Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Haroon Kassem and another vs Azam Suleman Madha1989 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-21
  leave to appealejectmentbona fide personal requirementlandlord and tenantgood faithsurrender of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, tenants facing eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sindh High Court which had reversed the Rent Controller's order dismissing the ejectment petition. The core legal question was whether the landlord's plea for personal requirement lacked good faith given that multiple flats in the landlord's building were re-let to new tenants during the pendency of the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the transfer of tenancies to new tenants implied the landlord's participation and amounted in law to a surrender of possession, which materially reflected upon the bona fides of the landlord's claim and was not properly considered by the High Court. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and suspended the eviction order subject to regular payment of rent, laying down the principle that the termination and creation of tenancies during litigation constitutes a surrender of possession relevant to the assessment of a landlord's good faith.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the re-letting of flats to new tenants during the pendency of ejectment proceedings affects the bona fides of a landlord's personal requirement plea?
  • Does the termination of one tenancy and the beginning of another amount to a surrender of possession in favour of the landlord?
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• Haque Nawaz vs Sultan and others1989 SCMR 1201(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-24
  pre-emptionconsent decreewrit jurisdictionleave to appealcounsel misconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a vendee in a pre-emption matter, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court. The original suit had been decreed against the petitioner on the basis of a statement made by his counsel, constituting a consent decree. In the petition for leave to appeal, the petitioner challenged the decree on the ground that his counsel had misconducted and made a false statement when conveying the consent. The core legal question was whether a writ petition is an appropriate remedy to challenge a consent decree based on the alleged misconduct of a counsel. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the petitioner might have a remedy against the counsel, the High Court acted rightly in declining to interfere in its writ jurisdiction regarding the consent decree. The key principle laid down is that a consent decree resulting from a statement of counsel cannot be effectively challenged through writ jurisdiction on the grounds of counsel misconduct, and the aggrieved party must pursue other appropriate remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Can a consent decree based on a statement of counsel be challenged in writ jurisdiction on the ground of counsel misconduct?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a party aggrieved by the alleged false statement or misconduct of their counsel in making a consent decree?
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• Hakim Noor Muhammad vs Bashir Ahmad1989 SCMR 1999 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-21
  arbitration awardregistration of awardimmovable propertyunanimous awardleave to appealarbitrator signatures
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the Civil Court, District Judge, and High Court, which upheld an arbitration award regarding the ownership of a house in Sahiwal. The core legal questions were whether an arbitration award signed by only four out of six appointed arbitrators is valid, and whether an arbitration award concerning immovable property requires registration under the Registration Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts committed no legal infirmity. Regarding the validity of the award, the Court accepted the trial court's finding that the award was unanimous, with two arbitrators unable to sign due to illness. Regarding registration, the Court affirmed the rejection of the objection, relying on established precedent that such awards do not necessarily require registration. The key principle laid down is that an arbitration award, even if not signed by all appointed arbitrators, may be upheld if it is proven to be unanimous and the absence of signatures is satisfactorily explained, and that arbitration awards regarding immovable property are not automatically invalid for lack of registration.

  Questions settled

  • Is an arbitration award invalid if it is not signed by all members of the appointed panel of arbitrators?
  • Does an arbitration award dealing with immovable property require registration under the Registration Act 1908?
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• Hakim Jalal Khan vs Hamid Augustin and others1989 SCMR 1980 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-17
  special leave to appealacquittalre-appraisal of evidencecriminal trialleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had partially dismissed the petitioner's challenge to an acquittal order passed by an Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the High Court's decision to dismiss the petition regarding three respondents while admitting it against a fourth. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence and the conduct of the trial. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had properly examined the evidence and correctly concluded that there was no prima facie case against the respondents. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the trial was vitiated by non-compliance with established legal principles. The Supreme Court affirmed that it would not re-appraise evidence already considered by the High Court when the trial was conducted in accordance with the law. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, as the impugned order warranted no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will re-appraise evidence that has already been examined by the High Court in an acquittal appeal?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court where the trial was conducted in accordance with law?
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• Hakeemvddin vs Arshad Mahmood and another1989 SCMR 136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-07
  res judicatafinality of judgmentproperty disputeallegation of fraudcivil revisionsettlement record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revisions regarding property disputes over flat tenements. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could re-litigate ownership claims over property that had already been conclusively adjudicated by the Supreme Court in previous litigation, based on allegations of fraud and newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's claims were barred by the principle of res judicata, noting that the petitioner failed to substantiate allegations of fraud or forgery with specific pleadings or evidence. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the petitioner failed to implead the necessary Settlement Department to challenge the authenticity of the records. The Court affirmed that once a matter has attained finality through a Supreme Court decision, it cannot be reopened through subsequent litigation based on claims that could have been raised earlier. The judgment reinforces the doctrine of finality of litigation and the strict requirement to prove fraud with specific particulars.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can re-litigate a property dispute after the Supreme Court has already rendered a final decision on the matter?
  • Is a suit barred by res judicata if the issues raised were previously adjudicated by the highest court?
  • Can a party successfully challenge a final judgment based on allegations of fraud without providing specific particulars of that fraud in their pleadings?
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• Hakeem Abdul Wahab Shirazi vs Tario Hussain and 2 others1989 SCMR 699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-05
  civil revisiondismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of petitionservice of noticepostal acknowledgmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court refusing to restore a civil revision petition that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioner, a tenant claiming ownership of a shop through an oral agreement to sell, faced eviction proceedings and subsequently filed a civil suit and revision petition. When neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared on the date of hearing despite warnings and postal intimation, the High Court dismissed the revision in default and vacated the interim stay order. The petitioner's subsequent application for restoration was rejected upon findings that adequate notice had been issued. The core legal question concerns whether the absence of a postal acknowledgment receipt precludes a finding of valid service and justifies the restoration of a matter dismissed in default. The Supreme Court held that the production of postal acknowledgment is not strictly required by law when other sufficient evidence of dispatch exists, and upheld the refusal to restore. The key principle laid down is that the absence of a postal acknowledgment receipt does not invalidate service or warrant restoration where sufficient proof of postal dispatch and antecedent conduct of avoiding appearance are established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a postal acknowledgment receipt invalidate the presumption of service of notice sent by post?
  • Whether a civil revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution should be restored when notice of the hearing date was duly dispatched?
  • Is the production of a postal acknowledgment receipt a mandatory requirement of law to prove service?
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• Hakam and another vs Muhammad Shafi and others1989 SCMR 1844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-19
  leave to appealfailure of considerationequitable reliefalienorMartial Law Regulationmortgage redemptioncivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the concurrent findings of lower courts dismissing their civil suit against a sale of land, which they argued violated Martial Law Regulation No. 64 and was affected by failure of consideration regarding the redemption of mortgage. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the plea regarding failure of consideration could not be entertained as it was not raised before the High Court. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's view that the petitioners, being the alienors seeking to invalidate their own voluntary act, were not entitled to discretionary equitable reliefs of declaration and injunction, particularly without offering to refund the consideration received. Finally, the contention regarding Section 19 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 was declined as it was raised for the first time before the apex court. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new plea of failure of consideration for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not urged in the High Court?
  • Whether an alienor challenging their own voluntary land sale is entitled to discretionary reliefs of declaration and injunction without offering to refund the received consideration.
  • Will the Supreme Court entertain a legal question regarding evacuee property restrictions raised for the first time at the leave to appeal stage?
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• Haji Sewa Gul vs Senior Member, Board of Revenue and others1989 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-15
  land revenueauction confirmationwrit jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefprocedural illegalityLambardarBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding land auction proceedings. The petitioner had purchased land belonging to a Lambardar, who was a defaulter in land revenue, through an auction. However, the auction proceedings were finalized and mutation was attested by authorities below the Commissioner, bypassing the mandatory requirement of confirmation by the Commissioner. The Board of Revenue subsequently set aside the auction, noting that the District Collector lacked the competence to confirm the sale and that no sale certificate had been issued as required by law. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction to restore auction proceedings that were fundamentally illegal, despite the petitioner's claim of innocent mistake. The Supreme Court held that the procedural illegalities were serious and violated the statutory purpose of the relevant provisions. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the High Court was justified in refusing to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction to restore illegal proceedings, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court justified in refusing to exercise writ jurisdiction to restore auction proceedings that suffer from serious statutory illegalities?
  • Does the failure to obtain confirmation of a land auction from the Commissioner, as required by the Land Revenue Act, render the auction proceedings illegal?
  • Can a District Collector confirm a land auction where the statute mandates confirmation by the Commissioner?
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• Haji Muhammad Sharif vs Khawaja Amjad Ahsan and others1989 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-17
  personal needevictionlandlord and tenantconcurrent findings of factconstitutional jurisdictionrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent findings of the rent authorities, which dismissed the landlord's eviction application seeking possession of the demised premises for the personal need of his son. The core legal question involves the determination of bona fide personal need in rent matters and the scope of interference by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction against concurrent findings of fact where a second appeal has been barred by statute. The Supreme Court held that the question of bona fide need entails reviewing the landlord's previous conduct, resources, and liabilities, and that concurrent findings of fact based on such comprehensive evaluation cannot be disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction, especially when a writ petition cannot be utilized to circumvent the statutory abolition of second appeals. The Court laid down the principle that factual determinations regarding bona fide personal requirement rendered by rent tribunals are final and insulated from interference under constitutional jurisdiction unless shown to be perverse or based on extraneous factors amounting to jurisdictional error.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide personal need of a landlord can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can a writ petition be used as a substitute for a second appeal where the second appeal under the rent restriction law has been abolished?
  • What factors are relevant for determining the bona fide personal requirement of a landlord in eviction proceedings?
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• Haji Muhammad Saifullah Khan vs The Federation of Pakistan and others1989 SCMR 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-13
  original jurisdictionfundamental rightsres judicatacompetency of petitionelection commissioncaretaker cabinet
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking to declare various Ordinances—specifically the Delimitation of Constituencies (Amendment) Ordinance IV of 1988, the Delimitation of Constituencies (Second Amendment) Ordinance VIII of 1988, and the Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance XIV of 1988—as illegal. The petitioner further challenged the constitution of the Election Commission and requested directions for the appointment of a caretaker cabinet and the fixation of fresh election dates. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was barred from seeking these reliefs due to a failure to include them in a prior writ petition and whether the invocation of the Court's jurisdiction under Article 184(3) was competent absent an allegation of a fundamental rights violation. The Court held that the petition was incompetent, ruling that the petitioner was debarred by the principle in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and that the petition failed to allege the infringement of any fundamental right necessary to invoke Article 184(3) jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner barred from seeking reliefs in a constitutional petition that could have been claimed in an earlier writ petition?
  • Can the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 184(3) be invoked without alleging the infringement of a fundamental right?
  • Does the principle embodied in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to petitions filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
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• Haji Muhammad Sadiq vs Iftikhar Saeed and 2 others1989 SCMR 1767 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-22
  rent restrictionejectmentbona fide requirementconcurrent findings of factleave to appeallandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment matter under rent restriction law, where the petitioner (tenant) challenged the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court regarding the landlord's bona fide requirement for the premises. The core legal question concerned whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the landlord's bona fide need were legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had consistently failed on the issue of bona fide requirement across all forums. Finding that the lower courts had rendered concurrent findings of fact and that the impugned judgment did not suffer from any infirmity of law or principle regarding the appreciation of evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in rent restriction matters unless there is a clear legal error or misapplication of principle in the appreciation of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide requirement in a rent restriction case?
  • Does the appreciation of evidence by a Rent Controller constitute a question of law sufficient for interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Haji Muhammad Nawaz vs Rahim Bakhsh and 6 others1989 SCMR 1511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-22
  restoration of appealnon-prosecutionsufficient causelegal representativesprocedural dutyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal for non-prosecution. The petitioner sought restoration of the appeal, citing circumstances explained in an affidavit by his counsel, which detailed the reasons for non-appearance and the delay in bringing the legal representatives of a deceased respondent on record. The Supreme Court examined whether the counsel's explanation, based on an estimate of court time and the belief that the case would be re-listed, constituted 'sufficient cause' for restoration, referencing established precedent regarding lawyer conduct and court attendance. Furthermore, the Court identified significant legal questions regarding the procedural duty of the respondents to assist in bringing legal representatives of a deceased party on record and whether an appeal can be effectively adjudicated without such impleadment. Finding merit in the petitioner's arguments, the Supreme Court granted leave, converted the petition into an appeal, and directed the preparation of the appeal on the existing record with provisions for necessary additional documentation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a lawyer's reasonable estimate of court time and the subsequent belief that a case would be re-listed constitute sufficient cause for the restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Is there a duty upon the respondents to assist the court in bringing the legal representatives of a deceased respondent on record?
  • Can an appeal be effectively decided without impleading the legal representatives of a deceased respondent?
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• Haji Kameer and others vs Sher Muhammad and others1989 SCMR 1989 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-13
  evacuee propertyland alienationmutation sanctionproperty transfercustodian declarationallotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment concerning the status of disputed land sold by the petitioners in 1944 to a non-Muslim who subsequently migrated to India. The core legal question was whether the land was correctly treated as evacuee property and transferred to the respondent, given that the initial mutation was not sanctioned under the Land Alienation Act until 1973. The petitioners argued that the property could not be treated as evacuee property without a formal declaration from the Custodian. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that because the petitioners had sold the land in 1944 to a purchaser who later migrated to India, the property was correctly classified as evacuee property. The Court affirmed that the subsequent sanction of the mutation by the Deputy Commissioner in 1973 satisfied the statutory requirements. The key principle laid down is that where land is sold to a person who subsequently migrates to India, the property assumes the character of evacuee property, and the lack of a prior formal declaration by the Custodian does not invalidate its transfer to an allottee.

