Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Haji Mohibullah & Co. and others vs Khawaja Bahauddin1990 SCMR 1070 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-05
  rent restrictioneviction petitionbona fide needpersonal usewrit jurisdictionconcurrent findingsmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge that had rejected a landlord's eviction petition. The landlord sought possession of a godown for his son's personal use. The core legal questions were whether the landlord's failure to disclose the nature of the intended business or the possession of other properties in the eviction petition rendered the claim mala fide, and whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court correctly intervened because the lower courts misread evidence and failed to apply established legal principles. The Court affirmed that a landlord is not legally required to disclose the specific nature of the business intended for the premises. Furthermore, while the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance requires a landlord to state they do not occupy other suitable property, failure to explicitly plead this is not fatal to the petition if bona fide need is otherwise established by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for a landlord to disclose the specific nature of the business intended for the premises in an eviction petition?
  • Does a failure to state in an eviction petition that the landlord does not occupy other suitable property automatically defeat the claim?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and the appellate court?
  • Is a landlord required to specify the exact number of rooms required when the leased premises were originally rented as a single unit?
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• Haji Ghaus Bakhsh and others vs Haji Rahim Bakhsh and others1990 SCMR 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-29
  pre-emptionagricultural landtransaction of exchangeconcurrent findingsleave to appealsettlement of litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking to challenge the concurrent findings of the subordinate courts and the High Court, which dismissed a suit for pre-emption concerning agricultural land on the ground that the underlying transaction was an exchange rather than a sale. The core legal question is whether a transaction characterized as an exchange can be treated as a sale subject to pre-emption based on the vendee's subsequent willingness to settle by accepting the market price to avoid litigation. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit, affirming the lower courts' concurrent findings. The Court ruled that a vendee's willingness to transfer land upon payment of the market price to avoid litigation does not constitute an admission that the transaction was a sale. The key principle laid down is that attempts to settle litigation or avoid disputes do not alter the true legal nature of a transaction established through evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transaction found to be an exchange can be subjected to pre-emption as a sale?
  • Does a vendee's willingness to accept market price to avoid litigation amount to an admission of a sale transaction?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of a transaction be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Haji Behram Khan vs Abdul Hameed Khan Achakzai and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-10
  election petitionelectoral malpracticeannulment of electionRepresentation of People Actballot box tamperingdiscretionary jurisdictionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an Election Commission order declaring an entire constituency election void due to irregularities. During the election, ballot boxes from two polling stations were snatched by miscreants. The Election Commission, invoking Section 103-AA of the Representation of People Act, 1976, annulled the entire election. The High Court, however, found that the missing votes were insufficient to alter the final outcome, as the leading candidate's margin was insurmountable even if all missing votes were attributed to the runner-up. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, refusing to interfere. The ratio of the judgment is that an entire constituency election should not be set aside due to localized malpractice or hooliganism if the final result remains determinable based on the remaining valid votes. The Court emphasized that annulling an entire election based on the misdeeds of supporters of losing candidates would frustrate the electorate's will and encourage tactical rigging to force re-elections.

  Questions settled

  • Can an entire constituency election be declared void under Section 103-AA of the Representation of People Act, 1976, if the result is still determinable despite localized irregularities?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order that achieves a just and fair result in an election dispute?
  • Should an election be set aside due to the misconduct of supporters of losing candidates if the missing votes cannot change the final outcome?
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• Haji Bashir Ahmad vs Mst.Riaz Elahi and others1990 SCMR 835 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-09
  recovery of dowryconsent decreeexecution proceedingssatisfaction of decreeconcurrent findings of factconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts. In a suit for the recovery of dowry, a consent decree was passed, and during execution proceedings, the judgment-debtor claimed to have satisfied the decree by delivering a cheque for Rs. 60,000 to the decree-holder. The executing court framed issues and found that the petitioner failed to prove the payment. This finding was affirmed upon revision by the Additional District Judge, and subsequently upheld by the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted the absence of evidence regarding the delivery or encashment of the cheque. The Court held that concurrent findings of fact based on available record do not warrant interference. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming that factual determinations regarding the satisfaction of a decree cannot be disturbed without cogent proof.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the payment of a decretal amount can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does a judgment-debtor bear the burden of proving the satisfaction of a decree through the alleged delivery and encashment of a cheque?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the lower courts have meticulously examined the evidence and concluded that payment was not proved?
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• Haji Abdul Aziz and others vs Muhammad Akram Bhatti and others1990 SCMR 1210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-16
  writ jurisdictionlandlord and tenantconcurrent findings of factevictionconstitutional petitionmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller and affirmed by an Additional District Judge, which was subsequently set aside by the Lahore High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the High Court, under Article 199 of the Constitution, was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and the identity of the disputed property. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in setting aside the eviction order. The Court reasoned that the High Court’s writ jurisdiction is not designed to function as an appellate forum to correct decisions merely because they might be considered wrong. Furthermore, the High Court proceeded on a ground—the identity of the property—that was not in controversy between the parties, as the respondent had previously conceded the property number. The key principle laid down is that a High Court cannot interfere with the findings of inferior tribunals in writ jurisdiction simply to re-evaluate evidence or decide issues not raised by the parties, particularly where concurrent findings of fact exist.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by inferior tribunals in exercise of its writ jurisdiction?
  • Is the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 equivalent to that of a full-fledged appellate court?
  • Can a High Court set aside an order based on a ground that was never in controversy between the parties before the lower courts?
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• Hafiz Sabahuddin Jamy vs Obaidur Rehman Khan and 4 others1990 SCMR 854 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-13
  seniority disputegovernment servicereinstatementservice tribunalleave to appealEstablishment Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his seniority status in government service. The petitioner, who was senior to the respondents in Grades 17, 18, and 19, was dismissed from service in 1976 but subsequently reinstated with full benefits and back pay. During his absence, the respondents were promoted to Grade 20, and the petitioner was promoted to the same grade later in 1978, but placed junior to them. The core legal question is whether the petitioner's seniority should have been restored based on the Establishment Code provisions regarding delayed recommendations by the Selection Board/DPC, and whether the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of these rules. The Supreme Court found that the points raised by the petitioner regarding the applicability of the Establishment Code and the relevance of previous case law required further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the petitioner's seniority was correctly determined upon his reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Establishment Code provision regarding delayed Selection Board recommendations apply to a civil servant reinstated after dismissal?
  • Whether a civil servant's seniority is preserved when they are promoted to a higher grade after being reinstated with full back benefits?
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• Hafiz Naeem Butt and others vs Mst. Rashida Begum and another1990 SCMR 1003 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-01Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar vs Income Tax OfficerPTCL 1990 CL. 755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-07
  writ jurisdictionalternate remedyincome tax assessmentFederal Ombudsmanhighhandednessjudicial reviewtax recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an income tax assessment order before the High Court, which dismissed the petition in limine on the ground that the petitioner had already availed of an alternate remedy by filing an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Upon seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the Court reviewed the department's conduct regarding the assessment of property value and the alleged fictitious nature of the vendors involved in the petitioner's property purchase. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petition, reiterating the principle that relief under the writ jurisdiction is generally unavailable when an adequate alternate remedy exists. However, the Court observed that where departmental authorities act with highhandedness, taxpayers are not without recourse. The Court held that the Federal Ombudsman provides an effective, quasi-judicial forum for such grievances, noting that the Ombudsman is not constrained by the same procedural technicalities or the 'alternate remedy' bar that limits the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, with the petitioner directed to approach the Ombudsman.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of an alternate statutory remedy preclude the High Court from exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Is the Federal Ombudsman a competent forum to provide redress against highhandedness by tax authorities?
  • Does the Federal Ombudsman's jurisdiction suffer from the same 'alternate remedy' limitation that applies to the High Court's writ jurisdiction?
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• Hafeezuddin vs Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and others1990 SCMR 931 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  service lawmedical retirementleave to appealfactual findingsmedical boardappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the retirement of the petitioner, an Assistant Typist with the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, on medical grounds. The petitioner, diagnosed with schizo-affective psychosis, had been retired following a Medical Board's recommendation that he was unfit for service due to the progressive deterioration of his condition and poor prognosis. The petitioner contended that subsequent medical certificates suggested he was responding to treatment and improving, thereby rendering the retirement order unjustified. The Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal had thoroughly examined the evidence and concluded that the determination of the petitioner's fitness for service was a question of fact. Finding no evidence of bias or mala fides on the part of the Medical Board, and noting that the Corporation had made reasonable efforts to provide medical treatment, the Court held that it would not interfere with factual findings in its appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the medical fitness of an employee is a factual determination not suitable for re-examination by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Is the determination of an employee's medical fitness for service a question of fact?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with factual findings regarding an employee's medical fitness in an appeal against a Service Tribunal judgment?
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• Habiburrehman and others vs Ziarat Gul and others1990 SCMR 1706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-26
  adverse possessionrevenue recordtenant-at-willproperty titlecivil revisionconcurrent findingsdeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioners' civil revision regarding a dispute over property ownership. The petitioners, who had filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, claimed ownership based on revenue records, arguing that their status as 'Ghair Dakhilkar' implied ownership. The core legal questions were whether the petitioners had established title to the disputed land and whether they had proven adverse possession. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which determined that the petitioners were tenants-at-will rather than owners. The Court held that revenue record entries designating the petitioners as tenants-at-will must prevail, especially in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence to support the claim of adverse possession. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the petitioners failed to prove their title or displace the findings of fact made by the courts of competent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an entry in the revenue record designating a person as a tenant-at-will prevail over claims of ownership in the absence of contrary evidence?
  • Can a party claim adverse possession when they are recorded in the revenue records as tenants-at-will?
  • Does the inclusion of a negligible area (min khafeef) from a larger Khasra number into a disputed Khasra number establish ownership rights?
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• Habibullaii vs The Superintendent of Police and others1990 SCMR 1472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-30
  service lawlimitation periodcondonation of delaydepartmental appealmercy petitionpolice servicePunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the dismissal of a police constable from service following allegations of involvement in narcotics trafficking. After his departmental appeal was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, the petitioner was acquitted in criminal proceedings and subsequently filed a representation to the Inspector-General of Police, which was rejected. He then appealed to the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal as time-barred. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribunal erred in refusing to condone the 720-day delay in filing the appeal, specifically whether time spent in criminal proceedings and pursuing a mercy petition should be excluded from the limitation period. The Supreme Court held that the decision of the Deputy Inspector-General was final under the relevant rules, and a mercy petition does not lie as a matter of right. Consequently, the limitation period commenced upon the dismissal of the departmental appeal. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, establishing that pursuing an unauthorized mercy petition does not toll the limitation period for filing a service appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a mercy petition to a superior authority extend the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • When does the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal commence after a departmental appeal is dismissed?
  • Is a mercy petition filed before an Inspector-General of Police considered a legal right that tolls the limitation period for service appeals?
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• Habibullah vs Nafees Ahmad and 3 others1990 SCMR 470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-01
  leave to appealdismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appealsuit for declarationappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiff against an order of the High Court. The underlying dispute originated in a suit for declaration, which was initially decreed in the petitioner's favour by the trial court. Subsequently, the respondents' appeal against this decree was dismissed by the District Court for non-prosecution, and the District Court further refused to restore the appeal. The respondents then challenged this refusal before the High Court, which accepted their appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court acted within its jurisdiction and in accordance with legal principles when it accepted the respondents' appeal against the order refusing to restore their original appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction and committed no error of law or principle in its decision to accept the appeal on merits. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the High Court's authority to adjudicate the matter on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to accept an appeal against an order of a District Court refusing to restore an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Can the High Court decide an appeal on its merits after the lower appellate court has dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution?
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• Habibullah and 4 others vs Sakhi Muhammad and 2 others1990 SCMR 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  inheritancerevisional jurisdictionfindings of factMuslim Family Laws Ordinancepre-deceased sonleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil revision dismissal by the High Court regarding a dispute over inheritance and possession of land. The petitioners claimed to be the sole heirs of the deceased, Muhammad Ali, excluding the respondent, Sakhi Muhammad, who asserted his status as the son of Muhammad Ali's pre-deceased son. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere in revisional jurisdiction regarding findings of fact made by the appellate court. The trial court initially dismissed the respondent's suit, but the appellate court reversed this decision, finding the respondent to be a rightful heir under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The High Court upheld this, ruling that the dispute involved pure questions of fact without any misreading or non-reading of evidence. The Supreme Court held that no error of law or principle existed in the lower courts' findings of fact. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that revisional jurisdiction is not attracted when findings of fact are properly rendered.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court's revisional jurisdiction extend to re-evaluating findings of fact where there is no misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, does a child of a pre-deceased son inherit the share that would have gone to the father?
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• Habib Insurance Co, Ltd. And Another vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central, Karachi_PTCL 1990 CL. 566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income taxinsurance businesstax exemptionstatutory interpretationnotional incomeFirst Scheduleassessment years
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave concerns the tax assessment of an insurance company whose income was computed under the special provisions of the First Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1922. The core legal question was whether such an assessee is entitled to claim tax exemption for income derived from newly constructed house property under Section 4(3)(xii) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the exemption provided by Section 4(3)(xii) is exclusively applicable to income chargeable under the specific head 'Income from property' as defined in the Act. Because the income of an insurance company is computed on a notional or artificial basis under the First Schedule, which operates to the exclusion of the ordinary heads of income, the specific exemption for property income cannot be extended to it. The Court affirmed that the First Schedule provides an exhaustive code for computing insurance business profits, rendering the standard exemptions for property income inapplicable. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the principle that special statutory regimes for insurance taxation override general exemptions not expressly incorporated into that regime.

