Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Arshad Saeed vs Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment1989 SCMR 808 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-18
  terms and conditions of servicecivil servantspromotion policystatutory rulescentral selection boarddepartmental promotion committeeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition questioning whether the terms and conditions of service of persons in the service of Pakistan can be regulated by executive policy guidelines alongside or in contravention of the Acts of the Legislature and statutory rules. The petitioner contended that administrative promotion policies issued by the Establishment Division unlawfully superseded the requirements of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1973, by eroding the statutory jurisdiction of the Departmental Promotion Committee and the Central Selection Board and introducing unreliable quantification mechanisms. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised substantial legal questions regarding the validity of regulating service conditions through policy guidelines rather than statutory rules and the limitation of the selection authorities' powers. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal for a detailed hearing on whether such promotion policies can lawfully override statutory rules framed under the Civil Servants Act, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Can the terms and conditions of service of persons in the service of Pakistan be regulated by policy guidelines instead of Acts of the Legislature and statutory rules?
  • Does an administrative promotion policy unlawfully limit the jurisdiction and statutory functions of the Departmental Promotion Committee and the Central Selection Board?
  • Are promotions of civil servants required to be governed strictly by the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the rules framed thereunder rather than executive memoranda?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs S.P. City Division, Lahore and others1989 SCMR 964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-23
  reinstatementextraordinary leaveservice tribunaldiscretionary powerpolice constabledismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Service Tribunal's order concerning the reinstatement of a police constable who had been dismissed from service following a criminal case registered under Section 448 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Although the Service Tribunal set aside the dismissal and ordered the petitioner's reinstatement, it directed that the period during which he remained out of service be treated as extraordinary leave without pay. The petitioner challenged this specific condition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal's discretionary power to treat the out-of-service period as extraordinary leave without pay was exercised lawfully. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretionary powers. Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate any violation of statutory rules or provisions of law, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the exercise of such discretion and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal has the discretionary power to treat the period a civil servant remained out of service as extraordinary leave without pay upon reinstatement?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary powers exercised by the Service Tribunal in the absence of any violation of law or statutory rules?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs Mst. Zuneeran Bibi1989 SCMR 1161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-10
  leave to appealconcurrent findingsinheritanceburden of prooforal giftpossession and permanent injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts decreeing the respondent sister's suit for possession and permanent injunction regarding her share in their father's inheritance. The petitioner had claimed exclusive ownership through an oral gift, which was rejected by the courts below. The core legal question revolved around the challenge to concurrent findings of fact and the technical objection regarding the improper placement of the burden of proof. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact suffered from no infirmity and that the technicality regarding the burden of proof was of no significance as the petitioner suffered no prejudice and failed to produce necessary evidence. The Court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact will not be interfered with in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence, and technicalities concerning the burden of proof lose significance when no prejudice is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Does a technical defect regarding the improper placement of the burden of proof warrant interference when no prejudice has been suffered by the party?
  • Can a party claim exclusive ownership of inheritance property based on an oral gift when concurrent findings of fact reject such a plea?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs Mst. Nawab Bibi and 3 others1989 SCMR 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-10
  res judicatawrit jurisdictionsettlement lawconstitutional petitioncivil suitintra-court appealadministrative order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought to challenge an order by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, which rejected his claim to a plot transferred to Mst. Nawab Bibi, despite his assertion of an agreement of association and payment of the purchase price. The petitioner initially challenged the Commissioner's order through a constitutional petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on merits. Although the petitioner filed an Intra-Court Appeal, he withdrew it to pursue a civil suit. The trial court rejected the plaint on the grounds of res judicata, noting that the High Court had already adjudicated the legality of the Commissioner's order. This decision was upheld by the Additional District Judge and subsequently by the High Court in revision. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that once the High Court has examined and upheld the legality of an administrative order in writ jurisdiction, the same issue cannot be re-agitated in a civil court. The principle of res judicata effectively bars the petitioner from challenging the same order in subsequent civil proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party re-agitate the legality of an administrative order in a civil court after it has been adjudicated upon by the High Court in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to a civil suit challenging an order that was previously upheld by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs Malik Fazal Ellahi1989 SCMR 1225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-31
  pre-emptionco-sharerPattievacuee landjoint Khatapartitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a suit for pre-emption claiming superior right as an owner in the Patti and a co-sharer in the Khata. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court reversed the decision and dismissed the suit, which dismissal was upheld by the High Court in second appeal. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to establish his claim of being an owner in the Patti, having deposed during trial that he was unaware of the Patti in question. Furthermore, the Court held that the allotment of specific field numbers by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities effectively partitioned the joint Khata under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, making the vendor the exclusive owner and terminating any joint ownership rights of the petitioner. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an admission by a pre-emptor in his testimony that he does not know the Patti defeat his claim of being an owner in the Patti?
  • Does the allotment of specific field numbers of evacuee land by Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities effect a partition of a joint Khata?
  • Can a co-sharer claim a right of pre-emption in evacuee land after specific field numbers have been allotted and transferred to a refugee vendor?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs Government of the Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-14
  limitation periodservice appealmistaken legal advicecondonation of delayservice tribunal jurisdictioncivil court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals on the grounds of limitation. The petitioners, formerly registration clerks, challenged a 1979 government notification abolishing their cadre and reverting them to the Deputy Commissioner's establishment. Initially, the petitioners sought relief through civil suits and writ petitions in the High Court, which were dismissed or rejected on the basis that their proper remedy lay with the Service Tribunal. Upon subsequently approaching the Service Tribunal, their appeals were dismissed as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing remedies in civil courts and the High Court under mistaken legal advice could be excluded from the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that the petitioners were not entitled to the deduction of the period spent in pursuing incorrect forums. The Court affirmed that mistaken legal advice does not constitute a valid ground for condoning delay or extending the limitation period for service appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Can the period spent pursuing a remedy in a civil court or High Court under mistaken legal advice be deducted when computing the limitation period for an appeal before a Service Tribunal?
  • Does the dismissal of a writ petition on the ground that the remedy lies with the Service Tribunal entitle a petitioner to condonation of delay for the time spent in the High Court?
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• Muhammad Anwar Hakim vs Secretary, Agriculture Department, Government of Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1802 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-14
  service tribunalseniority listdepartmental representationmaintainability of appealremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal questioning the legality and propriety of a final seniority list circulated by the Secretary, Agriculture Department, Government of Punjab. The petitioner had filed an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal against the final seniority list, which was dismissed on merits. The core legal question is whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is maintainable against a seniority list without first filing a departmental representation before the next higher authority. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order of the Service Tribunal, and remanded the case to determine the question of maintainability. The key principle laid down is that an appeal before the Service Tribunal is not maintainable without complying with the statutory obligation to file a representation against a seniority list before the next higher authority, namely the Governor of the Province.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is maintainable against a seniority list without filing a representation before the next higher authority?
  • Is a factual inquiry necessary to determine whether a representation was filed by a civil servant regarding a seniority list?
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• Muhammad Anwar Durrani vs Province of Baluchistan and others1989 SCMR 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-08
  locus standiconstitutional petitionremandexpedited hearingprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's Constitutional Petition No. 290 of 1988 on the ground of lack of locus standi. The core legal question concerned the propriety of dismissing the petition on this preliminary ground when a related Constitutional Petition No. 291 of 1988 was already pending before the same High Court. Upon agreement of the parties and the Attorney-General, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it. The Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the proceedings to the High Court with a direction to hear Constitutional Petition No. 290 of 1988 on its merits, alongside Constitutional Petition No. 291 of 1988. The Court emphasized the urgency of resolving the underlying constitutional dispute and directed the High Court to expedite the hearing within fifteen days. The key principle established is that where related constitutional matters are pending, procedural dismissals based on locus standi may be set aside to ensure a consolidated hearing on the merits when parties consent and urgency is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition dismissed on the ground of locus standi be remanded for hearing on merits if related petitions are pending?
  • Is the Supreme Court empowered to direct the High Court to expedite the hearing of a remanded constitutional petition?
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• Muhammad Anwar Birlas vs Muhammad Ismail Bhatti1989 SCMR 1091 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-12
  ex parte decreeleave to appealcivil revisionsufficiency of causelimitationfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order that dismissed a Civil Revision petition filed by the defendant. The underlying matter originated from an application to set aside an ex parte money decree passed against the petitioner. The High Court had ruled against the petitioner on two primary grounds: the issue of limitation and the insufficiency of cause for the delay. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner sought to contest these findings. The Supreme Court observed that even if the application were not time-barred, the petitioner had failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the default, a finding of fact made by the High Court that remained unexceptionable. Furthermore, upon reviewing the petitioner's liability regarding the loan obtained via a promissory note, the Court determined the case was not a fit matter for examination on its merits. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to maintain the ex parte decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the sufficiency of cause for setting aside an ex parte decree?
  • Is a finding of fact by the High Court regarding the sufficiency of cause for delay subject to interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Muhammad Anwar and others vs The State1989 SCMR 1381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-14
  petition for leave to appealcondonation of delayacquittal set asidecriminal appealre-evaluation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 10-4-1988, which convicted and sentenced the petitioners under sections 148 and 326/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, setting aside their acquittal by the trial court. The core legal questions involve the condonation of a fifty-four-day delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal and the justification for setting aside an acquittal by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by time without a satisfactory explanation for the delay, and further found that on merits, the High Court had duly considered all relevant facts, evidence, and legal aspects when setting aside the trial court's acquittal. The key principle laid down is that a petition barred by time without sufficient cause merits dismissal, and an appellate court's reversal of an acquittal based on a proper re-evaluation of evidence and material facts warrants no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal barred by time can be entertained without a satisfactory explanation for the delay?
  • Under what circumstances may the High Court set aside an order of acquittal passed by a trial court?
  • Is interference warranted when the High Court has duly considered all relevant facts, weapons used, injuries, and the quantum of sentence?
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• Muhammad Amin vs The State1989 SCMR 593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-15
  criminal appealmurderdeath sentencereduction of sentenceextenuating circumstancesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had confirmed the conviction and sentences imposed upon the petitioner by the Sessions Judge, Attock. The petitioner was charged, tried, and convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 on two counts of murder, resulting in death sentences, alongside convictions under Section 307 and Section 449 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for related offenses. The core legal question involved whether there were sufficient extenuating circumstances to warrant a reduction of the sentence from death to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that upon considering the evidence, including the eye-witness account, medical evidence, recovery of the weapon of offence at the spot, and established motive, no extenuating circumstances existed to interfere with the concurrent findings and sentences of the lower courts. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of conviction and sentence where no extenuating circumstances are established?
  • Does the recovery of the weapon of offence at the spot along with eye-witness and medical evidence sufficiently support a conviction for murder?
  • Whether appellate courts can reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment in the absence of mitigating factors?
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• Muhammad Amin vs Farzand Ali and 6 others1989 SCMR 1815 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-08
  petition for leave to appealacquittalmurderocular testimonyinterested witnessesappraisal of evidencecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereby the criminal revision of the petitioner was dismissed, the criminal appeal of the respondents was accepted, and the respondents were acquitted of murder charges. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction of the respondent under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based on uncorroborated ocular testimony, unreliable recovery evidence, unconvincing motives, and disbelieved dying statements. The Supreme Court held that the appraisal of evidence by the High Court was properly made, finding that the presence of the eye-witnesses was doubtful and no interference was warranted. The court thereby dismissed the petition, reinforcing principles relating to the evaluation of ocular testimony, interested witnesses, and the standard of proof in criminal acquittals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the respondent on the basis of uncorroborated ocular testimony of interested witnesses?
  • Does the rejection of recovery evidence and motive warrant setting aside a conviction for murder?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's appraisal of evidence in an acquittal matter when the presence of eye-witnesses is doubted?
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• Muhammad Ali vs Yousuf and another1989 SCMR 1823 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-26
  quashing of proceedingsleave to appealcondonation of delaycriminal procedureSection 145 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had allowed a criminal miscellaneous application to quash proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against the respondents. The petitioner initially faced a delay of 36 days in filing the petition, which the Supreme Court condoned after hearing counsel. Upon reviewing the merits of the case, the Supreme Court examined the impugned High Court judgment to determine if any legal error or substantial question of law existed that would warrant interference. Finding no defects in the High Court's reasoning and noting that the petitioner failed to raise any significant question of law requiring adjudication by the apex court, the Supreme Court concluded that the case was not a fit matter for the grant of leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court condone a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to quash proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Ali vs Sikandar Hayat and others1989 SCMR 1945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-15
  leave to appealenhancement of sentencealteration of convictioncriminal petitionappellate jurisdictionsentencing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 9-3-1987. The first petition sought the enhancement of a sentence, while the second challenged the acquittal of a respondent. During the proceedings, the petitioner's counsel did not press the petition regarding the acquittal, which was subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court. Regarding the petition for enhancement of sentence, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The core legal question identified by the Court concerns the High Court's decision to alter the conviction of the respondents from Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 304, Part II, of the same Code. The Supreme Court held that this alteration and the subsequent reduction of the sentence required a detailed examination to determine if there was any legal justification for such a modification, particularly where the reduction might not be warranted by law. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to further scrutinize the legality of the High Court's findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to examine the legal justification for altering a conviction from Section 302 to Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a reduction of sentence by the High Court subject to detailed examination by the Supreme Court if the legal basis for such reduction is questionable?
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• Muhammad Ali vs Muhammad Sharif1989 SCMR 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-23