  Questions settled

  • Does the lack of a formal declaration by the Custodian invalidate the transfer of land as evacuee property if the original owner sold it to a person who subsequently migrated to India?
  • Can a mutation sanction under the Land Alienation Act be granted after the property has been treated as evacuee property?
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• Haji Ahmad Yar vs Allah Ditta and anothers1989 PLD Supreme Court 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-22
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionLambardari appointmentdiscretionary jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court concerning a Lambardari appointment case. The core legal question is whether the High Court ought to interfere with Lambardari appointment cases in its constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly refused to interfere, affirming the well-established practice of declining interference in such executive appointment matters under its discretionary jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that superior courts will not ordinarily interfere with Lambardari appointments in constitutional jurisdiction due to the discretionary nature of the remedy and established judicial practice.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with Lambardari appointment cases in its constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • Is the refusal of the High Court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction in Lambardari cases in accordance with established practice?
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• Haji Abdul Hakim and others vs Additional District Judge, Peshawar1989 SCMR 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-14
  pre-emptionpre-emptorspecial leave to appealpendency of suitsMuslim Lawconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for special leave to appeal filed by pre-emptors whose constitutional petitions against the dismissal of their pre-emption suits were rejected by the High Court. The core legal question is whether pending pre-emption suits are saved by section 35(2) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act (Act X of 1987) where the requisite demands under Muslim Law were not strictly made, and whether decrees can be passed in favour of pre-emptors without such demands in light of prior Supreme Court precedents. The Supreme Court held that no decree can be passed in favour of the pre-emptors where no decree has been passed so far and demands were not strictly made, affirming the rejection of the contention regarding section 35(2) of the Act. The key principle laid down is that pending pre-emption suits cannot result in a decree in the absence of strict compliance with the requirements of demands under Muslim Law, notwithstanding the provisions of section 35(2) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act (Act X of 1987).

