Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• The State through Ag. N.W.F.P. and another vs Muhammad Ashraf Khan1990 SCMR 1135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-26
  post-arrest bailmedical groundsleave to appealcancellation of bailtrial delaycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal filed by the State and a private complainant against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which granted post-arrest bail on medical grounds to the respondent, Muhammad Ashraf Khan Tareen, who was accused of murder. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail on medical grounds was appropriate given the circumstances of the case, including allegations of the respondent's involvement in a fatal shooting. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the merits of the bail order. While the Court did not express a final opinion on the merits of the bail grant, it emphasized the necessity of ensuring the trial proceeds without obstruction. The Court held that the trial must not be delayed and explicitly empowered the trial judge to cancel the respondent's bail should he attempt to absent himself from the proceedings or otherwise delay the trial, thereby reinforcing the principle that bail is conditional upon the accused's cooperation with the judicial process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court cancel bail if the accused attempts to delay the trial proceedings?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to grant leave to appeal against a High Court order granting bail on medical grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary to Government of the Punjab vs Shaukat Jamil1990 SCMR 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-29
  civil service disciplinemedical leave rulesmisconductservice tribunaldepartmental inquirytransfer of civil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which set aside disciplinary penalties imposed on a civil servant for misconduct. The core legal question was whether the respondent’s failure to comply with mandatory leave rules regarding medical certification and his subsequent avoidance of duty by feigning illness constituted misconduct warranting disciplinary action. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's order and restoring the departmental penalties of censure and stoppage of increments. The Court held that civil servants must strictly adhere to prescribed leave rules, specifically the requirement to obtain medical certificates from designated government authorities. The Court further established that an officer's conduct must be viewed in the context of their actions; feigning illness to avoid a transfer and delaying appearance before a Medical Board constitutes misconduct that undermines service discipline. The Tribunal erred by failing to consider the mandatory nature of the leave rules and by viewing the respondent's conduct in isolation rather than as a calculated attempt to avoid duty.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant's failure to obtain medical certificates from a government-designated authority constitute a violation of the Civil Services Leave Rules?
  • Can a civil servant be penalized for feigning illness to avoid a transfer order?
  • Is a Service Tribunal required to consider all applicable leave rules when adjudicating a disciplinary matter?
  • Does avoiding a mandatory medical board examination constitute misconduct for a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• The President of Pakistan and others vs Brig. (Retd.) Abdul Rashid1990 SCMR 152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-28
  service tribunalbasic pay scalesleave payretrospective operationcivil servantsfringe benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the President of Pakistan challenges the order of the Federal Service Tribunal which allowed a civil employee (respondent) the benefit of an increased pay scale during his period of leave. The core legal question was whether the Scheme of Basic Pay Scales and Fringe Benefits of Civil Employees of the Federal Government, 1983, which was promulgated on 18-8-1983 but made effective retrospectively from 1-7-1983, modified the leave pay of an employee who had proceeded on leave prior to the retrospective date under the Revised Leave Rules, 1980. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's order, holding that since the Scheme did not specifically deal with or modify the subject of pay during leave in its preceding paragraphs, the existing Revised Leave Rules, 1980 continued to govern the respondent's leave pay pursuant to paragraph 27 of the Scheme. The key principle laid down is that retrospective fiscal or pay schemes do not modify past closed transactions or specific matters like leave pay unless expressly provided for or covered by the new scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retrospective pay scheme modifies leave pay governed by earlier rules when the scheme itself does not address pay during leave?
  • Are civil servants who proceeded on leave prior to the promulgation of the Scheme of Basic Pay Scales and Fringe Benefits, 1983 entitled to claim the enhanced rates for the leave period based on a retrospective effective date?
  • Do existing rules and orders continue in force under a new pay scheme to the extent they are not specifically modified by it?
  Read full judgment →
• The Managing Director, P.Ia.C. and another vs Mr. Saeed Hayat1990 SCMR 1490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-07
  service tribunalmisconductdismissal from servicereduction in pay scaledepartmental appeal limitationleave to appealmajority view
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two petitions filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arising from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal. The employee, a Scheduling Officer of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (P.I.A.C.), overstayed his ex-Pakistan leave, leading to disciplinary proceedings under the P.I.A.C. Employees (Service and Discipline) Rules, 1985 for misconduct, and was subsequently dismissed from service. He appealed to the Federal Service Tribunal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Tribunal, through a majority view, upheld the finding of guilt but modified the penalty from dismissal to reduction to the minimum of his pay scale for three years, while also ruling that the departmental appeal was within time. Both parties filed petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court heard the matters and held that the impugned judgment did not suffer from any infirmity and that no substantial question of law of public importance was involved, as the case merely presented conflicting views among the members and Chairman of the Tribunal where the majority view prevails. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed both petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution when no substantial question of law of public importance is involved?
  • Whether a service tribunal has the jurisdiction to modify a penalty of dismissal from service to a lesser major penalty upon upholding a finding of guilt?
  • Whether a departmental appeal is within time when the departmental authority fails to communicate a decision on the appeal within the statutory period?
  Read full judgment →
• The Land Acquisition Collector and 2 others vs Muhammad Akhtar1990 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  land acquisitionbank guaranteeexecution of decreestay of executionfinancial securitySupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application seeking clarification of a Supreme Court order regarding the withdrawal of deposited funds by a land-owner pending an appeal. The Supreme Court had previously ordered that the land-owner could withdraw the deposited amount upon furnishing security for one-half of the amount and a bank guarantee for the remainder. The Senior Civil Judge had rejected the bank guarantee provided by the respondent on grounds that it was not from a scheduled bank and had a limited validity period. The Supreme Court clarified that its original order did not mandate the guarantee be from a scheduled bank. The Court held that the primary objective of the guarantee is to ensure the appellants can recover funds if their appeal succeeds. Consequently, the Court directed that the guarantee should be accepted if the issuing bank's financial capacity (assets and liabilities) is verified through its balance sheet and if the guarantee is valid for the duration of the appeal's pendency. The Court emphasized that security must be sufficient, easily disposable, and realizable.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order requiring a bank guarantee for the withdrawal of deposited funds implicitly mandate that the guarantee must be issued by a scheduled bank?
  • What criteria should a court use to determine the acceptability of a bank guarantee provided as security for the withdrawal of funds?
  • Is a bank guarantee with a limited expiry date sufficient if the underlying litigation is still pending before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• The Lahore Diocesan Trust Association vs Province of Punjab and 61990 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-10
  leave to appealad interim injunctionrevenue recorddiscretionary orderscivil revisionsuit for declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff in a suit for declaration, challenging the dismissal by the High Court of a civil revision. The revision had arisen from the trial court's refusal to grant an ad interim injunction staying changes to the revenue record. The core legal question concerns the propriety of interfering with concurrent discretionary orders denying interim relief in civil proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to interfere with the discretionary orders regarding interim relief, holding that leave to appeal should be refused. However, the Court laid down the principle that any alterations made in the revenue records during the pendency of the civil suit shall remain subject to the final decision of the suit and shall not adversely affect any rights or interests of the petitioner in any manner whatsoever.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent discretionary orders denying ad interim injunctions?
  • Do changes made in the revenue record during the pendency of a civil suit affect the rights of the parties?
  • Can an appellate court safeguard a petitioner's interests by ordering that revenue record changes remain subject to the final decision of the civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• The Evacuee Trust Property Board and others vs Haji Ghulam Rasul Khokhar and others1990 SCMR 725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-28
  Evacuee Trust PropertyCharitable TrustAccretion to TrustDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) ActRemand OrderPermanent Transfer DeedBona fide transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding the status of four plots in Karachi. The core legal question was whether these properties, purchased by the 'Rai Bahadur Naraindas Moolchand Dharmda Trust' before the creation of Pakistan, constituted 'Evacuee Trust Property' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, or if they were validly transferred to individuals by the Settlement Department. The Supreme Court held that the documentary evidence, including sale deeds and correspondence with the Karachi Estate Board, established that the properties were acquired for the charitable trust created in 1941, making them accretions to the trust estate. The Court ruled that the High Court had exceeded the scope of the remand order by re-examining the connection between the trust and the properties. While declaring the properties as Evacuee Trust Property, the Court clarified that transfers made via Permanent Transfer Deeds prior to June 1968 remain valid under Section 10(1)(b) of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, provided they were bona fide, thus balancing the protection of trust assets with existing statutory transfer protections.

  Questions settled

  • Does property purchased by a trust for charitable purposes constitute an accretion to the trust estate?
  • Can a court, upon remand, re-examine issues that were already settled by the order of remand?
  • Are transfers of evacuee trust property made via Permanent Transfer Deeds prior to June 1968 protected under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
  • Does the lack of formal confirmation by the Custodian of a trust deed automatically invalidate the trust nature of property if other evidence confirms the trust's existence?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Amritsar Sweet Shop, Lahore and another1990 SCMR 1347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10
  sales tax assessmentlimitation periodretrospective legislationleave to appealtax lawstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax against judgments of the Lahore High Court, which had ruled in favour of the respondents regarding the limitation period for sales tax assessments. The core dispute involves whether the sales tax assessment for the year 1956-57, completed on 30-6-1961, was time-barred under the Sales Tax Act. The High Court, relying on precedent, had previously held the assessment to be time-barred. The petitioner, however, contended that the insertion of subsection (1-A) into Section 28 of the Sales Tax Act by the Finance Act of 1974 fundamentally altered the legal position. The petitioner argued that this amendment was retrospective in nature and validated the assessment, a point not considered by the High Court. The Supreme Court, finding that the plea raised a pure question of law regarding the retrospective effect of the 1974 amendment, granted leave to appeal in both petitions to examine the impact of the amended Section 28 of the Sales Tax Act on the limitation period for assessments.

  Questions settled

  • Does the amendment introduced by subsection (1-A) of Section 28 of the Sales Tax Act via the Finance Act of 1974 have retrospective effect?
  • Is a sales tax assessment completed after the lapse of the statutory period prescribed in the Sales Tax Act valid?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Sales Tax Lahore vs Messrs Amritsar Sweet Shop, Lahore and another1990 PTD 837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Incometax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi vs Messrs Haji Maula Bux Corporation Limited Sargodha1990 PLD Supreme Court 990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-13
  income taxundisclosed sourceunrecorded investmentexcess stockdeemed incometax assessmentonus of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a reference to the Lahore High Court concerning an income tax assessment for the year 1967-68. The respondent-assessee, a private limited company, declared a closing stock of grams valued at Rs. 3,88,717, but inquiries revealed that they had pledged stock valued at Rs. 13,07,180 with the National Bank of Pakistan. The Income-tax Officer rejected the assessee's explanation that the stock figures were inflated merely to secure higher credit facilities, and treated the value of the excess stock (Rs. 9,18,363) as income from an undisclosed source. The High Court upheld the finding of excess stock but ruled that the addition of the gross value without deducting the corresponding purchase price was arbitrary and unsustainable. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that under Section 4(2-B) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the value of unrecorded investments is deemed to be the income of the assessee. The Court established that when an investment in excess stock is treated as deemed income from undisclosed sources, the question of deducting its purchase price does not arise, as the entire value of the unrecorded investment represents the concealed income itself.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the value of unrecorded excess stock pledged with a bank can be deemed as income from an undisclosed source under Section 4(2-B) of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Is the Income-tax Officer required to deduct the corresponding purchase price of excess stock when treating the value of such unrecorded stock as deemed income?
  • Does an assessee's failure to satisfactorily explain the source of an unrecorded investment entitle the Income-tax Officer to presume the investment is of an assessable nature?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Incometax, Lahore vs Messrs Colony Woollen1990 SCMR 1349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10
  income tax assessmentrejection of accountstrading account additionstatutory provisoleave to appealarbitrary assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding tax assessment for the year 1966-67. The core legal question was whether the Income-tax Officer's rejection of the respondent's accounts and the subsequent addition of Rs. 50,000 to the trading account violated the first proviso to Section 13 of the Income-tax Act 1922. The High Court, relying on precedent, held that the assessment was violative of the statutory proviso due to the lack of a proper basis for the addition. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted the petitioner's argument that the High Court's reliance on the Rajput Metal Works Gujranwala case was inconsistent with established legal principles previously declared by the Supreme Court and the Privy Council. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the assessment was arbitrary and whether the legal interpretation applied by the High Court regarding the rejection of accounts and the exercise of discretion by the Income-tax Officer was correct under the governing statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Income-tax Officer's addition to a trading account based on low profit rates violates the first proviso to Section 13 of the Income-tax Act 1922?
  • Is an assessment made after scrutiny of accounts and historical profit ratios considered arbitrary under the Income-tax Act 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Incometax, Lahore vs Messrs Colony Textile Mills1990 SCMR 1345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-24
  income taxdepreciation allowancestatutory interpretationindustrial buildingstax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the applicable rate of depreciation for buildings under the Income-tax Act. The respondent, a public limited company, claimed a 15% depreciation rate for certain buildings constructed between 1946 and 1975. The Income-tax Officer restricted this to 10%, arguing the buildings fell under sub-clause (b) of section 10(2)(vi), while the respondent contended they fell under sub-clause (a). The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the respondent, a decision upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the statutory classification of buildings for depreciation purposes depends on their usage or merely on the construction date and exclusion from other specific categories. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the statutory language is clear: buildings constructed within the specified timeframe that are not residential buildings for industrial labour (sub-clause aa) or otherwise excluded fall under sub-clause (a), which entitles the assessee to a 15% depreciation rate. The Court affirmed that the classification is not based on the nature or use of the building.