  pre-emptionco-sharertenancy rightsjoint holdingleave to appealappellate procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions arising from a pre-emption suit where the pre-emptor claimed a right based on being a co-sharer, while the vendee-defendant resisted the suit claiming tenancy rights. The High Court had granted a pre-emption decree to the pre-emptor for a 2/3 share of the land, while allowing the vendee to retain 1/3 share based on his tenancy. The vendee challenged this, arguing the entire suit should have been dismissed because he held tenancy rights over the whole land. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that since the vendee purchased only a 1/3 share of the total joint holding, he was only entitled to retain that specific proportion under his tenancy. The pre-emptor also sought leave to appeal, alleging a lack of opportunity for a hearing before the appellate court. The Supreme Court dismissed this petition as well, ruling that it would not grant leave to appeal on mere technicalities when the petitioner could not demonstrate that a remand would alter the outcome of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Is a vendee entitled to retain tenancy rights over the entire land when they have only purchased a fractional share of a joint holding?
  • Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal based solely on procedural technicalities where the outcome of the case would remain unchanged?
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• Muhammad Ali vs Muhammad Farooq and 5 others1989 SCMR 1099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-08
  acquittalfree fightaggressorcriminal revisionpetition for leave to appealinterested witnessescorroborative evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a revision petition filed against the acquittal of the respondents for offences under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the courts below erred in acquitting the respondents and failing to determine the aggressor in what was argued to be a free fight, despite disbelieving the interested prosecution witnesses and finding no corroborative value in the recoveries. The Supreme Court held that once the prosecution evidence is disbelieved and the prosecution fails to establish who the aggressor was, the argument that the court must determine the aggressor in a free fight carries no force. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that no interference was warranted against concurrent findings of acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the court is bound to determine the aggressor in a free fight when the primary prosecution evidence has been disbelieved?
  • Does an appellate or revisional court interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal when the evidence does not inspire confidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of weapon recoveries when there are no matching reports from the forensic science laboratory?
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• Muhammad Ali vs Major Muhammad Aslam and others1989 SCMR 1065 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-22
  leave to appealspecific performanceoath on Holy Quranoffer and retractionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition in a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. The core legal question concerns whether a party who made an offer in court to be bound by the oath of the opposing party on the Holy Qur'an can unilaterally retract or modify that offer before the oath is actually taken. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions raised regarding the binding nature of the conditional offer and trial proceedings require detailed examination. The Court also ordered that status quo be maintained regarding the proceedings pending the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party bound by an offer to have the suit decided on the oath of the opposing party before the oath is actually taken?
  • Can a party unilaterally withdraw or modify an evidentiary offer made in court before the opposing party acts upon it?
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• Muhammad Ali vs Abdul Qayyum and 2 others1989 SCMR 1386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  petition for leave to appealreduction of sentencedeath sentencelife imprisonmentunproved motivecriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction of the respondents under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but reducing their sentence of death to imprisonment for life. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence of death to life imprisonment on the ground that the prosecution motive remained unproved. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that if the motive set up by the prosecution is not established, the prosecution must bear the consequences regarding the question of sentence. The key principle laid down is that the failure to establish an alleged motive can serve as a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to establish its motive can serve as a ground for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Does the reduction of sentence by the High Court warrant interference by the Supreme Court when cogent reasons are provided based on unproved motives?
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• Muhammad Ali Khan vs Muhammad Ashraf1989 SCMR 1415 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-07
  declaratory suitgiftconcurrent findingssecond appealleave to appealre-examination of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the defendant in a declaratory suit concerning the validity of a gift, challenging the High Court's dismissal of his Regular Second Appeal. The High Court had upheld the concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts, which determined that the gift in question was valid and genuine. Before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the petitioner's counsel sought to challenge these concurrent findings of fact by presenting various arguments. The Supreme Court found no merit in these arguments and held that no justification was established to warrant an interference with the concurrent findings or to conduct a re-examination of the evidence. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the decisions of the courts below.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a gift in the absence of any justification to re-examine the evidence?
  • Can a petitioner successfully challenge concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal before the Supreme Court without showing exceptional circumstances?
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• Muhammad Ali and others vs Ghulam Sarwar and others1989 SCMR 640 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-11
  pre-emptionexecution of decreejoint holdingphysical possessionsymbolic possessionexecuting court cannot go behind the decreecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondents filed a pre-emption suit which was decreed in their favor, leading to execution proceedings where they claimed possession. The petitioners objected before the Civil Judge that the land was part of a joint holding and incapable of physical delivery, which the Civil Judge accepted. However, the Lahore High Court set aside that decision upon revision, prompting the petitioners to seek leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerned whether physical possession or symbolic possession under Order XXI Rule 35(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applied to the pre-emption decree. The Supreme Court held that the decree was for specific pre-empted property rather than joint possession, making Order XXI Rule 35(1) applicable, and reaffirmed that an executing court cannot go behind a valid decree. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an executing court can go behind a decree passed by a civil court?
  • Does Order XXI Rule 35(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to a decree for possession of specific pre-empted property?
  • How is possession delivered in execution of a pre-emption decree under Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Muhammad Ali and 6 others vs The State1989 SCMR 1489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-26
  leave to appealappellate practicewaiver of argumentsquantum of sentencecriminal convictionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by Muhammad Ali and six others against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed their appeal against conviction and sentence under sections 307, 326, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners could re-argue the merits of their case after having restricted their arguments before the High Court solely to the quantum of sentence. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners' counsel had not pressed the appeal on merits before the High Court, but instead sought and obtained a reduction in the sentence awarded by the Magistrate, they were precluded from reopening the merits of the case at the appellate stage. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, noting that the relief regarding the reduction of sentence had already been granted. The principle laid down is that a party cannot seek to re-argue the merits of a conviction in a higher appellate forum if they had expressly abandoned those arguments in the lower appellate court to focus exclusively on sentencing.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner re-argue the merits of a conviction in the Supreme Court if they restricted their appeal in the High Court solely to the quantum of sentence?
  • Is an appellate court required to hear arguments on merits if the appellant previously abandoned those arguments in the lower appellate court?
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• Muhammad Akram vs Nawab Din and others1989 SCMR 1083 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  ejectmentrefereeconsent of partiesconstitutional petitiondiscretionary jurisdictionRent Controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a landlord-tenant dispute wherein respondent No. 1 filed an ejectment application against the petitioner. During the ejectment proceedings, the parties agreed to refer the matter to a named referee and to be bound by his decision without objection. The referee made a detailed report in favor of respondent No. 1, on the basis of which the Rent Controller ordered the petitioner's ejectment. After a remand by the District Judge for a fresh report, the referee again reported in favor of respondent No. 1, resulting in a second ejectment order which was upheld on first appeal. The petitioner then challenged these orders in the High Court via a Constitutional petition. The High Court refused to exercise its discretionary Constitutional jurisdiction, holding that the petitioner had repeatedly agreed to be bound by the referee's findings. Dismissing the petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no error in declining to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction where parties voluntarily bound themselves to a referee's decision and a fair disposal was effected.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party who agreed to be bound by the decision of a referee can subsequently challenge the order passed on the basis of that referee's report?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to exercise its Constitutional jurisdiction when a party acts contrary to its undertaking to accept a referee's decision?
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• Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Advocate vs Federation of Pakistan and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-18
  clarification of judgmentdissolution of assembliesconstitutional crisisexecutive interpretationlocus standiSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose upon an unusual application filed by an advocate seeking clarification of a detailed judgment of the Supreme Court, initiation of contempt proceedings against those allegedly misinterpreting it, and intervention to end constitutional chaos. The core legal question concerned the correct implications and legal effect of the Court's previous judgment upholding the High Court's findings that the dissolution of the National and Provincial Assemblies by the President and Governors was without lawful authority, while simultaneously refusing certain consequential reliefs regarding the restoration of assemblies and cabinets. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had locus standi, but clarified that its previous judgment did not render all subsequent executive actions, orders, or appointments illegal or in need of regularization as claimed in a government press release, because the Court had explicitly refused those specific reliefs. The key principle laid down is that a judgment of affirmance which refuses specific consequential reliefs cannot be interpreted by the executive to imply the legal nullification or required regularization of actions for which relief was expressly denied by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petitioner have locus standi to seek clarification of a judgment of the Supreme Court?
  • Does a judgment affirming the illegality of the dissolution of assemblies automatically render all subsequent executive appointments and actions illegal when specific relief seeking their nullification was refused?
  • Can a government press release interpret a Supreme Court judgment to require the suspension and regularization of executive actions that the Court refused to set aside?
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• Muhammad Akram and others vs Fazal Karim and others1989 SCMR 501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-02
  partition suitjoint ownershipconcurrent findings of factpermanent transfer deedexclusive ownership plealeave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil suit for partition and separate possession of a property, filed by three brothers against their fourth brother, Mushtaq Ahmad. The plaintiffs claimed a three-fourths share in the house based on a joint Permanent Transfer Order and Permanent Transfer Deed issued in 1960 and 1963, respectively. The defendant contended that he was the exclusive owner of the property. The Senior Civil Judge, Abbottabad, rejected the defendant's plea and passed a preliminary decree for partition, a decision subsequently upheld by the appellate court and the Peshawar High Court in revision. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the joint ownership and possession of the property were sustainable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the findings of fact regarding title and joint ownership were well-supported by evidence, including the payment of the property price from the compensation books of the plaintiffs. The Court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact, absent any significant question of law, do not warrant interference in its revisional or appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding joint ownership of property are subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a plea of exclusive ownership be sustained when the property was transferred via a joint Permanent Transfer Order?
  • Is the payment of property price from the compensation books of specific parties relevant to determining joint ownership?
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• Muhammad Akram and 26 others vs Noor Ahmad and others1989 SCMR 755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-18
  inheritancewill under customMuslim Personal Lawretrospective operationcustomary lawshares in inheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellants' revision in an inheritance case. The core legal question involved the effect of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance (XIII of 1983) on a will executed under custom prior to its enactment, specifically regarding whether a bequest in excess of one-third can take effect in its entirety. The Supreme Court held that the 1983 enactment applies retrospectively to the succession of the last male holder who died under customary law, thereby restricting the operation of the will to one-third of the property, with the remaining two-thirds to be distributed among the legal heirs according to Islamic law of inheritance. The key principle laid down is that wills made under custom are subject to the retrospective operation of subsequent statutory amendments enforcing Muslim personal law, limiting testamentary disposition to one-third without the consent of heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance (XIII of 1983) applies retrospectively to a succession that opened under customary law?
  • What is the extent of a bequest under a will executed during the prevalence of customary law when subjected to subsequent statutory application of Muslim Personal Law?
  • How is the remaining estate distributed when a will exceeds the permissible one-third share under Islamic law?
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• Muhammad Akhtar vs The State1989 SCMR 1814 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-12
  illegal gratificationpublic servantincome tax departmentcorruptioncriminal breachleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court maintaining the petitioner's conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while setting aside his conviction under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner, a record-keeper in the Income-tax Department, was caught red-handed accepting illegal gratification from a timber merchant to hush up an income tax matter. The core legal question was whether an employee who lacks the direct official capacity to personally grant a favour can be convicted under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for accepting illegal gratification as a motive for rendering or attempting to render service with another public servant. The Supreme Court held that it is immaterial whether the public servant was personally in a position to show favour, as the statute penalizes accepting illegal remuneration as a motive for rendering or attempting to render service with any public servant. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 require that the public servant accused of accepting illegal gratification be personally in a position to show favour to the complainant?
  • Is it an offence for a public servant to accept illegal remuneration as a motive for rendering or attempting to render service with any other public servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar vs Judge Family Court and others1989 SCMR 615 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-15
  Khuladissolution of marriagerestitution of conjugal rightsfamily courtappreciation of evidencesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which upheld the dissolution of a marriage on the basis of Khula. The core legal question concerns the propriety of dissolving a marriage on the ground of Khula due to incompatibility of temperament and failure of conciliation efforts. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the wife's aversion and inability to live within the limits prescribed by Almighty Allah involved the appreciation of evidence, which the High Court had correctly examined and found free of jurisdictional defects or legal infirmities. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that factual determinations based on evidence in family suits regarding Khula will not be re-examined by the apex court unless a substantial legal or jurisdictional error is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a marriage can be dissolved on the basis of Khula due to incompatibility of temperament?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-examine evidence concurrently appreciated by the lower courts and the High Court in a family matter?
  • Whether a writ petition against the judgment of a Family Court can be maintained without showing a legal infirmity or jurisdictional defect?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar Bajwa vs Federal Government of Pakistan and 41989 SCMR 1558 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-22
  service tribunal jurisdictionrailways policeleave to appealdeputationseniority disputemaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's appeal regarding seniority and appointment in the Pakistan Railways Police on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, holding that the petitioner remained an employee of the Provincial Government. The core legal question is whether provincial police personnel transferred to the Pakistan Railways Police under the Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977 become federal employees or remain provincial employees on deputation. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the Tribunal's view requires detailed examination by the Court as it affects a large number of cases and raises substantial questions regarding service status under the Act. The key principle laid down is that the interpretation of transfer and reversion provisions concerning former provincial personnel absorbed into federal forces warrants authoritative review by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether personnel transferred to the Pakistan Railways Police under the Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977 become employees of the Federal Government or remain provincial employees?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear service appeals regarding seniority from police personnel transferred from the provincial government to the Pakistan Railways Police?
  • What is the legal effect of the power of the Federal Government to revert transferred personnel back to the provincial police under the Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar Qureshi vs Government of Pakistan and 2 others1989 SCMR 1681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-02
  leave to appealservice tribunalright of audiencenatural justicedepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Service Tribunal, Government of Pakistan, dated 13-11-1980, filed by an ex-Assistant Central Intelligence Officer. The core legal question concerns whether the impugned order of the Tribunal was passed without holding a proper inquiry and without providing an opportunity of hearing, thereby condemning the petitioner unheard. The Court held that the contentions raised were not devoid of force and granted leave to appeal. The key principle established is that an adverse service order passed without a proper inquiry and opportunity of hearing warrants a grant of leave to appeal for a fuller examination of the legality of condemning a person unheard.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by a Service Tribunal without holding a proper inquiry is contrary to law?
  • Does failure to afford an opportunity of hearing violate the principles of natural justice amounting to condemning a person unheard?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ajmal vs The State1989 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-01