  Questions settled

  • Whether pending pre-emption suits are saved by section 35(2) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1987 where demands were not made strictly in accordance with Muslim Law?
  • Can a decree be passed in favour of pre-emptors who have not made the necessary demands strictly in accordance with Muslim Law?
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• Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar vs Income-Tax Officer1989 PTD 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-07
  writ jurisdictionalternative remedyincome tax assessmentFederal Ombudsmanhighhandednessjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an income-tax assessment order issued by an Income Tax Officer, which had been dismissed by the High Court on the grounds that the petitioner had an alternative remedy available through an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Supreme Court examined the matter, noting that while the High Court correctly identified the existence of an alternative remedy as a bar to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, the petitioner faced potential highhandedness from the tax department. The Court observed that the assessment appeared excessive and arbitrary based on the provided evidence. Ultimately, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the High Court's dismissal due to the technical hurdle of an alternative remedy. However, the Court clarified that the petitioner is not without recourse and may approach the Federal Ombudsman. It held that the Federal Ombudsman provides an effective, quasi-judicial alternative remedy that is not constrained by the same procedural technicalities or the 'alternative remedy' bar applicable to the High Court's writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of an alternative remedy by way of appeal bar the High Court from exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can the Federal Ombudsman provide an effective alternative remedy in tax matters where the High Court's writ jurisdiction is barred by the existence of an alternative remedy?
  • Is the Federal Ombudsman's jurisdiction restricted by the same technical procedural requirements as the High Court's writ jurisdiction?
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• Hafiz Muhammad Abdul Hameed and another vs Mahboob Ali and 191989 SCMR 1513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  leave to appealcivil revisionclosing of evidencecourt-feeremanddeclarationpermanent injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of the petitioners' Civil Revision by the High Court. The petitioners' suit for declaration and permanent injunction was dismissed after the trial court closed their evidence due to an alleged failure to produce it. On appeal, the District Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground of deficient court-fee. In revision, the High Court disagreed with the District Judge on the court-fee issue but proceeded to uphold the trial court's order closing the evidence, thereby dismissing the revision petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court should have remanded the case to the District Court for a decision on the merits once the appellate court's finding on court-fee was overturned, and whether the trial court's order closing the evidence was legally sustainable. The key principle is that when an appellate court's threshold dismissal is set aside in revision, the proper course of action regarding remand and the evaluation of the trial court's interlocutory orders must be carefully determined.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court, after setting aside an appellate court's dismissal based on deficient court-fee, should remand the case to the appellate court for a decision on the merits?
  • Whether a revision petition can be dismissed by upholding a trial court's interlocutory order closing evidence when the specific appellate order impugned in the revision was found to be unsustainable?
  • What is the correct procedure for reviewing the legality and propriety of a trial court's order closing a party's evidence under revisionary jurisdiction?
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• Hafiz Abdul Malik vs Muhammad Ilyas1989 PLD Supreme Court 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-01
  evictionlandlord and tenantpersonal requirementbona fide needrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind upholding the dismissal of the appellant-landlord's eviction application under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The appellant, an over-sixty-year-old landlord, sought eviction of the respondent-tenant on the ground of personal bona fide need. The Rent Controller and High Court dismissed the application, holding that the appellant had delayed seeking eviction for fifteen years after turning sixty and lacked good faith. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the landlord was disentitled from seeking eviction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that since the Ordinance came into force on 21st November 1979, the appellant could only invoke section 14 from that date onward, and the four-year lapse before filing did not bar the remedy as no limitation period is prescribed under the section. The Court established that prolonged past litigation and residing with relatives evidenced genuine personal necessity, thereby setting aside the lower court judgments and ordering the tenant to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord over sixty years of age is barred from seeking eviction under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 due to a delay in filing the application after attaining the age of sixty?
  • Does section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 prescribe any time limit or period of limitation within which a landlord must file an eviction application?
  • Whether past litigation between a landlord and tenant negates the bona fide personal requirement of the landlord for the demised premises?
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• Habibur Rehman Khan vs Syed Mustafa Abbas and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  acquittal appealocular testimonyinterested witnessappreciation of evidencecriminal appealmotivemurderSection 302 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of six respondents in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the acquittal was justified given the ocular testimony, motive, and medical evidence presented. The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of five respondents was erroneous, as the trial and High Court had misapplied principles of evidence appreciation. The Court established that a witness's relationship to the deceased does not automatically render them an 'interested witness' absent a proven motive to falsely implicate the accused. Furthermore, the Court held that when ocular testimony is natural, consistent, and supported by motive and medical evidence, it does not require corroboration from recovery evidence. Discrepancies in testimony arising from a significant lapse of time between the occurrence and the recording of statements should be treated as trivial rather than material. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittals of five respondents, convicting them under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while maintaining the acquittal of the sixth respondent due to insufficient evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere relationship of a witness to the deceased render them an 'interested witness' in a criminal trial?
  • Can ocular testimony be relied upon for conviction without corroboration from recovery evidence?
  • How should courts treat discrepancies in witness testimony recorded after a significant lapse of time?
  • Is the acquittal of an accused justified when ocular testimony is supported by motive and medical evidence?
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• Habibul Wahab Alkhairi vs Sheikh Rashid Ahmad and 5 others1989 PLD Supreme Court 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-04
  election petitioncorrupt practicesdissolution of assemblyinfructuous petitionelectoral disqualificationelection appealreturned candidate
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, challenges the order of an Election Tribunal which dismissed an election petition as infructuous following the dissolution of the National Assembly by the President. The core legal question was whether an election petition abates or becomes infructuous upon the dissolution of the National Assembly when it includes allegations of corrupt and illegal practices against the returned candidate. The Supreme Court held that proceedings in an election petition do not come to an end with the dissolution of the Assembly if corrupt or illegal practices are alleged, because a finding thereon determines the candidate's disqualification from future elections under the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. The Court established that an order dismissing a petition prematurely as infructuous constitutes a final decision concluding the trial and is appealable under Section 67(3), setting aside the Tribunal's order and remanding the matter for a trial on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does an election petition become infructuous upon the dissolution of the National Assembly when allegations of corrupt and illegal practices are made against the returned candidate?
  • Whether an appeal lies under section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 against an order of the Election Tribunal dismissing a petition prematurely on the ground that it has become infructuous?
  • Do allegations of exceeding election expenses and using government transport constitute corrupt and illegal practices under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
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• Habib Sultan vs Allah Ditta and others1989 SCMR 1754 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-16
  customary lawalienation of propertylegal necessityplaint rejectionchange of lawcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit challenging an alienation of property based on custom, specifically alleging a lack of consideration and legal necessity. The core legal question was whether the suit could proceed in light of subsequent legislative changes affecting customary law. The Supreme Court held that the petition could not succeed because the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983, rendered the petitioner's claim untenable, regardless of the merits of the initial plaint rejection under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court established the principle that even if a petition appeared to have force at the time of filing, a subsequent change in law that invalidates the underlying cause of action necessitates the dismissal of the petition, as the court must apply the law as it stands at the time of adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit challenging property alienation under custom proceed following the enactment of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983?
  • Does a change in law occurring after the filing of a petition but before its adjudication affect the outcome of the petition?
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• Habib Hassan Qadri vs The Settlement Commissioner (Lands) Hyderabad and another1989 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-31
  rehabilitation schemeproduce index unitsland allotmentsettlement of claimsdisplaced personsclassification of landconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Sind High Court, which upheld the Settlement Commissioner's order regarding the calculation of Produce Index Units (P.I.Us) for land allotted to a displaced person. The appellant, a claimant under the Rehabilitation Scheme, contended that his allotted land was wrongly classified as 'Flow' land (valued at 40 P.I.Us per acre) rather than 'Banjar Qadim' (valued at 5 P.I.Us per acre) under Correction Slip No. 2-P-1. He further claimed entitlement to a 10% extra allowance for Chahi units. The core legal question was whether the appellant could retrospectively challenge the classification and calculation of his land allotment years after the fact, particularly after the relevant Correction Slip had been withdrawn. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to challenge the classification at the time of allotment and that the relevant Correction Slip had been withdrawn with retrospective effect. Consequently, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower authorities, ruling that the matter involved questions of fact already adjudicated upon, and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claimant retrospectively challenge the classification of allotted land after the relevant administrative correction slip has been withdrawn?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding land classification in a constitutional petition?
  • Does a claimant acquire a vested right to the application of a specific administrative scheme if they failed to agitate the matter during the scheme's enforcement?
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• Habib Alwahab Alkhairi and others vs Commissioner, Rawalpindi1989 SCMR 837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-14
  locus standiaggrieved personconstitutional petitionzoning regulationsresidential schemesleave to appealpublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had challenged the sanctioning of commercial and industrial building plans on residential plots in Rawalpindi. The petitioners, who were tenants in possession of shops affected by the construction of an ice factory, sought to restrain the respondents from sanctioning such plans, requested the acquisition of land for public gardens, and sought a directive for the publication of the Master Plan and Zoning Regulations. The High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the petitioners lacked locus standi and were not aggrieved persons. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the issues raised—specifically regarding the rights of citizens to challenge commercial construction in residential areas and the standing of residents to file such petitions—were matters of significant public importance requiring authoritative settlement. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the legal standing of the petitioners and the broader implications of the construction activities in the specified residential schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Does a resident of a locality have the locus standi to challenge the sanctioning of commercial or industrial building plans on residential plots?
  • Are tenants in possession of property affected by a new construction plan considered 'aggrieved persons' for the purpose of filing a constitutional petition?
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• Habib AHMADPetit loner vs Abdullah and others1989 SCMR 709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-15
  private defenceacquittalappraisement of evidencereasonable doubtleave to appealunexplained injuriessuppression of facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal case where the respondents were acquitted by the Lahore High Court of charges under sections 302/149, 148, and 323/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents attacked the complainant party following a tractor collision, resulting in a death and injuries. Conversely, the respondents pleaded the right of private defence, asserting they were attacked while returning from a shrine. The High Court acquitted the respondents, finding that the complainant party suppressed material facts regarding previous enmity and failed to explain the injuries sustained by the respondents. The Supreme Court reviewed the petition, noting that the High Court had properly appraised the evidence, juxtaposed the two versions, and concluded that the respondents' plea of private defence was sufficiently established to create reasonable doubt. Finding that the High Court's view was reasonably supported by the evidence and involved no substantial question of law, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, thereby upholding the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries sustained by the accused provide grounds for acquittal?
  • Can the right of private defence be established when the accused's version is supported by the prosecution's own evidence?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when it merely challenges the High Court's appraisement of evidence without raising a question of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulsher and others vs The State1989 SCMR 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-06
  post-arrest bailpreparation for dacoityrecovery of armscriminal conspiracyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' request for post-arrest bail pending their trial for offences under sections 399, 401, and 402 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 13-D of the Arms Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the ingredients of offences relating to preparation for dacoity were fulfilled based on the recovery of arms from the petitioners during odd hours, warranting the grant of bail. The Supreme Court held that the High Court and the lower forums committed no illegality or violation of legal principles in refusing bail, considering the serious nature of the offences and the circumstances of the arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed that where accused persons are apprehended at odd hours armed with deadly weapons near a forest under suspicious circumstances, a reasonable presumption regarding preparation for dacoity may be drawn at the bail stage, justifying the denial of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the ingredients of offences under sections 399, 401, and 402 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 are fulfilled when accused persons are apprehended armed at odd hours?
  • Does the recovery of deadly weapons from accused persons near a forest at dawn raise a reasonable presumption to attract section 399 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the bail stage?
  • When can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's order refusing post-arrest bail in heinous offences?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Sher Ahmad vs Election Tribunal and others1989 SCMR 602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-20
  local council electionelection tribunalrecountballot validityleave to appealwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court regarding a local council election dispute. The petitioner, initially declared the winner via a draw of lots after tying with his rival at 220 votes each, saw his election challenged before an Election Tribunal. Upon a recount, the Tribunal determined the petitioner received 218 votes while his opponent received 219, resulting in the opponent being declared the winner. The petitioner challenged this outcome, arguing that a specific ballot marked with an 'R' was improperly excluded due to an unclear mark. The Supreme Court examined the Tribunal's findings and noted that visual inspection confirmed the marking itself was doubtful and not clearly affixed as required. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner failed to establish any legal error or justification for interference. The petition for leave to appeal was refused, affirming that where the validity of a ballot mark is factually determined to be doubtful by the Tribunal, no grounds for appellate intervention exist.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an Election Tribunal's factual determination regarding the validity of a ballot mark?
  • Does the exclusion of a ballot due to an unclear mark constitute a legal error warranting appellate review?
  • Is a candidate entitled to leave to appeal when the Election Tribunal has factually determined that a ballot mark was doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Sharif vs Fam Jan and 6 others1989 SCMR 1874 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-14
  leave to appealconstitutional jurisdictionpower of attorneyspecial attorneyjirga proceedingsconcurrent findingsquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Peshawar High Court, which declined to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with concurrent findings of lower forums in favor of the respondents. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner's special attorney possessed the authority under a written power of attorney to offer an oath binding the petitioner to the outcome of a jirga proceeding. The Supreme Court held that upon examination of the power of attorney, the attorney was indeed vested with the requisite authority to take such action, and the petitioner was bound thereby. The Court further noted that the matter pertained to a question of fact concluded concurrently by all courts below, presenting no legal defect to warrant interference. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the principle that a principal is bound by acts lawfully performed by an authorized attorney within the scope of the power of attorney.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a special attorney is authorized to bind the principal by offering an oath in jirga proceedings based on the terms of a power of attorney?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere in constitutional jurisdiction with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts absent any legal defect?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Muhammad vs The Sind Service Tribunal and 4 others1989 SCMR 574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-07
  service lawredesignation of postpay scale revisionadministrative negligenceservice tribunalback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service dispute regarding the redesignation of the appellant's post from Draftsman to Head Draftsman and the associated pay scale benefits under government notifications issued in 1963. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to these benefits despite the department's failure to implement the relevant notifications at the time and its subsequent refusal to grant the relief. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was entitled to the redesignation and benefits, noting that the department's ignorance of the specific notification did not extinguish the appellant's legal rights. The Court found that the Service Tribunal had failed to thoroughly examine the merits of the case, focusing instead on technicalities. The key principle laid down is that administrative ignorance or failure to implement a government notification does not serve as a valid ground to deny an employee their established legal rights and service benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Does administrative ignorance of a government notification justify the denial of an employee's legal rights?
  • Can a Service Tribunal dismiss a claim based on technicalities without examining the merits of the case?
  • Are employees entitled to the benefits of a redesignation notification that the department failed to implement?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Muhammad vs Nasir Ahmad and others1989 SCMR 1847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-04
  ejectmentbona fide personal needreconstructionconstitutional jurisdictionrent restrictionleave to appealburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed constitutional petitions filed by tenants against their ejectment. The landlord had sought eviction on the grounds of bona fide personal need and the requirement of the premises for reconstruction. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the applications, but the appellate court reversed these decisions, ordering the tenants to vacate. The High Court upheld the appellate orders, finding that the landlord had sufficiently established his requirements through evidence. The Supreme Court reviewed the contentions regarding the validity of the municipal sanction for reconstruction and the sufficiency of evidence regarding personal need. The Court held that the findings of the High Court were based on sound reasoning and that the evidence, including the landlord's unrebutted testimony, supported the claims. The Court affirmed that in constitutional jurisdiction, interference with the decisions of special forums created under rent restriction laws is limited to instances of material irregularity, illegality, or misreading of evidence, none of which were established here. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the decisions of special forums created under the Rent Restriction Ordinance in the absence of material irregularity or illegality?
  • Is the landlord's statement on oath sufficient to establish the plea of bona fide personal need if it remains unrebutted?
  • Does the scope of constitutional jurisdiction allow for the re-appraisal of evidence regarding the landlord's requirement for reconstruction?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Muhammad vs Muhammad Sharif and others1989 SCMR 1261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-08
  pre-emptioncourt-feevaluation of suittenant's right of pre-emptionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order regarding the valuation of court-fee in a pre-emption suit. The petitioner, a tenant, filed a suit for possession through pre-emption regarding a portion of land purchased by the respondents. Although the petitioner's suit was initially decreed for a specific portion of the land, the appellate and revisional authorities, and subsequently the High Court, held that the petitioner was liable to pay court-fee based on the entire land area involved in the original sale transaction, rather than the area for which the suit was decreed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether a pre-emptor is required to pay court-fee on the extent of the land for which the suit is decreed or on the entire extent of the land sold. Finding this to be a significant question of law requiring further examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine the correct basis for calculating court-fee in pre-emption proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor is liable to pay court-fee on the extent of land for which the suit is decreed or on the entire extent of the land sold?
  • Is the court-fee in a pre-emption suit determined by the claim put forward or the relief ultimately granted?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Muhammad vs Israruddin and others1989 SCMR 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-15
  pre-emptioncontiguityShamilat landconcurrent findingscivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a pre-emption suit wherein the vendee challenged the High Court's dismissal of a civil revision upholding a pre-emption decree granted in favor of the respondents on the ground of contiguity. The core legal questions involve whether concurrent findings of fact regarding contiguity could be upset and whether Shamilat or water-course land (Khata) could serve as a valid basis for establishing a superior right of pre-emption based on contiguity. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings regarding the contiguity of the relevant Khasra numbers were firmly established by revenue records and that the ownership of contiguous land owned by the pre-emptors, as distinguished from cases based merely on the common user of public thoroughfares or watercourses, validly supports a pre-emption decree. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that ownership of contiguous land, even if comprising Shamilat or Khata land owned by co-villagers, provides a valid legal basis for pre-emption based on contiguity, and concurrent findings of fact on such matters will not be disturbed in the absence of legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the contiguity of land in a pre-emption suit can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Does ownership of land comprised in a Khata or Shamilat provide a valid basis for establishing a right of pre-emption on the ground of contiguity?
  • Can the sharing of common amenities or public thoroughfares be equated with ownership of contiguous land for the purpose of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Hashim vs Noor Qadir and others1989 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-29
  bataiejectmentlandlord and tenantrevenue authoritiesleave to appealdefault in payment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the Revenue authorities and the High Court regarding a suit for the recovery of batai (share of produce) and ejectment filed by a landlord against a tenant. The petitioner contended that the lower authorities erred in calculating the batai at 50% of the produce, asserting that the legal limit was 40%, and further argued that he was entitled to deduct the costs of improvements made to the land from the payable amount. The Supreme Court examined the merits of these contentions and determined that, even when applying the 40% rate and accounting for the costs of improvements, the petitioner remained a defaulter in his obligations. Consequently, the Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower authorities did not warrant interference under its appellate jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that where a tenant remains in default of payment obligations despite adjustments for legal rates and improvements, the findings of lower revenue courts regarding ejectment and recovery will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of revenue authorities regarding ejectment when the tenant remains a defaulter?
  • Is a tenant entitled to deduct the costs of improvements from the batai payable to the landlord?