  Questions settled

  • Does the classification of buildings for depreciation under section 10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act depend on the nature of the building's use?
  • Are buildings constructed between April 1, 1946, and June 30, 1975, that are not residential buildings for industrial labour entitled to a 15% depreciation rate?
  • Does sub-clause (b) of section 10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act apply to buildings that fall within the scope of sub-clause (a)?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Colony Woollen1990 PTD 839 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10
  income tax assessmentrejection of accountstrading account additioncomputation of incomeIncome-tax Act 1922tax reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a tax assessment dispute concerning the respondent's accounts for the assessment year 1966-67. The Income-tax Officer rejected the respondent's submitted accounts based on an analysis of raw material purchases and historical profit ratios, subsequently adding Rs. 50,000 to the trading account. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal upheld this addition. Upon reference, the Lahore High Court, relying on precedent, ruled that the Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal violated the first proviso to Section 13 of the Income-tax Act 1922 by failing to compute income on a proper basis when rejecting the accounts. The petitioner (Commissioner of Income-tax) sought leave to appeal, arguing that the assessment was not arbitrary but based on careful scrutiny, and that the High Court's reliance on the Rajput Metal Works Gujranwala case conflicted with Supreme Court and Privy Council precedents. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the petitioner's submissions regarding the consistency of the High Court's decision with established legal principles required further examination by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Income-tax Officer violate the first proviso to Section 13 of the Income-tax Act 1922 by adding a sum to a trading account for low profit rates without a proper basis of computation?
  • Is an assessment made after scrutiny of accounts and historical data considered arbitrary under the Income-tax Act 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Colony Textile1990 PTD 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-24
  income taxdepreciation allowanceindustrial buildingsstatutory interpretationspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore, against the judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the assessment year 1957-58. The respondent public limited company claimed depreciation at the rate of 15% on certain buildings under Section 10(2)(vi)(a) of the Income-tax Act, whereas the Income-tax Officer allowed only 10% under sub-clause (b). The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and subsequently the High Court ruled in favor of the assessee, holding that buildings constructed within the specified period that are not residential buildings for industrial labour fall squarely within sub-clause (a) and qualify for the 15% depreciation rate. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the statutory language is plain and clear, and since the buildings in question were constructed within the relevant dates and were not meant for housing industrial labour, they rightly attract depreciation at 15% under sub-clause (a). The principle laid down is that statutory interpretation must adhere to the clear and unambiguous language of fiscal provisions regarding depreciation allowances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether buildings constructed within the specified period that are not meant for housing industrial labour fall under sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of Section 10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act for depreciation purposes?
  • Is a building that does not fall within the description of residential buildings for industrial labour entitled to a 15% depreciation rate under Section 10(2)(vi)(a) of the Income-tax Act?
  • Did the High Court correctly interpret the statutory scheme of depreciation allowances under Section 10 of the Income-tax Act?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Of Income Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi. vs M/s.PTCL 1990 CL. 1111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income taxundisclosed sourceunrecorded investmentdeemed incomeexcess stockassessment yearburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns an income tax assessment dispute where the assessee, a private limited company, declared a certain stock of grams, but the Income-tax Officer discovered a significantly larger stock pledged with a bank. The assessee claimed the stock figures were inflated to secure credit, but the tax authorities rejected this explanation and treated the value of the excess stock as income from an undisclosed source. The High Court upheld the finding that the stock existed but ruled that the tax authorities erred by adding the gross value of the excess stock to the assessee's income without deducting the corresponding purchase price. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that under Section 4(2-B) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, where an assessee fails to explain the nature and source of unrecorded investments, the value of such investments is deemed to be the assessee's income. Consequently, the Court ruled that the question of deducting a purchase price does not arise when the entire value of the excess stock is treated as deemed income from an undisclosed source.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the value of unrecorded investments can be treated as income from an undisclosed source under Section 4(2-B) of the Income Tax Act 1922?
  • Is an Income Tax Officer required to deduct the purchase price of excess stock when treating the value of that stock as deemed income from an undisclosed source?
  • Does the failure of an assessee to satisfactorily explain the source of investments entitle the Income Tax Officer to treat the value of such investments as income?
  • Can an assessee claim that stock figures were inflated for bank credit purposes after the tax authorities have rejected that explanation based on evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Incometax, Investigation, Karachi vs M/s. Nishat1990 SCMR 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-06
  adjournmentpendency of casesinterest of justiceconnected petitionsleave to appealprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax against a judgment of the Karachi High Court. During the proceedings, the Court directed the petitioner to provide information regarding the pendency of similar matters involving identical questions of law at the Karachi registry. Following a delay, the petitioner submitted a memorandum listing ten connected petitions for leave to appeal (CPSLA) pending disposal at Karachi, which involve the same legal questions as the present petition. Recognizing that the resolution of these connected cases would impact the current matter, the Supreme Court held that it is in the interest of justice to adjourn the present petition pending the final decision of the Karachi cases. The Court further directed the Advocate-on-Record to provide quarterly progress reports regarding the status of the Karachi matters. Consequently, the present petition was ordered to be re-fixed for hearing at Lahore following the adjudication of the connected matters, and the previously issued notice to counsel was discharged.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal should be adjourned pending the decision of other connected matters involving the same questions of law?
  • Is the Court empowered to direct periodic progress reporting by the Advocate-on-Record for pending connected cases?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chief Settlement Commissioner/Member (Settlement Rehabilitation1990 SCMR 1022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-29
  Evacuee PropertyDisplaced PersonsPending ProceedingsRepeal ActAllotment of LandSettlement CommissionerProvincial Government
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the interpretation of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The core legal questions address whether a respondent's claim forms constitute 'pending proceedings' under Section 2(2) of the Repeal Act, the binding nature of a concession made by counsel for the Chief Settlement Commissioner before the High Court regarding the respondent's status as a claimant Displaced Person and land availability, and the High Court's authority to direct land allotments from evacuee property after the repeal of the relevant laws, given that such lands were transferred to Provincial Governments. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues, specifically focusing on the scope of the Repeal Act and the jurisdictional limits of the High Court in ordering allotments of evacuee property post-repeal. The Court stayed the operation of the High Court's order pending the final adjudication of the appeal, allowing parties to file additional documents for the hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Can claim forms be treated as pending proceedings under Section 2(2) of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975?
  • Is the Chief Settlement Commissioner bound by a concession made by counsel regarding the status of a claimant and land availability?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to direct the allotment of evacuee land after the repeal of the Evacuee Laws and the transfer of such land to Provincial Governments?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chairman, Railway Board, Lahore and others vs Messrs M.1990 PLD Supreme Court 1034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-23
  railway liabilityultra vires rulesstatutory inconsistencycompensation for lossnotice of damagedelegated legislationcarrier liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the Railway Administration challenging the judgment and decree of the Peshawar High Court, which had affirmed a decree of Rs 40,706.13 in favor of the respondent firm for damaged goods. The core legal question was whether Rule 1.34 of the Pakistan Western Railway Coaching Tariffs Rules was ultra vires the powers under Section 54 read with Section 77 of the Railways Act, 1890. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that Rule 1.34, which required written notice of damage or loss to be given to the Station Master before delivery and removal of property from railway premises, was inconsistent with Section 77 of the Railways Act, which allows six months to file a claim. The Court laid down the principle that rules or bye-laws framed under a parent statute cannot override or conflict with the provisions of that statute, and where such inconsistency arises, the rules are ultra vires and unenforceable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Rule 1.34 of the Pakistan Western Railway Coaching Tariffs Rules is ultra vires the powers under Section 54 read with Section 77 of the Railways Act, 1890?
  • Can a rule or bye-law framed under a parent statute override or impose additional restrictive conditions not contained in the parent statute?
  • Can a party raise a mixed question of law and fact, such as a defense under Section 75 of the Railways Act, for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not pleaded in the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chairman, P.Ia.C. and others vs Nasim Malik1990 PLD Supreme Court 951 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-12
  service appealresignation under duresslimitationestoppelPIAC Actservice of Pakistanjurisdiction of Service Tribunalcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that reinstated a former Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) employee, declaring his resignation void due to alleged duress. The core legal questions concerned the Tribunal's jurisdiction following amendments to the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956, the limitation period for departmental appeals, and whether the respondent was estopped from challenging his resignation after requesting its conversion to termination and accepting substantial financial benefits. The Supreme Court held that upon the extension of the Act to PIAC employees, service matters fell exclusively under the Tribunal's jurisdiction, causing abatement of other proceedings. Regarding limitation, the Court ruled that an appellate authority must be consciously aware of a time-bar for any decision on merits to imply condonation of delay; mere silence does not suffice. Furthermore, the Court held that the respondent, having voluntarily sought the conversion of his resignation into termination and accepted significant financial benefits, was precluded from subsequently claiming the resignation was obtained under duress. The Tribunal's judgment was set aside, and the respondent's appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conversion of a resignation into a termination, followed by the acceptance of financial benefits, estop an employee from later claiming the resignation was obtained under duress?
  • Can an appellate authority's decision on merits be construed as an implied condonation of delay if the authority was not conscious of the limitation issue?
  • Does the extension of a statute to a new class of persons synchronize the commencement date of the statute with the date of extension for the purpose of abating pending civil proceedings?
  • Does the declaration of service under the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation as 'service of Pakistan' vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Service Tribunal to the exclusion of other courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain vs The State1990 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-05
  leave to appealcourt witnessessummoning of witnessesculpable homicideappellate reviewcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and sentence under section 325/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, alongside the dismissal of a revision petition against acquittal. The core legal question was whether the trial court and the High Court erred in law by relying upon the testimonies of court witnesses summoned under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the primary eye-witnesses did not support the prosecution case. The Supreme Court held that the conviction and sentence were legal and justified, as courts possess the requisite statutory power to summon material witnesses whose evidence is essential for the just decision of the case. The key principle laid down is that a trial court has wide discretionary powers under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to summon and examine any witness at any stage if their testimony is essential for a just decision, and such court witnesses can form a valid basis for conviction when found independent and disinterested.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court has the power to summon material witnesses at any stage of the trial?
  • Can a conviction be lawfully sustained on the statements of court witnesses when eye-witnesses fail to support the prosecution case?
  • Does the summoning of court witnesses under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vitiate the trial proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj MUHAMMADPetit ioner vs The State1990 SCMR 416 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-28
  murder convictioneyewitness testimonyminor discrepanciesleave to appealappraisal of evidencebenefit of doubtlife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and life imprisonment sentence for the murder of Mumtaz Khan. The petitioner, Taj Muhammad, was convicted by the Trial Court for inflicting fatal chhuri blows on the deceased. The core legal question was whether the eyewitness testimony, which the petitioner alleged contained minor discrepancies, was sufficient to sustain a conviction, and whether the courts below erred in their appraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the eyewitnesses were independent, natural witnesses from the same locality, and that the occurrence took place in a familiar setting, precluding mistaken identity. The Court affirmed that minor discrepancies in testimony do not inherently invalidate the evidence of otherwise credible witnesses. Furthermore, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt. While the conviction and sentence were maintained, the Court extended the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of minor discrepancies in eyewitness testimony automatically invalidate the evidence of natural and independent witnesses?
  • Is the identification of an accused person reliable when the occurrence takes place in a familiar locality among known persons?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the appraisal of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad, Exsuperintending Engineer vs Chairman, Water and Power Development Authority and another1990 SCMR 926 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-10
  disciplinary proceedingsWAPDAenquiry proceduredue processfactual allegationsservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions filed by the same petitioner challenging the disciplinary procedure adopted by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The core legal question is whether the respondent authority was legally justified in bypassing a full-fledged enquiry and instead utilizing a shorter procedure—consisting only of a statement of allegations, a reply, and a personal hearing—when the allegations against the petitioner were factual in nature and actively controverted. The petitioner contended that such factual disputes necessitate a full enquiry to allow the accused officer an opportunity to disprove the charges, arguing that the shorter procedure was insufficient and unlawful in these circumstances. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, acknowledging that the question raised is of considerable general public importance, did not issue a final adjudication on the merits in this order. Instead, the Court directed that the appeals be prepared expeditiously for a final hearing, effectively deferring the determination of whether the shorter procedure violated the requirements of due process in cases involving disputed factual allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a disciplinary authority dispense with a full-fledged enquiry when the allegations against an officer are factual and disputed?
  • Is a shorter procedure involving only a statement of allegations and a personal hearing sufficient for punitive action in cases of disputed facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Hassan Hashmi vs The State1990 SCMR 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-26
  post-arrest bailcriminal liabilityFIRnon-bailable offencesvicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which rejected the petitioner's application for post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite being named in the First Information Report (FIR) and having a specific role attributed to him in the commission of the alleged offense. The petitioner contended that his case was distinguishable from the principal accused because he allegedly inflicted only simple incised injuries on a non-vital part of the deceased's body, whereas the fatal injury was caused by a co-accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since the FIR specifically named the petitioner and ascribed a particular role to him in the incident, no case for the grant of bail was made out. The judgment reaffirms the principle that specific allegations of involvement in a serious crime, as detailed in the FIR, preclude the grant of bail at the pre-trial stage.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail when the FIR specifically names them and ascribes a specific role in the commission of a crime?
  • Does the infliction of non-fatal injuries by an accused in a murder case automatically entitle them to bail?
  • Can a case for bail be distinguished from the principal accused solely on the basis of the location of the injuries caused?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Wajid Ali and others vs Globe Automobile Limited and others1990 SCMR 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-14
  public auctiondisplaced personssettlement schemeindustrial concernprovisional transfer orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, concerning the disputed transfer of a property in Rawalpindi Cantt. The petitioners purchased the property via public auction in 1960, receiving a Provisional Transfer Order. Subsequently, respondent No. 1, an industrial concern in possession, sought transfer based on a 1960 Press Note issued under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially cancelled the auction in favor of the respondent, a decision later reversed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner and upheld by the Settlement Commissioner. However, the Chief Settlement Commissioner subsequently set aside the auction in favor of the respondent. A Single Judge of the High Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, but a Division Bench later reversed this in an Intra-Court Appeal. The Supreme Court, noting the complexity of the arguments regarding the availability of the property for auction and the applicability of Settlement Scheme No. 1, granted leave to appeal to authoritatively resolve these conflicting claims and the legal status of the auction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether property disposed of in a public auction remains available for subsequent transfer to an occupant?
  • Whether Paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 creates a vested right in favor of an occupant?
  • Whether an auction is rendered invalid if it violates the provisions of Paragraph 20 of Chapter 3 of Settlement Scheme No. 1?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Tathir Hussain Shirazi vs The Governor of the Punjab and others1990 SCMR 1510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-31
  probationertermination of serviceadverse remarksservice tribunalcivil servantleave to appealshow cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four petitions for leave to appeal against the Service Tribunal's dismissal of the petitioner's appeals regarding adverse remarks and the termination of his services while on probation as an Additional District and Sessions Judge. The petitioner challenged his termination, arguing that it was based on improperly recorded and uncommunicated adverse reports, and alleged victimization and mala fide intent. The Supreme Court examined the legal position of a probationer, referencing the established precedent in Muhammad Siddique Javed Chaudhry v. Government of West Pakistan. The Court held that the termination of a probationer's services by a competent authority, which contains no stigma, does not require a show-cause procedure. Furthermore, the Court determined that delays in recording adverse remarks do not inherently invalidate them, and the petitioner possessed no vested right to challenge the High Court's internal procedures for recording such remarks. Concluding that no question of law of public importance was raised, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the services were competently terminated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the termination of a civil servant's services during the probation period require a show-cause procedure if the order contains no stigma?
  • Does a delay in recording adverse remarks against a civil servant automatically render them illegal or ineffective?
  • Can a probationer challenge the internal procedures established by the High Court for the recording and handling of adverse remarks?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Shabbir Hussain vs Province of the Punjab and others1990 SCMR 1517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-23