  criminal appealmurder convictionbenefit of doubtocular evidencemedical evidencecontradictory testimonyacquittal of co-accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court’s judgment maintaining the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder and house trespass under Sections 302 and 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given significant contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence, and the reliability of eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution’s case suffered from material inconsistencies, particularly regarding the presence of witnesses and the nature of injuries sustained by the deceased. The Court held that the prosecution failed to present a clear, unimpeachable account of the occurrence. Crucially, the Court determined that the evidence against the appellant was indistinguishable from the evidence against his co-accused, who had already been acquitted. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and acquitted the appellant, establishing the principle that where prosecution evidence is inherently doubtful and inconsistent, and where the case against a convicted individual mirrors that of acquitted co-accused, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does a material contradiction between medical evidence and ocular testimony regarding the nature of injuries cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Is an appellant entitled to acquittal if the evidence against them is indistinguishable from the evidence against co-accused who have been acquitted?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the testimony of key eye-witnesses is found to be unreliable and contradictory?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ajaib and 2 others vs Mst. Ghulam Fatima through Leal Heirs1989 SCMR 1709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-23
  declaratory suitgift mutationagricultural landsecond appealburden of proofvalidity of gift
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a declaratory suit challenging a gift mutation of agricultural land. The respondents (original plaintiffs) contested a gift of 13 kanals 16 marlas of land allegedly made in favour of the petitioner, Muhammad Ajaib. While the trial court initially dismissed the suit, the District Judge reversed this decision on appeal, finding the respondents to be in continuous possession of the land and declaring the gift invalid. The petitioners subsequently filed a regular second appeal before the Lahore High Court, which was dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners sought leave to appeal against the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court examined the record and found a complete absence of evidence to substantiate the transaction of the gift or to prove the essential ingredients required for a valid gift. Consequently, the Court held that there were no grounds for interference with the concurrent findings of the lower appellate court and the High Court. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Is a gift of land valid where the essential ingredients of the transaction are not proven by evidence?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere in a regular second appeal where the lower courts have concurrently found the evidence lacking?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmad Shaffi vs S.E. Irrigation (Headquarter), Lahore and others1989 SCMR 947 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-15
  departmental inquiryservice tribunalstore shortageefficiency and discipline rulesleave to appealgovernment loss
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the order of the Service Tribunal, which had partially accepted the petitioner's appeal regarding a departmental inquiry. A departmental inquiry was initiated against the petitioner alleging a government loss of Rs. 30,840 due to store shortages resulting from negligence. The Inquiry Officer held the petitioner responsible for shortages totaling Rs. 8,461, leading to the imposition of a major penalty for recovery under Rule 7-A of the Efficiency & Discipline Rules, 1975. The Service Tribunal set aside the liability regarding diesel oil but maintained the recovery of Rs. 7,625 for the shortage of fixtures. The core legal question is whether the Service Tribunal or the departmental authority committed any error of law or procedure in imposing the penalty and sustaining the partial recovery. The Supreme Court held that no error of law or procedure was pointed out, noting that the Tribunal had already taken a sympathetic view granting partial relief, and consequently dismissed the petition. The key principle established is that factual findings of administrative authorities and service tribunals regarding departmental inquiries and store shortages, free from legal or procedural defects, do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with factual findings of a Service Tribunal in a departmental inquiry absent any error of law or procedure?
  • Can a major penalty for recovery of loss be sustained when the Service Tribunal has already granted partial relief by setting aside a portion of the shortage liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmad Ali Khan vs President of Pakistan and others1989 SCMR 1240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-08
  service petitiontermination of servicemartial law regulation 114jurisdiction of service tribunalmala fidesouster clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a service petition filed under Article 212 of the Constitution against the order of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the termination of his service under Martial Law Regulation 114. The Service Tribunal had taken the view that such an order could only be challenged if mala fides was specifically alleged and proved, and since no mala fides was alleged, it declined to examine the merits. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in refusing to examine the termination order on merits solely due to the absence of an allegation of mala fides, despite other recognized grounds such as lack of jurisdiction or coram non judice. The Supreme Court held that mala fides is not the only ground for interference, and that the Tribunal had the power and obligation to examine such cases on merits to determine if the action fell within the statutory grounds. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the Service Tribunal for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal can examine an order passed under Martial Law Regulation 114 on merits in the absence of an allegation of mala fides?
  • What is the extent to which the jurisdiction of superior courts and tribunals has been ousted in relation to orders passed under Martial Law Regulations?
  • Whether an order passed without jurisdiction or coram non judice is open to scrutiny notwithstanding an ouster clause?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs Tariq Majeed and 2 others1989 SCMR 1494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  murdersudden brawlcommon intentionsentence enhancementacquittalmitigating circumstancescriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal petitions arise out of a common judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a criminal altercation resulting in the death of Arshad Mahmood. The complainant sought leave to appeal against the acquittal of certain respondents under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and for enhancement of sentences, while one of the convicts challenged his conviction and sentence for murder. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, noting the existence of previous enmity and a chance encounter without premeditation where individual injuries were inflicted during a sudden brawl. The Court held that common intention could not be established, making the accused individually liable for their respective acts. Furthermore, the High Court's reduction of the death sentence to life imprisonment for the primary assailant was justified based on mitigating factors including youth, prior injuries, and the absence of repeated blows. The key principles laid down are that individual criminal liability attaches in sudden brawls lacking common intention, and mitigating circumstances such as youth and lack of repetition can warrant the commutation of a death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether individual criminal liability applies in a chance encounter where common intention among the accused is not proved?
  • Does the youth of the offender and the absence of repeated blows constitute sufficient mitigating circumstances to alter a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained when an injury is inflicted on a non-vital part but results in fatal bleeding?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal and others vs Mst. Surraya Begum and others1989 SCMR 1089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-05
  constitutional jurisdictionalternate remedymutation of giftcivil court decreeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the Commissioner's order directing the sanctioning of a land mutation based on a gift. The original owner, Sultan, had gifted land to respondents whom he described as his wife and son. After Sultan confessed judgment in a civil suit filed by the donees, a declaration was granted in their favor. Following Sultan's death, the local Revenue Officer attested a mutation of succession in favor of the petitioners who were collaterals, ignoring the gift. Litigation ensued through revenue forums up to the Board of Revenue and the High Court. The core legal question concerned the appropriateness of invoking constitutional jurisdiction when an alternate remedy was available and the validity of a gift already decreed by a civil court. The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was misconceived because the validity of the gift was a matter for the Civil Court and the petitioners had an adequate alternate remedy. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked when an alternate adequate remedy is available?
  • Can the validity of a gift decreed by a civil court be challenged through revenue proceedings and writ petitions?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal and anothers vs The State1989 SCMR 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-05
  murderdeath sentencecommon intentionocular testimonybenefit of doubtcriminal appealcircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction and death sentences of Muhammad Afzal and Muhammad Khan for the murders of Shah Nawaz and Muhammad Yaqub. The prosecution alleged that the appellants, motivated by a property dispute over a pathway, attacked the victims. Muhammad Khan shot Shah Nawaz, while Muhammad Afzal, along with two female co-accused who were later acquitted, allegedly set fire to a room where Muhammad Yaqub had taken refuge, causing his death by suffocation and burns. The core legal question was whether the conviction of the appellants was sustainable given the acquittal of the female co-accused and the contention that the appellants' roles were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the ocular testimony was consistent and credible, and the appellants' roles were sufficiently established by circumstantial and medical evidence, independent of the acquitted co-accused. The Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences, rejecting the plea that the incident was a sudden flare-up. The principle laid down is that the acquittal of some co-accused does not necessarily invalidate the conviction of others if their specific roles are independently supported by credible evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of some co-accused automatically render the conviction of the remaining accused unsustainable?
  • Can a conviction for murder be maintained based on ocular testimony when the motive is established and the witnesses are credible?
  • Is the death sentence appropriate for a murder committed by setting a room on fire?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zohra Khatoon vs Mehr Khan and others1989 SCMR 1493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-20
  alteration of convictiongrievous hurtSection 325 PPCSection 302 PPCpremeditationintention to killland disputecommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking the enhancement of the respondents' conviction from Section 325 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 back to Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from a capital charge to one under Section 325/34 PPC based on the appraisal of evidence regarding the parties' intentions during a land dispute. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court committed no legal error in its conclusion. The Court noted that the incident occurred without premeditation when the respondents resisted the complainant party's insistence on ploughing disputed land, and the respondents inflicted primarily simple blunt weapon injuries except for one fatal injury. The key principle affirmed is that where an altercations arises spontaneously over a land dispute without premeditation or intention to kill, altering a conviction from murder to grievous hurt under Section 325 PPC read with Section 34 PPC is legally justified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an alteration of conviction from Section 302 PPC to Section 325 PPC is justified where an incident arises spontaneously without premeditation during a land dispute?
  • Can an intention to kill under Section 302 PPC be inferred when parties inflict mostly simple blunt weapon injuries while resisting the ploughing of disputed land?
  • Is the Supreme Court bound to interfere with a High Court's appraisal of evidence regarding the sentence and conviction when no legal error is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zar Bano vs The State1989 SCMR 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-07
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsprohibition orderwoman with suckling childrecovery from private housebailable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Sind High Court, which refused to grant pre-trial bail to the petitioner facing trial under Section 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for allegedly possessing approximately 150 grams of heroin powder. The core legal questions concern whether the detention of a female petitioner with a suckling child in deteriorating health warrants bail, and whether recovery of contraband from a private house rather than a public place renders the offence bailable under Article 16 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the Sessions Judge, and confirmed the interim bail previously granted to the appellant. The key principle laid down is that valid grounds relating to the welfare of a suckling child and the nature of the place of recovery can establish a fit case for the grant of bail in narcotics matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the detention of a woman with a suckling child whose health is suffering justify the grant of bail?
  • Whether possession of a contraband article in a private house rather than a public place makes the offence bailable under Article 16 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab Bibi vs Mst. Ghulam Fatima1989 SCMR 1634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-22
  leave to appealframing of issuescivil revisionproperty disputeabsence of defendantprejudice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant sister against the dismissal of her civil revision by the High Court, concerning a dispute over property originally owned by the parties' deceased mother. The core legal question involves whether the trial court erred in examining the merits and dismissing the mother's suit without framing issues after the petitioner filed a written statement and subsequently absented herself. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not complain about the lack of framed issues since she had absented herself and suffered no prejudice, especially as the trial court initially dismissed the suit in her favor, and subsequent appellate and revisional forums properly heard and disposed of the matter on merits. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, establishing that a party who absents themselves cannot claim prejudice regarding the omission of framed issues where no actual prejudice is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a defendant who absents herself after filing a written statement can challenge the trial court's decision on the ground that issues were not framed?
  • Does the omission to frame issues cause prejudice to a party who is not present to contest the proceedings?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the concurrent dismissal of a civil revision regarding a property dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab Bibi and others vs Mst. Resham Bibi and others1989 SCMR 1378 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-09
  inheritance disputeconcurrent findings of factleave to appealmisreading of evidencecivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit concerning inheritance, which was dismissed by the trial court, with subsequent appeals also being dismissed by the appellate and High Court. The primary controversy involved the status of the respondent as the widow of the deceased. The petitioners challenged the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the lower courts, alleging misreading and improper appreciation of evidence. During the proceedings, it was disclosed that some petitioners had reached an agreement with the respondents and no longer wished to pursue the petition, while others maintained their stance. Upon hearing arguments on the merits, the Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal, holding that the case did not warrant interference with the concurrent findings of fact. The Court affirmed that it would not disturb findings of fact reached by lower courts in the absence of a compelling demonstration of misreading or misappreciation of evidence, effectively disposing of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a civil suit regarding inheritance?
  • Does the allegation of misreading of evidence provide sufficient grounds for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal against concurrent findings of fact?
  • What is the effect of a partial settlement among petitioners on a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zaidat vs Shahadat and others1989 SCMR 1392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-04
  leave to appealex parte decreeconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff against the dismissal of her writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the setting aside of an ex parte decree previously passed in her favour. The core legal question concerns whether the revisional order setting aside the ex parte decree warranted interference under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the revisional order passed by the District Judge was not liable to be set aside in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, particularly as subsequent proceedings on merits had already concluded and a separate petition was pending. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that discretionary constitutional jurisdiction will not be exercised to interfere with a revisional order setting aside an ex parte decree when the substantive suit has already proceeded and been decided on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order setting aside an ex parte decree is open to interference in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Does the conclusion of proceedings on merits in the main suit affect a pending challenge against the setting aside of an ex parte decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Yasmeen vs The State1989 SCMR 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-08
  bailcriminal appealwoman accusedpregnancynarcoticsHudood Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Mst. Yasmeen against the refusal of bail by the High Court of Sind in a case involving the alleged recovery of contraband including Hasheesh, Heroin, and Opium under the Hudood Ordinance. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner, a young woman who was pregnant and incarcerated, was entitled to the concession of bail despite a previous withdrawal of her bail application. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the interim bail previously granted should be confirmed. The Court laid down the key principle that an advanced state of pregnancy entitles a female accused to bail to ensure that her child is born free rather than in prison, and so that she may receive the necessary medical care and attention.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pregnant female accused is entitled to bail to ensure her child is born outside prison?
  • Does an advanced stage of pregnancy constitute a valid ground for confirming bail in narcotics cases?
  • Is a female accused entitled to bail on humanitarian grounds such as medical care and pregnancy?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tayyabun Nisa and others vs Abdul Ghani and others1989 SCMR 1685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-01-24
  evacuee propertypartition of propertysettlement authoritiesjurisdiction of civil courtsdisplaced personsproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment quashing an order by Settlement authorities that had partitioned a property jointly owned by evacuee and non-evacuee interests. The core legal question was whether Settlement authorities possessed the statutory power to partition property jointly owned by evacuees and non-evacuees under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that Settlement authorities lacked the jurisdiction to effect such partitions. The Court held that the power to partition property is vested in Civil Courts, and no provision in the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, explicitly or implicitly conferred this power upon Settlement authorities. The Court established that in the absence of express statutory authority, Settlement authorities cannot assume the judicial function of partitioning property between co-sharers. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Paragraph 16-C of the Schedule to the Act was inapplicable where the property in question was divisible, and that the Settlement authorities' actions could not bind parties who had already acquired interests in the property.