  • Can a tenant avoid ejectment if they remain a defaulter even after calculating batai at the maximum legal rate?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Asqal and others vs Additional Secretary, Home, N.W.F.P. and others1989 SCMR 1819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-15
  land disputejurisdiction objectionbelated objectionwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment and order of the Peshawar High Court dated 12-2-1989, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition concerning a land dispute. The underlying dispute originated from an application filed by private respondents for taking over 11 Chakawarms of land from the petitioners, which was ordered by the Deputy Commissioner Chitral and subsequently upheld in appeal by the Additional Commissioner and in revision by the Additional Secretary, Government of NWFP Home and Tribal Affairs Department. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the objection regarding the jurisdiction of the adjudicating forums, raised at a belated stage, could vitiate the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petition had no force and dismissed it, observing that the petitioners had never objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunals constituted under the relevant regulation during the earlier proceedings, rendering their belated technical objection immaterial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise an objection to the jurisdiction of tribunals at a belated stage before the Supreme Court when no such objection was raised during the initial proceedings?
  • Whether technical objections regarding the jurisdiction of judicial forums should be entertained when the matter has taken numerous years for adjudication?
  Read full judgment →
• Grp. Capt. Cecil (Sohail) Chowdhry vs Federation of Pakistan and others1989 SCMR 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-24
  constitutional jurisdictionelection manifestofundamental rightsnon-Muslimscause of actionpublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a constitutional petition invoked under Article 184 by a retired Group Captain belonging to the Christian community, challenging the election manifesto of a political party. The core legal question concerns whether the issuance of an election manifesto by a political party containing statements regarding restrictions on non-Muslims holding key posts provides a cause of action or raises a question of public importance for invoking the Court's original constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the apprehension of the petitioner is unfounded since a manifesto is merely a public declaration of a political party and the party has yet to come into power, thereby disclosing no violation of any constitutional article or question of law of public importance. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was declined. The key principle laid down is that the mere issuance of a political party's election manifesto does not furnish a cause of action or right of grievance under constitutional jurisdiction in the absence of an actual violation of fundamental rights or laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of an election manifesto by a political party give rise to a cause of action for invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
  • Whether apprehensions regarding policies stated in a political party's manifesto constitute a violation of fundamental rights under the Constitution?
  • What constitutes a question of law of public importance for the purposes of invoking original constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab vs Prof. Abdus Sattar Chohan and another1989 SCMR 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-03
  service appealpromotionseniorityforeign assignmentcivil servantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the Government of the Punjab against a judgment of the Provincial Service Tribunal. Respondent No. 1, an Assistant Conservator in the Forest Department, had been permitted to take up a foreign assignment in Nigeria, during which period junior officers were promoted to Conservators of Forest. Upon his return and subsequent promotion, his request for back-dating his promotion to claim seniority over junior officers was rejected by the department based on government instructions requiring civil servants on foreign assignments to return and earn a good report prior to promotion. The Service Tribunal set aside the departmental decision, holding that the instructions violated section 9 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act and specific rules of the Punjab Civil Service Rules. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention regarding promotion not being a matter of right and the alleged conflict between executive instructions and statutory provisions raised a question of law of considerable public importance affecting numerous civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether executive instructions requiring a civil servant on a foreign assignment to return and earn a good report before promotion violate the Punjab Civil Servants Act?
  • Is promotion a matter of right for a civil servant who is passed over while serving abroad?
  • Does the deferment of a civil servant's promotion during a foreign assignment violate established civil service rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab vs A. R. Toosi, S.E.1989 SCMR 1411(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-12
  service matterleave to appealcharacter rollservice tribunalpublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Government of the Punjab against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had accepted the respondent's appeal and directed the removal of a warning from his character roll. The Supreme Court considered the arguments presented by the counsel for the Government. The Court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any error of law or raise any question of public importance that would warrant the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction or require further determination. Consequently, the Court held that the petition lacked merit. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will not grant leave to appeal in service matters unless a significant legal error or a question of public importance is clearly established by the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the removal of a warning from a character roll by a Service Tribunal constitute a question of public importance sufficient for Supreme Court intervention?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against a judgment of a Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab, Lahore vs Dr. Khalid Hussain Gill and others1989 SCMR 748 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-11
  service lawspecial research allowancefield officerpay scalesinterpretation of statutesrecovery of allowanceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals by the Government of Punjab against a Service Tribunal decision granting 'Special Research Allowance' to employees recruited for research institutions. The core legal question was whether these employees qualified as 'Field Officers' under the 1983 pay scheme, thereby entitling them to the allowance, and whether the government could recover payments made during the period of dispute. The Supreme Court observed that while the government argued for a narrow definition of 'Field Officer', a subsequent 1987 government memorandum explicitly extended the research allowance to both field officers and those employed exclusively in research organizations, effectively negating the government's previous restrictive interpretation. Consequently, the Court held that the appeals lacked merit and did not involve substantial questions of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution. The Court dismissed the appeals, implicitly upholding the entitlement of the respondents to the allowance and rejecting the government's attempt to recover the payments made during the interim period.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to hear appeals regarding the interpretation of pay scheme allowances for government employees?
  • Can the government recover research allowances paid to employees when a subsequent government policy revision adopts the same interpretation of eligibility that the employees originally relied upon?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab and others vs M. Nasrullah Khan1989 SCMR 1179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-13
  service tribunaladverse remarksexpungementpetition for leave to appealpublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of the Punjab and the Commissioner, Multan Division, filed a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 12-10-1981, which had ordered the expungement of adverse remarks recorded in the service record of the respondent, M. Nasrullah Khan. The petitioners' counsel contended that the Tribunal acted contrary to law in granting relief to an employee with an unclean record. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the Tribunal's order was in accordance with law or involved any question of public importance. Finding no such question of public importance or illegality in the impugned order, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a service tribunal's order expunging adverse remarks in the absence of a question of public importance?
  • Does an adverse remark expunged by the Punjab Service Tribunal raise a substantial question of law warranting leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab and others vs Abdul Sattar Nadeem Hashmi and others1989 SCMR 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-03
  service tribunal jurisdictionnationalization of schoolsleave to appealservice senioritypublic importanceeducational institution status
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which arose from an appeal filed by a school employee, Abdul Sattar Nadeem Hashmi, challenging his service status and the nationalization of his institution. The petitioner sought a declaration regarding the status of the 'Achha Madrasa, Bahawalpur' following its nationalization as a primary school, and requested to be recognized as a High School Headmaster with associated seniority and pay scale benefits. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the status of the school or grant declarations regarding the upgradation of the institution. However, the Tribunal proceeded to fix the petitioner's monthly emoluments effective from the date of nationalization. Both the Government of Punjab and the employee challenged the Tribunal's order, citing the precedent of Province of Punjab v. Bashir Ahmad Bukhari. The Supreme Court, finding that a substantial question of law of public importance was involved, granted leave to appeal in both petitions to examine the propriety of the Tribunal's order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to determine the status of an educational institution or grant declarations regarding its upgradation?
  • Can a Service Tribunal fix the pay and emoluments of a civil servant when it has otherwise determined it lacks jurisdiction over the core subject matter of the appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan vs Habib Oil Ltd. and others1989 SCMR 955 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-03
  interim reliefgovernment revenuebank guaranteestime-barred review petitionpersonal bonds
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Government of Pakistan against the impugned judgment of the High Court of Sind, which followed the precedent established by the Supreme Court in Al-Samrez Enterprise v. Pakistan. The core legal question concerns the grant of interim relief and the protection of government revenue pending the main petitions, alongside the maintainability of a heavily time-barred review petition filed by the petitioner. The court declined to grant the interim relief in the terms prayed for by the petitioner. However, to safeguard government revenue, the court ordered by consent of the parties that the existing bank guarantees furnished by the respondents shall remain operative until replaced by personal bonds executed before the Nazir of the High Court, upon which the original bank guarantees shall be returned. The key principle laid down is that interim arrangements in revenue matters can be modulated by consent to protect government interests while pending final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interim relief should be granted when a review petition against the foundational judgment is time-barred by 352 days?
  • Can bank guarantees furnished by respondents be replaced by personal bonds to safeguard government revenue pending the decision on main petitions?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Estalishment Division and others vs Jalaluddin Akbar Zaidi and others1989 SCMR 1849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  service tribunalseniorityinter-departmental cadreaccounts groupleave to appealreorganization of serviceslocalized cadre
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from four petitions for special leave to appeal directed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 23 July 1984. The core legal question concerns the correct determination of seniority for an accounts officer from a localized cadre absorbed into a newly constituted inter-departmental Accounts Group under reorganization memoranda issued in 1974 and 1976. The respondent, confirmed in grade 17 from 1969 within the Telegraph and Telephone Department, challenged his placement below officers recruited between 1969 and 1974 in the inter-departmental seniority list. The Federal Service Tribunal accepted his appeal, directing that his seniority be fixed from his confirmation date of March 1, 1969, with consequential promotion benefits. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine contentions that the Tribunal misconstrued relevant seniority rules and deviated from its own prior inconsistent view regarding the seniority of localized cadre members versus all-Pakistan service members upon the formation of the inter-departmental cadre. The key principle noted for examination is the interpretation and application of seniority rules governing the merger and reorganization of government services into an inter-departmental cadre.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an officer belonging to a localized cadre is entitled to claim seniority from the date of confirmation upon absorption into a newly constituted inter-departmental cadre?
  • Did the Federal Service Tribunal misconstrue the relevant seniority rules regarding the fixation of seniority for amalgamated accounts services?
  • How does the constitution of an inter-departmental cadre affect the inter se seniority of officers previously belonging to different departmental cadres?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of N.W.F.P. through I.G.P. and others vs Mst. Tasleem1989 SCMR 1035 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-11
  service lawpolice servicedischarge from serviceleave to appealdisciplinary proceedingsprobationary period
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had set aside the discharge of a lady police constable from service. The respondent, having served only four months, was discharged following a complaint and an unsatisfactory response to a show-cause notice. The petitioners, representing the Government of N.W.F.P., challenged the Tribunal's decision, arguing that the competent authority possessed the legal power to discharge the respondent under Police Rule 12.21, notwithstanding that proceedings had been initiated under the Police Rules, 1975. The petitioners contended that Police Rule 12.21 is specifically applicable to police officers with less than three years of service, thereby permitting discharge without the necessity of full disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court, finding merit in the question of whether the initiation of proceedings under the Police Rules, 1975, precludes the application of Police Rule 12.21 for an officer with less than three years of service, granted leave to appeal to examine the scope and interplay of these provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the initiation of proceedings under the Police Rules, 1975, bar the competent authority from passing an order of discharge under Police Rule 12.21?
  • Is Police Rule 12.21 applicable to police officers with less than three years of service regardless of other ongoing disciplinary processes?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of N.W.F.P. and others vs Namroz Khan1989 SCMR 1458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-15
  leave to appealservice tribunaltemporary employeetermination of serviceunauthorized absenceback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners seek leave to appeal against the order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal dated 26-5-1988, which accepted the respondent's appeal, set aside his termination, and granted him back benefits. The respondent, initially appointed as a temporary cleaner in the FATA Forest Division, faced multiple absences from duty on medical and other grounds, ultimately leading to his termination from service by the Divisional Forest Officer after an unauthorized absence period. His departmental representations and appeals were rejected before he successfully approached the Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerns the validity of terminating a temporary employee's service without a formal detailed inquiry and whether such termination constituted a punishment requiring strict adherence to legal formalities. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioners require detailed examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further on the existing record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a temporary employee can be terminated from service without assigning reasons or notice?
  • Does the termination of a temporary employee based on unauthorized absence constitute a punishment requiring a detailed inquiry?
  • Are the findings of a Service Tribunal setting aside a termination order subject to examination by the Supreme Court under leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Gordhandas vs Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and another1989 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-01
  service tribunalremoval from servicestatutory powerdisciplinary enquirypublic interestplenary poweremployment termination
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examined whether the Service Tribunal correctly upheld the removal of the appellant from the service of WAPDA under Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act, notwithstanding pending disciplinary enquiries and previous charge-sheets. The appellant contended that the statutory power of removal could not be invoked as a cloak to bypass regular disciplinary proceedings or to inflict punishment carrying a stigma. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of constitutional guarantees and in view of the overriding and plenary nature of the statutory power conferred by Section 17(1-A), the Authority is legally competent to retire or remove an employee without assigning reasons, even if disciplinary enquiries are pending in the background, provided the order is free from mala fides and is not quorum non judice. The Court affirmed that such plenary powers allow the employer to examine the entire service record to determine if an employee's continuance is in the public interest, thereby dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Water and Power Development Authority invoke Section 17(1-A) to remove an employee while disciplinary enquiries are pending against him?
  • Whether the plenary power of removal under Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act can be challenged on the ground that pending enquiries should have been taken to their logical conclusion?
  • What are the grounds available for judicial review before the Service Tribunal against an order passed under Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Yasin vs Additional District Judge and others1989 SCMR 1054 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-07
  rent evictionlandlord-tenant relationshipconstitutional petitionleave to appealcivil suitrent defaultadverse possession
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed his constitutional petition, thereby upholding eviction orders issued by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge. The respondent, a widow, had successfully sought the petitioner's eviction based on default in rent payments. The petitioner contested the eviction by denying the landlord-tenant relationship, claiming instead that he held the property through a family settlement in exchange for his share in other joint property, and further asserting adverse possession. The Rent Controller, however, determined that the landlord-tenant relationship existed and that the petitioner was in default. The Supreme Court reviewed the petitioner's contention that a pending civil suit regarding title should have precluded the Rent Controller's findings. The Court found no jurisdictional error in the lower courts' appraisal of evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the eviction order while clarifying that the petitioner's pending civil suit regarding title remains unaffected and shall proceed on its own merits in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller determine the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship when a title suit is pending in a Civil Court?
  • Does the existence of a pending civil suit regarding property title automatically preclude a Rent Controller from ordering eviction based on rent default?
  • Is a finding of fact by a Rent Controller, upheld by an Appellate Court, subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction absent a jurisdictional error?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabir and 2 others vs Muhammad Sher and 8 others1989 SCMR 1182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-09
  inheritanceMuslim Personal Lawcustomary lawdevolution of propertyleave to appealmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a Civil Revision in a land inheritance dispute. The core legal question involves the devolution of property belonging to a deceased individual, Abbas, who died prior to the promulgation of the Shariat Application Law of 1948. The property was originally mutated under custom solely in the name of the deceased's son, Mangladah, to the exclusion of his daughter, Mst. Said Begum. Following Mangladah's death in 1982, the property was claimed by his heirs, including beneficiaries of a will made by him. The petitioners argued that Mst. Said Begum should have been treated as a rightful Muslim heir to her father under Section 2-A of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, as amended in 1983. Finding that the arguments presented find prima facie support in established Supreme Court precedents, the Court granted leave to appeal to re-examine the entire question of the devolution of the property of the deceased following his death, thereby setting the stage for a comprehensive review of the inheritance rights involved.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 2-A of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962 apply to the devolution of property of a person who died before the promulgation of the Shariat Application Law of 1948?
  • Can property inherited under custom by a son to the exclusion of a daughter be re-opened in light of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabbir vs District Food Controller and others1989 SCMR 1418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-20
  service tribunaldismissal from servicetheft of propertyleave to appealdisciplinary actionchaukidar
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an ex-Chaukidar in the Food Department, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against his dismissal from service. The disciplinary action arose from the theft of Bardana valued at Rs. 60,000 from the godown where he was posted in 1985. The Enquiry Officer concluded that the theft would not have occurred had the petitioner been present on the date of the incident. The petitioner contended that safety measures and electricity arrangements were unsatisfactory. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to point out any error of law or raise any question of public importance in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the dismissal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can be dismissed from service for negligence leading to the theft of departmental property?
  • Does the absence of proper electricity and safety arrangements absolve a watchman of liability for theft from a godown?
  • On what grounds will the Supreme Court interfere with a factual finding upheld by the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar vs Javaid alias Khalid and another1989 SCMR 1387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-28
  leave to appealenhancement of sentencemitigating circumstancesweak motivecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant seeking enhancement of the sentence awarded to the respondent under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court convicted the respondent and sentenced him to four years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine, which was subsequently reduced by the Sessions Judge on appeal to three and a half years' rigorous imprisonment. Upon further challenge, the High Court maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence to the period already undergone, noting that the immediate cause of the occurrence was undisclosed and the alleged motive was weak. The core legal question concerned the justification for enhancing a reduced sentence where mitigating circumstances such as an unproven immediate cause and weak motive exist. The Supreme Court held that the reasons provided by the High Court were weighty under the circumstances and refused to interfere with the sentence. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts may consider undisclosed immediate causes of occurrence and weak motives as valid mitigating factors for sentence reduction, which do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court for sentence enhancement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal for enhancement of sentence should be granted when the High Court reduces the sentence based on a weak motive and undisclosed immediate cause?
  • Can an undisclosed immediate cause of occurrence serve as a mitigating factor for reducing a sentence under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar vs Faiz Muhammad and another1989 SCMR 849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-17
  pre-emptionex parte decreeservice of summonsfraudconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a vendee/defendant against the dismissal of his Constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld concurrent findings of fact against him regarding the service of summons in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerned whether an ex parte decree and subsequent execution could be set aside on allegations of fraud regarding summons service without establishing the factual basis for the plea. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not succeed without establishing his plea on facts concerning the service of summons, and since concurrent findings of fact were rendered against him and his attempt to discredit the Process Server failed, no relief could be granted. The key principle laid down is that a party alleging fraud in the service of summons must establish the plea on facts, and concurrent findings of fact on such issues cannot be dislodged on technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can succeed in setting aside an ex parte decree on the ground of fraud regarding summons service without establishing the plea on facts?
  • Does a concurrent finding of fact on the question of the service of summons warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can relief be granted on technicalities when attempts to discredit the Process Server have failed?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul vs Wazir Khan and others1989 SCMR 1172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-08
  murderacquittalbenefit of doubtocular evidencemedical evidencematerial contradictionsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted the respondents of charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding the murder of the petitioner's father. The trial court had initially convicted the respondents based on the premise of a daylight occurrence and the absence of misidentification. However, the High Court acquitted them, finding the prosecution evidence highly doubtful and conflicting. Upon review, the Supreme Court found significant contradictions between the F.I.R., the ocular account, and the medical evidence. Specifically, the F.I.R. alleged two shots were fired, while the medical report indicated five firearm injuries, suggesting more than two shots were fired. Additionally, the recovery of crime weapons was not proven, and the ocular testimony was deemed unreliable. The Supreme Court held that these material contradictions created reasonable doubt, which must be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the number of shots alleged in the F.I.R. and the number of injuries found in the medical report constitute a material contradiction warranting acquittal?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the ocular account is contradicted by the medical evidence?