  Questions settled

  • Is an insurance company whose income is computed under the First Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1922 entitled to claim exemption for income from newly constructed property under Section 4(3)(xii)?
  • Does the First Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1922 provide an exhaustive method for computing the profits and gains of an insurance business to the exclusion of other provisions?
  • Can the exemption for 'Income from property' under Section 4(3)(xii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 be applied to income calculated on a notional or artificial basis?
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• Habib Bank Limited, Circle Office, Multan vs Alqaim Traders and another1990 SCMR 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-01
  leave to defendbanking companiesrecovery of loansdiscretionary powerbank guaranteespecial courtconditional leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order passed by the Lahore High Court, acting as a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, granting a banking company conditional leave to defend a recovery suit of Rs. 21 crores filed against it by a borrower firm. The core legal questions involved whether the Special Court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages against a bank, and whether the imposition of onerous conditions requiring the bank to deposit cash and furnish a large bank guarantee was justified given the bank's high liquidity and financial standing. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal, holding that while the imposition of conditions for leave to defend is a matter of judicial discretion, such discretion must be exercised reasonably and fairly rather than oppressively, and modified the conditions by reducing the cash deposit requirement while directing expedited disposal of the suit. The key principle laid down is that the exercise of discretion in imposing conditions for leave to defend under summary procedures must be balanced, taking into account the financial credibility and liquidity of a banking institution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for damages filed by a borrower against a banking company falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can the high liquidity and financial status of a banking company be considered a relevant factor when deciding whether to impose conditions for granting leave to defend?
  • Whether the imposition of onerous conditions for granting leave to defend to a banking company can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • What are the governing principles for exercising discretion under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding conditional versus unconditional leave to defend?
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• Gulzar and another vs The State1990 SCMR 1395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-26
  self-defenceprivate defenceculpable homicideappraisal of evidenceleave to appealocular evidencemedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' appeal against their convictions for murder. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner Gulzar acted in self-defence and whether the actions of the accused warranted a conviction under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than for murder. The Supreme Court held that the plea of self-defence was unsubstantiated, noting the deceased was unarmed and the accused sustained no injuries. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the offence fell under Section 304, as the medical evidence confirmed a fatal injury caused by a heavy sharp-edged weapon to the head, coupled with multiple other injuries, demonstrating the accused's intent and knowledge of the consequences. The Court affirmed the findings of the lower courts, noting that the ocular evidence was corroborated by medical reports and the dying declaration/report lodged by the deceased. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the Court found no grounds for re-appraisal of evidence or interference with the sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of private self-defence be sustained where the accused suffered no injuries and the deceased was unarmed?
  • Does causing a fatal head injury with a heavy sharp-edged weapon, accompanied by multiple other injuries, exclude the application of Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to re-appraise evidence in a criminal petition where the lower courts have concurrently relied on consistent ocular and medical evidence?
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• Gulzar Ahmed vs The State1990 SCMR 587 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-28
  criminal appealmurderleave to appealocular testimonycorroborationidentificationsuicide motive
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his father-in-law, committed in retaliation for the deceased successfully prosecuting a case for the dissolution of marriage of his daughter, who was married to the petitioner. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency and reliability of ocular testimony and corroborative evidence to sustain the murder conviction. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of natural witnesses, coupled with corroborating recovery evidence and identification facilitated by electric light and prior acquaintance, established the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and the lesser sentence already awarded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of natural and related witnesses residing in the same house is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the recovery of incriminating material provide adequate corroboration for an eyewitness account in a murder trial?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the conviction is supported by reliable identification and concurrent appraisal of evidence by lower forums?
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• Gulzada vs Muhammad Usman through Legal Heirs and 6 others1990 PLD Supreme Court 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-20
  pre-emptioncontiguityco-sharerkhatakhasra numbersbinding precedentlarger benchpartial pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave was filed by a vendee challenging the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which allowed a pre-emption suit regarding four contiguous khasra numbers while dismissing it for one non-contiguous khasra number. The trial and first appellate courts had dismissed the pre-emptor's suit in its entirety, reasoning that the vendee, retaining the non-contiguous khasra number, would become a co-sharer in the joint khata and thus defeat the pre-emptor's claim of contiguity based on superior status. The Supreme Court considered whether a vendee retaining non-contiguous land within the same khata can defeat a pre-emptor's contiguity claim by assuming the status of a co-sharer, and whether prior binding precedents of the Court could be reopened. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a pre-emptor is entitled to a decree for contiguous khasra numbers and the vendee cannot defeat this claim by asserting retained co-sharership in the khata. The Court reaffirmed that decisions rendered by its Benches constitute binding declarations of law that cannot be treated as sitting in appeal over coordinate or earlier benches.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendee defeat a pre-emptor's claim of pre-emption over contiguous khasra numbers on the ground that the vendee remains a co-sharer in the same khata by retaining the non-contiguous khasra numbers?
  • Is a pre-emptor entitled to obtain a decree for only those khasra numbers in a joint sale that are contiguous to their land when other purchased khasra numbers in the same khata lack contiguity?
  • Can a subsequent Bench of the Supreme Court sit in appeal over or re-examine a binding declaration of law rendered by another Bench of the Court?
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• Gulistan Khan and another vs The State1990 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-17
  criminal leave to appealculpable homicidereduction of sentenceextenuating circumstancescommon intentionmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Gulistan Khan and another against the order of the High Court maintaining their conviction under Section 304 Part II and Section 323 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and their sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder in connection with the killing of Sardar Khan, alongside sentences for causing injuries. The core legal question raised is whether the petitioners, who acted under the influence of their uncle and co-accused Sher Zaman, are entitled to a reduction in their sentence as an extenuating circumstance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that no case was made out to interfere with the conviction of the petitioners, maintaining the same. However, upon considering the argument that the petitioners acted under the influence of the main accused, the Court granted leave to appeal specifically to consider the question of whether the petitioners are entitled to a reduction in their sentence of imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that the subordinate role or influence of co-accused under a main offender may serve as an extenuating circumstance warranting a re-examination of the quantum of sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be maintained when the petitioners fail to demonstrate any legal infirmity in the findings of the lower courts?
  • Does acting under the influence of a main co-accused uncle constitute an extenuating circumstance warranting the grant of leave to appeal for reduction of sentence?
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• Gulfam and 2 others vs The State and others1990 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-14
  leave to appealrobberyhouse-trespasscriminal convictionenhancement of sentenceFirst Information Reportrecovery evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the convictions and sentences of the petitioners for robbery and house-trespass. The petitioners were convicted by the Punjab Special Court for Speedy Trial for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code, following an incident at a jewellery shop where the complainant was robbed at gunpoint. The petitioners challenged their conviction, arguing that the complainant deliberately omitted their names from the First Information Report despite prior acquaintance, and contested the validity of the recovery and identification evidence. The complainant filed a cross-petition seeking enhancement of the sentences. Upon hearing the arguments, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in the criminal petition filed by the accused. Consequently, the Court also granted leave in the complainant's petition regarding the enhancement of the sentence. The judgment primarily addresses the procedural threshold for granting leave to appeal in criminal matters where questions of evidence, identification, and sentencing are raised, effectively allowing the case to proceed for a full hearing on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of the names of known accused persons in the First Information Report cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Under what circumstances is leave to appeal granted by the Supreme Court in criminal cases involving robbery and house-trespass?
  • Can a complainant maintain a petition for the enhancement of a sentence imposed by a trial court?
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• Gul Saleem Shah and another Shah Muhammad vs The State1990 SCMR 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-17
  narcoticsheroin recoveryappreciation of evidencebenefit of doubthostile witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the Federal Shariat Court, which maintained the conviction and sentences of the petitioners for the possession of 110 kilograms of heroin. The petitioners were apprehended in a vehicle containing the narcotics. The core legal question was whether the contradictions between the testimony of the prosecution's Group Leader and the Mashirs (witnesses) rendered the prosecution's case doubtful, thereby entitling the petitioners to the benefit of doubt. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly appreciated the evidence, finding that the testimony of the Group Leader was sufficient to establish guilt, particularly as the Mashirs appeared to have been won over by the smugglers. The Court affirmed that minor procedural irregularities, such as the handling of the narcotic samples between laboratories, did not undermine the essential facts of the recovery. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, establishing that the testimony of a credible witness can sustain a conviction even if other witnesses are inconsistent or hostile.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of a Group Leader when the Mashirs provide contradictory statements?
  • Does the potential winning over of prosecution witnesses by the accused entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Does the transfer of narcotic samples between different laboratories for chemical examination invalidate the prosecution's case?
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• Gul Khan vs The State and others1990 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  leave to appealacquittalappreciation of evidenceocular testimonyinterested witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant Gul Khan against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 19-9-1987, which acquitted respondents Nos. 2 to 4 of murder and related charges. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court was legally justified in rejecting the ocular testimony and setting aside the convictions. The Supreme Court held that the appreciation of evidence is primarily the function of the High Court, and where the High Court has properly evaluated the evidence and concluded that the interested and inimical eye-witnesses were unreliable or not present at the spot, no ground is made out for interference unless misreading of evidence or miscarriage of justice is established. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court when the appreciation of evidence has been properly done?
  • Can related and inimical eye-witnesses be relied upon without corroboration when their presence at the spot is found doubtful?
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• Government of the Punjab through Secretary vs Dr. (Mrs.) Shamim Raza1990 PLD Supreme Court 731 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-01
  service appeallimitationcondonation of delaysenioritypromotionPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan examined whether the service appeal filed before the Punjab Service Tribunal was competent and within time under section 4 of the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974. The core legal questions involved the computation of limitation in service matters, the permissibility of condoning delay caused by pursuing non-statutory administrative remedies before Martial Law Authorities, and the validity of a promotion against eligibility rules. The Supreme Court held that the appeal before the Service Tribunal was hopelessly time-barred, as time is of the essence in service matters and pursuing extra-legal remedies such as representations to Martial Law Administrators does not constitute a valid ground for condoning delay. The Court ruled that repeated approaches to wrong forums do not justify extending limitation periods. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the judgment of the Service Tribunal setting aside the departmental orders was reversed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pursuing remedies before Martial Law Authorities constitutes sufficient ground for condoning delay in filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Is an appeal filed before the Punjab Service Tribunal after a delay spent on extra-legal administrative representations maintainable?
  • Whether subsequent amendments or clarifications in eligibility rules have retrospective effect on earlier promotions?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab through Additional Chief Secretary, Services1990 SCMR 1431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-23
  Annual Confidential Reportexpungement of adverse remarksPunjab Service Tribunalservice lawgeneral reputationmagistrate performanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Government of the Punjab under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal expunging adverse remarks recorded in an Annual Confidential Report (ACR) by a countersigning officer. The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in expunging adverse remarks that were based merely on the general reputation of a Magistrate rather than on an assessment of actual performance. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal. The Court held that the performance of a Magistrate must be evaluated through an expert assessment by a superior based on record and performance in individual cases, rather than mere general reputation. The Court laid down the principle that while detailed reasons are not required when recording ACR remarks, conclusions must be grounded in facts, and when challenged, the concerned reporting or countersigning officer must offer a plausible explanation to justify the adverse assessment.

