhammad1994 SCMR 2240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  specific performanceamendment of plaintevacuee propertylimitationleave to appealcause of actionrelation back doctrine
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over an agreement to sell an evacuee property. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner had agreed to sell a house to the respondent's predecessor, receiving full consideration and handing over possession, but failed to execute the sale deed. The respondent initially filed a suit for declaration, which was later amended by the appellate court to include a prayer for specific performance. The petitioner challenged the amendment, arguing it was time-barred and fundamentally altered the nature of the suit. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that once an amendment is granted, it relates back to the date of the suit's filing, rendering limitation arguments regarding the amendment ineffective. Furthermore, the Court established that adding a prayer for specific performance based on existing averments does not change the nature of the suit or the cause of action. The Court emphasized its broad discretion to allow amendments in the interest of justice, particularly where the underlying facts remain consistent and the opposing party suffers no injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Does an amendment to a plaint relate back to the date of the original suit filing for the purposes of limitation?
  • Does the addition of a prayer for specific performance to an existing declaratory suit fundamentally change the nature of the suit?
  • Can an amendment to a plaint be disallowed if the underlying averments and cause of action remain unchanged?
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• Anisa Rehman Versus P.Ia.C.1994 SCMR 2232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-28
  natural justiceaudi alteram partemmaster and servantstatutory corporationconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the dismissal of a Constitutional petition regarding the reversion of an employee of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (P.I.A.C.). The core legal question was whether the principles of natural justice, specifically the maxim audi alteram partem, apply to an employee of a statutory corporation in the absence of statutory service rules, and whether a Constitutional petition is maintainable despite the 'Master and Servant' doctrine. The Supreme Court held that the principle of audi alteram partem is applicable to both judicial and non-judicial proceedings and must be read into every statute if not expressly provided. The Court ruled that a violation of natural justice is equivalent to a violation of law, thereby warranting the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court established that the 'Master and Servant' relationship does not negate the requirement of natural justice; an order affecting an employee's rights without a hearing is void. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the reversion order was declared without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'Master and Servant' relationship between a statutory corporation and its employee exclude the application of the principles of natural justice?
  • Can a Constitutional petition be maintained for the violation of the principles of natural justice in the absence of statutory service rules?
  • Is the maxim audi alteram partem applicable to non-judicial proceedings?
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• Zain Packaging Industries Limited, Karachi Versus Abdul Rashid1994 SCMR 2222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-25
  wagesgratuitystanding orderscost of living allowanceregular allowanceslabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses the interpretation of the term 'wages' under Standing Order 12(6) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, specifically whether allowances such as house rent, conveyance, tea, and cost of living allowance form part of wages for calculating an employee's gratuity upon resignation. The core legal question is whether definitions of 'wages' from other unallied labour statutes, such as the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, can be imported to interpret the Standing Orders Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that statutes not in pari materia cannot be used to transplant definitions unless expressly provided. In its absence, 'wages' in the Standing Orders Ordinance must be construed in its ordinary meaning to include all regular, permanent payments made periodically in lieu of services, excluding contingent payments. The Court established the principle that regular allowances paid without contingencies form part of a worker's wages for gratuity calculation, and upheld the lower court's decision dismissing the employer's constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the definition of wages in the Payment of Wages Act 1936 be used to interpret the term wages under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • What constitutes wages in their ordinary meaning under Standing Order 12(6) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Whether regular and permanent allowances such as house rent, conveyance allowance, and tea allowance form part of a workman's wages for the calculation of gratuity?
  • Does the cost of living allowance form part of wages for the recovery of gratuity under the law?
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• Trustees of the Port of Karachi Versus Muhammad Saleem1994 SCMR 2213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-11
  industrial relationsworker definitiongrievance petitiondismissed employeeindustrial disputePort Trustratio decidendiprecedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court addressed whether a dismissed employee of the Trustees of the Port of Karachi, whose dismissal was unrelated to an industrial dispute, qualifies as a worker or workman under clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, so as to maintain a grievance petition under section 25‑A of that Ordinance. The respondent carpenter was dismissed from service following disciplinary proceedings under the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886, and subsequently invoked section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Labour Court, which dismissed his petition. The High Court, relying on a prior precedent, ultimately held the petition maintainable. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and held that under section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, a dismissed person is not a worker unless their dismissal is connected with or in consequence of an industrial dispute. Since the respondent's dismissal was unrelated to an industrial dispute, he was not a worker for the purposes of section 25‑A, rendering the grievance remedy unavailable to him.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dismissed employee whose dismissal is unrelated to an industrial dispute falls within the definition of worker under section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can a dismissed employee maintain a grievance petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 if their removal from service has no connection with an industrial dispute?
