Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Rahim Khan vs Arshad Khan And Other1987 SCMR 1885 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-19
  leave to appealmurderocular testimonyinterested witnessindependent corroborationacquittalenmity
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondents of charges under sections 302, 307, 324, 323, and 148 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The trial court had previously convicted the respondents for murder, assault, and rioting, while acquitting four co-accused. The High Court set aside the convictions, holding that the eye-witnesses were interested due to longstanding enmity, there was delayed reporting, and over-implication of accused persons, requiring independent corroboration which was lacking. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the testimony of a purported independent witness and overturning the convictions. The Supreme Court held that the witness in question was not disinterested, as he had previous criminal litigation involving a relative of the respondents, thereby justifying the High Court's refusal to treat him as independent. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an eye-witness who has prior criminal litigation with a party can be considered an independent and disinterested witness?
  • Is independent corroboration required for ocular testimony when witnesses are partisan and there is a history of serious enmity?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside convictions based on delayed F.I.R. and over-implication of accused persons?
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• Rahim Bakhshand Another vs Jan Muhammad And Other1987 SCMR 841 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-09
  settlement lawproperty transferunit classificationspecial leave to appealsettlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns a dispute over the classification of property transferred to the petitioners under settlement laws. The core legal question addressed was whether the property in question constituted a single unit or comprised two distinct units for the purpose of transfer. The Settlement Commissioner had previously determined that the property consisted of two units, resulting in the transfer of one unit to the respondents. The petitioners challenged this determination before the High Court, which declined to interfere with the Settlement Commissioner's findings. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no legal infirmity or error in the reasoning applied by the Settlement Commissioner or the High Court's subsequent refusal to intervene. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the lower authorities' findings, affirming that the property was correctly identified as two separate units. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, thereby maintaining the established transfer of the property units to the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property transferred under settlement laws constitutes a single unit or two distinct units?
  • Can the High Court interfere with a factual determination made by a Settlement Commissioner regarding property units?
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• Rahim Bakhsh And Another vs Munawar Ahmad And Another1987 SCMR 169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-11
  pre-emptionrepugnancy to Injunctions of Islamleave to appealsuperior right of pre-emptionPunjab Pre-emption Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a second appeal regarding a pre-emption suit. The respondents had originally filed a suit for pre-emption based on their relationship with the vendor and their status as landowners in the estate, alleging that the sale price had been inflated to defeat their pre-emption rights. While the trial court dismissed the suit, the appellate court reversed this decision and decreed the suit. The petitioners challenged this in the High Court, which upheld the decree. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the suit should fail based on the principle established in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360), which declared certain provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, regarding the right of pre-emption of a successor of a vendor, repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. Finding that leave had been granted in similar cases, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and directed the matter to be heard alongside other similar appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of Section 15(a) and (b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913, regarding the right of pre-emption of a successor of a vendor, repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
  • Should a petition for leave to appeal be granted when the legal point raised is pending consideration in other similar appeals before the Supreme Court?
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• Rab Nawaz And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 1623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-17
  private defencemurder trialleave to appealmedical evidencecriminal liabilityappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a murder conviction where the petitioners, Rab Nawaz and Ghulam Muhammad, were found guilty of murdering Muzaffar Khan and causing injuries to prosecution witnesses. The trial court convicted the petitioners under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentences which the High Court subsequently upheld while modifying the death penalty to life imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerns whether the petitioners acted in the exercise of their right of private defence. The petitioners argued that the prosecution's version was inconsistent with the medical evidence, specifically highlighting that the accused sustained numerous injuries, predominantly on their heads, suggesting they were attacked at close quarters by the complainant party. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the nature and location of the injuries sustained by the accused, found that the matter required deeper examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether, given the circumstances and the injuries sustained, the right of private defence had accrued to the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the nature and location of injuries on an accused can establish a plea of private defence?
  • Does the presence of multiple head injuries on an accused support the contention that they acted in self-defence?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the medical evidence suggests the possibility of a defence version being true?
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• Rab Nawaz And Another vs Muhammad Abdullah And Other1987 SCMR 1626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-14
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionpending civil litigationorder of remandleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of their writ petition challenging an order of remand passed by the District Judge in a civil matter. The core legal question was whether the High Court should interfere in pending civil litigation under its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in pending civil proceedings, particularly when the trial court has been specifically directed to decide all issues, including objections raised under the relevant statute. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming that lower courts are bound to follow the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court and address all framed issues accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Should the High Court interfere in pending civil litigation under its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Are the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court binding upon all courts in Pakistan?
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• Qazi Muhammad Naeem And Others vs Qazi Fazlur Rahman And Other1987 SCMR 618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-26
  special leave to appealprivate partitionfraud and misrepresentationcivil procedurepreliminary and final decreesconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a constitutional petition against the dismissal of an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question involves whether preliminary and final decrees obtained by concealing a prior private partition and misrepresenting property ownership can be challenged under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as being obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the concealment of the private partition and inclusion of the petitioners' share in the partition decrees required consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and issued a status-quo order in the meantime, laying down that deliberate concealment of material facts and prior partitions to obtain decrees affecting third-party rights warrants deeper judicial scrutiny under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree be set aside under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground of concealment of a prior private partition?
  • Whether third parties whose property is included in a partition suit without their joinder can invoke Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the intentional misrepresentation that an entire property belongs to a deceased person amount to fraud for the purposes of setting aside a judgment under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Qazi Faizul Haq vs Government of N. W.F.P. Through Chief Secretary, Peshawar1987 SCMR 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-02
  service appealcompulsory retirementlimitationtime-barredreview petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal against compulsory retirement on the ground of limitation. The core legal question concerns whether the service appeal was barred by time, specifically regarding the computation of limitation periods following the filing of a departmental review petition and the communication of its rejection order. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's finding that the rejection order of the review was duly communicated to the petitioner constituted a conclusive finding of fact based on the record and the petitioner's own admissions before the Tribunal. Consequently, no question of law of public importance arose to warrant interference, and the petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact by a service tribunal regarding the communication of departmental orders and limitation will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court when supported by the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed before the Service Tribunal is time-barred when the departmental review rejection order has been duly communicated?
  • Does a finding of fact by the Service Tribunal regarding the communication of a review order conclude the matter before the Supreme Court?
  • Is leave to appeal granted when no question of law of public importance arises from the Tribunal's dismissal of a time-barred service appeal?
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• Qaryam vs Member, Board of Revenue And Other1987 SCMR 721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-14
  consolidation schemelimitationcondonation of delaydiscretionary orderjudicial reviewBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to the consolidation scheme in Mauza Wafardarpur, Tehsil and District Muzaffargarh, which was confirmed on March 27, 1980. Respondents filed an appeal against this scheme over two years later, which was accepted on merits by the Additional Deputy Commissioner/Collector on December 3, 1984. Subsequent appeals and revisions by the petitioner were dismissed by the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue, respectively. The petitioner contended that the lower authorities failed to properly address the issue of limitation in the initial appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the initial appellate authority had explicitly noted the limitation issue and proceeded to decide the matter on merits. Furthermore, the Board of Revenue had affirmed that the Collector was justified in condoning the delay. The Court held that since the authorities possessed the jurisdiction to condone the delay and had exercised their discretion to do so, there was no ground for judicial interference. The petition was consequently dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate authority have the jurisdiction to condone a delay in filing an appeal against a consolidation scheme?
  • Can a court interfere with a discretionary order of a revenue authority that has condoned a delay in filing an appeal?
  • Is an order disposing of an appeal on merits valid if the issue of limitation was noted but the delay was condoned?
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• Qari Yar Muhammad vs Anjuman E Islamia1987 SCMR 1776 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-13
  Master and Servantwrongful dismissalspecific performanceprivate institutionservice contractstatutory rulesmaintainability of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former employee of a private school run by a registered society, challenged his dismissal by filing a suit for declaration and reinstatement. The trial and appellate courts decreed the suit in his favor, citing the applicability of the Baluchistan Education Code. However, the High Court set aside these decrees, ruling the suit non-maintainable under the principle of Master and Servant. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the Baluchistan Education Code possessed statutory force to govern the service conditions of private school employees. The Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any statutory authority for the Code, and that receiving government aid does not transform a private institution into a public body subject to statutory service rules. The Court affirmed that employees of private institutions are governed by the general law of Master and Servant, where specific performance of a service contract is barred by law, and the only remedy for wrongful dismissal is a suit for damages. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the receipt of government aid by a private educational institution convert it into a public body subject to statutory service rules?
  • Is a suit for declaration and reinstatement maintainable for an employee of a private institution governed by the law of Master and Servant?
  • Can a contract for personal service be specifically enforced under the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Does the Baluchistan Education Code have statutory force to govern the service conditions of employees in private schools?
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• Qamar Ud Din vs S.H.O., Police Station, Saddar Kasur1987 SCMR 2102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-26
  criminal procedureregistration of criminal casenikahfamily courtzinahabeas corpussupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the father of a major woman, Mst. Anwar Bibi, seeking a direction to the local police to register a criminal case under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 against Sohrab Khan, alleging that his daughter's subsequent nikah with Sohrab Khan was void due to a prior marriage to one Muhammad Rashid, and that she was living in adultery. The core legal question is whether the High Court should direct police registration of a criminal case regarding an allegedly void nikah and adultery when the validity of the prior marriage is disputed by the adult woman herself. The Supreme Court held that unless the prior marriage is established in a competent Family Court, it is inappropriate to direct the police to register a criminal case. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that disputed questions of marital status must be resolved by a Family Court before criminal proceedings for Zina are initiated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the police can be directed to register a case under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 when the existence of a prior marriage is disputed by the adult female?
  • Must a prior marriage be established in a Family Court before initiating criminal proceedings alleging an invalid subsequent nikah and adultery?
  • Does the rule in Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal apply when a party alleges a subsisting prior marriage against the statement of the adult corpus?
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• Qamar Ud Din Represented By Legal Heirs vs Mansoor Ahmad Malik, Additional Settlement Commissioner And Other1987 SCMR 1928 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-20
  evacuee propertySettlement Scheme No. VIIItransfer of propertyavailable propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of an evacuee property located in Gowalmandi, Lahore. The petitioners, who were local occupants of a portion of a three-storeyed house, sought the transfer of their portion under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. Their application was rejected by the Settlement authorities on the basis that the entire property had already been transferred to other occupants—who were either claimants or non-claimants—via an order dated 28-9-1966. Consequently, the authorities determined that no portion of the house remained "available" for transfer, a condition deemed a prerequisite under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The High Court subsequently upheld this decision, dismissing the petitioners' writ petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the reasoning of the Settlement authorities and the High Court to be legally sound. The Court held that where an entire property has been validly transferred to other parties, no part of it remains available for further transfer under the scheme. Finding no grounds for interference, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a portion of an evacuee house be transferred under Settlement Scheme No. VIII if the entire property has already been transferred to other parties?
  • Is the availability of a property a prerequisite for its transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
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• Qamar Ud Din And Others vs Ahmad Mumtaz And Other1987 SCMR 1513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-13
  leave to appealejectmentpersonal bona fide needlandlord and tenantgrandson as child
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the ejectment of the tenants. The original landlord sought the ejectment of the tenant from the disputed shop on the ground of personal requirement for his sons. However, evidence revealed the requirement was for a grandson whose father had predeceased the landlord. The Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application, but the Additional District Judge accepted the landlord's appeal and ordered ejectment, a decision subsequently affirmed by the High Court in a writ petition. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court relate to whether ejectment can be ordered for a ground not put to trial, and whether a grandson falls within the definition of a child of the landlord under the relevant rent restriction law. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised require detailed examination, and ordered that status quo regarding possession be maintained pending the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of ejectment can be granted on the basis of a personal need of a grandson when the original application pleaded the need of sons?
  • Whether a grandson can be regarded as a child of the landlord within the meaning of section 13(3)(ii)(a) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
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• Qaim Ali Khan vs Muhammad Siddique1987 SCMR 733 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-09
  pre-emption suitdismissal for defaultdate of hearingreplicationrestoration of suitnon-appearancefailure to file documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit that was dismissed for default under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the plaintiff failed to appear on a date fixed solely for filing a replication. The trial court and appellate court refused to restore the suit, but the Lahore High Court allowed the revision petition, holding that a date fixed for filing a replication is not a 'date of hearing' of the suit, and thus the suit could not be dismissed in default for non-appearance on such a date. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed this legal principle, holding that a plaintiff cannot be penalized for absence on a date not fixed for the actual hearing of the suit. Furthermore, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the High Court's order because the petitioner failed to file all requisite documents, including the relevant remand order, as required by established procedural rules. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a date fixed solely for the filing of a replication constitutes a 'date of hearing' for the purposes of dismissing a suit for default under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a plaintiff's suit be dismissed for non-appearance on a date fixed merely for an interlocutory matter or filing of pleadings rather than the actual hearing of the suit?
  • What is the effect of a petitioner's failure to file all requisite and material documents, such as a prior remand order, when seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
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• Qadir Bakhsh And Others vs Ahmad Bakhsh And Other1987 SCMR 1925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-18
  inheritancecustomary lawpartition suitMuslim personal lawleave to appealpresumption of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a property dispute between the children of the deceased Mst. Hayat Begum (petitioners) and her brother (respondent No. 1) regarding the inheritance of property left by their mother, Mst. Fateh Bibi. The trial court initially decreed the petitioners' suit for partition. However, the Additional District Judge reversed this decision, dismissing the suit on the assumption that because Mst. Fateh Bibi died before Independence, the parties were governed by customary law, which excluded sisters from inheritance. The High Court upheld this judgment in second appeal. The core legal question is whether the courts below erred in law by raising a presumption that Muslims residing in urban areas were governed by customary law, despite the absence of such a plea by the respondent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the contention regarding the erroneous application of customary law requires detailed consideration. The Court held that the presumption of customary law application without a factual basis or pleading constitutes a potential legal error warranting further examination by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court presume that parties are governed by customary law in the absence of such a plea?