  Questions settled

  • Can adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report be justified solely on the basis of an officer's general reputation?
  • Is the Punjab Service Tribunal empowered to review and expunge adverse remarks recorded in an Annual Confidential Report?
  • What standard of proof or justification is required from a reporting officer when adverse remarks recorded in an ACR are contested by a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Sind and anothers vs Sharaf Faridi and 3 others1990 SCMR 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-09
  separation of judiciary from executiveconstitutional mandatejudicial independenceadministrative controlconstitutional petitionimplementation committeeArticle 175(3)
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Sindh High Court judgment mandating the separation of the judiciary from the executive within specified timelines. The core legal question concerned the practical implementation of the constitutional requirement under Article 175(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court, acknowledging the federal and provincial governments' commitment to this constitutional mandate, held that while the objective of separation was mandatory, a structured, uniform, and practical approach was required. Consequently, the Court ordered the formation of a high-level committee, comprising representatives from the federal and provincial governments, the judiciary, and the bar, to oversee the implementation process. To facilitate this committee's work, the Court suspended the specific time-bound directions previously issued by the High Court, while clarifying that this suspension did not halt ongoing administrative efforts toward separation. The judgment establishes that the Court may utilize specialized committees to ensure the effective, phased, and practical realization of constitutional mandates, balancing judicial oversight with administrative feasibility in complex structural reforms.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court suspend the time-bound directions of a High Court to facilitate the implementation of a constitutional mandate through a committee?
  • Does the separation of the judiciary from the executive require a uniform, phased implementation scheme across all provinces?
  • Is the establishment of a committee comprising government, judicial, and bar representatives a valid judicial mechanism for overseeing the implementation of constitutional provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab, through Secretary, Home Department, Lahore vs Zia Ullah Khan and others1990 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-30
  leave to appealspecial courts for speedy trialsdiscriminatory legislationconstitutional petitionpublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of the Punjab sought leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court that examined the establishment and continuance of Special Courts for Speedy Trials under Act XV of 1987 as amended by Ordinance No. XIX of 1988. The core legal questions involved whether the impugned legislation was discriminatory, violated Articles 10 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, and whether the Ordinance had expired, rendering the courts incompetent to continue proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions raised involved the interpretation of constitutional provisions of general effect and public importance. Consequently, the Supreme Court suspended the effect of the impugned judgment so as not to affect proceedings taken by the Special Courts after 13th February 1989 until the date of the impugned judgment. The key principle laid down is that matters concerning the constitutional validity and interpretation of special trial legislation of public importance warrant a full appeal before the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the establishment of Special Courts for Speedy Trials under Act XV of 1987 violates Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the impugned legislation afford adequate protection to the accused as required by Article 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • What is the effect of the expiration of Ordinance No. XIX of 1988 on the continuance of proceedings before the Special Courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab through Secretary, Livestock and Dairy1990 SCMR 995 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-26
  leave to appealservice tribunalcompulsory retirementdepartmental enquiryback benefitsmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of the Punjab sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan against a judgment of the Service Tribunal that set aside the compulsory retirement of the respondent, an Assistant Research Officer, and directed his reinstatement with back benefits. The respondent had been proceeded against departmentally for overstaying his leave ex-Pakistan. Although the Enquiry Officer and the Authorised Officer exonerated him, the competent authority imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement without recording reasons for differing with their recommendations. The Service Tribunal set aside the retirement order on the ground that the authority failed to provide reasons for disagreeing with the exoneration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan evaluated the matter and found that the factual aspects had been thoroughly examined by the lower forums and that no substantial question of law of public importance arose under the constitutional provision to warrant interference. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the decision of the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the competent authority can differ from the recommendations of the Enquiry Officer and Authorised Officer without providing reasons?
  • Does an order of compulsory retirement passed without assigning reasons for rejecting exoneration sustain scrutiny before the Service Tribunal?
  • When will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab through Secretary, Education, Lahore and others1990 SCMR 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-26
  rent restrictionevictionstriking off defencerent depositnon-compliancelandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging eviction orders passed by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi. The petitioners, the Government of Punjab, had failed to comply with a Rent Controller's order directing the deposit of rent arrears and future monthly rent. Consequently, their defence to the eviction application was struck off under the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller possesses the discretion to condone delays in rent deposits and prevent eviction when a tenant fails to comply with a deposit order. The Supreme Court held that failure to comply with the Rent Controller's direction regarding rent deposits mandates the striking off of the defence and subsequent eviction. The court affirmed that the Rent Controller lacks the power to ignore such non-compliance or condone delays, emphasizing that the statutory consequence of non-compliance is mandatory and not subject to compassionate grounds, even when the tenant is a government entity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to comply with a Rent Controller's order to deposit rent mandate the striking off of the tenant's defence?
  • Does a Rent Controller have the discretion to condone delays in the deposit of rent by a tenant?
  • Can a tenant avoid eviction under the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 on compassionate grounds when they have failed to comply with a rent deposit order?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab through Secretary Health, Lahore and 2 others vs Zahid Beg1990 SCMR 1170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-23
  deputationtermination of serviceoverstay of deputationservice tribunalleave to appealmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of the Punjab sought leave to appeal against the Punjab Service Tribunal's judgment which set aside the termination of the respondent, a Physiotherapy Aid who had remained on deputation in Libya beyond the initial period without explicit extension or recall. The core legal question was whether the Government could validly terminate the respondent for overstaying deputation without authority when the Government itself failed to recall him or provide an opportunity to rejoin in accordance with the deputation terms. The Supreme Court held that the Government could not take advantage of its own omission, as its failure to recall the respondent created a justifiable impression that he could remain on deputation until informed otherwise, and that the Service Tribunal rightly reinstated him. The key principle laid down is that an employer cannot penalize an employee for an overstay on deputation resulting from the employer's own failure to exercise its stipulated right of recall.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government can terminate an employee for overstaying a deputation without first recalling him as per the deputation terms?
  • Can the Government take the benefit of its own omission in failing to recall an official from deputation?
  • Whether a service tribunal is justified in setting aside a termination order passed in haste and without due application of mind?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and anothers vs Sajjad Haider Syed1990 PLD Supreme Court 743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-25
  termination of servicetemporary civil servantcompetent authoritysecurity of Pakistanservice tribunalpresidential approvalultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Service Tribunal decision setting aside the termination of the respondent, an Intelligence Officer, on the grounds that Rule 17(2) of the Defence Intelligence Service (Civilian Class I) Rules, 1972, was ultra vires the 1972 Constitution and the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Supreme Court examined whether the termination was validly executed. The Court found that the Service Tribunal had overlooked crucial evidence showing the President of Pakistan had personally approved the termination of the respondent’s services. As the respondent was a temporary employee, he did not enjoy the constitutional protections afforded to permanent civil servants. The Court held that since the competent authority—the President—had authorized the action, the termination was lawful, rendering it unnecessary to determine the vires of Rule 17(2). Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal’s judgment, holding that the termination of a temporary civil servant, when approved by the competent authority, is valid and not subject to the same procedural requirements as permanent employees, save for potential claims regarding notice pay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the termination of a temporary civil servant require the same procedural protections as a permanent civil servant?
  • Can an administrative action be upheld if approved by the competent authority, even if the specific rule invoked is challenged as ultra vires?
  • Is a temporary civil servant entitled to constitutional protection against termination of service?
  • Does the President of Pakistan have the authority to approve the termination of a temporary civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Government Of Pakistan Etc. vs Hashwani Hotel Limited [M/s.]PTCL 1990 CL. 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-11
  central excise dutyhotel room chargesconcessional ratetaxing statute interpretationcategorisation of customersshow cause noticeconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Government of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a Constitution petition filed by Messrs Hashwani Hotel Limited challenging show cause notices and a Central Board of Revenue order demanding additional central excise duty. The core legal question concerned whether the charging provision under Section 4(3)(a) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 applied to a legitimate categorisation of customers with varying rates or constituted an impermissible concessional rate. The Supreme Court held that the hotel management was legally authorized to establish different categories of customers for operational considerations and that such differential pricing did not amount to a 'concession' under the Act. The Court laid down the key principles that taxing statutes must be interpreted strictly according to their plain and natural meaning without intendment or equity, and that in the absence of an express legal bar, a business management retains the privilege to fix varying rates for different classes of customers without triggering penal excise liability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 4(3)(a) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 applies to a hotel's bona fide categorisation of customers charged at different rates?
  • Does the creation of different customer categories by a hotel management amount to a 'concession' under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  • Can provisions be imported into a taxing statute to support an assumed deficiency or intendment?
  • Are tax authorities empowered to dictate the fixation of different charges for different categories of hotel customers under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan and others vs Messrs Hashwani Hotel Ltd.1990 PLD Supreme Court 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-11
  central excise dutyconcessional ratetaxing statute interpretationhotel management ratescategorisation of customersshow-cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave was filed by the Government of Pakistan against the Lahore High Court's judgment setting aside show-cause notices issued under the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The Central Excise authorities demanded additional excise duty from Hashwani Hotel Ltd., alleging that lower room rates charged to specific customer categories (such as airlines, travel agents, and diplomatic personnel) amounted to rendering services at a 'concessional rate' under Section 4(3)(a) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The core legal question was whether establishing distinct rate categories for various customer groups constitutes a 'concession' requiring duty to be calculated on the highest general rate. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court's decision, holding that categorisation of customers is a lawful management practice and different rates fixed for defined classes do not constitute a concession. Applying settled principles of literal interpretation of taxing statutes, the Court affirmed that excise duty is payable on the actual charges received unless a genuine favour or reduction from an established class rate is granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does fixing different room rates for distinct categories of hotel customers constitute providing services at a concessional rate under Section 4(3)(a) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  • How is a taxing statute to be interpreted when the statutory language is plain and unambiguous?
  • Does Section 13 of the General Clauses Act apply to convert rate categorisation into a concessional rate for the purpose of levying excise duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of N.W.F.P., Health and Social Welfare Department1990 SCMR 1321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-30
  vested rightpromotionconstitutional petitionservice tribunalterms and conditions of servicemedical and dental council regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether a civil servant holding the post of Associate Professor has a vested right to be promoted as Professor under the rules in force prior to the notification dated 12th January 1984, which altered the eligibility criteria by excluding holders of minor diplomas. The core legal question concerns whether promotion criteria for a higher post constitute a term and condition of service in which a civil servant can claim a vested right, and whether a constitutional petition is barred under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that a civil servant has no vested right in promotion or in the terms and conditions of a higher post to which they have yet to be appointed, and that the constitutional petition was barred under Article 212. The key principles laid down are that terms and conditions of service relate only to the post currently held, the government may enhance qualifications for higher posts to maintain efficiency, and rules governing promotion to a higher post do not operate retrospectively merely because they affect future promotion prospects of existing employees.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant has a vested right to promotion or eligibility for a higher post?
  • Does a constitutional petition challenging the amendment of promotion rules for a higher post lie before the High Court or is it barred under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Can the rules and qualifications for recruitment and promotion to a higher post be amended by the Government to enhance service standards?
  • Whether the terms and conditions of a higher post constitute the terms and conditions of service of an employee holding a lower post?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of N.W.F.P., Health & Social Welfare Department vs Dr.1990 SCMR 1524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-30
  vested rightpromotioncivil servantretrospective operationconstitutional petitionservice tribunalterms and conditions of servicejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether a civil servant possesses a vested right to be promoted under the rules in force at the time they became eligible, or if the government may alter qualification criteria for higher posts. The respondent, an Associate Professor, challenged a 1984 government notification that rendered him ineligible for promotion to Professor by changing the required qualifications. The High Court initially ruled in his favor, holding the notification could not apply retrospectively. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that a civil servant has no vested right to promotion or to the terms and conditions of a higher post they do not yet occupy. The Court affirmed that the government retains the authority to enhance qualifications and standards for recruitment and promotion to maintain service efficiency. Furthermore, the Court noted that constitutional petitions regarding terms and conditions of service are barred under Article 212 of the Constitution, as such matters fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Court concluded that the respondent could not claim protection under prior rules for a higher post.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to be promoted under the rules in force at the time they became eligible for a higher post?
  • Can a civil servant challenge the amendment of promotion criteria for a higher post through a constitutional petition in the High Court?
  • Does the government have the authority to enhance qualifications for promotion to maintain efficiency in service?
  • Are terms and conditions of service for a higher post considered vested rights for a civil servant currently holding a lower post?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Balochistan through Secretary, S&Gad, Quetta and others vs Marjan Khan and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-26
  service senioritydirect recruits vs promoteesprospective operation of rulesquota systemcivil service rulesretrospective effectregular appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the determination of inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees within the P.C.S. (Executive Branch) of Balochistan. The core legal question was whether the 50:50 recruitment quota prescribed by the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964, applied to the entire cadre strength retrospectively or only to vacancies arising after the Rules' enforcement. The Service Tribunal had accepted the respondents' contention that the quota applied to the total cadre strength, resulting in an adjustment of seniority. The Supreme Court set aside this decision, holding that the 1964 Rules operate prospectively and cannot be applied to pre-integration posts or retrospectively to disturb established seniority. The Court affirmed that departmental circulars interpreting rules cannot amend the rules themselves. Furthermore, the Court clarified that under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, seniority is determined by the date of regular appointment, and promotees retain seniority regardless of whether the post is permanent or temporary, provided the appointment is regular. The seniority list prepared by the Government was thus upheld as legally valid.