  Questions settled

  • Do Settlement authorities possess the power to partition property jointly owned by evacuees and non-evacuees under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does Section 8 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, grant Settlement authorities the power to partition property?
  • Can Settlement authorities partition property that is divisible under Paragraph 16-C of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Taj Bibi vs Syed Ahmad Shah1989 SCMR 1001 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-13
  secondary evidencelost documentmode of proofwaiver of objectionadmissibility of evidenceproof of executioncivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a property dispute where the appellant sought possession based on a sale deed. The trial court decreed the suit, but the High Court reversed this, ruling the secondary evidence (a certified copy) inadmissible due to alleged insufficient stamp duty and failure to prove the original document's loss. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the trial court's judgment. The core legal questions concerned the admissibility of secondary evidence for a lost document, the necessity of proving execution, and the effect of failing to object to the mode of proof at the trial stage. The Court held that the trial court’s discretion to admit secondary evidence should not be disturbed absent a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, it established that where a party fails to object to the mode of proof at the trial, they cannot challenge it in appeal, as such objections are waived. Additionally, the Court affirmed that the execution of a document can be established through presumptive or circumstantial evidence rather than solely direct testimony, and that the document in question was not compulsorily registrable.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection regarding the mode of proof of a document be raised for the first time in an appellate court?
  • Does the trial court's decision to admit secondary evidence for a lost document warrant interference in appeal?
  • Is direct testimony required to prove the execution of a document, or can it be established through circumstantial evidence?
  • Does the failure to object to a document's admission at the trial stage preclude a party from challenging its admissibility later?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sharifan and others vs Abdul Jabbar Khan and others1989 SCMR 1793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-09
  ejectment petitiondefault in rentleave to appealtenant evictionfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' First Appeal Against Order, which upheld the ejectment order passed against them. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioners were validly considered defaulters in payment of rent regarding the disputed commercial shop. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact by both the Rent Controller and the High Court established that the petitioners were indeed defaulters in rent, notwithstanding the withdrawal of a previous ejectment petition following a rent increase and alleged private arrangement. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding default in rent by lower forums will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court in leave petitions unless compelling legal grounds are shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding default in rent by the Rent Controller and High Court can be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the withdrawal of a previous ejectment petition upon an increase in rent absolve the tenant from subsequent defaults?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahnaz Akhtar vs Javaid Iqbal and others1989 SCMR 1255(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-26
  maintenancearbitration councilfinding of factwrit jurisdictionfamily lawrevision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld an order by a Collector regarding maintenance payments. The petitioner, a wife, had been granted maintenance by the Chairman of the Arbitration Council, which included a retroactive award for five years preceding the filing of her application. Upon revision, the Collector modified this order, disallowing maintenance for the period prior to the application's institution, citing a finding of fact that the respondent had already provided maintenance during that time. The petitioner challenged this modification in the High Court, which declined to interfere with the Collector's factual determination. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to disturb the Collector's finding of fact regarding the prior provision of maintenance. The Supreme Court held that the Collector's finding was a conclusive finding of fact, and the High Court acted correctly in not interfering with it. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit, affirming the principle that appellate or revisional courts generally do not disturb concurrent findings of fact unless they are perverse or unsupported by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact made by a Collector in a revision petition?
  • Is a finding that maintenance was already provided for a specific period considered a finding of fact?
  • Does an appellate court have the authority to grant maintenance for a period preceding the institution of the application if maintenance was already provided?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Seman vs Barkat Ali and others1989 SCMR 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-05
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptiontenancy rightscivil revisionleave to appealwaiver of argument
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the vendees challenging the dismissal of their Civil Revision by the High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners, as alleged tenants of the suit land, possessed a superior right to purchase the property, thereby defeating the respondents' claim of pre-emption. The High Court had dismissed the petitioners' contention on two grounds: first, that the argument regarding their status as tenants was not pressed before the lower appellate court; and second, that even if the status of tenancy were considered, the petitioners would still fail because they had joined in the purchase with a person who was not a tenant. The Supreme Court found no infirmity in the High Court's reasoning. The Court held that the factual determination by the High Court regarding the waiver of the argument in the lower appellate court was sufficient to dismiss the petition. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that joining a non-tenant in a purchase transaction defeats the claim of a superior right of pre-emption based on tenancy.

  Questions settled

  • Does joining a non-tenant in a purchase transaction defeat a claim of superior right of pre-emption based on tenancy?
  • Can a party raise an argument in a higher court that was not pressed before the lower appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sattan and others vs Mst. Rani and others1989 SCMR 1677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-16
  revisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factleave to appealmutation proceedingsinheritance dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  These two petitions for leave to appeal arose from separate judgments of the Lahore High Court and involved similar questions regarding concurrent findings of fact on the religious denomination (Shia or Sunni) of deceased persons in succession matters. In the first matter, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully claimed the deceased was a Shia through revenue and civil proceedings, culminating in a dismissed civil revision. In the second matter, the plaintiffs successfully obtained a decree declaring the deceased a Shia, which was upheld in appeal and revision. The core legal question was whether the High Court should have interfered with concurrent findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact reached by the lower courts suffered from no legal or other infirmity, and the revenue authorities' proceedings and alleged admissions did not warrant interference under revisional jurisdiction. The petitions were accordingly dismissed, laying down the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts will not be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction unless tainted by legal infirmity or misreading.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court should interfere with concurrent findings of fact in revisional jurisdiction?
  • Can revenue mutation proceedings and alleged admissions warrant interference with concurrent factual findings by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others vs Islam Khan and others1989 SCMR 1938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08
  pre-emptionregular second appeallimitationleave to appealdismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the vendee side against the dismissal of their regular second appeal by the High Court in a pre-emption suit. The High Court had dismissed the appeal in limine on the ground that the question of limitation, having been denied by the Additional District Judge as having been argued before him, was deemed to have been abandoned. Before the Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the petitioners conceded, in light of subsequent binding precedent of the Supreme Court in Allah Yar Khan v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others (1986 SCMR 1957), that he was unable to press the petition. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. The key principle governing the matter relates to the treatment of points raised in memorandum of appeal but not addressed or verified as argued before the lower appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in treating a point of limitation as abandoned when the trial or lower appellate judge denies that it was argued?
  • Does the failure to press a petition for leave to appeal in light of settled subsequent case law result in the refusal of leave?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sardar Begum vs Mst. Maryam Hameed and others1989 SCMR 1233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  leave to appealproperty transfersettlement claimrefugee entitlementauction validityJammu and Kashmir refugees
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Mst. Sardar Begum against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed her claim for the transfer of a residential property, House No. 2/1394, Sialkot. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner, as an occupant of the property, was entitled to its transfer based on her status as a refugee from Jammu and Kashmir, and whether the previous auction of said property was void ab initio. The petitioner relied on a report from the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, which indicated that the occupants were indeed refugees from Jammu and Kashmir, thereby rendering the prior auction invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the High Court had failed to properly appreciate this crucial aspect of the case regarding the petitioner's entitlement. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the matter required further judicial consideration to resolve the entitlement dispute. The Court directed that the appeal be prepared on the existing record, with liberty for parties to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the status of an occupant as a refugee from Jammu and Kashmir entitle them to the transfer of a property previously auctioned?
  • Can an auction of a property be considered void ab initio if the occupants are found to be entitled refugees?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sardar Begum and others vs Settlement Commissioner and others1989 SCMR 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-19
  leave to appealrehabilitation and settlement schemedisplaced personscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 30-5-1982 concerning the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The petitioners contended that their case was fully covered by paragraph 7 of chapter I Part II of the said scheme, an aspect which the High Court allegedly failed to consider. Finding that the contention requires examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal subject to the furnishing of security, directed the appeal to be made ready on the present record, allowed the parties to file additional documents within two months, and ordered the continuation of the interim order dated 7-2-1983.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court failed to advert to the legal aspect concerning paragraph 7 of chapter I Part II of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
  • Should leave to appeal be granted when a contention regarding the applicability of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme requires examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina Mai through her mother and 3 others vs Malik Zahoor Hussain1989 SCMR 1134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-09
  pre-emptionleave to appealcivil revisionright of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the vendee/defendant side against the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court in a suit for pre-emption concerning a house situated in a Mohallah of Multan City. The core legal question involved is whether the right of pre-emption was available to the respondent/plaintiff with respect to the said Mohallah, noting that leave to appeal had already been granted in a similar matter concerning the same Mohallah in Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Allah Ditta (1985 SCMR 1097). The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, directed that the present appeal be heard together with the pending connected appeal, ordered security of five thousand rupees, and directed the preparation of the appeal on the present record with liberty to file necessary additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of pre-emption is available in respect of the Mohallah in question?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted to be heard along with a pending connected appeal involving the same locality?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina Bim and others vs Murid Hussain and others1989 SCMR 1622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-11
  evacuee propertylacheswrit petitionsettlement authoritiesproperty transferspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal regarding the ownership of an evacuee property shop in Jehania. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioners, claiming through predecessors-in-interest, had a valid basis to challenge the transfer of the property to the respondent, Murid Hussain, and whether the High Court correctly dismissed the petitions based on the lack of merit and the doctrine of laches. The Supreme Court held that the claim of the first petitioner (Muhammad Ismail) was correctly rejected as his initial claim was dismissed by Settlement Authorities and the High Court in 1962, with no further pursuit of the matter. Regarding the second petitioner (Gulzar Ahmad), the Court held that the High Court properly dismissed the petition due to unexplained laches, as the transfer to the respondent occurred in 1976 and was not challenged until 1982. The key principle laid down is that a claim to property, once rejected by competent authorities and courts, cannot be revived after significant delay, and that unexplained laches serves as a valid ground for dismissing a writ petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claim to evacuee property be revived after it has been rejected by Settlement Authorities and the High Court decades prior?
  • Does an unexplained delay of six years in challenging a property transfer order constitute laches sufficient to dismiss a writ petition?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to challenge a property transfer if they failed to pursue their initial claim after a previous dismissal by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saira Bai vs Syed Anisur Rahman1989 SCMR 1366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-11
  evictiongood faithpersonal requirementSind Rented Premises Ordinancelandlord-tenant disputebona fide requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns an eviction application filed by a landlady against her tenant under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, claiming the premises were required in good faith for her son’s independent business. The core legal question was whether the failure to specify the nature of the intended business in the application, and the existence of a prior demand for increased rent, invalidated the claim of good faith. The Supreme Court held that the eviction application was valid and restored the Controller’s order. The Court ruled that specifying the nature of the business is not a material fact essential to the cause of action, as circumstances may change, and the choice of business rests with the landlord. Furthermore, the Court established that a prior demand for increased rent does not, by itself, negate a bona fide personal requirement if the requirement is independently proven. The principle laid down is that 'good faith' requires the act to be done honestly, and courts should not impose external constraints on the landlord's choice of business or property usage unless explicitly provided by law.