  • Is the benefit of doubt in a criminal case applicable when there are significant contradictions in the prosecution's evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul vs Shahid Mahmood alias Shadda and another1989 SCMR 1158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-08
  enhancement of sentencemurdermotivemitigating circumstanceleave to appealcapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant seeking the enhancement of the respondent's sentence from imprisonment for life to death, following a judgment by the Lahore High Court that maintained the respondent's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but altered the death sentence. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court was justified in altering the sentence of death to life imprisonment on the ground that the prosecution's set-up motive was not very obvious and remained shrouded in mystery, despite reliable eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and recovery. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the conclusion reached by the High Court regarding the mitigating circumstance of an unproven or obscure motive was sound and warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that where the real motive for a crime remains shrouded in mystery, the appellate court may consider this as a mitigating circumstance to alter the sentence of death to life imprisonment in a murder case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an obscure or unproven motive can be considered a mitigating circumstance for altering a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's appreciation of evidence regarding motive when findings are based on the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul vs Muhammad Bibi1989 SCMR 1673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-21
  inheritance disputemutationquestion of factconcurrent findingsleave to appealcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a civil revision petition regarding an inheritance dispute. The core legal question was whether the respondent, Mst. Muhammad Bibi, was the legally wedded wife of the deceased, Ghulam Haider, and thus entitled to a share in his estate. The petitioner contended that the deceased was a 'Sainlog' who had never married, challenging the inheritance mutation that granted the respondent a one-fourth share. The Supreme Court observed that the appellate court had relied on both oral testimony from the Lambardar and other landowners, as well as documentary evidence, to conclude that the respondent had lived with the deceased as his wife for over 25 years. The High Court upheld this finding of fact. The Supreme Court held that since the lower courts had concurrently decided this question of fact based on evidence, there was no ground for interference. The petition was dismissed, reaffirming that findings of fact supported by evidence are generally not subject to reappraisal in leave to appeal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding marital status in a leave to appeal petition?
  • Is oral testimony from local residents and landowners sufficient to establish the status of a wife in inheritance proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs Nazir and 2 others1989 SCMR 1532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-19
  civil revisionconcurrent findingsgiftmutation proceedingsMuslim Law of Inheritanceleave to appealfraud and misrepresentation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Civil Revision by the High Court, which had upheld a decree for declaration in a property dispute. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in their concurrent findings regarding the validity of a gift allegedly made by the deceased last male holder of the property. The plaintiffs, claiming as heirs under Muslim Law of Inheritance, challenged the gift and associated mutation proceedings, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court observed that all lower courts had rendered concurrent findings against the petitioner regarding the existence and validity of the gift. Furthermore, the petitioner's argument that the entry in the 'Rozenamcha Waqiati' of the Patwari was not given due weight was rejected, as the authenticity of that entry had not been established and was disbelieved by the courts below. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that no justification existed for interference with the concurrent factual findings, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a gift?
  • Does an entry in the 'Rozenamcha Waqiati' of a Patwari automatically establish the validity of a gift if its authenticity is disputed and rejected by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue, Punjab1989 SCMR 1163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-25
  consolidation of landwrit petitionleave to appealsurrender of landfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a writ petition challenging consolidation of land holdings proceedings. The petitioner contested the validity of a statement recorded by the Assistant Consolidation Officer, which allegedly bore his thumb-mark, surrendering four Kanals and ten Marlas of land. The core legal and factual question was whether the petitioner had indeed made and thumb-marked the statement surrendering the land. The High Court had assessed that the statement was genuinely made by the petitioner. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, finding no reason to differ with the factual assessment of the High Court, held that no justification was made out for the grant of leave to appeal. The petition was consequently dismissed, affirming that concurrent findings of fact regarding the voluntary surrender of land in consolidation proceedings will not be lightly disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a concurrent finding of fact regarding the voluntary surrender of land in consolidation proceedings can be disturbed by the Supreme Court in the absence of justification?
  • Whether a statement recorded and thumb-marked before an Assistant Consolidation Officer is binding on the party making it?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qasim Khan vs Punjab Service Tribunal and 3 others1989 SCMR 635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-22
  service matterdismissal from servicepolice servicedepartmental inquiryshow-cause noticeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had upheld the dismissal of the petitioner, a police official, from service. The petitioner, a Head Constable, was dismissed following allegations of issuing bogus driving licenses while posted as a Learning Licence Clerk in the Traffic Branch. After a departmental inquiry and the issuance of show-cause notices, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police reverted and subsequently dismissed the petitioner. The petitioner's departmental appeals and his appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal were unsuccessful. Upon review, the Supreme Court examined the findings of the lower authorities and the Tribunal. The Court held that the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner was based on a correct appreciation of the evidence presented during the inquiry. Finding no error in the lower forums' conclusions and determining that no question of law of public importance was involved, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, thereby affirming the dismissal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Is the dismissal of a police official based on an inquiry into the issuance of bogus licenses sustainable if the evidence was correctly appreciated by the disciplinary authority?
  • Does a petition for leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal order require the presence of a question of law of public importance?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir vs Abdul Majid and 11 others1989 SCMR 1211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-25
  inheritance disputelimited ownerreversionary rightsdeclaration suitconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Civil Revision by the High Court in a suit for declaration concerning an inheritance dispute. The core legal question involved the nature of the property rights held by a widow, Mst. Hussain Bibi, following the death of her husband, Fazal Hussain, and whether the respondents' predecessor, Charagh Din, had surrendered his reversionary rights in her favour. The petitioner, the son of the widow from a previous marriage, claimed title through a gift from the widow, asserting she held the property as an absolute owner. The trial court, the appellate court, and the High Court concurrently found that the widow was merely a limited owner and that Charagh Din had never surrendered his reversionary rights to her. The Supreme Court upheld these concurrent findings, determining they were unexceptionable. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the principle that a limited owner cannot alienate property beyond their interest, and that claims of surrender of reversionary rights must be substantiated by clear evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a limited owner of property alienate that property to a third party as an absolute owner?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding inheritance rights subject to interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does a claim of surrender of reversionary rights by a legal heir require proof of acceptance by the limited owner?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi vs Muhammad Asghar and others1989 SCMR 1995 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-24
  past maintenanceminor childrenHanafi lawconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court in a constitutional petition concerning the award of past maintenance to minor children. Mst. Razia Begum filed a suit for maintenance for herself and her three minor children, which was initially dismissed by the Family Court, but partly decreed on appeal by the Additional District Judge who granted maintenance from the date of the institution of the suit. Upon a constitutional petition filed by the respondents, the High Court awarded past maintenance from September 1982. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether past maintenance could be granted to minor children under Islamic (Hanafi) law when not previously fixed by court decree or by the father. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the impermissibility of granting past maintenance under Hanafi law and the alleged excess of jurisdiction under Article 199 required detailed consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and stayed the operation of the order regarding past maintenance upon furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Can past maintenance be granted to minor children under Hanafi law if it has not been previously fixed by a court decree or by the father?
  • Did the High Court exceed its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan in awarding past maintenance?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi vs Commissioner, Lahore Division and others1989 SCMR 1300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-18
  service tribunalreversion from servicedepartmental inquirytemporary employeeforgeryleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's service appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioner, a temporary junior clerk in the office of the Assistant Commissioner Sheikhupura, was reverted as an unemployed clerk following an inquiry into irregularities regarding arm licences. Although appellate authorities previously directed that a proper inquiry be held, the record examined by the Service Tribunal revealed that a regular inquiry had indeed been conducted by the A.D.C. (G), resulting in a detailed report holding the petitioner responsible for forgery. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was removed from service without an inquiry and in defiance of appellate directions. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's contention was factually baseless since a proper inquiry had in fact been conducted and completed. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the removal was valid upon the findings of the inquiry report.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can challenge a departmental reversion when a regular inquiry has duly established charges of forgery against him?
  • Does the failure of appellate authorities to be apprised of a completed inquiry invalidate the disciplinary action taken on the basis of that inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Education DEPARTMENTand another1989 SCMR 578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-09
  municipal high schoolsprovincializationservice tribunalcadre mergersenioritypromotionterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the extent to which staff of Municipal High Schools, whose control and management were transferred to the Government of Punjab under section 224(b) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 1975, could claim merger with the regular general cadre of government servants in the Education Department and compete for promotion. The Supreme Court held that while the notification and transfer conditions protected the transferred employees' previous service for pension, seniority, and other benefits, they did not guarantee the merger of separate cadres or entitle the appellants to be integrated into the general cadre or compete for seniority and promotion against existing civil servants therein unless expressly provided by law. The Court laid down that transferred personnel from local councils form a distinct entity and cannot unilaterally claim integration into a separate government service cadre or demand joint seniority and promotion rights without explicit statutory provision or relaxation of service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of municipal high schools transferred to the provincial government under the Punjab Local Government Act, 1975 have a right to claim automatic merger with the regular general cadre of the Education Department?
  • Can transferred municipal school staff claim joint seniority and the right to compete for promotion with civil servants of the general cadre without explicit statutory provision?
  • Does a transfer notification under section 224(b) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 1975 confer the right of cadre integration upon transferred educational staff?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Muhammad Ismail and others1989 SCMR 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-14
  appreciation of evidencedying declarationpartisan witnessbenefit of doubtleave to appealmurder convictionweapon recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent of murder charges under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the reliability of partisan eye-witnesses, the weight of an uncorroborated dying declaration, and the significance of a weapon recovery. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision to acquit was based on a sound evaluation of the evidence, noting that the eye-witnesses were partisan and the dying declaration lacked medical attestation and appeared to be a verbatim copy of the F.I.R. Furthermore, the recovery of the weapon was deemed insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of corroborating forensic evidence like crime empties. The Court affirmed that when a High Court correctly applies principles of evidence appreciation and finds the prosecution case unsafe, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the acquittal. Leave to appeal was refused, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of a dying declaration that lacks medical attestation and mirrors the F.I.R. verbatim?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal if the High Court has correctly applied the principles of evidence appreciation?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon sufficient to sustain a conviction when no crime empties were recovered from the crime scene?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Mst. Rashida Hamid and others1989 SCMR 1763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-31
  landlord and tenantevictionsettlement of displaced personsrelationship of landlord and tenantleave to appealcourt of general jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a tenant's petition arising from the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which upheld an eviction order under the Rent Restriction Law. The core legal question pressed before the Supreme Court was whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties concerning a property transferred under settlement laws for displaced persons. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts, determining the disputed portion was transferred to the respondents and establishing the petitioner as a tenant, were unexceptionable, thus justifying the refusal of leave to appeal. However, the Court observed that the petitioner might file a regular suit in a court of general jurisdiction for declaration of ownership and possession after surrendering possession to the successful party. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings regarding transfer of property under settlement laws and tenancy will not be disturbed in leave to appeal, leaving the party to seek remedy through a regular civil suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relationship of landlord and tenant exist when property is disputed under settlement laws?
  • Can concurrent findings of lower courts regarding property transfer under settlement laws be interfered with in leave to appeal?
  • May a tenant file a suit for declaration of ownership in a court of general jurisdiction after eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Directorgeneral, Pakistan Rangers1989 SCMR 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Federal Service Tribunalreview jurisdictioninherent powersservice lawfinality of ordersstatutory tribunals
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Sub-Inspector of the Pakistan Rangers, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his application for review of an earlier order. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Service Tribunal possesses the inherent jurisdiction to review its own final decisions on merits in the absence of an express statutory provision granting such power. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner’s counsel failed to cite any provision of law or judicial precedent establishing that the Tribunal has the authority to review its final orders on merits. Consequently, the Court upheld the Tribunal's dismissal of the review application, affirming that the Tribunal acted in accordance with the law. The judgment reinforces the principle that tribunals created by statute are creatures of that statute and possess only such powers as are expressly conferred upon them, meaning they lack inherent review jurisdiction unless explicitly provided by the governing legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal possess the inherent jurisdiction to review its own final decisions on merits?
  • Can a statutory tribunal exercise review powers in the absence of an express statutory grant?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad Khan vs The State1989 SCMR 1322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  bailinterim bailconditional bailleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by way of a petition for special leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 3-9-88. The core legal question involves whether a condition can be lawfully imposed while admitting an accused person to bail or confirming interim bail, rendering a conditional order of bail in accordance with the law. The Court held that the question is of public importance and requires detailed examination along with an authoritative pronouncement. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was ordered to be made ready on the present record for final hearing in the next session at Lahore, and the Advocate-General Punjab was directed to appear personally to assist the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court impose a condition while admitting an accused person to bail or confirming an interim bail?
  • Is a conditional order of bail in accordance with the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad and others vs Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1088 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-13
  consolidation matterleave to appeallimitationlacheswrit jurisdictionBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a consolidation matter where the High Court dismissed the petitioners' writ petition. The petitioners challenged the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, arguing that once a matter was admitted to regular hearing and a referee was appointed with the consent of the parties, the revision petition should not have been dismissed on the grounds of limitation or laches. The Supreme Court rejected this contention. The Court observed that the Member, Board of Revenue, had considered the case on its merits in addition to the issue of limitation. Furthermore, the High Court had duly considered the question of delay noted by the Member, Board of Revenue. Finding no legal or factual basis to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower forums, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to make out a case for interference. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revision petition be dismissed on the ground of limitation after a referee has been appointed with the consent of the parties?
  • Does the appointment of a referee preclude a tribunal from considering the issue of limitation or laches?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad and others vs Ijaz Ahmad and others1989 SCMR 583 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-20
  evacuee propertyjoint holdingallotment of landrehabilitation authoritieswrit petitionsale-deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petition concerning land allotments made to refugees from a joint holding with evacuees. The core legal question is whether land sold by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest to non-Muslim evacuees prior to partition correctly constituted evacuee property subject to refugee allotment. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the rehabilitation and custodial authorities—establishing that allotments were made exclusively from the Hissadari possession of non-Muslim evacuees and from land validly sold via registered sale-deeds—were lawful and justified. The court affirmed that land alienated to evacuees before partition retains its evacuee character and is liable to be allotted to displaced persons. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land sold by a local landowner to non-Muslim evacuees prior to partition constitutes evacuee property?
  • Can rehabilitation authorities make refugee allotments out of joint holdings without prior partition if the allotted area is restricted to the non-Muslim evacuee's Hissadari possession?
  • Whether concurrent findings of custodial and rehabilitation authorities regarding the status of land as evacuee property warrant interference in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad and others vs Amir Nawab Khan and others1989 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-15
  leave to appealex parte orderejectmenttime-barred appealconstitutional petitionrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition in limine and affirmed an order passed by the District Judge, Malakand. The underlying dispute originated from an ex parte ejectment order issued by the Rent Controller, Malakand, against the petitioners. The petitioners challenged this order before the District Judge, who examined the merits and concluded that there was no justification to set aside the ex parte ejectment order, particularly noting that the appeal was time-barred and the delay remained unexplained. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the petitioners failed to provide any effective arguments to warrant interference with the High Court's judgment. Consequently, the Court held that the case did not present a fit ground for granting leave to appeal. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding procedural defaults, such as unexplained delays in filing appeals, absent a compelling legal justification.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with an ex parte ejectment order when the appeal itself is time-barred and the delay is unexplained?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against an order of a District Judge upholding an ex parte ejectment order where no legal error is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad and anothers vs Muhammad Ilyas and others1989 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-08
  land allotmentSettlement and Rehabilitation Schemeproposal for allotmentsubsisting rightcancellation of allotmentdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the allotment of land in Chak No. 132/GB, Faisalabad. The appellants claimed the land based on a 1960 proposal, despite the absence of a signed confirmation order, while respondents claimed the same land based on a 1966 confirmation. The Lahore High Court initially dismissed the appellants' writ petition, reasoning that their claim had been abandoned and that the proposal lacked formal confirmation. The core legal question was whether a mere proposal for land allotment, even if unconfirmed by a signature, confers a subsisting right that precludes subsequent allotment of the same land to others without due process. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the earlier proposal in favour of the appellants remained valid and subsisting. The Court established the principle that a proposal for allotment under the Settlement and Rehabilitation Scheme creates a right that cannot be summarily disregarded or superseded by a subsequent proposal without formal cancellation and notice to the original allottee, affirming that such proposals are not mere nullities.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere proposal for land allotment under the Settlement and Rehabilitation Scheme confer a right that cannot be superseded without notice?
  • Can land already subject to a subsisting proposal be validly allotted to another party without cancelling the prior proposal?
  • Is a proposal for allotment of land legally effective even if the final confirmation order lacks the signature of the confirming officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mohyuddin vs Abdullah represented by Legal Heirs1989 SCMR 1994 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-12
  Shamlat Dehmandatory injunctioncommon village landencroachmentrevenue recordTalab
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed lower court decisions ordering the demolition of the petitioner's house. The respondent had filed a suit for mandatory injunction, asserting that the petitioner had constructed a house on land designated as a 'Talab' (pond) in the revenue record, which was reserved for the common use of the village (Shamlat Deh). The petitioner contended that because other portions of the land were already occupied by a mosque and other houses, and the pond no longer existed in reality, the land should be considered partitionable like other Shamlat Deh land. The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the petitioner's construction on land recorded as common village property could be regularized despite its designation. The Court held that no interference was warranted in the High Court's order, as the lower courts had properly exercised their discretion in ordering the demolition of the unauthorized construction on common village land. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can land recorded as a pond for common village use be treated as partitionable Shamlat Deh land if the pond no longer physically exists?
  • Is a court justified in ordering the demolition of a house constructed on land designated for common village use?
  • Does the existence of other unauthorized constructions on common village land justify the retention of a new encroachment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hyder Siddiqui vs Settlement Commissioner, Sind and others1989 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-08
  settlementprovisional transfer ordercancellation of allotmentnatural justiceaudi alteram partemvoid orderfunctus officio
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of an evacuee property unit under the settlement laws. The appellant was transferred a portion of the premises on his LH form, and a Provisional Transfer Order (PTO) was issued in his favour in 1960. Subsequently, respondent No. 3, who occupied a different property that turned out to be trust property, applied for alternative allotment. The Settlement Commissioner directed that any undisposed property be transferred to him. Consequently, the Settlement Authorities cancelled the appellant's PTO without notice and transferred the entire premises, including the appellant's portion, to respondent No. 3. The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition, upholding the Settlement Authorities' concurrent findings on indivisibility. The Supreme Court held that since the property was already transferred to the appellant under a valid and unchallenged PTO, it was not 'undisposed of' and was unavailable for transfer to respondent No. 3. The unilateral cancellation of the appellant's PTO without notice was a nullity, rendering all subsequent orders, including the Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) issued to respondent No. 3, legally ineffectual.