  Questions settled

  • Do the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964 apply retrospectively to determine seniority for pre-integration posts?
  • Can departmental circulars or instructions amend or override statutory service rules?
  • Does a promotee's seniority depend on whether the post held is permanent or temporary under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Should recruitment quotas be applied to the total cadre strength or only to vacancies arising after the enforcement of the relevant service rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Balochistan through Secretary, Communication and Works Department, Quetta and 2 others vs Shabir Ahmad and another1990 SCMR 1233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-17
  service tribunal jurisdictiondepartmental punishmentminor penaltyquantum of punishmentdisciplinary proceedingsterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against the Service Tribunal's decisions regarding the competence of appeals against departmental punishments other than dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement. The core legal question was whether the Balochistan Service Tribunals Act excludes the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction over minor departmental penalties. The Court held that the Service Tribunal possesses jurisdiction to examine the determination of guilt or innocence in disciplinary proceedings, even when the resulting punishment is minor. The Court clarified that the statutory bar on appeals to the Service Tribunal, as framed by the word 'quantum' in the relevant provision, applies only to the assessment or amount of the punishment itself, not to the underlying finding of guilt or the validity of the disciplinary proceedings. Consequently, the Service Tribunal is competent to adjudicate appeals challenging the finding of guilt, even if the penalty imposed is minor. The principle established is that the exclusion of jurisdiction regarding 'quantum' of punishment does not preclude the Tribunal from reviewing the merits of the disciplinary action, including the determination of guilt or innocence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a departmental punishment that is not dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement?
  • Does the statutory exclusion of appeals regarding the 'quantum' of punishment prevent the Service Tribunal from reviewing the finding of guilt in disciplinary proceedings?
  • Can the Service Tribunal examine the merits of a disciplinary action if the penalty imposed is a minor one?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Zakria vs Sher Bahadur Khan1990 SCMR 1719 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-28
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionco-sharertenant-at-willremand of caserevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by the appellant Ghulam Zakria against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had accepted a revision petition filed by the respondent Sher Bahadur Khan, setting aside the District Judge's judgment and restoring the trial court's dismissal of the pre-emption suit. The core legal question involves the determination of superior rights of pre-emption concerning agricultural land, specifically regarding tenancy status and co-sharer rights. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the decisions of the trial court on material issues lacked proper alignment with the oral and documentary evidence, and that the District Judge was justified in remanding the case for fresh evidence and determination. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the order of the District Judge directing a fresh trial with opportunities for both parties to lead further evidence. The key principle laid down is that where crucial issues regarding pre-emption and tenancy lack adequate factual findings on record, remand for fresh evidence is appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a remand of a pre-emption suit is justified when material issues lack proper findings and evidentiary support?
  • Can a vendee claim a superior right of pre-emption as a tenant-at-will against a co-sharer pre-emptor?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere in revision with findings of fact when material issues require proper legal and factual appraisal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar Chaudhry vs Chairman Central Board of Revenue1990 SCMR 1443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  service tribunalleave to appealupgradationAssistant Income-tax OfficersIncome-tax Officerspay scalediscriminationservice structure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, promoted Assistant Income-tax Officers (AITOs) from Inspectors, sought leave to appeal against the Service Tribunal's dismissal of their appeals. Their core grievance was that upon the enforcement of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, their separate identity was merged into the definition of Income-tax Officers (ITOs), and since they performed similar duties, they were entitled to the same pay scale and grade (upgradation from BPS 16 to BPS 17), failing which they faced unconstitutional discrimination. The core legal question was whether AITOs are entitled to the same pay, scale, and grade as ITOs merely because they are included in the inclusive definition of ITOs under the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court held that the statutory background and the inclusive definition recognized rather than erased the distinctive identity and categorization of AITOs, and that inclusion in the definition does not equate their service structure, pay, or grade to that of ITOs. The Court refused leave to appeal, laying down the principle that the inclusion of a lower post within the definition of a higher post under a fiscal statute does not automatically entitle the holders of the lower post to the same pay, scale, and grade, provided the classification is based on permissible criteria in the service structure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Assistant Income-tax Officers are entitled to the same pay, scale, and grade as Income-tax Officers under the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the inclusion of Assistant Income-tax Officers in the definition of Income-tax Officers abolish their separate identity and service structure?
  • Does the refusal to grant identical pay scales to Assistant Income-tax Officers and Income-tax Officers amount to unconstitutional discrimination?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Razzaq vs The State1990 SCMR 1314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-18
  petition for leave to appealdismissal of petitionsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by way of a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question involves the challenge against a lower judicial order or decision. The court considered the arguments presented and the record of the case. The Supreme Court decided to dismiss the petition. The key principle laid down is that where no sufficient grounds or infirmities are shown in the impugned judgment, the petition for leave to appeal stands dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal can be dismissed when no sufficient grounds are made out?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul vs Bashir Ahmad and others1990 SCMR 749 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-30
  civil revisionconcurrent findings of factabatement of suitland ownershipspecial leave to appealprescription
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision against concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts. The petitioner had filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction regarding land ownership, claiming rights through prescription and challenging inheritance mutations in favor of the respondents. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the appellate court upheld this decision. The High Court dismissed the subsequent civil revision, noting that the suit had abated under the Punjab Ordinance XIII of 1983 and that an appeal against the trial court's decree was not maintainable. The Supreme Court examined the arguments and the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that since the findings were concurrent and based on facts, and because the suit had abated under the relevant ordinance, there was no ground to interfere with the High Court's decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the finality of the concurrent findings and the legal effect of the abatement provision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit abate under the Punjab Ordinance XIII of 1983?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a civil revision?
  • Is an appeal maintainable against a trial court's decree if the suit has abated under the Punjab Ordinance XIII of 1983?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul and 5 others vs Janna T Bibi and 11 others1990 SCMR 744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-30
  civil revisionsettlement authoritiesjurisdiction of civil courtstransfer of propertyfinality of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision and upheld the appellate judgment of the District Judge setting aside the trial court's decree in favour of the petitioners regarding the disputed property. The core legal question concerns the jurisdiction of civil courts to challenge or correct orders passed by Settlement Authorities which have attained finality under special laws governing property transfers. The Supreme Court held that the civil suit was barred by the provisions of the special law, as the property was transferred and P.T.O. and P.T.D. were issued, rendering the final orders of the Settlement Authorities unchallengeable in civil courts pursuant to section 25 of the relevant Act. Consequently, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the suit was incompetent and the lower appellate and high court orders were correct.

  Questions settled

  • Do civil courts have jurisdiction to correct orders passed by Settlement Authorities that have attained finality?
  • Is a civil suit barred by provisions of a special law governing the transfer of property after the issuance of P.T.O. and P.T.D.?
  • Whether the High Court correctly upheld the appellate court's dismissal of an incompetent suit regarding settled property?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs The State1990 SCMR 1401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-19
  criminal petitionleave to appealdismissal of petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal in the case of Ghulam Rasool versus The State, reported in 1990 SCMR 1401. The core legal question concerned the validity of the petitioner's conviction or the legality of the lower court proceedings as challenged in the petition. The Supreme Court considered the arguments and the record, and ultimately held that the petition was devoid of merit. The court's decision was to dismiss the petition. The judgment establishes no extensive new legal principles due to its summary nature, affirming the dismissal of the proceedings at the leave stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal against the conviction can be dismissed when found without merit?
  • Did the Supreme Court dismiss the petition filed by Ghulam Rasool against the State?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool and others vs Faiz Bakhsh1990 SCMR 956 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-28
  pre-emptionex parte decreeleave to appealremandco-owners
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, real brothers, filed a pre-emption suit claiming superior rights as co-owners, which was decreed ex parte on 17-7-1982. The trial court later set aside the ex parte decree, tried the suit on merits, and dismissed it. On appeal, the District Judge remanded the matter, after which the trial court decreed the suit on 14-7-1988, a decision upheld by the District Judge. However, the High Court accepted the respondent's revision petition and set aside the judgments of the subordinate courts, holding that no decree could be passed after 31-7-1986 pursuant to the rule laid down in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that an ex parte decree had already been passed prior to the target date. The core legal question concerns whether the existence of an initial ex parte decree passed before 31-7-1986 exempts a pre-emption suit from abatement upon subsequent remand and retrial. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter, particularly noting conflicting views taken by the Lahore High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the passing of an ex parte decree in a pre-emption suit prior to 31-7-1986 save the suit from abatement where the decree was subsequently set aside and a fresh decree is passed after the target date?
  • Can a pre-emption suit be decreed after 31-7-1986 in light of the judgment in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qasim vs Sohna and others1990 SCMR 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-21
  ocular testimonyacquittalcapital chargereappraisal of evidenceunwitnessed crimecriminal appealprobative value
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal matter where the respondents were initially convicted by a Sessions Judge for murder under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with one respondent sentenced to death and another to life imprisonment. The Lahore High Court, in appeal, set aside these convictions and acquitted all respondents, concluding that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The complainant challenged this acquittal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the ocular testimony and concluding that the occurrence was an unwitnessed crime. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the reasons for rejecting the eye-witnesses—specifically doubts regarding their presence at the crime scene and the timing of the occurrence—were sound and valid. The Court held that the ocular testimony lacked the necessary quality and probative value to sustain a conviction on a capital charge. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that there were no sufficient grounds for a reappraisal of the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be sustained solely on ocular testimony if the presence of the eye-witnesses at the scene is found to be doubtful?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to reappraise evidence in a criminal petition for leave to appeal if the High Court's rejection of ocular testimony is based on sound and valid reasoning?
  • Does the failure of eye-witnesses to be present at the crime scene upon the arrival of the police undermine the credibility of their testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir vs Haji Khuda Bakhsh and 6 others1990 SCMR 675 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-13
  leave to appealcivil revisionstriking off defencememo of addressprocedural lawdiscretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff against the High Court's judgment accepting the respondents' civil revision. The trial court had struck off the defendants' defence for failing to submit a memo of address under Order VIII, Rule 12, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court set aside the trial court's order, noting that complete addresses were already available on the record and the trial court exercised its discretion illegally, especially when counsel was bed-ridden. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the striking off of defence and how the word 'liable' in Order VIII, Rule 12 should be interpreted. The Supreme Court held that the provision makes a party 'liable to have his defence... struck out', which must be construed as creating only a possibility rather than a mandatory mandate. Finding no error in the High Court's judgment and distinguishing the cited precedent, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the revisional jurisdiction was rightly exercised to correct an illegal exercise of discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the word 'liable' in Order VIII Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 creates a mandatory mandate or only a possibility for striking out a defence?
  • Can the High Court interfere in its revisional jurisdiction with an illegal exercise of discretion by the trial court regarding the striking off of a defence?
  • Is the striking of a defence justified under Order VIII Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the complete addresses of the defendants are already available on the judicial record?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir vs Ahmad Yar and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 1049 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-15
  adverse possessionalternative pleasinconsistent pleascivil revisionsuit for possessionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld a decree of possession in favor of the plaintiff. The core legal question concerns whether a party asserting ownership through a valid title by purchase and inheritance can simultaneously maintain an alternative plea of adverse possession. The Supreme Court held that pleading a valid title is mutually destructive to and incompatible with claiming adverse possession, as a party cannot assert lawful ownership while simultaneously claiming possession that is open, hostile, and against the true owner to mature title through efflux of time. The Court established the principle that when a party claims a valid title through purchase or inheritance, it becomes impossible to succeed in the alternative on the plea of adverse possession. Finding no merit in the petition or technical contentions raised, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party pleading a valid title through purchase and inheritance simultaneously maintain an alternative plea of adverse possession?
  • Does reliance on a valid source of title debar a party from pleading adverse possession?
  • Whether inconsistency between alternative pleas of lawful ownership and adverse possession renders them impermissible?
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• Ghulam Qadir Butt vs Finance Division (Military), Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi and another1990 SCMR 1411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-14
  service tribunalsurplus employeeretrenchmentlimitationjurisdictionpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his service appeal. The petitioner, formerly a U.D.C. in the Settlement and Rehabilitation Department, was declared surplus due to retrenchment under an order dated 26-1-1966. The core legal question was whether the Federal Service Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against an order or decision made prior to 1st July, 1969. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was rightly dismissed by the Tribunal as not entertainable. The key principle laid down is that under Section 4(1)(c) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, no appeal lies to the Federal Service Tribunal against any order or decision made before 1st July, 1969.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the Federal Service Tribunal against an order or decision made prior to 1st July, 1969?
  • Can a service appeal challenging a pre-1969 retrenchment order be entertained by the Federal Service Tribunal under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
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• Ghulam Mustafa vs Akbar Khan and another1990 SCMR 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-11
  leave to appealconviction alterationjudicial discretioncriminal appealsentence reductionculpable homicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner, Ghulam Mustafa, challenging a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 7-6-1987. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was legally justified in altering the respondent's conviction from Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which resulted in a reduction of the respondent's sentence from life imprisonment to seven years of rigorous imprisonment, along with a reduction in the imposed fine. Upon reviewing the judgment and the reasoning provided by the High Court, the Supreme Court determined that the High Court had provided cogent reasons for its decision and had exercised its judicial discretion in accordance with the law. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's judgment and dismissed the petition. The case affirms the principle that an appellate court may exercise its discretion to alter a conviction and sentence when supported by valid legal reasoning.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of judicial discretion in altering a conviction and sentence?
  • Is the reduction of a sentence from life imprisonment to seven years under Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, legally permissible when supported by cogent reasons?
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• Ghulam Murtaza vs Muhammad Arif alias Bahari and others1990 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  leave to appealmurdermitigating circumstancesreduction of sentencedeath sentencelife imprisonmentmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction of respondent Muhammad Arif under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ghulam Hussain, but reducing his sentence from death to imprisonment for life due to the non-availability of an immediate motive on record. The core legal question concerns whether the absence of an immediate motive constitutes a sufficient mitigating circumstance to justify the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider this question, noting that leave had already been granted in a similar matter involving an identical question of an unknown or concealed motive. The Court held that the petition warranted a detailed consideration alongside the connected matter and directed that the respondent remain in custody during the pendency of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of an immediate motive for an offense can serve as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
  • Does the non-availability of an immediate motive on record justify interference with the quantum of sentence in a murder conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Ghulam Muhammad vs Tamkeen alias Bhukka and 3 others1990 SCMR 1087 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-05
  leave to appealprivate defencealteration of convictionocular testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The complainant Ghulam Muhammad sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 1-6-1987, which acquitted one convict, Jamil, and altered the conviction of the other, Tamkeen, from section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code to section 304, Part I, of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentencing him to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question involved the assessment of ocular testimony, the plea of private defence, and whether the High Court was justified in accepting the accused's plea while rejecting the prosecution's eyewitness accounts. The Supreme Court held that the conclusions reached by the High Court were plausible based on the evidence on record, and the mere possibility of another view did not constitute a sufficient ground for granting leave to appeal. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming that plausible factual findings by the High Court regarding self-defence and rejection of ocular testimony warrant no interference under appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in accepting the plea of private defence in the absence of injuries on the person of the accused?
  • Does the mere possibility of another view on the evidence constitute a sufficient ground for granting leave to appeal against an acquittal or alteration of conviction?
  • Whether the rejection of ocular testimony warrants the acceptance of the accused's version when corroborated by defence witnesses?
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• Ghulam Muhammad and others vs The State1990 SCMR 590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-16
  criminal appealbenefit of the doubtocular testimonyappreciation of evidencemurderover-implicationcriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from judgments of the trial court and the High Court convicting multiple accused persons for murder, attempted murder, house trespass, and rioting under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether there had been an over-implication or inclusion of a larger number of persons than those who actually participated in the crime. The Supreme Court evaluated the reliability of the ocular testimony, the motive, and the specific roles attributed to each appellant. The court held that the testimony of certain key witnesses was unreliable and that the prosecution failed to establish the alleged motive or the active participation of all accused beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the court extended the benefit of the doubt to most of the appellants and acquitted them, while upholding the conviction of the main appellant whose role was corroborated by an injured natural witness. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's motive fails and ocular evidence contains serious infirmities regarding the identity and participation of numerous accused, the court will sift the grain from the chaff, exclude doubtful testimony, and grant the benefit of the doubt to those whose participation is not safely established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of an eye-witness who escaped unhurt during an attack can be safely relied upon?
  • Can the conviction of multiple accused persons be sustained when the prosecution motive is not established and participation of the accused is doubtful?
  • Whether the benefit of the doubt can be extended to certain co-accused while upholding the conviction of the principal offender based on the testimony of an injured witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad and 6 others vs Muhammad Bakhkh and 4 others1990 SCMR 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-31
  inheritancetestamentary successionShariat lawbequestMuslim Personal Lawlimited estate
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the inheritance of land owned by the late Noor Khan, who died issueless. The core legal question concerned the validity and effect of a will executed by the deceased in 1927, specifically regarding the devolution of property upon the death of the first legatee, Mst. Badshahan, in 1957. The appellants contended that the property should devolve upon the heirs of the last male-holder under Shariat law, pursuant to the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1948 and the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962. The Supreme Court held that the testator was only competent to bequeath one-third of his property via will. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, modifying the decree to grant the respondent one-third of the property under the will, while directing that the remaining two-thirds devolve upon the heirs of the last male-holder in accordance with Shariat law. The judgment affirms the principle that testamentary disposition is limited to one-third of the estate, with the remainder subject to Islamic inheritance laws.

