Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Khan Mir vs Sher Khan And Other1987 SCMR 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murderacquittaldying declarationmedical evidenceocular testimonycorroborationbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court acquitting the respondents of murder. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained solely on the basis of dying declarations corroborated by medical evidence, in circumstances where the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses had been completely disbelieved and rejected by the courts below. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's approach was fundamentally flawed, as medical evidence can only corroborate the type of weapon used but cannot identify the assailants, and the total rejection of the ocular testimony undermined the authenticity of the dying declarations, which required reliable independent corroboration that was absent in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed the acquittal and dismissed the appeal, laying down the principle that when the presence of eye-witnesses is doubtful and their testimony is rejected in its entirety, dying declarations lose their credibility and cannot safely be relied upon without strong, independent corroboration implicating the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can medical evidence alone corroborate the identity of an assailant in a murder trial?
  • Whether dying declarations can be relied upon without independent corroboration when the ocular testimony of prosecution witnesses has been rejected?
  • Does the rejection of ocular testimony destroy the authenticity of a dying declaration?
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• Khan Bahadur vs D.I. G. Police, Lahore And Another1987 SCMR 1740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-13
  departmental enquiryshow-cause noticereversionservice lawenquiry reportprocedural fairnesspolice discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the reversion of the petitioner, an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, to the rank of Head Constable following departmental proceedings. The petitioner faced charges of misconduct, specifically regarding his failure to attend mandatory anti-terrorist training courses and unauthorized absence from his headquarters. The core legal question is whether the departmental enquiry was vitiated because the petitioner was not provided with a copy of the enquiry report alongside the final show-cause notice, and whether he was adequately informed of the specific charges proven against him, as required by Rule 16-14(ix) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. The Supreme Court noted that it was an admitted position that the enquiry report was not served upon the petitioner, raising the issue of whether the principle established in Syed Mir Muhammad v. Government of N.-W.F.P. (PLD 1981 SC 176)—requiring the provision of an enquiry report to an accused official to enable a proper defense—applies to departmental enquiries under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine these procedural requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Is it a mandatory requirement in a departmental enquiry under the Punjab Police Rules 1934 to furnish a copy of the enquiry report to the accused official along with the final show-cause notice?
  • Does the failure to provide an enquiry report to an accused official in a departmental proceeding vitiate the subsequent disciplinary order?
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• Khalid Javed vs Anwar Khan And Other1987 SCMR 1043 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-11
  murderacquittal appealchance witnessprivate defencedeath sentencerevaluation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside the conviction and death sentence of the respondent, Anwar Khan, under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of Mahmood Ejaz, and answered the murder reference in the negative. The Supreme Court examined the facts, including the ocular testimony of interested or chance witnesses, the delayed FIR, and the circumstances of the incident where the deceased was alleged to have wielded a Danda against a co-accused. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the respondent and whether the right of private defence of person applied. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court's evaluation of the unreliable evidence regarding chance witnesses was sound, and further noting that the respondent was entitled to the right of private defence of the person of his co-accused based on the established facts. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts will not interfere with an acquittal order based on a reasonable appreciation of evidence, and a plea of private defence can be gathered from the totality of facts and circumstances even if not expressly raised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court's acquittal based on the evaluation of chance witnesses and delayed FIR warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can the right of private defence of another person be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the case?
  • Is the testimony of chance witnesses from a distant village sufficient to guarantee presence at the crime scene without corroboration?
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• Khair Muhammad And Others vs Sardar Habibullah And Other1987 SCMR 1752 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-19
  non-prosecutionout-of-court settlementdismissal of petitionleave to appealcivil dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal. The nature of the proceedings involved a dispute between the parties, Khair Muhammad and others against Sardar Habibullah and others. During the course of the hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners, acting on instructions, informed the Court that the parties had reached an out-of-court settlement regarding the underlying dispute. Consequently, the petitioners expressed that they were no longer interested in pursuing the petition further. The Court, acknowledging the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the settlement and the subsequent lack of interest in prosecuting the matter, proceeded to dismiss the petition. The holding of the Court was a dismissal of the petition for non-prosecution, effectively terminating the proceedings before the Supreme Court based on the parties' private resolution of their conflict. The principle affirmed is that where parties settle their dispute privately and the petitioner indicates a lack of interest in proceeding, the Court will dismiss the petition for non-prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed for non-prosecution if the parties have settled the dispute outside of court?
  • Does a statement by counsel regarding an out-of-court settlement constitute sufficient grounds for the dismissal of a petition?
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• Khair Din Through His Legal Heirs vs Haji Muhammad Din And Other1987 SCMR 1131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-29
  pre-emptionright of substitutioncompromisepre-emptorland salesuperior right of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the right of pre-emption regarding a sale of land. The appellant, having previously filed a pre-emption suit, entered into a compromise with the vendees to withdraw that suit in exchange for the purchase of a portion of the disputed land. Subsequently, the respondent filed a suit to pre-empt this new sale. The core legal question was whether a private compromise involving the sale of only a part of the original property, in consideration for withdrawing a pre-emption suit, qualifies as a sale in recognition of a superior right of pre-emption, thereby immune from further pre-emption claims. The Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption is fundamentally a right of substitution, requiring the pre-emptor to step into the shoes of the vendee regarding the entire transaction. Since the compromise involved a partial sale and price reduction, it failed to maintain the integrity of the original transaction. Consequently, the court ruled that the transaction was a fresh sale subject to pre-emption, dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sale of a portion of land in exchange for withdrawing a pre-emption suit constitute a sale in recognition of a superior right of pre-emption?
  • Is the right of pre-emption essentially a right of substitution that requires the pre-emptor to step into the shoes of the vendee for the entire transaction?
  • Can a private compromise that reduces the area and price of the original sale be immune from further pre-emption claims?
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• Khadim Hussain And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-11
  murderleave to appealocular evidencehostile witnessretracted statementaffidavitinterested witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioners under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The trial court sentenced both petitioners to death, which the High Court modified by confirming the death sentence of one petitioner while commuting the other's sentence to life imprisonment. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners challenged the convictions on the grounds of interested ocular evidence, conflict with medical evidence, and the fact that a key prosecution witness had previously filed an affidavit disowning his statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the complainant, despite being the brother of the deceased, was reliable as no personal grudge was shown. Furthermore, the court ruled that the key witness's trial testimony remained credible, and the affidavit disowning his previous statements was likely coerced and not voluntary. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a close relative of the deceased can be discarded solely on the ground of relationship in the absence of personal grudge?
  • Can a witness's trial testimony be discredited merely because they previously executed an affidavit disowning their statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an affidavit disowning previous statements when there are indications that it was not executed voluntarily?
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• Kasim Tar Muhammad vs Mst. Sherbano And Another1987 SCMR 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-27
  ejectment proceedingslandlord and tenantdevolution of interestpendente liteimpleadment of partyassignment of interestsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an ejectment proceeding initiated by the original landlady against her tenant on grounds of default and unauthorized construction. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the landlady sold the premises via a registered sale-deed. The Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application holding that the relationship of landlord and tenant had ceased to exist. The first appellate court maintained this dismissal, but the High Court allowed the second appeal, impleaded the vendee as a party, and remanded the matter. The core legal questions involved whether devolution of ownership during pending ejectment proceedings terminates the tenancy relationship and whether an appellate court can implead a successor-in-interest under Order XXII, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the transfer of ownership does not render the ejectment application infructuous, and that an appellate court possesses the competence to implead a person upon whom interest has devolved during the pendency of the proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transfer of ownership rights by a landlord during the pendency of an ejectment application renders the application infructuous?
  • Can an appellate court implead a successor-in-interest under Order XXII, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the devolution of interest during pending proceedings terminate the relationship of landlord and tenant for the purposes of continuing an ejectment application?
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• Karamat Hussain vs WAPDA Through Its Chairman1987 SCMR 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-12
  service lawWAPDA employeejudicial reviewdiscriminatory treatmentarbitrary removalremandservice tribunal jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the removal of the appellant, a former WAPDA employee, under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. The Federal Service Tribunal had previously upheld the removal, ruling that the Authority possessed absolute power to remove employees without assigning reasons. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted the scope of Section 17(1-A) and whether an order passed under this provision is immune from judicial review regarding allegations of arbitrariness, mala fides, and discriminatory treatment. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred in assuming it lacked jurisdiction to examine the basis of the removal order. The Court emphasized that such orders are reviewable, particularly when allegations of discriminatory treatment arise compared to similarly situated employees who were reinstated. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and remanded the matter for a fresh decision, directing the Tribunal to consider whether the appellant’s removal was based on the same material as other reinstated employees and to address the grievance regarding the non-payment of mandatory notice pay.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order of removal passed under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act 1958 immune from judicial review by the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to examine whether an order passed under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act 1958 is arbitrary or mala fide?
  • Can an order of removal under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act 1958 be challenged on the grounds of discriminatory treatment when similarly situated employees were reinstated?
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• Karamat Hussain and Others vs Muhammad Zaman and Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-08
  second appealrevisional jurisdictionconversion of appeal into revisionjurisdictional valuejudicial discretionCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses whether the High Court was justified in refusing to treat incompetent second appeals as revision petitions and disposing of them accordingly, following amendments to section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 and principles settled in Ilahi Bakhsh's case regarding jurisdictional valuation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's view—that revision is merely a privilege rather than a right and that applications for conversion should be rejected outright to discourage small-valuation litigation—was incorrect. The Court ruled that while revisional jurisdiction and the conversion of proceedings are discretionary, the right to invoke revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when conditions are satisfied is a valuable legal right, not a mere privilege. The Supreme Court laid down that courts should lean in favour of adjudication rather than stifling proceedings on technicalities, and where appeals are filed within limitation during a period of legal controversy regarding valuation, the High Court ought to consider exercising its judicial discretion to treat them as revision petitions and examine the merits under section 115.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to treat an incompetent second appeal as a revision petition solely on the ground that revision is a privilege and not a right?
  • How is the forum of appeal determined under the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962 read with section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the power to convert an incompetent second appeal into a revision petition form part of the judicial discretion of the High Court?
  • Is the right to apply for revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 a privilege or a substantive legal right?
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• Karamat Hussain And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 1692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-08
  culpable homicidesudden fightchance encounteralteration of convictionpremeditationunexplained injuriessentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal brought by convicts against their convictions and sentences under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident where one person died and three were injured after a dispute over lopped tree branches. The central legal issue was whether the case fell under premeditated murder or whether it constituted a sudden fight and chance encounter falling within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court observed that the prior altercation was trivial and insufficient to motivate a premeditated family attack, the timings and movements of the victims could not have been anticipated for advance planning, and injuries sustained by the accused were not satisfactorily accounted for by the prosecution. Consequently, the Court held that culpable homicide amounting to murder was not established. It altered the convictions from Sections 302/34 and 307/34 to Section 304 Part-I and Section 308 (three counts) PPC, reducing the sentences to the period already undergone.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 302 PPC be converted to Section 304 Part-I PPC where the incident arises out of a chance encounter and a trivial dispute lacking premeditation?
  • How does the prosecution's failure to adequately explain injuries sustained by the accused affect the determination of premeditated murder?
  • Whether the impossibility of anticipating the victim's presence at the scene negates the allegation of a planned and pre-arranged murderous assault under Section 302/34 PPC?
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• Karam Din And Another vs Lal Khan And Other1987 SCMR 1763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-18
  unlawful assemblyvicarious liabilitycommon objectmurderleave to appealenhancement of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed against a High Court judgment concerning a criminal assault resulting in a murder and injuries to several persons. The trial court convicted ten accused persons under sections 302/149, 307/149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code. On appeal, the High Court maintained the conviction and sentence of one accused under section 302, while altering the convictions of the remaining nine accused to sections 326/149 and 324/149, reducing their sentences accordingly. The core legal question is whether the High Court misconstrued the scope of vicarious liability under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code by failing to hold all members of the armed unlawful assembly constructively liable for murder and murderous assault, given that formidable weapons like guns and hatchets were openly carried and used during the incident. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the proper application of section 149, holding that members of an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons are deemed to know that death is a likely outcome in prosecution of their common object. The key principle established relates to the scope of constructive liability for offences committed in prosecution of the common object of an armed unlawful assembly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether members of an armed unlawful assembly can be held vicariously liable under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for an offence like murder committed during the occurrence?
  • Does the carrying of formidable weapons by members of an unlawful assembly establish their knowledge that death was likely to be caused in the prosecution of their common object?
  • Whether the High Court erred in altering the conviction of the co-accused from section 302/149 to section 326/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Karachi Industrial and Textile Mills Ltd. And Another vs The Settlement Commissioner (Industries), Lahore And Another1987 SCMR 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-09-10
  industrial concernpublic auctionevacuee propertyconstitutional jurisdictionlachesDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958equitable relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of an industrial concern. The appellants sought the transfer of property in their possession, contending it was distinct from the Patel Engineering Works auctioned to the respondent. The core legal questions addressed whether the property was correctly classified as an industrial concern, whether the auction was valid, and whether the appellants were entitled to relief despite their conduct. The Supreme Court held that the appeal lacked merit. It affirmed that the definition of an industrial concern is inclusive, not exhaustive, allowing for the property's classification. The Court emphasized that the appellants failed to exercise diligence, were present at the auction without raising objections, and failed to properly pursue their alleged prior claims. Consequently, the Court ruled that the appellants were not entitled to equitable constitutional relief due to their lack of diligence and failure to follow proper legal procedures. The principle established is that constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary and will not be extended to parties who fail to act with ordinary care and prudence in pursuing their legal remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'industrial concern' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 allow for an inclusive interpretation?
  • Are settlement authorities obligated to investigate factual grounds for transfer not explicitly pleaded by an applicant?
  • Does the presence of a claimant at a public auction without raising objections preclude them from later challenging the auction on grounds of property description?
  • Can a party invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge a property transfer after failing to pursue administrative remedies with due diligence?
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• Karachi Building Control Authority And Others vs Messrs Shaista1987 SCMR 1658 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-22
  commercialisation of plotmartial law orderconstitutional petitionbuilding controlleave to appealjudicial scrutiny
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court regarding the commercialisation of a residential plot situated in Clifton, Karachi. The respondent company had obtained a No Objection Certificate (N.O.C.) for converting a residential plot into a commercial category after depositing substantial commercialisation charges. Subsequently, upon representations from local residents, the Martial Law Administrator suspended the commercialisation permission, leading the respondent to file a constitutional petition in the High Court, which ruled in its favour. The petitioners challenged this judgment on grounds including the constitutional immunity of Martial Law orders under the Constitution of Pakistan, the availability of alternative remedies, and alleged non-compliance with building control regulations. The Supreme Court considered the contentions, held that the questions raised were of public importance, and granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order suspending the commercialisation of a plot passed by a Martial Law Administrator is immune from judicial scrutiny under Article 270-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether a constitutional petition against the suspension of a building N.O.C. is maintainable when alternative remedies allegedly exist?
  • Whether the commercialisation of a residential plot without fulfilling procedural requirements like public notice is bad in law?
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• Kanwar Muhammad Mehboob Ahmad Khan And Others vs Ahmad And Other1987 SCMR 750 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-16
  constitutional petitionspecial leave to appealsubsistence holdingland sale mutationclean hands doctrinelocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the constitutional petition challenging an order of the Board of Revenue. The core legal controversy concerned whether two land sales evidenced by mutations attested in 1960 and 1962 violated Martial Law Regulation 64 on the grounds that the vendors were allegedly left with an area less than a subsistence holding. The Board of Revenue found that the vendors had sold their entire holding, rendering Martial Law Regulation 64 inapplicable, a finding of fact the High Court declined to disturb. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly refused to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact by the Board of Revenue. Furthermore, the Court noted that one of the petitioners lacked locus standi and that the vendors had not come with clean hands as they failed to offer a refund of the purchase money while attempting to reclaim the land. Leave to appeal was consequently refused, establishing that discretionary relief will be denied to litigants who fail to restore benefits received under transactions they seek to impugn.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a concurrent finding of fact regarding land sales and subsistence holdings under Martial Law Regulation 64?
  • Does a petitioner who was not a party to the disputed land sales possess the locus standi to challenge mutation orders?
  • Is leave to appeal to be granted when petitioners fail to offer a refund of the sale consideration while seeking to invalidate land transactions?
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• Kamal Ud Din And Others vs The Province of the Punjab And Another1987 SCMR 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-15
  service tribunalreview petitionoperative orderimplementation of judgmentappellate jurisdictioneffective date of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the effective date of implementation of a Service Tribunal's order. The petitioners sought relief from 17 May 1982, the date of the original Service Tribunal order, rather than 8 December 1982, the date the Supreme Court dismissed the leave to appeal against that order. The core legal question was whether the implementation of an order upheld by an appellate court should relate back to the date of the original tribunal's order or the date of the appellate dismissal. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, noting that the specific point regarding the effective date was not raised during the previous hearing, thus providing no ground for review. However, the Court affirmed the legal principle that when an appellate court dismisses an appeal and does not interfere with the trial court's judgment, the original order of the trial court remains the operative order. Consequently, the Court clarified that the petitioners could approach the Government to seek implementation of the Service Tribunal's order effective from 17 May 1982.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of a trial court remain the operative order when an appeal against it is dismissed by an appellate court?
  • Is a failure to raise a legal point during the initial hearing a valid ground for a review petition?
  • From what date should an order be implemented when the appellate court upholds the original judgment of a tribunal?
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• Kamal Din And 2 Others vs Muhammad Sharif And Other1987 SCMR 1264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-01
  criminal appealmurder convictionocular evidencemedical evidencereasonable doubtinvestigation integrityforensic evidencewitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellants for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, given the discrepancies between the ocular account and the medical evidence, and the alleged fabrication of evidence during the investigation. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The Court found that the ocular testimony was unreliable due to the witnesses' deliberate concealment of their relationship with the deceased and contradictions with the medical report regarding the number and location of injuries. Furthermore, the Court noted that the investigation was tainted by the delayed recovery of weapons and the suspicious handling of forensic evidence, which cast doubt on the integrity of the prosecution's case. Additionally, the motive was deemed implausible as the accused were actively pursuing legal remedies in court. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, establishing that where ocular evidence is contradicted by medical findings and investigation is suspect, the benefit of the doubt must be given to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the nature and location of injuries render the testimony unreliable?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the investigation involves the delayed recovery of weapons and suspicious handling of forensic evidence?
  • Does the deliberate concealment of a relationship with the deceased by prosecution witnesses destroy their credibility?
  • Is the existence of a pending legal remedy in court a factor that weakens the prosecution's theory of motive?
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• Kala vs The State1987 SCMR 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-25
  murdercapital punishmentright of private defenceocular testimonyimprovements in evidencecriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was tried and convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing the murder of the deceased with a hatchet following a domestic dispute regarding an exchange marriage, and was sentenced to death along with compensation under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. His conviction and death sentence were upheld by the High Court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the ocular testimony, police reports, and omissions in the first information report, as well as the injuries sustained by the accused which were supported by medical evidence. The Court held that the presence of the primary eyewitness was doubtful, material improvements and omissions existed in the prosecution evidence, and the accused had successfully established a plea of private self-defence. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to the right of private self-defence when material omissions in the prosecution evidence render the eyewitness account doubtful and the accused sustains injuries during the incident?
  • Does the failure of the complainant to mention crucial prosecution facts in the First Information Report affect the credibility of ocular witnesses?
  • Can a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained when the prosecution fails to establish who was the initial aggressor?
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• Kala And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 1050 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-08
  culpable homicidesentence severitycommon intentioncriminal appealPakistan Penal Codeassaultlife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court judgment concerning charges of culpable homicide, attempted murder, hurt, and rioting. The High Court had convicted the appellants under Section 304, Part I, and other provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, applying Section 34 rather than Section 149, while setting aside the conviction for rioting under Section 148. Leave to appeal was granted solely to examine the severity of the sentence, with the appellants contending that life imprisonment under Section 304, Part I, was excessively harsh given the absence of a conviction under Section 302. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants' conduct, the lethal weapons employed, and the extreme cruelty demonstrated during the unprovoked attack fully justified the sentence imposed. The Court further noted that it would not examine whether the offence should have been categorized under Section 302, as the complainant party had not filed an appeal regarding the conviction. The judgment affirms that the nature of the act and the manner of commission are critical factors in maintaining sentences for culpable homicide.