  Questions settled

  • Can an evacuee property that has already been transferred under a valid Provisional Transfer Order be treated as undisposed of and transferred to another person?
  • Is an order cancelling a Provisional Transfer Order without prior notice or an opportunity of hearing to the holder legally valid?
  • Does a subsequent transfer order or Permanent Transfer Deed carry any legal efficacy if it is based on a prior void order of cancellation?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain Shah vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab1989 SCMR 1457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-10
  Horse Breeding Schemeland allotmentrevenue hierarchynew pleaconcurrent findingslease dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the decisions of lower revenue authorities regarding the allotment of land under the Horse Breeding Scheme. The dispute concerned two brothers competing for the lease of land previously held by their deceased father. The District Collector had allotted the lease to the respondent, a decision affirmed by the Commissioner and the Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue. The petitioner, who was employed elsewhere, contended that as an ex-serviceman, he was entitled to preference under a Board of Revenue circular. The Supreme Court found no error in the concurrent findings of the lower tribunals, noting that the respondent had been assisting the father in cultivation and was a permanent resident of the relevant locality. Crucially, the Court held that the argument regarding the petitioner's status as an ex-serviceman could not be entertained because it was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court and had not been pleaded before the lower tribunals. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new contention regarding preferential entitlement for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Are concurrent findings of lower revenue tribunals regarding land allotment subject to interference by the Supreme Court when no legal error is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain and others vs Muhammad Shafi through his Legal Heirs1989 SCMR 1543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  execution of decreelimitation periodleave to appealexecution second appealstay orderabatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by decree-holders against the High Court's decision accepting an execution second appeal and holding the execution petition to be time-barred. The core legal question concerns the starting point of limitation for filing an execution application when stay orders and subsequent appellate proceedings, specifically a petition for leave to appeal, took place after the High Court's initial appellate judgment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether time for execution runs from the dismissal of the regular second appeal or the subsequent dismissal of the petition for leave to appeal, and also considered contentions regarding limitation and the potential abatement of the petition under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance (XIII of 1983). The Court condoned the delay in filing the petition, granted leave to appeal, and directed the preparation of the appeal on the present record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for filing an execution application run from the date of the High Court's appellate decision or from the subsequent dismissal of the petition for leave to appeal?
  • Whether an execution petition remains within time when execution proceedings were previously stayed by the order of the court?
  • Does a petition abate under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance (XIII of 1983) under these circumstances?
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• Ghulam Haider and others vs Government of the Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-21
  property taxlocal governmentlegislative competencetaxation powersprovincial governmentrevenue sharing
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order dismissing an intra-Court appeal, which had upheld a notification issued by the Provincial Government under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, imposing property tax in Shah Kot. The petitioners contended that the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, specifically section 137 read with the Second Schedule, vested the power to tax buildings and lands exclusively in local municipal bodies, and that section 4 of the Ordinance gave it overriding effect over other laws. Additionally, they argued that because section 3-A of the Act requires the Provincial Government to remit a portion of collected taxes to local bodies, the Government acts merely as an agent and cannot impose taxes against the wishes of the local committee. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the power to tax under the Ordinance is expressly subject to other laws, and that the revenue-sharing mechanism in section 3-A does not create an agency relationship between the Provincial Government and local bodies. The Court affirmed the Provincial Government's legislative authority to impose property tax.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 override the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act 1958 regarding the power to levy property tax?
  • Does the revenue-sharing provision in section 3-A of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act 1958 create an agency relationship between the Provincial Government and local bodies?
  • Can a local committee prevent the Provincial Government from imposing property tax under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider and 7 others vs S.H.O. City Police Station Quetta and 91989 PLD Supreme Court 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-17
  video exhibitionpolice powerscognizable offencewrit petitionhotel businessillegal screening
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by hotel proprietors in Quetta against the dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court, wherein they claimed an uncontrolled and unchecked right to exhibit video films and programmes to their customers and guests. The respondents, including law enforcement agencies, resisted the petition, arguing that the petitioners were indulging in illegal activities and exhibiting prohibited films in contravention of laws such as the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979, the Customs Act, 1969, and the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioners possessed an unbridled right to exhibit video films without regulatory oversight and whether the police were competent to act against them. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners could not claim an uncontrolled right to exhibit films and that the police possess the power to prevent illegalities amounting to offences, while clarifying that all actions must be in accordance with law and that no offender should be dealt with outside legal procedures. The petition was accordingly disposed of with observations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether hotel owners have an uncontrolled and unregulated right to exhibit video films to their customers on their business premises?
  • Is the police competent to take action against the exhibition of video films that amount to cognizable offences?
  • Can a general writ be issued to restrain law enforcement agencies from interfering with business activities alleged to be in violation of penal laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Habib vs Sher Ali1989 SCMR 1329(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-25
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionco-sharersale of landpetitions dismissed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a pre-emption suit. The core legal question is whether the petitioner could claim a superior right of pre-emption to the entire tract of land sold based on his relationship with his vendor father, who was one of the co-sellers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner was only entitled to pre-empt to the extent of his father's specific share in the property sold, as concurrently ruled by the Additional District Judge and the High Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed as being without merit. The key principle laid down is that a pre-emptor claiming through a vendor co-sharer can only succeed to the extent of that specific vendor's share in the sold property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emptor claim a superior right of pre-emption over the entire property sold based solely on his relationship with one of the co-vendors?
  • To what extent can a pre-emptor succeed in a pre-emption suit founded on a relationship with a co-vendor father?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ghaus vs The Chief Engineer, WAPDA, Faisalabad Region, Faisalabad and another1989 SCMR 1139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-17
  civil servantsuspension periodfull payhonourable acquittalservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Service Tribunal dismissing his appeal regarding the denial of full pay for the period of his suspension. The petitioner had been subjected to an anti-corruption raid, convicted by the trial court, but subsequently acquitted on appeal. Following his acquittal, the competent authority refused to grant him full pay for the suspension period on the ground that the acquittal was not honourable, a view upheld by the Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to full pay for the suspension period based on his acquittal and the applicable rules. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal's appraisal of the evidence and its conclusion that the acquittal was not honourable did not raise any question of law warranting interference. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, laying down that factual appraisals regarding the nature of an acquittal by the Service Tribunal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 will not be interfered with unless a substantial question of law arises.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant entitled to full pay for the period of suspension upon acquittal when the competent authority determines the acquittal was not honourable?
  • Does the appraisal of material and evidence by the Service Tribunal regarding the nature of an acquittal raise a question of law under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Fatimah vs Muhammad Sharif1989 SCMR 1137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-30
  leave to appealadditional evidencecivil revisionsuit for possessionproperty boundariesappellate stage
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against the dismissal of her civil revision by the High Court, which upheld concurrent judgments and decrees for possession of the suit house passed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. The core legal question concerns the identification and boundaries of the properties in dispute, as well as the propriety of the lower appellate court's refusal to permit additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not be granted the concession of additional evidence at the appellate stage, finding no merit in the contention. Consequently, the Court ruled that the concurrent findings regarding the identity of the property were justified, and the petition for leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts are not bound to grant additional evidence unless statutory thresholds are met, and findings of fact regarding property boundaries based on evidence will not be lightly disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether additional evidence can be allowed at the appellate stage under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the identification and boundaries of a suit property be interfered with when the lower courts properly evaluated the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid and another vs Ghulam Muhammad and others1989 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-02
  civil revisionleave to appealimpleadment of legal representativesprocedural dismissallimitation periodsuit for possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by defendants against the dismissal of their civil revision. The underlying dispute involves a suit for possession which was decreed in favor of the plaintiffs. The petitioners had filed an appeal against the decree but inadvertently impleaded a deceased respondent, despite the legal representatives of the deceased having already been brought on record in the lower court. The petitioners' subsequent request to correct the record of the appeal was denied, leading to the dismissal of their appeal and the subsequent dismissal of their civil revision. The core legal question is whether an appeal can be dismissed on the grounds of failing to implead necessary parties or being time-barred when the legal representatives were already on record. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the issues raised regarding the procedural dismissal of the appeal require further examination by the Court. The decision establishes that procedural errors in impleading parties, particularly when legal representatives are already known to the court, warrant a substantive review rather than summary dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be dismissed for failure to implead necessary parties when their legal representatives are already on record?
  • Whether an appeal can be dismissed as time-barred due to a mistake in impleading a deceased respondent?
  • Does the failure to correctly implead a party in an appeal warrant the dismissal of the entire appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Dastgir vs Bagh Ali1989 SCMR 2015 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-29
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionpending suitscutoff dateShariat Appellate Benchleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal challenge Lahore High Court judgments that dismissed pre-emption suits based on the ruling in Said Kamal Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1986 SC 360). The petitioners, who had instituted their suits prior to the announcement of the Said Kamal Shah judgment, argued that the declarations therein were inapplicable to their pending cases and that they were entitled to decrees after the cutoff date of 31-7-1986. The core legal question was whether pre-emption suits filed before the Said Kamal Shah decision could proceed to a decree after the specified cutoff date. The Supreme Court, relying on its precedent in Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287), held that while decrees passed before 31-7-1986 remained effective, no fresh decrees could be granted in pending suits after that date because the underlying laws ceased to have effect. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the suits, establishing that pending pre-emption proceedings without a decree by the cutoff date could not culminate in a fresh decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a fresh decree be passed in a pre-emption suit after 31-7-1986 if the suit was instituted before the decision in Said Kamal Shah's case?
  • Do pre-emption decrees passed before 31-7-1986 remain effective despite the ruling in Said Kamal Shah's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Dastgir Khan and another vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-05
  land allotmentforgeryrevenue recordconstitutional jurisdictionfunctus officioevacuee propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the refusal of Revenue Authorities to incorporate an alleged land allotment into the annual revenue record, characterizing the underlying entitlement certificate as a forgery. The core legal question is whether the High Court erred in its constitutional jurisdiction by reversing a finding of fact regarding the validity of an allotment made in 1960, and whether the Board of Revenue correctly determined that authorities were functus officio due to the transfer of the land to the Health Department. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the petitioners' contentions regarding the validity of the entitlement certificate and the legality of the 1960 allotment required fuller examination. The Court held that the matter warrants a deeper review of the evidentiary basis for the allotment and the legal implications of the subsequent acquisition proceedings. The key principle established is that where factual findings regarding land allotments are based on secondary evidence due to the unavailability of primary records, such findings require careful scrutiny before being overturned in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court reverse a finding of fact made by the Additional Commissioner Revenue while exercising constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the unavailability of primary records like the RL-II justify reliance on secondary evidence to prove a land allotment?
  • Does the transfer of land to a government department render Revenue Authorities functus officio regarding prior allotment claims?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Dastgir and 3 others vs Jamal Din and 3 others1989 SCMR 1766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-27
  civil revisionalienation of propertyfindings of factleave to appealsuit for declarationforged transfer deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which had accepted a civil revision filed by the respondents. The underlying dispute originated from a suit for declaration filed by the respondents, who challenged the validity of an alienation of property made by their predecessor-in-interest, one Naiki, in favour of the petitioners, alleging the transfer deed was fake and forged. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, finding that the predecessor-in-interest had died during the partition disturbances long before the alleged execution of the transfer deed. Although the petitioners' appeal was initially successful, the High Court subsequently restored the trial court's decree upon revision. The Supreme Court heard arguments from both sides and determined that the controversy regarding the genuineness of the alienation was a matter of fact that had already been concluded by the lower courts. Finding the impugned findings of fact to be unexceptionable, the Supreme Court refused the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the case was not a fit matter for further appellate review.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a civil revision?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when the controversy rests solely on findings of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ahmad vs Sheikh and 5 others1989 SCMR 1404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-03
  specific performanceexecution of decreelimitationleave to appealagreement for sale
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale of property, which was decreed by the trial Court on 25-11-1961 and upheld in appeal on 22-6-1962. A subsequent revision petition filed by the respondents abated on 21-10-1967. Approximately five years later, on 31-7-1972, the petitioner applied for permission to deposit the purchase price, but the trial Court dismissed the application on the ground of limitation. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's subsequent revision petition, leading to a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerns whether the execution of a decree can be denied on the ground of limitation when the trial Court failed to prescribe a specific period for the judgment-debtor to fulfill obligations. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this question, directing security for costs and the continuation of the status quo.

