Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Rasab Versus State1993 SCMR 1323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-15
  leave to appealcriminal appealmurdercorroborationmotiveeyewitness testimonycommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency and legality of the corroborative evidence relied upon by the High Court to sustain the conviction of the petitioner Rasab, particularly where the trial court found no personal motive attributable to him and the High Court excluded the testimony of the primary eyewitness. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether required corroboration was legally forthcoming on the record against the convict Rasab, while refusing the complainant's petition seeking enhanced relief against the accused. The key principle laid down is that where an eyewitness account requires corroboration due to enmity, a generalized motive not linked to a specific accused cannot serve as valid corroboration against that individual.

  Questions settled

  • Can a general motive lacking personal connection to an accused serve as valid corroboration for an eyewitness account?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the High Court relies on tainted eyewitness testimony and questionable corroborative pieces of evidence?
  • Is the exclusion of an eyewitness's presence at the crime scene sufficient to necessitate independent corroboration for remaining testimony?
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• Musa Khan Versus Abdul Haque1993 SCMR 1304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Companies II, Karachi Versus S. Sultan Ali Jeoffrey1993 SCMR 1267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-25
  cash rewardtax evasioninformer schemesales tax assessmentincome tax losscentral board of revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two connected appeals arising from a dispute over the payment of a cash reward to an informer under the Cash Reward to Informer Scheme introduced by the Central Board of Revenue. Respondent No.1 supplied specific information regarding the evasion of central excise duty, sales tax, and income tax by an industrial company. While the tax authorities granted a reward for excise duty, they initially declined rewards for sales tax and income tax. The High Court of Sindh allowed the respondent's constitutional petition and directed payment for both sales tax and income tax evasions. The Supreme Court heard appeals filed by the tax authorities. The core legal question was whether an informer is entitled to a cash reward under the Scheme where the information leads to the reduction of declared losses rather than the quantification of evaded tax, and whether tax recovery is a prerequisite for the reward. The Supreme Court held that since the company remained in a net loss position despite adjustments, no specific amount of tax sought to be evaded could be quantified, which is a mandatory prerequisite for calculating rewards under the Scheme; however, recovery of tax is not required. Consequently, the Court allowed the income tax appeal denying the reward, but dismissed the sales tax and excise duty appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an informer is entitled to a cash reward under the Cash Reward to Informer Scheme when the information leads to a reduction of declared losses but no tax is assessed or quantified?
  • Does the Cash Reward to Informer Scheme make the actual recovery of evaded tax a mandatory condition for paying the reward to an informer?
  • What constitutes tax evasion as distinguished from tax avoidance under taxation law?
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• Habib Bank Ltd. Versus Mussadiq Hussain1993 SCMR 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-29Read full judgment →
• Mukhi Chatromal Versus Khubchand1993 SCMR 1113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-23
  court-feelimitationIntra-Court Appealdeficient court-feecondonation of delaycivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from an Intra-Court Appeal dismissed by the High Court due to delay in supplying the deficient court-fee, treated as a matter of discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question involved the effect of delay in paying the court-fee and whether an appeal could be dismissed on limitation and court-fee grounds when the court failed to specify the exact date and amount for making up the deficiency. The Supreme Court held that where the court fails to specify the exact date and amount of deficient court-fee to be deposited, no penal action such as dismissal of the appeal can be taken against the appellants on the ground of delayed payment or limitation. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the impugned judgment set aside, and the case remanded for a decision on merits, affirming the principle that the defect stands cured from the date the appeal was originally filed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal can be dismissed for deficient court-fee when the court failed to specify the exact amount and date for deposit?
  • Does the payment of deficient court-fee cure the defect from the date the appeal was originally filed?
  • Can penal action be taken against an appellant for delayed court-fee when the court did not fix a specific date or amount for compliance?
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• Aligarh Muslim University Old Boys' Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. Versus Muhammad Hisamuddin Ansari1993 SCMR 1062 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-16
  constitutional petitionevacuee landallotment of landpending claimcooperative housing societyland utilizationsettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the court arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh which directed the official authorities to satisfy the land claim of respondent No. 1 out of evacuee land comprised in Survey No. 21 of Deh Bitti Amri. The respondent had originally been allotted garden land in Larkana, which was subsequently cancelled to transfer the property to the municipality, leading to decades of litigation and efforts by the respondent to obtain alternate land in Karachi. The appellant cooperative housing society challenged the allotment, claiming the land was part of its own allotted area under Scheme No. 33. The core legal questions centered on the availability of the disputed land, the validity of the respondent's pending claim under the repealed evacuee laws, and the propriety of the High Court's direction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent's claim was valid and pending, and that the appellant society's allotment exceeded permissible limits under the applicable statement of conditions, though protecting the appellant's broader holdings to prevent prejudice to its members.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unsettled claim for garden land under repealed evacuee laws qualifies as a pending case to be settled by the Board of Revenue?
  • Whether a housing society can claim additional land allotment beyond the maximum unit limits prescribed under the statement of conditions?
  • Does non-implementation of a Provincial Government's decision regarding land allotment without cogent reason entitle a claimant to invoke constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Allah Bachayo Versus State1993 SCMR 1058 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-22
  dacoitylife imprisonmentHarabahHaddsentencingcriminal appealwrongful restraintstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the convictions for dacoity and wrongful restraint. The core legal questions were whether the offence of Harabah was established against the appellants and whether the sentence of life imprisonment for dacoity under Section 395, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 remained legally permissible following the 1980 amendments. The Supreme Court held that the conviction for Harabah could not be sustained because the prosecution failed to produce the requisite number of witnesses mandated by the relevant Ordinance. Regarding the sentencing, the Court clarified that the Criminal Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980, while introducing a minimum sentence of four years for dacoity, did not remove the punishment of life imprisonment. Therefore, the trial court acted within its legal authority in imposing life imprisonment. The Court affirmed that the legislative amendments merely established a sentencing floor rather than capping the maximum penalty at ten years. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the convictions and sentences imposed by the lower courts were upheld, as the evidence sufficiently established the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 1980 amendment to Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 abolish the punishment of life imprisonment for dacoity?
  • Is the offence of Harabah liable to Hadd proved when the required number of witnesses fail to support the prosecution's case at trial?
  • What is the effect of the Criminal Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 on the sentencing range for dacoity under Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• National Bank of Pakistan Versus Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal1993 SCMR 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-15Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of Punjab, Irrigation and Power Department, Lahore Versus Abdul Majid Mirza Abid Hassan Minto, Advocate Supreme Court (absent) and Sh. Masud Akhtar1993 SCMR 1010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-24
  service tribunalpromotion quotaseniorityofficiating promotioncivil servicepublic service commission approval
  Summary & questions settled

  These eight appeals by special leave arise from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding the promotion and seniority of diploma-holder Overseers who were promoted on an officiating basis as Sub-Divisional Officers in the Irrigation Branch. The core legal question is whether these officiating promotees were entitled to seniority and permanent absorption in Class-II service and further promotion to Class-I service, regardless of prescribed promotion quotas and Public Service Commission approval. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in declaring the respondents as appointed on a permanent basis without first determining whether their promotions fell within the applicable 20% quota under the West Pakistan Irrigation Engineering Service (Class-II) Rules, 1967, and without verifying the requisite approval of the Public Service Commission. The appeals were accordingly accepted, the Tribunal's judgment was set aside, and the cases were remanded for proper determination of available vacancies and quotas.