  Questions settled

  • Is a testator competent to bequeath more than one-third of their property under Shariat law?
  • How does the death of a limited estate-holder affect the devolution of property under the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1948?
  • Does the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962 limit the testamentary power of a last male-holder?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Khan vs The District Judge, Gujrat and 2 others1990 SCMR 136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-16
  maintenancefamily lawcompromise decreeexecution of decreeparental obligation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an order by the District Judge, Gujrat, regarding the execution of a compromise decree for maintenance. The petitioner, a father, challenged his obligation to maintain his daughter, arguing that his liability ceased because she refused to marry. The daughter had refused marriage to care for her ailing mother. The core legal question was whether a father's obligation to maintain his daughter terminates upon her refusal to marry, particularly when that refusal is based on the care of an ailing parent. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's contention lacked force. The Court reasoned that the daughter's refusal to marry was temporary and based on a genuine, temporary disability (caring for her mother), and that the father's liability would only be exonerated upon her actual marriage. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the maintenance obligation persists until the daughter marries, and a temporary refusal does not extinguish the father's legal duty.

  Questions settled

  • Does a father's obligation to maintain his daughter cease if she refuses to marry?
  • Is a daughter's refusal to marry due to the care of an ailing parent a valid ground for a father to stop maintenance payments?
  • Does a temporary refusal to marry by a daughter exonerate the father from his maintenance liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs Yousaf and 2 others1990 SCMR 1225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land settlementallotmentwrit petitionremandconflicting judgments
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court that allowed a constitutional petition arising out of a land settlement case. The core legal question involves examining the effect of the pendency of an earlier writ petition filed by the appellant on subsequent proceedings and ensuring no conflict of judgments arises from parallel litigation over the same subject-matter. The Supreme Court held that to avoid potential conflicting judgments, the matter ought to be heard and disposed of together with the pending earlier writ petition. Accordingly, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the High Court for re-hearing and fresh decision along with the connected pending writ petition. The key principle laid down is that where connected matters involving the same subject-matter are pending across different proceedings, the court must ensure they are heard together to prevent contradictory judicial outcomes.