  Questions settled

  • Whether execution of a decree could be denied to the petitioner on the ground of limitation when the trial Court had not prescribed the period within which the judgment-debtor was required to fulfil the obligations created thereunder?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ahmad vs Member, Board of Revenue and 2 others1989 PLD Supreme Court 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-21
  Lambardari appointmentwrit jurisdictionBoard of Revenueadministrative lawcustomary lawjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition challenging the appointment of a Lambardar, a decision previously finalized by the Board of Revenue. The core legal question was whether a writ petition is maintainable to challenge the appointment of a Lambardar, given established precedents. The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable, consistent with a long line of established case law affirming that such administrative appointments in Lambardari cases are not subject to judicial review under writ jurisdiction. The Court refused leave to appeal, finding no justification for interference. However, the Court observed that while the appointment process remains outside the scope of writ jurisdiction, it is appropriate for the Board of Revenue and relevant authorities to remove remnants of customary law considerations from their rules and legal instruments, ensuring they align with modern legal standards, particularly those regarding Shariat-based principles.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable against an order of the Board of Revenue regarding the appointment of a Lambardar?
  • Should considerations of customary law be removed from the rules and legal instruments governing the appointment of a Lambardar?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs Ajmal Shah and others1989 SCMR 1124(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-10
  leave to appealcivil revisionspecial oathauthority of counselpower of attorneyproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether a counsel and a co-petitioner possess the authority to make a binding offer to resolve a property dispute on special oath, which subsequently led to the dismissal of the revision. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's counsel, duly appointed via power of attorney, and the co-petitioner—who shared no conflict of interest—acted competently and without any motive against the petitioner's interests, rendering the subsequent challenge an afterthought. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a counsel has the authority to make a binding offer for the disposal of a civil revision on a special oath on behalf of the client?
  • Can a co-petitioner make an offer to resolve a property dispute on oath that binds another petitioner sharing no conflict of interest?
  • Whether the dismissal of a civil revision based on an accepted offer of a special oath can be successfully challenged as unauthorized?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas alias Boota vs Sanaullah and others1989 SCMR 1832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-16
  leave to appealmurderreduction of sentencemotiveocular testimonypre-concerted attackappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed by both the convicts and the complainant party against a judgment of the High Court, which had maintained the convictions of the respondents under sections 302 and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while setting aside convictions under sections 307 and 324, and reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The core legal question involved the assessment of ocular testimony, the existence of motive stemming from family honor due to an abduction, and the appropriateness of the sentence reduction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts accepting the natural and trustworthy ocular testimony were unexceptionable, and further held that the existence of a motive relating to family honor justified the High Court's exercise of discretion in reducing the sentence of death to imprisonment for life. Consequently, both petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed, affirming the convictions and sentences imposed by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent factual findings based on ocular testimony accepted by both the trial court and the High Court?
  • Does a motive based on the rehabilitation of family honor constitute a mitigating circumstance justifying the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether the appellate court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to confirm the death penalty under the circumstances of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• General Investment Ltd. vs Dubai Bank Limited1989 SCMR 724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-30
  banking recoverymortgage securityadequacy of securitycommercialization of plotremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from an order of the Sind High Court directing the appellant to furnish security and deposit cash in a banking recovery matter. The respondent bank had filed a suit for recovery under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, which was decreed. Upon appeal, the High Court previously remanded the case to determine the adequacy of existing mortgage security and assess any shortfall pursuant to section 12(5) of the Ordinance. On remand, the High Court ordered a fresh security of a lump sum without determining the actual value of the already mortgaged property or calculating any shortfall, while a controversy also arose regarding whether the Karachi Development Authority or the Karachi Municipal Corporation was the competent authority for commercializing the plot. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to follow the remand directions by ordering fresh security without determining the actual value of the mortgaged property and the shortfall. The appeal was allowed, the High Court order was set aside, and the case was remanded for a proper determination of the shortfall and the commercialization question.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can order fresh security without determining the actual value of the existing mortgaged property and calculating any shortfall under section 12(5) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Which authority is competent for the conversion of a plot from residential to commercial purposes between the Karachi Development Authority and the Karachi Municipal Corporation?
  Read full judgment →
• Gawa and 3 others vs The State and another1989 SCMR 1257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-12
  acquittalremand of caseSection 265-K Cr.P.C.prosecution evidencemurder trialspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside an order of acquittal passed by an Additional Sessions Judge under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in remanding the case for trial after finding that the trial court had acted prematurely in acquitting the accused due to the prosecution's failure to produce evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the trial court failed to consider the practical difficulties faced by the prosecution, specifically that the complainant was incarcerated as an undertrial prisoner at the time. The Court held that the High Court correctly determined there was no material on record to support the conclusion that witnesses were deliberately avoiding the court. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed that the High Court's decision to remand the case for a proper trial was the only legal and appropriate course of action, refusing leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court acquit an accused under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without sufficient evidence that witnesses were deliberately avoiding the court?
  • Is a High Court justified in setting aside an acquittal and remanding a murder case if the trial court failed to consider the prosecution's practical difficulties in producing witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Formica Corporation vs Pakistan Formica Ltd.1989 SCMR 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-22
  trademark infringementtemporary injunctionpassing offpublici jurisbalance of conveniencetrading style
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind refusing to grant a temporary injunction in a trademark infringement and passing-off matter. The appellant, an American company, claimed exclusive rights to the registered trademark 'Formica' for laminated plastics and alleged that the respondent company, 'Pakistan Formica Limited', was unfairly trading on its goodwill. The core legal question centered on whether the respondent's adoption of 'Formica' in its trading style infringed the appellant's trademark and was likely to deceive consumers, thereby warranting a temporary injunction. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to establish a strong prima facie case of actual or likely deception, noting that the word 'Formica' was used descriptively for laminated sheets and that the balance of convenience did not favor granting the injunction. The Court laid down that to succeed in a trademark infringement action, the plaintiff must prove trading with the mark, substantial goodwill in Pakistan, and that the defendant's use of an identical or resembling mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion in the course of trade.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the use of a registered trademark in a corporate trading style constitutes infringement under the Trade Marks Act, 1940?
  • Does a plaintiff seeking a temporary injunction in a trademark matter need to prove that the defendant's use of the mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion?
  • What are the essential elements a plaintiff must establish to enforce a right to a trademark against an alleged infringer?
  • When does the factor of balance of convenience recede into the background in applications for temporary injunctions in intellectual property disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• Ferozeuddin vs Government of the Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-15
  service tribunalseniority disputepast and closed transactionabatement of proceedingsreview jurisdictiondefunct tribunalfinality of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a Punjab Service Tribunal order, which had dismissed his appeal regarding seniority disputes. The petitioner had previously litigated these seniority issues before a defunct-Civil Services Tribunal and subsequently filed a writ petition in the High Court. Following the enactment of the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974, the petitioner sought to revive the matter before the Service Tribunal, claiming abatement of the pending writ petition. The Service Tribunal initially admitted the appeal but ultimately dismissed it, ruling that the defunct-Tribunal's decisions were protected and final, and that the Service Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to sit in appeal over them. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that matters adjudicated by the defunct-Civil Services Appellate Tribunal prior to the 1974 Act constituted past and closed transactions that could not be re-agitated. The Court further affirmed that the Service Tribunal lacks the inherent power to review its own orders. The key principle established is that the finality of decisions rendered by defunct tribunals under previous ordinances remains undisturbed by the establishment of new service tribunals under the 1974 Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Service Tribunal possess the inherent power to review its own orders?
  • Can a matter decided by the defunct-Civil Services Appellate Tribunal be re-agitated before the Service Tribunal established under the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974?
  • Does the abatement provision in Section 8 of the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974, allow for the revival of seniority disputes already adjudicated by a defunct tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan vs Saudad Khan and others1989 SCMR 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-20
  service lawPolice Groupcadre strengthdepartmental remedyFederal Service Tribunalseniority listleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which directed the induction of the respondent into the Police Group with effect from 21-11-1979. The respondent, originally a provincial police officer, sought inclusion in the Police Group seniority list, arguing that the Federal Government had incorrectly calculated the cadre strength by excluding Frontier Constabulary posts. The Federal Service Tribunal accepted this argument, relying on a 1985 notification to presume these posts were part of the N.-W.F.P. cadre, and consequently backdated the respondent's induction. The Federation of Pakistan challenged this, contending that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the induction issue because the respondent had not exhausted departmental remedies regarding the specific decision made while the appeal was pending. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that a 1986 corrigendum corrected the initial erroneous inclusion of Frontier Constabulary posts under the N.-W.F.P. cadre. The Supreme Court found that the legal points raised regarding the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction and the effect of the corrigendum warranted further examination, and thus granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal adjudicate a matter that was not the subject of a departmental appeal as required by the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Does the inclusion of posts in a cadre list by a notification create a vested right if a subsequent corrigendum corrects the allocation?
  • Is a Service Tribunal empowered to interfere with a departmental decision that was made while an appeal was pending, without a fresh departmental remedy being exhausted?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan vs Muhammad Az1m Khan and others1989 SCMR 1271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-14
  service appeallimitationcondonation of delaydepartmental representationtermination of servicecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Federal Government under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 examines whether the Service Tribunal erred in treating the respondent's service appeal as within time. The respondent's services as an Assistant Superintendent of Police were terminated on 15 July 1979 under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. He filed a departmental representation on 8 September 1979, which was rejected by the Establishment Division on 22 October 1979. He subsequently filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal on 26 January 1980. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was barred by limitation under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, as it was filed beyond 120 days from the date of the representation or 30 days from its disposal, and that an erroneous prior view of the law taken by the Tribunal does not constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay. The appeal is accepted, the Tribunal's judgment is set aside, and the service appeal is dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed before the Service Tribunal beyond 120 days of filing a departmental representation or 30 days of its rejection is barred by limitation?
  • Can a previous erroneous view of the law taken by a Service Tribunal serve as a sufficient ground for the condonation of delay?
  • Does a departmental representation addressed improperly to the Establishment Secretary instead of the President constitute substantial compliance when endorsed to the President?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan vs Aitzaz Ahsan and anothers1989 PLD Supreme Court 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-12
  election lawsvoter identificationconstitutional interpretationbogus votinginterim reliefright to voteultra vireselectoral integrity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment which held that Ordinances requiring the production of a National Identity Card as a condition for receiving a ballot paper contravened Article 51(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The core legal question was whether such a requirement imposed an unconstitutional clog on the entitlement of a qualified voter to cast their vote. The High Court had ruled that voters could establish identity through alternative means. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. By a majority, the Court suspended the operation of the High Court’s judgment pending the final decision. The Court held that, as a principle of constitutional interpretation, a law should maintain its normal operation until finally declared ultra vires. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the balance of convenience favored the petitioner, as the identity card requirement served to prevent bogus voting and ensured the integrity of the election process, thereby upholding the constitutional mandate that elections be conducted honestly, justly, and fairly.