  reversiondepartmental promotionadverse remarksspecial reportservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, who challenged his reversion from the post of Superintendent to his original post of Concurrent Auditor. The petitioner was promoted subject to a special report following adverse annual confidential reports for the years 1980 and 1981, which were subsequently expunged by the Service Tribunal. The core legal question is whether the expungement of earlier adverse reports renders the subsequent unsatisfactory special report and the resultant reversion inoperative. The Supreme Court held that despite the expungement of the earlier adverse entries, the adverse remarks in the special report remained intact and provided a sufficient and independent basis for the department to direct the petitioner's reversion. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an unsatisfactory special report recorded during a probationary or conditional promotion constitutes an independent and valid ground for reversion, notwithstanding the subsequent expungement of earlier adverse annual confidential reports that initially prompted the condition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the expungement of earlier adverse annual confidential reports invalidates a subsequent unsatisfactory special report leading to reversion?
  • Does an adverse special report recorded during a conditional promotion provide sufficient basis for reversion?
  • When can a civil servant be lawfully reverted to their original post following a conditional promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Nisar Haider vs Mst. Razia Sultana1990 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-15
  rent evictionbona fide personal needlandlord and tenantleave to appealrent control
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant challenging the High Court's dismissal of his first rent appeal, which had upheld an eviction order granted by a Rent Controller based on the landlady's personal need. The core legal question was whether a landlady's requirement for the premises to accommodate her married daughter, who would assist her due to her old age and ill health, constitutes a bona fide personal need under the relevant rent laws. The Supreme Court held that the landlady's stated need was legitimate and bona fide. The Court reasoned that the law does not prohibit a landlord from seeking eviction to accommodate a family member whose presence is mutually beneficial, particularly when the landlord has been transparent about the purpose of the requirement. Consequently, the Court affirmed the eviction order, finding no merit in the tenant's argument that the daughter should have been accommodated elsewhere. The key principle laid down is that a landlord's bona fide personal need, including the need to house a family member for caregiving purposes, is a valid ground for eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord seek eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal need to accommodate a family member for caregiving purposes?
  • Is a landlord's requirement to house a daughter for assistance due to old age and illness considered a bona fide need under rent law?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mustafa Hussain vs Muzaffar alias Bahi Sahib1990 SCMR 917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-07
  bona fide personal useejectmentrent controllerappreciation of evidencefinding of factlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines the correctness of a High Court judgment setting aside a Rent Controller's order directing the eviction of a tenant from commercial premises. The landlord sought ejectment of two shops for his bona fide personal use to expand his existing bicycle hiring business, which was operated from an adjacent small shop measuring 7 by 7 square feet. The Rent Controller partly allowed the application, ordering the tenant to vacate one shop. On appeal, the High Court of Sindh reversed this decision, holding the landlord's requirement lacked genuineness and discarding the testimony of the landlord's witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in reversing a finding of fact and discarding witness testimony merely because their statements were in identical terms, noting that the extremely small area of 7 by 7 square feet was manifestly insufficient for the expanding business. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Rent Controller's order granting one shop to the appellant was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Was the High Court justified in setting aside the finding of fact of the Rent Controller regarding the landlord's bona fide need?
  • Can the testimony of witnesses in a civil case be discarded merely on the ground that their statements are in identical terms?
  • Whether an area of 7 by 7 square feet is sufficient for running and expanding a bicycle hiring business?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Yousaf and another vs Qadeer Ahmad and another1990 SCMR 243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-22
  acquittalleave to appealextra-judicial confessionlast seen evidencecriminal appealappreciation of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the acquittal of the respondent on charges of murder and sexual assault under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the evidence presented—specifically an alleged extra-judicial confession and a purported 'last seen' witness—was sufficient to overturn an acquittal order passed by the trial court. The Supreme Court examined the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, noting that the witness claiming to have heard the extra-judicial confession failed to report the incident despite public outcry, and the witness cited for 'last seen' evidence did not actually testify to seeing the accused with the deceased. The Court held that the trial court and the High Court had correctly scrutinized the evidence and found it insufficient to establish guilt. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that in the absence of legal error or misreading of evidence, an acquittal judgment warrants no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Is an extra-judicial confession reliable when the witness fails to disclose it despite public knowledge of the crime?
  • Does the failure of a 'last seen' witness to testify that they saw the accused with the deceased constitute sufficient evidence for conviction?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a concurrent finding of acquittal by the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Ramzan vs Muslim Zaidi and others1990 SCMR 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  leave to appealspecific performancespecial oathagreement to sellconcurrent findings of factcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  Syed Muhammad Ramzan sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his civil revision arising from the dismissal of his suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 15-11-1977. The trial court and the Additional District Judge had previously dismissed the petitioner's suit and appeal, holding him bound by the statement of respondent No. 2 given on a special oath. The core legal question was whether a party who made an offer for the opposing party to take a special oath is bound by that statement and precluded from resiling from it. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact were unexceptionable and that the petitioner, having made the offer for the special oath which was duly administered and recorded, was bound by it and could not subsequently resile. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party who offers for the opposing party to make a statement on special oath bound by that statement?
  • Can a party resile from a special oath after making an offer for the same and having it administered?
  • Do concurrent findings of fact by lower courts bar interference in a petition for leave to appeal regarding a suit for specific performance?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Farooq vs Aziz Fazal and others1990 SCMR 1181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-15
  property disputesettlement authoritypermanent transfer deedfraudulent transferejectment proceedingstitle disputegift deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the title of a property previously transferred by the Settlement Authority to an original transferee, Ch. Muhammad Jalil, who held a Permanent Transfer Deed. Following the original transferee's death, his successors sought to execute an ejectment order against the tenant. Simultaneously, a third party, Muhammad Maqsood, claimed title based on a subsequent transfer order issued by the Settlement Authorities decades later, which he subsequently gifted to the petitioner, Syed Muhammad Farooq. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities could validly transfer property already subject to a Permanent Transfer Deed to a new party, and whether such a subsequent transfer could be upheld. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that once a property is permanently transferred, it is no longer available for subsequent transfer. The Court ruled that the subsequent transfer order issued to Muhammad Maqsood was void, as it was obtained behind the back of the original transferee. Consequently, the petitioner acquired no valid title through the gift, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can property already subject to a Permanent Transfer Deed be subsequently transferred by the Settlement Authorities?
  • Does a transferee who acquires no legal title to a property have the authority to gift that property to another?
  • Is a subsequent transfer order issued by the Settlement Authorities valid if the property was previously permanently transferred to another party?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mohsin Alt Hasani vs Government of Pakistan and another1990 SCMR 1685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-07-02
  review petitioncivil servicedeputationlienservice rules interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition directed against the Supreme Court's earlier judgment dismissing the petitioner's civil appeal regarding the denial of service benefits and higher pay following his transfer from the Provincial Government to the Federal Government. The core legal question was whether a government servant who has exercised an irrevocable option to serve under the Federal Government, but remains unconfirmed, retains deputation benefits and is entitled to the pay and promotion scale applicable in his parent provincial department. The Supreme Court held that where two interpretations of a service rule are possible, the one favourable and more beneficial to the employee must be adopted. Consequently, the review petition was accepted, the earlier judgment recalled, and the civil appeal allowed, granting the petitioner the emoluments he would have drawn under the Punjab Government from the date of his promotion. The key principle laid down is that in service matters involving competing interpretations of rules, the construction protecting the rights and interests of the civil servant against the State should prevail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a government servant who has exercised an irrevocable option to serve under the Federal Government retains a lien on his provincial post pending confirmation?
  • Does a rule interpretation more beneficial to a civil servant apply in a contest between two possible interpretations?
  • Is a review petition maintainable when the court previously overlooked an established principle of statutory interpretation regarding service benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Matlubul Hassan vs Brooke Bond Pakistan Ltd.1990 SCMR 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-05
  workmanindustrial relationslabour court jurisdictionleave to appealsalesman statusemployment termination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had upheld the decisions of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Labour Court. The petitioner, a former salesman for Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited, had challenged his removal from service. The lower forums had dismissed his grievance on the preliminary ground that, as a salesman, he did not fall within the definition of a "workman" and, therefore, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that in a previous judgment, Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited v. Conciliator appointed by the Government of Sind and others (PLD 1977 SC 237), it had already determined that a salesman falls within the definition of a "workman" under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further, directing the appeal to be prepared on the existing record and fixed for an early hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does a salesman employed by a company fall within the definition of a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does the Labour Court have jurisdiction to entertain a grievance petition filed by a salesman against his removal from service?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mansoor Ahmad vs Mst.Maqbool Begum and others1990 SCMR 1259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-17
  benami transactioncertified copy of registered documentproof of executionsecondary evidenceregistration actcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a civil suit for a declaration of ownership and correction of Cantonment Board records regarding a residential property. The plaintiff-respondent claimed ownership via a registered sale-deed, whereas the defendants contended that the transaction was benami and that the property was subsequently retransferred via a later sale-deed and then to the appellant. The trial court decreed the suit, holding the initial sale valid and the subsequent retransfer unproven, which findings were upheld by the first appellate court and the High Court in revision. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether a certified copy of a registered sale-deed is admissible and sufficient to prove execution when the original is denied and secondary evidence conditions are not met. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while a certified copy under Section 57(5) of the Registration Act, 1908, may prove the contents of a document, it does not dispense with the requirement to prove its execution in accordance with law, particularly when execution is denied and foundational requirements for secondary evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, are unsatisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Does the production of a certified copy of a registered document under section 57(5) of the Registration Act, 1908, dispense with the necessity of proving its execution when denied?
  • Can a certified copy of a sale-deed be admitted as secondary evidence without fulfilling the conditions laid down for the production of secondary evidence?
  • What is the distinction between the admissibility of a registered document's contents and the legal proof of its execution?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Hazrat Said vs Capt. Abdur Rasheed1990 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-13
  adverse possessionlimitationco-sharerinheritancepossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which affirmed the dismissal of the appellant's suit for possession of land and residential houses. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant's suit was barred by limitation and whether the respondents had acquired title by adverse possession, notwithstanding the appellant's claim of being a co-sharer. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to prove his father was a co-sharer or real brother of the original owner, that the respondents (members of the local Jirga) had taken over the property adversely upon the death of the owners rather than as co-sharers, and that the suit instituted in 1977 was heavily time-barred. The key principle laid down is that where members of a local body take possession of a deceased person's estate under a claim of custom and distribute it among themselves openly, such possession is adverse to the true heirs from its inception, rendering subsequent suits barred by limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for possession filed decades after the property was appropriated by a local Jirga is barred by limitation?
  • Can members of a local Jirga who take over a deceased person's property claim adverse possession against the legal heirs?
  • Does the possession of a small portion of disputed property as a tenant assist a party in claiming co-ownership over the remaining estate?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Habibullah vs The State1990 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-30
  narcotics recoveryleave to appealnon-cognizable offencesearch warrantprohibition lawappreciation of evidencenew plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Baluchistan High Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for possession of 200 grams of heroin. The petitioner was convicted alongside co-accused after being found in a narcotics den in Quetta. The trial court and the High Court both relied on the testimony of raiding party members to establish guilt. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued for the first time that the recovery occurred in a non-public place, rendering the offence non-cognizable under Article 16 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, and making the search illegal for lack of a warrant under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that as this plea regarding the nature of the premises and the lack of a warrant was neither raised at the trial nor before the High Court, it could not be entertained for the first time during leave to appeal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea regarding the illegality of a search due to the lack of a warrant be raised for the first time during leave to appeal proceedings?
  • Is a conviction under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979 sustainable when based on the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ali Shah vs Abdul Saghir Khan Sherwani and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionrevisional powerscondonation of delaytransfer of propertysettlement commissionerdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside a Settlement Commissioner's revisional order including two rooms and a kitchen in the appellant's transfer documents. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in exercising its constitutional writ jurisdiction to set aside the Settlement Commissioner's order, which had condoned delay and corrected an erroneous transfer of property in possession of the appellant since 1948 without a hearing or sustainable grounds. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the revisional order, emphasizing that revisional powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act are wide and can be exercised to undo injustice, and that constitutional writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to perpetuate an injustice or set aside orders that cure manifest illegalities. The key principle laid down is that discretionary constitutional jurisdiction is designed to foster justice and right a wrong, and should be declined if setting aside an order would result in perpetuating an injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in setting aside a revisional order of the Settlement Commissioner in exercise of constitutional writ jurisdiction when such order cures a manifest injustice?
  • Can the revisional authority under section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act examine the legality and propriety of an order and act of its own accord?
  • Does the question of limitation act as an absolute bar on the exercise of vast and unbridled revisional powers by a competent authority to prevent injustice?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ali Kausar Zaidi vs Muhammad Shafique and others1990 SCMR 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-20
  criminal proceedingsproperty disputeacquittalconstitutional petitionpossession of propertyspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding criminal proceedings. The petitioner had initiated criminal charges under sections 452, 448, 457, 148, 147, and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which resulted in the respondents' acquittal by a Magistrate under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner's subsequent revision petition was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, and the High Court similarly dismissed his constitutional petition. The core legal issue concerned whether the High Court's dismissal of the constitutional petition was justified given the underlying facts. The Supreme Court observed that the criminal case arose from a property dispute where prior proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 had already determined the respondents were in possession of the property. Furthermore, a civil suit regarding the same property was pending. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the case was not a fit matter for its interference and dismissed the petition, affirming that criminal courts should not be used to settle disputed property possession already subject to civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to interfere in criminal proceedings where a civil suit regarding the same property is already pending?
  • Can criminal proceedings be utilized to resolve a dispute over the possession of property when prior proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 have already determined possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Superintending Engineer, Public Health Engineering Circle, Multan and others vs Irshad Ahmad CH1990 SCMR 936 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-29
  service tribunalleave to appealsuspension ordersubsistence allowanceextraordinary leave without payimproper constitutionnecessary party
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, directed against an order of the Service Tribunal. The core legal questions concern whether remaining members of the Service Tribunal can perform functions when the office of the Chairman is vacant; whether a tribunal can partly accept an appeal after holding it improperly constituted and not entertainable due to non-joinder of a necessary party; whether a suspension order is void if not accompanied or followed by an order for subsistence allowance; and whether competent authorities can treat a period of suspension as extraordinary leave without pay when the suspension is followed by reinstatement with a minor penalty like censure. The Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions and directed the appeal to be made ready for hearing on the present record. The key principle relates to the proper constitution of service tribunals, the legal effects of suspension orders, subsistence allowance requirements, and the regulation of suspension periods upon reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • When the office of Chairman is vacant, can the other members of the Service Tribunal perform the functions of the Tribunal?
  • Whether it is open to the Tribunal to partly accept an appeal after recording a finding that it is improperly constituted and not entertainable on account of non-impleading of a necessary party?
  • Whether an order of suspension is void if it does not incorporate a direction or is not immediately followed by an order for the payment of subsistence allowance to the accused official?
  • Where suspension of an accused official is followed by reinstatement with a minor penalty like censure, is it open to the competent authority to direct that the period of suspension be treated as extraordinary leave without pay?
  Read full judgment →
• Superintending Engineer Multan Development Authority, Multan and others vs Habib Bank Ltd. and another1990 SCMR 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-28
  leave to appealexecution of decreelimitation periodmoney decreecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld the rejection of their application for the execution of a money decree as time-barred. The core legal question concerned the applicable period of limitation for filing the execution application in light of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 and Article 182 of the Limitation Act, and whether a period of six years applied. The Supreme Court noted that a similar question had been addressed in a previous case and held that the matters raised required formal examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions regarding the correct interpretation and computation of the limitation period for executing decrees.