  Questions settled

  • What is the effect of the pendency of an earlier writ petition on subsequent proceedings relating to the same land settlement dispute?
  • Whether a case should be remanded to the High Court to be heard along with a pending connected writ petition to avoid conflict of judgments?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain and another vs Province of Punjab and 2 others1990 SCMR 668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  leave to appealallotment of State landproprietary rightstarget datecivil revisionmesne profits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of the petitioners' civil revision by the High Court. The underlying proceedings originated from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction concerning the allotment of State land on lease with the potential acquisition of proprietary rights. While the trial Court non-suited the petitioners primarily on jurisdiction and other legal grounds, the High Court evaluated the merits and determined that the allotment orders relied upon by the petitioners fell outside the prescribed target date. Upon examination of the disputed allotment orders, the Supreme Court observed that multiple dates appeared on the forms, raising a triable controversy regarding whether the allotment was validly made within the target date. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to resolve this controversy and issued interim directions concerning the deposit of security for mesne profits and the maintenance of possession by the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allotment of State land was made within the prescribed target date?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted when conflicting dates on allotment documents raise a triable controversy?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider Khan vs Muhammad Hayat and 3 others1990 SCMR 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  leave to appealculpable homicidegrave and sudden provocationenhancement of sentencemolestationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against the judgment of the lower court convicting the respondent Muhammad Hayat under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for culpable homicide not amounting to murder on the ground of grave and sudden provocation, while acquitting the other co-accused. The petitioner sought either a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 or an enhancement of the seven-year rigorous imprisonment sentence. The core legal question was whether the case warranted interference regarding the finding of sudden provocation and the adequacy of the sentence given the mitigating circumstance that the deceased had molested the accused's sister, resulting in pregnancy. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the finding of sudden provocation was well-founded and the sentence imposed was appropriate given the circumstances. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, laying down the principle that appellate interference is unwarranted in culpable homicide convictions where grave and sudden provocation is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is justified when the act is committed under grave and sudden provocation?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a sentence of rigorous imprisonment under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in the presence of strong mitigating circumstances?
  • Whether molestation of a family member resulting in pregnancy constitutes grave and sudden provocation to reduce murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid vs The State and another1990 SCMR 1403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-24
  bail cancellationleave to appealunnatural offencediscretionary jurisdictionheinous offence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court whereby bail granted to him by the Additional Sessions Judge in a case under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code was cancelled. The core legal question involved the propriety of cancelling pre-trial bail in a heinous offence involving a minor. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in cancelling the bail called for no interference, noting the serious nature of the allegations supported by medical evidence showing semen stains on swabs taken from the minor victim. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that superior courts will not interfere with the discretionary cancellation of bail by the High Court in heinous offences where tentative assessment of record prima facie connects the accused with the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's order cancelling bail in a case under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does the cancellation of bail by the High Court call for interference when supported by medical evidence connecting the accused to the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid Khan vs Muhammad Hanif Khan and others1990 SCMR 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-11
  refereearbitration awardQanun-e-Shahadatadmissionobjections to awardsuccession disputeremand of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside a trial court's decree and remanded the suit for a fresh decision. The dispute involved the heirs of a deceased estate owner. During the trial court proceedings, the parties filed a joint application appointing a relative as a 'referee' to make a 'decision' (faisla) regarding the distribution of the entire estate. The referee submitted a written decision, and the trial court immediately passed a decree in accordance with it. The respondents challenged this, arguing that the decision was actually an arbitration award and that they were deprived of the opportunity to file objections. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that a reference to an outside party to decide disputes and apportion an estate is not a reference for information under Article 33 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat. Because the referee made a judicial determination rather than furnishing information, the decision constituted an arbitration award, which could not be made a rule of court without allowing the parties to file objections.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference to a third party to decide a dispute and apportion an estate constitutes a reference for information under Article 33 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat?
  • Does the use of the word 'referee' in a joint application prevent the court from construing the third party's decision as an arbitration award?
  • Can a trial court make a referee's decision that acts as an arbitration award a rule of court without giving the parties an opportunity to file objections?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Din and others vs Saifullah and others1990 SCMR 1017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-16
  land allotmentsettlement schemerehabilitation authoritiesprior proposalfactual controversywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of land measuring 217 Kanals 7 Marlas in village Kasana, Tehsil Shakargarh. The core legal question was whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities acted lawfully in ignoring an earlier proposal of land in favour of the respondents (dated 30-12-1965) to subsequently allot the same land to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest (dated 30-12-1969). The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, which had accepted the respondents' writ petition. The Court held that under Para 68 of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme, it was mandatory for the authorities to confirm the earlier proposal once made, and the failure to do so while allotting the land to another party was without lawful authority. The Court further refused to entertain a new factual contention regarding the transfer of the respondents' claims to another district, noting that this issue had been factually determined and settled by the Settlement Commissioner previously. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the respondents' superior entitlement based on the priority of their earlier proposal.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities to confirm a land proposal once it has been made under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
  • Can a party raise a new factual controversy in the Supreme Court that was previously determined and rebutted by the Settlement Commissioner?
  • Does an earlier proposal for land allotment confer a superior right over a subsequent allotment made without confirming the prior proposal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Bahu vs Mst. Maqsood Bibi1990 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-03
  ad interim injunctiondeclaratory suitguardian ad litemleave to appealprima facie caseirreparable loss
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a revision petition and restored the trial court's order dismissing the petitioner's application for an ad interim injunction in a declaratory suit. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the appellate court's interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing interim relief, particularly regarding the existence of a prima facie case and irreparable loss, as well as the procedural propriety of admitting affidavits in the appellate court without opportunity for rebuttal. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly considered the factual and legal aspects, including the valid appointment of a guardian ad litem, and that the High Court was fully justified in restoring the trial court's order, especially given the improper admission of un-rebutted affidavits by the first appellate court. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appellate court can interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing an ad interim injunction when a prima facie case and irreparable loss are not made out?
  • Is it proper for an appellate court to consider affidavits filed on appeal without affording the opposing party an opportunity to rebut them?
  • Whether the appointment of a guardian ad litem can be challenged without showing material procedural flaws or prejudice?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali vs Asmat Ullah and another1990 SCMR 1630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-13
  rejection of plaintOrder VII Rule 11 CPCcause of actionoral evidenceorder of remanddeed of exchangecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave was directed against the High Court's judgment accepting the respondents' First Appeal, setting aside a District Judge's remand order, and restoring the trial court's order rejecting the appellant's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.). The High Court had held that because certain terms regarding monetary adjustments and superstructure value were absent from the written deed of exchange, no oral evidence could be led, thereby concluding that the plaint failed to disclose a cause of action. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a plaint can be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. based on potential evidentiary limitations or lack of proof. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the remand order, holding that for determining whether a plaint discloses a cause of action, only the averments made in the plaint itself must be considered, regardless of whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaint can be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. on the ground of anticipated lack or weakness of proof?
  • Whether the court must look solely at the assertions made in the plaint to determine if a cause of action is disclosed under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.?
  • Does the inadmissibility of oral evidence to prove a claim justify the rejection of a plaint for non-disclosure of a cause of action?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali and others vs Muhammad Hanif and others1990 SCMR 1172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  leave to appealland allotmentsettlement authoritiesexcess allotmentwrit petitionmukhbiri application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had accepted a writ petition filed by the respondents and restored their land allotments. The original allottees, Malik Muhammad Zaman and Shah Muhammad Khan, had sold their allotted land to respondents Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Upon a mukhbiri application, the Settlement Authorities reduced the allotments as being in excess of entitlements. After protracted litigation involving remands and fresh decisions by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, the High Court ultimately set aside the cancellation, holding that the allotments were not in excess of entitlements and that minor irregularities in transferring units between districts were regularisable. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the factual findings and orders of the Settlement Authorities regarding excess allotments. The Supreme Court found prima facie merit in the petitioners' contentions that the allotments were indeed in excess of entitlements, and consequently granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the cancellation of land allotments made by the Settlement Authorities?
  • Are irregularities regarding the transfer of units from one district to another capable of being regularised?
  • Whether land allotments obtained in excess of entitlements are liable to be reduced by the Settlement Authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Akbar vs The State1990 SCMR 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-26
  post-arrest bailattempted murderfirearm injuriesweapon recoverycriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the bail application of the petitioner, Ghulam Akbar, who was charged along with another under section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for firing at the injured prosecution witness and causing multiple firearm injuries. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail considering the direct charge in the First Information Report, the recovery of the weapon of offence, and the existence of a motive. The Supreme Court held that given the direct attribution, the recovery of the pistol, and the motive to take revenge, the petitioner was not entitled to the grant of bail at this stage. The petition was consequently dismissed, upholding the concurrent refusal of bail by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused directly charged in the FIR with firearm injuries entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does the recovery of the weapon of offence from the accused preclude the grant of bail at an early stage?
  • Whether the existence of a strong motive affects the consideration for post-arrest bail in a charge under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ahmad vs Muhammad Sarwar and others1990 SCMR 829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-15
  evacuee propertycivil court decreevoid auctionbona fide purchasersettlement authoritiescompensation pooltitle dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves a dispute over the ownership of property No. 8/586 in Sialkot, which was claimed by the respondent as Muslim-owned property based on a 1944 Civil Court decree. The core legal question was whether the property, having been judicially determined as Muslim-owned and excluded from the Rehabilitation Department's record, could be validly auctioned as evacuee property by the Settlement Authorities. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that because the property was not evacuee property, it was never part of the compensation pool and could not be legally transferred by the Settlement Authorities. The Court held that the auction was void ab initio, and consequently, no valid title could be conveyed to the auction-purchaser or subsequent vendees, regardless of claims of being a bona fide purchaser for value. The key principle laid down is that property judicially determined to be owned by a Muslim prior to partition does not constitute evacuee property, and any subsequent administrative auction of such property is void, rendering derivative titles invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Can property judicially determined to be owned by a Muslim prior to partition be treated as evacuee property?
  • Does an auction of non-evacuee property by Settlement Authorities confer valid title upon the purchaser?
  • Can a subsequent purchaser claim the status of a bona fide purchaser for value if the underlying auction of the property was void ab initio?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghee Corporation of Pakistan and another vs Sh. Abdul Haq and another1990 SCMR 1581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-20
  judgment written after elevationfunctus officionatural justiceright of hearingremandcivil appealwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two civil appeals arising from a writ petition and subsequent miscellaneous proceedings concerning a challenge to a judgment written by a High Court judge after he had ceased to hold his office due to elevation to the Supreme Court. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court relates to whether an order passed on a miscellaneous application without notice and hearing to the affected party violates natural justice, and whether the validity of a judgment written post-elevation requires proper examination after hearing all concerned parties. The Supreme Court held that the order passed by the High Court without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant suffered from a procedural defect violating the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remanded the miscellaneous application for fresh decision after due notice and hearing to all parties concerned, keeping the connected appeal pending.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed on a miscellaneous application without issuing notice and hearing the affected party is sustainable in law?
  • Does a judge of a High Court become functus officio to write a judgment upon elevation to a higher court?
  • Whether a case should be remanded to the High Court when procedural improprieties and lack of opportunity to present legal submissions are established?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazanfar Ali and another vs Fida Hussain and 2 others1990 SCMR 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-26
  ejectmentnon-joinder of partiescivil revisionlandlord and tenantconcurrent findings of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a civil revision against an ejectment order concerning a shop unit in Abpara Market, Islamabad. The petitioners contended that the ejectment suit was defective due to the non-joinder of necessary parties, specifically alleging that other occupants were not included in the litigation. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that the individuals mentioned by the petitioners were not tenants under the agreement with the respondent landlords, nor had they responded to the legal notices issued. The Court held that the respondents, having purchased the property, had fulfilled their obligation by serving notice upon the petitioners. Furthermore, the Court observed that the findings of the three lower courts regarding the factual disputes were concurrent and free from legal infirmity or misappraisal of evidence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that no error of law existed to warrant interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to implead occupants who are not parties to a tenancy agreement constitute a fatal non-joinder of necessary parties in an ejectment suit?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by three lower courts subject to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal infirmity or misappraisal of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Gehram and 14 others vs Mst. Allah Jiwai and 72 others1990 SCMR 761 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  land disputesale deed authenticitymutationcivil revisionjoint khatadeclaration of ownershipappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a civil revision filed by the respondents. The dispute originated from a suit for declaration of ownership and possession of land, wherein the petitioners challenged the validity of three specific land mutations. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but the District Court reversed this decision, decreeing the suit in favor of the petitioners. The High Court subsequently accepted the respondents' revision, primarily addressing the issue of limitation regarding the land, which was part of a joint Khata. Before the Supreme Court, the core legal question was whether the sale-deed dated 4-4-1919, relied upon by the petitioners, was a genuine document. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had correctly appraised the evidence, concluding that the sale-deed was of doubtful authenticity. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it, affirming the High Court's decision to uphold the trial court's findings on the evidentiary issue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sale-deed of doubtful authenticity can form the basis for a claim of ownership in a suit for declaration?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to re-appraise evidence regarding the genuineness of a document in civil revision proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Gauhar Reiiman vs Jan Asiibi and another1990 SCMR 1586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-21Read full judgment →
• Gauhar Rehman vs Jan Ashbi and another1990 SCMR 1598 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-21
  redemption of mortgageequity of redemptionmutationconcurrent findings of factcivil appealtitle to property
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises out of a suit for redemption of mortgage filed by respondent No. 1, claiming title to the equity of redemption through a gift via Mutation No. 24 attested on 30-11-1962 from the sister of the original owner. The appellant contested the suit, claiming to have purchased the equity of redemption in 1950 via a sale-deed. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of respondent No. 1, which decisions were successively upheld by the Additional District Judge and the High Court. The core legal question concerned the validity and proof of the alleged sale-deed relied upon by the appellant, and whether respondent No. 1 had established valid title. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the lack of genuineness and failure of proof of the appellant's sale-deed were unexceptionable, and that respondent No. 1's title stood established. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the genuineness of title documents and property transactions will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a title document can be interfered with in second appeal?
  • Does a plaintiff seeking redemption of mortgage establish a valid title through a duly attested gift mutation of the equity of redemption?
  • Whether an unproven sale-deed bearing impossible payment dates and denied by the original owner can confer valid title?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary Establishment Division and 21990 SCMR 1448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-11
  service lawleave to appealarmy pensioncivil servicepension deductionpublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federation of Pakistan sought leave to appeal against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had ruled in favor of respondents regarding the non-deduction of Army pensions from their civil post salaries. The core legal question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Service Tribunal correctly interpreted the relevant laws, rules, and regulations concerning the entitlement of civil servants to receive their full pay in addition to their Army pensions. Upon hearing the arguments from both the petitioners and the respondents, the Supreme Court determined that the issues raised were of significant public importance requiring further judicial examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to address the sustainability of the Tribunal's findings. The principle established is that matters involving the interpretation of service rules regarding the concurrent receipt of pension and salary for civil servants, when contested by the Federation, constitute questions of public importance warranting a full hearing by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the receipt of an Army pension justify the deduction of that amount from the salary of a civil post?
  • Are questions regarding the interpretation of service rules for civil servants considered matters of public importance?
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• Federation of Pakistan through the General Manager (Personnel), Pakistan Railways, Headquarters Office, Lahore vs Mrs. Riaz Latif1990 PLD Supreme Court 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-07
  certified copylimitation acttime requisitecopying agency manualvalue payable postcondonation of delayexclusion of time
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a service-related civil suit filed by the respondent against the Federation of Pakistan. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent. The appellant applied for a certified copy of the judgment on the prescribed form, explicitly requesting delivery via Value Payable Post (V.P.P.) pursuant to the relevant rules. The Copying Agency failed to dispatch the copy by V.P.P., resulting in a delay of nearly four years before the appellant personally collected the copy and filed an appeal alongside an application under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908. Both the first appellate court and the High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that under Rules 13-A.12, 13-A.13, and 13-A.40 of the Copying Agency Manual, an applicant has a right to obtain a certified copy via V.P.P., and the Copying Agency is legally obligated to comply. The Court held that a party cannot be penalized for the non-observance of procedural rules by the Copying Agency.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a Copying Agency to dispatch a certified copy by V.P.P. entitles an applicant to exclude the resulting delay under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a litigant be penalized or deprived of time exclusion due to non-compliance with statutory duties by the Copying Agency?
  • Is the Copying Agency legally obligated to send certified copies by V.P.P. when a request is made on the prescribed form under the Copying Agency Manual?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Education and anothers vs Rao Muhammad Yasin Khan and another1990 SCMR 1692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-07
  civil servantpromotionFederal Service Tribunalnext below rulemala fideDepartmental Promotion Committeeservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan examined whether the Federal Service Tribunal was legally empowered to direct that a civil servant be deemed to have continued in National Pay Scale 19 after his reversion from the Northern Areas with consequential benefits, despite not being regularly promoted. The respondent, an Education Department employee, had his promotion repeatedly and arbitrarily blocked by his department through the withdrawal of his name from the Departmental Promotion Committee, while a junior officer continued to enjoy N.P.S.-19. The Supreme Court held that since the department handled the respondent's case perversely and mala fide, the principle of the next below rule applied. The Court modified the Tribunal's direction, granting the respondent entitlement to N.P.S.-19 pay from the date his junior began enjoying it until his retirement, while otherwise dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is legally empowered to grant a deemed promotion and consequential benefits to a civil servant who was arbitrarily deprived of regular promotion?
  • Does the next below rule apply when a civil servant's promotion is withheld perversely and mala fide while a junior officer is allowed to hold the higher grade?
  • Can a department arbitrarily withdraw a qualified civil servant's name from the Departmental Promotion Committee without valid reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through DirectorGeneral, T & T Department, Islamabad and 2 others vs Muhammad Mubarak1990 PLD Supreme Court 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil service pensionunconditional resignationbreak in serviceservice tribunalgovernment servants rulesforfeiture of past serviceprior permission