  • Is there a legal presumption that Muslims living in urban areas are governed by customary law regarding inheritance?
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• Qadir Bakhsh And Another vs Sanwal Khan And 6 Other1987 SCMR 1820 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-13
  land allotmentland reformsmesne profitsleave to appealcivil suitdeclaration and injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over land allotment under land reform laws. The petitioners were initially allotted survey No. 232 in Deh Baro, District Naseerabad, under Martial Law Regulation No. 117. This allotment was subsequently cancelled by the Board of Revenue, and the land was granted to the respondents. The respondents filed a civil suit for declaration, injunction, possession, and mesne profits, which was decreed in their favor by the District Judge. On appeal, the High Court maintained the decree regarding the declaration, possession, and injunction but set aside the award for mesne profits, finding the claim untenable. The petitioners sought leave to appeal against this High Court judgment. The Supreme Court held that the allotment of land to the respondents had been finalized through the proper hierarchy of the Land Reforms Regulation and was legally sound. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision to deny mesne profits. Finding no substantial question of law requiring further consideration, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order of land allotment made under the hierarchy of Martial Law Regulation No. 117 subject to judicial interference if the process was finalized?
  • Are respondents entitled to mesne profits in a suit for declaration and possession where the underlying claim for such profits is found to be legally untenable?
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• Qadar Gul And Another vs Ali Rehman And Other1987 SCMR 1250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-29
  constitutional petitionrevenue courtenhancement of rentejectment of tenantcontractual tenancycompensation for improvementslawful authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examines whether the High Court erred in dismissing a constitutional petition against revenue court orders regarding rent enhancement and tenant ejectment without deeply inquiring into the lawful authority of those orders. The respondent landlord had instituted a revenue suit for rent recovery, rent enhancement, and tenant ejectment after the expiry of a lease. The revenue authorities concurrently denied ejectment but enhanced the rent and addressed improvements, culminating in a dismissal of the tenants' revision by the Member Board of Revenue, which the High Court upheld in limine. The Supreme Court held that the lower authorities and courts failed to anchor their decisions in the applicable statutory provisions of the tenancy legislation, neglecting to specify the legal basis for refusing ejectment after a fixed term, for enhancing rent, or for reconciling enhancements with tenant improvements. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, declared the impugned orders without lawful authority, and remanded the matter to the Member Board of Revenue to decide the revision petitions afresh by direct reference to the applicable provisions of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950.

  Questions settled

  • Can revenue courts enhance rent for a contractual tenancy for a fixed period without citing explicit statutory authority?
  • Does a tenant have protection against rent enhancement and ejectment until receiving compensation for improvements under the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950?
  • Whether orders passed by revenue authorities without reference to applicable statutory provisions are without lawful authority?
  • Is a tenant liable to eviction upon the expiration of the term of a contractual tenancy under section 23 of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950?
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• Punjab EMPLOYEE's Social Security Institution vs Koh I Noor Textile1987 SCMR 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-21
  social security contributionextension of timeadministrative circularpenalty impositionstatutory interpretationemployer liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the imposition of penalties for delayed social security contributions. The respondent, an employer, had been granted specific permission by the Commissioner for Social Security in 1967 to deposit contributions within 30 days of the month's end, rather than the standard 15-day period. Despite this, a Regional Director later imposed penalties for late payments, citing a routine circular issued in 1974. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner possessed the authority to extend the payment deadline and whether a subsequent routine circular could override that specific grant of extension. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner acted within the scope of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security (Contribution) Rules, 1966, which explicitly allow the Institution to extend the payment period for good cause. The Court affirmed that the routine circular did not revoke the prior, valid extension granted to the respondent. The principle established is that an administrative authority's specific grant of extension, authorized by statute, remains valid unless formally recalled, and cannot be implicitly overridden by general circulars issued by subordinate officials.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Institution have the authority to extend the time period for payment of social security contributions beyond the standard 15 days?
  • Can a routine administrative circular issued by a subordinate official implicitly revoke a specific extension of time previously granted by the Commissioner?
  • Is an employer liable for penalties for late payment if they are acting in accordance with a valid, unrevoked extension granted by the Commissioner?
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• Province of the Punjab Through Secretary, Irrigation And Power1987 SCMR 1145 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  workmanrevisional jurisdictionnew plealeave to appealtrial courtfirst appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the Province of Punjab against the respondent. The primary issue raised by the petitioner was whether the respondent qualified as a 'workman'. However, the record demonstrated that this specific question was neither raised at the initial trial stage nor presented in the subsequent appeal before the learned Additional District Judge. Instead, the petitioner sought to agitate this factual issue for the first time during the exercise of revisional jurisdiction before the High Court. The High Court refused to entertain the new plea at the revisional stage. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, holding that a new plea cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in revisional proceedings when it was omitted at trial and first appeal. Consequently, finding no merit in the petition, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new question of fact for the first time in revisional jurisdiction before the High Court?
  • Whether the High Court properly exercises its discretion by refusing to entertain an issue not agitated at trial or first appeal?
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• Province of the Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura vs Anjuman Talim Ul Islam and Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-12
  grant of landresumption of landproprietary rightstenant statusarbitration clauseColonization of Government Lands ActCollector powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a second appeal and decreed the respondent's suit challenging the resumption of land. The core legal question was whether condition No. 9 of the grant, empowering the Collector to cancel the grant and resume possession for breach of conditions, was an independent power exercisable upon violation and whether it excluded the arbitration procedure provided in the grant or the application of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The Supreme Court held that since the grantee had not yet fulfilled the conditions of the grant (specifically constructing a school), he remained a tenant pursuant to condition No. 8 and section 15 of the Act, and had not acquired full proprietary rights to attract section 30. Consequently, the Collector validly exercised the power to cancel the grant and resume the land under condition No. 9, which was saved from arbitration by its own terms. The appeal was allowed and the suit dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Collector is empowered to cancel a land grant and resume possession under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 upon a breach of the conditions of the grant?
  • Does a grantee of government land who has not fulfilled the mandatory conditions of the grant maintain the status of a tenant rather than a proprietor?
  • Whether the arbitration clause in a conveyance deed excludes the operation of the Collector's power of resumption under condition No. 9 of the grant?
  • Does section 30 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 apply to a grantee who has not acquired proprietary rights in accordance with the prescribed statement of conditions?
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• Province of Punjab, Through Collector D.G. Khan And Others vs Messrs1987 SCMR 1904 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-26
  leave to appealarbitration awardrule of the courtlimitation periodextension of timecivil revisionexecution appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Provincial Government and others sought leave to appeal against judgments of the Lahore High Court which dismissed their civil revision arising from an arbitration award made rule of the court and dismissed their execution appeal. The dispute arose from a road construction contract wherein an arbitrator rendered an award against the petitioners. The petitioners raised contentions regarding the rank of the arbitrator, the expiration of the four-month period for rendering the award without formal extension, and the non-applicability of limitation against a null and void award. The Supreme Court held that the question regarding the arbitrator's rank was a question of fact not raised before the High Court and could not be entertained at that stage. Furthermore, correspondence by the court amounted to an extension of time, concluding the factual findings on limitation. The Court laid down that concurrent findings of fact regarding extension of time by the courts below will not be interfered with lightly, and dismissed both petitions for lack of force.

  Questions settled

  • Can a question of fact regarding the rank of an arbitrator, not raised before the High Court, be entertained for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether official correspondence and reminders sent by a court to an arbitrator can be interpreted as granting an extension of time for rendering an arbitration award?
  • Does the bar of limitation operate against objections filed out of time when the underlying arbitration award is challenged as a nullity?
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• Province of Punjab vs Sher Muhammad And Another1987 SCMR 1351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-08
  land acquisitionstay of executioninterim orderdiscretionary powercompensation awardsecurity for refund
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Province of Punjab against an order of the Lahore High Court, which refused to stay execution proceedings regarding compensation awarded for land acquired under the Lahore Township Scheme. The respondents were granted compensation at a rate of Rs.2,000 per Kanal by the civil court following a reference under the Land Acquisition Act. The High Court had declined to stay the execution but permitted the respondents to withdraw the awarded amount subject to furnishing security for potential refund, should the government's appeal succeed. The petitioner challenged this interim order, raising issues regarding the maintainability of the reference, limitation, and the government's alleged lack of funds. The Supreme Court held that the legal questions regarding the merits of the appeal would be addressed by the High Court during the final adjudication. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a plea of non-availability of funds does not justify staying execution proceedings, especially when the High Court has already secured the petitioner's interest by requiring security for refund. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as the Court found no justification to interfere with the High Court's discretionary interim order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-availability of funds justify a stay of execution proceedings in a land acquisition case?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a discretionary interim order of the High Court regarding the stay of execution?
  • Is it appropriate for the High Court to allow the withdrawal of compensation money subject to the furnishing of security for refund pending an appeal?
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• Province of Punjab vs Ch. Rashid Ahmad1987 SCMR 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-25
  service tribunalabatement of suitscivil servant statusjurisdiction of service tribunalslocal council serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Punjab Services Tribunal, which dismissed the Government of Punjab's appeal regarding the service status of a Local Council Service member. The respondent had initially obtained a civil court decree concerning his service conditions in 1973. Following a 1978 amendment to the Local Government Ordinance, 1979, which classified Local Council Service members as civil servants under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, the Government sought to transfer the matter to the Punjab Services Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding it incompetent because the original civil court decree had attained finality. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of abatement under Section 8 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974. The core legal question is whether the establishment of the Tribunal for a specific class of employees, following a legislative amendment, triggers the abatement of pending civil proceedings and allows for a fresh appeal before the Tribunal within the statutory limitation period, notwithstanding prior civil court proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the establishment of a Service Tribunal for a specific class of employees trigger the abatement of pending civil suits concerning their service matters?
  • Can an appeal be filed before a Service Tribunal within ninety days of the establishment of the Tribunal for a specific class of employees, even if a civil court decree was previously passed?
  • Does an amendment classifying employees as civil servants retrospectively bring them under the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal for the purpose of pending litigation?
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• Province of Punjab Through Secretary Education, Lahore And Others1987 SCMR 1173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-22
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantresidential buildingpersonal usegood faithleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments of the courts below ordering the ejectment of the petitioner, who operates a school in the rented premises. The landlord sought ejectment claiming the premises were required in good faith for his own use and the use of his sons, specifically stating at trial an intention to establish a school. The core legal question concerns whether a landlord can obtain the vacation of a residential building under the relevant rent restriction provisions for establishing a school rather than for personal residence. The Supreme Court observed that the statutory provision prima facie applies when a landlord requires the building for occupation by themselves or their children, and not for commercial purposes such as running a school, noting that evicting an existing school to start another would contravene the statutory intent. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further while maintaining the interim stay order during the pendency of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord can get a residential building vacated under section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 for establishing a school instead of for personal residence?
  • Does the requirement of a building for commercial purposes such as running a school fall within the scope of personal occupation under the rent restriction law?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Through Collector, Faisalabad And Others vs Ali1987 SCMR 664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-04
  State landproprietary rightsejected tenant schemeconstitutional petitiongovernment policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals against a judgment of the Lahore High Court that allowed constitutional petitions regarding the acquisition of proprietary rights in State land by allottees under the ejected tenant scheme. The core legal question concerned the legality of denying the purchase of State land exceeding a specific limit. Based on a change in government policy and a compromise reached between the parties, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeals by permitting the allotment of the excess land subject to the fulfillment of prescribed conditions and payments. The Court held that the precise amount to be paid by the respondents under the revised policy should be determined by the competent authorities after affording an opportunity of hearing, keeping open the question of calculation. The principle laid down is that administrative authorities must apply revised government policies regarding land disposal fairly and consistently, ensuring equal treatment to similarly situated parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether allottees under the ejected tenant scheme are entitled to purchase State land in excess of the prescribed limit upon a change in government policy?
  • How should the market value and additional charges for excess State land be calculated upon the adoption of a revised government policy?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Through Collector vs Muhammad Iqbal Qureshi And Other1987 SCMR 719 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-01
  civil court jurisdictionservice tribunalleave to appealdepartmental examinationN.P.S.-16service matters
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, concerning the jurisdiction of civil courts in service matters. The core legal questions involve whether the civil court possessed the jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit in light of the provisions of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, and whether the High Court correctly determined that the civil court had jurisdiction. Furthermore, the petition challenges the High Court's finding regarding the entitlement of the petitioners to retain N.P.S.-16 status despite failing to pass the departmental examination. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, finding these issues to be of public importance, granted leave to appeal to consider the jurisdictional and service-related questions raised. The Court ordered that the matter be heard on the existing record, with liberty for parties to file additional documents, and suspended the operation of the impugned order of the High Court pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to adjudicate matters falling under the Punjab Service Tribunal Act 1974?
  • Is the finding of the High Court regarding the jurisdiction of the civil court in service matters correct under the Punjab Service Tribunal Act 1974?