  Questions settled

  • Does a requirement to produce a National Identity Card to receive a ballot paper constitute an unconstitutional clog on the right to vote under Article 51(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Should the operation of a High Court judgment be suspended pending an appeal when the balance of convenience favors the petitioner in an election context?
  • Can sub-constitutional legislation mandate the production of an identity card as the sole proof of identity for voters?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan Haji Muhammad Saifullah vs Muhammad Akram Shaikh Federation of Pakistan1989 PLD Supreme Court 689 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-06
  judicial biasrecusal of judgesdoctrine of necessitynemo iudex in causa suaconstitutional interpretationreview petitionappointment of judges
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed by the Federation of Pakistan seeking the recusal of three Supreme Court judges from a review bench, alleging they were "judges in their own cause" because their appointments occurred during a period whose legality was under challenge. The core legal question was whether judges are disqualified from hearing a case when their own appointments might be affected by the outcome of the interpretation of a previous judgment. The Court rejected the application, holding that the principle of "no man shall be a judge in his own cause" is not attracted when the challenge concerns the legitimacy of the entire legal order or governmental acts. The Court affirmed that judges are the sole arbiters of their own impartiality and that the doctrine of necessity prevents the disqualification of judges when no other competent tribunal exists. The key principle laid down is that while the rule against bias is fundamental, it does not apply to general challenges against the legal order, and speculative or contingent interests do not disqualify a judge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle that 'no man shall be a judge in his own cause' apply to judges whose appointments are questioned during a general challenge to the legal order?
  • Can a party to a litigation claim a right to be tried by a particular judge or judges of their choice?
  • Is a judge disqualified from hearing a case if they have a contingent or speculative interest in the outcome?
  • Does the doctrine of necessity allow a judge to hear a case despite allegations of bias?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and others vs Rais Khan1989 SCMR 935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-22
  service tribunalad hoc appointmentacting charge basisregular promotionsenioritylength of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, whereby the respondent's appeal regarding his promotion from Grade B-17 to Grade B-18 was allowed, treating it as a regular promotion rather than on an acting charge basis. The core legal question concerns whether ad hoc or temporary service rendered in Grade B-17 can be counted towards length of service for regular promotion to Grade B-18 and whether such promotion made in the presence of required experience constitutes a regular promotion. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that ad hoc or temporary appointments do not confer rights to seniority or count towards length of service for promotion, relying on established precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ad hoc or temporary service counts towards length of service for regular promotion to a higher grade?
  • Does an ad hoc appointment confer any right to seniority under the civil service laws?
  • When can an appointment to a higher grade be deemed to have been made on a regular basis rather than on an acting charge basis?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and others vs Haji Muhammad Saifullah Khan and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-05
  dissolution of assemblyjudicial reviewdiscretionary powerconstitutional interpretationwrit jurisdictioncaretaker governmentseparation of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federation of Pakistan appealed against a High Court decision declaring the dissolution of the National and Provincial Assemblies unconstitutional. The core legal question was whether the President’s power to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution is absolute and immune from judicial review, or if it is subject to scrutiny. The Supreme Court held that the President’s discretion is not absolute but qualified, requiring an objective formation of opinion based on facts that the constitutional machinery has broken down. The Court found the grounds cited for dissolution were extraneous and lacked the necessary nexus to the constitutional preconditions. Consequently, the dissolution orders were declared unsustainable in law. However, in exercising its discretionary writ jurisdiction, the Court declined to restore the Assemblies, prioritizing the national interest in holding the scheduled general elections to avoid further political chaos. The judgment established that while the President possesses discretionary power, such power is subject to judicial review to ensure it is exercised reasonably, fairly, and within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, preventing arbitrary or whimsical exercise of authority.

  Questions settled

  • Is the President's power to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution absolute and immune from judicial review?
  • Must the President's opinion regarding the breakdown of the constitutional machinery be based on objective facts?
  • Can a court decline to grant relief even after finding an executive action unconstitutional?
  • Does the absence of a Prime Minister in a caretaker cabinet violate the constitutional requirement for a cabinet?
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• Federation of Pakistan and Other vs Haji Muhammad Saifullah Khan and OtherK.L.R 1989 Civil Cases -138, K.L.R 1989 Civil Cases 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  dissolution of assemblyjudicial reviewdiscretionary powerconstitutional interpretationwrit jurisdictioncaretaker cabinetnexus testpolitical question doctrine
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding the dissolution of the National and Provincial Assemblies by the President and Governors in May 1988. The core legal question was whether the President’s power to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution is absolute and immune from judicial scrutiny, or whether it is subject to review. The Court held that the President’s discretion is not absolute; it must be based on objective facts and have a clear nexus with the constitutional pre-conditions—specifically, that the government cannot function in accordance with the Constitution. The Court found the grounds provided for dissolution were vague, extraneous, and lacked the required nexus, rendering the dissolution order unsustainable in law. However, despite finding the dissolution unconstitutional, the Court declined to grant the relief of restoring the assemblies. It reasoned that the writ jurisdiction is discretionary, and in the interest of the nation—which was already preparing for general elections—restoring the assemblies would cause chaos. The principle established is that while executive discretion is subject to judicial review, the grant of relief remains discretionary based on the collective good.

  Questions settled

  • Is the President's power to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan subject to judicial review?
  • Must the grounds for the dissolution of the National Assembly under Article 58(2)(b) have an objective nexus with the constitutional pre-conditions?
  • Can a court decline to grant relief in a writ petition even after finding the impugned executive action to be unconstitutional?
  • Does the Constitution of Pakistan require the appointment of a Prime Minister to head a caretaker cabinet following the dissolution of the National Assembly?
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• Federal Land Commissioner and others vs Muhammad Aslam Khan and others1989 SCMR 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-16
  suo motu revisionland reformsrevisional jurisdictionownership rightspast and closed transactions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises two civil appeals arising from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which accepted a writ petition challenging a notice issued by the Federal Land Commission for suo motu revision under paragraph 29 of Martial Law Regulation 115. The core legal question was whether the Federal Land Commission possessed the jurisdiction under paragraph 29 of Martial Law Regulation 115 (as amended) to reopen and revise ownership rights and title settlements that had been granted and recognized by the Government itself rather than by a Commission or authority appointed under the land reforms regulations, and which had been affirmed through civil court litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that paragraph 29 as amended limits revisional powers exclusively to orders passed by a Commission or authority appointed under Martial Law Regulation 115 or the repealed Martial Law Regulation 64. Since the respondents' recognition as owners originated from an executive order of the Government of West Pakistan and was subsequently upheld by civil courts, the Federal Land Commission lacked the authority to invoke suo motu revisional jurisdiction to unsettle their title.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Land Commission can invoke suo motu revisional jurisdiction under paragraph 29 of Martial Law Regulation 115 against an order passed directly by the Government rather than a Commission or authority?
  • Does paragraph 29 of Martial Law Regulation 115 extend to revise orders or decisions made under the repealed Martial Law Regulation 64 by authorities other than those specifically appointed under the regulations?
  • Whether vested rights of ownership affirmed through civil court litigation can be reopened through executive or revisional proceedings under land reform regulations?
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• Federal Land Commission and others vs S. Ghulam Nabi Shah and others1989 SCMR 210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-08
  land reformsconstitutional jurisdictionsuo motu revisionmisreading of evidencegift of landrevenue recordsconfiscatory legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil appeals arising from the Federal Land Commission's exercise of suo motu revisional powers under the Land Reforms Regulation 1972. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could interfere with the Federal Land Commission's findings of fact regarding the validity of land gifts made by the respondents. The Federal Land Commission had declared these gifts void, alleging manipulation of revenue records and anti-dating. The High Court set aside these orders, finding they were based on misreading of evidence, surmises, and conjectures. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the High Court correctly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that where an administrative authority's findings are based on a misreading of evidence or are otherwise perverse, the High Court is empowered to intervene. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the Land Reforms Regulation, being confiscatory in nature, allows for judicial scrutiny of facts in constitutional jurisdiction to ensure that findings of fact by the revising authority are not arbitrary or unsupported by the material on record.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact made by the Federal Land Commission in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the Federal Land Commission have the authority to inquire into the bona fides of a gift made in favour of an heir under the Land Reforms Regulation 1972?
  • Is the High Court empowered to set aside orders of a revising authority that are based on a misreading of evidence or conjectures?
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• Federal Government of Pakistan and others vs Muhammad Sarwar1989 PLD Supreme Court 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-05
  smugglingcustoms adjudicationdouble jeopardycriminal acquittalvested rightsGeneral Clauses Actconfiscation of goods
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the interplay between customs adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution for smuggling under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether an acquittal by a Special Judge (Customs) regarding smuggled goods necessitates the nullification of prior administrative confiscation orders, particularly considering the application of the now-repealed Section 179-A of the Customs Act, 1969. The Supreme Court held that Section 179-A was enacted to prevent double jeopardy by making adjudication orders subject to the findings of the Special Judge. Although Section 179-A was subsequently repealed, the Court ruled that under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the respondent acquired a vested right to the benefit of the acquittal once the state’s appeals against the acquittals were withdrawn. Consequently, the adjudication orders, which failed to account for the finality of the criminal acquittals, were rightly declared void. The principle established is that where a statute provides for the subordination of administrative adjudication to criminal judicial findings, the repeal of that statute does not extinguish vested rights to the benefit of final acquittals.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeal of Section 179-A of the Customs Act, 1969, extinguish a vested right to the benefit of an acquittal obtained while the section was in force?
  • Are administrative adjudication orders under the Customs Act, 1969, void if they fail to conform to a final acquittal order passed by a Special Judge (Customs)?
  • Does the withdrawal of an appeal against an acquittal by the state render the acquittal final for the purposes of adjudication proceedings?
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• Fazalurrehman vs Mst. Sosan Jan and others1989 SCMR 651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-29
  pre-emptionNikahnamadowertransfer of propertybona fide purchasercompulsory registrationMuslim Family Laws Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a pre-emption suit where leave was granted to examine whether a Nikahnama is admissible as an instrument of transfer of property without compulsory registration, and whether the appellant-vendee was entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court held that the Nikahnama serves as a contemporaneous record of past events and marriage solemnization rather than a compulsorily registerable instrument of transfer, and that the Nikahnama is admissible in evidence. Furthermore, the courts denied protection under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, finding that the appellant failed to conduct a diligent inquiry by neglecting to inspect the Nikahnama regarding the recent transfer of land in lieu of dower. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a Nikahnama is not an instrument of transfer requiring registration and that a vendee must make thorough inquiries, including verifying public records such as the Nikahnama, to claim bona fide protection.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Nikahnama prepared under section 5 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 compulsorily registerable where it mentions the alienation of property in lieu of dower?
  • Whether a Nikahnama can be considered an instrument or document of transfer of property or merely a record of past events?
  • Can a vendee claim protection as a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 without inspecting the Nikahnama in cases of recent transactions?
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• Fazal Khursheed vs Agha Javed Raza1989 SCMR 957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-21
  rent restrictionevictiondefault in rentlandlord and tenant relationshipSection 13-A noticetransfer of propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which upheld an eviction order against the petitioner for alleged default in rent payment. The petitioner was a tenant of the original landlady and continued depositing rent in court after she sold the property to the respondent. Upon receiving a notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, the petitioner requested proof of the transfer, specifically a copy of the registered sale deed, before acknowledging the respondent as the new landlord. The respondent failed to provide this documentation and instead initiated ejectment proceedings. The Rent Controller and the High Court ordered eviction, deeming the petitioner a defaulter. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the petitioner’s request for proof of title was justified. Since the petitioner consistently deposited rent in court, the failure of the respondent to substantiate his status as the new landlord meant the petitioner’s non-payment to the respondent did not constitute default. The eviction order was suspended pending the final appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a tenant justified in withholding rent payment to a new landlord until proof of property transfer is provided?
  • Does a tenant's failure to pay rent directly to a new landlord constitute default when the tenant has requested proof of ownership?
  • Can a landlord initiate ejectment proceedings for default when they have failed to respond to a tenant's request for verification of title?
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