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a decision of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding a former government servant's claim to count past service for pension purposes following his resignation. The core legal question was whether the respondent, who resigned unconditionally to join a provincial department without obtaining the mandatory prior permission, was entitled to the benefit of Regulation 418(b) of the Civil Service Regulations, and whether his appeal was time-barred. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's decision. The Court held that the respondent failed to comply with Rule 3 of the Government Servants (Application for Services and Posts) Rules, 1966, which requires prior written permission to apply for other posts. By tendering an unconditional resignation based on false representations, the respondent could not later claim the resignation was a mere transfer of service. The Court established that administrative discretion to condone breaks in service cannot be exercised to reward conduct that violates mandatory procedural rules and involves misrepresentation to official superiors. Consequently, the respondent’s claim for pension benefits based on his prior service was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unconditional resignation tendered without prior permission to join another government department qualify for the protection of Regulation 418(b) of the Civil Service Regulations?
  • Is a government servant required to obtain prior written permission under Rule 3 of the Government Servants (Application for Services and Posts) Rules, 1966, before applying for another government post?
  • Can a government servant who resigns unconditionally based on false representations later claim that the resignation was intended as a transfer of service for pension purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan Nazir Ahmad Chaudhry vs Nazir Ahmad Chaudhry Pakistan through Establishment Secretary1990 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service tribunalofficer on special dutystaff carcar maintenance allowancehousehold orderlyentitled officercivil servant benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from cross-appeals filed by the Government and a retired Additional Secretary (Grade 21) against a decision of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the denial of official amenities including a residential telephone, a household orderly, and a staff car during his tenure as an Officer on Special Duty. The core legal questions pertained to whether a civil servant is entitled as of right to the provision of a household orderly and the free use of a staff car (or POL costs in lieu thereof) when posted as an Officer on Special Duty. The Supreme Court held that the provision of a household orderly is contingent upon the availability of a peon within the sanctioned strength of the division, and that the rule permitting the free use of a staff car by entitled officers does not impose a mandatory obligation on the department to procure or provide an additional vehicle unless one is already available, failing which the officer is only entitled to a car maintenance allowance. The Court established the principle that welfare facilities tied to availability or administrative discretion do not create an absolute financial liability on the State without proof of actual availability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an entitled officer can claim the cost of POL instead of a staff car when no spare vehicle is available in the division?
  • Is the provision of a household orderly to a Grade 20 and above officer absolute or dependent upon the sanctioned strength of peons in the department?
  • Does the rule permitting free use of staff cars for entitled officers impose a mandatory duty on the Government to procure additional vehicles?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and others vs Mumtaz Ali Khan1990 SCMR 1428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-14
  civil servicepromotion policymove-overconfidential reportsservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Federation of Pakistan challenging a decision of the Service Tribunal. The core legal question is whether a civil servant possessing only 'average' performance reports can be declared fit for promotion or entitled to 'move-over' to a higher scale simply because a Reporting or Countersigning Officer remarked that the individual is fit for promotion on their turn. The petitioner contends that actual promotion or move-over is contingent upon a broader assessment by the Departmental Promotion Committee or Selection Board, guided by the government's Promotion Policy and specific 'Guidelines for submitting move-over cases' which require 'generally good' confidential reports for move-over to scales 19 and 20. The Supreme Court found that the question raised requires further consideration and granted leave to appeal. Consequently, the Court suspended the operation of the impugned order of the Service Tribunal pending the final adjudication of the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant with only average performance reports be declared fit for promotion based solely on a remark by a Reporting or Countersigning Officer?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to 'move-over' to higher scales if their confidential reports are not 'generally good'?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and anothers vs C. M. Sharif1990 SCMR 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-14
  service lawdeputationpromotionreversioncivil servantterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the service grade of a civil servant, C.M. Sharif, who was a permanent employee of the Pakistan Ordnance Factory (P.O.F.) in Grade 19. In 1974, the respondent was deputed as Managing Director of Wah Industries Limited (W.I.L.), a subsidiary. Subsequently, the P.O.F. Board granted him pay in Grade 20. Upon his recall to the parent department, the respondent was reverted to Grade 19, prompting him to seek relief before the Service Tribunal, which ruled in his favor. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the respondent could claim Grade 20 as a matter of right based on his tenure at W.I.L. The Court held that because the P.O.F. Board's order granting Grade 20 did not provide for a deputation allowance, it constituted a promotion rather than a mere pay adjustment. Consequently, having promoted the respondent to Grade 20, the department could not unilaterally demote him upon his return. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the respondent's demotion was unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant claim a higher grade as a matter of right after being recalled from a deputation where they were granted that higher grade?
  • Does the grant of a higher pay scale without a deputation allowance constitute a promotion in service?
  • Can a parent department unilaterally demote a civil servant who was previously promoted to a higher grade while on deputation?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and another vs N.W.F.P. Government and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 1172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-29
  Qisas and DiyatIslamic LawRepugnancyQatl and JurhStatutory VacuumConstitutional LawEnforcement of Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition regarding the enforcement of Islamic laws of Qisas and Diyat. Following a statement by the Attorney-General, the Supreme Court addressed the timeline for the promulgation and implementation of the Ordinance relating to Qisas and Diyat. The Court held that the Ordinance must be promulgated by 5th September 1990 and fully enforced by 12th Rabi-ul-Awwal 1411 A.H. The Court further ordered that the previous decision declaring certain existing provisions repugnant to the injunctions of Islam would take effect on 12th Rabi-ul-Awwal 1411 A.H., at which point those repugnant provisions shall cease to have effect. Crucially, the Court established that if the new law is not enacted or lapses, a legal vacuum shall not exist; instead, the common Islamic law and injunctions of Islam regarding Qatl and Jurh (hurt) as contained in the Qur'an and Sunnah shall immediately become the applicable law, with the Pakistan Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code applied mutatis mutandis to facilitate the administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal consequence if the Ordinance for Qisas and Diyat is not enacted or lapses by the specified deadline?
  • Can the common Islamic law/injunctions of Islam be applied directly in the absence of statutory law regarding Qatl and Jurh?
  • Does the Pakistan Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code remain applicable in the event of a statutory vacuum regarding Qisas and Diyat?
  • Can the Court extend the effective date of a declaration of repugnancy to allow for the implementation of new legislation?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Land Commission through its Senior Member, Islamabad vs Sher1990 PLD Supreme Court 626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-25
  abatementdelegated legislationultra viresland reformsrevisional powersleave to appealstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federal Land Commission sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court which had accepted several constitutional petitions filed by the respondents. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government, under the guise of exercising powers conferred by Section 25 of the Land Reforms Act 1977, could issue a notification directing that all pending cases before the Commission would not stand abated, effectively nullifying the main statutory provision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the legislative intent of Section 25 was to mandate the abatement of all pending proceedings before the Federal Land Commission, subject only to specific exceptions where the Federal Government actively applied its mind to keep individual cases or specific classes of cases alive. The Court ruled that the impugned notification, which sought to save all pending cases from abatement, was ultra vires the powers of the Federal Government as it sought to nullify the statutory provision itself. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government issue a notification under Section 25 of the Land Reforms Act 1977 that completely nullifies the statutory rule of abatement for all pending cases?
  • What is the scope of the Federal Government's power to direct that a case or class of cases shall not stand abated under Section 25 of the Land Reforms Act 1977?
  • Whether a notification that saves all pending proceedings from statutory abatement is ultra vires the parent statute if the statute itself mandates general abatement.
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Government of Pakistan through the Secretary Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad vs M. D. Tahir, Advocate and others1990 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-10
  appointment of judgesconstitutional interpretationAttorney-General noticeconsent of partiessupreme court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an appeal by the Federal Government against an order of the Lahore High Court concerning constitutional questions regarding the appointment of High Court judges. During the proceedings, the Deputy Attorney-General stated that the Federal Government would be satisfied if a specific paragraph (paragraph 5) of the impugned order dealing with the interpretation of Article 193 and Article 48(1) of the Constitution in relation to the Prime Minister's role was excised, noting that notice under Order 27-A, Rule 1 was not given to the Attorney-General. Counsel for respondent No. 2 consented to this approach, while respondent No. 1's objection was overruled as he had not filed an appeal. Although some judges noted the importance of settling constitutional controversies of fundamental public importance, the majority agreed to dispose of the appeal by excising the offending portion of the judgment. The court held that the specified paragraph of the High Court's judgment should be excised while the judgment stood in all other respects.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal can be disposed of by consensus of the appearing parties when constitutional questions of public importance are raised?
  • Does the failure to issue notice to the Attorney-General under Order 27-A Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure affect the validity of a determination on a constitutional question?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Government Of Pakistan And Other vs Muhammad SarwarPTCL 1990 CL. 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs adjudicationsmugglingacquittaldouble jeopardyvested rightrepeal of statutecriminal prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the interpretation and interplay between customs adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution for the same set of facts under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question concerned whether an adjudication order of the customs authorities is subject to the decision of a Special Judge in criminal proceedings, particularly in light of the now-repealed section 179-A of the Customs Act, 1969, and the savings provision under section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court held that where a person is prosecuted and acquitted by a Special Judge, and appeals against such acquittal are subsequently withdrawn, the acquittal attains finality, vesting a right in the accused under section 6 of the General Clauses Act to have the adjudication order made subject to or in conformity with the acquittal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment that declared the conflicting customs confiscation and penalty orders void and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an adjudication order made under the Customs Act, 1969 is subject to the decision of a Special Judge in criminal proceedings under section 179-A?
  • Does the repeal of section 179-A of the Customs Act, 1969 extinguish the vested right of an accused to claim the benefit of an acquittal in adjudication proceedings pursuant to section 6 of the General Clauses Act?
  • What is the legal effect of the withdrawal of an appeal against an acquittal on the finality of the acquittal and its binding nature on concurrent customs adjudication orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazalurrehman Qureshi vs The Deputy Director, Food, Lahore and another1990 SCMR 1476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-15
  compulsory retirementservice tribunallimitationbarred by timepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the judgment dated January 14, 1985, passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, whereby the appeal of the petitioner against his compulsory retirement under Martial Law Regulation No. 114 was dismissed in limine on the ground of limitation. The core legal question is whether the Service Tribunal correctly exercised its discretion in dismissing the time-barred appeal due to the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay in invoking its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the order of the Tribunal calls for no interference as the delay remained unexplained. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that failure to provide a satisfactory explanation for delay warrants the dismissal of an appeal on limitation grounds without interfering with the tribunal's discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal can be dismissed in limine on the ground of limitation when no satisfactory explanation for the delay is provided?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by the Service Tribunal regarding the condonation of delay under proper legal principles?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Muhammad and others vs Fazal Elahi and others1990 SCMR 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-26
  leave to appealsettlement casebona fide purchaserauction-purchaserconfirmation of landwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition in a settlement case concerning land confirmation and subsequent auction. The core legal question is whether petitioners who purchased land from an auction-purchaser whose own auction was never confirmed and was subject to pending litigation can claim protection as bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The Supreme Court held that the auction-purchaser had no valid right or title to transfer the property because the auction was not confirmed and the property was subject to a High Court challenge decided in favour of the respondent. Consequently, the sale-deed in favour of the petitioners had no legal effect. The key principle laid down is that a purchaser from an auction-purchaser whose auction has not attained finality or has been nullified by judicial proceedings acquires no legal title, and the doctrine of bona fide purchase cannot protect a title derived from a non-owner or a person with a defeasible and extinguished interest.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a purchaser from an auction-purchaser whose auction was never confirmed can claim protection as a bona fide purchaser?
  • Does an auction-purchaser acquire transferable title to property when the auction confirmation is stopped and subsequently set aside by the court?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted against a detailed High Court judgment properly resolving settlement land claims?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Dad vs Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, Rawalpindi and 3 others1990 SCMR 1663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-25
  evacuee propertyJammu and Kashmir refugeelachessettlement authoritiesstatutory protectiontransfer of propertyjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerned the validity of the transfer of an evacuee property portion occupied by a Jammu and Kashmir refugee. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities had jurisdiction to transfer property in the possession of such a refugee, given the statutory protection afforded to them, and whether the respondent was barred by laches for failing to challenge the transfer earlier. The Supreme Court held that the transfer was void ab initio as the property was immune from transfer to non-refugees under Section 30(5) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and subsequently under Paragraph 19 of Settlement Scheme No. IV. The Court ruled that the Settlement Authorities lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property in the respondent's possession. Furthermore, the plea of laches was rejected because the respondent was never informed of the rejection of his claim, nor was he heard during the initial determination. The principle established is that statutory protections for Jammu and Kashmir refugees regarding property possession are mandatory, and transfers in violation thereof are without jurisdiction and not subject to the doctrine of laches when the aggrieved party was kept in ignorance of the adverse order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of laches apply to a party who was never informed of the adverse order passed against them?
  • Can Settlement Authorities transfer property in the possession of a Jammu and Kashmir refugee to a non-refugee?
  • Is a transfer of evacuee property made in violation of statutory protections regarding Jammu and Kashmir refugees void for lack of jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Fayyaz Hassan vs Province of Punjab through Secretary, Industries and Mineral Development, Punjab, Lahore and 2 others1990 SCMR 1546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-19
  service appealwilful absencedisciplinary actionremoval from serviceleave extensionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a senior clerk, sought leave to appeal against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against his removal from service. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner's prolonged absence from duty and failure to appear before the Medical Superintendent constituted wilful absence and gross indiscipline warranting removal from service. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was guilty of wilful default and absence from duty without leave of the competent authority, and that the Service Tribunal's findings were fully justified. The key principle laid down is that unauthorized and prolonged absence from duty coupled with failure to substantiate medical grounds when directed constitutes gross indiscipline, justifying dismissal from service, and such concurrent findings of the Service Tribunal do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether prolonged absence from duty without sanctioned leave constitutes gross indiscipline?
  • Does failure to appear before a medical board when directed justify the rejection of medical leave applications?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with factual findings of the Service Tribunal regarding wilful absence from duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Fatz Ahmad vs The State1990 SCMR 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-27
  criminal appealeye-witness testimonyconcurrent findingslife imprisonmentmedical evidencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the petitioner challenged the maintenance of his life imprisonment sentence by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the reliability of eye-witness testimony and the sufficiency of evidence were sustainable. The prosecution's case relied on the oral testimony of two related eye-witnesses, medical evidence, and a motive of revenge for a murder committed twenty-five years prior. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was well-founded, noting that the lower courts had correctly evaluated the evidence. The Court affirmed that the eye-witnesses were natural witnesses residing in the locality, their testimony was intrinsically true and reliable, and their account was corroborated by medical evidence showing injuries inflicted with vengeance. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction and sentence, and establishing that concurrent findings based on credible, corroborated testimony regarding the nature of injuries and witness veracity do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Are concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the reliability of eye-witness testimony subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the testimony of related witnesses, when found intrinsically true and corroborated by medical evidence, sustain a conviction?
  • Is a motive of revenge sufficient to support a conviction when corroborated by other evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad vs Abdul Fateh and another1990 SCMR 480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-17
  leave to appealacquittalbenefit of doubtocular testimonyappraisal of evidencemurderinterested witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had acquitted the respondent of murder charges under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondent had originally been convicted by the trial court for the murder of the petitioner's son, receiving a sentence of life imprisonment. The High Court, however, overturned this conviction, citing the triviality and lack of proof regarding the alleged motive, the interested nature of the eyewitnesses, and the unreliability of the recovery evidence, specifically the firearm. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's appraisal of the evidence and its decision to grant the benefit of doubt to the respondent warranted appellate interference. Upon reviewing the record and the impugned judgment, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had properly appraised the evidence and reached a sound conclusion. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the acquittal, affirming the principle that appellate courts will not disturb an acquittal based on a proper evaluation of evidence and the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere with an acquittal where the High Court has properly appraised the evidence and granted the benefit of doubt?
  • Can an appellate court discard ocular testimony if the witnesses are found to be interested and the motive is unproven?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad and others vs Rullia and others1990 SCMR 1157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  revenue mutationreview jurisdictionland salefinality of judgmentgift deedalienation of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the validity of land transactions and subsequent revenue mutations. The petitioner, having sold land to the respondents via a registered sale deed, later attempted to gift the same land to his sons, leading to conflicting revenue mutations. The core legal question was whether a Revenue Officer possesses the jurisdiction to review an order that has already been confirmed in appeal, and whether a vendor can validly gift property already alienated for consideration. The Supreme Court held that the Revenue Authorities lacked jurisdiction to review an order once it had been confirmed in appeal, citing Section 163 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a vendor cannot legally gift property that has already been transferred to another party for valuable consideration. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the previous litigation between the parties had attained finality and that the review proceedings were legally incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Revenue Officer review an order that has already been confirmed in appeal?
  • Does a vendor have the legal capacity to gift land that has already been sold to another party for valuable consideration?
  • Does an order passed by a Revenue Officer become immune to review once it has been subjected to appellate scrutiny?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Hussain vs Zahid Hussain and others1990 SCMR 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-18
  leave to appealculpable homicidetransfer of intentmurderalteration of convictioncriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court altering the respondent's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to one under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and reducing his sentence from death to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The respondent was originally tried for causing the death of the deceased by firing a gun during an altercation, where the bullet missed the intended target, the petitioner, and struck the deceased instead. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the High Court erred in holding that the act constituted culpable homicide not amounting to murder rather than murder, given that the respondent fired with the intention to kill the petitioner but inadvertently killed the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the contention raised regarding the legal effect of the transfer of intent warrants detailed consideration. Accordingly, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter, while directing that the respondent shall not be released during the pendency of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a gunshot killing an unintended bystander instead of the intended target constitute murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in the absence of motive against the deceased?
  • What is the legal effect of transferred intent on criminal culpability when a firearm discharge misses its target and results in a fatality?
  Read full judgment →
• Farman Ali and others vs Muhammad Ismail and another1990 SCMR 1216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-26
  seniority disputeservice lawretrospective regularizationpolice servicedirect recruitmentad hoc appointmentcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned a seniority dispute between two groups of Police Inspectors. The appellants, initially recruited temporarily after release from the Army, were regularized in 1983, while the respondents, though recruited later, had their appointments regularized in 1980 after fulfilling Public Service Commission requirements. The Service Tribunal had ruled in favor of the respondents, determining that their earlier regularization date entitled them to seniority. The core legal question was whether the executive authority could grant retrospective regularization to direct recruits to the detriment of the seniority of others already in service. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that in the absence of a specific law authorizing retrospective regularization, the executive cannot assign a seniority date earlier than the date of selection in accordance with the law. The Court affirmed that seniority is determined by the date of regular appointment, and since the respondents' regular appointment preceded that of the appellants, the respondents were rightfully senior.