  • Are employees entitled to retain N.P.S.-16 status if they have not passed the required departmental examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Through Collector Faisalabad And Others vs Mirza1987 SCMR 1391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-04
  arbitration awardlimitation periodremission of awardarbitration proceedingsleave to appealprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against the rejection of objections filed by the petitioners regarding an arbitration award. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in refusing to remit the arbitration awards to the arbitrator for failing to provide sufficient reasons, particularly in light of the Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's decision was correct because the objections were time-barred. Furthermore, regarding the petitioners' contention that the awards lacked sufficient reasoning and should have been remitted under Section 3(1) of the Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981, the Court found no merit in this argument. The ratio of the decision is that a party cannot seek relief on appeal regarding the remission of an award for lack of reasoning if such a request was never formally made before the trial court or the appellate court below. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed as the petitioners failed to raise the specific prayer for remission at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek the remission of an arbitration award for lack of reasoning on appeal if the request was not made before the trial court?
  • Are objections to an arbitration award filed outside the statutory limitation period maintainable?
  • Does the Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance 1981 mandate the automatic remission of awards lacking sufficient reasons without a request from the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Baluchistan Through Secretary, C & W Department, Quetta1987 SCMR 1755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-15
  withdrawal of appealappellate procedurecivil appealdismissal of appealprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal filed by the Province of Baluchistan, represented by the Secretary of the C & W Department. Upon the commencement of proceedings, the learned Advocate-General, acting on behalf of the appellant, formally requested the Court's permission to withdraw the appeal. The learned counsel for the respondent indicated that they had no objection to this request. Consequently, the Court granted the permission sought by the appellant. The Supreme Court of Pakistan accordingly dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, with no order issued regarding costs. The judgment serves as a procedural record of the voluntary withdrawal of the appeal by the appellant with the concurrence of the respondent, thereby concluding the litigation between the parties before the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellant withdraw an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan with the consent of the respondent?
  • Does the withdrawal of an appeal by the appellant result in an order as to costs?
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• Professor Attaul Haq vs Inayat Saeed And Another1987 SCMR 1714 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-09
  leave to appealfinding of factwrit petitionrent restrictionSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a writ petition arising from proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The petitioner sought to challenge the High Court's decision before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Upon review of the impugned judgment and hearing the arguments presented by the petitioner's counsel, the Supreme Court determined that the decision of the High Court was based entirely on a finding of fact. The Court held that the matter did not involve any substantial question of law that would necessitate intervention or a decision by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition. This judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will generally decline to interfere in matters where the lower court's decision rests on findings of fact rather than legal error or constitutional interpretation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal in cases where the impugned judgment is based solely on a finding of fact?
  • Is a finding of fact by the High Court sufficient to warrant interference by the Supreme Court in a rent restriction matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Pirzadaamir Hassan And Another vs Mrs. Shamim Shah Nawaz And Another1987 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-21
  specific performanceclosure of evidenceadjournmentres judicataleave to appealagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' Regular First Appeal and upheld the decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell passed in favour of the respondent-side. The core legal questions involved whether the trial court was legally justified in closing the petitioners' evidence upon repeated adjournments and failure to produce evidence, and whether the dismissal of an earlier suit for a mandatory injunction rendered the subsequent suit for specific performance barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court held that the trial court and the High Court rightly concluded that the provisions permitting the court to proceed forthwith upon refusal of an adjournment justified the closure of evidence, and that the earlier suit for a mandatory injunction to obtain transfer documents was distinct and did not bar the subsequent suit for specific performance. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the principle that trial courts possess inherent powers under procedural rules to prevent the abuse of adjournments and advance proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is empowered to close a party's evidence upon the unjustified failure to produce evidence and refusal of further adjournments?
  • Does the dismissal of an earlier suit for a mandatory injunction to obtain property transfer documents operate as res judicata against a subsequent suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell?
  • Whether the provisions of Order XVII Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 authorize a court to proceed with a suit forthwith when sufficient cause for adjournment is not shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Piran Ditta vs Member, Revenue Board And Another1987 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-14
  pre-emptiontenancypast and closed transactionsshariat appellate benchconstitutional petitionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging a pre-emption decree passed in favour of the respondent/pre-emptor on the ground of tenancy. The High Court had declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact on tenancy rendered by the revenue authorities. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner sought to challenge the decree by relying on the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgment in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360). The Supreme Court held that since the appellate judgment in the present case was passed on May 24, 1984, which was well before the effective date of the Malik Said Kamal Shah judgment (July 31, 1986), the proceedings had become past and closed. Consequently, the petitioner could not derive any benefit from the declaration of un-Islamic provisions in the pre-emption laws. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption decree passed and finalized before July 31, 1986, is affected by the Supreme Court Shariat Appellate Bench's judgment in the Malik Said Kamal Shah case?
  • Can a vendee claim retrospective benefit from the Malik Said Kamal Shah judgment to defeat a pre-emption decree that attained finality prior to the date the relevant pre-emption laws became ineffective?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Khan Through His Legal Heirs vs Military Estate Officer, Abbottabad1987 PLD SC 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-08
  land acquisitioncompensation enhancementright of appeallocus standibeneficiary entitystatutory rightreference to court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2)(e) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arose from land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. Land was acquired for the Central Government (Pakistan Ordnance Factory Havelian). The owner, dissatisfied with the Collector's award, obtained an enhanced compensation rate from the Senior Civil Judge under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The Military Estate Officer and the Central Government appealed the decree to the High Court, which reduced the compensation. The land owner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that neither the beneficiary nor the Central Government had locus standi to appeal. The Supreme Court held that right of appeal is purely statutory. Under Section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, local authorities or beneficiary entities are barred from demanding a reference under Section 18 and have no statutory right to appeal the court's decree. The Court distinguished general principles allowing affected non-parties to appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court's judgment was set aside and the trial court's decree restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does a beneficiary entity or local authority for whose benefit land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 have the right to file an appeal against an order enhancing compensation?
  • Can a right of appeal be inferred or implied in the absence of an express statutory provision?
  • Does the principle permitting an adversely affected stranger to appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to references under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Bakhsh Represented by His Legal Heirs and Other vs The Chairman, Allotment Committee and Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-17
  res judicatajudgment in remjudgment in personampast and closed transactionrehabilitation allotmentsprecedentprospective operationsettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated batch of civil appeals by special leave arises from judgments of the Lahore High Court concerning the revision of agricultural land allotments under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Schemes. The core legal questions involved the scope and effect of judgments in rem versus judgments in personam, the applicability and limits of the doctrine of res judicata, the finality of past and closed transactions, and whether a subsequent favorable ruling of the Supreme Court can reopen matters finally adjudicated inter partes where no appeal was preferred. The Supreme Court held that proceedings relating to individual claims of land allotments are actions in personam, and judgments rendered therein are binding only between the parties or their privies. Once rights are finally determined inter partes, they assume finality as past and closed transactions, and a subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court overruling the legal view taken by the High Court operates prospectively under Article 189 of the Constitution and does not have the effect of automatically reopening concluded rights or overriding the bar of res judicata against parties who failed to challenge the earlier judgment. The Court laid down principles distinguishing judgments in rem under Section 41 of the Evidence Act from judgments in personam, and reaffirmed that the binding effect of res judicata applies to decisions of competent courts even if subsequently found to be erroneous in law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment rendered in a writ petition regarding land allotment claims is a judgment in rem or a judgment in personam?
  • Does a subsequent declaration of law by the Supreme Court operate retroactively to reopen rights and matters finally concluded by a High Court judgment that was not appealed against?
  • Does the bar of res judicata apply where a previous judicial decision between the same parties is subsequently found to be founded on an erroneous view of the law?
  • Can a party who was not properly impleaded or represented in earlier writ proceedings be held bound by the final judgment rendered therein?
  Read full judgment →
• Pehlaj Rai vs Khem Chand And Other1987 SCMR 1772 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-07
  leave to appeallandlord and tenantdisputed titleejectmentrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from four petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeals under section 15 of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The core legal dispute involves a claim by the petitioner as landlord seeking the ejectment of the respondents, who disputed his title and claimed the property devolved to the State by escheat from a Hindu widow. The Rent Controller initially ordered ejectment, finding the landlord-tenant relationship established. However, the High Court set this aside, holding that the petitioner's title was clouded and pending civil litigation precluded ejectment, relying on precedent regarding genuine doubts on title in summary rent proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised substantial questions of law requiring examination, particularly regarding whether the tenants had successfully created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's title and whether prior procedural orders regarding staying the appeals were violated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller order the ejectment of a tenant when the landlord's title is subject to genuine and reasonable doubt?
  • Whether pending civil litigation challenging a landlord's title constitutes a bar to summary ejectment proceedings?
  • Do appeals pending before the High Court under the rent laws warrant a stay of proceedings pending the final decision of a related civil suit regarding property title?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan vs Public at LargeK.L.R. 1987 Labour and Service Cases 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-06Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Through The General Manager, Pakistan RailwaysLahore vs Messrs Q.M.R. Expert Consultants, Lahore1987 SCMR 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-22
  arbitration awardlimitation for objectionsservice of noticetermination of counselgovernment pleaderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a High Court order in revisional jurisdiction, which set aside a Civil Judge's order and held that the petitioner's time to file objections to an arbitration award had expired. The petitioner, Pakistan Railways, had its contract dispute referred to arbitration under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. After the award was filed, notice was served on the petitioner's former standing counsel, whose services had been terminated prior to the filing of the award but without obtaining the leave of the court under Order III Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court ruled that service on the counsel constituted valid service on the petitioner under Order III Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner contended that the special provisions of Order XXVII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 overrode the general provisions of Order III, and that the presumption of communication was rebutted by the termination of the counsel's engagement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these substantial legal questions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service of notice of an arbitration award on a counsel whose engagement was terminated, but without the court's leave under Order III Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, constitutes valid service on the client?
  • Does the special provision for service on Government Pleaders under Order XXVII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 override the general provisions of Order III Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is the presumption of communication of process to a party under Order III Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 rebuttable by proving the prior termination of the counsel's appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Rab Nawaz vs Mst. Mehr Sawai And Other1987 SCMR 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-10
  leave to appealinheritancepartition of propertycivil revisionuncontested issue
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's civil revision in a matter concerning inheritance. The plaintiff-respondent, Mst. Mehr Sawai, filed a suit for her share in the inheritance property of her deceased husband, Sultan A.I Shah, which was decreed by the trial court and upheld in first appeal and revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner, claiming as a successor-in-interest from the heirs, urged that the property had already been partitioned as framed under issue No. 7. The Supreme Court observed that the trial court had correctly noted that the defendants at whose instance the issue was framed did not contest the suit, leading to the decision against them. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petition lacked force and dismissed it. The key principle affirmed is that an un-contested issue regarding prior partition cannot be successfully urged by a successor-in-interest when the defendants who raised it failed to contest the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a successor-in-interest press an issue of prior partition when the defendants at whose instance the issue was framed failed to contest the suit?
  • Whether a civil revision arising out of an inheritance suit can be maintained when the underlying factual issues were left uncontested at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Television Corporation vs S. Ahtramullah1987 SCMR 753 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-02
  service matterwrit jurisdictionintra-court appealservice tribunalspecial powers ordinancecivil servantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed an Intra-Court Appeal as not maintainable. The dispute arose when the Pakistan Television Corporation removed the respondent from service under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance 1978. The respondent successfully challenged this removal in a writ petition, arguing his appointment date fell outside the Ordinance's scope. The petitioner Corporation contended that the respondent was appointed earlier, thus falling within the Ordinance's purview, and that the removal was protected by Article 15(2) of the Provisional Constitution Order 1981 and the Constitution (8th Amendment) Order 1985. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the High Court lacked jurisdiction because the respondent, as a deemed civil servant, should have approached the Service Tribunal under the Service Tribunals Act 1973, pursuant to Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting the substantial questions of law regarding jurisdiction and the applicability of the Service Tribunals Act, and suspended the operation of the impugned High Court order pending final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunals Act 1973 bar the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters concerning the removal of employees of the Pakistan Television Corporation?
  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal can be dismissed as not maintainable if the underlying writ petition was filed against an order passed under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance 1978?
  • Does Article 15(2) of the Provisional Constitution Order 1981 validate orders passed under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance 1978 notwithstanding a contrary High Court judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Sports Cooperative Society Ltd vs KH. Muhammad Iqbal Butt1987 SCMR 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-20
  property disputesettlement lawpermanent transfer ordertransfer documentfinality of orderscorrection of error
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a dispute over the transfer of property, specifically a double-storeyed building associated with an industrial concern, Kuckreja Sports Limited. The petitioner, having purchased the industrial concern at auction, sought to include the double-storeyed building in its transfer, a request initially granted by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. However, the respondent successfully appealed this decision to the Settlement Commissioner, who ruled that the portion in the respondent's possession be transferred to him. This order became final. Subsequently, the respondent obtained a Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) that contradicted the final order by including property previously awarded to the petitioner. The petitioner sought correction of this P.T.O. from the Chief Settlement Commissioner, who ordered the document to be amended to align with the final order. The High Court later set aside this correction, prompting the current petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question concerns whether a transfer document must strictly conform to the final underlying transfer order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that transfer documents must conform to the contents of the final transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Must a Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) conform to the contents of the final transfer order?