  Questions settled

  • Is it a mandatory requirement for a landlord to specify the nature of the intended business in an eviction application based on personal requirement?
  • Does a prior demand for increased rent by a landlord automatically invalidate a subsequent eviction application based on personal requirement?
  • What is the legal definition of 'good faith' in the context of eviction proceedings under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a tenant challenge the landlord's choice of business for which the premises are required?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Begum vs Ibrahim and 4 others1989 PLD Supreme Court 314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-26
  pre-emptionTalabsShufaabatement of suitsIslamic lawco-sharerretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed by pre-emptors against the dismissal of their regular second appeal and civil revision by the High Court, as their pre-emption suits filed before 31st July 1986 had not resulted in a decree by that date. The core legal questions involve whether pre-emption suits filed under the former statutory law can continue without a decree past 31st July 1986, the applicability and mandatory nature of Islamic demands ('Talabs') as an integral substantive part of the right of Shufa, and the interpretation of previous judgments of the Supreme Court including Said Kamal and Sardar Ali. The Supreme Court held that the failure to make Talabs at proper times extinguishes the right of Shufa, that pending pre-emption suits in which no decree had been obtained prior to 31st July 1986 abated and could not be decreed thereafter, and that new legislation such as the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987 does not save pending suits from the requirement of Talabs. The key principles laid down are that the law of Shufa is substantive rather than procedural, that Talabs are an essential element whose absence extinguishes the claim, and that no decree can be granted in pre-emption suits filed under old laws unless secured before the constitutional cut-off date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit filed before 31st July 1986 can be decreed after that date if no pre-emption decree was obtained prior thereto?
  • Is the requirement of making 'Talabs' a procedural rule or a substantive and integral part of the right of Shufa?
  • Whether the failure to make Talabs at proper times extinguishes the right of pre-emption?
  • Does the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987 save pending pre-emption suits from the mandatory requirement of fulfilling Islamic demands of Talabs?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeeda Begum and another vs Senior Civil Judge and 2 others1989 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-12
  child custodyhizanatwelfare of the minorguardian and wardleave to appealconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a Constitutional Petition by the High Court of Sind concerning the custody of a minor male child. The mother (petitioner No. 1) and her father sought custody against the biological father (respondent No. 3). The Guardian Judge and Additional District Judge had previously awarded custody to the father, relying on grounds including the mother's denial of access to the father, the child crossing the age of seven years (thus terminating the mother's right of hizanat under the law), and issues concerning the child's school records and accommodation. The High Court declined to interfere with these concurrent findings of fact. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the welfare of the minor had been given paramount consideration in the lower adjudications, while issuing interim arrangements for visitation rights to facilitate the child's transition and education.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact in child custody matters under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the mother lose her right of hizanat upon the minor male child crossing the age of seven years?
  • Whether the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration in determining child custody disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Roshan Ara vs Mst. Badri Kamala and 9 others1989 SCMR 1981 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-28
  leave to appealdower propertyacknowledgement deedfindings of factcivil revisiondeclaration and possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil revision where the High Court set aside the appellate judgment and restored the trial court's decree in favour of the respondents, who filed a suit for declaration and possession of a house claimed as dower property. The core legal question concerns findings of fact regarding whether the suit property was given to the respondent by her deceased husband in lieu of dower, supported by a subsequent written acknowledgement. The Supreme Court held that there is no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment, noting that the deed of acknowledgement executed by the deceased husband regarding the previous transfer of property in lieu of dower has valid legal import and value, which the petitioner failed to displace. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused, affirming the concurrent findings upholding the acknowledgement and the dower claim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a statement in an acknowledgement deed by a deceased husband regarding the previous transfer of property in lieu of dower carries sufficient legal weight to establish the claim?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding a dower property and acknowledgement deed be interfered with when no legal infirmity is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Begum and another vs Messrs Basco Enterprise Ltd. and others1989 SCMR 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-28
  rent restrictionnon-residential premisespersonal residential useevictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  Two petitions for leave to appeal were filed by landlords against the judgments of the High Court, which had allowed writ petitions filed by evicted tenants. The High Court had held that non-residential premises leased out for commercial purposes could not be vacated for the personal residential use of the landlord. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a non-residential building could be got vacated for residential purposes under the relevant rent restriction laws, a matter treated by the Court as one of first impression. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this question, noting the absence of direct binding precedents supporting the proposition that non-residential premises cannot be converted or got vacated for residential use. The Court directed the preparation of appeals on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Can a non-residential building be got vacated for the personal residential use of the landlord?
  • Whether premises leased out for commercial purposes can be claimed by a landlord for residential purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rasulan and 7 others vs Mst. Mumtaz Begum and 2 others1989 SCMR 1778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-20
  leave to appealinheritanceconcurrent findingscivil revisiondeclaration and permanent injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of the petitioners' civil revision by the High Court. The petitioners had instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction claiming inheritance rights to the property of one Noora, the last male-holder, asserting he left only a son as an heir. The respondents contested the suit, claiming inheritance as the widow and daughters of the deceased. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the concurrent findings were upheld in appeal and revision. Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court noted that oral and documentary evidence, including Nikahnama and birth entries, supported the respondents' status as legal heirs. The paternity and legitimacy of the daughters stood established and corroborated by the evidence, and the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts suffered from no legal error. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact warranted no interference, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts can be interfered with when supported by oral and documentary evidence?
  • Does the paternity and legitimacy of daughters stand established when corroborated by the mother's testimony and official entries?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashid Begum vs Abdur Rashid1989 SCMR 2046 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-21
  bail cancellationmurderleave to appealcriminal proceduresupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a miscellaneous application submitted by the petitioner complaining about the murder of her son and the subsequent release of the accused, Abdur Rashid, on bail by the High Court, apprehending further harm and abduction of her daughter-in-law. The Supreme Court relaxed the rules to treat the application as a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question examined by the Court was whether the High Court's order releasing the respondent on bail satisfied the well-established practice of superior courts regarding the release on bail of accused persons involved in murder cases. The Court held that the case was a fit one for detailed examination and granted leave to appeal against the bail order of the High Court, while issuing non-bailable warrants for the appearance of the respondent and summoning the police record. The key principle laid down is that bail orders in heinous offences like murder passed by lower courts must strictly conform to the established practices and parameters of superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an informal application complaining against the grant of bail can be treated as a petition for leave to appeal by relaxing the rules?
  • Does the release on bail of an accused charged with murder satisfy the well-established practice of superior courts under the circumstances?
  • Are non-bailable warrants properly issued upon the grant of leave to appeal against an order of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rakhema and others vs The Provincial Government and others1989 SCMR 1949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-21
  res judicataremand of caseconcurrent findingscivil revisionleave to appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a common judgment of the High Court which remanded two connected civil suits to the trial court for decision on merits. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court erred in setting aside concurrent findings of fact regarding the applicability of the principle of res judicata and whether the High Court misread or failed to consider material documentary evidence on record. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the submissions raised concerning the misreading of evidence and the improper application of res judicata to a suit where no such issue was framed required detailed consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions and stayed further proceedings on remand pending the final outcome.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts in civil revision?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply when a party was not involved in the earlier litigation and the property share in dispute was different?
  • Can a case be remanded by the High Court when findings on material issues were left unaddressed by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rafia Khanum vs Additional District Judge, Okara and others1989 SCMR 1983 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-03
  compromise deedout of court settlementdelivery of vacant possessionreconstruction of shoptenant evictionsanctioned plandisposal of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of a tenancy dispute between a landlady and her tenant. During the appellate proceedings, the learned counsel for both contesting parties jointly submitted that an out-of-court settlement had been reached and tendered a signed Deed of Compromise alongside a shaded site plan demarcating the disputed property. Under the terms of the settlement, the tenant agreed to deliver vacant possession of the shop to the landlady by a specified date, while the landlady undertook to reconstruct the premises per a sanctioned plan and deliver vacant possession of two newly-constructed ground-floor shops and a first-floor gallery back to the tenant by a subsequent stipulated deadline. The Supreme Court examined the settlement, confirmed that it was neither unlawful nor unfair, and held it to be mutually beneficial for both parties. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeal strictly in accordance with the terms of the compromise deed and directed that the site plan be treated as an integral part of the judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal can be disposed of in terms of an out-of-court Deed of Compromise signed by counsel for both parties?
  • Can a site plan produced with a compromise deed be incorporated as an integral part of the court's judgment?
  • What standard must the court satisfy regarding fairness and legality before accepting a compromise between a landlord and a tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor Jehan vs Mst. Razia alias Rajjo1989 SCMR 597 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-13
  ex parte decreeleave to appealcivil revisionlimitation periodnon-appearancemoney suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by a defendant against the dismissal of her civil revision by the High Court, which upheld the trial court's ex parte decree in a money suit and the dismissal of her application to set aside the decree as time-barred. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency of the explanation for non-appearance before the trial court and the limitation period for setting aside an ex parte decree. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the non-appearance was not sufficiently explained, and no sufficient grounds existed to interfere with the decree or grant leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that leave to appeal will be refused where a party fails to sufficiently explain non-appearance before the trial court and where no valid justification is shown to disturb a concurrent finding regarding an ex parte decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when an application for setting aside an ex parte decree is dismissed as time-barred?
  • Does failure to provide a sufficient explanation for non-appearance before the trial court justify refusing leave to appeal?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent decisions upholding an ex parte decree where no valid grounds are shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor Begum and others vs Member, Board of Revenue and others1989 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-30
  mutation of inheritancereview proceedingsjurisdiction of revenue officerWest Pakistan Land Revenue Actevacuee propertyres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed an Inter-Court Appeal regarding a dispute over a mutation of inheritance. The core legal question was whether the Assistant Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to initiate fresh review proceedings under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, given that previous review proceedings concerning the same mutation had been quashed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Assistant Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that Section 163 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, does not prohibit the initiation of new review proceedings on different grounds, even if prior proceedings were quashed. The Court noted that the initial proceedings were based on the claim that the land was evacuee property, whereas the current proceedings were based on the contention that the beneficiary was not the daughter of the deceased. Furthermore, the Court observed that the parties involved in the two sets of proceedings were different, and the matter remained pending for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the quashment of earlier review proceedings under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967 bar the initiation of fresh review proceedings on different grounds?
  • Can a revenue officer initiate a review of a mutation of inheritance if the parties involved in the new proceedings differ from those in previous, quashed proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naziran and others vs The Deputy Settlement Commissioner and another1989 SCMR 743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Settlement Scheme No. VIIIproperty transferconsent orderavailable propertydisplaced personswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the transfer of the upper floor of a property in Lahore under the Settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the property was 'available' for transfer to the appellants under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, and whether a previous High Court consent order, which directed the transfer of the entire upper floor to the respondent, Muhammad Deen, precluded the appellants' claims. The Supreme Court held that the previous High Court order was a consent order based on an agreement between parties, not a judicial finding that Muhammad Deen had validly filed an N.C.H. Form. Consequently, the appellants, who were not parties to that earlier litigation, were not bound by it. The Court determined that the upper floor portions in the appellants' possession were indeed 'available' for transfer when they filed their applications. The Court set aside the lower orders and directed that the portions in the respective possession of the appellants and the respondent be transferred to them, with joint use of the staircase. This establishes that consent orders do not constitute binding adjudications on non-parties regarding property availability.