  Questions settled

  • What is the applicable period of limitation for filing an application for the execution of a money decree?
  • Does the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 affect the limitation period previously governed by Article 182 of the Limitation Act?
  • Whether an execution application filed within six years is barred by time under the relevant statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Sikandar and others vs The State1990 SCMR 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-04
  leave to appealfree fightgrievous hurtquantum of sentenceappreciation of evidencecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which modified sentences in a criminal case involving charges under sections 323, 324, 326, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The trial magistrate had convicted the accused petitioners for causing injuries with a sharp-edged weapon, which was partly modified on appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge, and subsequently reviewed by the High Court. The core legal questions pertained to the appreciation of evidence regarding a free fight, the presence of cross-injuries on the accused, and the quantum of sentence for causing grievous hurt versus simple hurt. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly appreciated the evidence, noting that the injuries sustained by the accused were minor and superficial, and that the single grievous injury inflicted by the principal accused warranted a reduction in sentence rather than an acquittal or a finding of a free fight. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence of the accused under section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does the presence of minor scratches on the accused establish a free fight so as to alter the nature of the offence?
  • Whether the sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment for causing simple hurt with a stick is proper under the circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Muhammad and others vs Chairman, Federal Land Commission, Islamabad and others1990 SCMR 1364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-27
  audi alteram partemwrit jurisdictiondismissal in limineland disputeproperty rightsnatural justiceremandformer State of Dir
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of writ petitions by the Peshawar High Court regarding land disputes in the former State of Dir. The petitioners, claiming ownership and possession of specific agricultural lands, were not impleaded in proceedings before the Inquiry Commission constituted under Regulation No. 123 of 1972, which ultimately resulted in orders by the Federal Land Commission affecting their property rights. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petitions without inquiry, despite the petitioners' allegations that they were condemned unheard. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s dismissal was legally flawed, as it failed to address the petitioners' uncontroverted claims of ownership and possession. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgments and administrative orders, remanding the cases to the Inquiry Commission for fresh disposal. The key principle laid down is the fundamental doctrine of audi alteram partem, which mandates that no party should be deprived of property rights without being afforded a fair opportunity to be heard and present evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court dismiss a writ petition in limine when the petitioner alleges they were condemned unheard and supports this with an affidavit?
  • Is an order passed by a quasi-judicial body valid if it affects the property rights of persons who were not impleaded as parties to the proceedings?
  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem require that parties claiming ownership and possession of land be given notice before their rights are adjudicated by an Inquiry Commission?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Azam Shah and others vs Member, Board of Revenue and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-25
  Martial Law Regulation 115land alienationeconomic holdingbona fide requirementmesne profitsland reforms
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment concerning the validity of land alienations under Martial Law Regulation 115. The core legal question is the interpretation of paragraph 24(6)(a) of the Regulation, specifically whether the requirement that land be "bona fide required for the purpose of building thereon" must be satisfied by the alienor or the alienee. The appellants argued that the 1976 amendment, which removed the words "by the owner," implied that the bona fide requirement must be that of the alienor, thereby rendering the subject transactions void. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, holding that the amendment was intended to clarify that the bona fide requirement relates to the needs of the alienee, not the alienor. The Court affirmed that land transfers for building purposes are valid if the alienee requires the land for such purposes, regardless of the alienor's intent. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the forfeiture of the bank guarantee provided by the appellants to cover mesne profits due to the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase 'bona fide required for the purpose of building thereon' in paragraph 24(6)(a) of Martial Law Regulation 115 refer to the requirement of the alienor or the alienee?
  • Did the 1976 amendment to paragraph 24(6)(a) of Martial Law Regulation 115 change the requirement that land must be bona fide required for building purposes to apply to the alienor?
  • Are land alienations that reduce a holding below the economic holding limit void if the land is bona fide required by the alienee for building purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan and anothers vs Habib Ahmad and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 897 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-12
  pre-emptionco-sharerShariat Appellate Benchtarget datecivil appealsuit dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two consolidated civil appeals involving the right of pre-emption in Pakistan. The core legal question addressed is whether a suit for pre-emption based on the right of a co-sharer could be decreed after the target date of 31-7-1986, following the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgment dated 26-5-1990 (PLD 1990 SC 865). In both cases, the pre-emptors had not secured a decree for pre-emption prior to the specified target date. The Supreme Court held that the view previously held by the High Court, which allowed such suits to proceed based on the survival of the co-sharer's right as discussed in Said Kamal Shah's case, was no longer tenable in light of the Shariat Appellate Bench's ruling. Consequently, the Court determined that because the pre-emptors had not obtained a decree before 31-7-1986, their suits could not be decreed thereafter. The Court allowed both appeals, set aside the impugned judgments and decrees, and dismissed the pre-emption suits, establishing that the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgment must be given effect according to its tenor.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for pre-emption based on the right of a co-sharer be decreed after 31-7-1986 if no decree was granted before that date?
  • Does the judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench dated 26-5-1990 (PLD 1990 SC 865) preclude the decreeing of pre-emption suits after the target date of 31-7-1986?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ali and others vs Mst. Dildar Begum and another1990 SCMR 1033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  limitationcondonation of delaypre-emptioncompensation for improvementstime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, wherein the petitioners sought an enhancement of compensation awarded for improvements made on land that was the subject-matter of a pre-emption suit. The petitioners had previously challenged the compensation amount fixed by the trial court based on a Local Commissioner's report, but their appeal was dismissed by the District Judge, and a subsequent second appeal was dismissed by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petition was found to be barred by limitation by 60 days. The petitioners sought condonation of delay, citing the illness of one petitioner, Sultan Ali, and providing medical certificates indicating he was an outdoor patient. The Court observed that other co-petitioners, specifically Ghulam and Ghulam Shabbir, were available to pursue the legal remedy but failed to take action within the prescribed period. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that no sufficient grounds existed for the condonation of delay and dismissed the petition as time-barred, affirming that the negligence of co-litigants precludes the condonation of delay based on the illness of a single party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a delay in filing a petition be condoned based on the illness of one petitioner when other co-petitioners are available to pursue the litigation?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when it is filed 60 days beyond the period of limitation without sufficient cause?
  Read full judgment →
• State through AdvocateGeneral, N.W.F.P. and another vs Sajjad Hussain and others1990 SCMR 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-27
  Federal Shariat CourtFederally Administered Tribal AreasAppellate JurisdictionFrontier Crimes RegulationsConstitutional InterpretationLeave to Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against an order of the Federal Shariat Court, which had asserted its jurisdiction to hear appeals against convictions and sentences passed by political authorities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) under the Frontier Crimes Regulations 1901. The respondents had been convicted for the possession of large quantities of heroin. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Federal Shariat Court, as constituted under Article 203-C of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, possesses the legal authority or jurisdiction to entertain appeals regarding offences committed and tried within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the issue involves significant questions of general public importance regarding the interpretation of constitutional provisions. Consequently, the Court stayed further proceedings before the Federal Shariat Court pending the final adjudication of the appeal. The matter is set to be heard on the existing record to determine the scope of the Federal Shariat Court's appellate jurisdiction in relation to the tribal areas.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have jurisdiction to entertain appeals in respect of offences committed and tried in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas?
  • Can the Federal Shariat Court, as constituted under Article 203-C of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, exercise jurisdiction in relation to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas?
  Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan vs The Director, Military Lands and Cantonments, Rawalpindi and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 827 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-14
  annual rental valuerevisional jurisdictionstatutory interpretationtaxationcantonment boardleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the assessment of the annual rental value of a building under the Cantonments Act 1924. The Cantonment Board increased the annual rental value, which was subsequently reduced on appeal by the District Judge under Section 84 of the Cantonments Act 1924. The Director Military Lands and Cantonments, acting as a revisional authority under Section 277 of the Cantonments Act 1924, subsequently increased the value. The petitioner challenged this revisional order in the High Court via a constitutional petition, arguing that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 277 did not apply to taxation and assessment matters governed by Chapter V. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that a statute must be read and construed as a whole, and the division into chapters is merely for convenience. The Court ruled that the finality of appellate orders under Section 88 is subject to the revisional jurisdiction under Section 277, which explicitly permits revision of appellate decisions made by a District Magistrate from orders of the Board.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the division of a statute into chapters prevents a revisional provision in one chapter from applying to appellate orders passed under another chapter?
  • Does the finality clause of an appellate order under Section 88 of the Cantonments Act 1924 exclude the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 277 of the same Act?
  • Whether a revision under Section 277 of the Cantonments Act 1924 is competent against an appellate order of a District Magistrate arising from a valuation or assessment decision of the Board?
  Read full judgment →
• Spr. (Retd.) Duri Aman Khan vs Lt.Col. Muhammad Sadique and others1990 SCMR 1590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-20
  Border Area AllotmentLand AllotmentFraudulent AllotmentG.H.Q. RecommendationCancellation of AllotmentFactual Dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the cancellation of an allotment of 200 Kanals of land in the Border Area, which the appellant claimed was granted to him based on a recommendation from the General Headquarters (G.H.Q.). The core legal question was whether the appellant had established that he was a valid recommendee of the G.H.Q. for the land allotment as required under the relevant regulations. The Supreme Court observed that the appellant failed to produce the alleged recommendation letter despite multiple opportunities. Conversely, the respondents produced official correspondence from the Adjutant-General confirming that no such recommendation had been made and that the allotment was secured fraudulently. The Court held that the appellant failed to substantiate his claim, noting that the factual dispute had been consistently resolved against him by all lower forums. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that an allotment obtained without the requisite G.H.Q. recommendation, as mandated by the applicable regulations, is invalid and subject to cancellation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allotment of land in the Border Area is valid if the allottee fails to prove the mandatory recommendation from the General Headquarters?
  • Can an allotment of land be cancelled if it is determined to have been secured fraudulently without the required administrative recommendation?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of an administrative recommendation for land allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Soofi Dilawar Hussain Chishti vs Muhammad Afzal1990 SCMR 705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-10
  petition for leave to appealregular first appealsummary dismissalpromissory notesuit for recoveryremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 8-7-1987, whereby the petitioner's Regular First Appeal against a summary decree in a suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was summarily dismissed by a learned Single Judge in chambers. The core legal question was whether a Regular First Appeal could be dismissed summarily in chambers contrary to established precedent. The Supreme Court accepted the contention, relying on its prior ruling in Abid Hussain v. Mst. Afsar Jehan Begum and another (PLD 1973 SC 1), converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the same, and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The key principle laid down is that Regular First Appeals must be heard and decided in accordance with the prescribed legal procedure and cannot be summarily dismissed in chambers when binding precedent dictates otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Regular First Appeal can be dismissed summarily by a judge in chambers?
  • Can a suit based on a promissory note be decreed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Sirajuddin vs The State1990 SCMR 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-21
  murderdying declarationocular testimonyabscondenceleave to appealcriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Sirajuddin, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 2nd November 1986, which had dismissed his appeal and confirmed his conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Abdul Rehman (subsequently commuted to imprisonment for life via a Presidential Order). The core legal question was whether the conviction was sustainable on the basis of the dying declaration, ocular testimony, medical evidence, motive, and prolonged abscondence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had successfully proven its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent ocular testimony, corroborating medical evidence, a reliable dying declaration, and the petitioner's abscondence for over seven years. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dying declaration corroborated by medical and ocular evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can prolonged abscondence of an accused person serve as a corroborative circumstance supporting a murder conviction?
  • Whether the testimony of close relatives of the deceased can be discarded merely on the ground of being interested witnesses when no prior enmity is established?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj Din vs Sultan and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-28
  land reformsreview jurisdictionsuo motu powerwrit jurisdictionstatutory limitationinherent powersnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside orders of the Land Commissioner, which had reviewed a previous land sale. The core legal question was whether the Land Commissioner could review an order upon a time-barred application and whether the High Court should interfere with such a review when it corrects a manifest injustice. The Supreme Court held that while an interested party cannot claim review as a right after the twenty-day limitation period prescribed by Rule 12 of the Punjab Land Reforms Rules, 1972, the Land Commissioner possesses the power to review orders suo motu without time limits. The Court established that where a statutory functionary has such power, it is analogous to the inherent powers of courts to prevent injustice. Consequently, the High Court’s discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 should not be exercised to perpetuate an illegality or injustice. The appeal was allowed, and the Land Commissioner’s order was restored, as the original order had caused a clear injustice to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Land Commissioner review an order on a time-barred application if the power to review is exercisable suo motu?
  • Does the High Court have the discretion to interfere with a review order that corrects a manifest injustice under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is the power of a statutory functionary to review an order without a time limit analogous to the inherent powers of a Civil Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Road Transport Corporation through its Chairman vs Muhammad Ali G. Khokhar1990 SCMR 1404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-03
  master and servantstatutory ruleswrongful terminationconstitutional jurisdictiondelegated legislationwrit petitionservice regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns whether the Sindh Road Transport Corporation Service Rules, 1971, are statutory in character, thereby rendering a Constitutional petition maintainable for their non-compliance. The respondent, an employee of the Corporation, had his service terminated under Rule 23.4. The High Court had previously declared the termination illegal, ruling that the Chairman lacked the delegated authority to terminate service under that specific rule. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Service Rules, 1971, framed under Rule 139 of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969, are non-statutory regulations rather than statutory instruments, as they do not require government approval for validity. The Court affirmed that where a corporation frames its own service regulations without statutory prescription, the relationship between the corporation and its employees is governed by the principle of master and servant. Consequently, the Court ruled that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ in this matter, as the respondent could not claim statutory protection, and the Chairman was indeed the competent authority to terminate service.