  • Can a Settlement Department issue a transfer document that contradicts a final judicial order?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the authority to direct the amendment of a P.T.O. to make it consistent with a final order?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Sports Co Operative Industrial Society Ltd. vs Khawaja1987 SCMR 953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-07
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertysettlement authoritiesleave to appealadministrative correctiontransfer order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the ownership of two rooms previously attached to an evacuee industrial concern purchased by the petitioner-society. The respondent, a displaced person, had obtained a transfer order for an adjacent evacuee house, which included the disputed rooms. Following a series of litigation rounds, including eviction proceedings where the respondent successfully evicted the petitioner, the Additional Settlement Commissioner directed the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to correct the transfer documents to align with an earlier Settlement Commissioner order dated 6-12-1960, which allegedly excluded the disputed rooms from the respondent's transfer. The High Court, however, set aside this direction, prompting the current petition. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the petitioner's contention—that the respondent's transfer was based on an order that never included the disputed rooms—required further examination. The Court held that the legality of the administrative correction of transfer documents based on the original, final Settlement Commissioner order warrants a deeper judicial review to determine if the respondent's claim to the property was legally substantiated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner's original transfer order be used to correct subsequent transfer documents issued to a party?
  • Does a party have a valid claim to property that was not included in the original transfer order issued by the Settlement Commissioner?
  • Is a High Court's interference in administrative corrections of transfer documents justified when the corrections align with the original settlement order?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Progressive Cement Industries Ltd. (Now National Cement1987 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-11
  leave to appealbusiness expenditureinterest on purchase priceincome taxdeductions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, wherein the petitioners challenged the tax treatment of interest paid on the purchase price of the Dalimia Cement Factory Limited. The core legal question examined by the court is whether the amount of interest paid by the petitioners on the purchase price could be deemed to have been incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business and consequently allowed as a permissible deduction. The court granted leave to appeal to consider this question in depth based on the facts and circumstances of the case, requiring security of Rs. 5,000 in each case. The key principle relates to the interpretation and application of business expenditure deductions under tax law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interest paid on the purchase price of a factory can be deemed to have been incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business under the Income-tax Act 1922?
  • Can interest payments on capital acquisitions qualify as allowable business deductions?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Post Office vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1987 SCMR 1119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-11
  lachesequitable jurisdictiondepartmental delaywrit petitiongovernment litigationstatutory limitationevacuee propertydiscretionary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Peshawar High Court on the ground of laches regarding an urban settlement dispute. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly dismissed the petition without addressing the merits, and how the doctrine of laches applies to government litigation involving departmental delays. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its approach. It established that laches is an equitable doctrine, distinct from the statutory bar of limitation, and does not operate as an inflexible rule. The Court emphasized that the discretion to dismiss a writ petition on laches must not be exercised to perpetuate injustice. Furthermore, departmental delays in government litigation should be evaluated on their own merits rather than being automatically rejected under an inflexible formula. Consequently, the Court set aside the dismissal, ruling that a void, unjust, and improper order should not be shielded by the doctrine of laches, especially when the delay is reasonably explained and no estoppel arises.

  Questions settled

  • Is the doctrine of laches equivalent to the statutory bar of limitation?
  • Should departmental delays in government litigation be automatically rejected as a ground for condonation?
  • Can a High Court dismiss a writ petition on the ground of laches if the impugned order is void and unjust?
  • Does the principle of laches apply to government litigation in the same manner as it applies to private litigants?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Burmah Shell Limited vs Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi And Other1987 SCMR 1288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-11
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentlandlord and tenantsuccession certificatenotice under section 13-Aurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an ejectment order concurrently maintained against the appellant public limited company by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, and subsequently upheld by the Lahore High Court in writ proceedings. The appellant had leased a piece of land from the original owner, Brig. K.M. Idris, and after his death and the subsequent death of his widow, disputes or doubts arose regarding the payment of rent to the legal heirs, leading the appellant to withhold rent for a prolonged period. The core legal question was whether the absence of a formal notice under section 13-A of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, vitiated the eviction proceedings and whether the appellant's failure to pay rent constituted wilful default. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had sufficient knowledge of the devolution of ownership and that, in any case, the rent could have been deposited before the Rent Controller. The Court established that failure to serve a notice under section 13-A does not negate the relationship of landlord and tenant, and non-payment of rent following the eviction application renders the tenant liable to eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of a notice under section 13-A of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, amounts to the absence of a relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Does the failure to pay or deposit rent during the pendency of eviction proceedings constitute a wilful default making the tenant liable to eviction?
  • Is a tenant justified in withholding rent indefinitely on the ground of uncertainty regarding which legal heir is entitled to receive it?
  Read full judgment →
• Painda Gul And Another vs The State And Another1987 SCMR 886 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-04
  criminal revisionadditional evidencesummoning court witnessfilling lacunarevisional jurisdictionfunctus officioremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal calls in question an order of the Peshawar High Court whereby a criminal revision filed by respondent No. 2 was accepted, the trial court's order was set aside, and the prosecution was permitted to exhibit a cheque as case property and examine additional witnesses under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions involved the scope of the trial court's powers, the finality of earlier interlocutory and revisional orders, and the bar under section 439(4)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding successive revisions. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that fundamental questions of jurisdiction and the procedural history of repeated applications had not been properly considered by the High Court. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision in light of the background facts and observations made. The key principle laid down is that while section 540 confers wide discretionary powers on courts, such powers must be exercised with caution, and lower courts and high courts must consider the legal bars of finality, previous dismissals, and statutory restrictions on revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is barred by subsection (4)(b) of section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 from exercising revisional jurisdiction with respect to an order previously considered and dismissed in revision by the Sessions Judge?
  • Can a party circumvent statutory bars on successive applications or revisions by repeatedly filing fresh applications for summoning additional witnesses under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • To what extent are courts restricted from reviewing or altering their own earlier interlocutory decisions in light of the general principles of finality in criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• P.S. Ramdasia vs Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore And Other1987 SCMR 1148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-20
  remand of casesettlement proceedingsnotified officerInter-Court Appealpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court concerning the remand of a settlement case. The petitioner contended in an Inter-Court Appeal that the case ought to have been remanded to the Chief Settlement Commissioner rather than the Additional Settlement Commissioner because an earlier order had been passed by the former, creating potential embarrassment for subordinate authorities. The High Court Division Bench observed that following the repeal of the relevant law by Act XIV of 1975, neither the Chief Settlement Commissioner nor the Additional Settlement Commissioner exists, and the case must instead be decided by a notified officer. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan noted that the Single Judge's remand order had already explicitly directed the deciding authority to dispose of the matter independently without being influenced by the previous directions of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the petition with these clarifying observations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a case remanded by the High Court under repealed settlement laws should be decided by a notified officer?
  • Can a subordinate settlement authority decide a remanded case without being influenced by previous orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Obaid Ud Salam And Others vs Faiz Muhammad Khan And Other1987 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-10
  pre-emption moneyextension of timepublic holidaydiscretionary jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which allowed the respondent pre-emptor's writ petitions concerning the extension of time for depositing pre-emption money. The core legal question involved the validity of extending the time for depositing pre-emption money when the preceding day was a public holiday, and the scope of interference by a revisional court and a constitutional court with a discretionary order. The Supreme Court held that the trial Court's order extending time under section 23(4) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, was passed in exercise of a discretionary jurisdiction, and the District Judge acted without lawful authority in setting aside that discretionary order in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without establishing any jurisdictional defect, illegality, or irregularity. Consequently, the High Court's judgment upholding the extension was unexceptionable. The key principle laid down is that a revisional court cannot interfere with a proper exercise of judicial discretion by a trial court under section 23(4) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, in the absence of jurisdictional error or material irregularity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court's order extending time for deposit of pre-emption money under section 23 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950 is a discretionary order?
  • Can a revisional court interfere with a discretionary order of the trial court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without proof of illegality or jurisdictional defect?
  • Does section 9 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956 permit the deposit of pre-emption money on the next working day when the deadline falls on a public holiday?
  Read full judgment →
• Nusrat Ali Shah and Other vs Amir and Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-10
  fraudulent allotmentevacuee propertyconfiscation ordermartial law regulationrural rehabilitation and settlement schemebona fide purchaserland settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arise from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning disputes over land allotments between alienees of fraudulent claimants and subsequent allottees. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether sales of land in favour of contesting respondents by fake persons and fraudulent means were protected against appellants' allotments, and to determine the effect of the Rural Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme regarding alienations where the Special Military Court did not order confiscation of fraudulent properties. The Supreme Court held that upon the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 49 and the cancellation of allotments, the disputed lands assumed the status of evacuee property and vested in the Custodian. The court ruled that properties excluded from the order of confiscation by Martial Law authorities were not the personal property of the fraud perpetrator and therefore could not receive protection under President's Order No. 26 of 1962, as their status as evacuee property remained unaltered. The judgment establishes that alienations of land obtained through fraud or misrepresentation remain void and continue as evacuee property, incapable of being retained by bona fide purchasers under the guise of confiscation exclusions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land obtained through fraudulent claims and subsequently alienated can retain its status as evacuee property notwithstanding its exclusion from a Martial Law confiscation order?
  • Does the exclusion of certain properties from a criminal confiscation order against a fraud perpetrator confer valid title upon subsequent alienees of bogus allotments?
  • Whether alienations of land made by bogus allottees are deemed void under the provisions of the Rural Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
  • Can protection under President's Order No. 26 of 1962 be extended to properties that do not constitute the personal property of the convicted person?
  Read full judgment →
• Noori And Others vs The State And Other1987 SCMR 1806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-12
  criminal petition for leave to appealconstructive liabilityunlawful assemblymurderbenefit of doubtcompromisesentence computation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning convictions under sections 302, 325, 323, and 148 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The primary legal question addressed is whether section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code was correctly applied in a case involving multiple injuries, a concerted attack, and a background of enmity where the fatal injury was not specifically attributed to an individual accused. The Supreme Court held that section 149 was rightly invoked given the concerted nature of the attack and the multitude of injuries sustained by the victims, and accordingly dismissed the petition on merits while granting the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The key principle laid down is that constructive liability under section 149 is attracted in a concerted assault by an unlawful assembly where injuries are numerous and demonstrative of a joint action, even if the specific fatal blow is not pinned on a particular assailant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code is applicable in a concerted attack where the fatal head injury is not specifically attributed to any individual member of the accused party?
  • Can criminal petitions for leave to appeal seeking enhancement of sentence be dismissed as withdrawn on the basis of a compromise between the parties?
  • Is corroboration mandatory for ocular testimony in cases involving a background of previous enmity and cross cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad And 7 Others vs Haji Shahamand And 3 Other1987 SCMR 2057 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-03
  pre-emption suitlimitationmutation attestationconcurrent findingsspecial leave to appealprice calculation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a pre-emption suit where the Trial Court, District Judge, and High Court concurrently decreed the suit in favor of the respondents. The petitioners challenged the decision on two primary grounds: first, that the suit was barred by limitation, arguing that the starting point for limitation should be the date of taking possession rather than the date of mutation attestation; and second, that the courts erred in calculating the price at which the land should be pre-empted. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the lower courts, noting that the trial and appellate courts found no reliable evidence to support the petitioners' claim regarding the date of possession. Regarding the price calculation, the Court observed that this was a question of fact concurrently decided against the petitioners by the subordinate courts. Finding no infirmity in the lower courts' concurrent findings of fact, the Supreme Court held that there was no merit in the petition and refused to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the date of taking possession or the date of mutation attestation serve as the starting point for limitation in a pre-emption suit when evidence of prior possession is unreliable?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the price calculation in a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Ahmad vs Shamir And Other1987 SCMR 722 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-09
  murderenhancement of sentencelife imprisonmentfamily honourgrave and sudden provocationcondonation of delaylimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard two connected petitions arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench. The High Court had maintained the conviction of the respondents under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but reduced their sentences from death to life imprisonment. The complainant filed Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 299 of 1981 seeking enhancement of sentence to the extreme penalty, arguing the murder was premeditated. Concurrently, the convicts filed Jail Petition No. 69/R of 1984 seeking acquittal, which was barred by 981 days without sufficient cause for condonation. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, noting the prosecution witnesses established the crime, while the reduction of death sentence to imprisonment for life was justified because the immediate cause remained shrouded in mystery and the motive involved vindication of family honour due to suspected illicit relations with the convicts' mother. Consequently, the Court dismissed the jail petition on grounds of limitation and merits, refusing to interfere with the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether being landless tenants constitutes sufficient ground for condonation of a 981-day delay in filing a jail petition?
  • Whether the vindication of family honour due to suspected illicit relations constitutes a valid mitigating circumstance for altering a sentence of death to life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment when the immediate cause of the murder remains shrouded in mystery?
  Read full judgment →
• Nizamuddin Yahya and Other vs Additional Chief Land Commissioner, Sind and Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-22
  Land Reforms Regulationvested rightsdelegated legislationcivil servant land holdingretrospective operationstatutory notificationallotment of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, specifically regarding land holdings of civil servants. The appellants, legal heirs of a deceased civil servant, challenged the retrospective application of a notification that reclassified their land as self-acquired, thereby reducing their permissible holding. The core legal questions were whether land allotted under Settlement Laws constitutes inherited land under the proviso to paragraph 10(1) of the Regulation, and whether a subsequent notification could divest rights already vested under an earlier notification. The Court held that land allotted under Settlement Laws does not constitute inherited land or land acquired in lieu thereof by exchange or sale. However, the Court ruled that the appellants had acquired a vested right under the earlier notification before its cancellation. The Court established the principle that a subordinate body exercising delegated legislative power cannot issue notifications that retrospectively take away or destroy rights already accrued under previous valid notifications. Consequently, the Court set aside the order applying the later notification to the appellants' case.