  Questions settled

  • Is a consent order passed by a High Court binding on persons who were not parties to the litigation?
  • Does a consent order regarding property transfer constitute a judicial finding on the eligibility of the transferee?
  • When is a property considered 'available' for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazima Begum and others vs Mst. Hasina Begum and others1989 SCMR 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-21
  specific performancepermanent injunctionOrder II Rule 2maintainability of suitleave to appealres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns the maintainability of a suit for specific performance filed after the withdrawal of a prior suit for permanent injunction based on the same agreement of sale. The trial court rejected the plaint, citing the bar under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Additional District Judge reversed this decision and remanded the case, a view subsequently upheld by the High Court. The petitioners, who purchased the property in dispute, sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower courts' findings contradicted established precedent regarding the application of Order II, Rule 2. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the filing of the second suit for specific performance was legally competent after the withdrawal of the earlier suit for permanent injunction, specifically in light of the principles laid down in Aziz Ahmad and others v. Mst. Hajran Bibi and others (1987 SCMR 527). The Court stayed trial proceedings and ordered the maintenance of the status quo regarding possession pending the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for specific performance barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if a prior suit for permanent injunction based on the same agreement was withdrawn?
  • Does the withdrawal of a suit for permanent injunction preclude a subsequent suit for specific performance regarding the same subject matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nawab Jehan Begum vs Dr. Imdad Ali1989 SCMR 1798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-20
  amendment of pleadingsdelay in litigationleave to appealprocedural technicalitycause of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order granting the respondent/plaintiff permission to amend their pleadings. The petitioner challenged the amendment on the grounds of significant delay, arguing that the application for amendment was filed nearly two decades after the commencement of the proceedings. The Supreme Court considered whether such a lengthy delay should preclude the amendment of pleadings. The Court held that while delay is a relevant factor in deciding whether to grant or refuse an amendment, it must be balanced against the potential harm caused to the cause of justice by adhering strictly to technicalities. The Court affirmed that there is no statutory limitation period for seeking amendments to pleadings. Relying on established precedents, including Ahsan Kausar and others v. Ahmad Zaman Khan and Mst. Ghulam Bibi and others v. Sarsa Khan, the Court found no merit in the petitioner's arguments regarding the distinction of the present case from settled law. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant delay in seeking an amendment to pleadings automatically bar the court from granting permission for such amendment?
  • Is there a statutory limitation period for filing an application to amend pleadings?
  • Should the court prioritize the cause of justice over procedural technicalities when considering an application for amendment of pleadings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasreen and others vs Nazar Hussain and others1989 SCMR 1818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-15
  leave to appealcivil revisionproduction of documentspublic documentsCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of the petitioners' civil revision by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the lower courts' orders closing the petitioners' evidence for late production of documents under Order XIII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question involves the proper exercise of jurisdiction regarding the late production of public documents of unimpeachable authenticity and the necessity of notice under Order XLIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, converting the petition into an appeal, noting that the contentions raised involve points of law requiring consideration. The Court ordered security for costs, directed the appeal to be fixed for final hearing, and ordered that while proceedings could continue, no final judgment should be announced until the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the late production of public documents of unimpeachable authenticity can be refused under Order XIII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a notice under Order XLIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 required to be sent in appeals that do not fall under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasim Akhtar vs Khalil and 10 others1989 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-07
  compromiseout-of-court settlementproperty disputeinheritance shareSupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through leave of the Court arose from a property dispute that had generated multifarious litigation between the parties. During the hearing, the parties successfully negotiated an out-of-court settlement through their respective counsel. The core legal question concerned the lawful resolution and final compromise of conflicting claims over the disputed property and the inheritance shares therein. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal in terms of the written compromise memorandum produced and signed by the counsel for both sides. The Court held that upon the appellant depositing the agreed sum of Rs. 70,000 in Court for payment to the legal heirs of Malik Chanan Din representing their 1/12th share, all further claims to the property by the respondents or persons claiming through them would stand relinquished. The key principle laid down is that the Court actively encourages and gives effect to lawful out-of-court compromises reached by parties to bring an end to protracted litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of an appeal on the basis of a written compromise agreement reached between the parties out of court?
  • How are payments agreed upon in a court compromise involving multiple legal heirs to be deposited and disbursed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasim Akhtar vs Khalil Ahmad and 10 others1989 SCMR 1529 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-01
  civil revisionpossession of propertyimplementation of decreecontempt of courtleave to appealexecution of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a Civil Revision, which arose from the respondents' initiation of fresh litigation regarding title to a property before complying with a prior Supreme Court judgment directing the handover of possession. The core legal question was whether the respondents could initiate new litigation or retain partial possession of the disputed property (a shop) prior to fulfilling the Supreme Court's earlier mandate to surrender possession. The Supreme Court held that the respondents failed to comply with the spirit of the previous order, as they could not justify retaining possession of a fraction of the shop while the majority share was ordered to be handed over. The Court granted leave to appeal and, in the interest of justice and to ensure the implementation of its final order, directed the respondents to vacate the premises within five days, authorizing police assistance if necessary. While noting the situation could prima facie constitute contempt, the Court declined to initiate contempt proceedings to preserve familial relations and facilitate potential out-of-court settlement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party initiate fresh litigation regarding title to a property before complying with a prior Supreme Court order to hand over possession?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the immediate vacation of property to ensure the implementation of its final order?
  • Under what circumstances might the Supreme Court decline to initiate contempt proceedings despite a prima facie violation of its order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nafees Begum vs Assistant Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property, Hyderabad and others1989 SCMR 1963 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-25
  evacuee trust propertyprivate religious trustdisplaced personstrust poolpermanent transfer deedconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court was directed against the judgment of the High Court upholding the declaration of the disputed property as an evacuee trust property. The core legal question was whether a private religious trust property constitutes an evacuee trust property attached to a religious, educational, or charitable institution under the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the authorities and the High Court were correct in law, affirming that the expression "religious trust" encompasses both public and private religious trusts, and that the property in question was validly declared as evacuee trust property. The key principle laid down is that private religious trusts fall within the statutory definition of evacuee trust properties, and transfer documents issued in respect of such properties contrary to law confer no protection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the expression 'religious trust' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 includes private religious trusts?
  • Does a private religious trust property fall within the definition of evacuee trust property under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975?
  • Are protections available under section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 to a transferee where a Permanent Transfer Deed was not issued prior to the mandated date?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Musarrat Bibi vs Mehndi Khan and others1989 SCMR 1220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-07
  inheritancepaternitydeclaratory suitleave to appeallegitimacycivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant in a declaratory suit regarding inheritance, following the dismissal of her Regular Second Appeal by the High Court. The core legal controversy centers on the inheritance of one Fateh Muhammad, who passed away in 1967. The central question requiring resolution is the determination of the petitioner's paternity, specifically whether Mst. Musarrat Bibi is the daughter of the deceased. The opposing party contended that the deceased had divorced the petitioner's mother, who subsequently remarried, thereby severing the petitioner's status as the daughter of the deceased. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the material presented by both sides, determined that the matter warranted a deeper examination of the paternity issue and the legal implications of established precedents, including the principles set forth in Shah Nawaz v. Nawab Khan. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to further scrutinize the lower courts' findings on these factual and legal issues, while ordering that the appeal be prepared on the existing record with the option to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioner is the legitimate daughter of the deceased for the purposes of inheritance?
  • What is the effect of the alleged divorce of the mother on the paternity status of the child?
  • Does the evidence on record sufficiently establish the paternity of the petitioner?
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• Mst. Munawara Begum vs Muhammad Aslam and another1989 SCMR 1706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-16
  acquittalrevision petitionleave to appealcriminal trialwitness testimonymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Mst. Munawara Begum, sought leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed in limine her revision petition challenging the acquittal of the respondent, Muhammad Aslam, in a murder case involving her son, Tufail Khalid. The core legal question concerned whether there were sufficient grounds to challenge the acquittal. The Supreme Court observed that the initial report was lodged by the father of the deceased, and during the trial, both the father and other witnesses testified that the deceased had been murdered by an unknown person, thereby failing to implicate the respondent. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there was no basis to interfere with the High Court's order of dismissal. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that an acquittal cannot be overturned in revision proceedings where the prosecution witnesses themselves have failed to identify or implicate the accused during the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revision petition against an acquittal be maintained when prosecution witnesses have testified that the perpetrator was an unknown person?
  • Is leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition justified when the trial evidence fails to implicate the accused?
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• Mst. Mukhtar Begum vs Land Commissioner and others1989 SCMR 933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-08
  land reformscondonation of delaylimitationleave to appealtime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a land reforms matter involving the Land Commissioner. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal could be condoned. Upon hearing the arguments presented by the learned counsel regarding the application for condonation of delay, the Court determined that the circumstances did not warrant such condonation. Consequently, the Court declined to examine the merits of the case, dismissing the petition as time-barred. While the petition was dismissed on the ground of limitation, the Court noted the grievance raised by the petitioner's counsel regarding the possession of land, specifically that the petitioner only retained one square of land out of the permissible area. The Court advised the petitioner to approach the relevant authorities to address these grievances, expressing an expectation that any genuine issues would be resolved by those authorities. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural requirements, such as limitation, must be satisfied before the merits of a case can be adjudicated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained if it is time-barred and the delay is not condoned?
  • Is it appropriate for the Court to examine the merits of a case if the application for condonation of delay is rejected?
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• Mst. Mubarak Bibi and others vs The Additional District Judge, Sargodha and others1989 SCMR 1786 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-20
  civil revisionamendment of plaintleave to appealdismissal of suitremand of casedeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment arising from a civil suit for declaration regarding a land transaction. The plaintiffs had sought multiple reliefs in a single suit, prompting the trial court to order an amendment to the plaint to correct the suit's form. The defendants challenged this via civil revision, resulting in the District Court setting aside the amendment order and dismissing the suit entirely. The High Court subsequently declared the dismissal of the suit by the Revisional Court to be without lawful authority but upheld the setting aside of the amendment order, effectively remanding the case for trial on the original plaint. Both parties, aggrieved by the High Court's decision, sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether the trial court's initial order for amendment was lawful, whether the Revisional Court acted correctly in dismissing the suit rather than remanding it, and whether the High Court's partial intervention was appropriate in the circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Revisional Court has the authority to dismiss a suit entirely when challenging an order for the amendment of a plaint?
  • Under what circumstances is a trial court's order directing the amendment of a plaint considered lawful or improper?
  • Whether the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction by upholding the setting aside of an amendment order while declaring the dismissal of the suit unlawful?
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• Mst. Meno and others vs Abdus Sattar Ansari and others1989 SCMR 807 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-26
  ejectmentrent restrictionsublettinglandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment application filed by the respondent landlord against the petitioners under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act XI of 1963. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, but the Peshawar High Court subsequently allowed the landlord's appeal and ordered the ejectment of the tenants. The petitioners challenged this decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that the landlord failed to testify on oath regarding his requirement for the premises as a retired government servant. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting that the requirement was clearly pleaded in the original application. Furthermore, the Court observed that the High Court's order for ejectment was also independently supported by a finding of subletting, a ground the petitioners' counsel failed to challenge. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petition, holding that the High Court's decision was sound and did not warrant interference. The judgment affirms that where multiple grounds for ejectment exist, such as subletting, the failure to challenge such findings renders the appeal unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Is an ejectment order sustainable if it is supported by a finding of subletting that remains unchallenged?
  • Does the failure of a landlord to testify on oath regarding a specific requirement invalidate an ejectment application if that requirement was duly pleaded?
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• Mst. Matab Bibi vs Shamim Akhtar and others1989 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-01
  leave to appealdeclaratory suitgiftShariat Application Lawsinheritance sharecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant (donee) against the High Court's dismissal of her civil revision in a declaratory suit. The core legal question presented to the Supreme Court is whether, in the event a gift is annulled, the portion of the gift corresponding to the donor's own share (specifically one-fourth) should be preserved and allowed to remain intact under the relevant Shariat Application Laws. The petitioner relies on the precedent established in Hadayat v. Mehtab Bibi (1972 SCMR 243) to argue that the lower courts erred by failing to consider the partial validity of the gift. The Supreme Court, finding that the question raised requires further examination, granted leave to appeal. The Court directed that the appeal be prepared on the existing record, with liberty to file additional necessary documents, thereby setting the stage for a determination on whether a gift can be partially upheld regarding the donor's rightful inheritance share despite the annulment of the remainder.