  Questions settled

  • Whether officiating promotees can claim seniority from the date of continuous officiation without establishing that their promotions fall within the prescribed service quota?
  • Does the mere length of service as an officiating Sub-Divisional Officer convert an appointment into a substantive or permanent basis under the service rules?
  • Can a Service Tribunal declare employees as appointed on a permanent basis without determining the available vacancies under the applicable rules?
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• State Versus Waqar Ahmad1992 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-28
  retracted confessionjudicial confessionmurdercorroborationcriminal appealacquittalcircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the High Court which had acquitted the respondent of charges involving the murder of a young girl. The core legal questions concerned the evidentiary value and reliability of a retracted judicial confession, the necessity of independent corroboration, and whether the circumstantial evidence sufficiently connected the accused to the crime. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in discarding the retracted confession and corroborative recoveries. It established that a retracted judicial confession, once proven to be voluntary and true in its details, can form the basis of a conviction when supported by attending circumstances and material corroboration such as matching blood-stains, recovery of the weapon, and medical evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal, restored the conviction recorded by the trial court, and commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life in view of intervening general amnesty.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession be used as the basis for a criminal conviction?
  • Whether independent corroboration is strictly mandatory as a rule of law for a retracted confession, or merely a matter of prudence?
  • Does the High Court's misreading of material evidence justify setting aside an order of acquittal?
  • Whether the uncorroborated delay in retracting a judicial confession renders the retraction an afterthought?
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• Sardar Versus Nehmat Bi1992 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-14
  Muslim Personal Lawlimited estatecustomary lawdevolution of propertypredeceased daughterinheritancesuccession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a dispute over the inheritance of agricultural land following the termination of a limited estate held by a Muslim female under customary law. The core legal question is whether, upon the termination of a life estate under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, the devolution of property from the last full owner includes the right of inheritance for children of a predeceased daughter pursuant to Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Supreme Court held that upon the termination of the life estate, succession opens with reference to the last full owner, and the term Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) is a comprehensive expression that encompasses the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Consequently, the children of a predeceased daughter are entitled to inherit the share their mother would have received if she were alive. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the judgment of the Lahore High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the term Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) includes the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 for the purpose of devolution of property upon the termination of a life estate?
  • Are the children of a predeceased daughter entitled to inherit a per stirpes share from the estate of the last full owner under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • How does the termination of a limited estate under Section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 affect the opening of succession to the last full owner?
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• Abdul Qayyum Versus Niaz Muhammad , Nemo1992 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-28Read full judgment →
• Khalil-Ur-Rehman Versus Muhammad Younis1992 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptionco-sharerrejection of plaintsuperior right of pre-emptionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave to appeal filed by a pre-emptor whose plaint was rejected due to non-compliance with an order under section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The subsequent appeal and revision before the High Court were also dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned the enforceability and survival of a pre-emption suit where the pre-emptor claimed a superior right as a co-sharer in the Khata, but no decree had yet been passed in his favour. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was hit by the authoritative rule laid down in precedent cases since no decree had been passed. The key principle laid down is that a pre-emption suit based on a right which is no longer sustainable under the applicable law and binding judgments, where no decree has yet been passed, cannot succeed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emption suit abate or fail if no decree has been passed in favour of the pre-emptor and the claim is hit by the rule laid down in Malik Said Kamal Shah's case?
  • Can a pre-emptor maintain a suit founded on a co-sharer right when no decree has been passed by the lower courts?
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• Abdul Qayyum Versus Niaz Muhammad1992 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-18
  Canal and Drainage Actinterim restorationwatercourse disputeDivisional Canal Officerjurisdictionstatutory interpretationcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the dismantling of a watercourse and the subsequent order by the Divisional Canal Officer for its restoration under Section 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873. The core legal question was whether the Divisional Canal Officer could exercise jurisdiction under Section 68-A to order interim restoration of a watercourse in the absence of a pending dispute under Section 68 of the same Act. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that Section 68-A is an ancillary, interim provision that is functionally dependent on the existence of a main dispute under Section 68. Consequently, the pendency of proceedings under Section 68 is a condition precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of the Divisional Canal Officer under Section 68-A. The Court ruled that because no such proceedings were pending, the Divisional Canal Officer’s order was passed without lawful authority and was subject to challenge in a civil court. The principle established is that interim relief under Section 68-A cannot be granted in a vacuum; it must be a step in aid of a main dispute already initiated under Section 68.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Divisional Canal Officer order the interim restoration of a watercourse under Section 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, without a pending dispute under Section 68?
  • Is the pendency of proceedings under Section 68 of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, a condition precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of the Divisional Canal Officer under Section 68-A?
  • Can a civil court entertain a suit challenging an order passed by a Divisional Canal Officer under Section 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, if the officer lacked the necessary jurisdictional prerequisites?
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• Rozi Khan Versus Karim Shah Mian Younus Shah, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Haji Bashir Ahmad, Mian Younus Shah, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Mian Shakirullah Jan, Haji Bashir Ahmad, Abdul Samad Khan, Z. Mahfuz Khan, S. Safdar Hussain, Mian Shakirullah Jan, , Jan Muhammad Khan, Nemo, Mehfooz Khan, K.G. Sabir, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by M. Zahoor Qureshi,1992 SCMR 445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-20
  pre-emptionrepeal of statutepending litigationTalab-i-MuwathibatTalab-i-IshhadTalab-i-KhusumatIslamic Law of Pre-emptionfinal decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This batch of appeals concerns the interpretation of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, specifically regarding the impact of its repeal section (Section 35) on pending litigation initiated under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950. The Court addressed two primary questions: the effect of Section 35 on pending suits and the eligibility criteria for pre-emption under the 1987 Act. The Supreme Court held that the term "final" in Section 35(2) refers to judgments or decrees where the pre-emptor’s suit was successfully decreed by the court rendering it. Consequently, cases where a final decree in favor of the pre-emptor existed before the 1987 Act's enforcement are governed by the 1950 Act. Conversely, pending suits lacking such a decree lapse unless the pre-emptor fulfills the statutory requirements of the 1987 Act, including the essential "Talabs" (demands) stipulated in Section 13. The Court affirmed that the demand of pre-emption is a sine qua non for enforcing the right of pre-emption, and failure to comply extinguishes the right.

  Questions settled

  • What is the impact of Section 35 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 on suits and appeals instituted under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950 that were pending at the time of the 1987 Act's enforcement?
  • What constitutes a 'final' judgment or decree under Section 35(2) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
  • Is the making of demands (Talabs) a mandatory requirement for the enforcement of the right of pre-emption under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
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• Punjab Employees Social Security Institution, Lahore and others Versus Manzoor Hussain Khan and others1992 SCMR 441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-11Read full judgment →
• Abdul Sattar Versus Sardar Begum1992 SCMR 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-21Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Ahmad Versus State1992 SCMR 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-07
  robberymedical evidenceadmissibility of evidenceillegal armseyewitness testimonyoaths actcriminal appealprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges convictions for robbery, attempted murder, and illegal arms possession. The core legal questions concern the admissibility of medical evidence when the examining doctor is not produced, the necessity of proving the lack of a license for arms convictions, and the effect of failing to administer an oath to witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the convictions under sections 394 and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were unsustainable because the medical reports were improperly admitted through a junior clerk without establishing the doctor's unavailability. Similarly, the conviction under the Surrender of Illicit Arms Ordinance 1991 was set aside for lack of evidence regarding the absence of licenses. However, the Court upheld the conviction for robbery under section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, finding the eyewitness testimony credible. The Court established that while failure to administer an oath is a curable irregularity under section 13 of the Oaths Act 1873, the prosecution must strictly prove medical evidence and statutory elements of arms offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Can medical evidence be admitted through a secondary witness if the examining doctor is not produced?
  • Does the failure to administer an oath to a witness vitiate the entire trial?
  • Is a conviction under the Surrender of Illicit Arms Ordinance 1991 sustainable without evidence proving the lack of a license?
  • Can a conviction for robbery be sustained based on eyewitness testimony despite the failure of other charges?
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• Nizam-Ud-Din Versus Ghulam Muhammad1992 SCMR 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi Versus Akbar Ali1992 SCMR 2462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-17
  leave to appealacquittalgrave and sudden provocationchance witnessesrecovery evidenceSection 304-II PPCSection 302 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by Muhammad Shafi against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted co-accused Asghar Ali and converted the conviction of main accused Akbar Ali from Section 302/34 to Section 304-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to five years' rigorous imprisonment based on his own admission under grave and sudden provocation. The High Court had disbelieved the eye-witnesses as chance witnesses, discredited the recovery evidence due to lack of independent locality witnesses, and found the FIR to be recorded after preliminary investigation. The petitioner contended that the ocular, recovery, and medical evidence conclusively proved the guilt of the respondents under Section 302/34 PPC. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were reasonable and grounded in the evidence. The Court reiterated that the mere possibility of forming a different view does not warrant interference with an acquittal order. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere possibility of forming an alternative view of evidence justify interference by the Supreme Court against an acquittal order?
  • Can a conviction be based on the accused's admission under Section 342 Cr.P.C. when the prosecution's ocular and recovery evidence is disbelieved?
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• Habibur Rehman Versus Ali Zafar Siddiqi1992 SCMR 2351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-12
  ejectmentchange of usertenancy agreementrented premisesgodownshoplandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an ejectment order against a tenant for converting a premises described as a "shop" in the tenancy agreement into a "godown". The core legal question was whether, in the absence of an express restrictive covenant in the lease, the use of a premises let as a "shop" for a "godown" constitutes a change of purpose under Section 15(2)(iii)(b) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that the terms "shop" and "godown" are distinct, with the former implying a place for retail business transactions and the latter a place for storage. Consequently, using a premises let as a shop for a godown constitutes a change of user, rendering the tenant liable for eviction under the Ordinance. The principle laid down is that where a tenancy agreement describes premises as a "shop" without specifying the purpose, it is presumed to be let for the normal use of a shop, and conversion to a godown without the landlord's written consent violates the statutory prohibition against changing the purpose of the letting.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of a premises let as a 'shop' for a 'godown' constitute a change of purpose under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • In the absence of an express restrictive covenant, can a tenant convert a premises described as a 'shop' into a 'godown' without the landlord's consent?
  • Does the term 'shop' in a tenancy agreement include a 'godown' for the purposes of Section 15(2)(iii)(b) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
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• Maqbool Ahmed Versus State1992 SCMR 2279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-16
  circumstantial evidencemurderlast seenmotivebenefit of doubtQisas and Diyatcriminal investigationappeal
  Summary & questions settled