  Questions settled

  • Does land allotted under Settlement Laws constitute land acquired in lieu of inherited land under the proviso to paragraph 10(1) of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
  • Can a subordinate authority, in exercise of delegated legislative power, issue a notification that retrospectively destroys rights already vested under a previous notification?
  • Does the mere pendency of proceedings for determining land holdings prevent a party from claiming a vested right under a statutory notification?
  Read full judgment →
• Nizam Din And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 1555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-15
  leave to appealgrave and sudden provocationmurderculpable homicidecriminal appealsota blows
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioners under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of the deceased following a sudden altercation. The core legal question revolves around whether the circumstances of the case, arising from a heated exchange regarding family honor and a taunt about an illicit pregnancy, constitute grave and sudden provocation sufficient to bring the offense within Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court held that the contention regarding grave and sudden provocation required further consideration as the High Court had failed to advert to this aspect. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal to examine the applicability of Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code, establishing that appellate forums must duly consider pleas of grave and sudden provocation raised on the facts of the prosecution's own case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the facts alleged by the prosecution constitute a case of grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is an appellate court required to consider the plea of grave and sudden provocation when raised on the prosecution's own version of facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Hussain vs The State1987 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-25
  murderdeath sentencemitigating circumstancesgrave and sudden provocationleave to appealcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a criminal trial where the petitioner, Nisar Hussain, and a co-accused were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Zafar Abbas and sentenced to death, which sentence was confirmed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a lesser penalty of imprisonment for life should be awarded instead of the death sentence on the ground of provocation, arising from the deceased having previously abused and slapped the petitioner in a public gathering. The Supreme Court held that the death sentence was justified and refused leave to appeal, observing that the provocation claimed was the result of the petitioner's own wrongful act of teasing female visitors at a religious gathering, and the deceased was fully justified in reprimanding him. The key principle laid down is that self-created provocation, arising from retaliation against lawful reprimand for an immoral act, does not constitute a mitigating circumstance warranting a lesser penalty in a murder case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether self-created provocation resulting from a deceased's lawful reprimand for teasing women constitutes a mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser penalty?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted to imprisonment for life when the motive for the murder is retaliation for a public insult lawfully inflicted upon the accused?
  • Whether multiple fatal stab wounds inflicted on vital organs preclude the extension of leniency in sentencing under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmed vs Director, Chiltan Ghee Mills And Another1987 SCMR 1836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-14
  master and servantconstitutional petitiontermination of servicestatutory rulescorporation employeeswrongful dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of Chiltan Ghee Mills, had his services terminated by the employer with three months' salary in lieu of notice. He challenged the termination through a constitutional petition before the High Court of Baluchistan, which was dismissed on the principle of master and servant following the Supreme Court precedent in Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. Upon seeking leave to appeal, the petitioner contended that his service was governed by statutory rules framed under the Hydrogenated Vegetable Oil Industries (Control and Development) Act, 1973, which provided protection against arbitrary termination. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the matter and held that the petitioner failed to establish that the rules relied upon were validly framed statutory rules backed by delegated power from the Federal Government. The Court concluded that the master and servant relationship applied, the termination was a valid termination simpliciter under the applicable service rules without casting any stigma of misconduct, and the constitutional petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service rules of a corporation framed without a valid delegation of rule-making power from the Federal Government have statutory force?
  • Does a constitutional petition lie against the termination of service of a corporate employee where no statutory rules regulate their employment conditions?
  • Whether the termination of an employee's service on the ground of medical unfitness amounts to removal by way of punishment for misconduct attracting an inquiry?
  • When does the principle of master and servant apply to the employment contracts of corporate bodies set up under statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Niamat Khan And Another vs The State Through Enforcement Staff, Evacuee Property, Lahore And Other1987 SCMR 1468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-16
  constitutional petitiondiscretionary jurisdictiondismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration applicationgross negligencespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' constitutional petition against orders passed by settlement authorities. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court rightly declined to entertain a second constitutional petition after the petitioners' earlier writ petition and subsequent restoration applications were dismissed for non-prosecution and gross negligence. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is discretionary in nature and that substantial reasons were provided by the High Court for refusing to entertain the second petition due to the petitioners' gross negligence. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the impugned order and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that the High Court's discretionary constitutional jurisdiction will not be exercised in favour of a party that has been grossly negligent in pursuing earlier remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction is of a discretionary nature?
  • Can a second constitutional petition be entertained when an earlier writ petition was dismissed for non-prosecution and lack of diligence?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's refusal to exercise discretionary constitutional jurisdiction based on gross negligence?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazra And Another vs District Judge, Gujranwala And Other1987 SCMR 1874 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-09
  pre-emption suitabatement of suitdeath of plaintifflegal representativespartial pre-emptionindependent right to pre-empt
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of the petitioners' application for the abatement of a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the death of one of the co-plaintiffs during the pendency of a pre-emption suit, whose legal representatives were not brought on record within time, results in the abatement of the entire suit on the ground of partial pre-emption or non-survival of the right to sue. The Supreme Court held that the suit did not abate as a whole, distinguishing prior case law where an appeal had abated, and applied the principle that the test for abatement is whether the suit could initially have been instituted and prosecuted without the deceased plaintiff. Since each plaintiff possessed an equal and independent right to pre-empt the sale, the death of one co-plaintiff did not render the suit non-maintainable as to the remaining plaintiffs. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emption suit abate entirely upon the death of one of the co-plaintiffs if his legal representatives are not brought on record?
  • What is the test to determine whether a suit or appeal abates as a whole or only in part upon the death of a party?
  • Does the death of a co-plaintiff having an equal and independent right to pre-empt render the suit non-maintainable for partial pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Hidayat Ali And Other1987 SCMR 781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-18
  ex parte decreeno instructionsrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingssetting aside decreecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which upheld an ex parte decree passed against the petitioner. The petitioner sought to set aside the ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, but the trial court dismissed the application on grounds of limitation and merits, a decision affirmed by the first appellate court. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in proceeding ex parte when the petitioner's counsel pleaded 'no instructions' on the date of the hearing. The Supreme Court held that when a counsel pleads no instructions, the party effectively remains unrepresented, justifying the court's decision to proceed ex parte. Furthermore, the Court found the petitioner's contention that the suit was not fixed for hearing on the date of the decree to be factually incorrect. Consequently, the High Court correctly refused to exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a counsel pleading 'no instructions' on the date of hearing justify the court in proceeding ex parte against the party?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact under its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Is an application to set aside an ex parte decree liable to be dismissed if it is time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Ghulama And Another1987 SCMR 1704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-26
  pre-emption suitcompromise decreeconsent decreeextension of timedeposit of pre-emption moneycontinuation of suitdefault in deposit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from the dismissal of a civil revision by the Lahore High Court concerning a pre-emption suit. The original suit was decreed in favor of the respondent, requiring the deposit of a balance amount by a specific date, failing which the suit was deemed dismissed. An appeal was filed, and during its pendency, the parties entered into a compromise upon which the appellate court passed a consent decree. The appellant subsequently filed a separate suit to set aside the compromise decree, arguing that because the initial pre-emption money was not deposited in time, the original suit stood dismissed, the appeal had abated, and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. The trial Court decreed in favor of the appellant, but the High Court dismissed the subsequent revision. The Supreme Court granted leave and held that an appeal is a continuation of the suit, and the appellate court possesses the power to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money. The Court determined that the mere non-deposit of the balance amount before the decision of the appeal does not render the proceedings invalid or cause automatic abatement, and that the compromise decree was validly passed with full awareness of the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of an appeal automatically suspend the operation of a trial court decree requiring the deposit of pre-emption money?
  • Can an appellate court extend the time for depositing the balance of pre-emption money during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Does the mere non-deposit of the balance amount under a pre-emption decree during the pendency of an appeal cause the suit to stand dismissed and the appeal to abate?
  • Is a consent decree passed on the basis of a compromise subject to being set aside on the grounds of fraud if the non-deposit of the pre-emption money was known to the parties and the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Civil Judge 1ST Class Mailsi, And 3 Other1987 SCMR 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-08
  pre-emptionpost-decree compromiseres judicataleave to appealre-examination of evidencecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition, which arose from a dispute over a pre-emption decree. The petitioner sought to challenge the decree in favour of the respondent, alleging a post-decree compromise had been reached between the parties. The petitioner had previously litigated the issue of this alleged compromise through multiple tiers of courts, including a suit, an appeal, and a revision petition, all of which resulted in findings against him. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an objection petition under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which was also dismissed by the trial court and upheld by the District Judge and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could re-litigate the issue of the alleged compromise by leading further evidence. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner had already led evidence regarding the compromise in the initial round of litigation, there was no necessity to record further evidence. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that findings of fact by lower courts would not be re-examined.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party re-litigate the issue of a post-decree compromise after the matter has been adjudicated in previous rounds of litigation?
  • Is it necessary for a court to record further evidence on a compromise if the party has already led evidence on the same issue in earlier proceedings?
  • Will the Supreme Court re-examine findings of fact made by lower courts in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazeer Ahmad vs The State1987 SCMR 164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-01
  quashment petitionanti-corruptionfraud and embezzlementjurisdiction of special judgewithdrawal of prosecutionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal petitions for leave to appeal arise from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning allegations of irregularities, fraud, and embezzlement in a housing scheme allotment. The Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, acquitted the public servants involved but directed that private persons be tried by an ordinary criminal court, sending their files to the Sessions Court for entrustment to a Magistrate. The petitioner challenged this through quashment petitions before the High Court, which dismissed them while noting that it remained within the discretion of the State whether to prosecute or to withdraw the cases. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court erred in its approach and held that the discretion to prosecute or seek withdrawal of the case by the State remains unfettered, and dismissed the petitions on merits as well as noting that a petition was time-barred. The key principle established is that the State retains its inherent discretion regarding the prosecution or withdrawal of criminal proceedings against private individuals, which is not curtailed by court dismissals of quashment petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Special Judge Anti-Corruption can transfer cases of private persons to an ordinary criminal court upon acquitting public servants?
  • Does the dismissal of a quashment petition affect the State's discretion to prosecute or withdraw a criminal case?
  • Can a criminal petition for leave to appeal be dismissed on merits when it is barred by time?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Hussain Shah vs Noor Shah And 2 Other1987 SCMR 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-18
  res judicataunregistered sale deedpre-emption decreesuit for possessionregistered sale deedland disputeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's regular second appeal concerning a land dispute. The core controversy involves conflicting claims over 24 Kanals 18 Marlas of land. Respondent No. 1 claimed ownership based on an unregistered sale, while the petitioner secured a pre-emption decree against a subsequent vendee who held a registered sale deed. The petitioner challenged the lower courts' decisions, arguing that the respondent's earlier suit for declaration, which was dismissed, operated as res judicata against the subsequent suit for possession. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the respondent's reliance on an unregistered sale document was legally insufficient under the Transfer of Property Act 1882, given the requirement for registration. The Supreme Court, finding that these contentions raised significant legal questions requiring examination, granted leave to appeal. The Court held that the issues regarding the applicability of res judicata to successive suits for declaration and possession, and the legal validity of unregistered sale documents versus subsequent registered deeds, necessitated a formal review. The status quo was ordered to continue pending the final decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a previous suit for declaration of title that was dismissed operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent suit for possession?
  • Is an unregistered sale document sufficient to enforce a claim of ownership when the Transfer of Property Act 1882 requires registration?
  • Does a compulsorily registerable document of sale give way to a subsequent registered sale deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Ali And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 1808 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-12
  leave to appealappreciation of evidenceinjured eye-witnessfalse implicationunexplained injuriesrecovery of weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction of the six petitioners for murder, murderous assault, and rioting under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case was based on ocular testimony of injured eye-witnesses regarding an incident of violence arising from a dispute over cattle damaging crops. The petitioners contended that the trial court's acquittal of two co-accused on grounds of alibi and false implication of innocent persons rendered the eye-witness testimony unreliable without independent corroboration. Furthermore, the defence argued that the prosecution failed to explain seven injuries sustained by one of the accused petitioners, Muhammad Shafi, and improperly relied on unbloodstained weapon recoveries that were previously discredited. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether established principles of appreciation of evidence in criminal cases were properly followed by the courts below.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the false implication of some co-accused requires independent corroboration for the remaining accused before conviction?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries sustained by an accused during the occurrence affect the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • Can unbloodstained weapons recovered from the accused serve as valid corroborative evidence in a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawabzada Sala Huddin vs Begum Fakharuz Zaman Khan And Other1987 SCMR 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-08
  election petitionreturned candidatedisqualificationthrown away votesinterim stayage qualification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against an order of an Election Tribunal which set aside the election of the appellant, Nawabzada Salahuddin, to the National Assembly of Pakistan from Constituency No. NA-16, Mansehra II. The Tribunal had declared the appellant disqualified on the basis that he was under the age of 25 years on the nomination day and further ruled that the respondent, having secured the next highest number of votes, should be declared the returned candidate under the doctrine of 'thrown away votes'. The appellant challenged this decision, arguing that the Tribunal ignored crucial documentary evidence regarding his age and that there was insufficient evidence to prove the disqualification was notorious among the electorate. Upon preliminary review, the Supreme Court found that the Tribunal faced difficulties regarding evidence on the notoriety of the disqualification and the determination of age. Consequently, the Court held that a prima facie case for interference existed and ordered the suspension of the impugned judgment pending the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of 'thrown away votes' require proof that a candidate's disqualification was notorious among the electorate?