  Questions settled

  • Is a sentence of life imprisonment under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 justified where the accused acted with extreme cruelty and lethal weapons?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-examine whether an offence should have been charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the complainant party has not filed an appeal against the conviction under Section 304, Part I?
  • Does the presence of insignificant injuries on the accused side compared to the complainant side negate a plea of self-defense?
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• Kabiruddin A. Lalani vs Zafar Ishaq Ansari And Another1987 SCMR 2052 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-08
  rent defaultejectment applicationrent deposit orderstriking off defenseleave to appealtechnical default
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that affirmed a Rent Controller's order directing the tenant to deposit rent arrears. The landlord filed an ejectment application alleging rent default and unauthorized sub-letting. The Rent Controller ordered the tenant to deposit arrears of rent. The tenant challenged this, arguing that they were not in default as they had been regularly depositing rent in a separate Rent Miscellaneous Case after the landlord refused to accept it. The core legal question is whether a tenant's failure to deposit rent specifically within the ejectment proceedings, while continuing to deposit rent in a separate court miscellaneous case, constitutes a default under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, that warrants the striking off of the defense. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the failure to deposit rent in the specific ejectment case might be merely technical in nature, especially where rent was already being deposited in court, and stayed the ejectment proceedings pending the final decision of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's failure to deposit rent specifically in the ejectment case constitute a default under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, if the tenant has been regularly depositing rent in a separate court miscellaneous case?
  • Should a failure to deposit rent in the specific ejectment case be treated as a technical default not warranting the penalty of striking off the defense under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
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• Jiand vs The State1987 SCMR 1770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-06
  leave to appealocular testimonyinterested witnessescommon intentionrecovery of weaponcurable irregularitydeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and death sentence for murder. The petitioner was initially convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for a shooting incident involving a matrimonial dispute. On appeal, the High Court maintained the conviction and sentence but altered the conviction to Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involve whether the ocular testimony of interested witnesses requires independent corroboration in the presence of a motive, whether a recovery of a weapon made fourteen days after arrest violates Section 103, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the High Court can alter a conviction to Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the trial court failed to record such a finding, and if such an omission constitutes a curable irregularity under Section 537, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding these contentions regarding evidentiary reliability and procedural legality worthy of further consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of interested witnesses require independent corroboration in cases involving a matrimonial dispute?
  • Can a recovery of a weapon made fourteen days after arrest be considered reliable under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the failure of a trial court to record a finding under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 a curable irregularity under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Jehanzeb Khan vs Quaid I Azam University Islamabad1987 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-10
  disciplinary proceedingsinquiry officerservice matterconstitutional jurisdictionmisconductdepartmental inquirywrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the dismissal of an Assistant Executive Engineer from service at Quaid-i-Azam University. The petitioner had been dismissed following an inquiry conducted by a retired High Court Judge regarding allegations of misconduct. The core legal question was whether an inquiry report could validly form the basis of disciplinary action if the Inquiry Officer was not an employee of the University, specifically interpreting Rule 6(2) of the Efficiency and Discipline Statute of 1982. The High Court held that the provision requiring the Inquiry Officer to be senior in rank was intended to ensure impartiality and prevent prejudice, rather than strictly mandating that the officer be a university employee. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, reasoning that the inquiry conducted by an impartial authority of unquestioned integrity satisfied the requirements of justice. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to interfere, as the inquiry report provided a valid basis for departmental action despite the officer's non-employee status.

  Questions settled

  • Can an inquiry report form the basis of disciplinary action if the Inquiry Officer is not an employee of the organization?
  • Does the requirement that an Inquiry Officer be senior in rank mandate that the officer must be an employee of the institution?
  • Is the High Court's refusal to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction justified when the inquiry was conducted by an impartial authority?
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• Jehangir Alias Badshah vs The State1987 SCMR 1154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-25
  post-arrest bailcommon intentionpre-concerted attackcriminal liabilitymurderattempt to murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's bail application in a criminal case. The petitioner, along with three others, was charged under sections 302, 307, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an armed attack on the complainant and his brothers. The prosecution alleged that the group arrived armed, fired shots resulting in one death and one injury, and that the petitioner personally assaulted a victim with the butt of his pistol. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the allegations of a pre-concerted attack. The Supreme Court held that because the accused acted in concert and the provisions of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were prima facie applicable, the attack was pre-planned and executed without immediate provocation. Consequently, the Court refused to interfere with the High Court's order and dismissed the petition, affirming that bail is not appropriate where prima facie evidence of common intention and active participation in a violent crime exists.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of a pre-concerted attack involving multiple armed individuals justify the denial of bail?
  • Are the provisions of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 prima facie attracted when an accused participates in a joint armed assault?
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• Javaid Saigol and 7 Orher vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, LahorePLD 1987 Supreme Court 276. · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-04
  martial law regulationexcess income declarationincome tax referencereopening assessmentdividend incomejurisdiction of inspecting assistant commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals by members of the Saigol family (assessees under the Income-tax Act, 1922) against a judgment of the Lahore High Court answering income-tax reference questions in favor of the revenue. The core legal question was whether dividend income for the assessment year 1963-64, sought to be taxed via reopening of assessments under Section 34-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, was protected and covered under declarations of excess income filed by the appellants pursuant to Martial Law Regulation No. 32. The Supreme Court held that the consolidated statements filed under Martial Law Regulation No. 32 covered the assessment years 1960-61 to 1968-69, and processing them for the latest five years for tax computation was merely an administrative mechanism rather than an exclusion of prior years. Consequently, the disputed dividend income was fully covered by the excess income declarations, depriving the income-tax authorities of jurisdiction to tax it under Section 34-A. The appeal was allowed, holding that disclosures under Martial Law Regulation No. 32 grant immunity from reopening prior completed assessments for incorrect returns.