  Questions settled

  • Are the Sindh Road Transport Corporation Service Rules, 1971, considered statutory in character?
  • Does the principle of master and servant apply to employees of a corporation where service rules are non-statutory?
  • Can a Constitutional petition be maintained for the violation of non-statutory service regulations?
  • Is the authority competent to dismiss an employee also considered the competent authority to terminate service under Rule 23.4 of the Sindh Road Transport Corporation Service Rules, 1971?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Khan vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue and others1990 SCMR 943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  proprietary rightsState landlease schemeConstitutional Petitionleave to appealBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Constitutional Petition by the High Court, which originated from a dispute over the transfer of proprietary rights in State land. The core legal questions for the Supreme Court to determine include whether the High Court dismissed the petitioner's case on grounds independent of those relied upon by the Board of Revenue, and whether the petitioner's entitlement to proprietary rights was governed by specific lease schemes from 1971, 1972, or other relevant periods. Furthermore, the Court must examine whether the original lease was obtained illegally, whether the alienation of the petitioner's own land to his heirs disqualified him from receiving proprietary rights, and whether the petitioner failed to satisfy the requisite conditions for the grant. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address these issues, noting that the case requires a thorough examination of the applicable lease schemes and the validity of the petitioner's claim to the land in dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court erred by dismissing a Constitutional Petition on grounds independent of those considered by the Board of Revenue?
  • Does the alienation of one's own land in favour of heirs disqualify an individual from being granted proprietary rights in State land?
  • Which specific lease scheme governs the grant of proprietary rights in the disputed State land?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar and others vs Muhammad Ayub and others1990 SCMR 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-08
  tenant-at-willdispossessionejectmentleave to appealjurisdictioncivil suitstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding a dispute over the possession of land measuring 98 kanals. The petitioners, who purchased the land in 1970, faced claims from respondents asserting rights as tenants-at-will. Following a series of litigations, including a dismissed criminal complaint and a suit under the Specific Relief Act, the respondents eventually secured a decree for possession from the District Judge, which was upheld by the High Court following a difference of opinion between the judges of a Division Bench. The core legal question presented to the Supreme Court is whether a tenant-at-will is legally entitled to file a suit for dispossession or ejectment in either a Civil or Revenue Court, a matter on which there is no settled precedent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative pronouncement on this issue, noting the divergence of judicial opinion in the High Court. The Court ordered the maintenance of the status quo subject to the provision of security for compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant-at-will file a suit for dispossession or ejectment in a Civil Court?
  • Can a tenant-at-will file a suit for dispossession or ejectment in a Revenue Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Shrin Munir and others vs Government of Punjab through Secretary Health, Lahore and anothers1990 PLD Supreme Court 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-20
  Fundamental RightsGender DiscriminationMedical College AdmissionsEqual Protection of LawReasonable ClassificationHarmonious ConstructionQuota SystemCo-educational InstitutionsPrinciples of Policy
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from constitutional petitions filed by female candidates who obtained higher marks in their F.Sc. examination than admitted male students but were denied admission to co-educational medical colleges due to a fixed quota restricting female seats. The High Court's single bench allowed the petitions, but the Intra-Court Appeal bench reversed the decision, holding that Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution served as a special provision overriding the general equality guarantee under Article 25(2). The Supreme Court examined whether fixing a maximum seat quota for female students in co-educational institutions constituted unlawful sex discrimination under the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Harmonizing Articles 22 and 25, the Supreme Court held that while separate single-sex institutions may be established based on reasonable classification, allocating a ceiling on female admissions in co-educational institutions violates Article 25(2). The Court ruled that Article 25(3) permits quotas for women only as a protective minimum floor, not as a restrictive ceiling that favors less meritorious male candidates. The appeals were accepted, declaring female students entitled to compete freely on merit against male candidates in upcoming admissions without disturbing past admissions.