  • Can an appellate court suspend the operation of an Election Tribunal's judgment pending the final disposal of an election appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab vs Sher Bahadur And Another1987 SCMR 1349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-25
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionco-sharerconcurrent findings of factrevisional jurisdictionmutationburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the right of pre-emption regarding agricultural land. The respondent (Sher Bahadur) filed a suit claiming a superior right of pre-emption against the appellant (Nawab) based on his status as a co-sharer, asserting that his own purchase of land occurred earlier than the sale in dispute. The trial court and the first appellate court dismissed the suit, finding that the respondent failed to prove his superior right because both mutations were attested on the same date, and no evidence established that the respondent's purchase was completed prior to the disputed sale. The Peshawar High Court, in revision, reversed these concurrent findings, holding that the respondent's mutation entry was earlier. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the High Court could disturb concurrent findings of fact based on inconclusive evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interference, as the respondent failed to produce tangible evidence—such as the mutation copy or Khasra Girdawari—to prove his sale was completed before the disputed transaction. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the dismissal of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in its revisional jurisdiction disturb concurrent findings of fact based on inconclusive evidence?
  • Does the mere attestation of a mutation on an earlier date, without further proof of completion of sale, establish a superior right of pre-emption?
  • Is a party claiming a superior right of pre-emption as a co-sharer required to produce tangible evidence to prove the completion of their own purchase prior to the disputed sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab Khan Alias Nabi And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-08
  bail pending appealsuspension of sentencecriminal convictiongrievous injuriesprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail application filed by several petitioners seeking suspension of their sentences pending appeal against their convictions in a criminal case involving a capital charge. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the accused persons were entitled to bail pending the final adjudication of their appeal, given the specific nature of the injuries attributed to them in the prosecution evidence. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Court held that while the petitioners convicted of causing grievous injuries were not entitled to bail, those whose specific involvement in such injuries was not established or was limited to simple injuries were entitled to relief. The Court established the principle that in cases of multiple accused, the entitlement to bail pending appeal is contingent upon the specific role and the nature of the injuries attributed to each individual accused in the prosecution's case, rather than a blanket application of the conviction status. Consequently, the Court rejected bail for those attributed with grievous injuries and granted bail to the remaining petitioners subject to furnishing bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Are all co-accused in a capital case equally disentitled to bail pending appeal regardless of their individual roles?
  • Does the attribution of grievous injuries to specific accused persons preclude them from being granted bail pending appeal?
  • Can an accused person be granted bail pending appeal if the prosecution evidence only attributes simple injuries to them?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab Khan Alias Nabi And 12 Others vs The State1987 SCMR 558 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-05
  leave to appealocular testimonytutored witnessself-defenseunlawful assemblycommon objectreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the convictions of the petitioners for murder and murderous assault. The core legal questions involve whether the lower courts erred in relying on ocular testimony that the trial court itself described as a "photographic" and "tutored" narration, and whether the courts failed to properly distinguish between the culpability of injured and non-injured accused regarding the formation of an unlawful assembly and the common object. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the arguments raised substantial questions requiring a reappraisal of the evidence. The Court emphasized that where eye-witnesses provide an implausibly precise account of events, the evidence must be scrutinized with extreme caution to determine if the prosecution has successfully proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly when the defense raises a plea of self-defense and challenges the investigation's impartiality. The judgment underscores the necessity of judicial vigilance in distinguishing individual liability in cases involving multiple accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a photographic narration of injuries by eye-witnesses necessitate a more cautious evaluation of their testimony?
  • Is a court required to distinguish between the roles of injured and non-injured accused when determining liability for a common object?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the trial court itself notes that the eye-witness testimony appears to be the result of tutoring?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab Din And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 1458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-31
  vicarious liabilitysudden fightcommon intentioncriminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtsentence computation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder and murderous assault following a dispute between tenants and a landlord. The trial court convicted three accused under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting one. The High Court subsequently acquitted another co-accused, maintaining the convictions of the remaining two. The core legal question was whether the appellants were vicariously liable under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, given the High Court's finding that the incident was a sudden fight where the prosecution failed to explain injuries sustained by the accused. The Supreme Court held that the conviction of the landlord, Nawab Din, was unsustainable as no specific overt act was attributed to him, and the High Court's findings regarding the sudden nature of the fight precluded vicarious liability. However, the Court upheld the conviction of the son, Zafar Iqbal, noting his admitted participation and the brutality of the assault, while granting him the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appeal was partly allowed, setting aside Nawab Din's conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be held vicariously liable under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the prosecution fails to attribute a specific overt act to them during a sudden fight?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on the basis of benefit of doubt automatically entitle other similarly situated co-accused to acquittal?
  • Is the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to sentences for murder and murderous assault?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab And Others vs THF State1987 SCMR 1444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-30
  murdercriminal appealacquittal set asideocular testimonyinjured witnesscorroborationcrime empties
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside the acquittal of the appellants and convicted them under Section 302 and Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to death and imprisonment for life respectively. The incident involved a daylight double-assault and murder within the District Courts premises in Mianwali, arising out of a previous murder enmity. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal based on discrepancies between the First Information Report and the injured witness's statement, and whether the ocular testimony of an injured and inimical witness required independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the presence of the injured witness was undisputable, minor discrepancies indicated an absence of prior consultation rather than fabrication, and the ocular account corroborated by medical evidence, recoveries, and matching crime empties was entirely reliable. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies between an F.I.R. and a dying declaration or statement of an injured witness necessarily discredit their testimony?
  • Can the testimony of an injured eye-witness who is inimical to the accused form the sole basis of a conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in reversing an order of acquittal when the trial court's evaluation of evidence is found to be unreasonable?
  Read full judgment →
• Naveed Textile Milr Is Limited. Central Cotton Milr Is Limited. M/s. Firdaus Spininy Mills. Central Cotton Mills Limited. Shahyar Jute Mills Limited. Naveed Textile Mills Limited. Nishat Mills Ltd. M/s. Jamhoor Textile Mills Limited. M/s. M.F.M.Y. Industries Limited. M/s. Rashid Textile Mills Limited. vsPTCL 1987 CL. 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  customs dutyexemptionstatutory instrumentexplanationfiscal statute interpretationconstitutional jurisdictiondiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from ten petitions for leave to appeal filed by various textile mills against a consolidated judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing their constitutional petitions regarding customs duty on imported Auto Cone Winders. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of an explanation in a statutory notification (S.R.O. 702(I)/80) issued under the Customs Act, 1969, which excluded automatic cone winders from customs duty exemption on the premise that they are substitutes for locally manufactured cone winders. The Supreme Court held that the government's power to grant or revoke exemptions under the Customs Act is discretionary and wide in amplitude, and the explanatory statement regarding substitutability represented a policy decision and statement of fact rather than a conditional jurisdictional fact open to factual inquiry. Consequently, the court affirmed the High Court's interpretation, holding that the exclusion of auto cone winders from the exemption was lawful, and dismissed the petitions. The key principle laid down is that where an exemption power is wide and discretionary, an explanatory clause stating a policy reason or fact does not require independent factual proof of accuracy in constitutional review.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an explanation to a statutory notification under the Customs Act can be subjected to factual inquiry regarding the accuracy of the reasons stated therein?
  • What is the scope of the Federal Government's power to grant or revoke exemptions from customs duties under the Customs Act?
  • Does an explanation in a statutory instrument curtail the enacting provision or can it contain a statement of policy and fact?
  Read full judgment →
• National Motors Ltd. vs The Workmen Represented By The Ghandara Industries Employees' Union Through Its General Secretary1987 SCMR 980 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-25
  industrial disputeright of appealvested rightcontinuity of serviceindustrial courtrescission of ordersaving clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an industrial dispute between National Motors Limited and its workmen regarding the continuity of service following a change in management. The core legal questions were whether an appeal against an Industrial Court award was competent under the Industrial Disputes (Conciliation and Adjudication) Order, 1965, and whether the rescission of said Order revived the right of appeal under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. The Supreme Court held that the appeal to the High Court was incompetent because the 1965 Order expressly barred such appeals, and the saving clause in the rescission notification preserved this bar for pending proceedings. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a right of appeal is a substantive right that vests at the commencement of the lis, not at the time of the decision. The Court also upheld the Industrial Court's finding that the employees, by accepting termination and compensation, had severed their past service, precluding claims for continuity. The judgment establishes that specific statutory bars to appeal override general incorporated provisions and that saving clauses effectively maintain the legal regime for ongoing litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Is the right of appeal a substantive right that vests at the commencement of legal proceedings?
  • Does a specific bar to appeal in a special order override general provisions incorporated by reference?
  • Can employees claim continuity of service after voluntarily accepting termination and full compensation?
  • Do saving clauses in a rescission order preserve the legal regime for pending proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Said vs Water Andpower Development Authority And Another1987 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-27
  compulsory retirementcompetent authorityWAPDA employeesstatutory interpretationservice lawadministrative powerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Chief Engineer at the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), challenged his compulsory retirement before the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Chairman of WAPDA lacked the legal competence to order his retirement. He contended that under the WAPDA Employees (Retirement) Rules, 1979, the power to retire an employee with over 25 years of service vested exclusively in the 'Authority'—comprising the Chairman and Members acting collectively—rather than the Chairman alone. The petitioner relied on various office memoranda issued by the Authority between 1980 and 1985, which purportedly reserved the decision-making power regarding retirement after 25 years of service for the Authority itself. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner's contentions regarding the scope of the Chairman's authority versus the collective Authority under the relevant rules and memoranda raised substantial legal questions requiring further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine the validity of the retirement order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to retire an employee under the WAPDA Employees (Retirement) Rules, 1979, vest in the Chairman alone or the Authority collectively?
  • Can office memoranda issued by the Authority restrict the definition of 'competent authority' established in the WAPDA Employees (Retirement) Rules, 1979?
  • Is an order of retirement issued by the Chairman of WAPDA legally effective if the power to retire is reserved for the Authority by internal office memoranda?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Said vs WAPDA Through Its Chairman And Another1987 PLD Supreme Court 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-31
  WAPDA employeecompulsory retirementcompetent authorityservice tribunaljurisdictional defectadministrative instructionsretirement rules
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave was granted to examine whether the retirement order of a former WAPDA employee holding a Grade-20 post, passed under Rule 3(a) of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Retirement) Rules, 1979, was issued by the competent authority. The appellant contended that subsequent administrative memoranda issued by WAPDA had the force of rules and restricted the definition of the competent authority under Rule 2(c), requiring retirement orders for employees completing 25 years of service or attaining 55 years of age to be passed by the full Authority rather than the Chairman or appointing authority alone. The Supreme Court held that the general instructions and memoranda issued by WAPDA effectively modified the application of the retirement rules by redefining the competent authority for officers who completed 25 years of service or reached 55 years of age, including those in Grade-20. Consequently, the retirement order passed by the appointing authority rather than the full Authority suffered from a jurisdictional defect. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned retirement order was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether administrative memoranda issued by WAPDA can modify or supersede the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Retirement) Rules, 1979?
  • Did the Chairman of WAPDA possess the lawful authority to retire a Grade-20 officer under Rule 3(a) in view of subsequent general instructions?
  • Whether an order of retirement passed by an authority other than the designated competent authority suffers from a jurisdictional taint?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasim Hijazi vs Provincial Government of N. W.F.P. And 4 Other1987 SCMR 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-04
  leave to appealcompetitive examinationprovisional admissioncandidaturePublic Service Commissionservice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment and order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition regarding eligibility and limitations on chances for a competitive examination conducted by the Public Service Commission. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner could challenge the imposition of a limit on the number of examination chances when admission to the examination and candidature were expressly made provisional and subject to government decisions regarding such limits. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's admission and candidature were provisional and subject to the pending decision of the Provincial Government concerning the limitation of chances, thereby leaving the petitioner with no valid grievance against the subsequent disqualification. The key principle laid down is that a candidate admitted provisionally to a competitive examination subject to specific departmental instructions and pending government decisions cannot claim vested rights to challenge rules or limitations duly applied pursuant to such provisional terms.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate admitted provisionally to a competitive examination can challenge the subsequent imposition of a limit on examination chances?
  • Does a provisional admission certificate subject the candidature to pending government decisions regarding service rules?
  • Can a petitioner claim accrued rights when their admission to an examination is expressly made subject to being found eligible in all respects?
  Read full judgment →
• Najabat Ali vs Bashir Ahmad and Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-12
  consolidation of holdingsconsolidation schemecompromiselocus standiBoard of Revenueconstitutional petitionsplitting of holding
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a constitutional petition challenging an order of the Member, Board of Revenue, which set aside a consolidation scheme. The scheme, originally confirmed on the basis of a compromise among certain parties, had split a compact land holding into two separate plots divided by a canal. A party who acquired interest in the land via a civil court consent decree intervened in the proceedings. The central question was whether consolidation authorities are bound by a compromise scheme between private parties where the scheme violates basic statutory principles of consolidation and causes injustice. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the High Court and dismissed the appeal. The Court held that where a consolidation scheme is offensive to the statutory requirements of law and is unjust or unfair on its face, consolidation authorities are under a legal duty to reject it, notwithstanding any compromise or agreement among the parties or most of them.

  Questions settled

  • Are consolidation authorities bound to accept a consolidation scheme based on a compromise among parties if the scheme violates statutory consolidation principles?
  • Whether consolidation authorities have a duty to reject an unjust consolidation scheme that splits a compact land holding despite an agreement between the parties?
  • Does a person who acquires an interest in land via a civil court consent decree during litigation have locus standi to challenge a consolidation scheme affecting that land?