  An appeal was filed by the convict Maqbool Ahmed against his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentence of death as Qisas, and under section 201/511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for attempting to destroy evidence, handed down by the Special Court for Speedy Trials. The core legal questions involved the reliability of circumstantial evidence, the presence of motive, the credibility of the investigation, and whether the conviction could be sustained under Qisas or Ta'zir. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt due to a complete lack of motive, a hostile and tainted investigation, and uninspiring ocular and circumstantial evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal by majority, set aside the conviction and sentence, and ordered the immediate release of the appellant unless required in any other case, establishing principles regarding the strict requirements of proof in circumstantial evidence cases.

  Questions settled

  • Is the evidence of last seen by itself sufficient to sustain a charge of murder in a case based on circumstantial evidence?
  • Can a conviction for murder under Qisas be sustained when eye-witnesses are disbelieved and the required number of witnesses under Islamic injunctions is lacking?
  • Does a far-fetched or non-existent motive weaken a prosecution case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence?
  • What is the effect of a hostile and tainted police investigation on the credibility of the prosecution's case?
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• Shahadat Versus State1992 SCMR 2276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-16Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali Alias Sabah Versus State1992 SCMR 2088 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-25
  criminal appealocular evidenceadverse inferenceidentification paradeload-sheddingqisaswaiver of rightreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the convictions under sections 302/34, 324, and 337-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the refusal of a key injured witness to testify and conflicting evidence regarding the lighting conditions at the time of the occurrence. The Supreme Court held that the convictions were unsustainable and ordered the acquittal of the appellants. The Court reasoned that the injured witness's refusal to testify created a significant evidentiary gap, which, combined with the credible defense evidence of load-shedding and the failure of the identification parade, rendered the prosecution's case doubtful. The Court laid down the principle that the withholding of evidence by a party, particularly an injured witness, permits an adverse inference that the evidence would be unfavorable to that party. Furthermore, under Islamic law, an injured party's refusal to testify may be construed as a waiver of the right to Qisas, precluding conviction on that basis.

  Questions settled

  • Does the refusal of an injured witness to testify regarding their own injury and the murder of a relative create an adverse inference against the prosecution?
  • Can a conviction for Qisas be sustained if the injured party refuses to testify in court?
  • Is identification of an accused in court months after the occurrence, without a valid identification parade, sufficient to prove identity?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce an important witness, without satisfactory reason, raise a presumption under the Evidence Act?
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• Noor Muhammad Alias Noora Versus State1992 SCMR 2079 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-16Read full judgment →
• State Versus Muhammad Hanif1992 SCMR 2047 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-16
  Qatl-i-amdQisasstatement of accusedtotal rejection of evidenceburden of proofsubstantive lawgrave and sudden provocation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the State challenged a judgment of the Special Court for Speedy Trials, which convicted the respondent under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 while acquitting his co-accused. The State contended that the conviction should have been under Section 302(a) and that the co-accused were jointly liable. The Supreme Court addressed two primary legal questions: the effect of the total rejection of prosecution evidence on the accused's statement, and whether the requirements of Section 302(c) constitute an exception to be proved by the accused or a substantive element for the prosecution. The Court held that when prosecution evidence is rejected in its entirety, the accused's statement must be accepted as a whole, including exculpatory parts. Furthermore, the Court determined that Section 302(c) is substantive law, not an exception; thus, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the elements of the offense, including the applicability of Qisas. Finding no error in the trial court's appraisal of evidence or application of Islamic Injunctions, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • When prosecution evidence is rejected in its entirety, must the statement of the accused be accepted in its entirety?
  • Is the requirement of Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 an exception to be proved by the accused or a substantive element to be proved by the prosecution?
  • Does the total rejection of ocular evidence necessitate the acceptance of the accused's exculpatory statement?
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• Manzoor Versus State1992 SCMR 2037 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-25
  Qatl-i-amdQisasTa'zirright of self-defencecompensationTazkiya-tul-Shahoodcriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Special Court for Speedy Trials, involving cross-appeals by the State and the convicts against convictions and sentences for murder and attempted murder arising out of an armed confrontation. The core legal question concerned the proper application of Islamic criminal law (Qisas and Ta'zir) regarding evidentiary requirements such as Tazkiya-tul-Shahood, the availability of the right of private defence to an initial aggressor, and the legality of awarding compensation under Section 544-A of the Criminal Procedure Code when punishments are converted from Qisas to Ta'zir. The Supreme Court held that since the strict evidentiary requirements for Qisas, including Tazkiya-tul-Shahood and specific naming of assailants by all injured witnesses, were not fully met, the convictions could not be sustained under Qisas and were properly maintainable under Ta'zir. The Court also held that an initial aggressor cannot claim the right of self-defence, and that compensation under Section 544-A becomes applicable when an offense is reduced from Qisas to Ta'zir. Consequently, the death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, fines and compensation orders were added, and the State's appeal against acquittals was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an aggressor can claim the right of self-defence under criminal law?
  • Can a conviction under Islamic law for Qisas be sustained without fulfilling the requirement of Tazkiya-tul-Shahood?
  • Does Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply when an offense is converted from Qisas to Ta'zir?
  • Whether medical opinion regarding the level of injuries can override reliable ocular evidence?
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• Daniel Boyd (Muslim Name Saifullah) Versus State1992 SCMR 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-14
  HaraabahHadd punishmentTazkiya-al-Shuhoodretracted confessioncriminal appealbenefit of doubtOffences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction and sentences of the appellants for Haraabah (robbery) under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, which included Hadd punishments of amputation. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence to sustain Hadd and Tazir convictions, the validity of the Tazkiya-al-Shuhood (purgation of witnesses) process, and the admissibility of a retracted confession. The Supreme Court acquitted the appellants, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court ruled that the trial court’s Tazkiya-al-Shuhood was a mockery because it relied solely on superficial police reports rather than a rigorous, independent inquiry into the witnesses' character. Furthermore, the Court held that a retracted confession, unsupported by independent evidence, cannot sustain a conviction. The judgment reaffirmed that Hadd punishments require stringent proof, and any doubt—whether regarding the evidence or the procedural requirements—must result in the acquittal of the accused. The Court emphasized that Hudood laws are not to be applied mechanically but require strict adherence to evidentiary and procedural safeguards.