  Questions settled

  • Whether dividend income for an assessment year falling within the period of a consolidated statement is covered by declarations of excess income filed under Martial Law Regulation No. 32?
  • Whether the processing of consolidated statements of excess income for the latest five assessment years under Central Board of Revenue circulars excludes earlier assessment years from the immunity granted by Martial Law Regulation No. 32?
  • Does an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner have jurisdiction under Section 34-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 to reopen assessments for income already protected by a valid excess income declaration under Martial Law Regulation No. 32?
  Read full judgment →
• Javaid Saigol & 7 others vs The Commissioner of In-1987 PTD (Trib) 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-04
  income taxmartial law regulationexcess income declarationreopening of assessmentdividend incomereference to high courtstatutory immunity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals arising from income tax assessment proceedings concerning members of the Saigol family, who declared excess income under Martial Law Regulation No. 32. The core legal question is whether the disputed dividend income for the assessment year 1963-64 was covered and protected by the consolidated statements of excess income filed by the appellants under Martial Law Regulation No. 32, thereby barring the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner from reopening the assessment under section 34-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court held that the consolidated statements filed covered the entire period from 1960-61 to 1968-69, and the processing of such statements for the latest five assessment years was merely for tax computation purposes and did not exclude earlier years from the immunity granted. Consequently, the Court ruled that the disputed dividend income was fully covered by the declarations, rendering the reopening of the assessment without jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that declarations and consolidated statements of excess income under Martial Law Regulation No. 32 grant complete immunity from reassessment for the stated period, and administrative computation rules restricting processing to five years do not negate the substantive coverage of the full declaration period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether dividend income declared under consolidated statements pursuant to Martial Law Regulation No. 32 is protected from subsequent reassessment?
  • Whether the processing of consolidated statements of excess income for the latest five assessment years restricts the substantive coverage of the declaration to those years alone?
  • Does an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner have jurisdiction under section 34-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922 to reopen an assessment covered by statutory immunity granted under Martial Law Regulation No. 32?
  • What is the scope of reference proceedings under section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 regarding questions framed by the Commissioner of Income Tax?
  Read full judgment →
• Jan Muhammad And Others vs Taj Masih1987 SCMR 1142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-13
  pre-emptiontenant rightfirst right of pre-emptionLand Reforms Regulationsuperior right of pre-emptionrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the petitioners, who claimed a superior right of pre-emption as owners in the revenue estate, against the sale of suit land to Taj Masih, the sitting tenant. Although the trial court initially decreed the suit, the appellate court reversed the decision, relying on paragraph 25(3)(4) of the Land Reforms Regulation. The High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioners' revision petition. The Supreme Court considered the legal question of whether a tenant purchasing suit land possesses the first right of pre-emption so as to successfully resist claims by other pre-emptors under pre-emption laws. Affirming the High Court's view and relying on precedent, the Supreme Court held that a tenant of land enjoys the primary right of pre-emption and, upon purchasing the land himself, can lawfully defeat the pre-emption claims of all other potential pre-emptors. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sitting tenant who purchases suit land have the first right of pre-emption over other pre-emptors?
  • Can a tenant who purchases land successfully resist a pre-emption suit filed by an owner in the revenue estate under section 15 of the Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Jan Ahmad And Others vs The State And Other1987 SCMR 994 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-30
  criminal appealmurderright of private defenseland disputecommutation of sentencecapital punishmentocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for the murder of two individuals and the attempted murder of four others during a violent confrontation over a land dispute. The core legal question concerned whether the appellants, who claimed to be in possession of the disputed land, were entitled to the right of private defense, and whether the death sentences imposed by the lower courts were appropriate in the circumstances. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions under the Pakistan Penal Code, finding that the prosecution's ocular testimony, supported by the injuries sustained by the witnesses, established the appellants' guilt. However, the Court held that while the appellants were not fully justified in their use of lethal force, the existence of a genuine, albeit disputed, possession claim mitigated the culpability regarding the sentencing. Consequently, the Court upheld the convictions but commuted the death sentences of the primary appellants to life imprisonment, establishing the principle that while a claim of possession does not absolve one of murder, it may serve as a mitigating factor in determining the severity of the sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claim of possession over disputed land justify the use of lethal force under the right of private defense?
  • Can death sentences be commuted to life imprisonment based on the circumstances of a land dispute?
  • Is the presence of injured witnesses sufficient to establish their presence at the scene of the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamshed Ahmad Khan and 2 Other vs The S. D. M._Assistant Commissioner, Garden Sub Division Karachi and Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-09-07
  Representation of the People Act 1976election petitionballot paper validitymarking of ballot paperdirectory provisionvoter intentionrecount of votes
  Summary & questions settled

  These statutory appeals under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, arose from judgments of Election Tribunals regarding the validity of ballot papers. The core legal question was whether Section 33(5)(b) of the Act and Rule 17 of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1977, which prescribe placing the mark within the space containing the candidate's name and symbol, are mandatory or directory, and whether votes marked in an adjacent blank compartment must be excluded under Section 38(4). The Supreme Court held that Section 33(5)(b) and Rule 17 are directory, requiring only substantial compliance. Furthermore, Section 38(4)(c) provides an exhaustive list of grounds for rejecting ballot papers, under which a vote is invalid only if it is not clear for whom the elector voted. Consequently, where the voter's intention to vote for a specific candidate is clear and unambiguous despite the mark being placed outside the candidate's exact compartment, the vote is valid. The appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are the statutory provisions specifying the place for marking a ballot paper under Section 33(5)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 mandatory or directory?
  • Does a ballot paper marked in a blank compartment opposite a candidate's name constitute a valid vote if the voter's intention is clear?
  • Is the list of grounds for rejecting ballot papers under Section 38(4)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 exhaustive?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamil Ahmed Khan Through His L. Rs. vs Syed Jaffer Hussain And Another1987 SCMR 1583 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-21
  transfer of propertyauctioncancellation of transfervested rightlimitationsettlement commissionerconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court which had accepted a constitutional petition filed by the first respondent regarding the transfer of a disputed house in Kotri Town. The property was originally transferred to the appellant's predecessor-in-interest, Abdul Rasheed Khan, via a P.T.O. in 1959. Subsequently, the house was put to auction in 1964 and transferred to the first respondent. Following Abdul Rasheed Khan's death, his legal heir challenged the cancellation and auction through appellate and revisional forums. The Settlement Commissioner set aside the auction and transfer in favour of the first respondent, holding that the original transfer was never legally cancelled and no notices were served. The High Court, however, set aside the Settlement Commissioner's order on grounds of limitation and functus officio status after P.T.D. issuance. The Supreme Court held that the original transferee acquired a vested right and could not be deprived of the property without due notice and lawful cancellation, and that the property was not legally available for auction. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the Settlement Commissioner's order restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property already transferred to an original transferee through a P.T.O. can be legally auctioned without first lawfully cancelling the prior transfer and serving notice?
  • Whether the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) bars the settlement authorities from rectifying an illegal auction and fraudulent transfer made without notice to the rightful transferee?
  • Whether the finding of fact by a Settlement Commissioner regarding the non-service of notice and limitation should be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction when supported by the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamil Ahmad vs The State1987 SCMR 1067 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-07
  illegal gratificationcorruptiontrap raidappreciation of evidencetainted moneyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which confirmed the petitioner's conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The petitioner, a clerk at the Karachi Development Authority, was convicted for demanding and accepting illegal gratification to record a mutation entry. The prosecution's case relied on a trap operation involving an Anti-Corruption Officer and a Magistrate, during which tainted money was recovered from the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the conviction, specifically highlighting the complainant's testimony regarding his weak eyesight at the time of trial. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, noting that the complainant had confirmed his eyesight was perfect at the time of the incident and that the recovery was corroborated by the Magistrate and the Anti-Corruption Inspector. Finding that the pleas raised related merely to the appreciation of evidence and had been correctly addressed by the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a complainant's testimony regarding weak eyesight at the time of trial invalidate evidence of a transaction that occurred when the complainant's eyesight was reportedly perfect?
  • Can a conviction for illegal gratification be sustained where the recovery of tainted money is corroborated by a Magistrate and an Anti-Corruption Inspector?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamaitullah And Another vs State1987 SCMR 1505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-04
  common intentionsudden fightmurderattempted murderpre-concertcriminal appealException IV to Section 300 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of two brothers, Jamaitullah and Abdullah, for the murder of Abdul Hameed and the attempted murder of three others. The appellants, motivated by family honor regarding their sister's marriage to the complainant, attacked the complainant party near a railway crossing. The core legal questions concerned whether the incident constituted a sudden fight under Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the doctrine of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was applicable. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, rejecting the appellants' plea of self-defense and the High Court's finding of a sudden fight. The Court held that the evidence demonstrated pre-concerted action rather than a sudden flare-up, thereby negating the application of Exception IV. It affirmed that the appellants acted with a common intention to commit the assault. The Court emphasized that the presence of independent police witnesses and the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims versus the appellants substantiated the prosecution's case, confirming the appellants' guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a sudden fight preclude the application of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be applied when the evidence establishes pre-concerted action?
  • Is the testimony of independent police witnesses who intervened during an occurrence sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Jahaz Khan And Another vs The State And Other1987 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murdercriminal appealcorroborationocular testimonyballistic evidenceenhancement of sentenceacquittalfirearm injury
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal appeals against a judgment of the High Court concerning the conviction and sentencing of multiple accused individuals for murder and related offences. The core legal question revolves around whether the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Jahaz Khan, and the acquittal of the other co-accused were sustainable based on the available ocular testimony and supporting corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the ocular account required corroboration due to inconsistencies and medical evidence, which was successfully established against Jahaz Khan through firearm recovery and ballistic matching, but lacking as to the other co-accused. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in enhancing the sentence of imprisonment for life to death without finding the trial court's discretion perverse or the sentence grossly inadequate. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court should not interfere with the sentencing discretion exercised by a trial court unless compelling reasons such as perversity or gross inadequacy are demonstrated, and ocular testimony requiring corroboration cannot sustain the conviction of accused persons lacking such support.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in enhancing a sentence of imprisonment for life to death without finding the trial court's reasons perverse or the sentence grossly inadequate?
  • Can an uncorroborated ocular testimony sustain a criminal conviction when inconsistencies exist between the medical evidence and the eye-witness account?
  • Whether the recovery of an empty cartridge matched with a recovered weapon serves as sufficient corroboration to maintain a murder conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Izhar Ahmed And Others vs Maulvi Ghulam Habib And Another1987 SCMR 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-20
  permanent transfer deedsettlement authoritiesjurisdictionencroachmentevacuee propertycivil court jurisdictionfunctus officio
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside orders passed by Settlement Authorities after the issuance of permanent transfer deeds to the parties. The dispute involved the successors-in-interest of a transferee of an evacuee house and an auction purchaser of two adjacent evacuee plots, both of whom had obtained permanent transfer deeds in 1965. In 1969, the auction purchaser alleged encroachment by the transferee, leading to various demarcation orders by the Settlement Authorities. The High Court declared these post-transfer orders to be without jurisdiction, holding that once permanent transfer deeds are issued, the Settlement Authorities become functus officio. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed this view, holding that since the properties were distinct, owned by different evacuees, and bore different numbers, any dispute regarding trespass or encroachment after the issuance of permanent transfer deeds fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Settlement Authorities retain jurisdiction to resolve encroachment or boundary disputes after permanent transfer deeds have been issued to the parties?
  • What is the proper legal forum to resolve a trespass or encroachment dispute between transferees of evacuee properties once permanent transfer deeds are executed?
  • Does the issuance of a permanent transfer deed render the Settlement Authorities functus officio regarding subsequent disputes over the transferred property?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishtiaq Hussain Shah vs The State1987 SCMR 1724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-16
  leave to appealculpable homicidesudden provocationmurder convictionSection 300 Exception 4criminal appealstatement of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the Lahore High Court’s dismissal of an appeal against a conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner was convicted for the murder of the deceased following a sudden altercation at a marriage ceremony. While the prosecution relied on the testimony of a solitary eye-witness, the accused admitted to inflicting the fatal knife blow but claimed it occurred during a sudden fight without premeditation, asserting he acted in self-defense or under provocation. The core legal question is whether the petitioner’s actions, involving a single blow during a sudden quarrel, constitute murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the petitioner's contentions regarding the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, required further judicial consideration. The Court emphasized the necessity of evaluating whether the absence of previous enmity and the sudden nature of the incident mitigate the offence from murder to culpable homicide.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single fatal blow inflicted during a sudden quarrel without premeditation fall under Exception 4 to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the accused admits the act but claims it occurred during a sudden fight?
  • Is the testimony of a solitary eye-witness sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder when the accused provides a plausible alternative version of events?
  Read full judgment →
• Irfan Ashiq vs General Manager, Kundian Nuclear Complex1987 SCMR 751 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-04
  limitationspecial leave to appealacquittalcriminal procedureessential servicesretrial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition concerning an acquittal under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952. The petitioner, an employee at the Kundian Nuclear Complex, was prosecuted for failing to resume duty after leave and was acquitted by the Magistrate on 10-8-1981. The respondent filed a special leave to appeal before the Lahore High Court under section 417(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which the High Court allowed, setting aside the acquittal and remanding the case for retrial after computing the limitation period under section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908. Upon further appeal to the Supreme Court, the core legal question was whether the High Court appeal was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the petition for special leave to appeal before the High Court was indeed barred by one day upon correct calculation. The Court laid down that statutory limitation periods for filing appeals must be strictly computed and observed, and an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period without valid condonation cannot be entertained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for special leave to appeal under section 417(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is barred if filed after the expiry of the prescribed limitation period?
  • Can the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908 when computing the period of limitation for a special leave to appeal?
  • What is the effect of entertaining a time-barred petition for special leave to appeal without an application for condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Ellahl vs The State1987 SCMR 1274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-10
  vehicle confiscationdrug traffickingheroinProhibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Orderowner's liabilitynatural justicenexusdiscretionary powerconfiscation of property
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard an appeal against the confiscation of a car under Article 14 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, after heroin was found in it. The car's owner challenged the confiscation, arguing that liability to confiscation does not automatically necessitate such an order, and a nexus between the owner and the offence must be established. The trial court had confiscated the car despite acquitting three of the four occupants, including the driver, and the Federal Shariat Court upheld this. The Supreme Court held that the discretion to confiscate property must be exercised upon principles of natural justice, requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard. Crucially, no person should be deprived of property by way of penalty unless they are in some measure responsible for assisting or furthering the commission of the offence. The Court found that confiscation was not justified where a passenger secretly carried narcotics without the direct or indirect involvement of others in the vehicle or its control.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vehicle be confiscated under Article 14 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, solely based on its use in an offence?
  • Is it necessary to establish a nexus between the vehicle owner and the offence for confiscation under Article 14 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  • What principles govern the exercise of discretion to confiscate property by way of penalty?
  • Does the principle of natural justice apply to confiscation proceedings under Article 14 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  • Can a vehicle be confiscated if a passenger secretly carries narcotics without the owner's or driver's involvement?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Ahmad And Others vs Khurshid Ahmad And Other1987 SCMR 744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-20
  pre-emptionadditional evidenceappellate discretionrecord of rightsprocedural negligenceJamabandirebuttal evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which allowed the plaintiffs/respondents to produce additional evidence—specifically a copy of a Jamabandi—during the pendency of a regular second appeal in a pre-emption suit. The plaintiffs had previously failed to produce this document during the trial, leading to the dismissal of their suit for possession by pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in exercising its discretion to allow the production of this document at the appellate stage, despite the plaintiffs' earlier negligence. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the impugned order was not exceptionable because the document in question was a certified copy of a record of rights, the authenticity of which was not in dispute. The Court held that procedural technicalities should not prevent the reception of authentic public documents essential to the case, provided the opposing party is granted the right to rebut such evidence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with the petitioners granted the right to challenge the document's authenticity and produce rebuttal evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court allow the production of additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the document is a certified public record?
  • Does the failure to produce a document at the trial stage due to negligence absolutely bar its production at the appellate stage?
  • Is a party entitled to produce rebuttal evidence when the court allows the opposing party to introduce additional evidence in appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore vs Abid Hussain Sherazi1987 SCMR 1869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-23
  service tribunaladverse remarksannual confidential reportspecial leave to appealjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which accepted the respondent's appeal and ordered the expungement of adverse remarks in his annual confidential report. The core legal question concerns the extent of the jurisdiction of the Provincial Service Tribunal regarding the expungement of adverse remarks in service matters. The Supreme Court noted that leave to appeal had already been granted in a connected petition involving the identical legal question. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in the present petition and directed that the appeal be heard alongside the earlier matter on the existing record with permission to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the jurisdiction of the Provincial Service Tribunal extend to the expungement of adverse remarks in annual confidential reports?
  Read full judgment →
• Inspector General of Police, Baluchistan vs Jawad Haider And Another1987 SCMR 1606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-20
  service tribunallimitationdepartmental appealdismissal from serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Inspector General of Police, Baluchistan, challenging the decision of the Service Tribunal which overruled an objection regarding the limitation period of an appeal filed by a dismissed Motor Vehicle Examiner. The respondent was dismissed from service for corrupt practice on 29-6-1977, and his departmental appeal was rejected on 2-8-1977. Instead of approaching the competent authority, the respondent made further representations and eventually filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal on 24-11-1982, relying on a later letter dated 24-10-1982 to compute limitation. The core legal question is whether the Service Tribunal erred in condoning the delay and overruling the objection of limitation when the respondent had knowledge of the earlier rejection of his departmental appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the correctness of the Tribunal's decision on the question of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is barred by limitation when filed long after the rejection of the departmental appeal?
  • Can a civil servant claim a fresh period of limitation based on subsequent correspondence regarding a representation that lay outside the prescribed departmental remedies?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Ullah vs Zahoor Ud Din And Another1987 SCMR 1313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-19
  ejectmentwilful defaulttender of rentmoney orderdeposit with Rent Controllerpersonal requirementsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of ejectment proceedings initiated by the appellant-landlord under Section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance on grounds of personal requirement and default in rent payment. The Rent Controller and the first appellate authority concurrently ordered the eviction of the respondent-tenants on the basis of rent default. However, the High Court reversed these findings in second appeal, determining that the alleged default was not wilful. The Supreme Court considered whether a finding of default without mitigating circumstances could justify overturning concurrent ejectment orders. Affirming the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that the respondents were not wilful defaulters because they had tendered rent via money order—which the landlord refused—and subsequently deposited it regularly with the Rent Controller. The Court affirmed that where a landlord deliberately refuses rent to engineer grounds for eviction and the tenant acts diligently through prescribed alternative modes, the tenant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can be held to be a wilful defaulter when the landlord refuses rent tendered via money order and the tenant subsequently deposits it with the Rent Controller?
  • Whether concurrent orders of ejectment on grounds of default may be reversed in second appeal if the landlord failed to prove that the default was deliberate and wilful?
  • Can the Supreme Court examine additional grounds of eviction when leave to appeal was granted exclusively on the question of whether the default in rent payment was wilful?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Khan vs Haji Muhammad Suleman And Other1987 SCMR 1500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-05
  allotment of landmukhbari informationresumed landdisplaced personsrevisional powersretrospective operationpast and closed transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the allotment of resumed land between an original allottee and an informant who provided information leading to the resumption of said land. The core legal question was whether the respondent, as an informant, held a superior right to the land, and whether the revisional order in his favor was legally competent. The Supreme Court held that the allotment in favor of the appellant, made on 10-9-1964, was valid because the concession for informants was withdrawn at that time. Furthermore, the Court determined that the revisional order passed in 1965 by the Additional Settlement Commissioner was a nullity, as the Displaced Persons (Laws) Amendment Ordinance 1964 had removed such revisional powers. The Court established that while subsequent legislation (Act XXXVI of 1974) granted retrospective rights to informants, it specifically protected prior valid allotments by allowing informants to claim alternative land rather than displacing existing allottees. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appellant's original allotment was restored as a past and closed transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an informant has a preferential right to land resumed on their information if the concession for such allotment was withdrawn at the time of the original allotment?
  • Did the Displaced Persons (Laws) Amendment Ordinance 1964 remove the revisional powers of the Additional Settlement Commissioner?
  • Does the retrospective operation of Act XXXVI of 1974 allow for the displacement of a valid prior allottee of resumed land?
  • Is an order passed by an authority lacking jurisdiction considered a nullity in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Ali vs Allah Ditta And 2 Other1987 SCMR 1526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-20
  murderculpable homicidealteration of convictionreduction of sentencedying declarationleave to appealenhancement of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby the respondents were acquitted of murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, their conviction being altered to section 304-II and their sentences reduced to the period already undergone. The core legal question involves whether the High Court erred in altering the conviction and reducing the sentence given the dying declaration, medical evidence, and the brutal nature of the assault. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal against the respondent to examine whether the offence fell under section 300 rather than section 304-II, and whether the sentence reduction resulted in a miscarriage of justice, while dismissing the petition regarding the co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from murder under section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304-II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a dying declaration corroborated by medical evidence and recovery of weapons suffice to establish a murder charge?
  • Whether the reduction of a sentence to the period already undergone in a brutal murder case constitutes a grave miscarriage of justice warranting leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Ali And Another vs Manzoor Ullah And Another1987 SCMR 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-10
  service tribunalseniorityad hoc appointmentcontinuous officiationdirect recruitcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition challenging the seniority determination of civil servants by the Punjab Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerned whether an ad hoc, stop-gap appointment subsequently regularized could be counted as continuous officiation for seniority purposes over a direct recruit, and how statutory rules and the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 govern inter se seniority. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that an ad hoc appointment constituting a stop-gap arrangement, which was terminated when the officer went abroad, does not constitute continuous officiation, and seniority must be counted from the date of regular appointment pursuant to section 7(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The key principle laid down is that ad hoc, temporary stop-gap service cannot be tacked as continuous officiation for claiming senior gradation over a regularly appointed direct recruit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad hoc and stop-gap appointment can be counted as continuous officiation for the purpose of determining seniority under the service rules?
  • Does a temporary stop-gap arrangement create a lien on a post when the incumbent proceeds abroad for training?
  • From which date does seniority in a grade take effect for a promoted civil servant under Section 7(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Muhammad Khan vs Muhammad Sarfraz Cheema, Additional District Judge and Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-05
  ejectmentreconstructionlandlord and tenantwrit jurisdictionconcurrent findingsrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an ejectment order passed against tenants of a shop on the ground of reconstruction. The Rent Controller and the appellate authority concurrently ordered ejectment, finding the landlord's plea for reconstruction established, which the High Court maintained in writ jurisdiction. The core legal question addressed is whether a landlord seeking ejectment on the ground of reconstruction must prove that the premises are required reasonably and in good faith, in light of an intervening amending ordinance. The Supreme Court held that since the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1978 never came into force due to the lack of the requisite notification and was subsequently repealed, the original legal position remains unaltered. Consequently, a landlord seeking ejectment for reconstruction must plead and prove that the building is reasonably and in good faith required for that purpose. The Court laid down that concurrent findings of fact regarding good faith and reconstruction cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord seeking ejectment of a tenant on the ground of reconstruction is required to prove that the building is reasonably and in good faith required for that purpose?
  • Did the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance of 1978 take legal effect without the issuance of a notification by the Governor?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the requirement of a building for reconstruction be interfered with in writ jurisdiction?
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• Imam Bux And 2 Others vs The State And Other1987 SCMR 1539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-03
  petition for leave to appealalteration of convictionculpable homicide not amounting to murderbenefit of doubtsentence enhancementballistic evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which partly allowed a criminal appeal by altering the convictions of two accused from murder under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304(2), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing their sentences to seven years' rigorous imprisonment, while acquitting a third co-accused, and dismissing the first informant's revision application for sentence enhancement. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court's substitution of conviction and acquittal were founded on sound principles of criminal justice in light of the ocular and ballistic evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the submissions regarding the propriety of altering the conviction and acquitting the co-accused deserved detailed consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the first informant and, under section 439(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, also granted leave to the convicts to enable a comprehensive review of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was legally justified in altering the conviction from murder under section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the absence of a prosecution witness warrant an adverse inference sufficient to alter a conviction and acquit a co-accused?
  • Whether the acquittal of an accused charged under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was based on sound principles of criminal justice?
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• Ikhlaq Ahmad And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 1760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-25
  suspension of sentencepending appealappellate jurisdictionearly hearingcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment, sought suspension of their sentence from the Supreme Court after the High Court had previously refused their application pending the disposal of their appeal. The core legal question addressed was whether the Supreme Court should intervene to suspend a sentence while an appeal remains pending before the High Court. The Court held that it is inappropriate for the Supreme Court to intervene or express an opinion on the merits of a case while the appeal is still pending before the High Court. Consequently, the petition for suspension of sentence was dismissed. However, the Court observed that, given the petitioners' arguments regarding the merits of their case and the potential for acquittal, the High Court should endeavor to hear the pending appeal at an early date. The key principle established is that the Supreme Court will generally decline to suspend a sentence or interfere in matters currently sub judice before the High Court, preferring that the appellate process take its course.