  Questions settled

  • Can a gift be partially upheld regarding the donor's own share of inheritance if the remainder of the gift is annulled?
  • Does the annulment of a gift in a declaratory suit necessitate an examination of the donor's specific share under Shariat Application Laws?
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• Mst. Khushnoodi vs Aziz Khan1989 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-13
  leave to appealconcurrent findingsrevisional jurisdictionlicencepossessionmesne profits
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had dismissed her revision petition against concurrent findings of the lower courts granting the respondent a decree for possession and mesne profits in respect of a portion of a property. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the licensee status and lack of adverse possession or oral purchase suffered from any legal infirmity justifying interference in revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two courts below did not suffer from any infirmity or deficiency that would have justified the High Court in reopening the issues under revisional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the absence of jurisdictional error or material irregularity under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact can be reopened in a revision petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without showing material infirmity or deficiency?
  • Can a licensee claim adverse possession or ownership based on an alleged oral purchase without proper proof?
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• Mst. Khurshid and another vs Mst. Latif Fatima and 8 others1989 SCMR 1776 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-21
  evacuee propertywrit petitionsettlement lawsleave to appealtransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court which accepted a writ petition concerning the disposal of evacuee property and set aside certain departmental orders as without lawful authority. The core legal question involves whether the High Court failed to adjudicate upon certain prior impugned orders and an alleged transfer made in favour of the petitioner in 1968 prior to the repeal of settlement laws. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's judgment did not formally set aside an order dated 18-11-1978 nor addressed the alleged 1968 transfer order in favour of the petitioner. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the petition while granting liberty to the petitioner to approach the High Court for clarification or further hearing regarding these specific unresolved questions. The key principle laid down is that matters not explicitly adjudicated or clarified by the High Court in writ proceedings should be remitted back to it for clarification rather than being entertained initially by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court entertain arguments regarding an impugned order that was not formally set aside or adjudicated upon by the High Court?
  • Whether a party can seek clarification from the High Court regarding unaddressed claims such as a pre-repeal property transfer?
  • What is the appropriate recourse when the High Court's judgment omits adjudication on specific orders impugned before it?
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• Mst. Khalida Mumtaz vs Hamid Ali Khan and others1989 SCMR 458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-19
  suspension of sentenceleave to appealcriminal appealnon-bailable warrantsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal challenging an order passed by the High Court, which had suspended the sentences of the respondents/convicts in a criminal case involving offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned the validity of the High Court's exercise of discretion in suspending the sentences of the convicts under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court deemed the matter a fit case for the grant of leave to appeal. Noting that one of the respondents was currently in custody following the issuance of non-bailable warrants by the Supreme Court due to his failure to appear, the Court converted the petition into an appeal. The Court directed that the appeal be prepared on the existing record and scheduled it for final hearing and disposal, emphasizing that no adjournments would be granted. The decision reflects the Court's supervisory jurisdiction over the suspension of sentences pending appeal in criminal matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal when a respondent is in custody?
  • Is the suspension of a sentence by the High Court under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 subject to review by the Supreme Court?
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• Mst. Khadeeja Begum vs Muhammad Khalil and 4 others1989 SCMR 665 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-05
  settlement lawsPermanent Transfer Deedentitlement orderstay orderevacuee propertyappellate jurisdictionconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the inclusion of a 'Chaubara' in a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) issued under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether a P.T.D. is immune from scrutiny by settlement authorities when it contradicts the original entitlement order, particularly when issued in violation of a stay order passed by an appellate authority. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in declaring the P.T.D. final and beyond challenge. The Court ruled that a P.T.D. must strictly conform to the entitlement order passed by the competent authority. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that once a stay order is issued by an appellate authority, any subsequent administrative action, such as the issuance of a P.T.D., taken in defiance of that order is a nullity. The principle laid down is that settlement authorities retain jurisdiction to rectify inconsistencies between a P.T.D. and the underlying entitlement order, and a P.T.D. does not enjoy absolute immunity from scrutiny if it is not in accord with the law or pending judicial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Permanent Transfer Deed immune from scrutiny by settlement authorities if it contradicts the underlying entitlement order?
  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed in violation of a stay order passed by an appellate authority render the deed a nullity?
  • Do settlement authorities have the jurisdiction to rectify inconsistencies between a Permanent Transfer Deed and the original entitlement order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kausar Iqbal and others vs Mst. Mahmooda Akhtar and others1989 SCMR 674 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-30
  legitimacy of childrenvalidity of marriagepartition suitappreciation of evidencebigamydivorceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the legitimacy of a marriage and the status of children in a partition suit. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, Mst. Kausar Iqbal, was the lawfully wedded wife of the deceased, Kiramatullah, and whether her children were his legitimate heirs, specifically focusing on whether she had been validly divorced by her previous husband prior to her marriage to Kiramatullah. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the lower courts failed to properly appreciate the evidence. The Court reasoned that the deceased, a practicing lawyer, would not have knowingly entered a bigamous marriage, and the absence of protest from the previous husband suggested a valid divorce had occurred. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the presumption of legitimacy for children. The key principle laid down is that in determining the validity of a marriage, courts must consider the conduct of the parties and the legal awareness of the deceased, while avoiding findings that render children illegitimate without compelling evidence to the contrary.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conduct of a party, such as a lawyer, in entering a marriage create a presumption against the existence of a legal impediment like bigamy?
  • Should courts prioritize the presumption of legitimacy for children when evaluating evidence regarding the validity of a marriage?
  • Can the Supreme Court reappreciate evidence if lower courts have ignored critical circumstantial factors in a family dispute?
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• Mst. Kaniz Yousuf and 10 others vs Bakhsh Elahi1989 SCMR 938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-14
  leave to appealevictionpersonal requirementurban rent restrictionadditional evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of a second appeal by the Lahore High Court under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The respondent had sought the eviction of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest from a shop on various grounds, including personal requirement, which was ordered by the Rent Controller and upheld through the appellate stages. The petitioners raised contentions regarding the protection period under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, the bona fide personal requirement in light of the respondent owning a factory, and the non-disposal of an application for additional evidence. The Supreme Court held that the contentions regarding statutory protection and alternative premises were either not raised before the High Court or lacked factual foundation, and that the alternative factory premises were unsuitable for the respondent's intended business. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, granting the petitioners two months to vacate the premises upon complying with tenancy terms.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new factual contention not raised before the High Court be permitted to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether owning a factory at a distance negates the bona fide personal requirement of a commercial shop by a landlord?
  • Does failure to press an application for additional evidence in the High Court preclude a party from challenging it in the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kalsoom Zohra vs The United Bank Ltd. and others1989 SCMR 1120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-04
  leave to appealinterlocutory orderloan recoverybanking courtwrit petitionintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the defendant in a loan recovery case, challenging the dismissal of her Intra-Court Appeal by the High Court, which had previously dismissed her Writ Petition. The underlying dispute arose from the refusal of the Banking Court to grant the petitioner's application for the issuance of a notice to the opposing party to produce specific documents and record statements. The core legal question was whether leave to appeal should be granted against an interlocutory order in a pending suit. The Supreme Court observed that no stay of proceedings had been granted in the original suit and that the case was already ripe for final decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that it was not a fit case for the grant of leave to appeal against an interlocutory order. The petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that appellate courts generally decline to interfere with interlocutory orders when the main suit is nearing final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Should leave to appeal be granted against an interlocutory order when the main suit is ripe for final decision?
  • Is an order refusing the production of documents and recording of statements in a Banking Court a fit subject for leave to appeal?
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• Mst. Jameela Hameed vs Atta Muhammad1989 SCMR 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-07
  ex parte decreelimitationcivil suitfraudleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the demarcation and identity of two adjacent properties belonging to the parties. The respondent obtained an ex parte decree against the petitioner, which was upheld on appeal. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a separate civil suit challenging the ex parte decree on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, illegalities, and jurisdictional errors. This suit was dismissed as time-barred, and subsequent appellate and revisional forums upheld the dismissal, leaving the petitioner unable to defend her case on the merits. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner's separate suit challenging the ex parte decree in the second round of litigation was barred by time under the given circumstances. Granting leave to appeal, the Court held that the case warrants a detailed examination of the limitation question to ensure the petitioner is not foreclosed from defending herself on merits, thereby setting the premise for the formal hearing of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a separate civil suit challenging an ex parte decree on grounds of fraud and illegality is barred by time under the circumstances?
  • Can a party be denied the opportunity to defend a property dispute on merits due to the dismissal of a suit as time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Inshah Allah Begum and others vs Izzat Khan and 2 others1989 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-14
  appointment of receiverfiduciary dutyadverse titleagencydiscretionary jurisdictioncivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Division Bench of the Sind High Court, which upheld an order appointing a receiver for 20 shops in Liaquatabad, Karachi. The core legal question was whether the appointment of a receiver was justified in a suit for declaration, rendition of accounts, and cancellation of a lease, given the competing claims of ownership and the history of the property's management. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's discretionary order was sound. The Court found no error of law or fact in the lower courts' decisions. The ratio of the decision rests on the principle of agency: where a party has acted as an attorney or agent for another regarding a property, that agent is legally precluded from setting up a title adverse to their principal. Since the lease in favor of the petitioner's predecessor had been cancelled by the Karachi Municipal Corporation, the High Court correctly determined that a prima facie case for the appointment of a receiver existed to preserve the property during the pendency of the litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an agent or attorney set up a title adverse to their principal regarding the property they were appointed to manage?
  • Is the appointment of a receiver a valid exercise of discretionary jurisdiction when a prima facie case of ownership is established?
  • Does the cancellation of a lease by a municipal authority affect the title claims of the lessee in a pending civil suit?
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• Mst. Inayat Bibi and others vs Issac Nazir Ullah and others1989 SCMR 1213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-12
  leave to appealinheritanceChristian law of successioncustomary lawjustice equity and good consciencePunjab Laws Act 1872female heirsstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the widow and two daughters of a deceased Christian male owner against the judgment of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed their writ petition in an inheritance dispute. The core legal questions raised involve determining whether the Succession Act, 1925 or the Punjab Laws Act, 1872 governs the inheritance of the deceased, and whether a customary rule excluding female heirs from inheritance is contrary to justice, equity, and good conscience as understood either within the Pakistani jurisprudential context or within the Christian community. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions of law and general public importance. In granting leave, the Court directed the appeal to be prepared on the existing record with additional documents, ordered a maintain status quo, and prohibited any alienation of the disputed property during the pendency of the appeal before the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Succession Act 1925 governs inheritance matters in respect of a Pakistani Christian male owner?
  • Whether Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act 1872 is applicable to determine succession in cases involving Pakistani Christians?
  • Whether a rule of customary law depriving female heirs of inheritance is contrary to justice, equity, and good conscience under Pakistani jurisprudence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Inayat Begum and others vs The Additional District and Sessions1989 SCMR 1046 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-13
  default in rentwilful defaultrequisitioning of propertybona fide personal needejectment petitionurban rent restrictionconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from proceedings under urban rent restriction laws concerning two adjacent houses leased to a school, where landlords sought ejectment of the tenants on the grounds of default in rent payment and bona fide personal need. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment upon finding the tenants to be wilful defaulters and the personal need not bona fide, but the first appellate authority reversed the finding on default, holding that a past practice of accepting delayed lump-sum rent negated wilful default, which decision was upheld by the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the exercise of discretion by the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that while the past practice did not condone the default—as the tenant could have remitted rent by postal money order or cheque—the premises were subject to a requisitioning order during a significant portion of the default period, which suspended the statutory liabilities under the rent ordinance, and that the dilapidated condition of the property rendered the personal need unsustainable. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a past practice of accepting delayed lump-sum rent constitute a condonation of default under urban rent restriction laws?
  • Can a tenant be held liable for statutory default in rent during the period a property remains subject to an official requisitioning order?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide personal need of a landlord can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Mst. Inayat Begum and another vs Muhammad Boota and others1989 SCMR 1716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-19
  fraudulent transactiongeneral attorneyconcurrent findings of factleave to appealproperty salecivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court in a civil suit involving the sale of property. The core dispute arose from a transaction where property belonging to Mst. Alam Bibi was sold by her General Attorney, Madad Ali (petitioner No. 2), to his own wife, Mst. Inayat Begum (petitioner No. 1). The respondents challenged the transaction, alleging it was fraudulent. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, and the petitioners' subsequent first and second appeals were dismissed by the lower courts. The Supreme Court addressed whether there were grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the three lower courts. The Court held that the lower courts had properly dealt with the issues raised and that no justification existed for interference with the concurrent findings of fact. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions regarding the fraudulent nature of the property transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts where no justification is shown?
  • Is a property transaction valid when executed by a general attorney in favor of his own wife?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Imam Bibi vs Allah Ditta and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-08
  colonization of government landsinheritancegovernment tenancygeneralia specialibus non derogantshariat lawincorporation of statutesadaptation of laws
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff appealed against a High Court judgment restoring the trial court's dismissal of her suit for a share in the inheritance of her deceased father. The deceased held a tenancy under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 in the former Bahawalpur State and died on 28-2-1951 before paying all purchase instalments. The plaintiff claimed her inheritance share under Islamic Shariat Law or Section 19-A of the Act. The Supreme Court addressed whether subsequent amendments to an incorporated statute automatically apply to the adopting jurisdiction, and whether general Shariat legislation impliedly repeals a prior special enactment governing government tenancies.