  Read full judgment →
• M_s. Rafhan Maize Proucts Co. Limited. vs Pakistan Food and Agriculture Commitee and another_PTCL 1987 CL. 157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  oilseedsexcise dutystatutory interpretationmaizecesscrushingby-products
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a manufacturer of maize starch and by-products, challenged the levy of excise duty on maize oil under the Oil Seeds Committee Act, 1946. The core legal questions were whether maize qualifies as an "oilseed" under the Act and whether the specific extraction process, involving the separation of maize germs before crushing, satisfies the statutory requirement of "crushing" for the imposition of cess. The Supreme Court held that maize constitutes an "oilseed" because the term encompasses all oil-yielding seeds, regardless of oil content or classification as a food grain. Furthermore, the Court interpreted the term "crushed" in Section 3(1)(a) of the Act broadly, determining that it includes indirect extraction methods that destroy the seed's integrity. The principle laid down is that in the absence of a restrictive definition, statutory terms should be given their grammatical meaning, and "crushing" includes any process that applies pressure to extract oil, whether directly or through intermediate stages, thereby justifying the levy of excise duty on the extracted oil.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'oilseed' under the Oil Seeds Committee Act, 1946, include maize?
  • Is the definition of 'oilseed' limited to seeds that are predominantly oil-bearing?
  • Does the term 'crushed' in Section 3(1)(a) of the Oil Seeds Committee Act, 1946, include indirect extraction processes that involve separating seed components?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Habibullah Mines Ltd. And Others vs Municipal Corporation1987 SCMR 1822 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-13
  withdrawal of petitionmunicipal administrationoctroi ruleswarehousingadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed by M/S. Habibullah Mines Ltd. and others against the Municipal Corporation, Quetta, seeking relief regarding the establishment of warehouses for the temporary retention of goods. During the proceedings, the petitioners' counsel requested permission to withdraw the petition, expressing an intention to approach the Municipal Corporation directly by filing a formal application under the regulatory framework provided in Chapter XII of the West Pakistan Municipal Committees Octroi Rules 1964. The petitioners further requested that the Court direct the Municipal Corporation to consider their application on its own merits. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted the request to withdraw the petition. Regarding the request for a judicial observation, the Court held that it was unnecessary to issue specific directions, as it is expected that the Municipal Corporation, upon receiving a formal application under the relevant rules, will naturally process and decide the matter on its merits in accordance with the law. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Is it necessary for the Supreme Court to issue specific directions to a municipal authority to decide an application on its merits when the law already mandates such a process?
  • Can a petitioner withdraw a constitutional petition to pursue alternative remedies under specific municipal rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Muzaffar Hussain vs MRS. Lilavati Harchandani and Another1987 PLD Supreme Court 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-26
  election petitionproportional representationsingle transferable votedrawing of lotselection tribunalcandidate exclusionreserved seat
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an election dispute for a non-Muslim reserved seat in the Sind Provincial Assembly, where the Returning Officer, faced with tied votes, drew lots to declare a winner rather than to exclude a candidate. The core legal question was whether the drawing of lots under Rule 66(5) of the Representation of the Peoples (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1977, is intended for the selection of a successful candidate or for the elimination of a candidate in a proportional representation system. The Supreme Court held that Rule 66(5) mandates the drawing of lots specifically for the purpose of exclusion, not for declaring a winner. Consequently, the Returning Officer’s reliance on Rule 92 was erroneous as it applied to a different election mode. The Court clarified that while the election of the improperly returned candidate was void, the Election Tribunal erred in declaring the entire election void. The key principle laid down is that in proportional representation systems using the single transferable vote, drawing lots is an integral mechanism for elimination, and an error in this process warrants setting aside the specific result rather than the entire election.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 66(5) of the Representation of the Peoples (Conduct of Election) Rules 1977 require drawing lots for the purpose of selecting a winner or for excluding a candidate?
  • Is the drawing of lots under Rule 92 of the Representation of the Peoples (Conduct of Election) Rules 1977 applicable to elections held under the proportional representation system?
  • Should an entire election be declared void due to an error by the Returning Officer in the procedure for drawing lots?
  Read full judgment →
• Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. vs Mian Muhammad Sharif1987 SCMR 1768 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-06
  rent controlevictionpersonal requirementbona fidemala fideleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an eviction order passed by the Rent Controller and upheld by the High Court of Baluchistan. The petitioner, a tenant, faced eviction on the grounds of the landlord's personal requirement for the premises for his son. The tenant contended that the eviction plea was mala fide, arguing it was a retaliatory measure following the tenant's refusal to accede to the landlord's demand for a significant rent increase. While the lower courts found the requirement genuine, the Supreme Court noted that the landlord had initially demanded higher rent and then served a notice to vacate without mentioning personal use, only filing the eviction application shortly thereafter. The Supreme Court distinguished this case from precedents where rent increases were historical, noting that the proximity in time between the failed rent negotiation and the eviction notice raised serious questions regarding the landlord's bona fides. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the timing and circumstances of the eviction plea required further judicial examination to determine the landlord's true intent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's prior demand for increased rent automatically invalidate a subsequent claim for personal requirement of the premises?
  • Can the timing of an eviction notice in relation to a failed rent negotiation be considered as evidence of mala fide intent?
  • Is a landlord's failure to mention personal requirement in an initial notice to vacate relevant to the assessment of the bona fides of a subsequent eviction application?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmad And 3 Others vs The State1987 SCMR 424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-04
  leave to appealsuppression of injuriesmurderself-defenceFirst Information Reportgrave and sudden provocationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioners' convictions and sentences under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and murderous assault. The core legal question concerns the effect of the prosecution's suppression of multiple injuries sustained by two of the accused petitioners in the First Information Report and subsequent statements, and whether the defence version of the occurrence—alleging self-defence and grave and sudden provocation—was properly appraised by the courts below. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the unexplained suppression of injuries sustained by the accused in the initial report and witness statements requires a deeper examination of whether the defence version represents the true account of the incident. The key principle laid down is that the suppression of material injuries on the person of the accused by the prosecution casts serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case and necessitates a careful appraisal of the alternative defence version.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution case when injuries sustained by the accused persons are suppressed in the First Information Report?
  • Whether the failure of the courts below to properly appraise the defence version where accused injuries are concealed warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the omission of injuries in statements recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 undermine the credibility of eyewitnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Mureed Ahmad vs The State1987 SCMR 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-04
  murderdeath sentencemitigating circumstancesrevenge motivecriminal petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioner Mureed Ahmad under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the sentence of death for the murder of Ahmad. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the extreme penalty of death should be commuted to imprisonment for life on the ground that the murder was committed in revenge for the prior killing of the petitioner's brother. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the alternative sentence of life imprisonment on the ground of retaliation or revenge is not justified unless there is clear and established evidence on record connecting the deceased to the prior homicide. The key principle laid down is that to claim mitigation of sentence on the basis of a retaliatory motive or family feud, the accused must establish through evidence on record that the deceased was responsible for the antecedent death.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sentence of death can be reduced to imprisonment for life on the ground of revenge without supporting evidence on record establishing the retaliatory motive?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to a lesser penalty when evidence fails to prove that the deceased was responsible for the antecedent death of the accused's relative?
  Read full judgment →
• Murad vs Karam And Other1987 SCMR 2008 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-25
  inheritancelimited ownercustomary lawMuslim Personal Lawgiftreversioner suitleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a dispute over inheritance following the termination of a limited estate held under custom. The core legal question involved the validity of a gift made in 1953 by a limited owner, Mst. Karam Bibi, and the subsequent devolution of property upon the termination of her life estate under the relevant Shariat application statutes. The Supreme Court held that a limited owner could not competently gift the property, particularly where an earlier decree in a reversioner's suit annulling the gift had attained finality, and that upon the termination of the limited estate under custom, the estate devolved upon the heirs in accordance with Muslim Personal Law. The key principle laid down is that limited estates under custom stand terminated by subsequent legislation, requiring inheritance to be determined strictly under Muslim Shariat law while ignoring invalid alienations made by limited owners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a limited owner under custom can competently make a valid gift of property pertaining to the limited estate?
  • How does the termination of a limited estate under custom affect prior alienations and subsequent inheritance rights?
  • Are heirs entitled to inherit according to Muslim Personal Law upon the termination of a life estate?
  Read full judgment →
• Muqadar And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 1015 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-05
  vicarious liabilityunlawful assemblycommon objectdeadly weaponsmurderhouse trespasscriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court maintaining the conviction and sentences of the appellants under sections 148, 449, and 302 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder and rioting committed during an unlawful assembly. The core legal question examined was the vicarious liability of the appellants for murder under the second part of section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, where the established common object of the assembly was merely to commit house trespass by show of force, and whether the mere possession of deadly weapons raises an automatic presumption of knowledge that murder was likely to be committed. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, holding that the appellants did not share the common object of murder nor had the knowledge that murder was likely to be committed, as evidenced by their failure to use their weapons despite ample opportunity. The conviction was accordingly altered from murder under section 302/149 to house trespass under section 452 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The key principle laid down is that the second part of section 149 requires positive perception and cognition amounting to a 'likelihood' of the offence being committed, which cannot be presumed merely from the carrying of deadly weapons if the subsequent conduct of the accused negatives such knowledge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mere possession of deadly weapons by members of an unlawful assembly raises an automatic presumption of knowledge that murder was likely to be committed under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can members of an unlawful assembly formed with the common object of house trespass be held vicariously liable for murder committed independently by another member?
  • What degree of cognition and perception is required by the expression 'knew to be likely to be committed' under the second part of section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad Khan vs Samiullah Khan And Another1987 SCMR 171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-27
  Section 12(2) CPCnecessary partiesproper partiesfraud and collusioncivil revisionimpleadment of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil petitions arising from a common order of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision to implead two Advocates as respondents in applications filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner had sought to remove these Advocates from the array of respondents, arguing they were neither necessary nor proper parties but merely witnesses. The core legal question was whether Advocates who allegedly colluded with the petitioner to file written statements admitting a claim, thereby facilitating a decree through fraud, can be impleaded as respondents in proceedings challenging that decree under Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the Advocates were properly impleaded as respondents given the allegations of collusion and fraud in obtaining the decrees. The key principle laid down is that individuals, including Advocates, who are alleged to have actively participated in the fraud or collusion that led to a decree, are proper parties to proceedings challenging that decree under Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Can Advocates who allegedly colluded to obtain a decree through fraud be impleaded as respondents in an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Are persons alleged to have participated in the fraud that led to a decree necessary or proper parties in proceedings challenging that decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Municipal Committee, Gujrat Through Administrator, Municipal1987 SCMR 1340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-19
  service lawremoval from servicebiasmunicipal committeecivil servantadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the concurrent judgments of the lower courts and the High Court, which had decreed the respondent's suit challenging his removal from service. The respondent, a confirmed Sanitary Inspector in the Municipal Committee, Gujrat, was found guilty of unauthorized absence from duty after an inquiry conducted by the Administrator of the Municipal Committee. The Administrator ordered his removal and subsequently placed the matter before a meeting of the House of the Municipal Committee, which he presided over, and which approved the removal. The High Court, relying on precedent, held that the removal order was vitiated by bias because the Administrator participated in and presided over the meeting that confirmed his own earlier decision. The Supreme Court noted that the questions raised regarding the legality of the Administrator's participation and competency to remove the employee without confirmation by the House are of general public importance. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal for authoritative determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the participation of an Administrator who conducted a disciplinary inquiry in the subsequent committee meeting approving the removal vitiate the order on the ground of bias?
  • Is an Administrator or Chairman of a Municipal Committee independently competent to remove an employee from service without placing the matter for confirmation before the House?
  • Whether an administrative decision taken by an officer who previously acted as the inquiry officer suffers from a conflict of interest.
  Read full judgment →
• Municipal Committee vs Muhammad Abdul Aziz Rahmani1987 SCMR 680 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-07
  damagescivil revisionconcurrent findings of factmisreading of evidencemunicipal committeeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which dismissed in limine the petitioner's civil revision against concurrent findings of lower courts. The respondent had filed a civil suit for the recovery of damages against the Municipal Committee for causing structural damage to his house by diverting water, which was decreed by the trial court and upheld by the appellate court. The core legal question involved the assessment of damages and whether the lower courts misread evidence regarding the extent of damage caused to the property. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the quantum of damages were unexceptionable, noting that the witness had admitted the higher figure in his oral testimony and was not properly confronted with his earlier written report. The petition was accordingly found to be without merit, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts regarding the assessment of damages?
  • Can a revision petition succeed on the ground of alleged misreading of evidence when the witness admits the fact during cross-examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar vs Mohsin Ali Shah And Another1987 SCMR 1721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-17
  bail cancellationleave to appealcolumn No. 2 of challancriminal procedureinvestigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's application seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent, Mohsin Ali Shah. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the cancellation of bail was warranted under the circumstances presented. Upon hearing the arguments from the petitioner, the State, and the respondent, the Supreme Court noted that the investigating officer had placed the respondent in column No. 2 of the challan, indicating that he was not considered an accused at that stage of the investigation. Furthermore, the Court observed that the respondent had not yet been summoned as an accused by the trial judge. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there were no grounds to interfere with the High Court's order and dismissed the petition. The principle established is that where an individual has been placed in column No. 2 of the challan and has not been summoned by the trial court, there is no basis for bail cancellation proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition for cancellation of bail maintainable against a person placed in column No. 2 of the challan who has not yet been summoned by the trial court?