  Questions settled

  • Should the Supreme Court suspend a sentence while an appeal against conviction is pending before the High Court?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to comment on the merits of a case while the appeal is sub judice before the High Court?
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• Iftikhar Hussain And Others vs Mian Irshad Ali And Other1987 SCMR 2059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-10
  displaced personsurban agricultural landallotment cancellationadministrative discretionnatural justiceSupplementary Scheme No. 2rehabilitation settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of the Central Government’s orders regarding the allotment of urban agricultural land to a displaced person under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the Central Government, having granted a benefit under the second proviso to paragraph 24 of Supplementary Scheme No. 2 to a claimant in continuous possession of urban land, could subsequently revoke that benefit without notice or hearing. The Supreme Court held that the second proviso remained valid and unrepealed, and the initial grant of the benefit was a lawful exercise of discretion. Consequently, the subsequent revocation was declared illegal and without lawful authority because it was passed in an adversary proceeding without affording the affected party an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and fairness. The Court affirmed that administrative discretion, while broad, must be exercised consistently and fairly, and cannot be revoked arbitrarily once rights have accrued. The judgment also remanded related settlement revisions that were erroneously dismissed as infructuous by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Central Government revoke a benefit granted under the second proviso to paragraph 24 of Supplementary Scheme No. 2 without providing notice or a hearing to the affected party?
  • Does the second proviso to paragraph 24 of Supplementary Scheme No. 2 remain valid and enforceable despite subsequent changes in government policy?
  • Is an administrative order granting a benefit to a claimant, once acted upon, immune from arbitrary revocation?
  • Does the failure of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to act expeditiously on a claim application attract the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit?
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• Ibrahim vs Umar Din And Other1987 SCMR 23 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-19
  entitlement unitsrehabilitation settlementland allotmentlacheswrit petitionsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the calculation of entitlement units for land left behind in India, specifically concerning the rates applied for Banjar Jadeed, Banjar Qadeem, and Ghair Mumkin land. The petitioner was allotted land in 1956 based on initial calculations but challenged them in 1969, seeking higher unit rates. The Settlement Commissioner dismissed the petitioner's revision on 25-3-1974, holding that his total entitlement was already satisfied and the calculations complied with paragraph 16, Part II of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The Lahore High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition, noting the delay and lack of objection when the 1956 allotment was made. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the petitioner could not be permitted to agitate unit calculations that had been settled and satisfied as early as 1956. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner challenge the calculation of land entitlement units long after the original allotment has been finalized and satisfied?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in dismissing a writ petition filed years after the initial departmental calculation of entitlement units?
  Read full judgment →
• Ibrahim And 2 Others vs Qamar Raza Khan And Other1987 SCMR 695 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-20
  land settlementconstitutional petitionres judicatadouble allotmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against the dismissal of three constitutional petitions by the Lahore High Court concerning a land settlement dispute. The core legal questions involve whether previous writ petition observations prevented the application of res judicata and whether the respondents had obtained excess or double land allotments. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the principle of res judicata was correctly applied and that concurrent factual findings by the authorities and the High Court confirmed no excess or double allotment existed, rendering the petitions unfit for leave to appeal. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed. The key principle laid down is that repeated litigation of settled factual matters is barred by res judicata where concurrent findings confirm the legality and correctness of land allotments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a previous judgment operates as res judicata when subsequent challenges raise the same factual issues regarding land settlement?
  • Can an allottee retain land if the subsequent factual examination confirms that no excess or double allotment was made?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities and the High Court open to interference when not shown to be illegal?
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• Hussaini vs The State1987 SCMR 501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-12
  triple murderleave to appealsentence mitigationhonour killingappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Hussaini, for the triple murder of Hafiz Obaidullah, Mst. Zaitun, and Mst. Bashiran. The petitioner was convicted under sections 302, 148, 364, and 120-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while his co-accused were acquitted by the High Court. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that the prosecution witness, whose testimony was rejected regarding the acquitted co-accused, should not have been relied upon for his own conviction. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting that the murders occurred within the petitioner's house, where he was apprehended by witnesses while committing the acts. The Court upheld the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient. However, the Court granted leave to appeal solely on the question of sentence, considering the petitioner's argument that he acted under the belief of being honour-bound to prevent illicit relations involving his wife and sister-in-law, thereby potentially warranting a lesser punishment than the death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal limited solely to the question of sentence?
  • Is a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal condonable by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the belief that a murder was committed to stop illicit relations constitute a ground for mitigating a death sentence?
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• Hussain vs Allah Bakhsh1987 SCMR 1495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-10
  mortgage with possessionexecution of decreeredemption of mortgageoccupancy tenantspecial leave to appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court regarding the execution of a decree involving occupancy rights and a prior mortgage. The core legal question is whether, during execution proceedings, a court can order the redemption of a mortgage and direct the delivery of possession to a decree-holder, effectively bypassing the mortgagee's right to retain possession until redemption, or if such a determination requires a separate suit. The petitioner, a mortgagee with possession, argued that the High Court's direction to deposit mortgage money and proceed with execution deprived him of legitimate defenses, specifically citing Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the petitioner's contention regarding the propriety of the High Court's order—specifically whether it was permissible to direct redemption within execution proceedings rather than through a separate suit—raised significant legal questions requiring further examination. The Court held that the matter warranted a full hearing to determine if the petitioner's rights as a mortgagee were improperly curtailed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court order the redemption of a mortgage during execution proceedings?
  • Does an order for redemption in execution proceedings deprive a mortgagee of defenses available in a separate suit?
  • Is it permissible to bypass a separate suit for redemption when executing a decree for possession against a mortgagee?
  Read full judgment →
• Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. And Other vs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. And Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-12
  judicial saleauction confirmationexecution of decreeBanking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979Code of Civil Procedure 1908judgment-debtordecree-holderauction purchaserstability of judicial sales
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming an auction sale of property executed under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, specifically regarding the confirmation of sales, applied to execution proceedings under the Ordinance, and whether a court could refuse to confirm an auction sale solely because the decree-holder and judgment-debtor reached a settlement post-auction. The Supreme Court held that the auction purchaser acquires a vested interest upon the fall of the hammer, which cannot be disregarded merely due to a subsequent compromise between the parties. The Court ruled that once a court adopts the procedure of public auction, it is bound by the legal consequences thereof, and the sale must be confirmed unless specific statutory grounds for setting it aside are met. The key principle laid down is that the stability of judicial sales is paramount; judicial discretion to refuse confirmation must be exercised on sound, equitable principles and not arbitrarily, ensuring that third-party interests are protected.