  Questions settled

  • Can executive authority grant retrospective regularization to direct recruits to the detriment of existing civil servants' seniority?
  • Does the date of regular appointment determine seniority for Police Inspectors under the Police Rules?
  • Is the seniority of civil servants affected by the date of their initial ad hoc appointment versus their date of regular appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Farid vs Mst. Manzoqran and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  Muslim Family Laws Ordinancepredeceased childinheritanceleave to appealconflict of decisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions for leave to appeal concerning the interpretation of Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 regarding inheritance shares of grandchildren whose mother predeceased the grandmother. The core legal question is whether the predeceased child's share, inherited through the legal fiction created by Section 4, devolves entirely upon their sole child or is further subject to distribution amongst other reversionaries. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative decision due to a conflict between divergent views held by the Lahore High Court and the Peshawar High Court. The Court held that leave should be granted to resolve the conflict of interpretation regarding Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, while granting interim relief subject to security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a predeceased daughter's share under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 goes entirely to her children or is subject to further distribution among reversionaries?
  • How should Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 be interpreted when conflicting High Court judgments exist?
  Read full judgment →
• Farid Khan and others vs Mushtaq Ilahi1990 SCMR 949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-13
  temporary injunctionstatus quounpartitioned landGhair Mumkin Bhattaleave to appealco-owner
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for seeking leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding an appellate court order that granted a status quo order in favor of the respondent in a suit for permanent injunction concerning unpartitioned land. The core legal question involves the propriety of granting temporary injunctions against co-owners or lessees operating a brick kiln on unpartitioned land recorded as Ghair Mumkin Bhatta. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed the same, holding that given the special circumstances where the land was already characterized as Ghair Mumkin Bhatta at the time of the sale to the lessor, the trial court's order dismissing the injunction application was correct. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court, restored the trial court's order dated 15-9-1988, and directed the lower court to decide the main case within six months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a temporary injunction can be granted to restrain a lessee from operating a brick kiln on unpartitioned land?
  • Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal and set aside concurrent interlocutory orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Hussain and others vs Qurban Hussain and another1990 SCMR 759 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-27
  jurisdictionpreliminary issueland revenueconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing their constitutional petition in limine, which challenged the lower courts' refusal to treat the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before recording evidence. The core legal question was whether the trial court was bound to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue prior to other issues when it involved a factual controversy. The Supreme Court held that where an issue of jurisdiction involves a factual controversy regarding the nature of the suit land, it cannot be decided without recording evidence, and the lower courts rightly deferred its determination. The key principle laid down is that jurisdictional questions requiring factual inquiry through evidence need not be decided as preliminary issues and may be adjudicated along with other issues after recording evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of jurisdiction must be decided as a preliminary issue when it involves a factual controversy?
  • Can a trial court defer the decision on jurisdiction to be decided along with other issues after recording evidence?
  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against an interlocutory order refusing to treat jurisdiction as a preliminary issue?
  Read full judgment →
• Falak Sher vs Sachal and another1990 SCMR 314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-22
  bailable warrantsprocedural correctioninadvertent omissionjudicial orderSupreme Court procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a procedural correction regarding the issuance of bailable warrants in an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question addressed is whether the Court can rectify an inadvertent omission in a previous judicial order regarding the issuance of warrants for a respondent's appearance. The Court held that it possesses the inherent authority to correct clerical or inadvertent omissions in its prior orders to ensure that the intended judicial directions are properly executed. Consequently, the Court ordered the issuance of bailable warrants against respondent-1 in the sum of Rs. 25,000 with two sureties, returnable through the Sessions Court, Nawab Shah, to secure the respondent's appearance before the Supreme Court. The principle laid down is that the Court retains the power to rectify accidental slips or omissions in its orders to reflect the actual judicial intent expressed at the time of granting leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court rectify an inadvertent omission in a previous order regarding the issuance of bailable warrants?
  • Does the Court have the authority to correct clerical errors in its judicial orders?
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• Falak Sher Nawaz vs The State1990 SCMR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-21
  capital chargeocular testimonyleave to appealreappraisal of evidencemurder convictionwitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the convictions and sentences of the petitioners for the murder of two individuals. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony provided by witnesses, who were related to the deceased and resided in a different village, was sufficient to sustain a conviction on a capital charge. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the convictions were sound. The Court determined that the eye-witnesses provided a satisfactory explanation for their presence at the scene of the occurrence, and there was no evidence of enmity between the witnesses and the petitioners that would suggest perjury. Furthermore, the Court held that it would not reappraise the evidence in the absence of a valid foundation laid by the petitioners. The key principle established is that related eye-witnesses are credible if their presence is satisfactorily explained and no motive for false implication is demonstrated, and that the Court will not re-examine evidence without a sufficient legal basis.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be sustained based on the testimony of witnesses who are related to the deceased?
  • Is the testimony of eye-witnesses from a different village inherently unreliable?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court reappraise evidence in a criminal appeal?
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• Faiz Muhammad vs Hidayat Khan and 9 others1990 SCMR 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-23
  acquittal appealappraisal of evidencecriminal justiceprosecution versiondefence versionmaterial contradictionsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the acquittal of nine respondents by the Lahore High Court, which had overturned their convictions for offences under sections 148, 302, 325, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s conclusion—that the prosecution’s version of events was improbable and doubtful while the defence’s version was more probable—was based on safe principles of criminal justice. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting that the prosecution witnesses had made material improvements and contradictions regarding the motive and the nature of injuries sustained. The Court held that the High Court had conducted a careful appraisal of the evidence, and that a mere difference of opinion regarding the assessment of evidence does not constitute a valid ground for interference in an acquittal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the acquittal. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with an acquittal based on a sound, reasoned appraisal of evidence simply because a different assessment might be possible.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal solely based on a different assessment of the evidence?
  • Does a material improvement in a witness's testimony regarding the nature of injuries justify rejecting the prosecution's version?
  • Is the High Court's preference for a defence version over a prosecution version grounds for setting aside an acquittal if the appraisal of evidence is careful?
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• Faiz Muhammad and others vs Allah Ditta and others1990 SCMR 1190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-28
  displaced personsland allotmentregistration of claimsmukhbari applicationevacuee propertyproduce-index-units
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order restoring an original land allotment to displaced persons. The core legal question was whether land allotted based on an initial verification under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956, should be cancelled due to a subsequent, lower verification by the Central Record Office, and whether informers (Mukhbars) were entitled to the alleged excess land. The Supreme Court held that the initial verification stands, and subsequent verifications conducted without notice to the allottees are to be ignored to prevent the disturbance of settled displaced persons. The Court affirmed that the original allotment was valid and that, in any event, the occupants were entitled to purchase the land under the provisions of Act XIV of 1975. The principle established is that initial claim verifications under the 1956 Act are final and binding, and subsequent administrative re-verifications cannot be used to disturb settled allotments, ensuring equitable treatment for displaced persons.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent verification of claims by the Central Record Office override an initial verification made under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956?
  • Are informers entitled to claim land deemed as excess based on a subsequent verification when the initial allotment was made in good faith?
  • Can an occupant without title be offered land for sale under Section 3 of Act XIV of 1975?
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• FAHEEMUDDINPetitioncr vs Sabeeha Begum and another1990 SCMR 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-28
  quashment of proceedingssecond marriageMuslim Family Lawslocus standiaggrieved personcriminal complaintleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of criminal proceedings. The petitioner, a previously married man, contracted a second marriage without obtaining prior permission from the Arbitration Council under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The second wife subsequently filed a criminal complaint against him before the Ilaqa Magistrate for offences including violation of Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The core legal question examined is whether a second wife has the locus standi as an aggrieved person to file a complaint under Section 6 of the said Ordinance, given the contention that the provision is intended to protect the rights of the first wife. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider this question of first impression and ordered the suspension of further trial proceedings meanwhile.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second wife has the locus standi to file a complaint under Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 against her husband for contracting a second marriage without permission?
  • Does Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 intend to protect the rights of the first wife exclusively or does it extend to subsequent wives?
  • Can criminal proceedings initiated by a second wife for unauthorized polygamy be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore and anothers vs Syed Abdus Saleem and others1990 SCMR 143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-23
  evacuee trust propertyDisplaced Persons Actquasi-judicial natureSitla Mandirabatement of appealres judicatadedication of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  The Evacuee Trust Property Board appealed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court under Section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, which had reversed the Settlement Commissioner's decision declaring 21 properties attached to the 'Sitla Mandir' estate as evacuee trust properties.

  The core legal questions were whether an inquiry under Section 4(3) of the Act is purely administrative or quasi-judicial, whether the status of property as trust property depends on formal proof of initial dedication, and what weight should be given to pre-independence civil suit decrees establishing public trust status under Section 92 CPC where the appeal against such decree abated.

  The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 4(4) are quasi-judicial given the right of appeal. It ruled that Section 4 focuses on the actual user and factual status of the property at independence, rather than strict legal proof of dedication at inception. Since pre-independence civil suits had adjudicated the properties as public trust properties and a receiver was managing them at independence, the High Court erred. The appeal was allowed, High Court judgment set aside, and Settlement Commissioner's order restored.

  Questions settled

  • Are proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner under Section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 purely administrative or quasi-judicial?
  • Is the determination of whether a property is evacuee trust property under Section 4(3) dependent on strict legal proof of initial dedication or its factual status and use at the time of independence?
  • Does a pre-independence judgment declaring property as a public trust under Section 92 of the CPC hold evidentiary value regarding its status even if the appeal abated?
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• Edulji Dinshaw Limited. vs Income-Tax OfficerPTCL 1990 CL. 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-16
  reopening of assessmentchange of opinioncapital gainsventure in the nature of tradeconstitutional jurisdictionnullity of assessmentstay orderdisclosure of material facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the validity of notices issued by an Income-tax Officer under Section 65 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, seeking to reopen past tax assessments of the appellant-company. The core legal question was whether the Revenue could reopen assessments based on a mere change of opinion regarding whether the appellant's property sales constituted business income or capital gains, despite full disclosure of all material facts in previous returns. The Supreme Court held that the notices were illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court ruled that where an assessee has fully disclosed all relevant facts and the Income-tax Officer has consciously completed the assessment, the Revenue cannot reopen the matter under Section 65 merely by re-evaluating the same evidence. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that assessment orders passed after the issuance of a stay order by the Supreme Court are nullities in law. The key principle established is that the burden of proof lies on the Revenue to establish that a transaction is a venture in the nature of trade, and a change of opinion on previously disclosed facts does not justify reopening assessments.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Income-tax Officer reopen an assessment under Section 65 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, based solely on a change of opinion regarding previously disclosed facts?
  • Does the burden of proof lie on the Revenue to establish that a transaction constitutes a venture in the nature of trade?
  • Are assessment orders passed by an Income-tax Officer after the issuance of a stay order by the Supreme Court valid?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against the issuance of a wrongful notice under the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979?
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• Edulji Dinshaw Limited vs Incometax Officer1990 PLD Supreme Court 399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-16
  reopening assessmentchange of opinioncapital gainsbusiness incomestay ordernullity in lawconstitutional jurisdictionincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition against notices issued under Section 65 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, seeking to reopen past assessments for ten years. The core legal issues were whether the revenue could reopen completed assessments under Section 65 based on a mere change of opinion where all facts had been disclosed, whether the sale of family properties and receipt of government acquisition compensation constituted taxable business income or capital gains, and whether assessment orders passed in violation of a Supreme Court stay order were valid. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that where an assessee fully discloses all relevant material and the tax authority consciously completes assessments under Section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, Section 65 cannot be invoked to reopen proceedings based on a mere change of opinion without new information showing income escaped assessment. The Court held that property sales and compulsory acquisition proceeds constituted capital gains rather than business profits, and affirmed that assessment orders passed after a stay order is issued by the Court are a nullity in law.

  Questions settled

  • Can tax assessments be reopened under Section 65 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, on a mere change of opinion where all material facts were fully disclosed in original tax returns?
  • Whether the realization of proceeds from sales of long-held family immovable properties and compulsory acquisition compensation constitutes taxable business income or non-taxable capital gains?
  • What is the legal effect of an assessment order passed by an authority after a stay order has been granted by the Supreme Court?
  • Can constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 be invoked against the issuance of an illegal or jurisdictionally defective tax notice prior to exhausting alternative remedies?
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