  Questions settled

  • Is a secret police report regarding a witness's character sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Tazkiya-al-Shuhood in Hudood cases?
  • Can a conviction for Hadd punishment be sustained based solely on a retracted confession?
  • Does the failure to record the victim's statement before the statements of eyewitnesses violate the procedural requirements of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is it legally permissible to convict an accused for both Haraabah and dishonestly retaining stolen property arising from the same transaction?
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• Zafar Ali Versus Zainul Abidin1992 SCMR 1886 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-20
  pre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-IshhadN.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Actimmediate demandright of Shufa
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a leave to appeal petition filed by a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit, challenging the High Court's dismissal of his civil revision. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had complied with the mandatory requirements of Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad under Section 13 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the petitioner failed to perform Talb-i-Muwathibat immediately upon acquiring knowledge of the sale, instead delaying the process to obtain documentation. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to satisfy the statutory requirement of having Talb-i-Ishhad attested by two truthful witnesses. The Court held that the right of pre-emption is extinguished if these procedural demands are not strictly met. The principle laid down is that Talb-i-Muwathibat must be declared immediately upon knowledge of the sale, and subsequent inquiries or attempts to obtain copies do not toll the time for this declaration. Additionally, Talb-i-Ishhad serves as a confirmation of the first Talb; without a valid initial Talb, the second cannot legally exist.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of obtaining a copy of a sale mutation extend the time limit for making Talb-i-Muwathibat?
  • Is the attestation of two truthful witnesses mandatory for Talb-i-Ishhad under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
  • Can a valid Talb-i-Ishhad exist if the initial Talb-i-Muwathibat was not performed in accordance with the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Kamina Versus Al-Amin Goods Transport Agency1992 SCMR 1715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-29Read full judgment →
• Gulab Versus State1992 SCMR 1502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-11
  narcotics possessionchain of custodyforensic reportcriminal appealburden of proofpublic witnessesProhibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which upheld the appellant's conviction under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for the possession of heroin. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of significant evidentiary discrepancies. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution’s case suffered from fatal infirmities, most notably regarding the chain of custody of the forensic samples. Conflicting dates provided by witnesses and the chemical examiner regarding when the samples were submitted and received created uncertainty as to whether the forensic report actually pertained to the recovered contraband. Additionally, the Court noted the failure to associate independent public witnesses during a raid conducted in a populated city, and the failure to produce the recovered narcotics in court during trial. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case with the required degree of judicial certainty. The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentences were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy in the dates of submission and receipt of forensic samples by a laboratory invalidate the chemical examiner's report?
  • Is the failure to associate public witnesses during a raid in a populated area a fatal flaw in the prosecution's case?
  • What is the legal consequence of the prosecution's failure to produce the recovered case property in court during trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Riaz Ahmed Versus Mian Inayat Ullah1992 SCMR 1488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  specific performancepower of attorneyfiduciary dutyPardahnashin ladiesagencyalienation of propertycontractual interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The appeal challenged a High Court judgment decreeing specific performance of a sale agreement for a bungalow. The core legal question was whether the agent (respondent No. 2) possessed valid authority under powers of attorney to sell the appellants' shares, specifically considering the status of some appellants as Pardahnashin ladies. The Supreme Court held that the powers of attorney were limited to management and did not explicitly authorize the sale of the property. The Court emphasized that a general power of attorney does not inherently include the power to alienate property, which requires a clear, separate clause. Furthermore, the agent failed to discharge his fiduciary duty under Section 214 of the Contract Act 1872 to communicate with his principals in a 'case of difficulty,' especially given his personal interest in the transaction. Consequently, the Court set aside the decree against the appellants, limiting specific performance to the agent's own share in the property. The judgment establishes that courts must strictly construe powers of attorney, particularly where fraud or lack of authorization is alleged.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general power of attorney automatically include the authority to alienate or sell the principal's property?
  • What is the duty of an agent under the Contract Act 1872 when facing a 'case of difficulty' regarding the principal's property?
  • Can an agent who has a personal interest in a transaction be held to a higher standard of disclosure to the principal?
  • Is a person who signs an agreement as a witness automatically bound by the terms of that agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood Versus Muzaffar Ali Khan1992 SCMR 1471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-25
  family disputegift deedfraud and forgeryamicable compromisefilial dutyIslamic injunctionsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a family dispute between a father and his children regarding the validity of a gift deed executed in 1980. The father filed a suit claiming the gift was the result of fraud and forgery, which was initially dismissed by the trial court but subsequently reversed by the High Court. Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the proceedings were marked by allegations of abduction and ill-treatment of the father by his children. Recognizing the sensitive nature of the familial conflict and the Islamic injunctions regarding filial piety and parental compassion, the Court encouraged the parties to pursue an out-of-court settlement. The parties reached an amicable compromise, which was presented to and accepted by the Court. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal in terms of this compromise, modifying the High Court's decree accordingly. The Court emphasized the importance of familial harmony and the duties enjoined by Islamic principles, while noting that the compromise was to be implemented in its true spirit, with liberty reserved for the parties to approach the Court in case of non-compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of an appeal based on an amicable compromise reached between family members?
  • Does the Supreme Court retain jurisdiction to enforce a compromise decree if it is not implemented in its true spirit?
  • What is the role of the Court in facilitating settlements in disputes involving familial relationships?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Versus Abdullah-Khan1992 SCMR 1457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar Versus Muhammad Sharif1992 SCMR 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-02
  dismissal for non-prosecutionpartition suitdefault of appearancecivil revisionconstitutional petitiontrial court discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges a Peshawar High Court order upholding the dismissal of a partition suit for non-prosecution. The plaintiff failed to appear on the date fixed for recording her statement due to alleged illness, leading the trial court to dismiss the suit under Order 9, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the dismissal of the suit was warranted under Order IX, Rule 8 or if Order XVII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applied, and whether the trial judge erroneously considered dismissal as the only mandatory option. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge acted erroneously under a conceptual misunderstanding that he had no option other than to dismiss the suit, whereas both under Order XVII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the relevant Family Courts rules, judicial discretion existed to adjourn the matter rather than penalize the plaintiff. The Court laid down that trial courts possess discretionary powers to adjourn matters rather than resort strictly to dismissal for non-prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the dismissal of a suit for non-prosecution when evidence has already been partially recorded falls under Order IX Rule 8 or Order XVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a trial court have the discretion to grant an adjournment instead of mandatorily dismissing a suit for non-prosecution?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a civil revision petition into a constitutional petition in the interest of justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Taza Khan Versus Ahmad Khan1992 SCMR 1371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-25Read full judgment →
• Mian Dad Versus State1992 SCMR 1286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-21
  bail cancellationgrave and sudden provocationdiscretionary powerpunishable with life imprisonmentleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order cancelling the bail previously granted to the petitioner. The petitioner was initially charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but the First Information Report suggested a case under Section 304, Part I, based on the petitioner's claim of acting under grave and sudden provocation upon finding his wife with a paramour. The High Court cancelled the bail, reasoning that since the offence was punishable by imprisonment for life, bail was prohibited. The petitioner argued that while Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandates the refusal of bail for certain offences, the power to cancel bail under Section 497(5) is discretionary rather than mandatory, even for offences punishable by death or life imprisonment. The Supreme Court found prima facie merit in the argument that the discretion under Section 497(5) is distinct from the prohibition in Section 497(1) and is analogous to the principles governing the setting aside of acquittals. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the power to cancel bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory or discretionary when the offence is punishable by death or life imprisonment?
  • Does the prohibition against granting bail under Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically dictate the cancellation of bail under Section 497(5)?
  Read full judgment →
• Arula Versus Shahzada Ghulam Jilani , M. Aman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Nur Ahmad Khan, Mian Shakirullah Jan1992 SCMR 1099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-30Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz Zehri Versus Chairman, Selection Committee1992 SCMR 1078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Gul Versus The State1991 SCMR 942 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-27
  retracted judicial confessionexplosive substancessuppression of terrorists activitiesburden of proofcorroborationidentification paradepolice mashirsconspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves fourteen criminal appeals filed by four convicts against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which upheld their convictions and sentences awarded by the Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorists Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, for bomb blasts at Yousaf Musafir Khana and Almarkaz Hotel in Quetta, along with multiple recoveries of explosive materials. The core legal questions relate to the admissibility and reliability of retracted judicial confessions, the effect of delay in recording and forwarding them, the presence of corroborative evidence, the shifting of the burden of proof, and the validity of recoveries witnessed by police personnel. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that retracted judicial confessions, when voluntary and corroborated by independent evidence such as recoveries of explosives, diaries, and eyewitness identification, are sufficient to sustain convictions. The Court laid down that delay in recording confessions is not fatal when probed for complex subversive acts, that police personnel can act as competent mashirs where public witnesses are unavailable, and that the statutory presumption under special anti-terrorism legislation places the burden on the accused to disprove guilt upon possession of explosive materials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retracted judicial confession can form the basis of a conviction if corroborated by other material particulars on record?
  • Does delay in recording and forwarding a judicial confession render it involuntary or inadmissible?
  • Can police personnel act as valid mashirs for the recovery of explosive materials in the absence of public witnesses?