  Questions settled

  • Does the satisfaction of a decree after an auction sale but before its confirmation entitle the judgment-debtor to have the sale set aside?
  • Are the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to execution proceedings conducted by a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a court refuse to confirm a judicial sale on the sole ground that the decree-holder and judgment-debtor have reached a compromise?
  • Does an auction purchaser acquire a vested interest in the property upon the fall of the hammer in a public auction?
  Read full judgment →
• Hotel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Province of Punjab Through Secretary, Excise And Taxation And Another1987 SCMR 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-22
  hotel taxretrospective amendmentpast and closed transactiontax assessmentconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant-Company challenged a demand for hotel tax following a retrospective amendment to section 12 of the West Pakistan Finance Act, which included telephone charges within the definition of maximum daily charges for lodging units. The District Excise and Taxation Officer had sought tax recovery and production of accounts for the years 1965-66 to 1969-70. The Lahore High Court held that the tax for 1965-66 was a past and closed transaction and could not be re-opened, but permitted assessment for the remaining years as tax liability for those years had not been finalised. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the tax levy notice should have been issued within a reasonable time. During the hearing, the appellant abandoned the leave grounds and raised a new plea that all subsequent years were also past and closed transactions. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that this new plea, not raised before the High Court, lacked factual foundation as the appellant had not submitted tax returns or accounts, and upheld the High Court's judgment. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retrospective amendment to a taxing statute can re-open a tax liability that has already become a past and closed transaction?
  • Can an appellant raise a new factual plea before the Supreme Court that was neither pleaded in the constitutional petition nor argued before the High Court?
  • Are telephone charges included in the maximum daily charge for a single lodging unit under the West Pakistan Finance Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Hissamud Din vs Mst. Faizan And Other1987 SCMR 289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-08
  abatement of appeallegal representativescondonation of delaysufficient causeLetters Patent Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the appellant's Letters Patent Appeal on the ground that it stood abated due to the failure to bring the legal representatives of the deceased respondent on record within the prescribed period. The core legal question concerns whether the appellant showed sufficient cause for the condonation of delay in applying to set aside the abatement. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had sound factual grounds to conclude that the appellant failed to establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay, noting that the parties were litigating for a long time and resided in close proximity, making the appellant's claim of ignorance regarding the respondent's death implausible. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that findings of fact regarding knowledge of a party's death arrived at by the High Court will not ordinarily be interfered with by the appellate court, and in the absence of sufficient cause, an appeal that has abated cannot be revived.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellant can obtain condonation of delay for failing to implead legal representatives without showing sufficient cause?
  • Will the Supreme Court ordinarily interfere with a concurrent finding of fact by the High Court regarding a party's knowledge of a litigant's death?
  • Does an appeal stand abated if an application for impleading the legal representatives of a deceased party is not made within the prescribed period?
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• Hazoor Bakhsh And Others vs Abdul Rashid And Other1987 SCMR 1845 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-08
  mutation entryrevenue recordtitle disputeoral saleregistration of documentsrebuttable presumptiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil dispute concerns a claim of ownership over a Katcha house in Quetta. The appellants, as legal heirs of the original purchaser, sought a declaration of title and possession against the respondents, who claimed ownership through an alleged prior oral sale. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the appellants, relying on mutation entries in the revenue record. The appellate court reversed this decision, holding that mutation entries alone cannot create title for property worth over one hundred rupees without registration. The High Court affirmed this, dismissing the appellants' revision. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that in the absence of a written instrument, the provisions of the Registration Act 1908 are not attracted. The Court affirmed that under Section 42 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967, mutation entries raise a rebuttable presumption of correctness. Furthermore, as the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is not applicable in Quetta, an oral sale of property is valid, and the appellants' evidence successfully shifted the burden of proof to the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in the revenue record raise a rebuttable presumption of correctness under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967?
  • Are the provisions of the Registration Act 1908 attracted to an oral sale of immovable property where no written instrument exists?
  • Can a valid sale of immovable property be effected in Quetta without complying with Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  Read full judgment →
• Hassan Masood vs S.M. Ahsan1987 SCMR 655 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-16
  tentative rent orderstriking off defencewilful defaultejectment applicationlandlord and tenantrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal by the Sind High Court, which had upheld an order setting aside the striking off of a tenant's defence in an ejectment application. The core legal question was whether the tenant had committed wilful default in depositing rent under a tentative rent order passed by the Rent Controller under Section 13(6) of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Rent Controller had struck off the defence due to alleged non-compliance with the deposit schedule. The Supreme Court held that the initial tentative rent order was vague regarding the specific period of arrears and the commencement of future rent, which caused confusion for the tenant. Consequently, the Court found no wilful default and upheld the appellate courts' decisions to restore the defence. The key principle laid down is that a tentative rent order under the rent laws must be precise and unambiguous regarding the period of arrears and future rent obligations; it should not require parties to rely on extraneous calculations, as such orders carry serious consequences for the tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Does a vague tentative rent order under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 justify striking off a tenant's defence?
  • Is a tenant liable for wilful default if they are misled by an ambiguous tentative rent order regarding the payment schedule?
  • Should a tentative rent order for the deposit of rent be self-contained and specific regarding the period of arrears and future rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Hassan Din And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 1078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-07
  leave to appealmurderappreciation of evidenceblood-stained weapon recoverycriminal trialmedical evidence contradiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their appeal and maintaining their conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life for the murder of the deceased. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners and their co-accused attacked the deceased, with the petitioners inflicting hatchet blows. The trial court had acquitted four co-accused but convicted the petitioners based on ocular testimony corroborated by the recovery of blood-stained hatchets. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the medical evidence revealed no sharp-edged injuries on the deceased, that the prosecution never claimed the hatchets were used from the blunt side, and that the recovery evidence was erroneously relied upon while co-accused were acquitted. The Supreme Court held that the matter required further consideration regarding the proper appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, and consequently granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of blood-stained hatchets can corroborate ocular testimony when the medical evidence reveals no sharp-edged injuries on the deceased?
  • Whether the conviction of petitioners can be sustained based on weapon recovery when co-accused with similar allegations have been acquitted?
  • Whether the well-recognized principles of appreciation of evidence in criminal cases were properly followed by the courts below?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamal And 3 Others vs The State1987 SCMR 1082 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-05
  leave to appealappreciation of evidenceunexplained injuriescriminal convictionself-defenseburden of proofmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the convictions of the petitioners for murder and related offenses. The core legal question concerns whether the lower courts properly appreciated the evidence, particularly in light of the prosecution's failure to explain serious injuries sustained by one of the accused, Imam Bakhsh, during the occurrence. The defense contended that these injuries supported their version of events, which the lower courts allegedly failed to properly consider. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions regarding the unexplained injuries on the accused and the potential validity of the defense version required further judicial scrutiny. The key principle laid down is that the prosecution's failure to explain injuries on the person of an accused in a criminal case necessitates a rigorous re-evaluation of the evidence to ensure that the established principles of criminal evidence appreciation, particularly regarding the burden of proof and the credibility of the prosecution's narrative, were correctly applied by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prosecution's failure to explain injuries on the person of an accused necessitate a re-evaluation of the evidence?
  • Must a court consider the defense version of events when the prosecution fails to explain injuries sustained by the accused?
  • Are the established principles of appreciation of evidence in criminal cases satisfied when unexplained injuries on an accused are ignored by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Qureshi And Others vs Muhammad Manzoor And Other1987 SCMR 1722 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-06
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertycondonation of delayconstitutional petitionlocus standiurban immovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the constitutional petition filed by the appellants regarding the transfer of an evacuee property. The core legal questions involved the determination of when the property actually became available for disposal and whether the delay in submitting transfer application forms could be condoned under the relevant scheme. The Supreme Court held that the property only became available for disposal after it was partitioned by metes and bounds on 10-1-1978, separating the non-evacuee shares, and that the applications submitted by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 were well within the extended target date of 31-12-1978 pursuant to the Government Press Note. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellants had no locus standi to restrain respondents from submitting their forms as no legal rights were infringed thereby. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • When does an evacuee property with mixed non-evacuee shares become legally available for disposal under the settlement laws?
  • Whether the target date for filing applications under the Management and Disposal of Available Urban Immovable Property Scheme was extendable by a government press note?
  • Does a rival applicant have the locus standi to challenge the mere submission of transfer forms by another party?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Muhammad Nabi Khan And 2 Others vs Warasatullah Through Legal Representatives1987 SCMR 1698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-08
  Permanent Transfer Deedcompensation poolsuo motu revisionres judicatasettlement of claimsdisplaced personswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The respondent claimed entitlement to the 'Amrat Dhara Pharmacy' premises, which the Settlement Department contended was never sold, arguing that only machinery was transferred. Following the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD), the Settlement Commissioner sought to re-examine the transaction via suo motu revision. The High Court initially ruled that the Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to re-examine the entitlement once the property left the compensation pool, suggesting a civil suit was the proper remedy. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in ignoring the finality of an earlier judgment (Writ Petition No. 260-R of 1966), which had been upheld by the Supreme Court, and which explicitly permitted the Settlement Commissioner to examine the respondent's entitlement to determine if the PTD was erroneously issued. The Court ruled that the earlier judgment operated as a bar to the subsequent relief granted by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court judgment that has been upheld by the Supreme Court operates as a bar to subsequent writ petitions seeking the same relief?
  • Can the Settlement Commissioner re-examine the entitlement of a transferee after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Does the appellate court have the power to extend relief to a non-appealing party under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Jamil Ahmed vs Jalal Masih And Another1987 SCMR 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-07
  settlement operationsproperty transferScheme No. VIIIDeputy Settlement Commissionerclaim formconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of property in Lunda Bazar, Lahore. The core dispute concerned whether a specific residential unit, occupied by the respondent, had been previously transferred to the petitioner during settlement operations. The petitioner contended that the unit was part of the property already transferred to him, while the respondent argued it remained available for transfer under Scheme No. VIII. Upon reviewing the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order and the associated claim forms, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner had only been granted unit No. 5, while unit No. 4, occupied by the respondent, had been designated for auction and not transferred to the petitioner. Consequently, the Court held that the subsequent transfer of unit No. 4 to the respondent was lawful. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that property transfer orders must be strictly construed based on the specific units allocated in the original settlement proceedings, and a claimant cannot assert rights over property not explicitly granted in their transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claimant successfully challenge the transfer of a property unit to another party if the claimant's own transfer order explicitly excluded that specific unit?
  • Does the mere occupation of a property unit by a claimant during settlement operations automatically entitle them to its transfer if the official order allocated only a different unit?
  • Is a transfer of property under Scheme No. VIII valid if the unit in question was previously designated for auction rather than transferred to another claimant?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Gulsher Muhammad vs Muhammad Ismail1987 SCMR 1614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-14
  leave to appealevictionbona fide personal useconcurrent findings of factrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the Rent Controller's eviction order on the ground of personal bona fide requirement of the respondent-landlord. The core legal question concerns the propriety of interfering with concurrent findings of fact rendered by the lower forums regarding the landlord's personal need. The Supreme Court held that since the High Court re-appraised the case and confirmed the findings of fact based on a correct appreciation of evidence, there is no scope for interference by the apex court. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that concurrent findings of fact rooted in evidence regarding personal bona fide use will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding personal bona fide use?
  • Can a tenant challenge an eviction order based on personal requirement when the findings are rooted in evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Ghulam Rasul vs Karam Hussain Shah And Other1987 SCMR 1618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-07
  land settlementGhair Mumkin houseres judicataallotment of landmukhbari applicationremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that remanded a land dispute case to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for re-examination. The core legal question was whether a specific plot of land (Khasra No. 737/257) was classified as 'Ghair Mumkin house' and thus ineligible for transfer under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958. The appellant argued that the matter had already been settled in previous litigation. The Supreme Court held that the lower Settlement authorities had misdirected themselves by conflating the current dispute with prior judicial proceedings involving a different plot of land (Khasra No. 736/257). The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that because the specific status of the disputed land had never been adjudicated upon, the order of remand was fully justified. The principle laid down is that settlement authorities cannot dismiss a claim based on res judicata when the subject matter of the previous litigation is distinct from the current dispute, particularly when a specific statutory prohibition regarding the nature of the land remains unexamined.