  • Does the placement of an individual in column No. 2 of the challan preclude the necessity of bail cancellation proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Hussain vs The State1987 SCMR 8 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal leave to appealmurderprivate defenceweapon recoveryconvictionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed from jail against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioner under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case was that following a dispute regarding the pilferage of firewood, the petitioner attacked the deceased with a weapon, causing fatal injuries. The petitioner admitted causing the death but raised a plea of private defence of person and property, alongside a claim of mental instability. Both the trial court and the High Court rejected the plea of private defence, finding that the weapon used (a dagger) and the absence of injuries on the petitioner's person belied his version of events. The Supreme Court examined the record, affirmed the findings of the lower courts, and dismissed the petition, holding that the plea of private defence was rightly rejected and the lesser sentence of life imprisonment was justified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of private defence of person and property can be sustained when the accused bears no injuries and uses a lethal weapon like a dagger?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the rejection of a plea of private defence in a murder case?
  • Whether the uncorroborated version of the accused admitting the fatal blow while setting up self-defence is acceptable when contradicted by medical and physical evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zubair vs The State1987 SCMR 790 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-18
  leave to appealSection 302 PPCdeath sentencemitigating circumstancesunproved motivelesser penaltysentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and confirmed the death sentence awarded by the trial court for committing the murder of the deceased. The petitioner did not challenge the legality or propriety of the conviction itself. The core legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the capital sentence was warranted given that the prosecution failed to examine any witness possessing personal knowledge of the alleged motive, leaving the underlying reasons for the shooting shrouded in mystery. Citing relevant precedents where lack of proved motive justified the lesser penalty of life imprisonment, the petitioner contended that the death penalty should not have been imposed. The Supreme Court found that the contention concerning the sentence required consideration and consequently granted leave to appeal solely to determine the question of sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted on the question of sentence alone where the underlying motive for the murder is shrouded in mystery?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaheeruddin Anwar vs The State1987 SCMR 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-06
  cross-examinationre-summoning witnessfair trialinterest of justicediscretionary powercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, facing trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, challenged the refusal of the trial court to recall a prosecution witness for cross-examination. During the trial, the petitioner's counsel was absent when the first prosecution witness was examined. Upon the counsel's arrival, a request was made to recall the witness, who was still present in court, but the trial court rejected the application, a decision upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the trial court's discretion under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was properly exercised. The Supreme Court held that in the interest of justice, the trial court should have permitted the cross-examination of the witness. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned orders, and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to afford the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the witness before proceeding with the trial in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court have the power to recall a witness for cross-examination under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should a trial court permit the cross-examination of a prosecution witness if the accused's counsel was absent during the initial examination but arrived while the witness was still present?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaheer Khan And Another vs Muhammad Zamir Khan1987 SCMR 1144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-26
  special leave to appealconcurrent findingsrevisional jurisdictioncivil matterquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a civil matter where the core legal question was whether respondent No. 1 was the son of Muhammad Nazir Khan, who died in 1943. Both the trial Court and the Additional District Judge examined the evidence led by the parties and decided the question in the affirmative in favor of respondent No. 1. The High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction, declined to interfere with this concurrent finding of fact. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any legal infirmity in the concurrent findings of the lower forums. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in revisional jurisdiction unless a material infirmity is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact affirmed in revisional jurisdiction?
  • Can a petition for special leave to appeal succeed without showing a material infirmity in the lower courts' findings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yusuf vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1987 SCMR 817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-01
  abatementlimitation periodlegal representativesLetters Patent Appealwrit petitionprocedural lapse
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal and a writ petition due to abatement. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly dismissed the proceedings after the death of a respondent, Haider Bakhsh, where the petitioners failed to implead his legal representatives within the prescribed period of limitation and did not seek condonation of delay. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no infirmity in the conclusion that the proceedings had abated. The High Court had observed that because the parties resided in the same premises, the petitioners could not have been unaware of the respondent's death, thus negating any justification for the delay. The Supreme Court affirmed that failure to bring legal representatives on record within the statutory limitation period, without a valid application for condonation of delay, results in the abatement of the proceedings. Consequently, the petitions for special leave to appeal were dismissed, maintaining the finality of the High Court's order regarding the procedural lapse.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to implead legal representatives of a deceased respondent within the limitation period result in the abatement of a writ petition?
  • Can a court dismiss a proceeding as abated when the applicant fails to seek condonation of delay for impleading legal representatives?
  • Is the knowledge of a respondent's death by the petitioner a relevant factor in determining whether to condone a delay in impleading legal representatives?
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• Muhammad Yousuf Chauhan And Others vs Sarfraz Khan And Other1987 SCMR 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-03Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs The State1987 SCMR 1155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-26
  suspension of sentenceleave to appealcriminal appealdiscretionary orderappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, convicted under Section 364 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to imprisonment for life along with a fine, sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the rejection of his application for suspension of sentence during the pendency of his appeal by the High Court. The core legal question concerned the propriety of interfering with the High Court's discretionary order refusing to suspend the petitioner's sentence. The Supreme Court held that no justification existed to interfere with the discretion properly exercised by the High Court in refusing the suspension of sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the principle that appellate courts will not lightly interfere with the discretionary orders of lower courts regarding the suspension of sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in refusing to suspend a sentence during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Whether the refusal of the High Court to suspend a sentence under Section 364 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 warrants interference without strong justification?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs Captain (Retd.) Abdul Qayyum And Another1987 SCMR 1158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-26
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationanti-corruptionmisappropriation of fundstampering with record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the petitioner seeking the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to respondent No. 1 by the High Court. The respondent, an Executive Engineer, faced allegations of misappropriation of funds, tender irregularities, and record tampering, leading to a case registered under sections 468, 471, and 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Following an inquiry, the Assistant Director of Anti-Corruption found substance in only three allegations regarding tender document tampering, but concluded no bribery was established and recommended departmental action. The High Court consequently granted pre-arrest bail. The core legal question is whether pre-arrest bail granted by the High Court warrants interference by the Supreme Court based on such findings. The Supreme Court held that no case for interfering with the High Court's order was made out, noting also that the State did not challenge the order. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail granted by the High Court should be cancelled when an anti-corruption inquiry recommends only departmental action?
  • Does the absence of an appeal by the State against a pre-arrest bail order affect a private petitioner's application for bail cancellation?
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• Muhammad Younis vs The Chairman, Water and Power Development1987 SCMR 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-15
  service appeallimitationFederal Service Tribunaldepartmental appealcause of actionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four petitions for special leave to appeal against orders of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' service appeals on the ground of limitation. The petitioners, formerly meter readers, were dismissed from service following allegations of electricity theft. After unsuccessful attempts to seek redress through the Labour Court and initial departmental appeals, they approached the Superintending Engineer, who eventually rejected their appeals on merits without addressing the issue of limitation. Subsequently, the Federal Service Tribunal dismissed their appeals, holding that the departmental appeals were time-barred, despite the departmental authority not having raised or decided the issue of limitation. The core legal question is whether the Federal Service Tribunal possesses the authority to independently invoke the bar of limitation when the departmental appellate authority has not based its decision on that ground. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, indicating that the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the appeals on limitation grounds, when the departmental authority had not done so, requires further judicial consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal dismiss a service appeal on the ground of limitation if the departmental appellate authority did not base its decision on that ground?
  • Does an order by a departmental authority rejecting an appeal on merits provide a fresh cause of action for a service appeal?
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• Muhammad Younas vs Muhammad Yaseen Alias Shinoo And Another1987 SCMR 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-08
  murdercommutation of sentenceculpable homicidecriminal appealenhancement of sentencelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-petitions: a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant seeking the restoration of a death sentence, and a jail petition filed by the accused challenging his conviction and sentence. The accused was originally convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the High Court altered the conviction to Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment while increasing the fine. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting that the medical testimony indicated a struggle occurred between the parties, evidenced by abrasions and stab wounds, with only one injury being fatal. The Court held that the circumstances, specifically the existence of an altercation and fight prior to the attack, justified the High Court's decision to commute the sentence to life imprisonment. Consequently, the Court dismissed both the complainant's petition for enhancement of the sentence and the accused's jail petition, maintaining the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does evidence of a prior altercation and struggle between the accused and the deceased justify commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can a court maintain a conviction under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the initial conviction was under Section 302?
  • Is a jail petition barred by time subject to condonation if it involves a sentence of life imprisonment?
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• Muhammad Yaqub Sheikh, District Engineer, District Council, Toba Tek1987 SCMR 1354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-27
  disciplinary proceedingsmunicipal engineerservice tribunalleave to appealrecovery of loss
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Provincial Service Tribunal, which had maintained the penalty of recovery of financial loss imposed upon the petitioner following disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner, a municipal engineer, faced disciplinary action after a roof of a waiting hall constructed under his supervision collapsed due to rains. The core legal question concerned the competence of the Provincial Government to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, and challenges to the merits of the penalty. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the contention regarding the competence of the Provincial Government was not raised before the Service Tribunal and could not be entertained for the first time before the apex court. Furthermore, on the merits, the court noted that the petitioner had been punished after a regular inquiry providing ample opportunity of defense, and no substantial question of law of public importance arose. The key principle laid down is that fresh legal arguments not raised before the subordinate tribunal cannot be entertained for the first time in the Supreme Court, particularly when factual inquiry is required.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new factual or legal contention for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not canvassed before the Service Tribunal?
  • Whether disciplinary proceedings and recovery of loss can be imposed on a municipal engineer following structural failure after a regular inquiry?
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• Muhammad Yaqub Alias Panju vs The State1987 SCMR 783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-18
  murderdeath sentenceleave to appealcriminal convictioneyewitness testimonyappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Yaqub, who was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Muhammad Shakeel under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution's case rested on three eyewitnesses, the recovery of a weapon (Chhuri), medical evidence, and a motive. The petitioner admitted to the killing but provided a contrary version of events, which the trial court rejected in favor of the prosecution's evidence. The High Court subsequently upheld the conviction and confirmed the death sentence. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to establish the alleged motive and that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to exclude the defense's version. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the impugned judgment and the relevant evidence, found no merit in these contentions. Consequently, the Court held that the case did not warrant the grant of leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, thereby affirming the lower courts' findings regarding the petitioner's guilt and the reliability of the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to prove an alleged motive automatically invalidate a conviction for murder?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to grant leave to appeal when the lower courts have concurrently relied on eyewitness testimony and physical evidence to reject a defense version of events?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob Khan vs Member Board of Revenue/Chief1987 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-11
  constitutional petitionlachesurban settlementleave to appealauction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition in limine on the ground of laches regarding an urban settlement case where the property was auctioned in 1972. The core legal question is whether the constitutional petition should have been dismissed for laches when the petitioner was impleaded as a party in a Supreme Court appeal that was disposed of by compromise in February 1981, and the writ petition was filed shortly thereafter in March 1981. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the conduct of the petitioner warranted examination regarding the application of laches in light of the prior proceedings and compromise. The key principle laid down is that the timeline and active participation in related apex court proceedings are vital factors to be considered when evaluating the bar of laches against a constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition can be dismissed in limine on the ground of laches when the petitioner was pursuing related litigation before the Supreme Court?
  • Does participation as a party in Supreme Court proceedings affect the computation of laches for filing a writ petition?
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• Muhammad Yakoob And Others vs Darya Khan And Other1987 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-27
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtinterested witnessesmedical evidencecorroborationmurderpartisan witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from cross-appeals filed against a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had acquitted two convicts and upheld the conviction of three others under sections 302, 325, 324, 323, 447, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while granting the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had established its case beyond reasonable doubt through reliable and independently corroborated ocular and medical evidence in the face of deep-seated enmity and partisan witness testimony. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution witnesses, including injured haris, were interested and partisan, and their testimonies suffered from material discrepancies when compared with the medical evidence. Consequently, the Court ruled that independent corroboration was lacking and set aside the convictions and sentences of the remaining convicts by extending the benefit of the doubt. The key principle laid down is that in cases involving severe antecedent animosity, the testimony of interested witnesses must be subjected to strict scrutiny, and where material contradictions exist between ocular accounts and medical evidence without proper explanation, convictions cannot be sustained under safe principles of criminal administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an injured witness who is also a tenant of the deceased can be treated as that of a disinterested and independent witness in the presence of prior land disputes?
  • Can a conviction for murder and hurt be sustained where material discrepancies exist between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence regarding the injuries sustained?
  • Is independent corroboration mandatory for sustaining a conviction when the prosecution witnesses are proved to be interested and partisan?
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• Muhammad Walayat And Another vs Liaqat Hayat And Another1987 SCMR 1357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-18
  pre-emption suitZar-e-punjumdeposit of pre-emption moneyextension of timetrial court discretionrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the vendees-defendants in a pre-emption suit, challenging an order passed by the trial Court which extended the deadline for the deposit of Zar-e-punjum. The petitioners sought to contest the validity of this extension, a decision which the High Court had previously declined to interfere with under its revisional jurisdiction. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the trial Court possessed the legal competence to extend the time for depositing the Zar-e-punjum. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial Court acted within its lawful authority in granting the extension. The Court affirmed that under the relevant statutory provisions, the trial Court is empowered to extend the time for making such deposits, provided sufficient cause is established. Finding that the trial Court had duly recorded a finding regarding the existence of sufficient cause and that this finding suffered from no legal infirmity, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the lower court's discretion in procedural matters of pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Is the trial Court competent to extend the time for making the deposit of Zar-e-punjum in a pre-emption suit?
  • Does the trial Court have the authority to grant an extension of time for deposit if sufficient cause is shown?
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