  • How does the burden of proof shift under the Suppression of Terrorists Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, and the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, when an accused is found in possession of incriminating articles?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Akbar Versus Malook1991 SCMR 829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-09
  adverse possessionrevenue recordcontradictory pleasownership claimburden of proofcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which had reversed concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts, decreeing the respondents' suit for ownership and compensation regarding land. The respondents had claimed ownership based on revenue record entries and, alternatively, adverse possession. The core legal question was whether revenue entries of 'Bila Lagan ba Tasawar Malkiet' (without rent under the concept of ownership) alongside 'Ghair Dakhilkaran' (non-occupancy tenants) in the cultivation column were sufficient to establish adverse possession, and whether claims of ownership and adverse possession could be pleaded simultaneously. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its findings. The Court determined that such revenue entries do not establish adverse possession, as they do not constitute a clear, unequivocal, and notorious disavowal of the true owner's title. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that pleas of valid title and adverse possession are contradictory and irreconcilable in law. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the dismissal of the respondents' suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party simultaneously plead valid title and adverse possession over the same property?
  • Are revenue entries of 'Bila Lagan ba Tasawar Malkiet' sufficient to establish adverse possession?
  • What is the legal requirement for establishing adverse possession against a true owner?
  Read full judgment →
• Zabita Khan Versus Ganderi Gul1991 SCMR 771 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-21Read full judgment →
• Noor Alam Khan Versus Sohabat Khan1991 SCMR 661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-06
  occupancy tenancycompensation for treesWajib-ul-ArzHazara Forests ActGeneral Clauses ActMalkan-e-Qabzastatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from three consolidated appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the distribution of compensation for trees cut from land previously held under occupancy tenancies in Village Jareed, District Hazara. The core legal question was whether erstwhile occupancy tenants, who became full owners under section 4 of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, retained their entitlement to a half-share of tree compensation as previously prescribed in the Wajib-ul-Arz, or whether their acquisition of full ownership extinguished those rights in favour of the original proprietors. The Supreme Court held that despite the extinction of occupancy tenancies, the Wajib-ul-Arz—read alongside the Hazara Forests Act, 1936 and construed under section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and section 7 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956—retains statutory force, and references to occupancy tenants in such instruments must be construed as references to those who became full owners under the re-enacted tenancy legislation. Consequently, the Court dismissed all three appeals, upholding the High Court's decision that the former occupancy tenants are entitled to half of the compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether erstwhile occupancy tenants who become full owners under the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act retain their pre-existing rights to tree compensation as recorded in the Wajib-ul-Arz?
  • Do entries in the Wajib-ul-Arz acquire statutory recognition and force through the provisions of the Hazara Forests Act, 1936?
  • How does the repeal and re-enactment of tenancy legislation affect references to occupancy tenancies in existing instruments pursuant to section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qasim Khan Versus Mehbooba1991 SCMR 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-11
  inheritancelimited ownerguzarakhurlimitationfemale co-heirsJamabandiOrder XLI Rule 33 CPCtransposition of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from two cross-appeals by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the inheritance rights of female heirs (Mst. Mahbooba and Mst. Maqboola) over ancestral property held by female predecessors. The core issues involved determining whether a female holder (Mst. Ameera) possessed the property as a 'guzarakhur' (maintenance holder) or as a limited estate holder under customary law; whether the inheritance of a predecessor dying in 1945 was governed by Shariat or Custom; and whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation against co-heirs. The Supreme Court dismissed the defendants' appeal regarding limitation, holding that time does not run against female co-heirs in inheritance claims. On the plaintiffs' appeal, the Court held that since revenue entries (Jamabandi) recorded Mst. Ameera identically with other limited owners as an owner, she was a limited owner rather than a mere maintenance holder. Consequently, her estate devolved under the prevailing law upon her death post-1962. Further, invoking Order XLI Rule 33 CPC and Order XXXIII Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, relief was extended to a non-appealing/pro forma defendant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an entry in the revenue record (Jamabandi) designating a female relative as an owner indicates a limited estate holder rather than a mere maintenance holder (guzarakhur)?
  • Whether a claim for inheritance by a female co-heir can be barred by limitation against other co-heirs?
  • Whether the appellate court can grant relief under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to a pro forma defendant who did not file an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal-Ur-Rehman Versus Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1991 SCMR 423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-24
  locus standiagreement to sellwrit petitionfraudulent allotmentprospective vendeesettlement of land
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought to challenge the sale of agricultural land by the Government of the Punjab to the University of the Punjab, claiming that they held prior agreements to sell from the original allottees of said land. The High Court dismissed their writ petition on the grounds that an agreement to sell did not vest any legal right in the land, thereby denying the petitioners locus standi. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a prospective vendee possesses the locus standi to maintain a writ petition. While the Court acknowledged that a prospective vendee or an affected person may have standing, it ultimately upheld the dismissal of the petition on merits. The Court found that the original allotments in favor of the petitioners' vendors were obtained fraudulently and illegally, as determined by the Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, since the underlying allotments were void, the petitioners' claims based on agreements to sell were unsustainable. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, concluding that the petitioners had no valid case on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prospective vendee under an agreement to sell have the locus standi to maintain a writ petition?
  • Can a claim based on an agreement to sell survive if the underlying allotment of the vendor is found to be fraudulent and illegal?
  Read full judgment →
• Central Board of Revenue Versus Craftman1991 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-31Read full judgment →
• Abdul Baqi Versus Mitha Khan1991 SCMR 379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-18
  leave to appealTribal Areaconstitutional interpretationeviction proceedingsobjection petitioninterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 27-3-1990, which dismissed an objection petition filed under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 concerning eviction proceedings in the Tribal Area. The core legal question revolves around whether Article 247 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was attracted when Ordinance X of 1980 was promulgated by the C.M.L.A. under the Laws Continuance in Force Order 1977, and whether the Civil Procedure Code (Amended Ordinance X of 1980) applied to the Tribal Area without specific extension under Article 247(3). The Supreme Court held that a substantial point of constitutional interpretation requiring examination by a larger bench was involved, thereby granting leave to appeal. However, the Court declined to grant interim relief of status quo regarding possession, noting that the petitioner had full knowledge of the prior eviction proceedings yet failed to seek impleadment in a timely manner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 247 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan was attracted when the C.M.L.A. promulgated Ordinance X of 1980 under the Laws Continuance in Force Order, 1977?
  • Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Civil Procedure Code (Amended Ordinance X of 1980) was not specifically extended to the Tribal Area?
  • Can interim relief in the nature of status quo be granted to a petitioner who had full knowledge of eviction proceedings but failed to seek impleadment as a party?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asalat Versus Nadir Masih1991 SCMR 369 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Shabrati Versus Qamar Sultan1991 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-23
  Leave to appealEnhancement of sentenceMurderCulpable homicideSentencing discretionAmnestyGrievous hurt
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application for leave to appeal seeking enhancement of sentence against a High Court judgment. The respondents were initially convicted by the trial court under Section 304, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Section 324/34, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, receiving 3.5 years' R.I. for the former. The High Court subsequently convicted them under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, sentencing them to life imprisonment each, maintaining the fine and compensation. The petitioner argued that the High Court, having found the accused guilty of murder, should have awarded the normal capital punishment under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and failed to provide reasons for not doing so. The Supreme Court, while noting the High Court's lack of explicit reasons, declined to grant leave to appeal for sentence enhancement, considering that the respondents would have benefited from a Presidential Order of Amnesty if capital punishment had been awarded after a certain date, and also considering the nature of the deceased's injury and subsequent medical complications. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court refuse to enhance a sentence of life imprisonment to capital punishment in a murder case, even if the High Court did not explicitly state reasons for not awarding capital punishment?
  • Should the Supreme Court consider the potential benefit of a Presidential Amnesty Order for convicts when deciding on an application for enhancement of sentence?
  • Is the nature of the injury and subsequent medical complications leading to death a relevant factor when determining the appropriateness of a life sentence versus capital punishment for murder?
  • Does the Supreme Court have discretion to refuse leave to appeal for sentence enhancement based on specific circumstances of the case, even if the High Court's reasoning for the original sentence was not fully elaborated?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zulfiqar Versus Gulab Khan1991 SCMR 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-21
  pre-emptiondisplaced personsCapital Development Authoritystatutory exemptionright of pre-emptionrule of sinkeragricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning the sale of agricultural land in Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether the respondents, as displaced persons resulting from the construction of Islamabad, were exempt from the right of pre-emption under a notification issued pursuant to Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, and whether the certificate of displacement issued by the Assistant Director (Lands) of the Capital Development Authority was valid. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' findings that the respondents were indeed displaced persons and that the certificate issued by the Assistant Director was sufficient. The Court held that the mandatory exemption provided under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, extinguished the right of pre-emption against the respondents. The Court further clarified that where a statutory exemption exists for displaced persons, the right of pre-emption is extinguished, and the rule of sinker does not override the mandatory effect of such statutory exemptions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of pre-emption exist against a person certified as a displaced person by the Capital Development Authority under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Is a certificate issued by the Assistant Director (Lands) of the Capital Development Authority sufficient to establish the status of a displaced person for the purpose of pre-emption exemption?
  • Does the rule of sinker apply to a sale transaction that is otherwise exempt from pre-emption under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  Read full judgment →
• Saadat Ullah Khan Versus Sikandar Hayat Shaheen1991 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-04Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Fatima Versus Sablan1991 SCMR 2530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-20