  • Does a precedent sub silentio or a case that did not actually decide a specific question of law serve as a binding authority on that question?
  • Are the remedies under section 23 of the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886 and section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 available when the statutory definition of worker excludes individuals whose dismissals are unconnected to industrial disputes?
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• Mussarat Shaukat Ali Versus Safia Khatoon1994 SCMR 2189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-25
  specific performanceoral agreementnovation of contractconstructive noticebona fide purchaserabandonment of contracttransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a suit for specific performance of an oral agreement for the sale of a house. The appellant, having entered into an oral agreement to purchase property, sought enforcement after the vendor's death. The High Court dismissed the suit, finding that the appellant had abandoned the contract by pleading novation and claiming damages in a legal notice. The Supreme Court reversed this, holding that an oral agreement for the sale of immovable property is enforceable. The Court clarified that failing to prove a pleaded novation does not automatically abrogate the original contract, nor does claiming compensation in a notice constitute abandonment of the right to specific performance, provided the party's conduct does not indicate such intent. Furthermore, the Court held that a person in actual possession of property provides constructive notice to subsequent purchasers under Explanation II to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. Consequently, the Court restored the trial court's decree, ordering specific performance upon payment of the enhanced price previously offered by the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to prove a pleaded novation of a contract automatically result in the abandonment of the original agreement?
  • Does a claim for compensation in a legal notice, without the use of 'without prejudice', necessarily constitute an abandonment of the right to seek specific performance?
  • Does a person in actual possession of immovable property provide constructive notice of their title to a subsequent purchaser under the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • Can a court grant specific performance of an oral agreement for the sale of immovable property?
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• Riffat Hayat Versus Judge Special Court for Suppression of Terrorist Activities, Lahore1994 SCMR 2177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-25
  cognizanceprivate complaintpolice challanSpecial Courtsuppression of terrorist activitiescriminal procedurejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition that challenged a Special Court's issuance of summons to the appellant and others in a case under sections 302/324 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether a Special Court could entertain a private complaint under section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975, after a police challan had already been filed or initiated in respect of the same case. The Supreme Court held that the Special Court acted within its jurisdiction in taking direct cognizance of the case based on a private complaint filed before the submission of the police report, as section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act does not expressly or impliedly exclude the entertainment of direct complaints. The principle laid down is that a Special Court is competent to take direct cognizance of a scheduled offence on a private complaint under its governing statute where no police report has been submitted to it at the time of filing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Special Court can entertain a private complaint under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 after a police challan has been filed?
  • Does section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 exclude the procedure of entertaining a direct complaint available under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What is the correct procedure to be adopted by a trial court when it is seized of a case based both on a private complaint and a police challan?
  • Can a trial court summon accused persons who have been placed in column No.2 of a police report upon a private complaint?
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• Federation of Pakistan Versus Muhammad Azam1994 SCMR 2176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-09
  leave to appealprobation periodtermination of serviceservice lawextended probation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, involving the termination of service of a public employee. The core legal question addressed is whether the service of respondent No. 1 was lawfully terminated prior to the expiry of the extended period of probation in accordance with the applicable law and rules. The Court heard the counsel for the parties and granted leave to appeal to examine the legality of the termination vis-a-vis the probationary period. The holding of the Court is that leave to appeal is granted to consider the proper interpretation and application of the relevant termination rules during an extended probation period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service of a probationer can be terminated before the expiry of the extended period of probation?
  • Was the termination of service in accordance with the provisions of the relevant law and rules?
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• Abdul Rashid Versus Mahmood Ali Khan1994 SCMR 2163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haroon Versus State1994 SCMR 2161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-22Read full judgment →
• Zahida Shaheen Versus State1994 SCMR 2098 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-08
  ZinaOffence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979TalaqIrregular marriageFasid marriageCriminal intentMuslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961Reasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants under Section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for allegedly contracting an illegal marriage. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellants' marriage was valid based on a disputed prior divorce, whether ignorance of the law constitutes a valid defense, and whether an irregular (Fasid) marriage falls within the definition of Zina. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellants, holding that the evidence regarding the earlier divorce deed was sufficient to create reasonable doubt regarding the subsistence of the prior marriage. The Court established that failure to provide notice of Talaq to the Chairman of the Union Council does not render a divorce ineffective under Shariah. Furthermore, the Court clarified that ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for Zina, and that irregular marriages fall within the definition of Zina under the Ordinance, though they may be liable to Tazir rather than Hadd.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to send a notice of Talaq to the Chairman of the Union Council render a divorce ineffective under Shariah?
  • Does an irregular (Fasid) marriage fall within the definition of Zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can ignorance of the law be pleaded as a defense to the charge of Zina?
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