  Questions settled

  • Does capping the maximum number of seats for female applicants in co-educational medical colleges violate Article 25(2) of the Constitution?
  • Can Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution be construed to override or exclude the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex under Article 25(2)?
  • Does Article 25(3) of the Constitution permit the State to establish quotas that operate to the detriment and prejudice of women?
  • Is it constitutionally permissible under Article 25 to establish exclusive educational institutions for males or females based on reasonable classification?
  Read full judgment →
• Shitab Khan vs Sultan and others1990 SCMR 945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-26
  leave to appealland allotmentsettlement proceedingsproduce index unitsverified claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging orders passed by the Settlement authorities regarding the cancellation and allotment of land. The core legal question concerns whether a verified area left in India can be properly converted into the entitlement of the petitioner in terms of produce index units when his units remain unsatisfied. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the contention regarding the conversion and assessment of the verified claim against produce index units requires detailed consideration by the Court. The key principle laid down is that unsatisfied verified claims and their conversion into produce index units must be thoroughly examined to determine actual entitlements and excess land cancellations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a verified area left in India be converted into the entitlement of a petitioner in terms of produce index units when their units are still unsatisfied?
  • Whether the High Court is bound to consider the proper assessment of land entitlements based on produce index units before upholding the cancellation of excess land?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Bahadur vs The Government of N.W.F.P. through the Secretary for Agriculture and another1990 SCMR 1519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-02
  service appeallimitation periodcondonation of delayservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, Peshawar, which had dismissed the petitioner's service appeal. The core legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal erred in dismissing the appeal on the grounds of limitation. Specifically, the Tribunal had found that the appeal was filed one day beyond the prescribed period of limitation and that the petitioner had failed to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to seek condonation of this delay. Upon hearing the petitioner in person, the Supreme Court examined the record and determined that the petitioner could not demonstrate any error in the Tribunal's finding regarding the delay or the absence of a condonation application. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there were no valid grounds for interference with the Tribunal's order. The petition was dismissed, reaffirming the principle that an appellate forum is justified in dismissing an appeal as time-barred when the statutory period of limitation has expired and no formal application for condonation of delay has been submitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal dismiss an appeal as time-barred if no application for condonation of delay is filed?
  • Is a delay of one day in filing an appeal sufficient grounds for dismissal by a Service Tribunal if no condonation is sought?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Ahmad vs Bati and 6 others1990 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  leave to appealacquittalmurderidentificationstar lightappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against the acquittal of the respondents in a murder case. The core legal question involved the assessment and appreciation of evidence regarding the identification of the culprits during a dark night by star light, and the grounds required for interfering with an order of acquittal. The Supreme Court held that in petitions against acquittal, an appellate court will not set aside the acquittal merely on a difference of opinion regarding the assessment of evidence unless the lower court's judgment suffers from well-known infirmities such as the non-reading or misreading of evidence on substantial points. Since the lower courts' findings regarding identification and the lack of reliable corroboration did not suffer from such legal infirmities, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not lightly interfere with an acquittal based on a plausible evaluation of evidence, particularly regarding identification in adverse visibility conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Will an acquittal be set aside by the Supreme Court merely on a difference of opinion regarding the assessment of evidence?
  • Can an eyewitness identification made during a dark night by star light sustain a conviction if accepted by the lower court?
  • What infirmities must be shown in the appreciation of evidence to interfere with an order of acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Nasim vs Municipal Committee, Wazirabad and others1990 SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-21
  service terminationlimitation periodcondonation of delaydue diligenceconstitutional jurisdictionlabour court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Octroi Clerk for the Municipal Committee, Wazirabad, challenged his removal from service through various forums, including an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner and grievance petitions before the Punjab Labour Court, all of which were dismissed, primarily due to limitation issues. Subsequently, the petitioner invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court, challenging the removal order and the appellate dismissal. The High Court examined whether the time spent pursuing remedies before the wrong forum could be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908. Finding that the petitioner had not acted with due diligence and was indolent in pursuing his remedies, the High Court declined to condone the delay and dismissed the petition, finding no jurisdictional defect or illegality in the impugned orders. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that it would not interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to condone the delay where the petitioner failed to demonstrate diligent prosecution of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can the time spent pursuing a case before a wrong forum be excluded from the period of limitation if the party was not diligent?
  • Does the High Court have discretion to refuse condonation of delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 when a petitioner is found to be indolent?
  • Is a dismissal of a service grievance petition on the grounds of limitation and lack of diligence subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Arif through Legal Heirs vs Syed Ahmed E Arooq and others1990 SCMR 861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  rent restrictionres judicatawrit jurisdictionejectment applicationpersonal requirementappellate findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that remanded a rent dispute case. The dispute arose from a second ejectment application filed by a landlord under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, following the dismissal of an initial application. The Rent Controller had dismissed the second application on the grounds of res judicata, but the Additional District Judge, while dismissing the appeal on merits regarding the lack of bona fide personal requirement, explicitly disagreed with the finding of res judicata. The High Court, however, proceeded on the erroneous premise that the Additional District Judge had upheld the res judicata finding. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the High Court exercised its jurisdiction incorrectly by misconstruing the appellate court's findings. The core principle established is that a High Court, when exercising writ jurisdiction, must accurately reflect the findings of the lower appellate court and cannot set aside an order based on a factual premise that contradicts the record of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court set aside an appellate order based on a factual premise that contradicts the record of the proceedings?
  • Does a second rent application based on a different ground of personal requirement constitute res judicata when the first application was dismissed on a different ground?
  • Is the High Court justified in remanding a case when it misinterprets the findings of the lower appellate court regarding the applicability of res judicata?
  Read full judgment →
• Shan Ali alias Shan Khan vs Ch. Muhammad Akram and others1990 SCMR 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-04
  election petitionrecounting of votestampering of election recordwrit petitionleave to appeallocal government election
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition regarding a local government election dispute. The petitioner and respondent No. 1 contested the election for membership of the Municipal Committee Kasur, and the petitioner was initially declared the winner. Respondent No. 1 challenged the election through an election petition alleging improper rejection and acceptance of votes. The Election Tribunal initially dismissed the petition, but upon a constitutional petition, the High Court remanded the matter for recounting. Upon recounting, respondent No. 1 was declared successful. The petitioner challenged this before the High Court, alleging tampering of the election record. The High Court inspected the record, concluded there was no tampering, and upheld the Election Tribunal's order. The Supreme Court evaluated the arguments that the petitioner's applications were arbitrarily dismissed and held that since the High Court itself conducted an inquiry and verified the integrity of the record, no ground for interference was made out. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can examine election records and conduct an inquiry to satisfy itself regarding allegations of tampering?
  • Does an order of the Election Tribunal following a court-ordered recount warrant interference when the High Court has verified the integrity of the election material?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakar Khan and 9 others vs Member, Board of Revenue, Balochistan1990 PLD Supreme Court 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  revisional jurisdictionrevenue courtland ejectmentsecond appealstatutory interpretationconstitutional petitionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a land ejectment case under the Balochistan Tenancy Ordinance, 1978. The appellants' ejectment order was initially upheld by the Collector, but an appeal before the Commissioner set aside the subordinate orders and remanded the case. The Member, Board of Revenue, accepted the respondents' revision and declared the Commissioner's second appellate order void for lack of jurisdiction, a view affirmed by the High Court in a constitutional petition. The core legal question concerned the harmonious interpretation of subsections (3) and (4) of section 71 of the Balochistan Tenancy Ordinance, 1978, regarding the revisional powers of the Commissioner versus the Board of Revenue, and whether an incompetent appeal could be treated as a revision. The Supreme Court held that while a second appeal was indeed barred where the original order was confirmed on first appeal, subsections (3) and (4) of section 71 must be reconciled: subsection (3) applies when final orders, decrees, or final proceedings are to be modified or reversed (requiring the Commissioner to submit his opinion to the Board of Revenue), whereas subsection (4) applies to interlocutory or non-final orders. Furthermore, an appellate forum may treat a competent revision as an appeal or vice versa. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the orders of the High Court and Board of Revenue, and the case was remanded to the Board of Revenue to treat the Commissioner's order as a submitted opinion under section 71(3) for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second appeal lies against an original order or decree confirmed on first appeal under the Balochistan Tenancy Ordinance 1978?
  • How are subsections (3) and (4) of section 71 of the Balochistan Tenancy Ordinance 1978 reconciled regarding the finality of orders a Commissioner can pass?
  • Can an appellate forum treat a pending appeal as a revision when the appeal is otherwise incompetent?
  • Does the non-mention of a specific provision of law vitiate an otherwise valid order passed by a statutory authority acting within its powers?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahadat alias Shadda vs The State1990 SCMR 329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-19
  Offence of ZinaHudood Ordinanceleave to appealcriminal convictionsentencing leniencyrape
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the petitioner's conviction under Section 10 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, while modifying the sentence from five years' rigorous imprisonment and 30 stripes to three years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's decision to maintain the conviction and reduce the sentence warranted interference through a grant of leave to appeal. The Supreme Court examined the record, which included medical evidence confirming the rape of the 15-year-old victim, Mst. Rani, and corroborating testimony from her mother and other witnesses. The Court held that the High Court had already adopted an unnecessarily lenient approach in reducing the sentence. Finding no merit in the arguments presented by the petitioner, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, thereby affirming the conviction and the modified sentence imposed by the High Court. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts must carefully weigh evidence in Hudood cases before granting leniency.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reduction of a sentence by the High Court in a case involving the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 constitute a ground for Supreme Court interference?
  • Is a conviction under Section 10 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 sustainable when supported by medical evidence and corroborating witness testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Muhammad and others vs Muhammad Anwar Khalid and others1990 SCMR 940 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-14
  leave to appealSettlement CommissionerDeputy Settlement CommissionerKNCH formPermanent Transfer DeedPTDspot inspectionremand orderstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal Nos. 371 and 372 of 1986 were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging an order arising from writ petitions before the High Court. The Settlement Commissioner had originally remanded the matter to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to carry out a personal spot inspection and determine whether the property in possession of the revision petitioners was unallotted and eligible for transfer to them on their KNCH forms. The High Court, in two separate writ petitions, allowed one by remanding the appeal to the Notified Officer and dismissed the other on grounds of laches. The core legal controversy concerned whether the disputed property formed part of the premises transferred via a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) to respondent No. 1, or whether the petitioners were entitled to its transfer. The Supreme Court observed that the contention regarding the propriety of the Settlement Commissioner's remand order for factual verification and spot inspection required consideration. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted subject to furnishing security, and status quo was directed to be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to consider if a Settlement Commissioner's order remanding a case for spot inspection and factual verification of property possession and transfer was fair and lawful?
  • Whether properties occupied by petitioners formed part of an industrial premises already transferred under a Permanent Transfer Deed to a respondent?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Gul and others vs Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others1990 SCMR 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-26
  pre-emptionrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factmortgage versus saleconsent decreemisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court setting aside the concurrent judgments of the District Judge and Civil Judge, Abbottabad, and dismissing the appellants' pre-emption suit. The dispute concerned whether a land transaction was an outright sale or a mortgage, where the vendors were illiterate women who subsequently confessed judgment in a declaration suit stating it was a mortgage. The appellants filed a suit for pre-emption, claiming the consent decree was collusive to defeat their right. The trial and appellate courts decreed the suit, but the High Court reversed the finding in revision. The core legal question was whether the High Court was competent in revisional jurisdiction to reverse concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly interfered as the subordinate courts had misread evidence and overlooked vital material circumstances regarding the parties' conduct and the nature of the transaction. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is competent in revisional jurisdiction to reverse concurrent findings of fact recorded by subordinate courts?
  • Does a consent decree obtained by vendors declaring a transaction to be a mortgage bind a pre-emptor who was not a party to the suit?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact be interfered with if subordinate courts overlook material circumstances and misread evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Din and another vs District Manager, P.R.T.C. and others1990 SCMR 837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-29
  writ jurisdictionfindings of factmisconductlabour lawreinstatementspecial tribunaljudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal against judgments of the Lahore High Court, which set aside orders of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal reinstating two conductors dismissed by the Punjab Urban Transport Corporation for misconduct. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, could interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal regarding the establishment of misconduct. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court does not ordinarily interfere with findings of fact by special tribunals, such interference is justified when those tribunals overlook material circumstances or base their findings on untenable grounds. In this case, the Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal ignored the credible testimony of Inspectors who caught the petitioners failing to issue tickets to passengers who had paid fares. The Court affirmed that the Inspectors' reports and on-the-spot confrontation were sufficient evidence of misconduct, rendering the High Court's intervention lawful. The petitions were dismissed, confirming that tribunals cannot ignore material evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact recorded by a special tribunal in writ jurisdiction?
  • Is the testimony of an Inspector sufficient to establish misconduct in departmental proceedings against a bus conductor?
  • Does the failure to examine passengers as witnesses in departmental proceedings invalidate a finding of misconduct against a conductor?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Bakhsh and anothers vs The State and 2 others1990 SCMR 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-17
  appeal against acquittalmurderocular evidencemedical contradictionabscondencerecovery of weaponbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by right and connected petition for leave to appeal arise from a judgment of the High Court setting aside the appellant's acquittal by the Trial Court and convicting him under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court was justified in reversing a well-reasoned judgment of acquittal and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt through ocular testimony, medical evidence, recoveries, and abscondence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the acquittal, holding that the presence of the eye-witnesses was doubtful, their testimony contradicted the medical evidence, and the circumstantial evidence regarding weapon recovery and abscondence was flawed. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court should not lightly interfere with a plausible judgment of acquittal based on a proper appraisal of evidence unless there is a clear defect of law, jurisdiction, or misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in interfering with a plausible judgment of acquittal rendered by a Trial Court in the absence of any legal defect or misreading of evidence?
  • Does a contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence warrant the rejection of the prosecution's case?
  • Can the recovery of a weapon from a locked room be attributed to the accused when exclusive possession and control of the premises are not satisfactorily established?
  • Is proof of abscondence sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction on a capital charge when the primary evidence remains doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Shafiq Ahmed vs The State1990 SCMR 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-13
  post-arrest bailmurderfurther inquirycriminal appealeyewitness testimonybail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail by the High Court in a murder case. The petitioner was charged with the murder of Muhammad Iqbal, based on the statements of two witnesses who claimed to have seen the petitioner leaving the deceased's house around midnight. The initial First Information Report did not implicate the petitioner or any other suspect. The High Court had previously denied bail, citing the existence of a motive due to prior litigation between the parties and the testimony of the eyewitnesses. Upon review, the Supreme Court examined the evidence and the circumstances surrounding the alleged identification. The Court held that the case against the petitioner required further inquiry, as the evidence presented did not sufficiently establish a prima facie case at the pre-trial stage to warrant continued incarceration. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted the petitioner bail, subject to the furnishing of sureties to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of prior litigation between the accused and the complainant automatically disentitle an accused to bail in a murder case?
  • When does a criminal case qualify for 'further inquiry' under the law governing bail?
  • Is the testimony of witnesses claiming to see an accused leaving a scene of a crime sufficient to deny bail when the initial FIR was lodged against unknown persons?
  Read full judgment →
• Shafi Muhammad vs Muzaffaruddin and others1990 SCMR 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-11
  writ petitionstriking off defencewritten statementconstitutional jurisdictioncivil procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition, which had challenged an appellate order setting aside the trial court's order of striking off the respondents' defence. The core legal question was whether the Additional District Judge acted without jurisdiction or authority in setting aside the trial court's order where the written statement was submitted later on the same day fixed for filing. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction as no legal defect was pointed out in the order of the Additional District Judge, who had permitted the filing of the written statement before the closing hours of the court. The petition was accordingly dismissed for lack of merit, affirming that a party should generally not be shut out from defending a suit where the written statement is tendered on the assigned date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the trial court is justified in striking off the defence of a defendant for failing to file a written statement earlier in the day when the statement is tendered later on the same date?
  • Can the High Court interfere in constitutional jurisdiction with an appellate order that allows the filing of a written statement on the date fixed for that purpose?
  • Does an Additional District Judge act without jurisdiction by setting aside an order that struck off a defence when the written statement was submitted before the closing hours of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Shad Muhammad vs Shah Poor1990 PLD Supreme Court 933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-20
  pre-emptionco-sharerreview petitionstare decisisprecedentland law
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arose from a dispute concerning the right of pre-emption, specifically whether the partial retention of land by a petitioner allows them to assert a superior right of pre-emption as a co-sharer over the remaining land. The review petitioner sought to delay the proceedings pending a decision by a larger Bench on a reference regarding the interpretation of pre-emption rights. The Supreme Court examined the request in light of established precedents, particularly Gulzada v. Muhammad Usman (PLD 1990 SC 465) and Ahmad Khan v. Sattar Din (PLD 1981 SC 148). The Court held that the legal principles established in Ahmad Khan remained valid and binding, as the conditions for re-examining declared law were not met. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that existing law declared by the Supreme Court remains in force until altered by statutory or other appropriate means. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the request to keep the review petition pending and dismissed the petition, affirming that the established legal position on pre-emption rights continues to hold the field.