  Questions settled

  • Can settlement authorities dismiss a claim based on previous litigation if the subject matter of the current dispute involves a different plot of land?
  • Is a remand order justified when settlement authorities fail to examine the specific status of land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ulas vs Maulvi Muhammad Raza1987 SCMR 1830 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-12
  ejectmentrent defaultburden of proofleave to appeallandlord-tenant disputebona fide requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller. The petitioner-landlord had sought the respondent-tenant's ejectment on grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide requirement. While the Rent Controller ruled in favor of the petitioner on both issues, the High Court reversed this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the High Court's finding regarding rent default, arguing that the respondent failed to substantiate his defense that rent had been paid or tendered. The petitioner contended that he had successfully discharged the burden of proof regarding the default, whereas the respondent provided no evidence to support his claims of having sent rent via money order or deposited it in court. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner's contention regarding the respondent's failure to discharge the onus of proof required further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court erred in overturning the Rent Controller's findings on default.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's failure to produce evidence of rent payment or deposit, after a landlord has established a prima facie case of default, constitute a failure to discharge the burden of proof?
  • Can a High Court set aside a Rent Controller's finding on default without addressing the tenant's failure to substantiate their defense?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Shaikh Muhammad Aboobakr Ratra vs Jamal Mushariff And 3 Other1987 SCMR 1588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-23
  review petitionbona fide requirementrented premisesevictionunchallenged evidenceacademic exercise
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a Supreme Court judgment that dismissed an appeal regarding an eviction order. The petitioner challenged an order directing him to vacate premises, which the Rent Controller had granted upon finding that the respondent-landlords bona fide required the property for personal use. Although the Supreme Court initially granted leave to appeal to determine whether a landlord residing in a rented house is, by itself, sufficient proof of a bona fide requirement under the relevant rent legislation, the appeal was ultimately dismissed on its merits. The Court observed that the petitioner had failed to challenge the evidence presented by the respondents regarding their need for the premises. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court correctly upheld the Rent Controller's order. In the present review petition, the Court reaffirmed that because the appeal was decided on its specific merits due to the unchallenged evidence, the legal question for which leave was granted became redundant. The Court reiterated its practice of avoiding academic exercises and dismissed the review petition, finding no merit in the arguments presented.

  Questions settled

  • Is a landlord's residence in a rented house, by itself, sufficient to prove a bona fide requirement for personal occupation under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Should the Supreme Court decide a question of law if the case can be resolved on its merits without doing so?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Shafi Muhammad vs Mst. Shah Bibi And Another1987 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-04
  sale-deed registrationpart performanceDastoorul Amal Diwanitransfer of propertyIslamic Shariacivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan which allowed a second appeal and dismissed the appellant's suit for declaration and possession regarding agricultural land. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether under the Dastoorul Amal Diwani applicable in the former Kalat State, the rule of decision was Shariat which did not require registration of a sale-deed, and whether the High Court erred in denying the appellant the benefit of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court held that the Registration Act, 1908, was duly extended to Kalat by Ordinance XXI of 1960, rendering registration imperative for conveying title, and that the Council of Islamic Ideology had found the Registration Act not repugnant to Islamic injunctions. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellant could not claim the benefit of part performance under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act as he did not enter into or hold possession in part performance of the contract. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether under the provisions of Dastoorul Amal Diwani applicable in the former Kalat State the rule of decision in the Court of the Kazi was Shariat which did not require registration of the sale-deed?
  • Whether the High Court was in error in denying to the appellant the benefit of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act?
  • Whether the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908, are repugnant to the injunctions of the Qur'an and Sunnah?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Rajab Ali vs Superintendent, District Jail, Quetta And Another1987 SCMR 1746(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-08
  infructuous petitionwithdrawal of petitionjudicial economypractice and procedureSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition filed by Haji Rajab Ali against the Superintendent of the District Jail, Quetta, and another respondent. The core legal question involved the merits of the petition as originally presented to the Court. However, during the proceedings, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Tahir Muhammad Khan, informed the Court that the petition had been rendered infructuous due to subsequent developments or changes in circumstances. Consequently, the counsel did not press the petition further. In light of this submission, the Supreme Court held that the petition could not be adjudicated upon its merits as it no longer presented a live controversy. The Court accordingly dismissed the petition as withdrawn. This decision reinforces the principle that courts will not entertain or proceed with petitions that have become infructuous, allowing parties to withdraw such matters when the underlying grievance or legal necessity for the petition has ceased to exist, thereby conserving judicial time and resources.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition be dismissed if it has been rendered infructuous by subsequent events?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to withdraw a petition that is no longer pressed by counsel?
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• Haji Muhammad Iqbal vs Muhammad Abbas And Other1987 SCMR 1983 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-26
  election petitionrecount of votestampering of election recordcompromise agreementmutual mistake of factremandElection Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose out of an election dispute concerning the Municipal Corporation, Gujranwala. The petitioner and the returned candidate originally entered into a compromise before the Election Tribunal agreeing to resolve the dispute solely through a recount of votes. However, upon summoning the election packets, the Tribunal observed that the seals of envelopes containing ballot papers were broken, opened, and torn, indicating deliberate tampering. Notwithstanding objections raised by the returned candidate regarding the tampered record, the Election Tribunal enforced the compromise and declared the petitioner elected. On writ, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the case for adjudication in accordance with law, holding that the agreement was founded upon a mutual mistake of fact regarding the integrity of the official records. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment and refused leave to appeal, ruling that judicial and quasi-judicial determinations must rely on materials beyond suspicion. When election records are tampered with, a compromise based on the presumption of their authenticity cannot be strictly enforced.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Election Tribunal can enforce a compromise for a recount when the election records are discovered to be deliberately tampered with?
  • Does a compromise based on the presumed regularity of official election records become unenforceable upon discovery of mutual mistake of fact regarding record tampering?
  • Whether judicial or quasi-judicial adjudications can validly proceed upon evidentiary material whose authenticity and integrity are fundamentally compromised?
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• Haji Muhammad Akram And Another vs Syed Jalil Ahmad And Other1987 SCMR 1462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-23
  ex parte decreeservice of summonsspecific performancesetting aside ex parte decreecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 8-3-1986, which had set aside an ex parte decree. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the respondents were duly served with summonses in the suit for specific performance and whether their application for setting aside the ex parte decree was valid. The Supreme Court held that the decision of the High Court does not require any interference, noting that once the trial Court itself concluded that the respondents did not reside at the place where summonses were served, it was wrong to hold that they were properly served. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs. The key principle laid down is that proper service of summons is a prerequisite for an ex parte decree, and service at an incorrect address where the defendant does not reside does not constitute valid service.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ex parte decree be sustained when the defendant was not properly served at their actual place of residence?
  • Whether service of summons at an address where the defendant does not reside constitutes valid service under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Haji Hafiz Rashid Ahmad vs The State1987 SCMR 844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-02
  leave to appealmurderdeath sentencebenefit of the doubtdefence versioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dated 23-11-1986, whereby his conviction for the murder of his wife and the sentence of death passed by the trial court were upheld and confirmed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner's defence version, when placed alongside the prosecution case, created a reasonable possibility of being true, thereby entitling him to the benefit of the doubt and acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the evidence on record did not warrant interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, finding no merit in the contention that the defence version was ignored or misconstrued. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of guilt based on proper appreciation of evidence will not be disturbed by the apex court where the defence plea fails to create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of guilt in a murder trial?
  • Does a defence version presented by an accused automatically entitle him to the benefit of the doubt?
  • When will leave to appeal against a death sentence confirmed by the High Court be refused?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Babu Muhammad Rafique And Others vs Government of Baluchistan And Other1987 SCMR 1861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-21
  cooperative bankgovernment directiveadministrative powerconstitution petitionjurisdictionoffice shifting
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave was directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had dismissed a Constitution Petition filed by the appellants. The appellants, members of the Board of Directors of the Baluchistan Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd., challenged a directive issued by a Section Officer on behalf of the Secretary to the Government of Baluchistan, Agriculture and Co-operative Department, instructing the bank to shift its office from Jinnah Road to a newly constructed building at Rani Bagh. The core legal question was whether the Secretary to the Government of Baluchistan possessed the legal authority or power to direct the management of the Co-operative Bank to shift its office premises. During the Supreme Court proceedings, the counsel for the respondent conceded that the impugned letter did not constitute a command or binding order issued by the respondent to the bank. Consequently, the Supreme Court modified the High Court's judgment to reflect that the letter was not an order, satisfying the appellants and resolving the dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a government department has the legal authority to direct a provincial co-operative bank to shift its office premises?
  • Whether a letter from a Section Officer conveying a desire of a Secretary constitutes a binding administrative command or order?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Through His Legal Heirs And Other vs Khuda Yar Through His Legal1987 PLD Supreme Court 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-20
  abatement of appealpartial abatementlegal representativesOrder XXII CPCrevenue record entrieslimitation for declaration suitco-sharers possessioninconsistent decrees
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a Lahore High Court decision affirming a decree declaring the respondents entitled to a two-thirds share in agricultural land and holding that the appellants' second appeal had abated as a whole due to the non-impleadment of the legal representatives of one deceased appellant (Haji). The Supreme Court examined whether the abatement of an appeal qua a single deceased co-appellant causes the entire appeal to abate under Order XXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Reversing the High Court on this procedural point, the Supreme Court held that where the rights of co-appellants are divisible or relate to distinct, ascertainable shares in immovable property, the abatement of the appeal as to one deceased appellant does not render the entire appeal improperly constituted or result in impermissibly inconsistent decrees. The Court also affirmed that an erroneous mutation in revenue records does not confer title or trigger limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908 where co-sharers remain in continuous possession. The appeal was dismissed on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to implead the legal representatives of one deceased co-appellant cause the entire appeal to abate if the rights of the co-appellants relate to divisible shares?
  • Can a court pass inconsistent decrees in respect of different parties to the same suit relating to immovable property?
  • Does an erroneous entry in a revenue mutation start the running of limitation against a co-sharer who remains in continuous possession of the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdur Rahim vs District Judge, Lahore And Another1987 SCMR 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-31
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentdishonoured chequewrit jurisdictionleave to appealquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which declined to interfere with the order of the District Judge setting aside an order of ejectment. The petitioner, owner of a house, had filed an ejectment application against respondent No.2 on the ground of default in rent payment before the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller allowed the application, but the District Judge dismissed it on appeal, a view upheld by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The core legal question concerned whether respondent No.2 was a legal defaulter in rent payment given the circumstances of the dishonoured cheque and the timing of the eviction application. The Supreme Court held that the District Judge's finding was essentially on a question of fact not suffering from any legal infirmity, and accordingly dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact determined by lower appellate courts, when based on an appraisal of evidence, will not ordinarily be interfered with in constitutional or appellate jurisdiction unless shown to be suffering from a legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can be considered a defaulter in rent payment when an eviction application is filed within sixty days of the rent becoming due?
  • Does a cheque dishonoured solely due to a notation written by the tenant constitute a default in the absence of insufficient funds?
  • Can findings of fact rendered by a District Judge in rent matters be interfered with under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdullah vs Haji Dost Muhammad And 3 Other1987 SCMR 1825 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-12
  proper partynecessary partyimpleadment of partymultiplicity of proceedingscivil proceduredeclaration and permanent injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the High Court dismissing the petitioner's revision petition, which had challenged the trial court's order allowing the first respondent's application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to be impleaded as a party in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The core legal question was whether the first respondent qualified as a necessary or proper party to be joined in the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that although the first respondent was not a necessary party, he was a proper party for the effective determination of the matters in controversy and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, given his categorical claim to the suit property and the admissions made in the plaint. The Court laid down the principle that a person laying a bona fide claim to the subject matter of a suit can be joined as a proper party to ensure complete and effective adjudication and prevent multiple legal actions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person laying a claim to the suit property can be impleaded as a proper party under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is an intervenor who is not a necessary party still entitled to be joined as a proper party for the effective determination of the suit?
  • Does the inclusion of a proper party help in avoiding the multiplicity of proceedings in a civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Ghafoor Rishi vs Raza Muhammad Khan1987 SCMR 1826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-14
  ejectmentpersonal bona fide requirementadditional groundleave to appeallandlord and tenantpleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a landlord, filed an ejectment application against the respondent tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, based on personal bona fide requirement, which was allowed by the Rent Controller. During the appeal before the High Court, the respondent sought to raise an additional ground under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, asserting that the landlord had obtained possession of another portion of the building and thus no longer required the disputed premises. The core legal question concerned whether a new plea regarding subsequent acquisition of premises could be raised for the first time in appeal without affording the landlord an opportunity to rebut it in the pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the contention required examination and granted leave to appeal to consider whether the landlord was seriously prejudiced by the admission of such a plea without a proper foundation in the written statement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant raise a new plea of subsequent acquisition of premises for the first time in appeal without pleading it in the written statement?
  • Does the acquisition of another portion of the building by the landlord during the pendency of proceedings extinguish the need for the disputed premises?
  • Is a landlord prejudiced when an appellate court allows an additional ground regarding alternative accommodation without giving an opportunity to rebut?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Syed Akhtar Hussain And Others vs Usman Khan And Other1987 SCMR 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-11
  limitationcondonation of delaypetition for leave to appealcertified copysufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against an order of the High Court in a writ petition. The primary issue centers around whether sufficient cause was made out for condoning a delay of 37 days in filing the petition for leave to appeal. The appellants initially obtained a copy of the judgment for 'private use' after a delayed announcement of the decision, and subsequently applied for another copy for Supreme Court use, resulting in the time bar. The Supreme Court held that the delay was not sufficiently explained, as the appellants failed to act with due diligence after receiving the first copy within the period of limitation, or alternatively, to file the petition with the available copy seeking relaxation of rules. Consequently, the Court upheld the respondents' preliminary objection regarding limitation, setting aside the earlier conditional condonation of delay, and dismissed the appeal as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal can be condoned when the appellant fails to act with due diligence upon receiving a copy of the judgment?
  • Can a respondent challenge an order condoning delay that was passed without hearing them?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when filed beyond the period of limitation without establishing sufficient cause?
  Read full judgment →
• Hadayat Khan vs Muhammad Nawaz And Another1987 SCMR 1417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-26
  acquittalpetition for leave to appealself-defenceunexplained injuriesmurderinterested witnessescriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the acquittal of the respondents by the Lahore High Court for the murder of the petitioner's son under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question involves the propriety of an acquittal where the prosecution failed to explain injuries sustained by the accused and where eye-witnesses were found to be interested and inimical. The Supreme Court held that the courts below correctly appraised the evidence, noting that the multiple injuries on the accused suggested the complainant party was the aggressor and that the fatal injury may have been inflicted in the exercise of the right of self-defence. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of acquittal based on a plausible appraisal of evidence, including unexplained injuries on the accused and an established right of self-defence, will not be interfered with by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of an accused can be maintained when the prosecution fails to explain injuries sustained by the accused during the occurrence?
  • Does the presence of multiple injuries on the person of the accused indicate that the complainant party was the aggressor?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding acquittal based on the appraisal of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Khan vs Mst. Hafiza Bibi And Other1987 SCMR 1149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-26
  civil litigationoral saleconcurrent findingsrevisional jurisdictionburden of proofspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order in a civil dispute concerning the ownership and possession of a three-marla plot of land in village Tatliali, District Gujranwala. The petitioner claimed to have purchased the land through an oral transaction from the respondents' predecessor-in-interest and asserted subsequent construction of a shop. Both the trial court and the District Judge concurrently found that the petitioner failed to establish the alleged sale or prove possession of the disputed property. The High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction, declined to interfere with these factual findings, noting they were based on a sound appreciation of the evidence. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the District Judge failed to record findings on all framed issues. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner failed to establish the foundational claim of ownership via the alleged sale, the omission to record findings on all issues did not warrant interference. The petition was dismissed, affirming that concurrent factual findings supported by evidence remain undisturbed in the absence of legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a lower appellate court to record findings on all framed issues necessarily warrant interference by the Supreme Court when the primary claim of ownership has failed?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding an alleged oral sale when those findings are based on the appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• H.M. Moinuddin Ansari vs Government of Pakistan1987 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-31
  pensionary benefitsrevised pension rulesleave preparatory to retirementoption periodrailway employeeconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition regarding entitlement to pensionary benefits. The core legal question was whether the appellant, a retired Railway Guard who had proceeded on leave preparatory to retirement before the promulgation of the Revised Pension Rules, was legally required to be individually notified of the new rules, and whether mere publication in the official gazette constituted sufficient notice. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant was on leave preparatory to retirement and subsequently retired during the currency of the option period, and in light of provisions extending time for those on leave, the penal consequences of failing to opt within the time limit could not be applied without proper individual notice or communication. The ratio is that remedial rules conferring benefits on employees must be construed benevolently, and where an employee is on leave preparatory to retirement, mere gazette publication is insufficient notice, requiring the administration to properly inform and invite options.