  non-suitingpenal provisiondiscretionary powerpersonal appearancestrict constructionCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court order that upheld the trial court's decision to non-suit the plaintiffs for failing to appear in person as directed under Order X, Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal questions were whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion under the penal provisions of Order X, Rule 4(2) and whether the necessary conditions for invoking such a penalty were strictly satisfied. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to properly exercise its discretion, particularly given the status of the plaintiffs as females and minors. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that Order X, Rule 4(2) is a penal provision requiring strict construction; the conditions precedent under sub-rule (1)—specifically the refusal or inability of a party to answer material questions—must be established beyond reasonable doubt before penal action is taken. As these conditions were not satisfied, the Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the case for trial on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is the power to pronounce judgment under Order X, Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory or discretionary?
  • Must the conditions precedent under Order X, Rule 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be strictly established before penal action is taken under sub-rule (2)?
  • Should the status of plaintiffs as females or minors influence the court's exercise of discretion under Order X, Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary Board of Revenue Punjab Versus Khalid Ahmad Khan1991 SCMR 2527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-22
  Order VIII Rule 10 CPCwritten statementpenal consequencesspeaking ordercivil revisionpublic exchequer
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of a Civil Revision by the High Court, which arose from a judgment pronounced under Order VIII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to the appellants' failure to file a written statement. The core legal question was whether the lower courts adhered to the precedent set in Sakhawatuddin v. Muhammad Iqbal regarding the imposition of penal consequences for failing to file a written statement. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts failed to satisfy the legal requirement of issuing a 'speaking order' that explicitly demonstrates the court's application of mind in 'requiring' a written statement. The Court affirmed that penal consequences under Rule 10 only apply when the court has specifically required the written statement through such an order, rather than in routine instances. However, despite ruling on the legal point in favor of the appellants, the Court declined to set aside the decree, reasoning that further litigation would impose an unnecessary and disproportionate burden on the public exchequer given the small amount involved.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can penal consequences be imposed under Order VIII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for failure to file a written statement?
  • Is a routine order sufficient to require a written statement for the purposes of Order VIII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the failure to file a written statement that could be filed as of right under Order VIII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 attract the penal consequences of Rule 10?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Bashi Versus Allah Khan1991 SCMR 2504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-09-09Read full judgment →
• Suleman Khan Versus Sabran Bibi , Nemo1991 SCMR 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-04Read full judgment →
• Akbar Jan Versus Chairman District Evacuee Trust Committee1991 SCMR 2206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-16
  evacuee trust propertyreligious endowmentrevenue recordcompensation for improvementsleasehold rightsDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958Thakar Dawara
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment declaring certain land as "evacuee trust property" and addressed the lessees' entitlement to compensation for improvements. The core legal questions were whether the property constituted a religious trust and whether lessees could claim compensation for structures built after the lease expired. The Supreme Court held that the property, identified as a "Thakar Dawara" in historical revenue records, was indeed evacuee trust property. It affirmed that a formal trust deed is not strictly required to establish a religious trust if sufficient prima facie evidence, such as official revenue entries, exists. Regarding compensation, the Court ruled that the lessees were entitled to payment for improvements made under the lease conditions, as the Custodian had previously validated these terms. The key principle laid down is that the status of a religious trust can be determined by the rule of preponderance of evidence based on official records, and lessees of evacuee property retain rights to compensation for authorized improvements upon the termination of their lease.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a formal trust deed preclude a property from being declared as attached to a religious or charitable trust?
  • Can revenue records serve as sufficient evidence to establish that a property is an evacuee trust property?
  • Are lessees of evacuee trust property entitled to compensation for improvements made to the land upon the expiry of their lease?
  • Is it necessary for the entire property to be used for religious purposes for it to be classified as property attached to a religious institution?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir Versus Chairman Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal1991 SCMR 2087 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-15Read full judgment →
• Baggo Versus Hussan Bano , M.S. Mahboob and M. Ilyas Siddiqui, Advocates Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record1991 SCMR 2051 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-08
  Islamic Law of Inheritanceconsent decreefamily settlementtestamentary dispositioninheritance disputerevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the inheritance of property originally owned by Ghulam Khan, who died in 1944. Following a 1926 Will, property was divided between his son, Fateh Khan, and his wife, Mst. Banni Begum. Litigation ensued regarding the property held by Mst. Banni Begum upon her death in 1964. The Lahore High Court disposed of the matter via an agreed order, declaring shares for all family members based on Islamic Law of Inheritance, intending to end all family litigation. The core legal question was whether this settlement applied only to the property of Mst. Banni Begum or to the entire estate of Ghulam Khan, including property held by Fateh Khan. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment, by its language and the scope of the agreed shares, encompassed the entire estate of Ghulam Khan. The Court ruled that the settlement was a comprehensive resolution of all inheritance disputes, overriding previous testamentary dispositions that conflicted with Islamic Law. The principle established is that a consent decree intended to resolve family litigation should be interpreted to give effect to the parties' clear intention to distribute the entire estate according to Islamic Law of Inheritance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a consent decree be challenged in appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a settlement regarding inheritance shares in a family dispute apply to the entire estate of the deceased or only the specific property subject to the suit?
  • Can a court interpret an agreed order to include property not explicitly mentioned in the pleadings if the intent of the parties was to resolve all family litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Munshi Muhammad Versus Election Commission of Pakistan , M. Aslam Chishti, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and M.K.N. Kohli, Advocate -on-Record1991 SCMR 2033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-27
  Election Commission of PakistanRepresentation of the People Act 1976re-pollingstatutory jurisdictionelection petitionconstitutional jurisdictionstoppage of poll
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) regarding re-polling at specific stations in a provincial assembly constituency. The core legal question was whether the ECP’s order for re-polling was issued under Section 103AA or Section 27 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, and whether the High Court erred in its characterization of the order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by ignoring the record, which clearly indicated the ECP exercised its power under Section 27 due to the stoppage of polls caused by law and order issues. The Court clarified that the ECP’s jurisdiction is derived from the statute itself, not the specific provision cited by a petitioner in an application. Consequently, the Court ruled that an applicant cannot limit or control the amplitude of a statutory authority’s jurisdiction by invoking a particular section. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and dismissed the respondent's Constitution Petition, affirming the validity of the ECP’s order under Section 27.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner limit the jurisdiction of a statutory authority by invoking a specific legal provision in their application?
  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the authority to order a fresh poll under Section 27 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, when polling has been stopped due to law and order issues?
  • Is the Election Commission of Pakistan's power to order a fresh poll under Section 27 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, dependent on the specific section cited by a complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mitha Khan Versus Muhammad Younus1991 SCMR 2030 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-27
  rejection of plaintcause of actioncivil procedurecompromiseremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court was justified in maintaining the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure despite recording positive findings. The appellant had filed a suit alleging violation of an old agreement and compromise, which went through various tiers of adjudication including a Qazi, Majlis-e-Shoora, trial court, and appellate court before reaching the High Court in revision. The High Court had dismissed the proceedings holding that the plaint lacked a cause of action, was vague, and suffered from formal defects. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's assertions of a valid compromise and its subsequent violation clearly disclosed a cause of action, and that subsequent questions regarding vagueness, court-fee, or limitation are matters to be decided on merits or after providing an opportunity to rectify formal defects rather than outright rejection under Order VII Rule 11. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, the High Court's finding on cause of action was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a plaint claiming violation of a valid compromise disclose a sufficient cause of action?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground of vagueness without affording an opportunity to correct defects?
  • When do questions regarding limitation, court-fee, and form of suit arise in relation to a cause of action?
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• Naseer Ahmed Uppal Versus Pakistan WAPDA1991 SCMR 1998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-28
  review petitiontermination of serviceWAPDAsimpliciter terminationservice tribunalpenal order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought a review of the Supreme Court's earlier judgment whereby the Service Tribunal's order setting aside his retirement from WAPDA under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act was itself set aside. The core legal question involved the scope of inquiry and validity of an action taken under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, particularly whether such termination requires a penal inquiry or fault commensurate with the action. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that an order under section 17(1-A) is not a penal order or an order requiring prior fault or adherence to Efficiency and Discipline Rules, but rather an order terminating service simpliciter based on subjective qualitative assessment or performance. The key principle laid down is that the standards of a penal order do not apply to termination under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, and failure to observe strict directions leading to potential financial irregularities constitutes a valid ground for termination without stigma.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of retirement or termination under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act is a penal order requiring prior fault?
  • Can the validity of an action under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act be tested on the touchstone of Efficiency and Discipline Rules?
  • Does failure to keep correct contract documents by a Divisional Accountant constitute a valid ground for action under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act?
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• Sultan Jan Versus Sher Muhammad1991 SCMR 1966 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-04Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool Versus Abdullah1991 SCMR 1964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-29