  Questions settled

  • Does the partial retention of land by a petitioner grant them a superior right of pre-emption as a co-sharer over the remaining land?
  • Should a review petition be kept pending awaiting the decision of a reference to a larger Bench regarding the same legal issue?
  • Does the law declared by the Supreme Court remain valid until it is changed by statutory or other means?
  Read full judgment →
• Shabbir Ahmad Sheikh vs Government of the Punjab through its1990 SCMR 1683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-12
  civil servicead hoc appointmentregularizationpenal interpretationstatutory constructionservice tribunalremoval from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a judgment of the Service Tribunal regarding the removal of a civil servant under Section 11-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The appellant, initially appointed on an ad hoc basis in 1974 and later regularized, had his appointment reviewed and re-regularized in 1977 following Martial Law Instruction No. 21. The core legal question was whether the appellant, whose appointment was reviewed and regularized after the cutoff date specified in Section 11-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, remained subject to removal under that provision. The Supreme Court held that Section 11-A, being penal in nature, requires strict interpretation. The Court determined that because the appellant’s appointment had already been reviewed and regularized by the competent authority after the period specified in the statute, the provision did not apply to him. Consequently, the Court set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment and the removal order, establishing the principle that penal provisions affecting civil service tenure must be interpreted strictly and cannot be extended to cases where regularization occurred after the statutory cutoff date.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 11-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 apply to civil servants whose appointments were reviewed and regularized after the cutoff date specified in the statute?
  • Should penal provisions in civil service legislation be given a strict interpretation?
  • Can a civil servant be removed under Section 11-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 if their appointment was already reviewed and regularized by the competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Shabbar Hayat vs The State1990 SCMR 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  leave to appealre-appraisal of evidenceattempt to murderplea of insanitycriminal convictionsufficiency of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Shabbar Hayat against his conviction under sections 307/34 and 353/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as upheld by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner was initially convicted by the Punjab Special Court for Speedy Trials for an armed attack on a Sub-Engineer of the Irrigation Department. While the High Court acquitted the petitioner's co-accused, it maintained the petitioner's conviction. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner initially raised a plea of insanity based on epilepsy, which was subsequently abandoned. The petitioner further challenged the sufficiency and independence of the prosecution evidence. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had thoroughly examined the evidence and found the petitioner guilty. The Court affirmed that it would not undertake a re-appraisal of evidence at the leave-to-appeal stage unless the petitioner could demonstrate a specific error of law or a misreading of evidence by the lower courts. Finding no such error, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will undertake a re-appraisal of evidence in a petition for leave to appeal where the lower courts have already examined the evidence?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a concurrent finding of guilt by lower courts in a criminal matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Muhammad Zulfiqar vs Province of the Punjab through Secretary, Communication and Works Department and others1990 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-10
  service tribunalleave to appealsub-engineercivil servantsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Sh. Muhammad Zulfiqar, Sub-Engineer, against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 20-4-1981. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal committed any legal or equitable error in its judgment warranting interference by the apex court. The Supreme Court heard the petitioner's counsel, who failed to raise any substantial ground to justify granting leave to appeal. Holding that the Punjab Service Tribunal had comprehensively considered all legal and equitable aspects of the case before rendering its decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no case made out for leave. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not grant leave to appeal from a Service Tribunal judgment where the Tribunal has duly weighed all legal and factual aspects and the petitioner fails to point out any justifiable ground for interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal when the petitioner fails to urge a justifiable ground?
  • Did the Punjab Service Tribunal consider all legal and equitable aspects of the case before passing its judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Muhammad Sharif Uppal vs Sh. Akbar Hussain and others1990 SCMR 1599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-19
  partition suitpartnership firmfindings of factsecond appealappraisal of evidenceadministration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a suit for partition, administration, and rendition of accounts regarding the estate of late Haji Muhammad Hussain. The trial court decreed the suit, holding the appellant as an accounting party while excluding certain properties. On appeal, the Additional District Judge modified the decree, holding that a plot measuring 2 Kanals 19 Marlas belonged to the appellant as it had been invested in a partnership firm, Messrs Sharif Sons, and relinquished by the original owner. The Lahore High Court reversed this finding, holding that the partnership agreement and its dissolution were not duly proved. The Supreme Court examined the documentary evidence, including the partnership deed, bank records, and loan transactions, and held that the first appellate court's finding of fact was based on proper appreciation of evidence and should not have been interfered with by the High Court in second appeal. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment regarding the disputed plot, and restored the judgment of the Additional District Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a concurrent or first appellate court's finding of fact in a second appeal based on the appraisal of evidence?
  • Does the registration of a firm under the Partnership Act alone constitute proof of the execution of a partnership agreement?
  • Can shares declared by a preliminary decree in a partition suit be varied due to subsequent events?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Muhammad Saleem vs Muhammad Bashir and 4 others1990 SCMR 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-26
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationforgeryfraudrevenue recordssettlement authoritiesland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns five petitions for the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted by the High Court to respondents accused of forgery and fraud. The dispute involves land transferred by Settlement Authorities to private individuals, which was subsequently sold to a co-accused, Izharul Haq. The complainant, Shaheen Foundation, alleged that the sale deeds were forged to usurp property purportedly transferred to the Pakistan Air Force and subsequently to the Foundation. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting pre-arrest bail given the conflicting claims over the land's title and the absence of evidence in the revenue records supporting the Foundation's claim. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the revenue records and Register RL-II confirmed the transfers to the respondents, while no record existed supporting the Foundation's ownership. The Court held that the High Court's assessment of the record was well-founded and that no grounds existed to interfere with the exercise of discretion in granting pre-arrest bail. The principle affirmed is that bail should not be cancelled where the lower court's order is based on a sound examination of existing documentary evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is the cancellation of pre-arrest bail justified when the lower court's order is supported by existing revenue records?
  • Does the absence of mutation entries in favor of a complainant in revenue records undermine allegations of forgery against the current title holders?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Muhammad Rafiq and others vs The Administrator, Municipal1990 SCMR 1520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-17
  municipal taxationadministrator powerslocal governmentultra viresprocedural compliancetransitional provisionsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition that challenged the levy of octroi and other taxes by the Administrator of the Municipal Committee, Qila Didar Singh. The core legal questions were whether the Administrator lacked the competency to levy taxes under the Punjab Local Government Act 1975, and whether the mandatory procedural requirements for imposing taxes under the West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Imposition of Taxes) Rules 1960 were violated. The Supreme Court held that the Administrator was duly authorized to perform the functions of the Municipal Committee under existing transitional provisions, including Section 235(2) of the Punjab Local Government Act 1975, and that the taxation authority was legally sound. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's finding that the procedural requirements for taxation had been substantially complied with. The Court established that an Administrator appointed under valid transitional legal orders retains the authority to exercise the powers of a local council, and that factual findings regarding procedural compliance by the High Court are not to be disturbed absent clear error.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Administrator appointed to a dissolved Municipal Committee possess the legal authority to levy taxes under the Punjab Local Government Act 1975?
  • Can a court interfere with factual findings regarding procedural compliance in tax imposition if no error or misreading of the record is demonstrated?
  • Do transitional provisions in local government legislation allow an Administrator to continue exercising taxation powers until a new council is constituted?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Muhammad Nazir vs Muhammad Iqbal and others1990 SCMR 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-04
  specific performancelimitationleave to appealcontractsale-deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's civil revision against concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which dismissed a suit for specific performance of a contract on the ground of limitation. The core legal question involves the determination of the starting point of limitation for filing a suit for specific performance when a specific date for performance was allegedly fixed through correspondence between the parties. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the question of limitation in light of the correspondence that took place between the petitioner and the respondents. The key principle laid down is that correspondence establishing a fixed date for the performance of a contract can trigger the commencement of the period of limitation for filing a suit for specific performance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for specific performance of a contract is barred by limitation if filed beyond three years from the date fixed for performance in correspondence?
  • Can correspondence between parties establish a fixed date for the performance of a contract to start the running of limitation?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to re-examine concurrent findings on the question of limitation based on documentary evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Muhammad Ibrahim vs Syed Abdul Aziz Shah and others1990 SCMR 542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-13
  tenant evictionpersonal requirementwithdrawal of applicationCode of Civil Procedurerent lawcause of action
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the eviction of a tenant on the grounds of the landlord's personal requirement, following the dismissal of the tenant's writ petition by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a landlord, having previously withdrawn an eviction application based on personal requirement without seeking permission to refile, was barred from filing a fresh application for the same ground under the principles of Order XXIII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action for personal requirement can arise periodically depending on the circumstances. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is not strictly applicable to rent cases, and its equitable principles should be used to advance justice rather than to penalize a party. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, determining that the landlord was not barred from filing the subsequent application.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of an eviction application without permission to refile bar a landlord from filing a subsequent application on the same ground of personal requirement?
  • Is the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 strictly applicable to rent cases?
  • Can the equitable principles of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be applied to penalize a party in a rent case?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Butt vs The State1990 SCMR 1090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-29
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaynon-capital offencecriminal procedurebail entitlementcustodial period
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail after being in custody for over one year following his arrest for possession of a large quantity of heroin. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the third proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which mandates the release of an accused on bail if their trial for a non-capital offence has not concluded within one year, provided the delay was not caused by the accused. The Supreme Court observed that the trial had not concluded within the statutory period and that there was no evidence suggesting the delay was attributable to the petitioner's conduct, despite some adjournments requested by co-accused. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to the statutory benefit of bail. The ratio establishes that where an accused has been detained for over a year for a non-capital offence and the delay in trial is not occasioned by the accused's own acts or omissions, the court is obligated to grant bail under the third proviso to Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail under the third proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the trial has not concluded within one year?
  • Does the conduct of a co-accused in seeking adjournments preclude the petitioner from claiming the benefit of the third proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Must the court grant bail if the delay in trial is not occasioned by the act or omission of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Bashir Ahmad vs D.Ig. (Police) and another Superintendent of Police1990 SCMR 808 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-23
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsminor penaltyformal inquiryprobationservice tribunalcompetent authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector of Police, filed two petitions for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging judgments of the Punjab Service Tribunal which upheld disciplinary actions against him. The first matter concerned a penalty of censure imposed for negligence in failing to report a traffic accident to superior officers, despite the petitioner's claim that a formal inquiry was required. The second matter involved the refusal to place the petitioner on probation, based on his service record containing multiple recent punishments. The Supreme Court addressed whether an elaborate formal inquiry is mandatory for minor penalties and whether the Service Tribunal can interfere with the competent authority's assessment of an officer's fitness for probation. The Court held that for minor penalties, providing the grounds and an opportunity to explain is sufficient to meet the standard of fairness, and an elaborate inquiry is not required. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the assessment of an officer's fitness for probation is within the discretion of the competent authority, and the Tribunal cannot interfere absent a legal ground.

  Questions settled

  • Is an elaborate formal inquiry mandatory before imposing a minor penalty on a civil servant?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to interfere with the competent authority's decision regarding an officer's fitness for probation?
  • What constitutes the required standard of fairness when imposing a minor penalty on a police officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Ahmad Akbar vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary to Government of Pakistan, Finance Division and 2 others1990 SCMR 784 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-25
  civil servicemove-over benefitpay scaletechnical and professional categorydepartmental examinationservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired civil servant, sought leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal judgment that denied him the benefit of 'move-over' to a higher pay scale. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having passed the Subordinate Accounts Service examination, qualified as a member of a 'technical and professional' category entitled to move-over benefits under government instructions issued on 1-7-1983. The Supreme Court upheld the Service Tribunal's decision, holding that the petitioner did not fall within the specified technical or professional categories. The Court reasoned that the Subordinate Accounts Service examination is merely a departmental examination designed to ensure internal efficiency and expertise, rather than a recognized technical or professional qualification available to the general public. Consequently, the Court determined that the petitioner failed to meet the criteria for the claimed pay scale advancement. The principle laid down is that departmental examinations restricted to internal employees do not constitute 'technical or professional' qualifications for the purpose of claiming special pay scale benefits intended for specific professional categories.

  Questions settled

  • Does passing a departmental examination, such as the Subordinate Accounts Service examination, qualify a civil servant as belonging to a 'technical and professional' category for pay scale benefits?
  • Are departmental examinations restricted to internal employees considered technical or professional qualifications for the purpose of government move-over policies?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Abdul Qadeer vs Mst. Shamim Akhtar1990 SCMR 644 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  dowry disputeconcurrent findings of factcivil revisionleave to appealprocedural technicalitiessubstantial justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by a husband challenging the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court in a family dispute regarding the alleged misappropriation of dowry articles. The core legal question involves the sustainability of concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding disputed factual assertions and technical procedural objections raised by the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the case involved contradictory pleas on disputed questions of fact concluded concurrently against the petitioner by the lower courts, and that technical procedural objections without proof of prejudice do not warrant interference. The Court established the key principle that concurrent findings of fact on disputed matters will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court unless they suffer from an error of law or principle, and technicalities that cause no substantial prejudice cannot override substantial justice. Accordingly, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a family dispute regarding dowry?
  • Can technical procedural objections without proof of prejudice form the basis for setting aside concurrent findings of fact?
  • Does a defense of being 'Khana Damad' and shifting of dowry articles raise disputed questions of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Sevenup Company Sony Kabushiki Kaisha, Tokyo (Sony Corporation) Abdul Aziz Noor Muhammad Trading as Aziz Products vs Kohinoor Thread Ball Factory and 3 others Registrar of Trade Marks and anothers the Sevenup Company—1990 PLD Supreme Court 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-08
  trade markslikelihood of deceptionregistration of trade markstrade connectiongoodwillconsumer confusionintellectual property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved several appeals concerning the registration of identical trade marks ("7-Up" and "Sony") for goods different from those for which the marks were originally registered. The core legal question was whether such registration is permissible under the Trade Marks Act, particularly regarding the likelihood of deception or confusion under Section 8(a). The Supreme Court held that while there is no absolute monopoly on a trade mark across all goods, registration must be refused if there is a likelihood of deception or confusion. The Court dismissed appeals where the goods were entirely different (e.g., beverages vs. wool, soap, or sports goods), finding no likelihood of confusion. However, it allowed the appeal regarding "Pan Masala," finding that despite different classifications, the products shared similar trade channels and consumer bases, creating a real likelihood of confusion regarding the source. The Court established that trade mark protection is inherently linked to specific goods, and the test for refusal is the factual likelihood of deception, determined by considering marketing methods, consumer awareness, and the nature of the goods.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of a trade mark grant an absolute monopoly over its use for all classes of goods?
  • What is the test for determining whether the registration of an identical trade mark for different goods should be refused under Section 8(a) of the Trade Marks Act?
  • Is a trade connection or common field of activity a mandatory requirement to establish the likelihood of confusion in trade mark registration disputes?
  • Can the registration of a trade mark be refused if the goods are of a different description but likely to be associated with the original proprietor due to reputation?
  Read full judgment →
• Senior Superintendent of Police and others vs Waris Khan1990 SCMR 1358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-19
  disciplinary proceedingspolice serviceshow-cause noticeformal inquiryservice tribunal jurisdictionreinstatementnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the dismissal of a police official, Waris Khan, who was terminated from service following allegations of failing to properly operate a check-post barrier and allowing subordinates to accept illegal gratification. The respondent challenged his dismissal before the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which reinstated him on the grounds that the disciplinary authority failed to conduct a formal inquiry despite the existence of disputed factual allegations. The petitioners, representing the state, challenged this decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that the respondent was not a civil servant and that the N.-W.F.P. Police Rules, 1975 barred judicial review of such orders. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal but refused to stay the Tribunal's order of reinstatement. The Court held that where an accused officer denies the allegations in a show-cause notice, a factual controversy arises that necessitates a formal inquiry with the officer's participation. Consequently, the Court affirmed the requirement for a proper inquiry before dismissal, allowing the department to proceed with disciplinary action from the point of the show-cause reply, provided the officer is first reinstated.

  Questions settled

  • Is a formal inquiry mandatory when an accused officer denies the allegations contained in a show-cause notice?
  • Can a disciplinary authority dismiss a police officer without an inquiry when the facts underlying the charge are disputed?
  • Does the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain appeals against dismissal orders passed under the N.-W.F.P. Police Rules, 1975?
  Read full judgment →
• Senior Member, Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P. Peshawar and others vs Muhammad Iobal Khan and another1990 SCMR 1516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-09
  service lawadverse remarksannual confidential reportservice tribunal jurisdictionleave to appealadministrative control
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had accepted an appeal filed by an Assistant Excise and Taxation Officer and expunged adverse remarks recorded in his Annual Confidential Report (A.C.R.) for the year 1986. The respondent had initially received adverse remarks, which were upheld by the appellate authority, leading him to approach the Service Tribunal. The petitioners contended that the Tribunal erred in interfering with the opinion of the counter-signing authority, who had made the adverse entry based on available material. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Service Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in hearing the appeal and that the impugned judgment contained no exceptional errors warranting interference. The Court held that the Tribunal possesses the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate such service matters. Finding no question of public importance involved in the petition, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, thereby maintaining the Tribunal's decision to expunge the adverse remarks.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the recording of adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a Service Tribunal's decision to expunge adverse remarks where no question of public importance is involved?
  Read full judgment →
• Seith Abdul Salam vs Malik Mahmood Hasan and 12 others1990 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-30
  inheritance rightsMuslim Personal Lawco-ownershipleave to appealpreliminary decreeburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a Regular First Appeal, which had upheld a preliminary decree recognizing the respondent's right to inherit property from her deceased father. The petitioner, the respondent's brother, raised two primary contentions: first, that he was a co-sharer in the suit property, having jointly purchased it with his father; and second, that the respondent forfeited her inheritance rights because the petitioner had incurred significant expenses for their father's medical treatment and burial. The Supreme Court rejected the first plea, noting the petitioner's failure to provide any documentary evidence or cogent material to substantiate his claim of co-ownership, which had been concurrently decided against him by the lower courts. Regarding the second plea, the Court held that under Islamic law, a sister cannot be deprived of her inheritance share based on expenses incurred by her brothers on behalf of their father. Consequently, finding no merit in the contentions, the Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a brother deprive his sister of her inheritance share on the ground that he incurred expenses for their father's medical treatment and burial?
  • Is a claim of co-ownership in property valid without documentary evidence or cogent material to support it?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Irrigation and Power Department, Government of the Punjab and 2 others vs Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,3, Lahore at Ferozewala and 2 others1990 SCMR 1030 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-30
  leave to appealworkmancivil servantservice terminationconvictionlachescriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an order granting leave to appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petition sought to examine three specific questions of law. The first question concerned the classification of an 'Overseer' as either a 'Workman' or a 'Civil Servant', a distinction crucial for determining the applicable legal framework for employment disputes. The second question addressed whether a government employee must be retained in service even after being convicted and sentenced under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which deals with criminal breach of trust by a public servant. The third question related to the doctrine of laches, specifically whether the delay in filing the petition had been adequately explained to prevent the application of this equitable defense. The Court granted leave to appeal to thoroughly examine these points, directing that the matter be heard at an early date based on the existing record, with an option for parties to submit additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Does an 'Overseer' fall into the category of 'Workman' or 'Civil Servant'?
  • Must an employee be kept in Government employment even after conviction and sentence under Section 409, Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Was the delay appropriately explained to avoid the application of laches?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Evacuee Trust Property Board vs Muzammil Hussain and another1990 SCMR 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-25
  evacuee trust propertyreligious trustburden of proofsettlement authoritiesproperty inheritanceTikano
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a dispute regarding the status of property bearing City Survey No. D/1396 in Hyderabad, which the appellant, the Evacuee Trust Property Board, claimed was attached to a religious trust. The appellant challenged the transfer of this property to the respondent, contending it was evacuee trust property. The core legal question was whether the appellant provided sufficient evidence to establish that the property was indeed a religious trust rather than private property subject to inheritance. The Chief Settlement Commissioner dismissed the application, finding the evidence—specifically entries in the Property Register Card describing the property as a 'Tikano'—vague, inconclusive, and contradictory, as the document also cited inheritance as the source of title. The High Court upheld this decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to substantiate its claim that the property was trust property. The judgment affirms the principle that mere descriptive entries in official records, when contradicted by evidence of private inheritance, are insufficient to establish the existence of a public religious trust.