  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 19-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 (introduced in Punjab in 1951) was not automatically applicable to Bahawalpur State without specific adaptation or extension. Applying the maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant*, the Court held that the subsequent general Shariat Act did not abrogate or override the special provisions of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 governing government tenancies. Succession was rightly governed by Section 20 of the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Do subsequent amendments made to an adopted or incorporated statute automatically apply in the adopting jurisdiction without express extension?
  • Does a general law governing personal or Muslim inheritance impliedly repeal or override prior special statutory provisions governing government land tenancies?
  • Which legal provisions govern succession to a government tenancy under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 where full purchase instalments have not been paid prior to the tenant's death?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hassan Bano and 3 others vs Mrs. Mumtaz Younus1989 PLD Supreme Court 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-13
  leave to appealstay of ejectmentarrears of rentlimitation bardiscretionary reliefclean hands doctrine
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an interim order of the High Court granting a stay of ejectment in favor of the petitioners subject to the condition of depositing arrears of rent dating back to November 1971 and ongoing monthly rent. The core legal question raised was whether the High Court acted without jurisdiction in imposing a condition to pay arrears of rent beyond the three-year period of limitation prior to the impugned order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that even if a technical jurisdictional objection or limitation bar exists, the grant of leave to appeal is discretionary and depends on the fitness of the case and the conduct of the parties. The Court laid down the principle that discretionary relief under Article 185 of the Constitution or similar appellate jurisdiction will be denied to litigants who do not approach the court with clean hands, particularly where the liability for rent relates to a period during which protracted litigation was pending at the behest of the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can impose the deposit of historical rent arrears as a condition for granting a stay of ejectment?
  • Does the bar of limitation automatically render an interim condition for the deposit of rent arrears without jurisdiction?
  • Is the Supreme Court bound to grant leave to appeal against every interim order found to be technically without jurisdiction?
  • Does a litigant who prolongs litigation and withholds rent qualify for discretionary relief without clean hands?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hamida Bibi vs Fateh Muhammad and others1989 SCMR 1201(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-31
  leave to appealcivil revisiondoctrine of mushagiftconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against the dismissal of her civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld the decree against a gift made in her favour by their predecessor-in-interest. The core legal question raised was the application of the doctrine of 'Musha' to the disputed gift. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that leave to appeal cannot be granted merely to examine the doctrine of 'Musha' when the lower courts concurrently found that the making of a genuine gift was otherwise not established. The Court concluded that since the factual finding regarding the non-establishment of the genuine gift was unexceptionable, granting leave would serve no useful purpose. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's civil revision.

  Questions settled

  • Will leave to appeal be granted to examine the doctrine of Musha when the genuineness of the gift has not been established as a matter of fact?
  • Can a civil revision be dismissed on the basis of unexceptionable concurrent findings regarding the validity of a gift?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hamida Begum and another vs The State and 3 others1989 SCMR 711 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  enhancement of sentencecriminal revisioninordinate delayleave to appealjudicial discretionhomicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a criminal revision petition seeking the enhancement of sentences imposed on the respondents. The underlying incident occurred in 1964, resulting in the death of Muhammad Siddiq and injuries to others. The trial court had convicted the respondents under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, awarding sentences that the petitioners argued were inadequate and based on legal errors regarding the application of Exception 4 to Section 300. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether it was appropriate to interfere with the High Court's refusal to enhance sentences after a significant lapse of time. The Supreme Court held that while the trial court's judgment contained legal defects, the inordinate delay of twenty-two years since the occurrence, coupled with the fact that the respondents had already served their sentences, justified the High Court's refusal to disturb the position. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to exercise its discretion to interfere, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with a High Court's refusal to enhance a sentence when there has been an inordinate delay in the disposal of the matter?
  • Does the fact that a convict has already served their sentence influence the court's discretion in deciding whether to enhance that sentence upon revision?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajiani Aisha and others vs Abdul Wa Heed1989 PLD Supreme Court 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-09
  default in payment of rentevictionlandlord and tenantlump sum rent paymentpractice of receiving renturban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from eviction proceedings initiated by the respondent/landlord against the appellants/tenants under section 13 of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 on the grounds of subletting, non-payment of rent, and personal requirement. While the Rent Controller and the first appellate court dismissed the eviction application, the High Court ordered eviction on the ground of default in rent payment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a landlord's acceptance of rent in lump sum amounts on sporadic occasions establishes a practice or agreement to alter the mode of payment, thereby shielding the tenant from eviction for default. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to prove a practice of accepting lump-sum rent, as the record demonstrated that rent was generally paid in advance. The Court laid down that the mere acceptance of rent at irregular intervals or periodically by a landlord does not constitute an agreement to alter the terms of tenancy or waive the statutory obligation of timely monthly rent payment, and a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove a binding fresh agreement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acceptance of rent in lump sum on isolated occasions by a landlord establishes a practice of receiving rent at irregular intervals?
  • Does the mere fact that a landlord accepts rent periodically imply that the landlord has agreed to alter the terms of tenancy regarding the time of payment?
  • What is the burden of proof required to establish an agreement between a landlord and tenant to alter the mode of rent payment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Fatima vs Karam Shah and others1989 SCMR 994 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-12
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptioncompletion of salemutationrevisional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court arising out of a pre-emption suit. The original owners sold land to initial vendees, who subsequently transferred the land to the petitioner in recognition of her superior right of pre-emption. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for possession through pre-emption based on his status as a co-sharer and estate owner. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit, holding that the sale to the petitioner was completed upon sanction of the mutation. The District Judge reversed this, finding the sale complete on the earlier entry date, but the High Court restored the trial court's decree in revisional jurisdiction. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the sale was complete on the date of entry under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, regardless of attestation or delivery of possession, and that the High Court improperly interfered in revision. The Supreme Court held that the contentions regarding the completion of sale and the propriety of interference in revisional jurisdiction require further consideration, and accordingly granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sale is completed on the date of entry of mutation or the date of its sanction?
  • Is attestation of mutation or delivery of possession necessary for the completion of a sale under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • When can a High Court interfere in its revisional jurisdiction with a finding of fact recorded by a lower appellate court?
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• Mst. Fatima and another vs Mst. Rehmat Mai1989 SCMR 1202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-04
  leave to appealrestoration of suitnon-prosecutioncondonation of delaycivil revisioninheritance declaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the defendants against the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld the District Judge's order restoring an inheritance declaratory suit that was earlier dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question concerned the propriety of restoring a suit upon an application for restoration and condonation of delay, particularly relying on the testimony and affidavit of the plaintiff's counsel. The Supreme Court held that the reliance placed by the High Court on the counsel's testimony and affidavit was unexceptionable and that the concurrent findings of fact did not suffer from any legal infirmity. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, laying down the principle that concurrent findings of fact regarding the restoration of a suit based on satisfactory explanation of absence, supported by counsel's testimony, warrant no interference under appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's reliance on the testimony and affidavit of a party's counsel for restoring a suit dismissed for non-prosecution is unexceptionable?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the restoration of a suit be interfered with when they suffer from no legal infirmity?
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• Mst. Fateh Bibi and others vs Mst. Zainab Bibi and others1989 SCMR 1152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-20
  oral agreement of saleState land allotmentburden of proofconcurrent findings of factpronoteColony Actcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil dispute concerning the alleged sale of State land allotted to the respondents. The petitioners claimed that an oral agreement existed under which they paid Rs. 6,000 to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest to cover land installments in exchange for half ownership of the land. The respondents denied the sale, asserting the money was a loan evidenced by a pronote. The trial court initially decreed in favor of the petitioners, but the appellate court reversed this, finding no evidence of a sale agreement and noting the absence of required government permission under the Colony Act. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent revision. The Supreme Court addressed whether the petitioners had established the existence of an oral agreement of sale. The Court held that the petitioners failed to prove the agreement, as the payment was evidenced by a pronote indicating a loan. Consequently, the Court upheld the concurrent findings of fact, dismissing the petition. The principle affirmed is that where an alleged agreement of sale is not established by evidence, claims of title based on such agreements must fail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a pronote regarding a payment for land installments negate the claim of an oral agreement of sale?
  • Can a court grant a declaration of title based on an oral agreement of sale when the existence of such an agreement is not proven by evidence?
  • Is permission under Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 required for a sale agreement that has not been established as a matter of fact?
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• Mst. Datan Mai and 5 others vs Mst. Sardaran Bibi and 5 others1989 SCMR 1807 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-28
  arbitration proceedingsconsent orderalienation of state landPunjab Colonization of Government Lands Actleave to appealagreement versus alienation
  Summary & questions settled

  These two petitions arose from a common subject matter wherein the High Court had disposed of a First Appeal from Order (FAO) based on the mutual concurrence of both parties to abide by the statement of a designated individual regarding whether an arbitrator had participated in the proceedings. The High Court, upon the statement being recorded in the affirmative, set aside the Additional District Judge's order and restored the Civil Judge's order. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that an illegality occurred because the suit land belonged to the State and was subject to alienation restrictions under section 19 of the Punjab Colonization of Government Lands Act. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Court does not interfere with the enforcement of agreements as distinguished from alienations, and to that extent the statutory bar does not operate. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the impugned orders passed on the basis of a lawful award and party concurrence.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 19 of the Punjab Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912 operate as a bar to the enforcement of agreements concerning State land as distinguished from actual alienations?
  • Can a party challenge an order passed by the High Court on the basis of their own express concurrence and agreement?
  • Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an impugned order founded upon a lawful award and mutual consent of the parties?
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• Mst. Dani vs Mst. Bashiran Bibi1989 SCMR 1990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-22
  giftfraudcompromiseout-of-court settlementmaintenancesecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit where the petitioner/plaintiff challenged a gift of suit land made to her niece (the respondent) on the ground of fraud. While the trial court dismissed the suit, the first appellate court accepted the appeal. On second appeal, the High Court reversed the findings of the first appellate court on the ground of misreading of evidence and dismissed the suit. Before the Supreme Court, the parties, with the permission of the Court, negotiated an out-of-court settlement. Under this agreement, the parties agreed that the disputed gift in favor of the respondent would remain intact and operative, while the respondent and her son undertook to maintain the petitioner for the remainder of her life by paying her an amount equal to one-half share of the income received from the land. The Supreme Court accepted this arrangement and disposed of the petition accordingly, binding the respondent and her surety to the undertaking.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dispute regarding the validity of a gift deed be resolved through a negotiated out-of-court settlement during the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether an undertaking for lifetime maintenance given by a donee in favor of a donor can be legally enforced as part of a court-decreed settlement?
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• Mst. Bilqis Bibi vs Mst. Zainab Bibi and others1989 SCMR 1008 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-19
  review jurisdictioninheritance disputevalidity of marriageapostasydissolution of marriagefinality of judgmentMuslim Personal Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a Supreme Court judgment regarding the inheritance rights of the respondent, Mst. Zainab Bibi, and her children. The petitioner challenged the previous holding that Mst. Zainab Bibi was the lawfully wedded wife of the deceased, arguing that her prior marriage to another man remained intact despite her alleged conversion to Christianity. The core legal question was whether the grounds raised—including the alleged misinterpretation of evidence, failure to frame specific issues, and the applicability of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939—constituted sufficient cause for review. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the review jurisdiction is extraordinary and limited to exceptional circumstances, such as an error apparent on the face of the record or the inadvertent omission of a crucial statutory provision. The Court reaffirmed that a review petition cannot be utilized as a mechanism for a rehearing or an appeal merely because a party is dissatisfied with the previous decision. Consequently, as the issues were already adjudicated, no valid grounds for review were established.

  Questions settled

  • What are the parameters for exercising the extraordinary power of review by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a review petition be treated as an appeal or a rehearing of the merits of a case?
  • Is the mere incorrectness of a conclusion reached by the Court a valid ground for review?
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