  ex parte decreeservice of processjudicial custodycivil procedureright to fair trialremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment upholding an ex parte decree passed against the appellant in a civil suit. The appellant, who was incarcerated following a criminal conviction under Section 325, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, failed to appear in the Qazi's court on the date fixed for his written statement. Although the appellant's son submitted an adjournment application, the court proceeded ex parte. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted lawfully in passing an ex parte decree against a defendant who was in judicial custody and had not been served with process for the relevant hearing date. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by failing to issue process to the appellant once it became aware of his detention. The Court emphasized that ex parte proceedings cannot be initiated without proper service of process, especially when a party's absence is involuntary due to incarceration. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the case to the trial court for a fresh trial in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court proceed ex parte against a defendant who is in judicial custody without issuing process to them?
  • Does the appearance of a family member who is not a constituted attorney constitute a valid appearance for a defendant?
  • Is an appellate court empowered to set aside an ex parte decree if the trial court failed to issue proper process to the defendant?
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• Ghulam Fatima Versus Noor Hussain1991 SCMR 1959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-04Read full judgment →
• 1991 SCMR 19571991 SCMR 1957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-04Read full judgment →
• Faizullah Versus Yaqub Khan1991 SCMR 1925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-17Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul Versus Assistant Commissioner1991 SCMR 1924 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif Versus Nasir Ahmad1991 SCMR 1916 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31Read full judgment →
• Sorab Khan Versus Muhammad Usman , Muhammad Shafi Rakhshani, Assistant Advocate-General, Balochistan1991 SCMR 1907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-20
  route permittransport authoritycancellation of permitleave to appealfactual controversy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a transporter holding a route permit between Quetta and Samungli, sought leave to appeal against a Balochistan High Court judgment dated 3-4-1989 that set aside the cancellation of a route permit granted to respondent No.1. The core legal question concerned the validity of the cancellation of the respondent's route permit, which had been cancelled by departmental authorities following allegations of misrepresentation and unauthorized vehicle substitution, a factual controversy that the High Court found unresolved by the authorities. The Supreme Court held that in light of its authoritative pronouncement on the grant of route permits in the case of Malik Niaz Muhammad v. Provincial Transport Authority and others (1989 SCMR 79), no further question of law required examination. Furthermore, because the respondent had been plying the bus to the satisfaction of the authorities since the High Court judgment, the court refused to grant leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that where the legal position regarding route permits is settled by precedent and the factual operation of the route is running satisfactorily, leave to appeal against the setting aside of a permit cancellation may be refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cancellation of a route permit is justified when departmental authorities fail to resolve underlying factual controversies regarding vehicle substitution and misrepresentation?
  • Is leave to appeal warranted against the setting aside of a route permit cancellation when the matter is covered by settled precedent and the permit holder is operating to the satisfaction of the authorities?
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• Zohra Mai Versus Member, Board of Revene1991 SCMR 1905 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-26Read full judgment →
• Nisar Hussain Shah Versus Extra Assistant Commissioner1991 SCMR 1898 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Salim Qureshi Versus Chairman, Central Borad of Revenue1991 SCMR 1870 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18Read full judgment →
• Resham Jan Versus Abdul Rehman1991 SCMR 1849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-22
  bail cancellationmurder casefurther inquirynon-bailable offencemisuse of bailcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the grant of bail to the respondent in a murder case. The core legal question examined was whether the mere need for further inquiry entitles an accused to bail under section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a specific finding that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accused committed a non-bailable offence. Additionally, the complainant alleged misuse of the concession of bail through threatening witnesses, supported by a police report and proceedings under sections 107 and 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was not entitled to bail under the circumstances and accordingly cancelled the bail, noting that the case did not fall within subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and that the respondent had misused bail. The key principle laid down is that bail cannot be granted on the ground of further inquiry without satisfying the statutory requirement regarding reasonable grounds, and misuse of bail is a valid ground for its cancellation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere need for further inquiry entitle an accused to bail under section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a finding that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accused committed a non-bailable offence?
  • Is the misuse of the concession of bail by threatening witnesses a valid ground for the cancellation of bail?
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• Rehmat Ali Versus Fazal Karim1991 SCMR 1800 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mansoob Butt Versus Managing Director Pakistan International Airlines Corporation1991 SCMR 1755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-22Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan Versus Mir Badshah1991 SCMR 1753 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-28Read full judgment →
• Akbar Jan Versus Deputy Settlement Commissioner1991 SCMR 1740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-19
  constitutional petitionsettlement matterauction-purchaseextension of timediscretionary jurisdictionlachesSupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the appellants' constitutional petition arising from an urban settlement case regarding the auction-purchase of a shop. The core legal questions examined the validity of the auction by settlement authorities and the acceptance of purchase money deposits at a late stage despite prior orders contemplating resumption, alongside the propriety of exercising discretionary writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the refusal of the High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction was justified given the considerable inactivity and laches on the part of the appellants, who failed to challenge the transfer proceedings in a timely manner. Furthermore, the settlement authorities were empowered to extend the time for depositing the purchase amount under the circumstances. The appeal was accordingly dismissed by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to exercise constitutional writ jurisdiction where a party shows considerable inactivity and laches in challenging settlement proceedings?
  • Can settlement authorities lawfully extend the time for depositing the balance of auction-purchase money despite earlier orders contemplating resumption?
  • Does the acceptance of a delayed deposit by settlement authorities warrant interference by the Supreme Court in a discretionary matter?
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• Faza Khan Versus Ahmad Khan1991 SCMR 1581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-25
  Frontier Crimes RegulationTribal CustomPreventive DetentionDouble JeopardyUltra ViresBlood FeudCriminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns proceedings under the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901, where respondents were convicted of murder. The core legal questions were whether the Deputy Commissioner could, under the Regulation, declare the convicts 'Dushman' (enemy) under tribal custom, and whether a perpetual prohibition against residing in their home locality was lawful. The Supreme Court held that the Frontier Crimes Regulation did not authorize the 'Dushman' declaration. Such a declaration, which implied immunity for future violence by the complainant, was ultra vires, lacked statutory basis, and violated principles against double jeopardy. Conversely, the Court upheld the prohibition on residing in the specific locality as a valid preventive measure under Section 36 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, provided it was not perpetual. The Court emphasized that administrative functionaries cannot exercise powers beyond those explicitly conferred by statute, and tribal customs cannot supersede the statutory limitations of the Regulation. Consequently, while the conviction and residency prohibition remained, the 'Dushman' declaration was annulled as being without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Deputy Commissioner under the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 declare a convict a 'Dushman' under tribal custom?
  • Does the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 authorize a perpetual prohibition on a convict residing in their home locality?
  • Is a preventive order under Section 36 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 required to be time-bound?
  • Can a Council of Elders make recommendations beyond the scope of the specific question of guilt or innocence referred to them under the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901?
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• Mauj Din Versus Bano1991 SCMR 1556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01Read full judgment →
• Ayub Khan Versus Hussan Feroz Begum1991 SCMR 1554 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1900-02-25Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali Versus The State1991 SCMR 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-22Read full judgment →
• Association for the Welfare of Retired Persons Versus Government of Pakistan1991 SCMR 1501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-17Read full judgment →
• Noor Din Versus Abdul Karim1991 SCMR 1499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-20Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool Versus Hurmat1991 SCMR 1495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-11Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali Versus Secretary Finance1991 SCMR 1491 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Salahuddin Versus Member,Board of Revenue -II1991 SCMR 1489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-22
  land leasevoid ab initioBoard of Revenuemunicipal limitsjurisdictional excessnullityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Balochistan High Court judgment regarding the validity of a land lease granted by the Board of Revenue. The core legal question was whether the 1975 lease of land situated within Quetta Municipal limits, which involved building construction, was validly granted by the Board of Revenue. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, which had affirmed the Member, Board of Revenue's finding that the lease was void ab initio. The Court held that the Board of Revenue lacked the legal authority to lease land within municipal limits for building purposes, rendering the grant a nullity in law. Consequently, the petitioners acquired no vested rights through the void lease. The key principle laid down is that administrative authorities, such as the Board of Revenue, cannot act beyond the scope of their statutory powers, and any grant of land made in violation of such jurisdictional limits is void ab initio and confers no legal rights upon the grantee.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Board of Revenue grant a lease for land situated within municipal limits if the purpose involves building construction?
  • Is a lease granted by an authority acting beyond its statutory powers considered void ab initio?
  • Does a void lease create any vested rights for the lessee?
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• International Guarantee Trust Company Ltd Versus Abida Hussain1991 SCMR 1487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-19
  leave to appealadministrative ordersconstitution petitionlarger benchvacation sittingsHigh Court Chief Justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order passed by the learned Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, whereby the petitioner company's requests for the urgent hearing of a pending Constitution Petition during court vacations, by a larger Bench, and at the principal seat of the High Court were rejected. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court can interfere with the internal administrative decisions of the High Court regarding the constitution of benches, fixing of cases during vacations, and determination of hearing venues. The Supreme Court held that requests concerning the hearing of cases during vacations, constitution of larger benches, and venue of hearings are entirely administrative in nature and devoid of judicial content, and the High Court Chief Justice's discretion in such matters cannot be interfered with. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not sit in judgment over administrative decisions taken by the Chief Justice of a High Court regarding case management and bench constitution, though parties may approach the High Court administratively if urgency requires.