  Questions settled

  • Is a property entry in a register describing it as a 'Tikano' sufficient evidence to establish it as a public religious trust?
  • Can property described as being subject to inheritance be simultaneously classified as trust property without further evidence?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of property if the evidence is found to be vague and inconclusive?
  Read full judgment →
• Sarfraz Khan Cheema vs Muhammad Ashraf and 2 others1990 SCMR 685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-07
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer deeddeclaratory suitconcurrent findingsleave to appealsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his revision petition affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The dispute involved a house that was transferred as evacuee property to respondent No. 1 by the Settlement Authorities in 1968, followed by the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD). The petitioner's father was ejected, and the petitioner subsequently filed a declaratory suit claiming ownership based on an alleged purchase from a non-Muslim in 1947. The trial court, the District Judge, and the High Court concurrently dismissed the petitioner's suit and subsequent challenges due to a lack of proof regarding the confirmation of the sale by the Custodian of Evacuee Properties. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts suffered from no legal infirmity, as the property was duly transferred as evacuee property and the petitioner failed to prove a valid confirmed purchase. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a declaratory suit regarding evacuee property is maintainable without proof of a confirmed sale by the Custodian of Evacuee Properties?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when no legal infirmity is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardara vs Muhammad Hayat and others1990 SCMR 1185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-30
  Limitation Actcertified copiestime requisitecopying agencybarred by timetechnicalitycivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal addresses whether an appeal before the First Appellate Court was barred by time due to the manner in which certified copies of the judgment and decree were obtained. The core legal question involves the computation of the 'time requisite' for obtaining certified copies under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, specifically whether the period spent on a returned copy application at one copying agency can be excluded when a fresh application is subsequently filed at another location. The Supreme Court held that dismissing an appeal as time-barred under such circumstances, where the initial application was returned through no fault of the appellant and only a fresh application was subsequently submitted, places undue emphasis on a technicality. The key principle laid down is that procedural technicalities regarding the re-filing of copy applications should not defeat a litigant's right to appeal when the delay stems from administrative record transfers between copying agencies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period spent on a returned application for a certified copy at a copying agency can be excluded in computing the period of limitation under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Does the failure to present the exact same returned copy application to a different copying agency, instead of filing a fresh application, render an appeal time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardara vs Khanqa H Pir Shah Badshah1990 SCMR 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-14
  adverse possessionJamabandiconcurrent findingsleave to appealproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged the concurrent findings of the trial court, the District Judge, and the High Court, all of which rejected the petitioners' claim of adverse possession over the disputed property. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners had successfully established the essential elements of adverse possession based on the evidence presented, specifically relying on the entries contained in the Jamabandi. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the entries in the Jamabandi did not support the petitioners' claim or advance their case in any manner. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower courts' findings that the plea of adverse possession was not substantiated. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of evidence establishing the requisite elements of adverse possession, the concurrent findings of the lower courts were correct and did not warrant interference. Leave to appeal was refused, thereby maintaining the status quo established by the lower courts regarding the property in dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of adverse possession be established solely on the basis of Jamabandi entries that do not support the claim?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding adverse possession when evidence is insufficient?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar and others vs Shaukat Ali and others1990 SCMR 951 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-07
  evacuee propertycivil court jurisdictionallotmentcustodian authoritiesdeclaration of title
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit filed by the petitioners seeking a declaration that certain property vested in them and was not evacuee property. The trial court, the district court, and the Lahore High Court had previously dismissed the suit, holding that the civil courts lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the civil court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the status of property treated as evacuee property, particularly when the property had been allotted to an allottee and possession delivered. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the petition lacked merit. The Court held that since the property was allotted as evacuee property and possession was delivered, the allotment remained unchallenged. The key principle laid down is that where property is treated as evacuee property and allotted, any person claiming an interest therein is legally required to approach the Custodian authorities for a declaration, rather than invoking the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the status of property treated as evacuee property?
  • Is a person claiming an interest in property allotted as evacuee property required to approach the Custodian authorities for a declaration?
  • Can a civil suit be maintained to declare property as non-evacuee after it has been allotted and possession delivered to an allottee?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanaullah Cheema vs The State1990 SCMR 10 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-19
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptionraiding partyrecovery of tainted moneyspecial leave to appealbail stage
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction and sentence under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The prosecution case was that the petitioner, a police official, demanded and accepted illegal gratification from the complainant for not opposing a bail application and for releasing stored cement. A raiding party organized by the Anti-Corruption Authorities successfully apprehended the petitioner, and tainted currency notes were recovered after he threw them on the ground upon the Magistrate disclosing his identity. The core legal question pertained to the reliability of the recovery of tainted money and whether the lower courts erred in convicting the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were in accordance with law and established legal dicta, noting that the recovery from the ground immediately after the raid sufficiently established guilt. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of tainted currency notes from the ground after a raid constitutes valid proof of acceptance of illegal gratification?
  • Whether the absence of overheard conversation between the accused and the complainant vitiates a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanaullah and others vs Muhammad Iqbal and others1990 SCMR 1067 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-15
  leave to appealocular testimonysentence enhancementunlawful assemblymurderappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the convictions of six petitioners for murder and attempted murder but modified their sentences. The petitioners were convicted under sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the killing of two individuals, allegedly in retaliation for a prior murder. The High Court had upheld the convictions based on ocular testimony but reduced the death sentences of three petitioners to life imprisonment and dismissed the complainant's revision petition for sentence enhancement. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the High Court correctly appreciated the evidence regarding the presence and credibility of eye-witnesses and whether the sentencing discretion was exercised in accordance with legal principles. The Supreme Court, upon hearing arguments regarding the alleged doubtful presence of witnesses and the appropriateness of the sentences, granted leave to appeal in both petitions, determining that the contentions raised by both the convicted petitioners and the complainant party require further judicial consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of a witness who was a co-accused in a prior case render their testimony inherently doubtful in a subsequent murder trial?
  • Can the appellate court reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment solely based on the motive of revenge for a prior murder?
  • Is it legally sustainable to maintain convictions based on ocular testimony when the recovery evidence is rejected by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanam Jan Khan vs Mst. Noor Begum and 7 others1990 SCMR 881 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-10
  succession certificatejoint bank accountIslamic law of inheritancedowerdisputed questions of factconsent order
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court relating to the grant of a succession certificate concerning a joint bank account held by a husband and wife, payable to either or survivor. After the husband's death, his heirs claimed their shares according to Islamic law of inheritance, while the widow claimed exclusive right to the amount, partly on the ground that it was in lieu of her dower. The Civil Judge granted the certificate to the appellant to the extent of an assumed Islamic share, but the High Court set it aside, holding that the matter involved disputed questions of fact and law and should be tried as a suit. Upon appeal before the Supreme Court, the parties reached a settlement during the hearing. The Supreme Court accordingly disposed of and partly allowed the appeal in terms of the agreed distribution of the bank amount and profits among the widow, appellant, and other respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a succession certificate dispute involving a joint bank account and rival claims based on inheritance and dower should be decided as a regular suit when complex questions of fact and law arise?
  • Can an appellate court dispose of an appeal regarding the grant of a succession certificate on the basis of a compromise reached between the contesting parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Samandar Khan and anothers vs The State1990 SCMR 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-21
  criminal appealsentence reductionrigorous imprisonmentsentencing guidelinesbenefit of section 382-B
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a petition for leave to appeal challenging the sentence imposed on the appellants. While the appellants initially sought to raise weighty legal questions previously addressed by the Supreme Court and the Federal Shariat Court, counsel for the appellants ultimately abandoned these arguments, choosing not to contest the conviction itself. Instead, the appellants prayed for a reduction in the sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment, citing precedents where similar offences resulted in a sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment, and requested the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The State, represented by the Additional Advocate-General, could not provide any distinguishing factors justifying the harsher ten-year sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the sentence of rigorous imprisonment from ten years to five years and granting the appellants the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, while maintaining the conviction and other aspects of the original order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment be reduced to five years when precedents for similar offences support the lesser term?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a sentence of rigorous imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Salim Nasir vs Khalid Mehmood and others1990 SCMR 1065 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-17
  bail cancellationmurdersulfuric acid burnsextrajudicial confessionexpeditious trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition arising from an appeal against the grant of bail to respondent Khalid Mehmood by the Lahore High Court. The respondent, along with others, stood trial before the Sessions Judge, Sialkot, for offences under section 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of Mst. Abida Parveen through sulphuric acid burns. The Sessions Judge had initially refused bail, but the High Court granted it. The complainant petitioned the Supreme Court for bail cancellation, and leave was granted alongside the issuance of non-bailable warrants. During the appeal proceedings, counsel for both parties agreed that since the trial had already commenced and evidence was being recorded, the accused should remain in custody while the trial is expedited. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal by maintaining the custody of the respondent and directing the trial court to conclude the trial within two months, granting liberty to the respondent to apply for bail afresh before the trial court if the timeline is not met.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted by the High Court can be disposed of by directing the trial court to conclude the ongoing trial within a specified timeframe?
  • Can an accused apply for bail afresh if the trial court fails to conclude the trial within the stipulated period ordered by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Salim Ahmad Khan vs Mst. Jamila Latif1990 SCMR 1117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-06
  evictiondefault in rentbona fide personal needSindh Rented Premises Ordinanceconcurrent findingspugreeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed against judgments of the Sindh High Court which dismissed the petitioner's appeals against eviction orders passed by the Rent Controller. The core legal questions involved whether the landlord's eviction petitions under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 were barred by separate proceedings under section 14(2), whether the unpleaded defense of pugree could be raised, and whether concurrent findings regarding default in rent payment and bona fide personal need were legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that proceedings under section 14 and section 15 of the Ordinance constitute separate causes of action and do not bar each other, that unpleaded matters such as pugree cannot be raised for the first time, and that concurrent findings of fact regarding default and personal need warrant no interference. The key principle laid down is that the simultaneous or prior pursuit of eviction under section 14 does not preclude a landlord from seeking eviction on independent grounds under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of an eviction application under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 bar the landlord from filing or pursuing another eviction application under section 15 of the said Ordinance?
  • Can a tenant raise the plea of having paid pugree when the same was not pleaded in the rental agreements or before the Rent Controller?
  • What is the prescribed timeframe for the payment of rent under the tenancy agreements and the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 to avoid default?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding default in rent and bona fide personal need open to interference by the Supreme Court without showing legal error?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Ali vs Mahmud Hussain and 23 others1990 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-13
  leave to appealrejection of plaintcourt-fee deficiencyregular second appealsuit for possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal, which had challenged the rejection of a plaint in a suit for possession due to a deficiency in court-fee. The core legal question concerns the validity of rejecting a plaint for insufficient court-fee in light of established precedent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to examine the contentions raised by the petitioner and to consider the effect and application of the precedent established in Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another (PLD 1984 SC 289). The Court held that leave should be granted to thoroughly review these legal questions regarding plaint rejection and court-fee deficiencies, directing the parties to prepare the appeal on the present record with essential documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaint can be rejected solely on account of a deficiency in court-fee?
  • What is the effect of the judgment in Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another (PLD 1984 SC 289) on cases involving deficient court-fees?
  Read full judgment →
• Saifullah Khan vs The State1990 SCMR 327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  self-defenceright of private defencecriminal appealappreciation of evidenceconvictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal conviction under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, Saifullah Khan, was convicted by the trial court, and his conviction and sentence were maintained by the High Court, while his co-accused were acquitted. The core legal issue concerns the High Court's inconsistent findings: while the High Court explicitly accepted the defence version—which posited that the petitioner acted in self-defence after an altercation regarding stray cattle—it nonetheless upheld the petitioner's conviction and sentence. The petitioner contends that once the High Court accepted the defence version as more probable, the conviction became legally unsustainable as the act was committed in the exercise of the right of private defence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the petitioner acted in the exercise of his right of self-defence, given the High Court's factual findings. The matter focuses on the legal consequence of accepting a defence version that establishes self-defence while simultaneously maintaining a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained if the court accepts the defence version that the accused acted in self-defence?
  • Does the acceptance of a defence version regarding an altercation over cattle entitle an accused to the right of private defence?
  Read full judgment →