  Questions settled

  • Whether publication of the Revised Pension Rules in the official gazette constitutes sufficient notice to an employee who has already proceeded on leave preparatory to retirement?
  • Can an employee who is on leave preparatory to retirement during the currency of the option period be penalized for failing to exercise the option under the Revised Pension Rules without being individually notified?
  • Do the rules governing the exercise of option for pensionary benefits contemplate an extension of time or exception for government servants who are on leave on the relevant date?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Muhammad And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 1227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-06
  criminal appealmurderunlawful assemblyriotingpolice encounterright of private defenceidentification evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal by seven convicts against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed their appeals with modifications regarding their conviction and sentences for murder, rioting, and related offences. The appellants, former tenants who had re-occupied land and houses from which they were previously ejected, resisted a police party led by local officials attempting to encircle and evict them, resulting in a clash during which a police constable was killed by a firearm injury and several others sustained simple injuries. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had reliably established individual criminal liability and participation of the appellants in the capital charge under the prevailing circumstances of cross-firing, lack of the original FIR report on record, and aggressive police action involving encirclement and tear-gas. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions and sentences, holding that the prosecution evidence was fraught with contradictions regarding the primary aggressors and identification, making it unsafe to maintain convictions on capital charges arising from such an operation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder and rioting can be sustained when the initial police report justifying the operation is not brought on record?
  • Can members of an alleged unlawful assembly be safely convicted on capital charges in a situation of general stone-pelting and conflicting accounts of police encirclement?
  • Whether individual criminal liability can be fastened on specific accused persons where the prosecution evidence suffers from material contradictions regarding the identity of assailants?
  Read full judgment →
• Governor, N. W.F.P. And Another vs Gul Naras Khan1987 SCMR 1709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  corporation servicereversion of servicecontrolling authoritytransfer of servicestatutory interpretationnon-obstante clauseboard of intermediate and secondary education
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of an appeal and two petitions for special leave to appeal arising from a Peshawar High Court judgment concerning the reversion and transfer of employees of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Peshawar. The core legal questions involved whether employees of the Board were 'persons in Corporation service' under Ordinance VIII of 1978, enabling the Governor to revert them, and whether the Governor was competent to transfer an employee to an outside department under section 13(6) of Ordinance XIX of 1961. The Supreme Court held that the Board is an institution controlled by and set up under a statutory direction of the Government, bringing its employees within the definition of Corporation service, and that the Governor validly exercised powers of reversion. Furthermore, the Court held that the non-obstante clause in section 13(6) of Ordinance XIX of 1961 clearly intended the provision to apply to existing employees, rendering the Governor competent to transfer the employee to the Directorate of Education. The petitions of the employees were dismissed, and the appeal of the Governor was accepted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education qualify as persons in Corporation service under Ordinance VIII of 1978?
  • Does the Governor possess the authority to revert employees of the Board appointed or promoted between 1-1-1972 and 5-7-1977?
  • Whether the Controlling Authority is competent to place the services of a Board employee at the disposal of the Government or an outside institution under section 13(6) of Ordinance XIX of 1961?
  • Does the non-obstante clause in section 13(6) of Ordinance XIX of 1961 make the provision applicable to persons who were already in the service of the Board prior to its enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab vs Rao Shamsher Ali Khan And Other1987 SCMR 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-29
  out-of-turn promotionaccelerated promotionsenioritycivil servantscomparative meritservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  Six petitions for leave to appeal were filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan against a consolidated judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had allowed appeals regarding the re-fixation of seniority. The respondents had been granted out-of-turn accelerated promotions to Grade-18 in the Executive Branch of the Punjab Province for exceptional service, without considering the comparative merits of others similarly placed. A provisional seniority list later relegated them until their batch-mates became ripe for promotion. The Service Tribunal upheld the respondents' claim that their accelerated promotions entitled them to reckon seniority from the date of promotion. The core legal question is whether out-of-turn promotion granted to an individual in isolation, without comparing merit with others similarly placed, violates the Punjab Civil Servants Act and relevant rules. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the question of law raised is of public importance requiring an authoritative pronouncement, while declining the request to suspend the impugned order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an out-of-turn accelerated promotion granted to a civil servant in isolation violates the statutory provisions governing promotion?
  • Can a civil servant claim seniority from the date of an out-of-turn promotion made without considering the comparative merit of others similarly placed?
  • Does the Punjab Civil Servants Act permit making an individual a class by himself for the purpose of promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab, Lahore vs Dr. Khalid Hussain Gill And Other1987 SCMR 1436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-26
  Special Research Allowancefield officersservice tribunalbasic pay scalesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Punjab against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the respondents, who were recruited to work in research institutions and laboratories under the Agricultural Department, qualified as "field officers" entitled to a Special Research Allowance under paragraph 20 of a Basic Pay Scales scheme sanctioned on 25-8-1983. The Service Tribunal had accepted the respondents' appeals, holding that visiting fields to collect data and conduct tests made them field officers. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised by the Government regarding the proper interpretation and intended scope of the expression "field officer" required examination. The Court granted leave and ordered that the interim order remain in force pending the hearing of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether research workers employed in research institutions and laboratories can be classified as field officers for the purpose of receiving a Special Research Allowance?
  • Does the expression 'field officer' under a government pay scheme encompass civil servants whose primary employment is in research laboratories even if they occasionally visit fields to collect data?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab And Others vs Sh. Akbar Hussain And. Other1987 SCMR 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-18
  dissolution of corporationPunjab Road Transport Boardexecutive fiatintra-court appealsurplus poolleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed Intra-Court Appeals and set aside the dismissal of respondents' writ petitions. The Punjab Road Transport Board, established under the Punjab Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, was dissolved by a notification issued by the Governor of the Punjab, vesting its assets in the Government and placing employees in a surplus pool. The High Court declared the notification and consequential retirement and termination orders illegal. Upon petitions for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court granted leave to examine core legal questions regarding whether the power to establish a corporate body under section 70 of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 includes the power to dissolve it, whether an executive fiat used to establish a corporation can be used to end it, and whether such a corporate institution ceases to exist when its members are gone. The Court ordered that the interim stay already granted shall continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 70 of Punjab Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, which enables the Government to establish a Road Transport (Corporate Body) confers similar power on the Government to dissolve or abolish the Board?
  • Whether the High Court has correctly decided that once the Government establishes a corporate institution through its executive fiat under an enabling provision of the statute, it cannot bring the corporation to an end in the like manner through another executive fiat?
  • Whether a Board of the type contemplated by section 70 would, like a corporate aggregate, come to an end when the members constituting the Board are no longer in existence?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan vs Shahi Bottlers Ltd.1987 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-28
  central excise dutyraw material accountstheoretical yieldbeverage bottlingdiscretionary assessmentexcise rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Pakistan against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside orders demanding additional excise duty and imposing a penalty on the respondent company, Shahi Bottlers Limited, a bottler of Coca Cola beverages. The core legal question was whether the authorities could invoke Rule 226(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, to assess and demand duty based on theoretical raw material consumption (concentrate) without establishing a violation of a specific rule requiring the maintenance of accounts for that particular raw material. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the existence of a rule prescribing the maintenance of accounts for the specific raw material and a factual violation thereof are sine qua non for invoking Rule 226(2). The key principle laid down is that discretionary assessment of excise duty based on raw material utilisation cannot be made under Rule 226(2) unless the law or rules explicitly mandate the maintenance of accounts for that specific raw material and such rule has been violated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the invocation of Rule 226(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, requires a pre-existing rule prescribing the maintenance of accounts for the specific raw material?
  • Can excise duty be assessed on the basis of theoretical raw material consumption without proving a violation of the rule requiring account maintenance?
  • Is a manufacturer's self-maintained register for a raw material not specified by the Central Board of Revenue sufficient to invoke Rule 226(2)?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan vs Shahi Bottlers Limited.PTCL 1987 CL. 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-28
  excise dutytheoretical yieldraw material accountsstatutory interpretationCentral Excise Rulesdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the assessment of excise duty on a beverage manufacturer. The core legal question was whether the excise authorities could invoke Rule 226(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, to demand additional duty based on theoretical yield calculations derived from raw material consumption, specifically Coca Cola concentrate, when no rule mandated the maintenance of accounts for that specific raw material. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the petition. The Court held that the power to determine duty under Rule 226(2) is conditional upon the existence of a specific rule requiring the maintenance of accounts for the raw material in question and a finding that such a rule has been violated. Since it was conceded that only Crown Corks, and not the concentrate, were specified by the Central Board of Revenue as raw materials requiring account maintenance, the authorities lacked the legal basis to invoke the discretionary power under Rule 226(2) to demand additional duty based on the concentrate utilization.

  Questions settled

  • Can excise authorities invoke Rule 226(2) of the Central Excise Rules 1944 to demand duty based on raw material consumption if no rule mandates the maintenance of accounts for that specific raw material?
  • What are the mandatory pre-conditions for an officer to exercise the power to determine duty under Rule 226(2) of the Central Excise Rules 1944?
  • Is the discretionary power to demand duty under Rule 226(2) of the Central Excise Rules 1944 applicable to raw materials for which no account-keeping rule exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Establishment Division, Rawalpindi And Another vs Kh. Imtiaz Muhammad1987 SCMR 1384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-18
  civil servicesuspensioncompulsory retirementFederal Service Tribunalnew evidenceappellate jurisdictiondisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the respondent’s compulsory retirement but declared his prior suspension order illegal due to the Auditor-General’s lack of authority at the time. The Government sought to challenge this by producing an office order before the Supreme Court, which allegedly proved the Auditor-General had the necessary approval. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should consider this new evidence, which was not presented to the Tribunal, to overturn its factual findings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal is the exclusive authority for determining questions of fact. The Court emphasized that departmental authorities must present all relevant material before the Tribunal initially. Because the administration failed to do so and conceded the lack of authority during the original proceedings, they could not introduce a new case on appeal. Consequently, the Court refused to interfere with the Tribunal’s decision, establishing that the Supreme Court will not entertain evidence withheld from the lower forum to upset its findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court consider evidence not presented before the Service Tribunal to overturn its findings?
  • Is the Service Tribunal the exclusive authority for determining questions of fact in service matters?
  • Does the failure of departmental authorities to present relevant evidence before the Service Tribunal preclude them from raising it on appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan And Another vs Dada Amir Haider KhanPL D 1987 Supreme Court 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  administrative discretionpassport issuanceright to travelnatural justicejudicial reviewfundamental rightspublic power
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside the government’s refusal to issue a passport to the respondent. The core legal question concerned whether the executive possesses absolute, unbridled discretion to deny a passport or whether such administrative power is subject to constitutional and procedural constraints. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the refusal was unlawful because the authorities failed to provide reasons or grant the respondent an opportunity to be heard. The Court affirmed that while the Passport Act 1974 regulates international travel, the exercise of public power remains subject to judicial review. The key principle laid down is that administrative discretion, even regarding privileges like passports, cannot be exercised arbitrarily. Public functionaries must act fairly, reasonably, and in good faith. Consequently, an affected citizen has a right to be informed of the reasons for an adverse decision and to be heard, unless the state explicitly establishes that disclosure would imperil national security or public interest, in which case that specific sensitivity must be communicated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the government have absolute and arbitrary discretion to refuse the issuance of a passport to a citizen?
  • Is an administrative authority required to provide reasons when refusing to issue a passport?
  • Does a citizen have a right to be heard before an application for a passport is rejected?
  • Can the government refuse to disclose reasons for denying a passport on the grounds of public interest?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan And Another Federation of Pakistan vs Junejo1987 PLD Supreme Court 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-16
  civil servantreinstatementsenioritypromotionMartial Law Order No. 23Federal Service Tribunalnext below rule
  Summary & questions settled