  Questions settled

  • Are requests for hearing a matter during vacations, before a larger bench, and at the principal seat of the High Court judicial or administrative in nature?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the refusal of a High Court Chief Justice to hear a case during vacations or constitute a larger bench?
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• Muhammad Saleem Versus Dad Muhammad1991 SCMR 1482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-15Read full judgment →
• Salahuddin Versus Bibi Khorian1991 SCMR 1471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-14Read full judgment →
• Abul Kalam Versus Dilshad1991 SCMR 1421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-08
  leave to appealejectmentpersonal requirementbona fide needlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which allowed the respondent's first rent appeal and ordered the ejectment of the petitioner from the disputed flat and garage on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. The core legal question is whether a landlord's bona fide personal requirement for ejectment is negated merely because she resides with her mother in a large house owned by the mother. The Supreme Court held that the ownership of property by a parent has no direct bearing on the child's bona fide personal requirement, and a landlord is not under any legal or moral obligation to permanently reside with her mother. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's finding.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's residence with her mother in a property owned by the mother negate the landlord's bona fide personal requirement for ejectment?
  • Is a landlord under a legal or moral obligation to continue living with her mother for all time to come?
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• Waris Ali Khan Versus Zaibun Nisa1991 SCMR 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-21
  pre-emptiondeposit of purchase priceexecuting courtcivil revisionleave to appealextension of time
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision by the Peshawar High Court, which upheld orders allowing a pre-emptor decree-holder to deposit the balance purchase price. The respondent had filed a pre-emption suit which was ultimately decreed by the High Court, but the High Court's decree omitted to specify the amount and the time period for depositing the balance purchase price. The executing court subsequently permitted the deposit, a view maintained through appellate and revisional tiers. The core legal question concerned whether the executing court could permit the deposit of the balance purchase price and whether the decree had become infructuous due to non-deposit. The Supreme Court held that since the omission was attributable to the court's decree rather than any wilful default by the decree-holder, the executing court exercised its discretion reasonably and properly. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing court allow the deposit of a balance purchase price when the original appellate decree omitted to specify the amount and time for payment?
  • Does the omission of payment timelines in a pre-emption decree render the decree infructuous due to non-deposit by the decree-holder?
  • Is an appellate court empowered to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money in fit and suitable cases?
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• Muhammad Din Versus Muhammad Bashir1991 SCMR 1408 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Adalat Khan Versus Begum Bibi1991 SCMR 1381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  inheritanceres judicataconstructive res judicataland disputeco-heirsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from a land inheritance dispute where the Lahore High Court had dismissed the plaintiff/appellant's suit by allowing the respondents' Regular Second Appeal, holding that the suit was barred by res judicata due to prior litigation. The core legal question was whether the appellant's claim as an heir was barred by the principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata based on an earlier suit where he had unsuccessfully claimed ownership through purchase. The Supreme Court held that the previous litigation did not finally determine the question of the appellant's maternity or status as an heir, and therefore neither res judicata nor constructive res judicata applied. The Court further evaluated the evidence, noting admissions by a co-heir and witnesses, and concluded that the appellant had successfully established his status as the son and co-heir of the deceased Mst. Dani. Consequently, the appeal was partly accepted, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appellant's suit for inheritance was decreed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a previous suit claiming ownership through purchase operates as res judicata against a subsequent suit based on inheritance?
  • Does a finding in an earlier suit that fails to finally determine a party's status as an heir attract the bar of res judicata?
  • Can constructive res judicata be invoked when the plea of inheritance was already raised and put in issue in the previous litigation but left undetermined?
  • Is the admission of a co-heir regarding the paternity or maternity of another claimant admissible against other respondents?
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• Abdul Hameed Naz Versus Razia Begum Awan1991 SCMR 1376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-07Read full judgment →
• Allah Wasaya Versus Rahim Bakhsh1991 SCMR 1369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-30Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed Versus Yar Muhammad Nizami1991 SCMR 1367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14Read full judgment →
• Zamir Ahmad Khan Versus Hayat Begum , Hamid Aslam Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record1991 SCMR 1363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-29Read full judgment →
• Zenab Bibi Versus Nisar Ahmad1991 SCMR 1360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-19Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad Versus Muhammad Ibrahim1991 SCMR 1339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-08Read full judgment →
• Shamim Afza Versus Friends Mutual Co-Operative Housing Society (Regd.) , Kh. Shaukat Ali, Advocate Supreme Court & Nemo1991 SCMR 1301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-29Read full judgment →