  These five appeals by special leave challenged the orders of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had held that civil servants reinstated in service under Martial Law Order No. 23 were entitled to seniority in the next higher grade over officers who were junior to them at the time of retirement and were promoted while the reinstated officers were out of service. The core legal question was whether a reinstated civil servant is entitled to take seniority in the next higher grade from the date officers junior to him were promoted during his absence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that under section 8 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, seniority is not a vested right and takes effect from the date of regular appointment to a post in that grade, and that a legal fiction cannot override statutory principles and specific policy instructions. The key principle laid down is that reinstated civil servants under Martial Law Order No. 23 are governed by special Establishment Division instructions where promotion seniority runs strictly from the date of regular appointment, without automatic application of the 'next below rule' or back-dated seniority over juniors promoted during the period of absence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant reinstated in service under Martial Law Order No. 23 is entitled to seniority in the next higher grade over officers who were junior to him at the time of his retirement and were promoted while he was out of service?
  • Does section 8 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 confer a vested right to a particular seniority in a service, cadre, or grade?
  • Whether seniority in a grade to which a civil servant is promoted takes effect from the date of regular appointment to a post in that grade?
  • Are special instructions issued by the Government regarding the seniority of reinstated civil servants applicable over general principles of seniority?
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• Government of Baluchistan vs Shabir Ahmad1987 SCMR 1754(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-05
  service tribunalleave to appealconflicting decisionsjurisdictioninterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the interpretation of proviso (b) (ii) of Section 4 of the Baluchistan Service Tribunals Act 1974, specifically in the context of conflicting decisions rendered by the same Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerns the proper construction and application of the said statutory proviso regarding the jurisdiction or maintainability of appeals before the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the correctness of the interpretation, directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents, refused to stay the proceedings before the Tribunal, and vacated the prior interim order that had suspended the operation of the impugned High Court judgment. The Court established that leave is warranted to resolve conflicting interpretations of service tribunal provisions by the tribunal itself, ensuring consistent application of procedural and jurisdictional bars under the service tribunal law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to resolve conflicting decisions of the Service Tribunal regarding the interpretation of Section 4 of the Baluchistan Service Tribunals Act 1974?
  • Can proceedings before the Service Tribunal be stayed while an appeal regarding its jurisdictional interpretation is pending before the Supreme Court?
  • Under what circumstances should an interim order suspending the operation of a High Court judgment be vacated by the Supreme Court?
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• Government of Baluchistan vs Amir Jan And Other1987 SCMR 1827 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-21
  service lawabsorptionSecretariat Ministerial Serviceleave to appealadministrative reorganization
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the entitlement of the respondents to be absorbed into the Secretariat Ministerial Service with effect from July 1, 1970. The core legal question presented for consideration is whether the respondents were legally entitled to such absorption, specifically in light of the fact that they were not absorbed into the Secretariat at the time of the formation of the Province of Baluchistan. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, thereby allowing the petitions. The Court directed that the appeals be heard together on the same record, while granting the parties liberty to file additional documents if necessary. The judgment establishes the procedural path for determining the merits of the respondents' claims regarding their service status and absorption rights following the administrative reorganization of the province.

  Questions settled

  • Are respondents entitled to absorption in the Secretariat Ministerial Service with effect from July 1, 1970, if they were not absorbed at the time of the formation of the Province of Baluchistan?
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• H Umayun vs The State1987 SCMR 914 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-01
  ocular testimonycorroborationinterested witnessescriminal appealappreciation of evidencemotivemedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question concerns whether a conviction can be sustained based on motive and medical evidence when the primary ocular testimony has been rejected as unreliable and interested. The trial court and the High Court had disbelieved the prosecution's ocular account regarding the appellant's co-accused, leading to their acquittal, yet maintained the appellant's conviction by relying on the appellant's head injury and alleged motive as corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court held that the conviction could not be maintained. The Court established the principle that motive and medical evidence are merely supporting evidence and cannot serve as corroboration for ocular testimony that has already been deemed entirely unreliable. Furthermore, the Court found the medical evidence regarding the appellant's injury contradictory and the motive evidence insufficient to establish guilt. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, emphasizing that where ocular testimony is rejected as untrustworthy, supporting evidence lacks the necessary corroborative value to sustain a conviction on a serious charge.

  Questions settled

  • Can motive and medical evidence serve as corroboration when the primary ocular testimony has been rejected as unreliable?
  • Does the presence of a prior injury on an accused person necessarily corroborate their participation in a subsequent criminal occurrence?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution's ocular evidence is found to be untrustworthy and the remaining evidence is insufficient?
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• Ghulam Shabbir vs Fateh Shah1987 SCMR 1485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-20
  ejectmentbona fide requirementpersonal requirementlandlord and tenantrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment application filed by the appellant-landlord against the respondent-tenant under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, seeking eviction from a demised shop on the ground of personal bona fide requirement for establishing a chemist's shop. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, holding that the requirement was not proved in good faith, noting the lack of evidence regarding a licence or business expertise, and the failure to raise personal requirement in prior ejectment proceedings. The Sind High Court dismissed the subsequent appeal in limine. Upon leave being granted by the Supreme Court, the core legal question examined whether the appellant's bona fide requirement was duly proved, particularly considering his retirement from government service. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly evaluated the evidence and applied the relevant provisions of the 1959 Ordinance, and that omitting the ground of personal requirement in earlier litigation was a valid consideration for assessing bona fides. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to urge personal requirement in previous ejectment applications is a relevant consideration in determining the bona fides of a landlord's current ejectment application?
  • Whether retirement from government service alone establishes a bona fide personal requirement for a commercial premises under rent restriction laws?
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• Ghulam Sarwar vs Muhammad Hussain And Other1987 SCMR 1440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-02
  ex parte decreespecific performancefraudservice of summonscivil procedureres judicataleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute concerning an ex parte decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land. The petitioner initially failed to contest the suit, leading to an ex parte decree. Subsequently, the petitioner unsuccessfully sought to set aside this decree under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging lack of service and fraud. After these proceedings failed, the petitioner filed a fresh application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, reiterating claims of fraud and lack of service, while also denying the execution of the sale agreement. The trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court dismissed these applications. The Supreme Court upheld these decisions, holding that the petitioner's claim regarding non-service had already been adjudicated against him in the earlier proceedings. The Court clarified that Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is not intended to duplicate proceedings under Order IX, Rule 13, and that the petitioner could not raise issues he failed to contest in the original suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can proceedings under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be used to duplicate proceedings under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a party entitled to challenge an ex parte decree on grounds that were already adjudicated in previous proceedings?
  • Can a defendant challenge the validity of an agreement to sell in an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after failing to contest the original suit?
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• Ghulam Rasul Shah vs Water & Power Development Authority And Another1987 SCMR 1951 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-26
  service tribunaljurisdictionremoval from serviceWAPDA employeeservice record
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 29-5-1984, which dismissed the appellant's appeal against his removal from service under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958. The core legal question involved the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal to interfere with orders passed by WAPDA in respect of its employees in view of the ouster of jurisdiction under Section 17(1-C) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, a matter previously resolved by this Court in WAPDA v. Muhammad Arshad Qureshi (1986 SCMR 18). The Supreme Court held that the removal of the appellant from service was justified on merits, given that his service record was fraught with allegations and he had been charge-sheeted and punished on multiple occasions. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where an employee's service record justifies disciplinary action and removal under the applicable statutory provisions, and jurisdictional bars are established, the Service Tribunal's intervention is not warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to interfere with orders of WAPDA in respect of persons employed under it in view of section 17(1-C) of the WAPDA Act, 1958?
  • Is the removal of an employee under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 justified when the employee's service record is full of allegations and previous punishments?
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• Ghulam Rasool vs Member Board of Revenue And Other1987 SCMR 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-28
  consolidation proceedingscondonation of delaylimitation periodconstitutional jurisdictionrevenue authoritiesdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a Lahore High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition against revenue authorities' decisions in consolidation proceedings. The petitioner challenged an order by the Collector, but the appeal filed before the Additional Commissioner was time-barred by approximately two years. The petitioner sought condonation of delay citing illness, which the Additional Commissioner rejected as unsatisfactory. Consequently, both the appeal and a subsequent revision petition before the Board of Revenue were dismissed. The High Court declined to interfere with these concurrent findings, prompting the current petition. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with the revenue authorities' discretionary decision regarding the condonation of delay. The Supreme Court held that the Additional Commissioner acted within his competence in rejecting the explanation for the delay, and the Board of Revenue correctly upheld this decision. The Court affirmed that where revenue authorities exercise their discretion reasonably within their competence, the High Court is justified in declining to interfere, thereby upholding the finality of the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a discretionary order of revenue authorities regarding the condonation of delay in filing an appeal?
  • Is a decision by revenue authorities to reject an explanation for a two-year delay in filing an appeal within their legal competence?
  • Does the dismissal of a time-barred appeal by revenue authorities warrant interference under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
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• Ghulam Rasool And Others vs The State And Other1987 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-08
  criminal petitionspecial leave to appealmurderreappraisal of evidenceacquittalsentence reductiondeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two criminal petitions for special leave to appeal filed against a judgment of the High Court concerning a triple murder trial. The core legal questions involved the propriety of the convictions, sentences, and acquittals of the accused persons under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court considered whether to reappraise the evidence or interfere with the High Court's judgment which had acquitted one co-accused, reduced the death sentences of two convicts to imprisonment for life, and confirmed the death sentence of the third. The Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioners merely amounted to a request for a reappraisal of evidence on questions of fact and that the High Court was justified in its findings regarding the acquittals and sentence reductions. Consequently, both petitions for special leave to appeal were dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily reappraise evidence on questions of fact to reach a different conclusion where the lower courts have properly evaluated the case, and will not interfere with reasoned acquittals or sentence modifications by the High Court without compelling grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court reappraise evidence on questions of fact to interfere with concurrent findings of guilt?
  • Is the High Court justified in reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life based on the facts and circumstances of a case?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the acquittal of a co-accused?
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• Ghulam Rasool And Others vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab And Other1987 SCMR 1530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-30
  abatement of casesLaw Reforms Ordinanceretrospective effectprocedural lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition where the learned counsel submitted that the provisions of the Law Reforms Ordinance concerning the abatement of cases are procedural in nature and possess retrospective effect, thereby avoiding the abatement of the writ petition in the present case. It was noted that leave to appeal had previously been granted by the Supreme Court on this identical legal point in several earlier matters. The core legal question addressed is whether the provisions relating to abatement under the Law Reforms Ordinance apply retrospectively as procedural law. The Supreme Court held that leave to appeal is granted to examine this question, directing the matter to be heard along with a connected pending case upon furnishing security. The key principle recognized is that procedural amendments concerning abatement may have retrospective application, warranting a formal authoritative determination by the appellate court when raised.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of the Law Reforms Ordinance dealing with the abatement of cases of a procedural nature having retrospective effect?
  • Does a writ petition abate under the Law Reforms Ordinance when procedural amendments apply retrospectively?
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• Ghulam Qadir And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-20Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir And Others vs Allah Yar1987 SCMR 1427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-10
  abatement of appealindivisible salepre-emption suitlegal representativeslimitation periodjoint appellantscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed an appeal due to abatement. The core legal question was whether an appeal against a decree involving an indivisible sale transaction abates in its entirety if the legal representatives of one of the deceased joint appellants are not impleaded within the prescribed period of limitation. The High Court had determined that the sale in favour of the two joint purchasers, Pathana and Sohna, was indivisible, rendering the decree obtained by the respondent pre-emptor also indivisible. Consequently, the High Court held that the failure to bring the legal representatives of the deceased appellant on record within time resulted in the total abatement of the appeal. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, finding no infirmity in the High Court's reasoning. The principle laid down is that where a decree arises from an indivisible transaction, the failure to implead the legal representatives of a deceased party in an appeal results in the abatement of the entire appeal, as the decree cannot be set aside in part.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal against a decree involving an indivisible sale transaction abate in its entirety if the legal representatives of one of the deceased joint appellants are not impleaded within the limitation period?
  • Is a decree obtained in a pre-emption suit regarding an indivisible sale considered indivisible for the purposes of appeal abatement?
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• Ghulam Murtaza vs The State1987 SCMR 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-12
  leave to appealmurderrapelast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner Ghulam Murtaza sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing his appeal and confirming his death sentence for the rape and murder of a minor girl, Mst. Iqbal Bibi. The prosecution's case rested on circumstantial evidence, specifically the 'last seen' testimony of a witness and an alleged extra-judicial confession. While both the trial court and the High Court disbelieved the extra-judicial confession, they relied solely on the 'last seen' evidence to convict the petitioner. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction for a capital offense can be sustained solely on uncorroborated 'last seen' evidence when other major supporting evidence has been rejected. The Supreme Court held that the case required consideration as to whether proper principles of appreciation of evidence in criminal cases were followed, and consequently granted leave to appeal to examine the sufficiency of the 'last seen' evidence without corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained solely on the uncorroborated 'last seen' evidence?
  • Does the rejection of an extra-judicial confession require additional independent corroboration for 'last seen' evidence to form the basis of a capital conviction?
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